In recent years, the precise character of Calvin’s ‘Calvinism’ has been extensively discussed. Numerous scholarly contributions have been occasioned by Dr. R.T. Kendall’s provocative monograph *Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649* (1979). The discussion seems to suggest, on balance, that a significant theological gap *does* exist between Calvin and later Calvinists, although many remain unconvinced. Various factors might explain a widespread reluctance to revise what is regarded as the traditional view of Calvin, with all that this might entail for Reformed orthodoxy. (Could our venerated Calvin be wrong, or are we ‘out of step’ after all?). Tradition is a powerful obstacle to theological revision. The situation may be compounded by personal psychological factors; there is a sense of security in a clear-cut, unquestioned theological stance vis-à-vis the fluctuating uncertainties of much alternative theology. A generation of Reformed scholars and preachers have established their reputations on the strength of their commitment to the ‘Five Points’, and acceptance within the Reformed fraternity will not be lightly jeopardised.

Whereas an idiosyncratic individualism, and a ‘unity-at-any-price’ ecumenism are alike to be shunned, the true scholar will ever be ready to reach new conclusions if the evidence is deemed sufficiently compelling. In addition to the ‘truth-value’ of any viewpoint, it will appear all the more attractive if it possesses a distinct tendency to reconcile opposing positions. Although truth, rather than deliberate compromise, must ever lead the way, the pursuit of an orthodox *via media* will ever be a legitimate concern for the evangelical scholar.

Whilst evangelicalism continues to be divided on many issues, no division has had such lasting and far reaching effects as the Calvinist—Arminian controversy. In the words of Alan Sell, the dispute has never been ‘solved, but only shelved’. This author pleads for a renewed concern for ‘doctrinal clarity, provided it could be fostered without acrimony’. It is the belief of the present writer that the recent debates about Calvin and Calvinism provide a unique
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opportunity to re-assess a controversy of such obvious and fundamental importance.

It would be historically inaccurate and theologically unjust to apportion blame unequally to the parties in dispute. However, it seems probable to conclude that predestinarian theology in the hands of Theodore Beza was the immediate stimulus for the Arminian reaction, rather than Calvin's own balanced and essentially Christological theology.\(^5\) As one reaction prompted another, so the seventeenth century Calvinists repudiated Arminianism with Bezan scholasticism, rather than Calvin's balanced biblicism. The dispute therefore became a contest between two equally anomalous positions. Sub-orthodox evangelicalism, i.e. Arminianism, was opposed by ultra-orthodox evangelicalism, i.e. High Calvinism. This was how the divines of Saumur in France (John Cameron, Moise Amyraut and others),\(^6\) Richard Baxter 'the apostle of Kidderminster'\(^7\) and others in England evaluated the issues. In nineteenth century Scotland, it was the conviction of Ralph Wardlaw that High Calvinism provided too easy an excuse for the Arminians to reject true Calvinism.\(^8\) Once this consideration is grasped, it is unjust to regard Amyraldianism alias Baxterianism as merely another variation on the theme of theological heterodoxy.

A failure accurately to define Calvinism in terms of John Calvin's actual soteriology has confused the entire discussion for too long. High Calvinist dogmas have prejudiced biblical exegesis in those areas central to the debate itself, viz. the nature, design, extent and application of the atonement. To assist us in substantiating these arguments, it will be useful to consider a number of evangelical theologians, ranging from that doyen of Puritan high Calvinism, Dr. John Owen, to John Wesley, the very personification of English Arminianism.

Any attempt at theological reconstruction almost inevitably involves the demolition of 'myths'. This is regrettably necessary where the incisive and brilliant contribution of Dr. J.I. Packer is concerned, whose advocacy of the orthodoxy of John Owen is well known. Dr. Packer remains an unflinching supporter of Owen, believing that the Puritan wrote the very last word on the subject of the atonement.\(^9\) He is evidently confirmed in the myth, more recently perpetuated by Paul Helm,\(^10\) that no significant differences exist between the theologies of John Calvin and John Owen. Dr. Packer's own statement, that the Synod of Dort taught what Calvin would have said 'had he faced the developed Arminian thesis'\(^11\) is entirely questionable, especially if he thinks that Dort speaks for Owen. Since Calvin had no quarrel with the Council of Trent over the atonement,\(^12\) it is arguable to suggest that, election apart, Calvin would have been happy with the Arminian thesis. He would have objected to their denial of election and predestination (based on faith
foreseen) but not to the idea of universal atonement *per se*. In short, later Calvinism represented a policy of 'over kill' in its handling of the controversy. This is especially true of the Westminster divines, and even more so in the case of John Owen.

It must be said that even the theology of Dort only represents a half way stage in the transition from the theology of Calvin and the other reformers to the theology of Owen. In other words, contrary to the verdict of some, even Dort Calvinism is not so 'high' as subsequent developments. Indeed, it is a popular fallacy to associate Owen with Dort, when one discovers Richard Baxter asserting 'In the article of the extent of redemption, wherein I am most suspected and accused, I do subscribe to the Synod of Dort, without any exception, limitation, or exposition, of any word, as doubtful and obscure.' Only from Baxter's perspective is it true to say that Dort's theology expresses the mind of Calvin.

Fundamental to the Dort Canon's conception of the atonement is the formula 'sufficient for all, efficient for the elect'. This conception was properly the view of the Calvinistic universalists, rather than the particularists. One may suggest however, that article 3 of the second Dort Canon is marginally ambiguous, in that its concept of the sufficiency of the atonement does not distinguish between Beza's idea of *mere* (or undesigned) sufficiency and what Bishop John Davenant called an *ordained* (or designed) sufficiency. It is clear that Owen follows the Bezan tradition, whereas Davenant and Baxter follow Calvin. Unlike Beza and Owen, Davenant and Baxter would concur with Calvin's comment on the thief on the cross, '... our Lord made effective for him his death and passion which He suffered and endured for all mankind...' In the words of John Cameron, Calvin's use of the 'sufficient for all/efficient for the elect' formula involves a more 'ample' concept of sufficiency. Owen's use of this is very different. It implies that the atonement would have been sufficient for all had God intended it. In short, according to Owen's thesis, the atonement was only sufficient for whom it was efficient.

Dr. Packer's sympathy for Owen's theology of the atonement involves him in a further anomaly, especially where his adherence to Reformed Anglican orthodoxy is concerned. A close examination of the Parker Society volumes reveals that the Anglican reformers embraced a theology of the atonement closely akin to John Calvin's. John Hooper and Hugh Latimer are particularly clear in this respect. It is perfectly clear from Cranmer's Prayer Book and the Thirty-nine Articles that the Reformed Anglican Church never committed its clergy to the doctrine of limited atonement. John Wesley argued this point with Rowland Hill in view of Article XXXI, the Communion service and the Catechism. Whereas George Whitefield was entirely correct to challenge Wesley on the latter's implicit rejection of Article XVII, 'Of Predestination and Election'
Wesley had a case against Whitefield, Hill and Toplady where the extent of the atonement was concerned. John Goodwin, Owen’s Arminian contemporary, argued this point with even greater force than Wesley was able to muster. Indeed, Goodwin shows how familiar he was with Calvin and the other Reformation divines, whose views on the atonement he enlisted against his high Calvinist critics. Wesley’s case is further substantiated by the views of John Jewel and Richard Hooker in the late sixteenth century, and more recent statements by John Newton, Thomas Scott and J.C. Ryle. In short, Dr. Packer is in as anomalous a position for going ‘beyond’ Anglican Calvinism, as Arminian Anglicans are for failing to embrace it. It was for the via media that Baxter was pleading, a position arguably identical to Calvin’s original biblical insights.

Hitherto, John Owen’s exposition of the theology of the atonement has been considered unanswerable and irrefutable. However, there is good reason to suggest that the chief strength of his argument lies not so much in his exegesis of the biblical data, but in the distinctly Aristotelian methodology he employs in the process. Although some attention has been drawn to Owen’s Aristotelianism, its most damaging feature has not been detected. Owen is not so much to be penalised for the use of the syllogistic method as such, but for ignoring, or distorting, textual data in his deductive operations. Owen’s logical starting points are sometimes suspect, and he often argues ‘beyond’ the data, rather than within it, to the utter detriment of Scriptural paradox. For instance, Owen would never acquiesce in Calvin’s acceptance of the paradox between the generality of the provision of grace and its particular, efficacious application. Of course, Calvin sees a direct correlation between the universal offer of gospel grace and a universal atonement. Another example of Owen’s Aristotelianism is his ‘means-end’ thinking. Owen argues for a single, exclusivist teleology in the atonement, viz. the one end in the death of Christ was the salvation of the elect, and the procurement of grace for them alone. The entire drift of Owen’s argument in the Death of Death would lead one to imagine that Owen would find no place for the popular idea of common grace in his soteriology. However, this is not the case. In short, Owen, cannot really validate the distinction he still employs, along with Baxter, the Westminster divines and Calvin, between common and special grace. It is hardly surprising to find Hussey, Brine and Gill in the next century discarding the notion of common grace whilst they pursued the rigorous logic of Owen’s Death of Death. Baxter’s point is that the Bible does not support the kind of exclusive particularity of the atonement implied by Owen. The doctrine of common grace suggests other, even ‘lower’ ends, than the admittedly chief end of the redemption of the elect. It is important also to remember, that Owen did not confine his idea of common
grace to providence alone, since it did have a place in the *ordo salutis*. In other words, one is committed to a dualistic hermeneutic of the kind obvious in Calvin and latent in the Scriptures themselves, e.g. Deut. 29:29; Matthew 22:14, 1 Tim. 4:10. Indeed, a precise correlation obtains between common grace and special grace, and the 'sufficient for all/efficient for the elect' formula. The universal provision of grace by means of an all sufficient atonement is as much part of the design of the atonement as its effectual application to the elect. Owen is thus forced to choose either Baxter's position if he wishes to retain common grace, or Gill's position if the atonement is strictly limited.

The position therefore emerges more clearly that the atonement, as with the entire scheme of redemption, possesses *general* as well as *particular* features. Unless this synthesis, rooted in plain text after plain text, is adhered to, then no gospel statement is safe from distortion. The Gospel is therefore *universal* in provision (John 3:16), though *particular* in application (John 6:37). When high Calvinism stressed the latter at the expense of the former, it was natural for the Arminians to commit the reverse mistake. Each viewpoint distorted the aspect it suppressed, viz. the Arminian rejected sovereign election, as the high Calvinist rejected universal atonement. One may conclude that if Arminianism is the rationalism of the left, then high Calvinism is the rationalism of the right. Both positions, albeit from opposing perspectives, suppressed textual data in the interests of theory. True Calvinism accepts the biblical paradox of the fact of election *and* the fact of a universal atonement. It is surely significant that when Amyraut was charged with heterodoxy at this point, he appealed to Calvin's own teaching in his *Defense De La Doctrine De Calvin* (1644) and other writings. Pierre du Moulin—the French John Owen, was as much out of order in his treatment of Amyraut as was Owen in his treatment of Baxter.

John Owen is at his most reprehensible when he employs Aristotle's metaphysical substance/accidents theory. As is clear from the *Death of Death*, Owen employs the Commercial theory of the atonement to argue its particularity in both design and application. This is why he adopts the modified idea of sufficiency referred to above. The atonement is only sufficient for whom it is efficient, because it only relates to the debts of the elect. In arguing with these commercial metaphors, Owen insists that the Lord Christ paid the same price owed by the elect to God on account of their transgressions—the *solutio ejusdem*. Richard Baxter (following the Dutch jurist-theologian Grotius at the only point he could do so with any real justification) argued that, in virtue of the obvious differences between our Lord's *limited* sufferings, and the *eternal* sufferings of the lost, Christ only 'paid' a qualitative equivalent—the *solutio tantidem*. It is at this point that, in reply to Baxter, Owen resorts to
Aristotle's dubious substance/accidents theory to argue a 'sameness' between our Lord's sufferings and the pains of the damned. In short, our Lord's agonies were 'substantially' the same, but 'accidentally' equivalent. In other words, Owen is forced to concede that there is only a similarity, not a sameness at all. Had Baxter been as nimble as David Hume at this point, he would have exploded Owen's case. However, Aristotle had a few more years to reign in seventeenth century scholastic circles. We are now able to see how Owen's questionable commercialism falls to the ground, and with it, the classical case for the doctrine of limited atonement.

It is surely important to note that numerous Reformed theologians have rejected what is surely the raison d'être of limited atonement, in most cases retaining the theory against their better judgment. Charles Hodge, R.L. Dabney, and Andrew Fuller are but three. Thomas Chalmers seems to have seen the full implications of this, whilst virtually embracing an Amyraldian position. Andrew Fuller made the valuable point that if the commercial theory is correct, then believers appear at the throne of grace as claimants rather than suppliants. As Joseph Bellamy of New England observed, the commercial theory implies that those who 'claim' the benefits of the atonement have some prior knowledge of their election. Of course, the very pastoral problem suggested by this kind of thinking explains the tragedy of the Hypercalvinism of Hussey, Brine, Gill and the Gospel Standard Strict Baptists, with all its associated personal misery. It seems therefore perfectly just to suggest that Owen, through the embryonic Hypercalvinism of the Death of Death, made his contribution to this 'downgrade', equally pernicious as the opposite one from Baxterianism to Unitarianism. On the other, and more healthy hand, Calvin taught that Christ is the mirror of election. Election is only known indirectly by faith in Christ, and the gospel call takes place within the context of a universal atonement. Those who reject the gospel do not 'pay' over again what Christ 'paid' for them. He suffered the tantundem; they will 'pay' the idem. Assuming the commercialist analogy, there is no duplication of payment, in which case, Toplady's oft-quoted lines do not apply as a proof of limited atonement.

The idem-tantundem distinction sheds light on the question of substitution. Just as the provision of atonement in Israel was co-extensive with the nation, yet not all actually partook of the benefit (many being disobedient and impenitent), so the provision of Calvary extends to all the world, though many do not actually believe. In this respect, there is really something 'on offer', antecedent to its actual reception, making full sense of the idea of the atonement's universal sufficiency. Furthermore, as in the Old Testament the lamb and its sufferings were substituted for the deserved sufferings of guilty Israel, so likewise Christ and His sufferings were substituted for the
deserved pains of mankind. Dr. Packer criticised Baxter for arguing that God relaxed the law rather than satisfying it, but it is noteworthy that even Owen grants a relaxation of the law with respect to the persons suffering. Baxter was surely correct to pursue the point that God relaxed the law both with regard to the persons and their sufferings. Baxter's point is surely irrefutable when he argues that the law did not permit the notion of the punishment of a substitute in the place of the offender. Thus Christ's sacrifice satisfied the law-giver as above His law. Coupled with the infinite dignity of the suffering Saviour, His sufferings were regarded as a satisfactory equivalent for all that is deserved by mankind. The 'exact payment' idea would involve the unthinkable thought that the Saviour would suffer eternally in hell while the sinner was in heaven. This consideration apart, only a rehabilitation of Aristotle can give validity to Owen's argument, a thought unlikely to appeal to evangelical scholars.

Dr. Packer is correct to point out the dangers of Baxter's dependence on the Governmental theory of Grotius. Even then, the Puritan's worst crime is to 'overdo' political analogies to the point of using every aspect of secular government to illustrate sacred themes. As R.L. Dabney suggests, the objection chiefly relates to the form of government in question, not the fact of government itself. This said, in fairness to Baxter, there are monarchical analogies in the Bible, and he does not depend so heavily on notions of governmental expediency or utilitarianism as does the Dutchman. In short, Baxter does consider that the atonement relates chiefly to the satisfaction of divine justice, rather than the mere deterrence of sin, especially in his later works. What Baxter did see, viz. that Owen was guilty of over using commercial metaphors, applies equally to his own over-use of political metaphors. In this respect, both men were in error. After all, analogy is not identity. There is a difference between God's rule and secular kingship, and there is a difference between sins and debts. In other words, the atonement is incorrectly viewed in either political or commercial terms, as understood in the seventeenth century. It must surely be viewed, as by the Amyraldian A.H. Strong in ethical terms. The atonement was a qualitative mystery, rather than a quantitative transaction. It is because of this particular insight that Baxter has the 'edge' over Owen in the exposition of the 'universalist texts like John 3:16 and 1 John 2:2, etc. Even while allowing for election as the ultimate explanation of the applied particularity of redemption, Baxter is able to resist the temptation to 'particularise' the universalist expressions as Owen repeatedly does, i.e. 'world' = 'world of the elect'; 'all' = 'all the elect', etc. It would, of course, be better to treat the whole matter as did Calvin and the other reformers, without regard to the metaphysical complexities of the commercialism versus politicism era of the seventeenth century.
Nonetheless, it seems correct to conclude that Baxter rather than Owen is the true heir of Calvin's Scriptural theology.

Having dealt with the major thesis of John Owen's *Death of Death*, a few residual problems should be tackled. It is commonly argued that if the atonement relates to any who perish, then the blood of Christ was shed in vain. Closely related to this objection is the one which says that none will be found in hell for whom Christ died. How can they be justly punished if Christ died for them? Quite apart from the fact that the Apostles Paul and Peter saw no theoretical difficulties here,\(^{59}\) it may be said that if the atonement is the ground upon which the gospel is universally preached, then that particular `end' is accomplished. Furthermore, the atonement is also the basis upon which those who reject the gospel are justly punished. Indeed, the question may be returned, if it is the duty of mankind to believe the gospel, and unbelief is guilty disobedience (2 Thess. 1:8; Romans 1:5), what are unbelievers guilty of rejecting if Christ was not given for them? However awesome the thought, are there not those who are condemned, precisely because they have spurned God's conditional offers of mercy?

It must of course be appreciated, that all three positions—High Calvinist, Amyraldian and Arminian, are confronted by the insoluble difficulty of reconciling the ultimate paradox of divine sovereignty on one hand, and human responsibility on the other. Closely correlating with this is the additional paradox between divine election and universal invitations of grace. At the centre of the latter paradox is the question, ‘For whom did Christ die?’ The important thing is to answer this question without suppressing or distorting any aspect of the paradox. It has been already shown that the high Calvinist answers the question from the perspective of election, thus denying that Christ died for any other than the elect. Similarly, the Arminian replies to the question from the perspective of the universal offer, thus denying election (in the Calvinist sense, of course). What the Amyraldian does is to live with the paradox without adjusting it as the other parties do. An analogy will illustrate the position as follows. God's revealed truth may be likened to a house. `Upstairs' is the realm of God's secret will, the decree of electing grace, the efficacious application of the atonement to the elect, and their perseverance in grace. `Downstairs' is the realm of God's conditional will and indiscriminate offers of mercy, a universally sufficient atonement and exhortations to persevere in grace. The Arminian tends to think he lives in a `bungalow', whereas the High Calvinist tends to live `upstairs' all the time. However, the Amyraldian recognises that both floors have scriptural data for their support, seeking always the wisdom to know when, and how, to use the `stairs'. It may be said that Baxter was wonderfully agile in this respect!' He realised that the `world' was not to be greeted with the
good news by shouting from an ‘upstairs room’, but by proclaiming it from the ‘front door’. However, he knew his Bible well enough to know that the final success of evangelistic endeavour was guaranteed by ‘higher’ considerations than mere human nature.

In common with the teaching of Calvin and the sixteenth century reformers, Richard Baxter believed that the question ‘For whom did Christ die?’ must be answered in terms of the kind of dualistic hermeneutic we have illustrated. In short, Christ died for all sufficiently (pardon being conditional), though for the elect absolutely and efficiently. He believed that the evidence of the Bible allowed no other interpretation which did not, at one and the same time, offer violence to the data. He summed up his position as follows:

When God saith so expressly that Christ died for all, and tasted death for every man, and is the ransom for all, and the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, it beseems every Christian rather to explain in what sense Christ died for all men, than flatly to deny it.60

It is refreshing to find Baxter making a straightforward, if slightly indirect reference to certain texts in the New Testament. His one object, after all the metaphysical and logical jousting was over, was to leave his fellow disputants with the verbum Dei. He believed that the task of the theologian was to make a balanced response to all the evidence, and he believed also that his version of the issues alone met that requirement. As we have seen, Baxterianism was the seventeenth century expression of Calvinism, rather than a heterodox theology. Of course, judged by the criteria of high Calvinism, it was bound to look like a compromise with Arminianism, as surely as the Arminians thought Baxterianism to be too Calvinistic! Baxter considered that, at their best, both high Calvinism and Arminianism were but emphasising opposite sides of the same coin. They were both, in differing though complementary senses, semi-Calvinist. He saw that as the Arminian was not all wrong, so the high Calvinist was not all right, and vice versa.

If Baxter and his theological companions are right, then Arminianism appears no more heretical than high Calvinism arguably seems. The men of the via media would therefore have no difficulty in singing with Charles Wesley:

O for a trumpet voice,
On all the world to call!
To bid their hearts rejoice
In Him who died for all;
For all my Lord was crucified,
For all, for all my Saviour died.61
Considerations of election apart, these verses are as much the authentic voice of true Calvinism as they are of Arminianism. It is only on the level of the atonement’s application that the Calvinist parts company with the Arminian. The true Calvinist alias Amyraldian alias Baxterian is therefore in a unique position to attempt a reconciliation between the opposing wings of Evangelicalism. True Calvinism has a strong sympathy with what is demonstrably Scriptural in both viewpoints, although it could not agree with both in everything. Although Richard Baxter had little success in healing the divisions of his day, it remains true that the theological ground he occupied is the most likely meeting place for a united evangelicalism. True, an entrenched traditionalism might render such thoughts powerless, but a reconsideration of the issues as outlined above must surely create new possibilities. In which case, our return visit to Geneva via Canterbury, Kidderminster and Saumur will have proved a worthwhile beginning to the task of theological reassessment and reconciliation.

ALAN CLIFFORD is a Baptist Minister at Great Ellingham, Norfolk

NOTES

5 This is not to question Calvin’s own rigid teaching on predestination, but merely to acknowledge a difference in perspective compared with Beza’s approach. See Dr. Buick Knox’s comment in *op. cit.*, p.148.
7 See Baxter’s *Catholick Theologie*. (1675). Bk.2. p.50. and his *Preface to Certain Disputations of Right to Sacraments*. (1658).
10 See *Calvin and the Calvinists*. (1982).


16 Contrary to Kendall's claim, it is clear that Calvin accepts the formula in his comment on 1 John 2:2, although he denies that it has relevance to the text itself.


18 Armstrong, op. cit., p.59.

19 See op. cit., (Banner of Truth ed.), p.184. This idea dictates Owen's view of his famous 'triple choice' question, viz. Christ died for 'either all the sins of all men, or all the sins of some men, or some of the sins of all men.' (op. cit., p.61). Unlike Owen, Calvin and Baxter embrace the first choice with respect to the atonement's sufficiency, and the second choice with respect to its efficiency. This is also the teaching of the famous *Heidelberg Catechism* (1563) in its answer to Q.37. Christ suffered the wrath of God 'against the sins of all mankind . . .'

20 *Later Writings of Bishop Hooper*, (1852). p.31.


22 Statements in both the Communion service and the Catechism show a clear understanding of a universal dimension in the atonement.

23 See Article XXXI, and also Articles II and XV.


30 See Scott's *Theological Works* (1839), pp.139 and 144n.


33 See Calvin’s *Comment* on Matthew 23:37 and Romans 5:18. In an otherwise valuable survey of the literature, Roger Nicole fails to grasp this. He is thus involved in an incoherent exposition of Calvin’s position, see op. cit., pp.213, 217. Judging by Nicole’s remarks on Calvin’s logic (p.210), he is clearly unwilling to share the reformer's version of the ultimate paradox.


35 See also Berkhof’s concessionary comment about common grace, together with the cautionary remark that the common/special grace distinction is not intended to suggest two kinds of grace, in *Systematic Theology*, (1963 rep.). pp.436 and 435 respectively.

36 John Owen is guilty of this, in a way Calvin is not. Compare Owen’s exposition of John 3:16 in the *Death of Death*, p.2071 with Calvin’s *Comment* on the verse.

37 ibid., p.153f.

38 ibid., pp.155, 184.
The metaphysical point here, as highlighted by David Hume with irrefutable cogency, is that a 'thing' is what its 'accidents' are. Once the accidents or properties are logically separated from the substance, what can be meaningfully said about the 'substance'? Equivalence in 'accidents' can only mean equivalence of the thing. Even William Cunningham shows little sympathy for Owen's position, thus failing to grasp the significance of the issue. See Historical Theology. (1960 rep.), Vol.2, p.307.

Owen was 'better than his creed', still teaching 'free offers of grace', whereas developed Hypercalvinism denied the 'free offer'.

An 'equivalent compensation'.

The same, exact payment.

Payment God cannot twice demand.
   First at my bleeding Surety's hand.
   And then again at mine.' See Diary and Hymns of Augustus Toplady. (1969 ed.) p.193.

See The Doctrine of Justification ... Among the Puritans in By Schisms Rent Assunder. (Puritan Conference Report. 1969), p.27.


In the same volume appears Dabney's penetrating discussion God's Indiscriminate Proposals of Mercy (pp.282f.) in which he entertains a much broader conception of the love of God than ever Owen would allow.

See Systematic Theology. (1890), pp.409f.

See 1 Corinthians 6:1; Romans 14:15; 1 Corinthians 8:11 and 2 Peter 2:1. It has to be said that, at this point, Owen's exegesis of these verses is totally unconvincing.


ibid., Hymn 1 verse 6.