

Wycliffe the Academic: the old and the new

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John Wycliffe was at Oxford for most of his working life, as student and teacher; and for all the years when his habits of thought were being formed he was working within an academic tradition. He proved to be extraordinarily good at academic exercises and he became prominent at Oxford. His academic ability launched him on a career in the royal service because it brought him to notice, and much followed from that, as he came into contact with the controversies of a wider world and involved himself in them disastrously. But his later notability must not be allowed to blind us to the ordinariness of his beginnings as a scholar. Wycliffe's mind had a long training in a discipline which required a particular rigour, and when he turned to politically contentious subject-matter and to views which brought him to charges of heresy, he did not change his methods of analysis or his approach to problem-solving. The views of his later years were arrived at by a process of steady unfolding of ideas he had long held but which were given a new direction and sharpness by his growing anger. The underlying conventionality of Wycliffe's scholarship cannot be overemphasized.

The story is well known. As far as we can determine, John Wycliffe's education at Oxford followed the usual course.¹ He would have spent four or five years as an undergraduate, studying the *artes*; then three or more years as *scholaris* and *sophista*, followed by a year of question and response in the academic exercises, before his first 'determination' as a graduate; a further three years at least would have followed until his determination and inception as a master (*creatio magistri*).² The undergraduates of the day came to Oxford without necessarily possessing the inclination or the aptitude for these studies, and only a comparatively small proportion achieved the bachelor's degree and still fewer the master's.

Wycliffe was one of a still smaller number who went on to become theologians. We hear of him for the first time as a probationary Fellow at Merton.³ In 1360 there were six colleges, with a total of less than seventy-five members. Most of these already had their bachelor's degrees and were beginning to prove themselves. The colleges were designed to provide housing and support for poor but promising scholars,⁴ while they worked towards a higher degree. With his doctorate, a man was almost bound to get preferment and to become self-supporting. By 1360 Wycliffe was a *magister* and Master of Balliol; but these college affiliations were temporary, as they were

designed to be. Before he continued his studies, he retired temporarily to a college living at Fillingham in Lincolnshire, and when he returned to Oxford in 1363 he took lodgings in Queen's College for a time. Queen's was at that period a poor college which let rooms rather as the halls did, to undergraduates in need of board, lodging and tuition. While he was living there, Wycliffe began the course of hearing four years' lectures on the set books for theology.

In 1365 he was offered the wardenship of a foundation known as Canterbury College, one of a number of houses to which members of religious orders were sent so that they could study at Oxford. Wycliffe's wardenship was not a success and he was ejected.⁵ He continued to live at Queen's for the rest of his time at Oxford. There remained, after a fifth year of opposing and a seventh year of responding, a period of reading the Sentences, and then a further two years before he became *magister theologiae*, during which the bachelor of theology must preach and give lectures on a book of the Bible.⁶ Wycliffe seems to have reached this point about 1371.

By 1372 he was beyond dispute the leading master,⁷ and his entry into the royal service about this time, and his mission to Bruges in 1374, did not take him permanently away from Oxford.⁸

These are the external events. They tell us something about the growth of Wycliffe's mind. The most striking feature of such a training is its length: a continuance in the same exercises of hearing lectures put together in a similar way, and engaging in formal disputations about questions arising, year after year. Wycliffe saw no reason to alter the methods of work and thought thus formed.

The system bred the habit of controversy, too. Senior churchmen tried to check the speculative licence allowed in the schools, but with little success. The academics had considerable freedom of speech. When Wycliffe applied his mind to abuses in the church, he won support from fellow academics who wanted to popularize his views, and therein lay the danger: as it proved, academic controversy moved out into society at large at some peril to everyone. Until the early 1370s, Wycliffe wrote about matters of current debate in the schools. Then, soon after he entered the royal service, he began to produce contentious contributions to disputes which had a political colour. Here again we can trace the influence of outward events. Wycliffe was present at the Parliament of 1371 when John Bankin, a doctor of divinity and one of the Augustinian friars, asserted the principle that it was justifiable for the state to seize the property of the church for the common good. Wycliffe came to support this position warmly, because it struck at abuses he perceived within the church. In the Parliament of October 1373 the Commons expressed their dislike of the system of 'provisions', by which the pope could reserve for himself the appointment to many benefices, including nearly all the English bishoprics. In 1374 a meeting was held at Bruges to which the

pope despatched envoys, and seven English ambassadors were sent. Again Wycliffe was present. He began to think seriously about the nature of lordship, in order to make a case for the right of his royal masters to act as they wished to do against the higher clergy. He was censured by the ecclesiastical authorities. He wrote again, more fiercely, striking at some of the basic principles of Catholic doctrine, until in 1376 his opinions on lordship were condemned at Avignon. By 1378 he had gone further than he could withdraw from, without loss of face, and indeed his temper seems to have been roused by now to a point where he had ceased to be held back by any prospect of damaging his career. Again we can see external events acting upon him, forming his opinions in the way his training in the schools had formed his methods of problem-solving.

The study of the Bible was central to Wycliffe's thinking in every area of his early and later work. It is here that we can see best of all, perhaps, how his academic training and his awakening to the political world worked together in him. Although in his youth he himself had found Scripture illogical, in 1378 he wrote the *De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae* to defend the literal truth of the Bible.⁹ He had been criticized for using biblical authority in his polemical writings, to the exclusion of the authority of the church. He wanted to justify himself and at the same time to make a further attack on the clergy by insisting that the Bible did not need their interpretation; all Christians could read the Scriptures for themselves. Indeed, the Bible is essential reading for everyone. There is a hint of this attitude even in his early textbook on logic, where he begins by explaining that he has written it to enable students to read the Bible with an intelligent grasp of the way its language works, and to help them see through arguments which are put forward by confused interpreters, or which are actually fallacious.¹⁰ He complained frequently that his contemporaries read the Bible ignorantly or superficially.¹¹ He wanted both more rigorous and more popular Bible study. The Bible is designed to teach ordinary men and make them soldiers in the church militant.¹²

Pressing a little further, he insists that it is by living according to the teaching of the gospel (*doctrina evangelii*) that a man makes himself pleasing in the sight of God; to keep the *regula evangelica* is to do all that is necessary to be preserved from damnation.¹³ There is no room here for the church's teaching on the necessity of sacraments for salvation. Indeed, says Wycliffe, the church itself would be in a better state if it were ruled purely by the light of Scripture (*statum ecclesiae . . . utilius et undique expeditius foret sibi regulari pure lege Scripturae*) rather than in the present way, where 'human traditions' (*traditiones humane*) are so mingled with biblical truths.¹⁴ The Bible is itself, simply, 'the faith'.¹⁵

It followed that the church is not the select body of bishops, priests, monks, canons, friars, against whose claim to authority Wycliffe was

now setting his face, but the elect body of all faithful believers. His attack on the doctrine of transubstantiation was of a piece with this line of thought: if a miracle takes place at the consecration of the host which only priests can perform, they have a claim to hold a special place in the church. The internal consistency of all these claims made it impossible for Wycliffe to abandon his position without giving way on all his assumptions. When a commission of twelve doctors condemned him to Oxford in 1380, he retired to his living at Lutterworth; he would not alter his views and stay in Oxford.¹⁶

If we look more closely at Wycliffe's methods of approach to the Bible as teacher and exegete, some aspects of this interplay between his training and his new awareness of implications become apparent at once.¹⁷ Some contemporaries were arguing that some parts of the Bible must be false because they contradict the laws of logic.¹⁸ This was academic controversy, but it spurs Wycliffe on to make claims which are in keeping with his developing position on Scripture and tradition. Scripture cannot err; it is indefectible.¹⁹ Scripture contains all truth.²⁰ Indeed it is the only source of certainty. Only by its truth can the falsity of certain arguments be demonstrated.²¹ Human knowledge is useless by comparison.²² He goes so far as to assert that nothing not found in Scripture can be true religion, although he allows for much to be implicit rather than explicit.²³ Whatever is valid in human laws is implied or stated in Scripture.²⁴ *Novitas* is dangerous unless it can be shown to be not novelty at all because it is in Scripture.²⁵ (Wycliffe builds his case against transubstantiation in part on its novelty.) He is uncomfortable with terms which are not in the Bible.²⁶

Similarly, in commentary, Wycliffe takes the conventional method²⁷ and uses it in his own way. The Fathers and modern commentators alike are valueless unless what they say 'sounds in conformity with Scripture'; 'Augustine did not presume to impose his own opinion on Christ's meaning'.²⁸ If a commentator argues that certain Old Testament figures lied, he has failed to understand God's intention in making it appear so: He was limiting their perceptions for a time for his own purposes, and he uses them to make some truth plain; he is the *auctor signorum*.²⁹

Scripture must be seen as a whole, Old and New Testament together, in total agreement with itself.³⁰ Whether the two accounts of the parable of the talents in Luke and Matthew are to be taken as describing the same occasion or whether they are thought of as different accounts, their meaning is the same.³¹ The epistles are of the same authority as the gospel; they are themselves a gospel (*evangelium*) because they were dictated by the same Spirit.³² Scripture is the rule and limit of interpretation.³³ No interpretation is satisfactory unless it is *consona Scripturae*, in keeping with the spirit of Scripture as a whole.³⁴ 'A gloss ought not to be accepted unless it is in accordance with Scripture.'³⁵

This high doctrine of the infallibility of Scripture reduces the Fathers to a humbler position where they can be criticized. There are difficulties about how certain 'moral words' of Chrysostom are to be accepted literally.³⁶ 'It seems to many more difficult to understand [Augustine] here than the text of the Gospel on which he is commenting.'³⁷ It is clear that such criticisms were current in the schools and that it is not only Wycliffe who would, for example, compare Augustine and Chrysostom to the disadvantage of one or the other.³⁸ But Wycliffe takes an extreme view of the implications of such inadequacies on the part of the Fathers. The authority of Scripture is infinitely greater than any other opinion, even of the saints. The authors of Scripture took what they said directly (*immediate*) from God, but the other saints who came after them did so only in part. Where what they say comes from the Holy Spirit it is sound, but the devil mixes in *multa periculosa dogmata*, and it is wise to regard non-biblical opinions as *probabilia*. Wycliffe would like to see the people of God content with the good bread of Scripture alone, for that is all they need.³⁹

The same reconsideration of traditional methods in the light of new priorities is apparent in Wycliffe's use of figurative interpretation.⁴⁰ He gives his own emphasis to the principle that every word of Scripture is there for a reason.⁴¹ It may be there for several reasons. Words in Scripture may have multiple meanings,⁴² and where that is the case we may be confident that any meaning which is appropriate and *consona Scripturae* is intended by the divine author; Christ's Word is full of life (*vivax*).⁴⁹ Thus above the literal sense stand the allegorical, anagogical and moral senses, and Wycliffe refers to them freely where he feels them helpful. Zacharias and Elizabeth, *sponsi concordēs*, are figures of Christ and his bride the church, taken *moraliter*.⁴⁴ He explains the mystical meaning of Rachel's weeping,⁴⁵ how Peter is a type of the active life, John of the contemplative,⁴⁶ all stock interpretations, but still forceful for him. He gives a conventional account of the system of interpretation itself: the literal or historical sense refers to what has actually happened, the allegorical says what the believer ought to hold about the church in this world, the anagogical what he ought to hope about the world to come, and the moral what he ought to do in his own life if he is to conduct himself rightly. He even includes the rhyming mnemonic:

Litera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria,
Moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia.⁴⁷

But he counsels moderation in the use of such interpretations beyond the literal. It can often be more helpful to concentrate on the literal meaning, the sweetest of all, the most full of wisdom, the most precious.⁴⁸

In taking this view, he is again adopting a relatively 'modern' position, an approach which leads him to want to see the gloss not only fit a harmonious interpretation of Scripture but also accord with reason,⁴⁹ and which encourages him to 'begin from the beginning and first uncover the signification of the terms'.⁵⁰ The emphasis on signification, and the habit of close scrutiny of the way words are used in context, was the fruit of the work of logicians in the last two and a half centuries who had become increasingly expert in the analysis of terms,⁵¹ and who regarded them as the foundation of logic. Wycliffe takes the same view in his *Logica*, beginning with terms, the properties of terms, and the way they behave.⁵² But the logic Wycliffe has in mind is a Christian logic, not used to defy Scripture but in its service.⁵³ There must be no crude misunderstanding, either, such as a mere schoolmaster (*grammaticus*) is liable to fall into if he is over-ambitious in his interpretations.⁵⁴

Wycliffe was treading a careful path between tradition and the *moderni*. He sometimes uses *modernus* as a term of reproof: 'For those evidences, together with others like them, lead the modern doctors, not yet to say that most of Scripture is false, but that there is manifest lying, from which they conclude ... that it is permissible to lie either out of humility, or out of piety, or else for some other reason which is acceptable to God.'⁵⁵ Strictly speaking, the *logica moderna* was that branch of the subject which was covered neither in the *Logica Vetus* nor in the new works of Aristotle, which had arrived during the twelfth century and made up a complete Aristotelian logic. He left uncovered, or touched only in passing, certain topics which became central to later medieval logic: the properties of terms, the difference between terms which signify by themselves in a proposition (*categoremata*) and those which signify only in company with others, such as prepositions and conjunctions (*syncategoremata*); the argument-game known as 'obligations'. Wycliffe was born late enough in the development of this additional logic to be able to include it quite naturally in his own syllabus in the *Logica*, and to think of the *moderni* in a rather broader way as representing a tendency to let logic run away with common sense.

Nevertheless, their influence has its effect. He is able to consider possibilities such as errors of transmission (*codicum incorrectio*) and mistakes in translation in discussing an interpretation,⁵⁷ in a way which would have been quite revolutionary two hundred years earlier.⁵⁸ He has contemporary 'philosophers' and 'metaphysicians' metaphorically at his elbow as he writes, reminding him of their definitions and lending him their technical terms.⁵⁹ Their challenges irritate him into response on points he says it would otherwise be unnecessary to labour. 'It would not be appropriate to discuss that subject in such detail or in so elementary a way (*pueriliter*)', he remarks, were it not for the attacks which were being made on

Scriptural truth.⁶⁰ If human tradition is not misrepresented it goes along with the truth of the Bible.⁶¹ And yet, as he writes, Wycliffe again and again uses a technical term of the *moderni*: *supponere*,⁶² *pro isto suppono locum*,⁶³ in a way rather broader than its technical sense in logic, and which argues his own utter familiarity with its world of discourse.

If we are to see Wycliffe at work with his peculiar combination of the traditional and the modern approaches to Scripture, we cannot do better than look at his use of two connected elements of the new and 'modern' logic: consequences and obligations.

Wycliffe discusses consequences fully in the *Logica*. He calls a consequence a *habitudo*, a 'relationship' between antecedent and consequent which has an outcome in a consequent.⁶⁴ He gives twenty-two rules by which it may be determined what the consequent will be in different cases. These he applies in his own discussions of *ius*, for example, in the *De Mandatis Divinis*: 'Although *ius ad rem* and *ius in re* differ like antecedent and consequent, nevertheless it is impossible for anyone to have *ius ad rem* unless he has *ius in re* ... and vice versa.'⁶⁵ 'Every man ought to know that all human suffering, whether of the just or the unjust, is just and *per consequens* pleasing to God.'⁶⁶ 'The soldier of Christ will not be crowned before he finishes this fight and *per consequens* the great necessity [of putting an end to it] urges him on in the midst of the battle.'⁶⁷ 'The everlasting crown infallibly follows (*infallibiliter consequitur*) the successful end of the spiritual fight.'⁶⁸ 'It is obvious (*patet*) from this that nothing is a greater security to a rational being, nothing more joyous, and *per consequens* nothing more perfect, than that the Lord should deign to be with him.'⁶⁹ A more elaborately worked out example in one sermon demonstrates the support which the major premiss of the argument has, answers an objection, and brings out the consequent in that way;⁷⁰ but often Wycliffe is confident enough of his listeners' familiarity with the rules of consequences to make no more than a passing reference to antecedent and consequent in a sermon, or in a treatise. *Et per consequens* is frequently enough.⁷¹

More than once in the treatises of the new logic, Aristotle reflects on the need for the logician to develop a skill which will help him avoid being outwitted in argument. At the beginning of the *Topics*, he says that he has two purposes: to teach his pupils 'to reason from generally accepted opinions' (or 'topics'); and to be able, when meeting an argument, to avoid saying anything which will weaken their own case.⁷² In the *Prior Analytica* he gives more details. If we are to avoid having a syllogism constructed against us when our opponent asks us to admit the grounds of his argument without disclosing his conclusions, we must be able to see ahead as in a game of chess. Conversely, when we are on the offensive, we should try to make our opponent concede the grounds of our argument and leave

the conclusions obscure, so that he will not see where we are leading him, or ask him to concede points whose connection is not obvious—again so that he will not see where he is being led.⁷³

A hint of the formal teaching of this sort of deliberate trickery is to be found in John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon*,⁷⁴ but systematic training in the game of 'obligations' seems to have become a recognized part of the teaching of logic in the thirteenth century,⁷⁵ first perhaps in a rather motley way, focusing on a few paradoxes, and then more systematically.⁷⁶

The focal point of discussion is a place in the *Topics* where Aristotle is discussing contrareity hidden in the premisses of an argument. The same obscuring of implications is at issue here.⁷⁷ Over and above the logical question, there was the attraction of the 'game' of obligation.⁷⁸

Wycliffe gives his own account of obligations in the *Logica*. Obligation, he says, is the art which 'obliges' the 'respondent' to answer in the affirmative or the negative according to the 'proposer's' desire.⁷⁹ It is a logical game, with rules of play which are agreed beforehand—perhaps used to teach students to recognize what is relevant and irrelevant (*pertinens* and *impertinens*) in arguments and to think ahead.⁸⁰ *Signa obligationis* are used to identify the moves in the game: I posit (*pono*); I lay down (*depono*); I admit (*admitto*); I concede (*concedo*); I deny (*nego*); I doubt (*dubito*); I distinguish (*distinguo*); I propose (*propono*).⁸¹

Of Wycliffe's two types of obligation, *posito* obliges the respondent to reply in the affirmative, and *deposito* obliges him to reply in the negative. The rules are these:

1) During the exercise, the proposition which has once been admitted to be true must be considered indisputable, and all its formal implications admitted. For example, if 'Antichrist is in Rome' is admitted for purposes of argument, 'Antichrist is a man' must be admitted, too, because it follows from the first proposition. 'There is no Antichrist' must be denied, because that is incompatible with what has been argued.⁸²

2) Whatever follows when two propositions are brought together must be admitted, whatever the consequence may be; this will produce curious results when one proposition has been denied or admitted for purposes of argument and the other is denied or admitted in reality. For example, if we take 'Every man is in Rome' for purposes of argument, and then I propose 'You are in Rome', and you deny that because it is not true, if I then propose 'You are a man', it must be denied, because it is not compatible with the truth (which has been agreed) of 'Every man is in Rome' and 'You are not in Rome'.⁸³

3) If a proposition is irrelevant to the one proposed as obligatory, it must be admitted or denied or stated to be uncertain truthfully.⁸⁴

4) What is absolutely impossible need not be admitted; what is absolutely necessary should not be denied; an obligation must be admitted only if it is possible.

5) Two contradictory propositions must not be admitted during the same exercise.⁸⁵

The aim of the game on the opponent's part is to do everything he can to make the respondent reply badly (*male respondere*) and the respondent must do his best not to be put into a position where he is obliged to say anything absurd.⁸⁶

Among the examples Wycliffe gives in the *Logica* itself are two which suggest that the game of obligations was played with theological subjects and was therefore of far greater importance in its possible repercussions than the mere training of young men in a facility with logic. I posit, '*Deus sit homo*'. That is admitted, because it is true. Then it is posited, 'God is immortal', and that is conceded. Then the argument runs thus: *Iste Deus* (i.e. Christ) is immortal and the same is mortal. Therefore the same (God) is mortal and immortal. The respondent must be able to see that the difficulty can be got round by pointing out that 'mortal' and 'immortal' are not being used in the same way throughout (*isti duo termini non eodem modo significant per omnia*) and 'mortal' *secundum humanitatem*.⁸⁷

Similarly, I posit that Peter grows in charity uniformly during this hour and Paul does the same. At the last instant of the hour, Peter dies, and Paul is still alive at the last instant of the hour. Is Paul more perfect than Peter? Has he an instant's more growth in perfection? No, because an instant is indivisible, the smallest unit of time, like a point in geometry, and if it is added to an hour it does not make it any longer.⁸⁸

The game of obligations must have lent itself admirably to the purposes of those who wanted to catch out the Bible in misleading statements. Some of these 'adversaries' of Christian truth, says Wycliffe, try to prove that Christ himself is a liar. They say that if a man deliberately says what is false, he is a liar. But Christ did so. Therefore he was a liar. The intention here is to get the defendant to admit, just as in the formal game, an innocent-seeming proposition from which he will be led to accept far from innocent implications.⁸⁹

In these three areas of 'modern logic', then, as in others, Wycliffe was obliged to maintain his own competence and to train his students, if the truths of faith, and especially the truth of the text of Scripture, were to be defended. He was forced to be a man of his time in his approach to criticism and problem-solving, in order to preserve ancient tradition.

The ways in which this interplay of old and new in Wycliffe's thinking led him into controversy towards the end of his life is another story, but we can surely see the beginning of it here, in the difficulty of maintaining a balance in the immensely difficult, refined

and precisely technical application of a fourteenth-century Oxford education to theology, and also to law, politics, the religious orders, and other subjects on which Wycliffe came to speak.

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NOTES

- 1 On the general background see G. Leff, *The Universities of Oxford and Paris in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (New York 1968); on Wycliffe's career, see the account and references in J. A. Robson, *Wyclif and the Oxford Schools* (Cambridge 1961), p.10 ff. See, too, J. Weisheipl, 'The Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century', *Mediaeval Studies*, 26, 1964, pp.143-85, and 'Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century', *Mediaeval Studies*, 28, 1966, pp.151-75.
- 2 Strickland Gibson, ed., *Statuta antiqua universitatis Oxoniensis* (Oxford 1931), pp.lxxxix-xcviii.
- 3 Robson, op. cit., p.13, discusses this period.
- 4 G. Leff, op. cit., p.11, gives a convenient account.
- 5 Robson, op. cit., pp.15-16.
- 6 *Statuta*, pp.cix-cxii, 51, 195.
- 7 Robson, op. cit., p.16.
- 8 Robson, op. cit., pp.16-17.
- 9 On, for example, the relation between the study of the Bible and the theory of the Church, cf. H. F. Klauck, *Theorie der Exegese bei Bonaventura in S. Bonaventura*, IV (Rome 1974), pp.71-128 and *The Cambridge History of Later Mediaeval Philosophy* (Cambridge 1982), p.80. See, too, B. Smalley, 'The Bible and Eternity: John Wyclif's Dilemma', *Studies in Mediaeval Thought and Learning* (London 1981), p.408.
- 10 Wycliffe, *Logica* M. H. Dziewicki, ed. (London 1893), vol.I, p.1. The *Logica*, like other works of Wycliffe written during the period of his academic career before he became a controversial figure, was certainly finished by 1373/4, but in this case probably much earlier.
- 11 Wycliffe, *Sermons*, J. Loserth, ed., 1888, vol.II, p.300, no.42.
- 12 *ibid.*, p.354, no.49.
- 13 *ibid.*, p.28, no.4.
- 14 Wycliffe, *De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae*, R. Buddensieg, ed. (London 1905), vol.II, p.136, ch.20.
- 15 Wycliffe, *Cruciata*, VIII, in *Polemical Treatises*, II, R. Buddensieg, ed. (London 1883), p.617. cf. Duns Scotus, *De Sufficientia Sacrae Scripturae et Ordinatio*, P. Peratoni, ed. (Vatican 1950), p.59, cf. John Hus, *Super IV Sententiarum*, W. Flajshans and M. Kominkova, eds (Prague 1903), *Inceptio* I, p.5.1-2.
- 16 K. B. McFarlane, *John Wycliffe and the Beginnings of English Nonconformity* (London 1952), ch.1.
- 17 B. Smalley, 'The Bible and Eternity: John Wyclif's Dilemma', *Studies in Mediaeval Thought and Learning* (London 1981).
- 18 Wycliffe, *Sermons*, J. Loserth, ed. (London 1887), vol.I, p.125.8, no.18.
- 19 *ibid.*, p.185.22, no.28.
- 20 *Polemical Treatises*, II, p.524, *De Religione Privata* II, i.
- 21 *Sermons*, vol.I, p.179.4-8, no.26.
- 22 *Sermons*, vol.III, p.83, no.11.

- 23 *Sermons*, vol.III, p.262, no.32.
 24 *ibid.*, p.263.
 25 *Sermons*, vol.II, p.179, no.25.
 26 *Sermons*, vol.III, p.23.
 27 See B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford 1952²), on the early and early mediæval history of exegesis.
 28 Wycliffe, *Opus Evangelicum*, J. Loserth, ed. (London 1895-6), vol.I, p.205.34-9, ch.56.
 29 *De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae*, vol.II, p.28.8-21, ch.16.
 30 *Sermons*, vol.III, p.217, no.28, and *De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae*, vol.II, ch.19.
 31 *Sermons*, vol.II, p.37, no.6.
 32 *Sermons*, vol.III, p.i, no.1.
 33 *Sermons*, vol.III, p.3.
 34 e.g. *Sermons*, vol.I, p.4.16 ff. and p.7.27-30, no.1.
 35 *Sermons*, vol.III, p.1, no.1. Wycliffe also mentions agreement with reason in this passage; we shall return to that later.
 36 *Opus Evangelicum*, vol.I, p.209.34-6, ch.57.
 37 *ibid.*, p.222, 1, ch.60.
 38 *ibid.*, p.146, ch.36.
 39 *Sermons*, vol.I, p.376, no.57.
 40 H. de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale* (Paris 1959), 2 vols., discusses the history of this method.
 41 *Opus Evangelicum*, vol.I, p.10.24-6, ch.4.
 42 *ibid.*, p.328.1-5, ch.23.
 43 *ibid.*, p.283.13-27, ch.9.
 44 *Sermons*, vol.II, p.106, no.15.
 45 *Sermons*, vol.II, p.25, no.4.
 46 *Sermons*, vol.II, p.114, no.16.
 47 *Sermons*, vol.III, p.170.1, no.22.
 48 *Sermons*, vol.I, pp.83-4, no.12.
 49 *Sermons*, vol.III, p.1, no.1, cf. n.35.
 50 *Opus Evangelicum*, vol.I, p.221.1, ch.60.
 51 See *The Cambridge History of Later Mediaeval Philosophy*, pp.159 ff. for a convenient account.
 52 Wycliffe, *Logica*, vol.I, p.1.10-11. Cum tota variacio probacionis proposicionum habeat ortum ex terminis, diversorum terminorum proprietates et passiones intendo declarare. In ch.1 he gives an outline account, which he follows up in detail later.
 53 *De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae*, vol.II, p.20.15 ff., ch.19.
 54 *ibid.*, p.18.9.
 55 *ibid.*, p.43.1 ff., ch.17.
 56 *Opus Evangelicum*, vol.I, p.129.14 ff., ch.36.
 57 *ibid.*, p.17.13-8, ch.5.
 58 Peter Abelard's *Sic et Non* begins with a prologue in which such matters are tentatively raised. It was a highly controversial work in its day (PL 178).
 59 *Opus Evangelicum*, vol.I, p.15.1, ch.5 and p.20.36-7; p.29.1-2, ch.7, are instances.
 60 *De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae*, vol.II, p.116.4-9, ch.19.
 61 *ibid.*, p.145.1-5, ch.20.
 62 *Opus Evangelicum*, vol.I, p.11.28-33, ch.4.
 63 *De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae*, vol.I, p.2, ch.1.
 64 *Logica*, vol.I, p.43.2-3.
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