

Political Authority in Decline?

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There is a widespread unease about 'authority' in the world today. On the part of some it is the apparent absence of authority which is so troubling. No matter where we look—in schools or in government, in sport or in the church—authority, we are told, is in short supply. On the part of others it is the apparent enhancement of authority which is worrying. Government has become so much bigger and in many ways more coercive, and, following government, dozens of other bodies have become bureaucratized, with remote leadership often handling issues in 'authoritarian' ways. What are we to make of this? Is there too much authority, or too little? Are both kinds of fear justified? Is 'authority' desirable, and if so on what terms? Or is authority best thought of as a kind of necessary evil, with the less we see of it the better so that we can all lead our lives without uninvited interference?

Before we can begin to answer such questions, or even to reflect on why they are being so widely asked in contemporary discussion, we must attempt to understand better the term 'authority'. Indeed the very raising of these questions makes clear that 'authority' is a term which can bear a variety of meanings.

The word 'authority' is commonly used in two different ways. We speak of those 'in authority', meaning thereby those who occupy formal positions of power. Such persons hold office, and their authority is derived from the office which they occupy. Most obvious are the offices of state, but we may equally speak of those in authority in lesser bodies, such as universities, prisons, churches and so on. The important point about the use of the term 'authority' in this context is that it is linked to an office. Authority derives from the office, not from the person occupying the office.

But in a quite separate sense we commonly speak of a person as being 'an authority' on a particular subject, without this characterization carrying with it any implication that the person so described occupies a formal office. For example, a person may be described as an authority on penal policy, and as such his views may command a great deal of attention. Governments may listen hard to advice which he offers, but unless and until he is appointed Home Secretary (or to some office within government where responsibility

for penal policy is located), he is not in authority.

We obey those who are 'in authority' because of the formal position they hold. The motives for our obedience can vary. It may be that we obey because we fear the penalties of disobedience; those in authority have an armoury of weapons which they can employ against us. The state can employ force directly, or we can be taken before the courts and some other sanction such as imprisonment or fine imposed upon us. Within a lesser organization sanctions may still be employed, such as suspension of membership or expulsion. However, most of the time, most of us obey those in authority because we believe it right to do so. Again, the source of this belief may vary greatly: it may be that we believe the authorities to be exercising a divinely appointed task; it may be that we subscribe to a theory of social contract, and thereby accept that obedience to those in authority is right because disobedience cumulatively leads to disorder which is inimical to the collective good of society from which much of our individual good is derived.

We do not, however, have any such obligation to obey a person who is 'an authority' on a certain subject, nor is such a person able himself to employ sanctions against us if we disobey. Indeed the word 'obey' is out of place in this context. Rather it is a question of our following or failing to follow the advice of an authority. If we fail to follow his advice, then we may suffer penalties, but they are not penalties imposed by the authority whose advice we failed to follow.

The former understanding of the term 'authority' links the concept closely with power. It is for this reason that the word 'authority' has often been defined as 'formal power'. An empirically minded social scientist finds it hard to handle the concept if it is not so defined. Those 'in authority' are so described because they can activate processes which involve the assertion of power, with its end-product of compulsion. Compliance is usually given to those in authority without power being exercised, but the power is there, latent so to speak. Hence the definition 'formal power'.

The latter understanding of the term authority links it closely with reason. It is the capacity of 'an authority' on a subject to develop reasoned argument in support of his view which is important. He is always able (or so it is believed) to augment his view with good reasons. It is this understanding of the term 'authority' which the political philosopher Carl Friedrich asserts: he defines 'authority' as the capacity to develop reasons for an action, and if necessary to do this at length, and in ways which intersect with the understanding of a community.¹ In support of this view he draws attention to the Roman antecedents of the word 'authority':

It has predominantly the sense related to the verb from which it is derived: *augere*, to augment. *Auctoritas* thus supplements a mere act of

the will by adding reasons to it. Such augmentation and confirmation are the results of deliberation by the 'old ones.' The *auctoritas patrum* is, for that reason, more than advice, yet less than command. It is advice which cannot be properly disregarded, such as the expert gives to the layman, or the leader in a parliament to his followers.²

Hence Friedrich argues that it is not the power of him who wills something which gives his decision authority, but the good reasons which lie behind the decision, and confer upon it a quality otherwise lacking, which make it 'authoritative'. It is the capacity of a person who possesses authority to develop reasoned argument and convincing explanation, which is distinctive.³ Such argument is convincing not only because of the quality of reasoning itself (its consistency, the eloquence with which it is offered, and so on), but because it is reasoning which is grounded in shared values. Thus authority may wane and disappear, not because the arguments being advanced are any less convincing in an objective sense, but because they are no longer expressed in terms which the community understands or appreciates. True authority does not lose its capacity to express itself in ways which meet with contemporary values. This must not be misunderstood as meaning that authority is entirely a subjective phenomenon. Rather it is to see authority as a bridge, a means of linking the tradition upon which a community is based and the contemporary life and setting of that community. That bridge is harder to maintain if rapid social change is taking place, a point to which we will return.

We may now link up the two separate understandings of the word 'authority'. The essential meaning of the term is the ability to develop sound, well-grounded reasons for a decision. It ought to be a characteristic of those in authority that they have this capacity. But it is not necessarily so. And it could be that if authority is in short supply today, then this state of affairs has arisen because those 'in authority' have lost the capacity to exercise authority; they have lost the ability to elucidate convincing reasons for their policy and action. This may be a much more pertinent explanation of the loss of authority than the suggestion that people *en masse* are simply more rebellious and less respectful.

It is well with a people when those who hold formal positions of power are authoritative; when those who are in authority are capable of exercising true authority. But when those in power are not trusted by the people, or when they repeatedly fail to achieve the targets they have set, they lose genuine authority. They may still remain 'in authority', and they may still enjoy the compliance of the people, but they cease to act with true authority. Sometimes the phrase 'coercive authority' is used, in contrast to 'consensual authority'. This indicates that compliance is offered because of the coercion which those in authority can apply. This is not genuine authority as we have

defined the concept here, though we must recognize that a dynamic relationship often exists between authority and power. Those in authority who do possess genuine authority and are confident of the fact may enhance their authority by employing power. Alternatively, a failure to use power by those in authority can indicate that true authority is lacking: in such a situation a rapid collapse of authority is possible.⁴

Before we move on to analyse more precisely the concept of political authority, we may take note of two more terms which often creep into discourse on this subject. The perjorative term 'authoritarian' is commonly applied to leadership which is dogmatic and unreasoned, but which may yet evoke compliance because of the potential for asserting power which lies behind it. This is far from genuine authority; leaders who rely on such a method will themselves either be repudiated or become despots. The adjective 'authoritarian' illustrates for us how easily the concept of authority is misunderstood. The same point can also be made with reference to the phrase 'the method of authority'. The true method of authority is convincing, reasoned explanation, but when calls are made for 'the method of authority' to be used, something very different is usually in mind. Since the Enlightenment, this phrase has frequently been contrasted with reasoned explanation, and held to denote something fundamentally opposed to rationality. The 'method of authority' has been synonymous with unreasoning superstition; the liberal mind preferred to rely on reason, and was thus set up against authority. The institutional church, as it lost authority (in the true sense) but sought to retain power, did much to cause this debasement of the concept of 'authority'. And therein may lie an important lesson for today. It is no good imagining that all that is necessary for a return of authority is a reassertion of bold pronouncements and clear policy decisions by those in offices of various kinds. Unless these are well grounded in good reason and well communicated in terms of shared values, the authority so asserted will be empty.⁵

Political authority

There are good reasons for focusing particularly on political authority. The role of government is crucial to the well-being of any modern society. Furthermore, there is sociological evidence to indicate that patterns of authority which exist elsewhere in a society are almost certainly influenced by the dominant pattern of authority in society, and for most modern societies this is undoubtedly the authority of the regime—that is the group of institutions within the state which co-ordinate and control administration. We may usefully distinguish a regime from a government, the latter consisting of the incumbents of office at any particular time. Political authority may be

defined as the capacity to develop convincing reasons for an action by those who occupy office. Genuine political authority therefore rests on consent, which in turn is generated by a belief that a regime is legitimate and the government is effective in achieving desired goals. A government may lose authority while a regime retains this quality. If a regime loses authority, then a revolutionary upheaval is likely.

What is it then that generates a sense of legitimacy, of the right to rule? Any discussion of this subject may usefully take as a starting-point the classic analysis made by Max Weber. He distinguished three sources of legitimacy—tradition, charisma, and rational-legality—and elucidated these as ideal types or pure forms, each giving rise to its particular kind of authority. In applying this analysis, while we may scarcely expect to identify any particular system as resting on one of these pure forms of legitimacy, we may nonetheless find Weber helpful in pointing to the predominant values which underlie the authority of different regimes. According to Weber, the most universal and primitive category was tradition. It was an 'established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions'⁶ which gave rise to this type of legitimacy. The strength of a ruler, whose authority is so based, depends on the strength of the social institutions which he leads. Strictly speaking, there is no personal influence accorded to such rulers; their authority depends on their status, i.e. their position within the order which they represent. They are accorded obedience on the grounds of personal loyalty, and it is this rather than obedience to rules which supplies the dynamic for regimes based on tradition. A modern writer suggests that in only about a dozen countries of the world today (chiefly in Central America and in Central and South Asia) does the *top* leadership rely primarily on this kind of legitimacy.⁷ But an element of traditionally based authority is evident in many other regimes, notably the British, where Lord Hailsham recently spoke of the 'priceless value' of the British Constitution's 'immemorial antiquity'.⁸

Charismatic authority, according to Weber, rests on 'devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person and the normative pattern of order revealed or ordained by him.'⁹ This is something quite outside everyday routine. No formal rules or abstract legal principles exist, nor is there any wisdom to be found in precedents. The past is repudiated. Economic considerations do not exist: the staff of a charismatic leader are called without appointment or dismissal, career prospects or salaries. Authority derived from this type of legitimacy is inherently unstable; it occurs only in unusual circumstances which cannot be engineered. The charismatic leader is therefore concerned, Weber argued, to 'routinise his authority' by transforming its basis into traditional or rational-legal legitimacy. Charismatic authority has been most associated with revolutionary situations, including struggles for

colonial independence. It has remained relatively important, particularly in developing countries. Again, elements of charismatic authority may be found where legitimacy predominantly derives from other values. (Likely candidates would include Churchill in 1940, De Gaulle in 1958, possibly Kennedy in 1960, Castro in 1958, Nasser in 1955, Tito in 1940).

Wherever legitimacy rests on legality, then the third type of authority—legally based authority—is present. In this case, administration derives from rules which are mutually consistent and dependent on formal principles. Whenever this is the process by which rules are enacted—when it is their legality which determines their legitimacy—the basis for this kind of authority is present. Office-holders are obeyed because of the impersonal order which they represent, rather than because of personal qualities or tradition, though personal qualities may remain important in so far as they reveal an aptitude to work through the institution to attain desired ends. Bureaucracy is characteristic of societies in which legitimacy is based on rational-legality. And of course this is the dominant pattern of legitimacy in the modern world. 'Bureaucracy has been woven into the whole fabric of western societies.'¹⁰ Bureaucratic leadership has become the rule in most western countries most of the time, and is the usual form in communist countries as well.

It has been argued that the most crucial distinction to be drawn when classifying types of regime in existence in the contemporary world, centres not on the *form* of Government but on the *degree* of government.¹¹ Is the regime stable? Is government really possible under a particular regime? Or is the regime just establishing itself or in the process of being repudiated? 'Few regimes achieve fully legitimate status in a short time', writes Richard Rose,¹² and he goes on to suggest that 'in practice no regime might be said to be moving away from repudiation unless it has survived long enough to have been the predominant influence upon the political memories of more than half of its present adult population from childhood onwards.' In 1970 it remained premature to speak with confidence about the stability of regimes in nearly all African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries, while Latin American regimes are notorious for their inability to maintain support. 'The normal expectation of a Latin American regime would be that it is heading for repudiation', and this despite the stability of the state in Latin America (where territorial boundaries show much more stability than in Europe).¹³ The creation of a legitimate stable public order is the most basic requirement for most countries in the world.¹⁴

An application of Weber's analysis may help in illustrating why this is so. Typically, the process of colonization may be said to have destroyed the old basis of legitimacy which existed in many countries—the 'sanctity of immemorial tradition.' In the colonial era this

was replaced by authority based on rational-legality; the colonial powers chosen instrument of bureaucracy was applied. This in turn became undermined by indigenous nationalism, with charismatic leaders often playing a crucial role. But in the course of the struggle for liberation from the colonial power, the rational-legal basis for authority was discredited and undermined.¹⁵ Respect for the idea of impersonal legal rule, for the rule of law, withered away. But, equally, respect for the old traditional order had disappeared too. The uncertainty, the state of flux that resulted, proved a good breeding-ground for charismatic leadership, but, as Weber suggested, authority so based is highly unstable. The vacuum that often accompanied or shortly followed independence, has in many countries been repeated as charismatic leaders have failed to routinize their authority. Power there may be, but coercive rule is hard to sustain and, once embarked upon, hard to deviate from, as the monotonous and bloody succession of military dictatorships indicates. Put in this way, and using part of Weber's analysis, perhaps helps to show the very great difficulties facing countries which have been suddenly and artificially transformed by the invasion of western power (as in the colonial era) when that power is withdrawn.

In seeing something of the difficulties facing regimes as they try to develop a sense of legitimacy, we see how one of the prior conditions for the exercise of genuine authority is not fulfilled. Reverting for a moment to the idea of authority as a bridge linking the tradition of the past with the reality of the present, we see a further obstacle to the development of authority in the rapid social change which was frequently associated with countries emerging from a colonial past, and which has become endemic in various degrees throughout the world. Developments in the means of communication, the transistor radio and now the television set, cause a diffusion of values with a rapidity unmatched and un contemplated by any previous age.¹⁶ To some extent opinion polls keep leaders apprised of changing values, and elections can encourage a certain amount of sensitivity to such values; but these are very crude mechanisms, and genuine political communication is far from guaranteed.

Consent

If regimes require legitimacy as a pre-condition for the exercise of authority, governments require consent. In most western states, elections are crucial in generating consent. It is not necessarily the fairness of the electoral system which is important, but the fact that a contested election takes place. Success in an election constitutes a form of anointing to office. The modern equivalent of a medieval coronation is the conceding and claiming of victory which we see on our television screens on election night. As soon as a new leader is

elected, even though (as in the USA) he may not take office for several weeks, the basis for the exercise of authority shifts. There is a special boldness about elected men; in any open dispute it is not those superior in knowledge or understanding of a subject, but those who are elected, who usually have the self-confidence to attempt to wield authority. A more sophisticated analysis may indicate that elected office-holders lack the endurance and the skills necessary for imposing new directions on the bureaucratic agencies of government, but the popular expectation to which they at least attempt to conform, is that initiative rests with them. Maybe the perceived decline in the effectiveness of most governments in modern societies is affecting this situation. Is the authority of the expert replacing the authority of elected persons? This hypothesis is frequently argued, but without any clear view emerging.¹⁷ The trouble with 'experts' is that they are often wrong and almost invariably disagree with each other. These are considerable handicaps when it comes to establishing authority. A further problem is that experts often lack communicative skills which are important in exercising authority. Again, experts come in so many different areas; as far as political authority is concerned, an important element is co-ordination and the formulation of coherent policies. By definition, genuine expertise is attainable on a narrow front, and this does not savour well for the ability to develop a broader perspective necessary for formulating coherent policies. Perhaps increased attention has been given to the supposed growing authority of experts mainly because authority elsewhere has apparently been in decline. But authority (like power) is not available in a fixed supply which must inevitably be parcelled out somewhere. It may be that authority has simply been evaporating from modern society. A psychiatrist writing on political authority in 1965 suggested that 'the really modern form of authority is that of the specialist' and went on to argue that the quality of political authority could be measured by its ability to integrate specialist detailed knowledge with a striving for power.¹⁸ John F. Kennedy was viewed as a prototype of a new fraternal political authority because of his ability to integrate teams of specialist advisers with office-holders within government. The experiment was short-lived, and in retrospect it is hard to draw the conclusion that political authority would have been enhanced in America if his term of office had run its full course. It was, after all, Kennedy who first embroiled the USA in Vietnam. It might be wiser to see Kennedy as simply a rather more flamboyant example than usual of the need most politicians feel to bolster their political authority by making use of expertise. This can present a beguiling prospect to many experts as well. In general I would argue that, whilst in the 1950s there was much optimism about the role of expertise and the likely achievements of technocracy, in 1980 there is more a crisis of confidence in expertise, and a loss of faith in technique.

Loss of political authority may arise through a chronic and painful inability to communicate clear and convincing reasons for policy and action on the part of a politician. Richard Nixon recounts in his memoirs how in 1970, when anti-war protest was at its height in the USA, he was stoned by irate demonstrators. The presidential limousine was battered and dented, and that evening he sat pondering this fact, for it was the first time as far as he knew that the president of the United States had been stoned by his fellow-countrymen. Here was a man in high authority being treated in this way—and why? Because at that time he lacked true authority *vis à vis* a substantial proportion of the American people. Indeed he recounts a number of instances before this in which he had endeavoured to explain his policy, but he felt frustrated and helpless in his efforts at communication. In this case he gave the hostile crowd the V-sign, a gesture to which they responded by throwing rocks.¹⁹

Politicians who fail to mobilize consent for their policy-decisions, risk the loss of political authority. Nixon was a dramatic example of such a failure, and it was ironic that the complete collapse of his authority should occur so soon after his overwhelming electoral victory in 1972. A further lesson may be drawn from his example. Where victory in elections is a necessary prelude to office-holdings, politicians may as it were be suitably packaged by professional advertising agents and in effect sold in a highly successful way to the public. But the essence of such an electoral campaign is that the appeal is made not centrally to the mind, but to the feelings and emotions. While elections may be won in this way, genuine political authority—dependent on convincing reasoned argument—is not strengthened. A dilemma in modern democracy may be that electoral success is best achieved by methods inimical to the establishment of true authority.²⁰

Effectiveness

Political authority also derives from effectiveness. The authority of a regime may be enhanced when its effectiveness is proven. Though this would not normally be expected to happen when the authority of a government is being undermined, arguably it did in America in 1974. The fact of Nixon's removal from office was widely interpreted as a vindication of American constitutional processes. Usually, however, the authority of a regime is enhanced as successive governments achieve stability and perceived effectiveness. We will therefore particularly consider the effectiveness of government.

The *sine qua non* of government is that as an organization it is capable of influencing society around it. 'Effectiveness is the first concern of governors. Government is not only about good intentions; it's also about getting things done.'²¹ A whole library of literature has

appeared in the last decade analysing the declining effectiveness of government. The problem has been viewed as one of overload on government; public expectations of government have increased at the same time as government's ability to fulfil expectations has declined. A crisis of governability emerges; government is in danger of going bankrupt. There is a 'credibility-gap', a 'legitimacy-deficit', and so on. 'Is there fire behind the smoke?', asks one political scientist.²²

We may start by drawing attention to the vast growth in government which has occurred. The number of government employees, the percentages of gross national product passing through government hands, the range of functions government undertakes, have grown steadily in all western democracies. In Britain, growth has been continuous throughout this century. It has been as great in the twenty years since 1960 as it was in the twenty years before 1960. Apologists for this growth point to reasonable public expectations as the main catalyst; there is something decent and highly civilized about a welfare state, for example. Sceptics point to the apparently ineluctable nature of government expansion, and suggest that it is a consequence of rival teams of politicians bidding for election votes by promising economic goodies, the bill for which can always be delayed, and as far as any group of voters is concerned can probably be shifted on to someone else. Expectations were stoked up particularly while great faith in technocracy lasted. In 1963 Mr Wilson, in his peroration to a memorable conference speech, declared: 'We shall harness science to socialism to produce the good life for all.' Nixon renamed the Cancer Research Institute the Conquest of Cancer Agency.

A government that attempts to do more is almost by definition more likely to fail somewhere. This is surely part of the problem. Much of the remainder lies not in government's failure to do as well as previously, but in its failure to meet the rising expectations of its peoples. But in the 1970s even what had previously been taken for granted began to seem at risk again. As inflation and unemployment reached record levels (not just in Britain), government seemed incapable of doing more than fumble for solutions. Serious worries about violence and public disorder arose.²³

As the formal responsibilities of government have increased, and its size correspondingly grown, so, it is often assumed, has its power. But this growth in size has positively handicapped government; co-ordinating all its bits and pieces proves too burdensome. Because government is bigger, it seems more powerful, and because most people have increasingly more to do with government, it seems more coercive. But in reality its power has not increased. And in terms of our earlier analysis of authority, government has had much more explaining to do, and has found convincing explanations increasingly difficult to offer. Its authority has diminished.

The lack of trust in government, the public expectation that

politicians will not keep their promises, the lack of conviction with which politicians all too often seem to act: all these are further factors undermining political authority. In so far as the main purpose of government has become the increase in material well-being of its people, then one might well ask if this is a satisfactory enough purpose with which to engage the mind of man? The national interest has ceased to be interesting; government has become banal, and the people lack a sense of purpose. How can one expect political authority to thrive?

But should the politicians be particularly blamed? When Mr Harold Macmillan was asked in his retirement to defend his 'You've never had it so good' appeal in the 1959 election, he suggested that it was the role of archbishops and not prime ministers to give people a sense of purpose.²⁴ Certainly there is truth in the dictum that a society gets the government it deserves. Just what do we deserve as a people today?

No country is watched more closely throughout the world than America, and no country has suffered such a catastrophic decline in political authority as America. The Vietnam morasse, followed by Watergate, has had repercussions far beyond American shores. A nation of tremendous power had a government which lost authority; this initially occurred on the domestic scene under President Johnson. Lacking true authority, the government became nervous and inhibited about the use of power. As its vacillation became apparent, so its authority on the international scene was further undermined. The decline in trust within government, as well as between government and people, bred the habits of deception which culminated in Watergate. Nixon's successors have proved unable to reassert authority; in many respects they have reaped and will continue to reap the consequences in further national humiliation. Robert Nisbet has argued that these American traumas have resulted in the commencement of a new reformation, not with the church as the central object of its force, but the political state, and with the overthrow of the 'political clerisy' as its goal.²⁵ Such an overthrow would not leave modern society without government, but it might well leave it without genuine political authority. A false coercive form of authority would exist in the context (most likely) of a totalitarian regime.

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It would be a mistake to view political authority in isolation from the exercise of authority elsewhere in society. But it is a particularly prominent kind of authority, and I believe its exercise both reflects and influences the exercise of other kinds of authority. In the contemporary world all forms of genuine authority are harder to sustain. The

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heightened complexity of almost every aspect of life presents a challenge to those who exercise authority. The rapidity of change of all kinds makes the task more difficult. The temptation to take short cuts is very real. It is temporarily easier to become authoritarian than to be authoritative. But this is not really a short cut; it is more a *cul-de-sac*.

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NOTES

- 1 Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (McGraw Hill, New York and London 1963) ch.12. cf. also *Tradition and Authority*, Carl J. Friedrich, (Macmillan, London 1972).
- 2 *ibid.* pp.218-19.
- 3 *ibid.* pp.223-5.
- 4 cf. An interesting comment by H. Kissinger makes this point in a forceful way. 'A national leader . . . will not be able to take away the moral curse of using force by using it half-heartedly or incompetently. There are no rewards for exhibiting one's doubts in vacillation: statesmen get no prizes for failing with restraint. Once committed they must prevail. If they are not prepared to prevail they should not commit their nation's power . . .' H. Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, London 1979) p.498.
- 5 Reason can of course build on premises which are not themselves open for debate. Thus reason and revelation need not be antipathic.
- 6 Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation* (ET Free Press, Collier Macmillan, London) p.328. See also pp.341-58.
- 7 Jean Blondel, *Political Parties* (Wildwood House, London 1978) p.177.
- 8 Lord Hailsham, Richard Dimbleby Memorial Lecture, 1976. *The Listener*, 21 October 1976.
- 9 Weber, *op. cit.* p.328. See also pp.358-66.
- 10 Blondel, *op. cit.* p.177.
- 11 S. P. Huntingdon, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale University Press, New York 1976) p.1.
- 12 R. Rose, *Governing without Consensus* (Faber, London 1971) p.35.
- 13 *ibid.* pp.35-6.
- 14 cf. S. P. Huntingdon, *op. cit.* pp.7-8. 'In many modernising countries . . . the primary problem is not liberty, but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may of course have order without liberty but they cannot have liberty without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited, and it is authority which is in short supply.'
- 15 This point is developed by A. R. and D. Willner, 'The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders', *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 358 (March 1965) pp.77-88.
- 16 cf. Donald Schon, *Beyond the Stable State* (Pelican, London 1970) esp. ch.1 'The Loss of the Stable State'.
- 17 For example B. Crick, *In Defence of Politics* (Penguin, London 1964) ch.5. G. Vickers, *Value Systems and Social Process* (Penguin, London 1970) ch.5. Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Society* (ET Random House, New York 1964) p.255. Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (Peregrine, London 1973) ch.6.

- 18 A. Mitscharlich, 'Changing Patterns of Political Authority: A Psychiatric Interpretation' in *Political Leadership in Industrial Societies*, ed. L. T. Edinger (R. E. Keniger Publishing, New York 1976) p.33.
- 19 R. Nixon, *Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (Sidgwick and Jackson, London 1978) pp. 492-3. See also pp. 458-66, his account of his impulsive 5.00 am visit to demonstrators at the Lincoln Memorial, described by Kissinger as 'his awkward visit to Lincoln Memorial', Kissinger, op. cit. p.514.
- 20 cf. J. McGinniss, *The Selling of the President* (Andre Deutsch, London 1970), a somewhat satirical examination of Nixon's 1968 Campaign. For a serious analysis of problems facing politicians in realizing electorally popular programmes, see R. Rose, *Problem of Party Government* (Macmillan, London 1974; Penguin, London 1976) ch.15.
- 21 R. Rose, *Challenge to Governance* (Sage Publications, London 1970) p.7.
- 22 cf. A. King (ed.) *Why is Britain Becoming Harder to Govern?* (BBC Publications). R. Rose and G. Peters, *Can Government go Bankrupt?* (Macmillan, London 1978). S. Brittan, *The Economic Consequences of Democracy* (Temple Smith, London 1977). R. Rose, 'Ungovernability: Is There Fire Behind The Smoke?', *Political Studies*, Vol. XXVII, 1979.
- 23 See for example R. Clutterbuck, *Britain in Agony* (Faber, London 1978).
- 24 See H. Fairlie, *The Life of Politics* (Methuen, London 1968) pp.250-1. A. Sampson, *Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity* (Penguin, London 1967) p.249.
- 25 R. Nisbet, *The Twilight of Authority* (Oxford University Press, New York 1975) pp.5, 205-6. This book is interesting as a post-Watergate expression of alarm from the Right.