The *Filioque* Clause in the Teaching of Anselm of Canterbury — Part 2

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**An Exegetical Foundation**

Augustine does not seek to substantiate his *filioque* from Scripture, although one could find in him scriptural foundation for it. Anselm goes further than Augustine, seeking to justify his *filioque* exegetically. The New Testament, he argues, witnesses to the Spirit as being the Spirit of both the Father and the Son. His argument for the *filioque* is based primarily on a number of texts which the polemicists tend to ignore. He attacks the Eastern exegesis for isolating John 15:26 from the wider context of texts. He argues that John 14:26, ‘whom the Father will send in my name’, must be taken together with John 15:26, ‘whom I will send to you from the Father’. Whereas the Eastern Church focuses on the part of John 15:26—‘who goes out from the Father’—to argue for a single procession of the Spirit, Anselm insists that the two verses, when read together, reveal that each person sends the Spirit on behalf of the other. The Father sends the Spirit in the name of the Son; the Son also sends the Spirit in the name of the Father. The Spirit is sent, therefore, from the (single) name of both Father and Son. The Son with the Father constitutes the co-principle and co-sender of the Holy Spirit. In Anselm’s words—

So what does ‘whom the Father will send in my name’ mean except that whom the Father will send the Son also will send?—just as when the Son says ‘whom I shall send from the Father’, nothing else is meant except ‘I and the Father shall send’. For ‘Son’ is the name of Him who said ‘the Father will send in my name’. Therefore, ‘the Father will send in my name’ means only ‘the Father will send in the name of the Son’. Hence, what does ‘the Father will send in the name of the Son’ mean except that the Father will send as if the Son were sending, so that when the Father sends, the Son is understood to send. But how are the Son’s words ‘whom I shall send from the Father’ to be interpreted? Assuredly, the Holy Spirit is sent from Him from whom the Son sends Him. Now, the Son sends Him from the Father. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is sent from the Father. But the one from whom the Holy Spirit
is sent sends (the Holy Spirit). Hence, when the Son says, ‘I shall send from the Father,’ the Father is understood to send. So what does ‘I shall send from the Father’ mean except ‘I shall send as if the Father were sending, so that my sending and the Father’s sending are one and the same?’

The economical sending of the Spirit, in Anselm, is rooted in the immanent relationships of the Trinity. The Son sends the Spirit from the Father. The Spirit who is ‘sent’ from the Father also ‘proceeds’ from the Father. Thus being sent and proceeding belong to the same order of reality, according to which the sending of the Spirit by the Father mirrors the procession from the Father, and in like manner, the sending of the Spirit by the Son also mirrors the procession from the Son. Anselm clarifies, ‘Now, if “proceeding” meant being given or sent, then it would be as true that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as that he proceeds from the Father, since He is likewise given and sent by the Son.’ This means that the economic relations of the Trinity corresponds to the ontological relations of the Godhead, therefore accentuating the knowledge of God as he is in himself.

Anselm also deduces the filioque doctrine from Matthew 11:27, ‘No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.’ John 10:30 (‘I and the Father are one’) affirms the identity of essence between the Father and the Son, which is the ground of their mutual knowledge. The Son says about the Holy Spirit in John 16:13: ‘He will not speak on His own authority, but whatsoever He will hear that will He speak.’ This means that the Holy Spirit must have received knowledge of the Father and the Son about which He will speak. But how does he receive the things of God other than ‘his essence’ which is one with the Father and the Son? ‘He exists (habet essentiam) from the one (the Son) from whom He hears what He speaks and teaches.’ This assertion is reinforced by John 16:14, where the Son says, ‘He (the Holy Spirit) will glorify me because He will receive from me and will declare unto you.’ This shows clearly that the Son himself is the one from whom the Holy Spirit receives his knowledge and his essence, otherwise he would be less than the Son (and the Father), and therefore not God. Anselm elaborates: ‘He (the Son) shows plainly that the Holy Spirit exists (essentiam habere) and proceeds from Himself (i.e., from his own essence). For what is not divine essence is inferior to the Holy Spirit; and the Holy Spirit does not receive something from that
which is inferior to Himself. Therefore, when the Son says, ‘He will receive from me,’ He signifies here nothing of His own except His own essence.50

The New Testament undisputably associates the Spirit closely with Christ. John 15:26 must not be understood in isolation but in relation to John 20:22-23 where the Risen Christ ‘breathes’ upon the disciples and says, ‘Receive the Holy Spirit.’51 Here Anselm’s interpretation is dependent on Augustine’s distinction between the sign and the thing signified, which mirrors the biblical truth that God accommodates himself to meet us in visible signs.52 Scripture signifies a hidden thing by means of the ‘likeness’, not ‘identity’, to perceptible things; that which signifies and that which is signified are not ‘alike in all respects’. Anselm has the Risen Christ say—

Just as you see this breath—through which I signify to you the Holy Spirit (imperceptible things being able to be signified by perceptible things)—proceeds from the depths of my body and from my person, so know that the Holy Spirit whom I signify to you through this breath, proceeds from the hiddenness of my deity and from the person.53

And yet the person of the Word and of the man is one, in whom are two natures, viz. a divine and human nature. The Holy Spirit is revealed to and recognized by us in this peculiar form of the ‘breath’. Based on these texts, Psalm 32:6, 33:6, Isaiah 11:4, Ezekiel 36: 26-7 and 2 Thessalonians 2:8, he draws the conclusion that the Holy Spirit is signified by these phrases: ‘the breath of the Lord’s mouth (Father’s), by whose words the heavens have been established; the breath of the Lord Jesus’ mouth, by whose words he slays the wicked, and the breath of Jesus’ lips, by which he converts the wicked. Surely the efficacy does not lie in audible words and perceptible breath, but in the thing they signify, i.e., the Holy Spirit, of whom God speaks through his prophet. God employs the selected elements of his created order (e.g., breath) as his instrument of power to effect his saving will. If we maintain with the Greeks to understand ‘Father’s mouth’ as the Father’s ‘essence’, out of which proceeds his word and his breath, he argues, ‘what is clearer than that just as the breath of the Father’s mouth exists and proceeds from the Father’s essence, so the breath of the Son’s mouth and lips exists and proceeds from the Son’s essence?54 Therefore one must concede that the Holy Spirit proceeds equally from Him (Son) of whose mouth and lips He is called the breath.
The New Testament put the Holy Spirit in close proximity with Christ in such a way that the Person and work of the Spirit are to be understood via the Person and work of Christ. However could one reverse the order, defining the Person and the work of Christ in terms of the Spirit? Didn't Luke 4:18ff speak of Christ as the designated Son of God by the descent of the Spirit on him at his Baptism? Christ himself claims that 'the Spirit of the Lord is upon me'. In addition, both Matthew 1:20 and Luke 1:35 ascribe his virgin birth to the work of the Holy Spirit, implying that Christ is 'of the Spirit' just as much as the Spirit is 'of Christ'. All these verses, he argues, point to the operation of the Spirit in virtue of Christ's humanity, not his divinity. The Spirit's descent on him at Baptism is his commissioning to achieve the work of redemption via the concrete unity of his two natures, but with an emphasis on his humanity. The Spirit's work in his birth is to prepare the humanity for its union with the Word, endowing it with his presence in that union. What is ascribed to the Holy Spirit in the virgin birth is the assumption of humanity into unity with God in the Logos mode of existence. Furthermore the Son himself says through the prophet: 'And now the Lord God and His Spirit have sent me' (Isa. 48:16). This, for the Greeks, clearly means that the Holy Spirit also sends the Son, concluding that the Son exists from the Spirit. To this objection, Anselm replies that this verse applies also to 'the human nature assumed by the Son, who by the common will and ordinance of the Father and the Spirit' appears in order to achieve the work of redemption. It pleases the Father, the Son and the Spirit that the Son alone be the one to assume our flesh, subsequently to be anointed with the Spirit in his concrete salvation history of obedience. Jesus' anointing with the Spirit is an implication of the hypostatic union. Filioque doctrine thus requires that the hypostatic union is the presupposition, not the consequence, of Jesus' anointing with the Spirit. Whereas the activity of the Word is primary in the Incarnation, the activity of the Spirit is posterior to it, and is logically, if not chronologically, dependent on it.

In order to affirm the Son's participation with the Father in the causal procession of the Holy Spirit, the Greeks maintain that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father 'through' the Son (per filium) instead of from the Son (a Filio). Their key text, which Anselm wonders speculatively, is Romans 11:36, where the apostle Paul says, 'All things are from Him and through Him and in Him.' Beyond dispute is the Credal assertion that 'all things' means 'all divinely created beings', which exist 'through the Son'. What is created by the Father through the Son may also be said to have been created by the Son, for the Scripture teaches,
'Whatever the Father does, this the Son does likewise' (John 5:19). From this instance, he sees no conceptual difference between the two expressions, *a filio* and *per filium*, which are interchangeably one. Consequently if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the deity of the Father ‘through’ the deity of the Son, then since the Father and the Son have the same essence, he can also proceed ‘from’ the deity of the Son. However, deeper problems arise when the Greeks include in the designation ‘all things’ the Holy Spirit to justify his origin *per filium*. This interpretation, he argues, collapses the distinction between the created beings and the uncreated being. Anselm writes: ‘Whatever is created is not identical with God, but different from Him.’57 The Holy Spirit is not different from God, but is one and the same God as the Father and the Son, therefore cannot be identified with, or reduced to any, divinely created beings. Furthermore he rejects Greek exegesis on this verse, contending that if the Holy Spirit is included among ‘all things’ which Paul states to exist through the Son, so too are the Father and the Son. For to include any one person of the three among all things and to exclude the other two is inconceivable.58 In short, Anselm concludes, the Eastern Church has no basis in Scripture for denying the *filioque*.

**Concluding Remarks**

The aforementioned shows that Anselm opts for the Western procession model of filioque, denying the Eastern procession model of the *per filium* and monopatristism.58 Augustine’s *De Trinitate* is the major influence of Anselm’s *filioque*. In his *Prologus to Monologion*, Anselm admits his indebtedness to Augustine—

As often I examined this work, I could find nothing in it which was not in harmony with the writings of the Catholic fathers and especially St. Augustine. For this reason, if it seems to anyone that I have proposed anything in this small work which is either new or dissent from the truth, I ask that he not immediately denounce me as a rash innovator or a vile pævaricator, but that he first attentively check the books of the aforementioned teacher Augustine, *De Trinitate*, and then judge my little work by them.59

However the *filioque* model is not without criticisms. Augustine interpreters, Marsh and Gunton, contend that Augustine errs in grounding his thought on the Trinity in the unity of divine substance. Marsh charges that Augustine has
abandoned the earlier Latin tradition’s ‘strong sense of divine monarchy—the one God is first and foremost the Father’ for the ‘one God to mean the divine substance or nature which then is verified in Father, Son and Holy Spirit’. By separating the substance from the persons, and in giving primacy to the former, Augustine ends up discarding ‘the concept of ὀρθοτονία or order from its central place in the traditional understanding of the Triad’, thereby introducing ‘an impersonal concept of God’. This shift of emphasis also confronts him with the problem of how to conceive distinctions in God without implying modalism. Gunton’s criticism of Augustine springs mainly from his deep appreciation of the Cappadocians who, in his view, have wisely perceived God’s being as ontologically relational, in virtue of which there is no divine substance or essence behind, supporting the hypostatic relations. ‘For them, the three persons are what they are in their relations, and therefore the relations qualify them ontologically, in terms of what they are.’ By viewing a ‘relation as a logical rather than an ontological predicate’, Augustine is ‘precluded from being able to make claims about the being of the particular persons who, because they lack distinguishable identity tend to disappear into the all-embracing oneness of God’. In Gunton’s estimation, Augustine ‘either did not understand the trinitarian theology of his predecessors, both East and West, or looked at their works with spectacles so strongly tinted with neoplatonic assumptions that they have distorted his work’.65

At basic level, the same criticisms levelled against Augustine may also be levelled against Anselm. That is, Anselm also fails to see the relations between Father, Son, and Spirit as grounded in the ontology of God. Instead of conceiving God’s being as constituted by their relatedness, Anselm puts the emphasis on the view of divine substance preceding or supporting the person, making it ontologically primary as Augustine does. By overstressing the ontological unity of God’s being, Anselm may be criticized as tending towards modalism, absorbing the distinguishing identity of each individual person into the oneness of God’s being. Anselm, undoubtedly, is keenly aware of this danger and has tried, as Augustine did before him, to move away from the limitations of analogy of memory, understanding and will. Such analogy sounds as though the one ‘Supreme Spirit’ is simply active in three modes, just as the one human mind is active in three modes without being truly three in itself. Although Anselm does not use the term circumincension (or perichoresis), the substances of which are found in him.66 The patristic idea of
circumcession grounds the persons’ unity of essence so that each exists fully in the others, yet without exceeding the others. The Father is in the Son and in the Spirit common to him and the Son; the Son is in the Father and in this same Spirit; this common Spirit is in the Father and in the Son. By *perichoresis*, Anselm argues that each person of the Trinity possesses equally all the intellectual perfections, otherwise each person would not be fully God, in which case the unity of essence would be destroyed. The Father, for example, does not need the Son to understand. He states—

We must not suppose that the Father can only remember through himself, while being able to understand only through the Son and to love only through His and the Son’s Spirit....For each of these three singly is the Supreme Being...so perfectly that this Being...remembers, understands, and loves through itself.

For each person, by himself, is ‘essentially memory, understanding, love, and whatever must be present in the Supreme Being’.67 If each person is memory, understanding, and love, one may ask, does that not collapse the trinitarian distinctions in God? The significance of the Augustinian analogy, Levering writes, lies in the fact that it helps us see the intra-divine processions, *ad intra* life of God.68 Thus when the Father is referred to as memory, this is not done in order to exclude the essential properties of understanding and loving from him; rather it is solely to specify the Father’s unique place in the intra-divine processions that distinguish the persons. Speaking of the Father, for example, Anselm states, ‘[W]hatever he is, is only the begetter and the one from whom another proceeds.’69 To avoid modalism, Anselm makes a helpful distinction between (A) begetting and proceeding which distinguish the persons; and (B) the three persons who exist in a perichoretic unity of essence so that these essential properties—remembering, understanding and loving—mutually coinhere, and are equally predicated of each of the persons. All three persons mutually share in the life of the others so that none is isolated or detached from the actions of the others. This is far from Modalism.

Despite the aforementioned criticisms, Anselm’s *filioque* doctrine is worthy of assertion. First, in respect to the life of faith, it ties the Spirit closely to Christ. The work of the Holy Spirit is to communicate to us the gospel, that in Christ’s cross and resurrection divine mercy has conquered divine wrath. The work of
redemption is completed, and the benefits which Christ has acquired and won for us by his sufferings, death, and resurrection belong to us in faith. But this work remains hidden and is of no use to us unless God causes us to perceive and receive it. Not until the Holy Spirit comes to offer and apply to us this treasure of salvation, the work of Christ would have been all in vain. Thus he who spurn knowing the Father in the Son loses all knowledge of God. It is by the Holy Spirit that we are led to see God in the flesh, in whom the Father is mirrored. The God who came to us in Christ is indeed the same God who comes as the Holy Spirit. Redemption is accomplished by Christ, but the Holy Spirit carries his work incessantly until the last day. When considering the work of inculcating the benefits of Christ’s cross and sufferings for our salvation, which is precisely the Spirit’s, we must think of *filioque* in which the the work of Son and the work of the Spirit are closely related. The foundation of their reality consists in the single essence (love) which all three share in a differentiated unity verified distinguishably as relations. In saying this, the Holy Spirit participates fully and equally in the mutual love between the Father and the Son, both of which he also conveys to the believer. God has revealed himself and opened to us the profoundest of his sheer, boundless love. Moreover, none could come to recognize the Father’s love were it not for the Lord Christ, who is the mirror of God’s fatherly heart. But neither could we know of Christ’s heart had it not been revealed by the Holy Spirit. The love that flows between the Father and the Son is the love of the atoning sacrifice of Calvary. In it God’s forgiveness and God’s self-offering coincide. Thus a denial of the *filioque*, says Bray, implies a denial of the Son’s atoning love in the life of the believer, although Anselm does not explicitly draw such a conclusion.⁷⁰

Second, the *filioque* doctrine possesses its force in enabling contemporary theology to take seriously the divine life proper, that which transpires within God’s interior life. Anselm does not develop his pneumatology within the framework of the history of salvation; he moves too quickly from the economic action to the eternal procession.⁷¹ By the principle, that the temporal missions of the Trinity reflect the eternal relations of the Godhead, Anselm concludes that the New Testament witnesses to the Spirit as being the Spirit of both the Father and the Son. The relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit is not restricted to the temporal trinitarian relations within the economy of salvation, but belongs ontologically to the primal trinitarian relations; conversely, there already is an inner-trinitarian basis for the temporal sending of the Spirit.
through Jesus Christ, the Son of God. Moltmann, in his discussion of the
filioque problem, recognizes the importance of this principle is for
contemporary theological reflection which, if it is accepted, would lead to
Anselm’s position, although Moltmann himself proposes the opposite, that the
Spirit proceeds ‘from the Father of the Son’ eternally. Moltmann makes a
distinction between ‘existence’ and ‘form’: ‘The Holy Spirit who proceeds from
the Father of the Son and and receives his “form” from the Father and the
Son.’ This is a modified but acutely speculative version of the filioque,
suggesting that the being (divinity) of the Spirit comes from the Father alone,
but his person is from the relational form between the Father and the Son.
Moltmann’s view, Thompsom criticizes—

...is dubious theologically and unlikely to gain much acceptance since it
introduces a further speculative suggestion as a possible solution. The
distinction between existence and form is difficult to maintain. 
Moltmann’s view must be argued on better exegesis of the text and a more
adequate Christology. This will not in the end deny mutuality but lead to
a more limited application within the parameters of the nature of
revelation....The result of the more speculative views of Moltmann leads
to a plethora of possibilities which the limitations of revelation forbid.

More sympathetic to the filioque is Barth, who accentuates the Anselmian
principle, seeing the whole pattern of relationship linking the three persons in
the work of Revelation and Redemption as the basis for our understanding of
God’s inner-trinitarian life. Although Barth and Moltmann differ on the issue
of the filioque, they concur with each other insofar as they do not posit a
difference between the temporal missions of the Spirit and the intra-relations
of the Trinity, but affirm their intrinsic connection. They maintain with Anselm
the principle of correspondence, one of the most basic principles of divine self-
revelation. We know of the inner economy of the Trinity only by way of
Revelation. We formulate the doctrine of the Trinity on the basis of historical
Revelation in Christ and the Church’s experience of the Spirit. Without
filioque, we have only knowledge of the economic relationship between the
Son and the Spirit, and we have no knowledge of God’s actual being, of the
immanent relationships between the Son and the Spirit within God’s triune
life. Anselm’s filioque doctrine underscores the principle that God remains true
to himself, that God is indeed in his own being what he reveals himself to be,
the immanent Trinity is known by the economic Trinity. Thus we can speak only of one Trinity, and of its economy of salvation, otherwise we are introducing a contradiction in God’s being (cf. 2 Tim. 2:13).

Third, directly related to the principle of correspondence between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity is the question of how Anselm conceives of the cross of Jesus Christ. Is the suffering of Jesus Christ merely an outward event, belonging only to the economic Trinity? Or is it an intra-trinitarian event in which God as God identifies himself with the crucified Jesus? If ‘God is love’, which Anselm affirms, then the logical conclusion is that God and suffering coincide in Christ and his cross. Since the Spirit proceeds as a hypostasis from the Father and the Son, he must be in his person the communion of love that exists between them. The Spirit is both the principle of unity and relationship in God’s immanental life. Peters expands on the theological import that filioque has on what is called the divine life proper, deducing that the Spirit maintains ‘unity in difference’. The Spirit is the principle of the differentiated unity within God’s life, in virtue of which the Father is the Father in relation to the Son, and conversely, the Son is who he is due to a corresponding relationship, and the Spirit is the reciprocity of love between them. If this were true of Anselm, it means there already is a mutuality of self-giving love in the immanent Trinity, awaiting its concretization in history: in love the Father surrenders the Son, and in love the Son surrenders himself, and the Spirit of love is between them. God, in unity with the crucified Jesus, suffers as God the Son being forsaken by God the Father, and he is God the Spirit, who lets the Father and the Son be one in the death of Jesus. Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinguished, but united as one God in this cross event that assumes suffering and death into his own life. Trinity is the conceptuality of the cross: the Son relates to the Father in obedient suffering and love, and the Father suffers the loss of his Son, with the Spirit binding them, even in the loss. Since the Father and the Son are one in essence and act, as Anselm affirms, then the Father is said to suffer through a perichoretic unity with the Son, except that it is the Son who suffers dying on the cross. A modalistic doctrine endangers the trinitarian distinctions of persons; a perichoretic doctrine would have enabled Anselm to see the differentiated ways in which God suffers uniquely as Father and as Son. Since God is wholly one, and has no parts, the separation that occurs between the Father and the Son cannot be ontological, but relational. This relational break defines the Father as Father, the one who
gives his Son up to death in love, and the Son as Son, the one who gives himself up in love, but is healed by the Spirit, the unitive principle of love. He is God the Spirit who unites the Father and the Son in love in the cross event of God-forsakenness. The passion and death of Jesus Christ is thus the revelation of the immanent Trinity. The perception of the suffering Christ as the lowly servant is thus carried into the inner life of God, allowing a predication of Christ's suffering not only of the economic Trinity, but also of the immanent Trinity, the former being the self-manifestation of the latter. The God of Jesus, and therefore of Christians, is a passible God not the passionless, immutable and impassible deity of the Greek.

That being said, it is my contention that Anselm as a medieval scholastic does not, and in fact cannot, make such conclusion which modern theologians—Barth, Moltmann and Jungel—have made, because his thinking is still under the grip of Aristotelian philosophy, especially its idea of divine apatheia. Suffering, which is predicated only of Christ's humanity, cannot be predicated of Christ's divinity, which he has with the Father and the Spirit. There is a forever untouched hinterland in God's being. Anselm denies any real feelings of love and compassion in God himself, insisting that although we experience God as compassionate, there is really no compassion in God himself. We may experience the effects of God's love, yet God's being is not affected by our experiences. Anselm's solution to the paradox of a compassionate and an impassible God is to assert that—

...thou art compassionate in terms of our experience, but not compassionate in terms of thy being.

...Truly, thou art so in terms of our experience, but thou art not in terms of thine own. For when thou beholdest us in our wretchedness, we experience the feeling of compassion, but thou does not experience the feeling. Therefore, thou art both compassionate, because thou dost save the wretched, and spare those who sin against thee; and not compassionate, because thou art affected by no sympathy for wretchedness.

Finally, there is a sense in which filioque enables Anselm to speak of the Spirit as ontologically and logically, if not chronologically, dependent upon the two persons within the divine life. The unitive principle of relationship depends
upon the twoness in order to relate. The language of dependency does not imply an inferiority of the Spirit, relegating him to something secondary. This dependency is not a temporal priority, as in a modalistic presentation of the divine successively; rather it is an ontological and logical priority, for the Spirit, who is 'God from God', never exists 'outside' the Godhead, but is eternal with the Father and the Son. In Peters' words, 'The Spirit is the condition whereby the generation of the Son is made possible, yet without the Son to whom the Father relates there would be no divine Spirit.' In relation to the Spirit, an ontological and logical priority is due to the Son; and correspondingly the Spirit is an ontological and logical posteriority to the Son, but is equal to the Son who is of one essence with the Father. In the eternal begetting of the Son, the Father manifests himself as the Father, and the Son manifests himself as the Son; in the eternal procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, the Spirit is ontologically and logically posterior to the Father and the Son. This evinces a certain priority of the Father-Son relation; and the Spirit, strictly speaking, is essentially this relation within God's intra life. So constitutionally, there is an economic subordination of the Spirit without jeopardizing his con-substantiality with, and equality to, the Father and the Son. Anselm elaborates—

Perhaps someone will marvel and ask: 'How can it be comprehended that one thing exists from another without the other from which it exists somehow existing more principally and more valuably, and without the thing which exists from this other somehow existing inferiorly and as something secondary?...To this query we must reply: Just as the existence of God is vastly different and diverse from created existence, so when we say that God exists from God by being begotten and by proceeding, this begottenness and this procession must be understood in a far different way from when, in other cases, we say that something proceeds or is begotten. For in the case of God neither naturally nor temporally nor in any respect is anything earlier or later, more or less, or at all in need of anything. Rather, the whole of what God is is not so much equal to and similar to and coeternal with itself as it is identical with itself and altogether sufficient unto itself through itself; in the case of God nothing proceeds or is begotten in the sense of passing from not-being to being....Now (in God) that which is begotten or that which proceeds is no other than that from which it proceeds or is begotten, viz., the one and only God. Consequently,
just as God is not greater or lesser than Himself; so in the case of the three (persons) there is not anything greater or lesser; and no one of them is what He is any more or less than is another of them, even though it is true that God exists from God by proceeding and by being begotten.\textsuperscript{30}

Forsyth’s phrase, ‘subordination is not inferiority’, echoes Anselm’s view.\textsuperscript{81} Divine self-subordination, in Anselm’s account, lies at the heart of God’s nature. It is precisely God-like to possess the glory of divine self-subordination on an infinite scale in the Godhead. The subordination is not enforced; rather it is that which is rendered by God to himself as is proper to the relation of the Spirit to the Son—the Spirit takes what is the Son’s and reveals it to us; likewise, the obedience within God is that which is rendered by God to himself as is proper to the relation of the Son to the Father—the Son became ‘obedient unto death’ on the cross. This means there is already in God a divine self-subordination, which forms the basis of the economic subordination of the Spirit to the Son. And yet this godlike glory of self-subordination does not compromise the unity and equality of a being like God. Just as it is the nature of the Son to be obedient to the Father who sends him, so it is the nature of the Spirit to be subordinate to both the Father and the Son, who as one principle send the Spirit. This is the order in the Godhead, and he keeps it in its proper place without attributing diminutive inferiority or slavish obedience to a being as God. For the order has nothing to do with dignity or value, but has to do with relationship within God’s immanental life. Self-subordination is thereby ontologized, belonging to God’s eternal essence, which is commonly shared by all three persons existing in a perichoretic unity. This is also an implication of Anselm’s filioque, the justification of which must be sought in the ontologically fundamental unity of the Father with the Son rather than their differentiation.

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ENDNOTES
43. David Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” Theological Studies 51 (1990): 199. ‘In its earliest formulation, Augustine felt some obligation to provide scriptural foundation for the mutual-love theory, though he was unable to do this in a satisfactory way. But by the end of the De trinitate it had
become for him an almost self-evident variation or extension of the *filioque*, and so did not require any justification beyond mere mention.’


46. Anselm, 3.200 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*).


48. Anselm, 3.204-205 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*).


50. Anselm, 3.205 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*).

51. Anselm, 3.202 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*).

52. Anselm, 3.202-204 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*). Cf. Donald G. Bloesch, *The Holy Spirit. Works & Gifts* (Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2000), p. 42, where he says that Augustine’s distinction between the sign and the reality reflects ‘the Platonic polarity between the material copy and the original’. Cf. Augustine’s *De Trinitate* 15.26.45, where he says John 16:26 ought to be interpreted together with John 20.23 so as to show that he (the Spirit) proceeded also from (the Son) as verified in the Son’s ‘breathing’ on the disciples.

53. Anselm, 3.202 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*).

54. Anselm, 3.204 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*).

55. Anselm, 3.201 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*).

56. Anselm, 3.209 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*).

57. Anselm, 3.210 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*).

58. Anselm, 3.209 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*).


“cause” of the being and life of God does not consist in the one substance of God but in the hypostasis, that is, the person of the Father. The one God is not the one substance but the Father, who is the “cause” both of the generation of the Son and of the procession of the Spirit’ (pp. 40-41). For a recent study of the same, see Alan J. Torrance, *Persons in Communion: Trinitarian Description and Human Participation* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1996) who deals with the question of the ontological principle—in God the person of the Father or the relational divine being itself. Alan advances the position of his uncle, Thomas Torrance, who writes that the Being of God is ‘essentially personal, dynamic and relational Being’. See his *The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), p. 141 as quoted in Ralph Del Colle, “Person” and “Being” in John Zizioulas’ “Trinitarian Theology: Conversations with Thomas Torrance and Thomas Aquinas,” *Scottish Journal of Theology* 54 (2001): 73.

61. Marsh, *ibid*.


64. Gunton, *ibid*.


66. Anselm, 1.68 (*Monologion*).

67. Anselm, 1.69 (*Monologion*).

68. Levering, “Speaking of the Trinity,” pp. 132-3. For Anselm’s linguistic analysis of ‘uttering’ (*dicere*) as an essential property, see Anselm 1.701-72: ‘For there ought to be no doubt that the Father and the Son and their Spirit each speaks of Himself and the other two, just as each also understand himself and the other two’ (*Monologion*).

69. Anselm, 1.69 (*Monologion*).


80. Anselm, 1.224-225 (*De Processione Spiritus Sancti*).