

The Augustinian Background of St. Anselm's Concept *Justitia*

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I

THE problem of the translation and interpretation of important philosophical and theological terms is not a new one. The grandson of Ben Sirach summed up the matter many centuries ago, when he explained, in the Prologue to *Ecclesiasticus*, that "the same things uttered in Hebrew, and translated into another language, have not the same force in them; and not only these things, but the law itself, and the prophets, and the rest of the books have no small difference, when they are spoken in their own language." He therefore begged his readers "to pardon us, wherein we may seem to come short of some words, which we have laboured to interpret."

The misgivings of Ben Sirach's grandson may well be shared by modern Christian theologians, for our theological vocabulary contains a host of Hebrew, Greek and Latin words, many of which possess, in their original contexts, a richness of meaning which cannot possibly be conveyed by the one-to-one matching of modern words with the originals. The difficulty is heightened when the only modern words available for translation already have significant non-theological associations, and meanings are imputed which were never intended by the original authors. A notorious case in point, which has received extensive (if not, indeed, excessive) attention in modern theology is that of *agapē* and *eros*, which has already been profitably discussed in the pages of this journal.¹

It is the object of this present paper to suggest that a serious problem exists in the translation and interpretation of *justitia*, one of the key words of Latin Patristic and Medieval theology, with particular reference to the theology of St. Anselm of Canterbury. The obvious English equivalent of this word is "justice." But in English usage, "justice" ordinarily bears the somewhat limited meaning of fair or equitable conduct towards one's fellow man, or else the still narrower meaning of the exercise of authority in judicial proceedings, in the context of positive law. Some modern interpreters of Latin philosophical and theological texts, who bring this narrow understanding of the term "justice" to their treatment of *justitia* in Latin authors, find that they must reject or apologize for what they regard as the illicit use of legalistic concepts. Other writers recognize that in Latin usage the term *justitia* bears a much broader meaning, and attempt to solve the problem by

1. A. S. Dewdney, "Agape and Eros: a critique of Nygren," Vol. I (1955), pp. 19ff.

translating it sometimes as "justice," sometimes as "righteousness." While this method has the definite advantage of treating the concept of *justitia* as more than a legalistic one, it also has defects. At worst, it makes the term *justitia* appear as completely equivocal; at best, it misses the essential relationship between theological, moral and legal concepts in Medieval theology and political theory, originally emphasized by the common use of this term in these several contexts.

II

The concept of *justitia* is clearly a central one in St. Anselm's theological system. Without a proper understanding of his use of this term one cannot begin to make sense of his important formulation of the theory of the Atonement (in the *Cur Deus homo*, and elsewhere), his extremely influential definition of Original Sin (in the *De conceptu virginali*), and his definition of Truth (in the *De veritate*); for *justitia* occurs as a key term in each of these discussions. While his use of the concept in each of these contexts is important, it is with reference to the theory of the Atonement that it has presented greatest difficulty to modern interpreters.

It has been the constant complaint of certain modern scholars that St. Anselm's treatment of the Atonement is "legalistic" or "juridical." The view promoted by Adolph Harnack in his famous *History of Dogma*, that the history of the doctrine of the Atonement in the West is a story of the progressive legalizing of religion under the influence of Roman legal theory and the penitential discipline of the Church, is characteristic of much modern thought on his subject.² St. Anselm, of course, with his strong emphasis on "justice," is readily represented as the culmination of this legalizing process. Hastings Rashdall was simply expressing in an extreme manner what is in fact the consensus of many scholars, when he wrote: "Anselm appeals to justice, and that in all good faith: but his notions of justice are the barbaric ideas of an ancient Lombard king or the technicalities of a Lombard lawyer rather than the ideas which would have satisfied such a man as Anselm in ordinary human life."³ Similarly, Bishop Aulén, in his very influential little book, *Christus Victor*, claims that St. Anselm's "whole conception of Atonement is juridical in its inmost essence. . . . The relation of man to God is treated by Anselm as essentially a legal relation for his whole effort is to prove that the atoning work is in accordance with justice."⁴ Both Harnack and Aulén (among others) trace the history of this "Latin doctrine of the Atonement" to the supposed transformation of Christian theology by the

2. For a summary of Harnack's view, see his *History of Dogma* (Eng. tr., London, 1897), III, pp. 310ff. It is not our intention to include a survey of modern interpretations of St. Anselm's doctrine. A useful listing of the most important of these is provided by George H. Williams, at the beginning of his recent article, "The Sacramental Presuppositions of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*," *Church History*, XXVI (1957), pp. 245-274, which itself represents a most significant re-interpretation of St. Anselm's theory as "penitential-eucharistic" in character.

3. *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology* (London, 1919), p. 355.

4. Gustaf Aulén, *Christus Victor: An Historical Study of Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement* (Eng. tr., London, 1931), pp. 106f.

importation of legal concepts, particularly by Tertullian and St. Cyprian; a transformation which was carried out more and more thoroughly under the influence of the penitential discipline of the Western Church. No one would claim that the doctrine of the Atonement and the development of penitential discipline were not significantly related, and therefore this kind of explanation, although it is not without difficulties, carries a certain measure of plausibility—particularly if one begins by agreeing with these authors that discussion of the Atonement in terms of *justitia*, and related ideas, is sheer legalism.

It is precisely at this point, however, that some serious questions must be raised. Does St. Anselm mean by *justitia* what we ordinarily mean by "justice" (and its equivalents in other modern languages)? If his concept is not primarily legal, nor even legalistic, but philosophical and theological, what suggestions can be made with respect to the historical background of his formulations? In answer to these questions, we shall attempt very briefly to describe St. Anselm's concept of *justitia*, and then to make some suggestions as to the background of his concept in the theological tradition of the Church.

III

St. Anselm defines *justitia* as a certain rightness, or a certain rectitude of will for its own sake; it is one with truth and rectitude of will.⁵ Justice is what God wills, and human justice, or rectitude of will, consists in the subjection of the rational creature in obedience to God's Will.⁶ Man was created in a state of justice (*justitia originalis*), and sin is the absence or privation of that justice, for which all men (one man in Adam) are responsible.⁷ The basis of sin is the free defection of the rational will; the carnal appetites, not in themselves unjust, become so only by the determination of the will.⁸ God, who is supreme justice, justly maintains His honour in the ordering of all things, and it is intolerable that man by disobedience should distort God's order of things, and thus rob the Creator of due honour, without making satisfaction.⁹ But sinful man is powerless to restore the order of justice, for "a sinner cannot justify a sinner":¹⁰ so God Himself, in His mercy, intervenes to satisfy His own order of *justitia*, in the work of the God-Man, who alone, true God and perfect man, taking sinless humanity from the Virgin, can offer satisfaction.¹¹ By their incorporation into Christ's sinless (i.e., just) humanity, the faithful receive the benefits of Christ's atoning sacrifice.¹²

5. Cf. *De veritate*, 12; 3; 4; *De casu diaboli*, 9 (F. S. Schmitt, ed., *S. Anselmi opera omnia*, I, 191ff.; I, 180f.; I, 246).

6. Cf. *Proslog.*, 11; *Medit. III*; *De concept. virg.*, 6; *Cur Deus homo*, I, 11 (Schmitt, I, 109; III, 87; II, 147; II, 68).

7. Cf. *De concept. virg.*, 2; 3; *De casu diaboli*, 16 (Schmitt, II, 141ff.; I, 259ff.).

8. Cf. *De concept. virg.*, 4; *De casu diaboli*, 14 (Schmitt, II, 144; I, 258).

9. Cf. *Cur Deus homo*, I, 13-15; I, 12 (Schmitt, II, 71ff.; 69).

10. *Ibid.*, I, 23 (Schmitt, II, 91).

11. Cf. *Ibid.*, II, 6-8, and the excellent discussion of this matter by E. R. Fairweather (ed.), *A Scholastic Miscellany* (Philadelphia, 1956), pp. 56ff. On the relation of justice to mercy, cf. *Proslog.*, 9-11, and Fairweather, *op. cit.*, p. 80, n. 36.

12. On the mode of this incorporation, particularly on the rôle of the Eucharist, see Williams, *art. cit.*, pp. 260ff.

Thus creation, sin and redemption are set by St. Anselm within the framework of God's *justitia*, His right ordering of all things, which prescribes man's place in the hierarchy of created beings, judges his defection, and effects his reconciliation.

In the light of this brief summary of evidence, it should be obvious that an interpretation of St. Anselm's concept of *justitia* in terms of legal justice, or even of moral righteousness, is quite inadequate. The essential content of the term for him (as, indeed, for other Patristic and Medieval authors) is rectitude of order, which has its source in God Himself, and embraces the whole order of creation, regulating the relations of man to God, of man to man, and mutual relations within the interior being of man. Thus, when he uses the term in theological or philosophical discussion, he is not borrowing a concept from the courts of law, for legal justice is only one aspect of *justitia*—God's justice as it is expressed in the organized maintenance of social order; nor is his concept limited to moral righteousness, for that too is only one aspect of *justitia*—the conformity of man's free actions to the all-embracing standard of God's justice. We must concede to the critics that he does sometimes use the language of positive law; but we must not allow these legal illustrations to obscure the more fundamental theological meaning of *justitia* as universal rectitude of order.

IV

When St. Anselm, in the eleventh century, used the term *justitia* to express that rectitude of order which is the Will of God, he was not coining a new word, nor was he imparting new meaning to an old word; in fact, he was not being original at all. The term, in this sense, had for many centuries occupied a prominent place in philosophical and theological discussion, and it is incomprehensible, to say the least, that St. Anselm's critics seem to have succeeded in either ignoring or obscuring this fact. To write the history of this concept, one would have to recount the greater part of the development of Greek philosophy and Roman legal theory, of Hebrew religion and St. Paul's theology, as well as a substantial portion of Patristic and Medieval theology. We shall undertake here very briefly to indicate only a few of the more significant features of the history of the concept in the philosophical, Biblical and Latin Patristic traditions.¹³

The Greek idea of justice (*dikē*) was initially a religious idea. The essential concept was that of the retribution which counters wrong-doing, either as an external deity, or as the reign of law or fate. In the Pre-Socratic philosophers, the concept is associated with the balance and equilibrium of the elements. All of these ideas are summed up in the philosophical elaboration of the concept of *dikaïosunē* (justice), particularly in the thought of Plato, who devoted one of his major works (the *Republic*) to this subject.

13. For fuller surveys, with extensive documentation, see G. del Vecchio, *Justice* (Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1952), cc. II-IV, and G. Quell and G. Schrenk, *Righteousness* (Eng. tr., from G. Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch*, London, 1951).

For him, justice is a virtue of right order or proportion, and is equivalent to *aretē*, or virtue in general. For Plato, for his disciple, Aristotle, and for the Greek tradition generally, justice is most fundamentally a virtue of balance and harmony in the relationships of man with man, and in the mutual relationships of the parts of the human soul. Chiefly through Cicero, this philosophical concept of justice found its way into Roman legal theory; but even in that context, the idea is clearly philosophical, referring to a principle underlying the order of nature, the eternal and immutable expression of the sovereignty of God.¹⁴ It is this concept of justice, and not a legalistic (in the modern sense) notion, which the Church Fathers, including Tertullian, derive from Roman sources.

For the Hebrews, the concept of the justice of God was central. God is the fountain of justice, and the source of the justice of law. He Himself, in His faithfulness, constitutes the norm of justice: "A just weight and balance are the Lord's." His justice is expressed in the ordering of creation, where God is the orderer of all things, weighing the hills in a balance and giving the water its limit; ordering all things by measure, number and weight.¹⁵ Human justice is considered to be a matter of right relationship to God, brought about primarily by obedience to God's justice as expressed in the Law. The just man is the man who walks with God.

When the seventy-two elders, as tradition has it, were assembled at Alexandria to translate the sacred books of the Hebrews into Greek, they were faced with precisely the problem stated by Ben Sirach's grandson. It is of no small importance that they chose the Greek term *dikē* (and its derivatives) to translate the usual Hebrew term for justice (*ḥedheq*, and its derivatives). For all who read these writings in Greek, the ideas associated with the Greek term would inevitably be blended with the Hebrew concept. Philo Judaeus, writing some centuries later from the same Alexandrian background, shows how effectively these ideas could be blended by a philosophically minded Jew. St. Paul, who was familiar with both the Hebrew and the Greek of the Scriptures, chose the same Greek word (*dikaiosunē*) to express the justice of God, a central idea in his theology, both as an attribute of God, and as a quality in man caused by God.

The earliest Latin translators of the Bible (and let us remember that the earliest versions were at least as early as Tertullian)¹⁶ did the obvious when they rendered *dikaiosunē* by the Latin *justitia*, which had long since been established as its equivalent in the philosophical vocabulary of Cicero and others. The Latin Church Fathers, who used the term generously, accepted the full implications of both Biblical and philosophical usage. The term had,

14. For these ideas in Plato, see particularly *Republic*, 443 d-e; 352 a (Cf. J. Wild, *Plato's Theory of Man*, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, pp. 156ff.); in Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. V; in Cicero, cf. R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Political Theory in the West* (Edinburgh and London, 1903), pp. 5f., with references.

15. Cf. *Prov.* 16: 11; *Job* 28: 25; 38: 5, 10, 12; *Wisd.* 11: 22.

16. Cf. P. de Labriolle, *Histoire de la littérature latine chrétienne* (3 ed., Paris, 1947), I, pp. 69ff.

naturally, some legal reference, but that reference was, as for the Biblical authors and the philosophers, derivative. Even in the case of Tertullian, whose legal background is supposed to have been decisive, it is impossible to maintain (as critics of the "Latin doctrine of the Atonement" would like to do) that the concept of justice is primarily legal.

The Latin Fathers repeat much of the traditional philosophical teaching on the subject of justice, as one of the cardinal virtues, and as the whole of virtue.¹⁷ Justice includes (as for Cicero and Philo) the virtue of piety as God-ward justice; hence there can be no true justice without the worship of the one true God. The whole of justice, as St. Ambrose explains, is founded upon piety, and from it arises true charity, which prefers others to self, and seeks not its own. The Christian era is the age of justice, and the Church is the form of justice.¹⁸ For Tertullian, the *justitia* of God is not in any narrow sense a forensic concept: it is particularly related to God's activity as *ordinator* in creation; in accordance with his justice (which is correlative to his goodness) he distinguished created beings and determined their natures. All the hierarchy of heaven and earth is the expression of the justice of God; and his judicial action is related primarily to the ordering of creation, and only secondarily to the judgment of evil.¹⁹ Because of man's place in this hierarchy of justice, as Lactantius in particular argues, justice for man consists primarily in *pietas*, the knowledge and worship of God; and the neglect of this duty is tantamount to the expulsion of justice from the life of man and society.²⁰

Some more specific theological applications of the concept of justice were made by several Church Fathers (St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, St. Athanasius, St. Ambrose, and others) especially with reference to the work of Christ, and man's bondage to the devil; but perhaps enough has already been said to indicate the general nature of the concept itself, as it appeared in Latin Christian tradition. It is really to St. Augustine that we must turn for the full elaboration of the concept of *justitia* in many theological applications.

V

The Bishop of Hippo was not, at least in the ordinary sense of the word, a "systematic" theologian. The obscurity of his views on many important philosophical and theological themes is more than adequately attested by the controversies which have surrounded his name during the fifteen centuries

17. Cf. Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.*, II, 12 (CSEL, 47, 351); Lactantius, *Instit.*, V, 5 (CSEL, 19/1, 413); Ambrose, *In Luc.*, V, 62; *De paradiso*, III, 22 (CSEL, 32/1, 207; 279).

18. Cf. Ambrose, *De offic.*, I, 49: 252; 27: 127 (PL, 16, 107; 65f.); *De paradiso*, III, 22 (CSEL, 32/1, 279); *De offic.*, I, 29: 142 (PL, 16, 70).

19. Cf. *Adv. Marc.*, II, 12; 13 (CSEL, 47, 351ff.). We agree with G. L. Prestige (*God in Patristic Thought*, London, 1952, pp. xxv, 97f.) that the modern interpretation of Tertullian's thought as "juristic" needs serious modification.

20. Cf. *Instit.*, V, 14; 6 (CSEL, 19/1, 446; 418).

since his death. Yet the discerning reader of the Augustinian *corpus* will note the omnipresence of certain key concepts which contribute a unity and a coherence to the whole. One such concept is *caritas*. Another is *justitia*.

The concept of *justitia*, in a wide variety of contexts, runs like a thread through St. Augustine's pages, not only in the discussion of political theory, but also with reference to the central theological questions of the Nature of God, man, sin, and the Atonement. The concept is not primarily political, for, as several modern interpreters of St. Augustine's political thought have pointed out, his use of the concept in the doctrine of the State is determined by its theological use.²¹ We may, for our present purposes, pass over his repetition of justice as one of the four virtues, and as the whole of virtue, and the problem of political justice, and devote our attention to his more specifically theological uses of the concept.

Justitia is first of all attributed to God, who is Himself the highest justice. In creation, He is *justissimus ordinator*,²² who orders all things in number, measure and weight, in a pattern of which the eternal law (the Divine Reason, or the Will of God) is the supreme exemplar.²³ This ordered hierarchy of created beings, most aptly described by Etienne Gilson as "physical justice,"²⁴ is simply the reflection, or imitation of God's justice as embodied in the eternal law, the pattern of the Divine Ideas. This hierarchy of order and value is reflected in created beings, not only in their external relations to one another and to God, but it also prescribes the internal order of human nature.²⁵ The truth and goodness of creatures must be seen as their conformity to that eternal justice expressed in the work of God as *justissimus ordinator*.

It is this concept of *justitia* (which is surely very different from modern ideas of the "legal" or "juridical") which occupies so important a place in St. Augustine's view of sin and redemption.²⁶ Man's original condition is described as that of justice: right relation to God, and (in dependence upon this relation in hierarchy of order) rectitude of order within his own nature. In creation, man received *justitia*, which he lost by sinning.²⁷ Sin, for St. Augustine, is always the will to do what justice (the order willed by God) forbids, and is never identified with concupiscence, however much the disorder of the passions (laudable in themselves) may be emphasized as the

21. Cf. R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *op. cit.*, I, p. 168; H. X. Arquillière, *L'Augustinisme politique* (Paris, 1934), p. 21.

22. *De civ. Dei*, XI, 17; cf. *Epist.* CXX, 4: 19 (CSEL, 40/1, 536; 34, 721).

23. Cf. *De trin.*, III, 9: 16 (PL, 42, 878); *Contra Faust.*, 22: 27; *De lib. arb.*, I, 51 (CSEL, 25, 621; 74, 16).

24. *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), p. 77.

25. Cf. *De lib. arb.*, I, 109 (CSEL, 74, 32f.); *De trin.*, X, 7 (PL, 42, 977).

26. While the several studies of J. Rivière (*Le dogme de la Rédemption chez saint Augustin*, Paris, 1933, and others) are the most generally useful for the history of the doctrine of Redemption, their value is diminished, so far as our study is concerned, by the author's preoccupation with the theme (scarcely typical of St. Augustine) of divine justice towards the devil, to the neglect of other important uses of the concept of justice.

27. Cf. *De trin.*, XIV, 15: 21; *Enarr. in ps. CXLIII*, 6 (PL, 42, 1052; 37, 1860); *De gen. ad lit.*, VI, 27: 38 (CSEL, 28/3, 199).

consequence of original sin or as the incentive to actual sin.²⁸ Man, having lost, by his defection in Adam, the justice originally granted by God in creation, cannot offer to God *justitia*, his primary obligation to the Deity.²⁹ And hence it is impossible for him to restore rectitude of order in his relation to God, and within his own nature. Mankind can offer to God no pure offering in propitiation.³⁰

God Himself, in His mercy, effects reconciliation in Christ the Mediator, who takes pure humanity from the Virgin, and comes forth as priest and victim; who offers Himself, a pure sacrifice, *hostia immaculata*, by His justice breaking man's bondage to the devil, and fulfilling the requirements of divine *justitia*.³¹ The emphasis is placed on the purity and obedience of Christ's humanity: not as God, but as man, He reconciles us to God, restoring the condition of justice on man's side, turning God's judgment to mercy.³² Man, by participation in Christ, in Baptism, and in day to day renewal, is made just, until finally he reaches that perfection of justice which is also true charity.³³

VI

The similarity between St. Augustine's concept of justice and that of St. Anselm is striking. One point of similarity has led several modern interpreters to argue that the Anselmian, and later Scholastic, formulation of Original Justice has its basis in St. Augustine.³⁴ We should like to go farther, and suggest that the Anselmian concept of *justitia* as such, not only with reference to man's original state, but also with reference to the doctrines of God, sin and redemption, is authentically Augustinian. In addition to the general similarity of concept, which is suggested by the foregoing analyses, some further considerations can be adduced in support of our view.

St. Augustine's position as the great teacher of the West in the Middle Ages is completely beyond question. While this is *a fortiori* true of the Early Middle Ages, it is scarcely less true of St. Anselm and of the other great theologians of the Scholastic period. The comment of Matthew of Aqua-

28. Cf. *Op. imperf. contra Jul.*, I, 47 (PL, 45, 1067ff.); *De civ. Dei*, XIV, 6; XIX, 21 (CSEL, 40/2, 11; 409); *De nupt. et concup.*, I, 23: 25; I, 24: 27; II, 35: 59 (CSEL, 42, 237; 239f.; 318); *De perf. justit.*, 8; 9 (CSEL, 42, 17f.); *De gen. ad lit.*, X, 12: 20f. (CSEL, 28/3, 309f.). In the light of these and countless similar texts, it is difficult to see how the fundament of original sin for St. Augustine is anything other than the free defection of the rational will (cf. E. Portalic, "Augustin (saint)", *Dict. de théol. cath.*, I, 2396). While St. Anselm's doctrine on this subject may be a break from a common Medieval interpretation of St. Augustine (cf. Fairweather, *op. cit.*, p. 58), it is hardly a break from St. Augustine himself (but see Williams, *art. cit.*, p. 259).

29. Cf. *De pecc. merit. et remiss.*, II, 23: 37 (CSEL, 60, 109).

30. Cf. *Enarr. in ps. LXIV*, 6; *CXLIX*, 6 (PL, 36, 777; 37, 1953).

31. Cf. *ibid.*, and *De trin.*, XIII, 12-16 (PL, 42, 1026ff.).

32. Cf. *Enarr. in ps. CIII*, 4: 8 (PL, 37, 1383f.): an important point in St. Augustine (as in St. Anselm) which Aulén has overlooked; cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 75.

33. Cf. *Enchir.*, 14: 52; *Contra Jul.*, II, 9: 31 (PL, 40, 256f.; 44, 694); *De perf. justit.*, 8: 17 (CSEL, 42, 15f.).

34. Cf. A. Michel, "Justice originelle", *Dict. de théol. cath.*, VIII, 2031; J. B. Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel d'après saint Thomas* (Paris, 1930), p. 8.

sparta, that St. Augustine is the "exemplary doctor, whom catholic doctors, and especially theologians, ought to follow,"³⁵ is naturally to be expected from an Augustinian; but the sentiment would certainly be shared by St. Thomas Aquinas, of whom Professor Gilson writes that he "would have considered himself a true disciple of Augustine."³⁶ St. Anselm clearly testifies to his own indebtedness, when he writes, in the Preface to the *Monologion*: "I have been able to find nothing I have said which is not in agreement with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, and especially of Blessed Augustine."³⁷

The whole effort of Early Medieval Christian thought could be summed up (with few exceptions) as an attempt to understand what the great Bishop of Hippo had said; and it should not be surprising that when Medieval intellectual life began to blossom afresh in St. Anselm, its colour was brilliantly Augustinian. The fact that some earlier and later Augustinians held views different from those of St. Anselm on some important issues should not be allowed to mislead us. Bernhard Geyer's remarks,³⁸ to the effect that St. Anselm understood St. Augustine to a greater extent than any before him had done, are much to the point, and might be extended to include many later theologians and historians as well.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that St. Anselm's distinction was not primarily as a legal or political theorist, but as a theologian, and it is somewhat gratuitous to search every possible source other than the theological tradition for enlightenment as to the background and meaning of his leading concepts. Our contention is that there is present in the theological tradition of the Middle Ages, transmitted especially by St. Augustine, a properly philosophical and theological (and only derivatively legal and political) concept of *justitia*; and that any attempt to understand St. Anselm's important theological formulations which ignores the nature and background of this concept is likely to result in serious misinterpretation. *Justitia* in St. Anselm's teaching does not stand for an essentially legal relation, but for that rectitude of order which is the Will of God: a concept which is properly theological, and authentically Augustinian.

35. *Quaest. disput.*, Q. II *de cognit.*, in *resp.* (ed. Quaracchi, I, 252).

36. *Op. cit.*, p. 81.

37. *Monolog.*, in *prolog.* (Schmitt, I, 8).

38. In *Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, II: *Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie* (12 ed., Basel, 1951), p. 194.