The Filioque Clause in the Teaching of Anselm of Canterbury — Part 1

Dennis K P Ngien

Anselm of Canterbury (1093), often ranked as the father of scholasticism, seeks to explore the logical status of Christian dogmas such as the Trinity and incarnation. Anselm adopts Augustine’s first principle: to understand, by the use of reason, what he believes. Elsewhere he declares: ‘I thank you (God), because what I already believed by your grace I now understand by your illumination, to the point that if I refused to believe it, my understanding would force me to recognize it.’ He is affirmative about the ability of the human mind to demonstrate the rationality and thus the logical necessity of all Christian doctrines, believing that reason and revelation are both gifts of God. He is best known for his ‘ontological argument’ for the existence of God in his Proslogion. He is also remembered for his formulations of a ‘proof’ of the dogma of two-nature christology in his Car Deus Homo?, resulting in what came to be known as the ‘Satisfaction theory’ of the atonement. Not only God’s existence, argues Anselm, but also God’s nature as triune can be proven. The Monologion represents the extended attempt to find such arguments for it. This is not to say that he tries to prove philosophically that God’s being is constituted as triune; rather he attempts to show, in his De incarnatione Verbi and De processione Sancti Spiritus, that the doctrine of God’s triunity, an article of faith, is at least rationally grounded and logically consistent.

Augustine’s profound approach and insights into the doctrine of the Trinity, especially the filioque, constitutes the foundation and shape of the later Latin theological tradition beginning with Anselm, Aquinas right through to the Franciscan school and many of the late Protestant reformers. The doctrine of filioque, which originates with the Latin tradition, re-emerges in Anselm’s theological reflection, but as an elaborated defence. The Father, who is without beginning, is the principle of the Son and the Spirit. The Son comes from a principle—the Father, but is himself, together with the Father, the principle of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is not the principle of another. To avoid collapsing the personal distinctions in the Trinity with the essence common to
all three, Anselm turns to the definition of the persons by relationships—this understanding which is already in S. Augustine and the Greeks. This article seeks to provide an exposition of Anselm’s filioque, showing that he belongs to the Western tradition.

One substance, three persons

Influenced by Platonic philosophy, Augustine has as his point of departure the unity of the Godhead. Unlike the Cappadocians whose starting-point is persons (hypostases), Augustine gives primacy to the one indivisible divine substance (substantia). This he states very clearly at the outset of his De Trinitate. ‘We shall undertake,’ he writes, ‘to the best of our ability...to account for the one and only and true God being a Trinity, and for the rightness of saying, believing, understanding that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one and the same substance or essence.’ He affirms the teaching of the Catholic tradition, according to which ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit in the inseparable equality of one substance present a divine unity; and there are not three gods but one God’. God is substantivaly one, but is relationally distinct. Father, Son and Spirit exist in a differentiated unity of the one indivisible essence, thereby forming a con-substantial triad.

Anselm does not deviate from Augustine’s description of God as one substance, and three persons (una substantia, tres personae). In his letter to John the Monk concerning his opponent, Roscelin, he argues potently that three persons do not mean three gods, a position which he ascribes to Roscelin. He takes great pains to point out that the divine substance cannot lose its simplicity; it cannot be divided into parts. In God, one is three; three is one. However he oscillates in the usage of these terms, substance and persons, because of the uneasiness these terms convey. In his Monologion preface, he attributes to the Greeks the concept of God existing as three substances in one person. In the last chapters of the same, he goes so far as to identify substantia with personae, seemingly willing to describe God as either three persons or three substances. For the early Scholastics, the term ‘substance’ is ordinarily applied to individual beings, which especially are subject to accidents. Anselm sees in this an inadequacy to express the notion of the unity of a thing as it undergoes change. But the supreme Being, to which the idea of accidents is inadmissible cannot be called, Anselm explains, a substance, except as the word ‘substance’ is used in the same sense with the word ‘Essence’ or ‘being’.
Hence on the ground of this ‘rational necessity, the Supreme Trinity which is one, or Supreme Unity, which is triune, can irreproachably be called one being and three persons or three substances’. So having spoken of the unity of the essence, it is necessary to speak about an essence and about three persons or three substances. Also the term person fails to represent the notion of plurality in the Trinity, for this term usually refers to individuals existing separately from each other. In the Trinity, the three distinct persons do not exist as three independent individuals. Compelled by the lack of an appropriate term, Anselm uses person but with reservation. Augustine, having recognized the ineffability of the tripersonal God, and the limitation of human language, writes, ‘But the formula “three persons” has been coined, not in order to give a complete explanation by means of it, but in order that we might not be obliged to remain silent.’ Likewise Anselm affirms: there is ‘a unity because of the unity of essence; a trinity, because of the three I know not what (trinitatem propter tres nescio quid)’. Truly, therefore, God remains ineffably One and Three. In spite of his oscillation, Anselm in the body of his Monologion, rejects the Greek rendering of God as existing as one person in favour of God as existing as one essence or nature. His definitive position, reminiscent of the language of his Monologion preface, is clearly stated in De incarnatione Verbi, where he writes: ‘The Latins call these three persons, the Greeks (three) substances. For just as we say that in God there is one substance and three persons, so they say one person and three substances. But they mean by “substance” what we means by “person”, so that in faith they do not differ from us in any respect.’

Although the persons in the Trinity are distinguished, they are not separate, because each is essentially God. If Roscelin is saying that there are three Gods, then God is more than one substance. This would disrupt the simplicity of the divine essence, thereby violating the Boethian idea, that what is simple is greater than what is composite. One cannot conceive of, Anselm argues, anything greater than God, and likewise cannot conceive of plurality of substance, essence or nature in the highest Good. God has no parts; there is no partition in God’s essence; the divine essence is indivisibly one. The highest Good must necessarily be wholly one, not many. Father, Son and Holy Spirit do not differ as God, for they are co-eternal, co-equal, and co-exist in a consubstantial triad. They differ in the way each person is God in relation to the others. Augustine’s remark, ‘God is everything that he has except for the
relations through which each person is referred to the other’, is picked up by Anselm. In his *De incarnatione verbi*, Anselm takes issue with Roscelin’s miscontrual of the three persons in God. Roscelin asserts that the three persons are only one ‘thing’ (*res*), not three things, regarding which Anselm accuses him of Sabellianism—a position which abolishes the personal distinctions in the Trinity. Roscelin’s position is this: God is but one person who assumes three different modes of being; there are no three persons in God, for they have the same substance; they have the same characteristics of relation, in virtue of which Father and Spirit are said to be incarnate with the Son. If the three persons are one thing, not three separate things, like three angels, and if they share a commonality of power and will, says Roscelin, then the Father and the Holy Spirit must be incarnate with the Son. This, argues Anselm, constitutes a repudiation of the Christian faith, which affirms that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are numerically one with respect to his essence, but numerically three with respect to his persons. This relational dynamism in the same Godhead allows the incarnation of the Son, the assumption of humanity ‘not into a unity of nature but into a unity of person’, yet without necessitates the incarnation of all three. In Anselm’s words:

For my opponent (Roscelin) does not deny that there are several persons, since he admits that they are distinct from one another. If they were not different from one another, they would not be several.... The Father and the Son, therefore, are not several or different from each other with respect to substance—for they are not two substances. The Father is not one substance and the Son another; rather, the Father and the Son are the one and the same substance. However, with respect to person, they were several and different from each other—for the Father and the Son are not one and the same person, but two persons who are different from each other. My opponent says: ‘If the Son was incarnate, and is not a different thing from the Father, but is numerically one and the same thing as the Father, then the Father also must have been incarnate. For it is impossible for a thing which is numerically one and the same both to be and not to be at the same time incarnate in the same man.’ To this I reply that if the Son is incarnate, and if the Son is not numerically one and the same person as the Father, but another person, then it is not necessary for the Father also to be incarnate. For it is possible for one person to be incarnate in one man and for another person not to be incarnate in this same man together
with Him....For whoever accepts His incarnation rightly, believes that he assumed manhood not into a unity of nature but into a unity of person.\(^\text{15}\) 

There abides in Anselm a sharp distinction between substantival unity of deity and personal unity of humanity. The incarnation pertains to the personal unity, that the Son of God assumes humanity into his person, not his nature. The plurality of persons makes it impossible for the Father to be incarnate together with the Son.

Furthermore Roscelin’s error lies in his blurring Augustine’s distinction between those attributes—his omnipotence, benevolence, eternity—which are proper to God’s unity and those attributes—Fatherhood, Sonship, and so on — which are proper to individual persons.\(^\text{16}\) Anselm writes:

Those things which are common to them—like omnipotence, eternity—are understood to belong only to their unity, and those things which are proper to them individually—like ‘begetter’ or ‘begetting’ to the Father or ‘word’ and ‘begotten’ to the Son—are signified by these two names, that is, those of Father and Son.\(^\text{17}\)

The context here has to do with the relationship of signification which obtains between res and verbum. When the words ‘Father’ or ‘Son’ are mentioned, we understand the res unique to each, for instance, ‘begetter’ or ‘the one who is begotten’. When the word ‘God’ is used, we understand it to signify that which is common to all the persons as God. So when we say the two persons are two ‘things’, avers Anselm, we are predicating a relation in respect to that which is peculiar to each, but not that of one being to another, in whose case there entails two substances or beings—a position he ascribes to Roscelin. Although that the res itself is, paradoxically, both one and three, is a deepest mystery, Anselm sees no mystery over its specific application.

Anselm’s treatment of the procession of the Holy Spirit falls into two parts: first, by way of logical argument; second, by working out the implications of the Scriptural texts.

\textit{Filioque} is required in order to establish a proper distinction between the Son
and the Spirit. Anselm, following Augustine, contends that, necessarily, the
divine persons are distinguished by relations of origin. Without this relation
between the Son and the Spirit, they cannot be said in any sense to be distinct
from each other. Although the Franciscan theologian Duns Scotus agrees with
Augustine and Anselm that persons are distinguished by their relations of
origin, he rejects the necessity of such a relation to obtain a distinction between
the Son and the Spirit. With the Greeks, Scotus asserts: that which
distinguishes the Son from the Spirit is his peculiar property of begottenness;
conversely, the peculiar property of Spirit as proceeding distinguishes him from
the Son. The distinction between divine persons is adequately explained by
virtue of the unique properties each possesses. What distinguishes the persons,
therefore, was not so much their opposing relations of origin as their different
ways in which the Son and Spirit proceed from the Father. The difference
between these two modes of origin constitutes the basis for distinguishing
between the Son and the Spirit. Contrarily, Anselm sees the distinction as
deriving from relationships of origin. The persons are distinguished because
they are related to one another as source and derivation from source, and yet
one source. The Spirit’s distinction from the Son is obtainable only if the one
is the source of the other.

In his work against the Greeks, Anselm stresses the equality of the Father and
the Son as source, the former being the principal source and the latter being a
derivative source. For Augustine, the Spirit proceeds in a ‘principal’ sense from
the Father (de Patre principaliter), but also in a ‘derivative’ sense from the Son.
This shows the filioque is defensible, in that the procession of the Spirit from
the Father is inseparable from the relation between the Father and the Son.
Anselm argues that filioque is not only defensible, but also necessary. He does
not repudiate Augustine’s principaliter a patre, but places it within the
framework, in which the Son’s begetting and the Spirit’s procession are
understood against an identity of essence and an equality of divinity, both of
which are intrinsic to the divinity. The Father communicates his spirative
power to the Son so that the Son is also the ontological cause of the Spirit.
Governed by una substantia as his prolegomena, and alike Augustine, Anselm
affirms that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as from one
principle, a Patre Filioque tanquam ad uno principio. The Spirit exists not
from two sources but from one source: i.e., he exists from the one Godness of
the Father and of the Son. There is a fatherly cause as well as a sonly cause, yet
one cause due to one essence common to both. The Son, who receives his being from the Father, participates as the Father’s agent in the causal derivation of the Spirit. Therefore being and acting in this derivative manner does not entail a rejection of an equality of divinity in the production of the Spirit. Anselm writes of this:

The Holy Spirit comes from that in which the Father and the Son are one, that is, from God, not from that in which they differ from each other...and because the Father is neither before nor after the Son, neither greater nor lesser, and because the one is neither more nor less God than the other, the Holy Spirit is not from the Father before (being from) the Son. If, then, it is said that the Holy Spirit comes from the Father as the principle, nothing more than this is meant: the Son himself, from whom the Spirit comes, has it from the Father that the Spirit comes from him.21

The Son forms with the Father a single co-principle in the spiration of the Spirit—an understanding exactly opposite to the monopatrism of the Eastern Church, which affirms the monarchy of the Father. Seemingly unaware of the importance the Eastern fathers give to the formula a Patre per filium, from the Father through the Son, Anselm writes:

As the Father and the Son do not differ in the unity of the deity and as the Holy Spirit only proceeds from the Father as the deity, if that deity is similarly in the Son, it is not possible to see how the Spirit would proceed from the deity of the Father through the deity of the Son and not (immediately) from that same deity of the Father, but from his fatherhood, and that he proceeds through the sonship of the Son and not through his deity—but that idea is clearly stupid.22

Anselm looks for analogies from the created order which will illuminate the mystery of triunity. One of these is the ‘Nile image’, in which the Persons of the Trinity are likened to the Spring, flowing through the river into a lake.23 The spring is not the river nor is the lake; the lake is not the spring nor is the river. Yet the spring is the Nile; the river is the Nile; and the lake is the Nile. Collectively the three are called Nile, for the three is predicated of one complete whole. Yet there are not three Niles, but only one. The Nile is one nature, one watercourse predicated of all three. The spring, the river, and the
lake are three distinct things, which are not predicated of one another. However, the spring does not exist from the river or from the lake; the river exists only from the spring, not from the lake; the lake exists from both the spring and the river. In other words, the whole river exists from the whole spring; the whole lake exists from the whole river and the whole spring. Transposed this image trinitarianly, it means the Son exists from the Father; the Holy Spirit exists from the Father and the Son in another way, so that the Holy Spirit is not the Son, but one who proceeds. The Holy Spirit does not come from nobody, nullo; He is from the Father and the Son, not as Father and Son, but as God. The Holy Spirit is not the Father nor is the Son; yet he is what the Father and the Son are —*vic.*, God. Abiding here is a unity without distinction in respect to the divine essence, and also a unity with distinction in respect to the persons; the former is logically prior to the latter. The divine essence, not the Father, is the ultimate source of the other persons.

This image is also found in the Greek fathers who use it to express their idea of the Spirit (lake) proceeding through the Son (river), not from the Father (spring) and Son (river) conjointly. Gregory of Nyssa, for example, admits that the Son could be the cause of the Spirit not in the same absolute sense as the Father is, but only in a secondary sense, that the Spirit is said to proceed from the Father ‘through’ the Son. 24 The Greeks reason that although the lake comes from the river, it does not proceed from the river; rather it accumulates from the river. So even if the Holy Spirit exists from the Son, he cannot be properly said to proceed from the Son; rather he is properly understood to proceed from the Father, as from his source of origin. This reasoning, says Anselm, is valid only insofar as being begotten from the Father proceeds ‘outside’ the Father, and if there exists a ‘spatial interval’ between the Holy Spirit existing from the Father ‘before’ existing from the Son. ‘For the river flowing from the Spring proceeds outside the spring and after an interval accumulates into a lake.’ An interval occurs between the lake existing from the spring ‘before’ existing from the river. So the lake exists from the spring through the river, not from the spring and river as from one source. Anselm's reply is this: the image, in the created order, may not convey the latter idea; but in the uncreated order, the word *principaliter* takes on a different meaning within the deity. There is no lesser or later, before or after, no intervals, no grades or degrees in God. Things must be different in God, for one cannot separate the Son from the Father because the Son is in the Father, and is in no way different from him in essence.
Just as the lake does not exist from that by reason of which the spring and the river differ from each other but exists from the water in virtue of which they are the same, so the Holy Spirit does not exist from that by reason of which the Father and the Son differ from each other, but from the divine substance in which they are one. The origin is neither person taken by himself, but the divine essence which both person possess—the Father has it in himself, the Son has it as that which he receives from the Father. He continues his argument in the line of Augustine: ‘But in being begotten from the Father, the Son does not pass outside the Father but remains within Him and does not differ from the Father spatially or temporally or essentially; moreover, that from which the Holy Spirit proceeds is one and the same for the Father and the Son.’ Since God exists from ‘within’ God, not ‘outside’ God, all three persons retain in their deity a singularity. Heron clarifies: ‘The origin of the Spirit lies in the divinity shared by the Father and the Son, not in their relationship: he cannot therefore proceed in one way from the Father and in another way through the Son, for this would make the differentiation between the Father and the Son ontologically prior to his own being.’ Thus the filioque, far from dividing the Godhead into two separate sources, safeguards its fundamental unity. Even though the Spirit does not proceed from the Son in the same way as from the Father, it is vitally necessary that we name the Father and the Son together in affirming his procession, otherwise we might exclude the Spirit from the ontologically fundamental unity.

In chapter one of his De Processione Spiritus Sancti, Anselm firmly counters Greek theologians in defence of the filioque. He draws two basic expressions: (A) ‘God from whom God exists’ and (B) ‘God from God’. To quote:

God the Father is A because the Son is begotten from Him and because the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him; He is not B, since He neither proceeds nor is begotten. God the Son is B since He is begotten; and He is A since the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him. God the Holy Spirit is B since He proceeds from the Father and the Son; but He is not A, since neither the Father nor the Son proceeds from Him or is begotten from Him.

In the second chapter of the same, Anselm, following Augustine, makes a distinction between the Holy Spirit as immanently ‘proceeding’ and as being economically ‘sent’ or ‘given’. Here the relation between the immanent Trinity
and the economic Trinity is brought into view, the former being the presupposition of the latter. A correspondence, not a difference, occurs between the immanent proceeding and economic giving or sending. For the Son to be sent is to be referred to his origin from the Father; likewise for the Holy Spirit to be sent or given is to be referred to his procession from the Father and the Son. Anselm relates the eternal generation of the Son and eternal procession of the Spirit on the one hand to the temporal missions of the Son and the Spirit in the world on the other. The Holy Spirit exists by proceeding from the Father eternally, as having his being from him. But he is given or sent by the Son to the creatures. This giving or sending is also eternal in relation to the Holy Spirit, although this giving or sending happens in time. If the Holy Spirit proceeds only by existing from the Father, he argues, he must also exist by proceeding from the Son, because he is God from God, and the Son is God. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and since the Father is God, the Eastern Creed sufficiently declares that the Holy Spirit proceeds from God. In similar fashion, Anselm intimates: ‘when the Creed says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from God, then since the Son is God, the Creed indicates plainly that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.’ What the Spirit receives from the Father is his being God, which is precisely what the Father and the Son have in common—the Father and the Son are one God. ‘Therefore, if the Holy Spirit exists from the Father because He exists from God, who is Father, then since He exists from God, who is Son, He cannot be denied to exist also from the Son.’

Along the line of Augustine, Anselm affirms: just as the Son is begotten of the Father, yet does not depart but remains in the same Godhead with the Father, and is one God with him, so also the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and is sent by the Son, yet does not depart but remains with the Father and the Son in the same Godhead, and is one God with both.

To reconcile unity and plurality in God, Anselm coins the famous phrase which the Council of Florence later elevates to dogmatic status: ‘unity does not lose its consequence unless some opposition of relation stands in the way’ (ubi non obviat aliqua relationis oppositio). With Augustine, Anselm affirms: ‘everything in God is identical except where there are opposed relations of origin (as there are in father, Son and the Holy Spirit).’ The mutual relations of the Father, the Son and the Spirit expressed distinctively in their names constitute their particular identities. Persons are three distinct ways of being one God. The relations, which denote their distinctive modes of origin, are
irreversible. The only thing, he argues, that makes the Son not the Father is that he is begotten by him; the only thing that makes the Holy Spirit not the Father or the Son is that he proceeds from both. Thus the Son cannot be the Father, because he exists from the Father; the Holy Spirit cannot be the Father because he proceeds from the Father. But how are the Son and the Spirit really distinct? Only if the one proceeds from the other. Anselm resorts to the later medieval principle of the wholes and parts to explain the way in which ‘God exists from God’. Either the whole exists from the whole or the part exists from the part; or else the whole exists from the part or a part exists from a whole. But God has no parts. The only adequate explanation for God to exist from God is the whole from whole. But if we argue that the Son exists from the whole of God, we must also concede that he exists from both the Father and the Holy Spirit; likewise the Holy Spirit, if he exists from the whole of God, must exist from both the Father and the Son. The conclusion, that both the Son exists from the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit exists from the Son, is impossible because of the opposition of relations: The Son’s (A) origin from the Spirit (B) precludes the Spirit’s (B) origin from the Son (A). Here a set of anomalies would emerge in the ‘existing from’ as operating between the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Anselm resolves it by speaking of two different ways of being ‘God from God’. If the Holy Spirit is ‘begotten’ of the Son, he argues, then the Holy Spirit would be the Son’s son as the Son is the Father’s. Thus the Spirit exists from the Son as he exists from the Father by ‘procession’, not by generation. Now either the Holy Spirit exists from the Son or the Son exists from the Holy Spirit. Anselm argues for the former, contending that the Son is not begotten of the Holy Spirit, because if he were, the Holy Spirit would be his father. But the Holy Spirit is not the Father. The Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit, because if he were, he would be the son of the Holy Spirit. Therefore by ‘unassailable reason’, the Holy Spirit must proceed from the Son as He is from the Father.32 Just as the Son cannot be really distinct from the Father unless he exists (proceeds) from the Father by begetting, so the Holy Spirit cannot be really distinct from the Son unless he exists from the Son by proceeding.33 The relation of the Father (the begetter) and the Son (the begotten) is such that if the Holy Spirit exists by proceeding from the Father, he too exists by proceeding from the Son. The principle of the ontological unity of the Godhead is to be maintained insofar as it does not infringe the distinct characteristics of
the individual persons. So there can be no Father except the Father of the Son, no Son except the Son of the Father, and no Holy Spirit other than the Spirit of the Father and the Son. Evans summarizes Anselm’s unity-trinity dialectic:

His (Anselm’s) argument turns on symmetry. Only if the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son do we have a situation in which each person of the Trinity is peculiar to himself and each has an attribute which he shares with the other two. Only the Son has a Father; only the Father has a Son; only the Spirit does not have a Spirit proceeding from himself. But both the Father and the Spirit do not have a Father; both the Spirit and the Son do not have a Son; and both the Father and the Son have a Spirit proceeding from themselves.34

Anselm uses Augustine’s ‘psychological’ model of the trinity—memory, intelligence, and love—to furnish a logical explanation of how the distinction of persons accords with the unity of essence in God.35 Augustine sees in the human image merely a reflection of the divine. However Anselm goes beyond Augustine, providing instead a metaphysical account of what transpires within a ‘Supreme Spirit’ (Father). The Supreme Spirit knows itself; the resultant self-knowledge is the Son; it also, in the dyadic form of the Father and the Son, loves itself, and the resultant self-love is the Holy Spirit. Anselm observes a parallelism between the effect of the Supreme Spirit’s self-knowledge and the effect of its self-love. The Supreme Spirit loves itself, regarding which he writes, ‘But, lo, as I am contemplate with delight the distinguishing properties of the Father and the Son, together with what they have in common, I find in the Father and the Son nothing more delightful to reflect upon than the affection of mutual love.’36 Just as God may be thought to remember and understand himself, he is also thought to love himself, so that ‘if the Father is referred to as the memory of the Supreme Spirit, and if the Son...as the understanding of the Supreme Spirit, then it is obvious that the love of the Supreme Spirit proceeds equally from the Father and the Son’.37 The Father and the Son love themselves, and each other with an equal love. This Love is as great as the Supreme Spirit, and hence it is the Supreme Spirit (or Being). To quote Anselm:

But what can be equal to the Supreme Spirit except the Supreme Spirit? Hence, this Love is the Supreme Spirit. In fact, if there never had been a creature—i.e., if nothing had ever existed other than the Supreme Spirit,
who is Father and Son—nonetheless, the Father and the Son would still have loved themselves and each other. Hence, it follows that this Love is identical with what the Father and the Son are, viz., the Supreme Being.

Now, since there cannot be many supreme beings, what is more necessary than that the Father, the Son, and their Love be one Supreme Being? Therefore, this Love is the Supreme Wisdom, the Supreme Truth, the Supreme Good, and whatever else can be predicated of the substance of the Supreme Spirit.\(^{38}\)

Likewise the love of the Supreme Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, not as two loves, but as one and the same whole. Just as the Supreme Spirit generates the Son by an act of self-knowledge, so too does the Supreme Spirit, now existing as dyad—as Father (or memory) and Son (or intelligence), produces the Holy Spirit (love) by an act of self-love. The Son as the Father's eternal self-expression is not identical with the Father because he is begotten as thought is begotten by intellect. The Father and the Son are mutually related as mind and thought are. Strictly speaking, they are one as to essence or being, but distinct as to modality or relation. Two such relations within one essential, intellectual being must have a third as the love that binds them together and that is the Holy Spirit—the third relation within the divine essence that proceeds eternally from both the Father (lover) and the Son (beloved).\(^{39}\) The Divinity's love of itself, a parallel to the divinity's knowledge of itself, produces the third person. ‘Since all things in God are perfect and simple, the love “breathed forth” as Spirit by Father and Son, Mind and Word’, Daley explains, ‘is co-extensive with them both; love, according to 1 John 4, is what God is, so that the Holy Spirit, as love, is precisely the “supreme essence” as shared by the Father and the Son, given not in virtue of the personal qualities of either of them, but “in virtue of their being”.’\(^{40}\) What is crucial for Anselm is this: the origin of the Holy Spirit is not rooted in the mutual love between the Father and the Son, but in love as the divine essence shared by both—viz., their one Godness of love. ‘For the Father and the Son equally send forth such a great good not from their relations, which are plural (the one relation is that of Father, the other that of Son), but from their essence, which does not admit of plurality.’\(^{41}\) This is in keeping with Anselm’s dominant emphasis on the principle of unity—the ‘one nature, highest of all the things that are, alone sufficient unto itself in its eternal beatitude’\(^{42}\).
DENNIS NGIEN is Research Professor of Theology at Tyndale Seminary, Toronto, Canada.

ENDNOTES
5. Ibid., I.7.
6. Anselm, 3.3 (De Incarnatione Verbi).
7. Anselm, 1.4 (Monologion).
8. Anselm, 3.37 (De Incarnatione Verbi).
9. Anselm, 1.84-85 (Monologion).
10. Ibid.


15. *Theological Treatises*, 24-25 (De Incarnatio Verbi).


17. Schmitt, I 11.21-5 as cited in Evans, *Anselm and Talking about God*, p. 100. (Translation is Evans’s.)


20. Congar, *ibid.*, pp. 98-99. Cf. Fortman, *ibid.*, p. 174: ‘Though Anselm generally followed Augustine closely, he did not approve Augustine’s statement that the Holy Spirit proceeds principaliter from the Father any more than he approved the Greek view that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father “per Filium”.’ Cf. Gerald O’Collins, “The State of the Questions”, in *The Trinity*, eds. Stephen Davis, Daniel Kendall & Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 11. One must note this as a historical fact, that the original form of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (from 381) did not say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father ‘alone’; rather it states that the Spirit proceeds ‘from the Father of the Son’. Cf. Augustine, *De trinitate* XV. xvii, 29, where he states that the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son, albeit principaliter from the Father. For a study of Photius’s doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father ‘alone’, see

21. Schmitt, II.213: ‘*Ex eo enim quod pater et filius unum sunt, id est ex deo, est spiritus sanctus, non ex eo unde alii sunt ubi invicem...Et. Quoniam pater non est prior aut posterior filio, aut maior aut minor, nec alter magis aut minus est deus quam alter, non est spiritus sanctus prius de patre quam de filio. Si ergo dicetur quod spiritus sanctus principaliter sit a patre, non alium significaret, quam quia ipse filius de quo est spiritus sanctus sit de illo, a patre.’ As quoted in Congar, *ibid.*, p. 99. (Translation is Congar’s.) Cf. Anselm, 3.198 & 214; Augustine, *De Trinitate* 15.17.29: ‘...and God the Father alone is he from whom the Word is born, and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds. And therefore I have added the word “principally”, because we find that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son also. But the Father gave him this too, not as to one already existing, and not yet having it; but whatever he gave to the only-begotten Word, he gave by begetting him. Therefore he so begat him as that the common Gift should proceed from him also, and the Holy Spirit should be the Spirit of both.’


26. A. I. C. Herron, “‘Who Proceedeth From the Father and the Son’: The Problem of the Filioque,” *Scottish Journal of Theology* 24 (1971):154. It is Heron’s judgment that Barth follows the Anselmian line of trinitarian thought. He quotes Barth’s concluding remark about the procession of the Spirit: ‘This third mode of existence (i.e., the Spirit) cannot result from the first alone or from the second alone, nor yet from a co-operation of the two, but only from their being as God the Father and God the Son, who are not “persons” either for themselves or in co-operation, but two modes of existence of the one being of God. Thus the one Godness of the Father


28. Anselm, 3.261, fn. 5; Theological Treatises, 87, fn. 2 (De Processione Spiritus Sancti).


33. G. L. Bray, The Doctrine of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993), pp. 181-2, where he criticizes Anselm who, having ignored the evidence of both Scripture and tradition, ‘subsumed the generation of the Son under the general heading of procession, as if it were analogous to the procession of the Spirit’. See Fortman, ibid., p. 174, who also recognizes that the term ‘procession’ has a double meaning, applying it both to the Son’s procession from the Father (which he means generation) and the Spirit’s procession from the Father and the Son (which he means spiration).


35. Anselm, 1.61-73 (Monologion 48-63); Schmit, II.183:22-29 (De processione Spiriti Sancti I). Cf. Augustine’s De Trinitate 15.7.12 who understands the Father as memory, the Son as understanding, and their Spirit as will or love. See Wayne Hankey, “The Place of the Psychological Image of the Trinity in the Arguments of Augustine’s De Trinitate, Anselm’s Monologion, and Aquinas “Summa Theologiae,” Dionysius III (Dec., 1979):99-110; Matthew Levering, “Speaking the

40. Brian E. Daley, “Revisiting the ‘Filioque’: Roots and Branches of An Old Debate, Part One,” *Pro Ecclesia X* (2001):48, where he deals with *Monologion* 54 (Anselm, 1.64). See *Summa*, Ia, 37, 1, ad 3 as cited in Gaybba, *ibid.*, p. 79. Aquinas, too, accepts the idea of the Spirit as the mutual love between Father and Son. But for him a ‘bond’ is a connection, which cannot explain the origin of nor can be it identified with Spirit. As such this bond is a medium, not an end product or term (*terminus*).

41. Anselm, 1.64 (*Monologion*).
42. Schmit, 1.13 (*Monologion*) as cited in Pelikan, *ibid.*, p. 261