The Inspiration and Authority of Scripture:
J. D. G. Dunn versus B. B. Warfield (continued)
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II

Dunn’s proposal for an alternative to Warfield
In the first instalment of his article in *Churchman*, Professor Dunn attempted to prove that ‘the Warfield position’ on Scripture is not a viable option. In the second instalment he undertakes to provide us with a more acceptable alternative—one, we would expect, that he deems exegetically probable, hermeneutically adequate, theologically safe and educationally productive. The strategy, therefore, is clear: first, free the ground from a view thought unacceptable by subjecting it to scathing criticism; and then proceed to build in its place a structure regarded as desirable, stable and not open to the strictures applicable to the former. This may explain the increasingly strident tone of Professor Dunn’s opposition to inerrancy: he starts with carefully aimed bullets and closes with a veritable machine-gun fire, until he is satisfied that the opponent is ‘dead as a dodo’. Yet, from time to time, even in the latter, presumably constructive, part of his article he cannot resist the temptation to fire some volleys in the direction of Warfield and his successors, somewhat like the hero of a Western movie who thinks he has killed his rival and nevertheless enjoys opportunities to fire into the corpse, or what he thinks is the corpse of his enemy. For my purpose, it is not essential that every one of these criticisms be answered, as it was that the main strictures presented in the earlier instalment be met fairly. I will therefore relegate materials of this type to the footnotes, and concentrate on evaluating Dunn’s construction of a biblical model for the authority and interpretation of Scripture.

1) Dunn’s understanding of the biblical view of scriptural authority
Assuming that the express statements of Scripture concerning inspiration cannot yield exegetically a sufficiently detailed formulation of the biblical conception of authority, Professor Dunn proposes that we should concentrate out attention on the way in which inspired writers used earlier inspired writings. This will enable us to catch in their actual procedure what they meant when they
spoke of scriptural inspiration and authority. By observing their practice, we will gain a true insight into the nature of their view.⁷⁵

Without at all conceding that the way in which quotations are introduced has as little significance as Dunn suggests,⁷⁶ I would readily grant the value and validity of making a study of the way in which the New Testament writers deal with the Old Testament passages that they quote, with respect to both form and meaning. There are in the New Testament some 295 explicit references to the Old Testament, occupying roughly 352 verses altogether. If an assessment is to be made of the New Testament view of the authority of the Old, it is this mass of material that must be the basis for conclusions. Professor Dunn, however, presents us with an analysis based on ten passages,⁷⁷ all of which manifest a somewhat exceptional relationship to their Old Testament source. To be sure, these texts, as well as many others, must be considered as a part of the relevant evidence. To deal with them, however, as if they constituted the dominant New Testament practice, on the basis of which a fundamental understanding of the New Testament attitude toward the authority of the Old may be construed, is clearly abusive. In the discussion which follows, it will be apparent that I for one do not at all agree with Dunn’s interpretation of most of these passages, nor with the hermeneutical structure that he builds on this interpretation; but quite apart from this area of disagreement, one cannot refrain from expressing stupefaction that a general pattern of hermeneutics should be based on something less than 3 per cent of the evidence, while a great preponderance of relevant texts is disregarded in which the complete harmony between the Old and the New Testament prevails, both as to form and as to meaning. One might as well state that the plural of nouns in English is marked by the ending ‘-en’ because of ‘brethren’ and ‘children’, a theory which disregards the endings ‘-s’ and ‘-es’, for which thousands of examples could easily be given! A true theory of English plurals must take account of forms like ‘bills’, ‘glasses’, ‘fish’, ‘formulae’, ‘maxima’, ‘children’, ‘geese’ and many others, if it is to be comprehensive. Professor Dunn’s method of special pleading is fatally flawed statistically, and would remain such even if many more difficult passages were quoted. By contrast, after an overview of the whole range of New Testament quotations, C. H. Dodd expressed his conclusion in the following words:

It must be conceded that we have before us a considerable intellectual feat. The various scriptures are acutely interpreted along lines already discernible within the Old Testament canon itself or in pre-Christian Judaism—in many cases, I believe, lines which start from their first, historical intention—and these lines are carried forward to fresh results. Very diverse scriptures are brought together so that they interpret one another in hitherto unsuspected ways.⁷⁸
As we pursue our discussion, we would do well to remember these wise words of this New Testament scholar, who cannot by any stretch of the imagination be faulted for having been prejudiced in favour of 'the Warfield position'.

Ordinarily a stricture of the type just enunciated would render any further criticism superfluous. In this case, however, while it appears clear that Dunn's base for formulating a view of 'The Authority of Scripture According to Scripture' is much too restricted, it remains that the passages which he advances are in Scripture and may, therefore, provide evidence as to an attitude to inspired writings which, without being at the centre of gravity, nevertheless remains within the bounds of legitimacy. It is therefore essential that this evidence be examined with care.

Before entering into a more detailed discussion of 'Jesus' attitude to and use of Scripture', followed by a study of the practice of the 'earliest churches' in this area, Dunn advances Matthew 19:4f. and Galatians 3:16 to prove that even when strong formulae of introduction are used, a considerable shift in meaning may take place.

Since Matthew 19:4f. is a statement of Jesus, and Galatians 3:16 one of Paul, without damaging Professor Dunn's case we may deal with his treatment of these two texts under his main divisions.

a) Dunn's assessment of Jesus' attitude to and use of the Old Testament

In Matthew 19:4f., he holds that 'one scripture is being used to interpret (and in some sense to discount?) another.' This ties in with his discussion at a later point of Mark 10:2-12, and could be related as well to a consideration of parallel passages in Matthew 5:31f. and Luke 16:18. As I see it, there are two main issues here: a) Did Jesus 'discount' Deuteronomy 24:1?, and b) Why did Mark and Luke omit the exception clause found in Matthew? This whole area has been the object of very considerable learned discussion and it would be impossible here to do more than merely to point out a fons solutionis.

Let us start with Matthew 5:31f., which is part of a total development following Jesus' great affirmation of the law's authority in Matthew 5:17-20. It would be nonsense to imagine that Jesus would proceed to 'discount' the law in the same breath, so to speak, in which he castigated those who do so as 'least in the kingdom of heaven'. Out of the six cases specifically mentioned by our Lord in Matthew 5:21-48, the first two and the fourth are manifestly not a repudiation of the Old Testament law, but constitute a reinforcement of its significance in terms of the intention of God, the lawgiver, who detests not only physical murder, but also thoughts of greed, hatred or contempt that move in the direction of murder; not only
consummated physical adultery, but also lustful thoughts that are a premeditation of adultery; not only perjury, but untruth of any kind. The sixth case deals with a faulty interpretation of Leviticus 19:18 that narrowed the duty of love to embrace only Israelites, and Christ showed that God wants love extended toward all human beings, even those who are perceived as our enemies. The third and the fifth examples may at first appear as a reversal of the law, and Professor Dunn so interprets them. Yet it is not difficult to see how they fit in with the other cases. The law of Deuteronomy 24:1 required the husband to provide his repudiated wife with a certificate of divorce. This imposed a sharp limitation on the arbitrariness and impulsiveness of the husbands, and secured some much-needed rights for the wives. It introduced some welcome time-lapse, a transaction in proper legal form, and possibly the return of the dowry. The law furthermore secured the finality of the break (Deut. 24:2-4) so that very careful thought had to be given to the matter before consummating the divorce. What Jesus shows in Matthew 5:31f. is that the whole process of divorce is obnoxious to God, for only death and adultery can actually dissolve the marriage bond. This is spelled out more fully in Matthew 19:4f., where the significance and permanence of the institution of marriage is inferred from the narrative of the creation of humanity. Jesus shows the vacuity of Hillel’s interpretation, who permitted divorce for trivial causes, and supports Shammai’s approach, where adultery alone can be an adequate reason for dissolving a marriage. This law was given because of human hardness of heart, for it is always human sinfulness that causes a marriage to founder, and our Lord focuses the attention on the original purpose of the Creator rather than on the failings and frailties of sinners. Viewed in this light, it is evident that Jesus’ mandate, far from setting aside the Old Testament law, reinforces it and carries its impact further than the Jews had perceived. Incidentally, in insisting on dealing with the import of the law upon the realm of thought, as well as concrete actions or spoken words, Jesus manifests his acceptance of the law’s divine origin, since God alone knows the thoughts of the heart, and can legislate and judge in this realm.

Mark 10:11f. and Luke 16:18 do not mention the exclusion clause, and this may be explained in a number of ways that do not involve a tampering with the actual words of Christ. In view of the great variety of contexts, it appears probable that our Lord dealt with this topic at least on three different occasions: a) Matthew 5:31,32; b) Luke 16:18, c) Matthew 19:3–9; Mark 10:2–12. The precise form in which this teaching was given apparently differed somewhat, as may be seen in the following table:
Under these circumstances it does not seem unlikely that our Lord at some points expressed the principle of the indissolubility of marriage in its sweeping generality, without taking pains to note the exception recorded in Matthew, and at some other points he did mention the exception clause, thus specifying more fully the precise application of his statement. Matthew 5:31 does not make very good sense without the exclusion clause, for the wife who has committed adultery is already in the category of an adulteress, and another marriage would not change this. Furthermore, the form of the saying in Mark and Luke does not rule out the exception clause, since the sin to be feared is adultery; and if it has already been committed, as the exception presupposes, the standing of the marriage is jeopardized in any case. Thus it is not necessary to posit here editorial emendations, either by way of addition by Matthew to our Lord’s statement, or by way of intentional deletion by Mark and Luke. Jesus’ stance here is in any case a reinforcement of the law, based on a clear vision of God’s purpose in marriage as expressed in the Old Testament.

Professor Dunn advances Matthew 5:38–42 as another example in which Jesus discounts the Old Testament law. The *lex talionis* in its Old Testament form (Ex. 21:20; Lev. 24:20; Deut. 19:21) had reference to the administration of justice by the courts, and served as a standard by which the amount of penalty and/or restitution could be established with reference to damages incurred or to false witnesses. The traditional interpretation had shifted this purpose of the law into
a rule of thumb to determine the extent of private revenge allowable. Even in this distorted understanding, it could function as a helpful curb against an inordinate vendetta with its snowballing effects. In Matthew 5:38 and 42, Christ does not address the issue of judicial administration in the Jewish theocracy, but deals exclusively with the matter of the vengeful spirit and the insistence on securing one’s right at any cost.87 In harmony with certain other Old Testament passages (Lev. 19:18; Prov. 25:21), our Lord enjoins forgiveness and forbearing, and this message is pointedly carried out in Romans 12:17–20. Professor Dunn has, therefore, a very fragile base for affirming ‘that Jesus was thereby abrogating part of the Mosaic law’, or again that Jesus ‘did in effect deny that they [certain scriptures] were the Word of God for his time.’88 In affirming this, he runs a collision course with what Jesus had expressly emphasized in Matthew 5:17–20, and he wrests the interpretation of this passage from the unity of the context (5:21–48).

Mark 7:1–23 is presented as another example of a case where Jesus repealed the Old Testament law and ‘declared it void for his disciples.’89 Dunn does indeed acknowledge that the discussion arises in connection with ablutionary regulations not prescribed in the text of the Old Testament, but he presses the point that the principle set forth by Jesus, ‘nothing that enters a man from the outside can make him unclean’ (v.18, cf. v.15), cuts across various scriptural prescriptions for ritual purity, specifically the distinction between clean and unclean foods. This is indeed what Mark expressly states (Mark 7:19), and it is later reinforced by the vision of Peter (Acts 10:12–15; 11:6–10) and by direct statements in the epistles (Rom. 14:14,20; 1 Cor. 10:25,27; Col. 2:20–23; 1 Tim. 4:3,4).

In the setting of our Lord’s earthly life, Jesus did not abrogate any Old Testament law, for he was ‘born under law’ (Gal. 4:4). Thus he did not violate any of the commandments of the Torah, not even those which pertained to ceremonial or civil matters.90 In Matthew 15 and Mark 7, Christ addressed the way in which the Jewish leaders had inverted the true purpose of the laws of ritual and ceremonial cleanness. They had swathed the relatively simple divine commandments in a complicated network of minute regulations, that were destined at first no doubt to prevent fortuitous transgressions, but that developed into an elaborate casuistic system in which the original purpose of the law had been obnubilated. Then they had magnified the importance of the observance of such details to the point of bypassing some express commands of God (Matt. 15:3–9; Mark 7:6–13). Our Lord, by contrast, focuses the attention once again on the divine purpose at the root of the commandments on ceremonial purity. Undoubtedly there were hygienic advantages both in the dietary laws and in those relating to defiling contacts, but the primary aim of such prescriptions could be found in God’s desire to provide
an object lesson that would inculcate certain spiritual truths to the worshippers. They were to discern that all things are not acceptable in this world; although created by God, it has been polluted by the entrance of evil, and even the natural order has been affected by the moral disorder rooted in sin. By pressing demands for ritual cleanliness, God gave an impressive revelation of his own holiness and of the moral bankruptcy of humanity. 'If God abhors even some physical defiling contacts', the worshipper could think, 'how much more must he loathe the corruption of my heart!' Jesus once again stresses this point: the defilement which is supremely obnoxious to God is not a matter of diet or of external contacts; it is the spiritual alienation and pollution of the heart in which the wide variety of sins finds its source (Matt. 15:17-20; Mark 7:18-23).

When our Lord had completed his work on earth, the ceremonial and civil aspects of the Old Testament law were superseded (Mark 7:19) in order to make room for the economy of the New Testament: what is national and local yielded to the universal reference; what is physical to a new emphasis on the spiritual, what is provisional to the finality of the Gospel; Moses and Elijah to the one Mediator, Jesus Christ. As Stephen clearly perceived, the Old Testament contains already the seed of this glorious development and, as Pascal put it, 'both testaments look to Christ as their centre.' The prescriptions of the Old Testament are literally 'fulfilled' in Jesus Christ (Matt. 5:17), and an attempt to return to the performance of ritual and civic laws denotes a grievous failure to understand the full bearing of the work of Christ (Gal. 5:4 and passim). The perception of this truth does in no way invalidate or restrict the reality of the divine origin of the law in all its parts. The law is the Word of God, but some aspects of it had a provisional character, and were in force only until the coming of Christ. They function like a scaffolding erected around a building, or basting thread on a garment: when the building or the garment is completed, what is provisional is removed (Heb. 8:13). It behoves us, therefore, to pay close attention to the context, for the mere fact that a command is found in Scripture does not automatically make it mandatory for everyone at every point of time. The regulations concerning ceremonial cleanness in Leviticus 11-15 are not binding on us now, and neither is Jesus' command to the blind man 'Go, wash in the pool of Siloam' (John 9:7) or Paul's injunction 'Bring the cloak that I left with Carpus at Troas' (2 Tim. 4:12). This is a point that inerrantists understand well, and Warfield, for one, was happy to make Sunday his day of rest and worship; he had no objection to pork meat, and he never arranged to have two bulls sacrificed by an Aaronic priest on the first of the month (Num. 28:11,14)!

One point which Professor Dunn has perhaps not sufficiently stressed in connection with Mark 7 (and Matt. 15) is the great emphasis placed by Jesus upon the authority of the Torah itself over
against the authority of tradition. The contrast is between ‘the command(s) of God’ (Matt. 15:3; Mark 7:8,9) and ‘the Word of God’ (Matt. 15:6; Mark 7:13) on the one hand; and ‘rules taught by men’ (Matt. 15:9; Mark 7:7), ‘traditions of men’ (Mark 7:8) and ‘your [own] tradition(s)’ (Matt. 15:3,6; Mark 7:9,13) on the other. Jesus does not chide the Jewish leaders for an excessive regard for the Scripture, but for overburdening the Scripture with human traditions which actually ‘make void’, or work at cross purposes with, ‘God’s Word’. Far from undermining the authority of Scripture, this pericope does in fact greatly emphasize it. It makes perfectly plain that Jesus, in his attitude to the Old Testament, was not simply accommodating himself to (without sharing) the Jewish approach, for here he is not hesitant to run a collision course with the Jews. If their reverence for Scripture had been such a harmful thing, would not our Lord also have disown its authority?

Finally, Dunn argues that Jesus’ use of Isaiah 61:1f. in Luke 4:18f. shows—by the omission of the clause ‘to proclaim the day of vengeance of our God’—that all the Old Testament was not ‘of equal, and equally binding, authority’ for him, or at least that he had certain intimations of his Father’s will which were not derived from Scripture.

The latter point is not in dispute by Christologically orthodox inerrantists. Only one who holds to extreme kenoticism would be prepared to affirm that Jesus, even in the days of his flesh, knew nothing more about himself and his mission than what he could derive by exegesis of the Old Testament! Meanwhile, to omit a reference to the judgement that will mark our Lord’s second coming, in order to concentrate on the prophetic utterances relating to his first coming, can scarcely be viewed as a discrimination in the authority of Scripture. John the Baptist, as well as other contemporaries, needed to readjust their understanding of Messiah’s earthly career, and the way in which Jesus quoted the prophecy would help them to do this.

I conclude, therefore, that the passages advanced by Professor Dunn to the effect that Jesus’ attitude to, and use of, Old Testament Scripture, are at variance with ‘the Warfield position’, do not warrant this conclusion at all. When considered fairly, some of them bear witness in the opposite direction.

b) Dunn’s assessment of the earliest churches’ attitude to and use of Scripture

i) First of all, Professor Dunn argues from Galatians 3:16 that even when an introductory formula like ‘Scripture says’ is used, this does not imply an affirmation of a perennial, indefectible authority. Since this passage is often quoted by inerrantists and those who hold to verbal inspiration because of Paul’s insistence on the singular ‘seed’ rather than a plural ‘seeds’, it is challenging to find this verse
here as a witness for the prosecution! Dunn's point is that Paul 'adapts the clear reference of the original' to Abraham and his descendants, 'and gives the scripture a different sense from that which was obviously intended in the original' by referring 'seed' to Jesus Christ. This interpretation, he graciously adds, was not 'without justification. ... by the canons of that time [it] would have been wholly acceptable', but 'the authoritative Scripture is Scripture interpreted, Scripture understood in a sense which constituted a significant variation or development or departure or difference from the original sense.'

We need not quarrel with Dunn concerning the sense in which Abraham and many Jewish people understood this promise of God. In fact the promise was partially fulfilled in the rise and destiny of the Jews. What appears strange, however, in his reasoning is the assumption that he understands exhaustively the meaning of a statement by God, so as to be able to say that the presence of a singular noun in this promise could not be construed as a divine intimation of the coming redeemer, to be born in the descent of Abraham. This he affirms, when St Paul affirms the opposite. Dunn accounts for this by ascribing to St Paul 'a particular style of rabbinic exegesis which we no longer regard as acceptable exegesis.'

One is reminded of the comment of Bishop C. J. Ellicott on this very passage:

We may here pause to make a brief remark on the great freedom with which so many commentators have allowed themselves to characterize St Paul's argument as either artificial ... or Rabbinical ... or ... even ... 'plainly arbitrary and incorrect.' It may be true that similar arguments occur in Rabbinical writers ... Nevertheless, we have here an interpretation which the Apostle, writing under the illumination of the Holy Ghost has deliberately propounded, and which, therefore, (whatever difficulties may at first appear in it), is profoundly and indisputably true.

J. B. Lightfoot, the gentle and scholarly Bishop of Durham, comments:

With a true spiritual instinct, though the conception embodied itself at times in strangely grotesque and artificial forms, even the rabbinical writers saw that 'the Christ' was the true seed of Abraham. In Him the race was summed up, as it were. In Him it fulfilled its purpose and became a blessing to the whole earth. Without Him its separate existence as a peculiar people had no meaning. Thus He was not only the representative, but the embodiment of the race. In this way the people of Israel is the type of Christ; and in the New Testament parallels are sought in the career of the one to the life of the other. ... In this sense St Paul used the 'seed of Abraham' here.
Surely we have here an amazing situation. Professor Dunn tells us that he regards Paul's exegesis as 'no longer acceptable'. This presumably means that we ought to feel constrained to renounce the authority of the inspired apostle, dealing with a clearly religious issue, in order to conform to 'acceptable' standards of exegesis. And who will determine these 'acceptable' standards? Who, beside Professor Dunn, is included in this 'we' to whom this task is entrusted? Professor Dunn does not tell us.

What is peculiarly ironical in this instance is that Dunn was using Galatians 3:16 in order to establish the point that his own view of the authority of Scripture is in fact the scriptural view of the matter. But the passage is counterproductive for his purpose in any eventuality, whether or not St Paul's exegesis is 'acceptable'.

If St Paul's exegesis is after all 'acceptable', then Galatians 3:16 proves how the apostle was able and willing to build a significant development on a very small detail, actually one letter of Old Testament Scripture. This manifests on the part of St Paul precisely the kind of view of biblical authority which Dunn was aiming to disprove. This is why Warfield, among others, does not fail to quote this very text in support of his strict view.

If St Paul's exegesis is deemed 'unacceptable', as Dunn would rate it, then St Paul was either aware of that defect, or he was not. If the latter, his intention in quoting is exactly the same as if the exegesis were 'acceptable', so that the doctrine of Scripture which St Paul embraces, that is to say the authority of Scripture according to this Scripture, is once again the strict view, not the lax view.

If St Paul was aware that his exegesis is unacceptable and that his basis for argument is 'the Bible wrongly interpreted', then his position is simply disingenuous or even dishonest, and Professor Dunn surely would not want anyone to move in this direction. Certainly he does not desire to lodge authority in 'unacceptable' exegesis, and on this score his own view of the authority of the Bible would again differ from the biblical view presented in this passage.

Dunn's presentation of the earliest churches' practice now proceeds in terms not of particular passages, but in terms of a discussion of three features of the New Testament usage of Old Testament Scripture, to which is added a page and a half dealing with the freedom manifested in reporting the statements of our Lord. It will suffice to make brief comments here on each of these points.

ii) Professor Dunn emphasizes that the New Testament brought about a substantial abandonment of a number of Jewish practices mandated in the Old Testament: distinction between clean and unclean foods, circumcision, animal sacrifices, Sabbath observance, and the like. This revolution could not have taken place, he argues, if the Old Testament had been viewed as permanently binding. This point was discussed above in connection with the statements of Jesus
in Mark 7 and Matthew 15. It is therefore not necessary to revert to it here otherwise than to insist that the New Testament authors acknowledge the provisional character of the ceremonial and civil aspects of the Sinaitic legislation, yet recognize its divine origin and its permanent significance manifested in the perfect fulfilment and climactic embodiment in the person and work of Jesus Christ. This interpretation of the ultimate meaning of various Old Testament practices and mandates so far exceeds the presumable understanding of Moses and the prophets that it does in itself bear witness to a recognition of the divine origin of all such texts. Summarizing Stephen's discourse (Acts 7) we might say that the best thing that can be said in favour of the law and the temple is that they were foreshadowings of Jesus Christ, in whom everything worthwhile has been epitomized and enhanced, and everything provisional has been completed and finalized.

iii) Professor Dunn points to the fact that the New Testament authors referred to Scripture interpreted in a fresh manner, rather than to Scripture narrowly conceived in terms of the original meaning of the human writers. He points to Romans 1:17 as a reference to Habakkuk, and to Romans 10:6–10 as a reference to Deuteronomy 30:11–14. Galatians 3:16, examined above, would also be a case in point.

There is, of course, room for certain differences in interpreting the Old Testament passages in view, as well as the precise connection between the original meaning and the New Testament reference. I, for one, would offer the opinion that it is possible to show a legitimate relation between every New Testament quotation and its source, when properly established and understood. The point that Dunn presses, however, may be seen to support the opposite of his thesis. It is only when sufficient attention is given to God's intended meaning in the Old Testament Scripture, rather than to the narrow understanding of the human authors and recipients, that the true relevance of the Old Testament passage to the New Testament situation appears in its fulness. This, however, implies a direct recognition of divine authorship and consequently of divine authority, even in those features of the Old Testament text that may not have been plain to the original recipients. The appeal to authority is not to Scripture tout simple, as Dunn rightly says, 'but to Scripture interpreted'—indeed. Scripture interpreted as being God's utterance and bearing a meaning only God could have intended!

iv) A third consideration presented by Professor Dunn is the freedom with which the New Testament authors handle the text of the Old Testament. This freedom, he avers, is far remote from the kind of punctilious accuracy that an inerrantist view would seem to require. Two observations on this point will be offered.
It is perfectly obvious that the biblical writers never felt bound by the rules for quotations which prevail in modern scholarly writings. They did not have an apparatus of punctuation, including quotation marks, ellipsis marks, brackets, etc., that would permit a strict documentation with respect to the relation of their quotation to the original source. They had no footnotes to give a precise account of their source or sources or again to explain incidentals. As a result they felt free to omit words or to add them if helpful for the understanding; they adjusted verb tenses and pronouns freely to fit the quotation into their discourse or text; they combined various passages in order to bring out a fuller meaning; they summarized or amplified, as the case might require, without giving special notice. None of these practices reflects a cavalier attitude toward the text, and there are parallels in the quoting methods prevalent throughout antiquity. It is the development of printing that has brought about a stiffening of the standards which are nowadays deemed appropriate for quotations. Even with such rigorous standards it is a matter of plain record that those who accept verbal inspiration and inerrancy do not always quote with utmost accuracy. In preaching, especially, some of the liberties taken by the New Testament writers may readily be paralleled in the practice of people whose strict view of Scripture is not in doubt. To argue from freedom in quoting to loose views of the authority of Scripture is a non sequitur.

There is a great difference, however, between free quotations and manipulations of a text, engineered in order to press it to yield a desired meaning which could not be supported in the original. This I would strenuously maintain does not occur anywhere in the New Testament. Professor Dunn therefore gives us welcome relief, when, after listing some very unconvincing examples of this type of procedure, he writes: ‘It should ... be stressed, the choice of text was not arbitrary, the emendation was not arbitrary, and the interpretation was by no means completely divorced from the original intention of the author. This is precisely what I should also say, and I draw the logical conclusion that the examples given are not truly illustrative of such a faulty methodology. If the New Testament is truly inspired of God, how could God permit such an unwarrantable procedure? Does God trade in sophistry?

v) Professor Dunn finds confirmation of his understanding of the earliest churches’ attitude to Scripture in the way in which the ‘Jesus-tradition’ was handled by the New Testament writers. He illustrates his point by a comparison between Mark 7 and Matthew 15, and again between Mark 10:2—12 and Matthew 19:3—9. These relate respectively to the questions of clean or unclean foods, and to divorce and marriage. Dunn interprets the differences between Matthew and Mark as a deliberate effort by Matthew to soften the sharpness of the Markan account, not indeed by ‘creating or
inventing sayings *de novo* and putting them in Jesus' mouth*, but rather out of 'concern to show the words of Jesus speaking to his own time and to the issues of his own time'.

These passages have been examined above in connection with Jesus' attitude to the Old Testament. The relationship between Matthew's form and Mark's has been discussed there with reference to Jesus' attitude to divorce. A few comments are appropriate at this point, however.

Basic to Professor Dunn's whole contention is the priority of Mark and the hypothesis of the use by Matthew (and Luke) of Mark as a source, in fact their only source for passages they have in common. To this is added the use by Matthew and Luke of *Q*, a document that has to be reconstructed entirely by speculation. The fact that 'the majority of NT scholarship' endorses this view at the present time does not by itself establish it as unassailable truth.

If the methodology of dealing with Mark as a source for Matthew (or Luke) be accepted, it does not in any way necessarily follow that all modifications made by Matthew (or Luke) are due to a desire to improve upon Mark's version of the events. A change in Greek diction might be explained in this way especially in the relationship of Luke and Mark. But when there are differences in the events reported or conversations recorded, one needs to proceed much more carefully, since many such differences could not possibly be accounted for on this principle alone.

When scholars go so far as to claim that Matthew (or Luke) found certain statements and events as recorded by Mark misleading or unacceptable, and then proceeded to tamper with the record, not on the basis of actual informational data but in a purely arbitrary, not to say whimsical, manner, the time has come to blow the whistle. Mark is inspired Scripture, and it does not make good sense to hold that Matthew (or Luke) would find what he wrote objectionable. It seems even more inappropriate that he would tamper with the record, changing details and doctoring statements. The difficulties that some people think are caused by a policy of harmonization are very small indeed when compared with the fundamental incongruity of assuming that one inspired writer presumed to correct another and to produce out of the whole, modifications that have no ground in the events. It is, of course, true that many New Testament critics, form critics and redaction critics have toyed with such concepts for some time, but this scarcely justifies the procedure, let alone establishes it as unassailable. It is a matter of plain record that, from the very beginning, the gospels of Matthew, Luke and John (as well as Mark) were received by the church as giving us an inspired, reliable and authentic account of the life and teaching of Jesus Christ. Only overwhelming evidence should prompt us to leave this solid footing.
Professor Dunn concludes this part of his study by placing a heavy emphasis on the concept of the historical relativity of Scripture. At a later point in the article, he has given us some clarification of what he meant by this expression. He divides the concept into two sub-categories, ‘covenant relativity’ and ‘cultural relativity’.

Under ‘covenant relativity’, he refers to the shift that occurred by virtue of the coming of Jesus Christ, and that rendered a number of Old Testament prescriptions obsolete—not because they lacked the original divine sanction, but because they received their fulfillment in Jesus Christ and do not regulate the life and practice of those who live in the new economy. The New Testament itself, both by the word of Christ and by the apostolic teaching, articulates this shift so that we are not at a loss to know how we should relate to the ceremonial and civil legislation of the Jewish age. Dunn is careful to indicate that we can never exercise toward the New Testament writings the kind of freedom and discrimination with which Christ and the apostles treated the Old Testament. For indeed the New Testament must remain our norm and we cannot embolden ourselves to judge the norm. This is an excellent paragraph and, while it restricts severely the bearing of certain other parts of his article, I am happy to say that, barring a few matters of wording, I find myself in agreement with him. This is not really a new insight, but a fair expression of the Christian view from the very first century and held through the ages by orthodox Christians.

Under ‘cultural relativity’, he enters a much more debatable area. He holds that Jesus’ modification of the laws on divorce and on retaliation belongs to this category, as if such issues were merely a matter of ‘culture’. In the New Testament he cites Matthew’s alleged relaxation of Jesus’ statement on divorce, and James’ alleged correction of Paul’s statement on justification by faith. All of this is highly questionable. Of course neither the Old nor the New Testament was given in a vacuum, and for the best understanding we do well to consider the cultural environment. This sometimes enables us to grasp more firmly what was at issue and therefore to apply the Word more meaningfully to our own situations. It is extremely dangerous, however, to say ‘we must recognize that what was the Word of God in and to a culture and time very different from ours (New Testament as well as Old Testament) may well no longer be the Word of God to our culture and time.’

Since the Bible was given in a historical context, certain elements of its message relate of course to the particularities of this context, but when an aura of relativity is permitted to prevail over the absolute and perennial character of revealed truth, then grievous damage is done to the biblical representation of the eternal reliability of the Word of God: ‘Your word, O Lord, is eternal, It stands firm in the heavens. ... Your statutes are forever right; ... All your words
are true, all your righteous laws are eternal.' (Psalm 119: vv.89, 144, 160).

The psalmist appears to have been more concerned with the eternal stability of God's Word than with historical relativities!

2) Towards an evangelical hermeneutic
Professor Dunn concludes his article with a section in which he attempts to set forth in a summary form six basic principles which, in his judgement, ought to characterize evangelical hermeneutics. This summary is very helpful and very revealing, because it enables us to view how the various insights presented in the paper relate to one another and constitute a framework for the hermeneutical task. At other points he inveighs against dogmatics and systematicians, and here he certainly shows that even he needs a system, albeit a hermeneutical one.

a) Dunn's first principle is the assertion of the inspiration and authority of Scripture without the exaggerations of the inerrantists who 'out-scripture Scripture'. The validity of his representation of this point depends upon the adequacy of his claims concerning the teaching of Scripture on this subject. My whole article will show that I am far from judging these as adequate either in the treatment of the texts or in the assessment of their implications. Meanwhile the standard accusations against the Warfield positionsurface again: Pharisaism, legalism and bibliolatry!

b) His second principle is the assumption that every Christian attitude to, and use of, Scripture must conform to the New Testament pattern. Here he wants to make it quite clear that he does not advocate our following the hermeneutical techniques of the New Testament, which were 'relative to their time and are often unacceptable for modern exegesis', neither does he advocate our resorting to 'the same sovereign freedom exercised by Jesus and Paul'. What he desires is the same kind of respect for Scripture as shown by the early Christians.

Professor Dunn does not show us why the hermeneutical pattern of the New Testament should not be followed. He appears governed in this by what is 'acceptable' to modern exegesis. But, by his own principles, modern exegesis should be seen as historically relative, even as was ancient exegesis; thus the whole process is thrown into a vicious circle of relativity. Furthermore, Dunn was in the process of developing a biblicalview of the authority of Scripture, and yet here he expressly abandons the New Testament way of using, of interpreting, the Old Testament. This is a very grievous departure from his announced programme and jeopardizes at its root the biblical character of the view presented here.

c) His third principle is that the exegete's first task is to ascertain the meaning of a text in its historical context. The exegete must be
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central with what God said (in the past tense) and this does not automatically mean that God says this now. Granting that one should not pick passages at random in the Bible and imagine that God's will for an individual will infallibly be discovered in this way, it remains that Scripture retains an eternal contemporaneity which is articulated by the use of the present tense in introducing quotations, a feature that Warfield emphasized and which Dunn elsewhere acknowledges as implying that Scripture is 'the ever-present and ever-speaking Word of God'. This is the basic conviction with which we must read and preach the Word of God. To weaken the Christian and the minister of the Word at this point is simply disastrous.

d) Dunn's fourth principle is precisely that Scripture continues to address humanity, sometimes in terms of its original meaning as determined by careful exegesis, but sometimes also in ways that function quite apart from this meaning. In this mode the Holy Spirit can take over and address individuals and groups in an unpredictable manner and convey a message that is quite different from that which an exegetical analysis of a text would yield. Professor Dunn holds that this phenomenon was present in the New Testament (e.g. in the reinterpretation of Levitical cleanliness and circumcision, and in Matthew's alleged softening of Jesus' word concerning divorce) and still functions today. 'To recognize this is simply to confess faith in the Spirit ... in the interpreter Spirit ...' This recognition, he avers, will 'shut the door to legalism and bibliolatry', save us from 'a casuistic harmonization', exalt 'the Spirit above the Bible', and prevent us from 'shutting the Spirit up in the book'. This is surely expecting a rich harvest from illuminism and enthusiasm! This programme might be tempting if the history of the church were not replete with examples of disastrous deviations along this path. To be sure, Dunn undertakes to make certain qualifications in his principles 5 and 6, but it is necessary to pause at this point to formulate some needed questions which this methodology raises:

1) How does one differentiate between a Spirit-led use of Scripture and a merely ignorant misapprehension of the text? The answer cannot be by proper exegesis, for this might rule out what Dunn views as the helpful diversity and might throw us into 'casuistic harmonization'!

ii) How can Christians check the propriety of a message alleged to come from God, if the Scripture in its proper exegetical meaning can be overarched by Spirit-led representation? Should not the Bereans have been condemned rather than lauded for checking Paul's message in the Scriptures (Acts 17:11)?

iii) What is the value of studying Hebrew and Greek and submitting oneself to the rigorous discipline of exegesis, if at any time the Spirit may and will short-circuit all this and authenticate a message that has
an inadequate foundation in the text? If Christians could count on being transported by the Spirit like Philip (Acts 8:39), they could save a lot of money spent on airplane tickets!

iv) How is the methodology of ‘pneumatic’ hermeneutics taught? Is it not true that the less people know of the exegetical process, the more likely they are to come forward with interpretations that go beyond the text and should be rated unlikely to have been given by the Spirit? Should not this approach, rather than Warfield’s, be termed ‘educationally disastrous’? \[120\]

v) How does Professor Dunn know that Warfield was not ‘Spirit-led’ in his formulation of the doctrine of Scripture beyond what Dunn thinks is exegetically justifiable?

vi) Why does Dunn hold that we should not avail ourselves of ‘the same sovereign freedom exercised by Jesus and Paul’? \[121\] Is not this too a restriction of the Spirit?

e) Professor Dunn’s fifth principle may in part, but only in part, provide some answer to some of these questions. The principle is that exegesis and Spirit-led insights must not be practised in isolation from each other. Exegesis alone runs the risk of relegating God’s word to a remote past; Spirit-led insights run the risk of enthusiasm and uncontrolled prophetism. \[122\] In order to help us in combining these two factors, Dunn distinguishes between ‘normative authority’ and ‘directive authority’. \[123\] The normative authority is the Bible, primarily the New Testament, by which the essence of Christianity is made known for all times and any claim in this area must be tested. The directive authority cannot be derived wholly from Scripture, since we face different situations than those addressed in Holy Writ. The directive authority must therefore involve the present work of the Holy Spirit in connection with the light provided by the Scripture. How this is recognized and differentiated from ideas, decisions and policies that are not Spirit-led is not made clear. The doctrine of authority is therefore obscured here. Contrast with this the closing paragraph of the first chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith!

The Supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other than the Holy Spirit speaking in the scripture.

f) Dunn’s sixth principle is designed to help us in the ambiguity remaining after the fifth principle. It is this: ‘church and tradition are also inevitably bound up in the hermeneutical process . . . Authority is a stool balanced on three legs, not just two, far less just one.’ \[124\] The three legs are: Scripture, Spirit, tradition.

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I would grant that the best *locus* for performing any theological task—whether exegesis, hermeneutics, systematics (including dogmatics and ethics), or homiletics—is within the fellowship of God's people. It will often protect the individual thinker from idiosyncrasies, vagaries, excrescences and superfluities that could easily mar the work of any person. I would further acknowledge that in the twentieth century we reap the benefits of previous centuries of reverent study, consecrated thinking and Spirit-led reflection, not to speak of the value for us of the rejection of various heresies and heterodoxies that have arisen in the past and are still threatening in the present. But to raise tradition to the standing of a leg in the stool of authority, with a footing equal to Scripture (God-breathed) and the Spirit (God Himself), is a wholesale reversal of the Reformation insight, not to speak of the severe condemnation by Jesus of the Pharisaical commitment to tradition (Matt. 15:3.6,9; Mark 7:7,8,13), and the warning of St Paul (Col. 2:8).

I will comment in the next section of this article concerning the performance of Professor Dunn in terms of his own principles, so it will suffice to say here that the charge of Pharisaism, which he repeatedly raises against the strict view of inspiration, might perhaps fit more readily his own construction of tradition's import for authority. Our Roman Catholic friends will no doubt rejoice about this paragraph from the pen of an 'evangelical' theologian!

(to be continued)

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NOTES

74 Professor Dunn adverts to what he calls 'the weakness of Warfield's famous essay "It says"; "Scripture says"; "God says"' (J. Dunn, op. cit., pp.201–2), to wit that Warfield was contented to study the bearing of those formulae of introduction and did not give an extensive discussion of the way in which the Scripture was used in these quotations. This at the most may be called a limitation rather than a 'weakness', for Warfield was specifically concerned to explore these three forms of introduction and to show that they are pretty well interchangeable. This in itself is a very significant conclusion, in which Dunn concedes that Warfield was right, and which involves the notable equation 'Scripture says' = 'God says' = 'It says' (a formula not found elsewhere, and in which the NT writers function with the expectancy that the reader will supply the proper subject, to wit, 'God' or 'Scripture'). Warfield covered every instance in the NT of the use of these three formulae. If he had extended his study to consider how the NT writers handled the OT with respect to meaning, there would have not been any good reason to limit the discussion to quotations thus adduced, and the fairly lengthy article would perforce have become a full-sized volume!

75 I see a grievous weakness in Dunn's failure to perceive the necessary implication of the equation 'Scripture says' = 'God says' for the truthfulness, yea inerrancy, of Scripture (see my part 1, Churchman, 97, 1983, p.201).

devoted to the study of introductory formulae and constitutes a companion volume to his *The Old Testament in the New* (Williams & Norgate, London 1868, xxxii, 279 pp.) in which he studies the form and meaning of the quotations themselves.


If the reckoning presented by D. Hay and mentioned by Dunn in his footnote 86 (p.223) were followed, we would actually have a figure of 1600 citations. I chose not to use that number because too many of the passages in view merely adopt OT phraseology without being an express quotation.


80 ibid., pp.206, 207.


82 If it be thought that the arrangement of materials is the work of the evangelist rather than of Jesus, it remains that, unless we are prepared to view Matthew as a moron, it seems unthinkable that he would not realize that 5:21-48 may appear to be in conflict with 5:17-20, and would in fact conflict, if it be held that Jesus actually repudiated the OT law in any part of this pericope. It does not seem unreasonable to insist that a proper interpretation of this passage must make allowance for a minimum of intelligence with Jesus and/or Matthew!


84 One interesting suggestion, which, however, does not convince me, would interpret the word *porneia* as relating not to sexual immorality, but to a marriage within forbidden degrees of consanguinity (Lev. 18:6-18). This type of relationship is mentioned in the law in the same context (Lev. 20:10-21) with some of the gravest sexual disorders (homosexuality, bestiality). This approach would account for the presence of the exception clause in Matthew, written primarily for people of Jewish culture; and for its absence in Mark and Luke, for whose audience this consideration would have less relevance. It is difficult, however, to ascribe this meaning to *porneia*, and to see divorce rather than annulment as the remedy to such a situation. cf. Oral Collins, 'Divorce in the New Testament', *The Gordon Review*, VII, 4 1964, pp.158-69.

85 It is interesting to note that, in Luke as well as in Matthew, the statement on divorce is preceded by an energetic reaffirmation of the authority of the law (Luke 16:17).

It is quite amazing that Dunn, in the face of the express statements of our Lord, could write: 'Remarriage of divorced Christians can be given properly scriptural legitimacy when this point [the historical relativity of some Scriptures] is recognized.' J. Dunn, op. cit., p.225, n.112.

86 ibid., p.205.

87 Prof. Dunn on this text rejects very arbitrarily the helpful exposition provided by N. B. Stonehouse, *The Witness of Matthew and Mark to Christ* (Tyndale Press, London 1944), p.208.

88 J. Dunn, op. cit., p.205.

89 ibid., pp.205-6.

90 It is to be noted that even though great contestations arose with respect to his observance of the Sabbath, he never condoned, commanded or committed any infraction of the OT law. It was the traditional interpretation and the Pharisaic network of regulatory prescriptions that he affronted, and this was the origin of the conflict.

91 On the relationship of Scripture to tradition, see a brilliant chapter in John R. W.
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92 J. Dunn, op. cit., p.204.


94 loc.cit.

95 ibid., p.222, n.69.


97 J. B. Lightfoot, *Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians*, (Macmillan, London 1890[10]), p.143. Is Bishop Lightfoot still in good repute in Durham these days?

98 The list of scholars who have so rated Paul’s argument may well include Baur, Bouset, Burton, Daube, Döpke, Emmet, Ewald, Farrar, Feine, Hilgenfeld, Holsten, H. J. Holtzmann, Hühn, Lagrange, Lietzmann, Lipsius, Meyer, Sanday, Sardinoux, Schöttgen, Sieffert, Stamm, Toy, L. Williams.

On the other hand there are scholars of at least equal exegetical stature who have sought to validate the argument of Gal. 3:16. I may name the following: Alford, Ballantine, Beet, Bengel, Beyer, Beza, Böhl, Boice, F. F. Bruce, Buzy, Calvin, Drusius, Duncan, Eadie, Ellicott, Ellis, P. Fairbairn, Findley, Godet, Gomarus, Greidanus, Guthrie, Hackett, Hebert, Hendriksen, Hengstenberg, Hofmann, Hovey, Howson, Huxtable, F. Johnson, J. B. Lightfoot, J. MacGregor, W. D. Mackenzie, Maurer, Oepke, Olshausen, Perowne, Philippi, Rendall, H. N. Ridderbos, Riddle, Schaff, Schlatter, Schlier, Schmoller, Tasker, Tenney, Tholuck, Zahn, Zöckler.

Betz, John Brown, Cole and W. Ramsey appear to me ambivalent.


‘It Says:’ ‘Scripture Says:’ ‘God Says:’ in *Inspiration and Authority*, p.301 and passim.


Dunn lists Rom. 10:6-8, Eph. 4:8, and possibly Rom. 1:17, as cases where St Paul quoted a form of the text which favoured his meaning. But it is not difficult to relate each of these to the Massoretic text of the source.

Dunn then lists Matt. 2:23 and 27:9-10 as deliberate adaptations to demonstrate a closer ‘fit’ between the prophecy and its fulfilment! He accuses Matthew of having ‘clearly (and awkwardly) ... modified’ details ‘to fit more precisely the tradition of Judas’s fate.’ Obviously such an understanding of the NT is not only unnecessary but unacceptable.

102 J. Dunn, op. cit., pp.211-12.

103 ibid., p.212.

104 Dunn states explicitly that this is his assumption in his note 98, p.224.

105 loc.sit.

106 ibid., pp.212-14.

107 ibid., pp.216-17.

108 This position was particularly well articulated in more detail by John Calvin in two great chapters of the *Institutes* (II, x and xi) in which the relationship between the Old and the New Covenant is delineated. cf. also pp.12-13 in the present article.


110 ibid., p.215; cf. p.221.

111 ibid., p.215; cf. pp.221, 222.

112 ibid., p.216.

113 Under this rubric, Dunn enunciates more fully what he understands by historical
relativity (pp.216-17). This material seems to relate most closely to an earlier part of the article and in the present discussion has been considered there (p.20).

114 For indeed by this method one is as likely to hit upon statements by Satan, historical narrative statements or covenant relative commands which are not mandatory for Christians, as to find permanent divine injunctions, which one would have had to obey in any case. Examples of Scriptures that cannot be used in this way might be: 'You will not surely die' (Gen. 3:4); 'I am Joseph! Is my father still living?' (Gen. 45:3); 'When David arrived at the summit ... Hushai the Arkite was there' (2 Sam. 16:32); 'Take your son ... sacrifice him' (Gen. 22:2).

115 Matt. 22:43; Luke 20:42; John 19:37; Acts 2:25,34; 7:48; 8:34; 13:35; Rom. 4:3,6; 9:15,17,25; 10:5,6,11,16,19,20,21; 11:2,4,9; 15:10,12; 1 Cor. 6:16; 14:34; 2 Cor. 6:2; Gal. 3:16; 4:30; Eph. 4:8; 5:14; 1 Tim. 5:18; Heb. 1:6,7; 3:7; 5:6; 8:5,8; 10:15; James 4:5.


118 ibid., p.218; cf. p.221.

119 ibid., p.219.

120 ibid., p.118.

121 ibid., p.216.

122 ibid., p.219.

123 ibid., p.220.

124 ibid., p.221.

125 I am well aware that the charge of having renounced the stance of the Reformation is in itself an appeal to tradition, and I am not concerned to deny that in some very real way we are all influenced by our environment and react to it, sometimes positively, sometimes negatively. In the Reformation, however, the place of tradition was clearly subordinate to Scripture and every tradition could, and should, be critically examined in the light of Scripture. This is a long way from making it the third 'pod' of a tripod!