1. Tillich's Main Concerns

PAUL TILLICH (1886-1965) cannot be catalogued into some familiar theological pigeon-hole. This is not to deny that he owes much to Schleiermacher as well as to other thinkers. But he himself rightly deplores 'the cheap and clumsy way of dividing all theologians into naturalists and supernaturalists, or liberals and orthodox' as an 'easy way of shelving somebody'. The range and direction of Tillich's concerns may be indicated by calling attention to four themes in his writings.

Firstly, Tillich thinks and writes as a Christian apologist. He tries to view Christianity from the outside as well as from the inside, and is intensely concerned about man's situation in the twentieth century. He remarks, 'Most of my writings try to define the way in which Christianity is related to secular culture.' Tillich's major work, his three-volume *Systematic Theology* is cast in the form of five sets of questions and answers which are formulated in apologetic terms. After a detailed discussion of method, the first volume begins with questions about human reason, which suggest answers about revelation. Next, questions about 'being' are offered some kind of answer in symbols which point to 'God'. In the second volume questions about concrete existence are related to answers concerning Christ as the new being. Finally, in the third volume, the ambiguities of life are correlated with a doctrine of the Spirit; and questions about the meaning of history find theological answers in notions about the kingdom of God. It is fundamental to Tillich's work that 'apologetics presupposes common ground, however vague it may be.' He defines apologetics, therefore, as answering theology. He comments, 'In using the method of correlation, systematic theology proceeds in the following way: it makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and it demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions.'
It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that Tillich is unduly intellectualistic in his diagnosis of the secular man's questions. In his more popular book *The Courage to Be*, for example, he probes into man's anxieties about fate and death, into his experience of emptiness and meaninglessness, and into his feelings of guilt and condemnation. Tillich himself has great affinities with Romanticism. Music, architecture, literature, and especially painting, have an important place in his life. Hence apologetics is for him never simply a matter of abstract reasoning. He is concerned with problems of life, and not just problems of thought. His political sympathies with socialism represent one aspect of this many-sided concern.

Secondly, Tillich is concerned that the ultimate should be located only in God. This point is most easily expressed negatively. No absolute or ultimate claim may be made for any reality that is merely finite, be it a person, a symbol, an event or a sacred writing. Grace is not bound to any finite form, whether it be a church, a book, or a sacrament. The positive value of all such forms in religion can only be that they point to the ultimate beyond themselves. This principle, as we shall see, applies even to conceptual formulations about God. Nothing except the 'God' who is above and beyond these formulations is exempt from criticism and relativisation among other finite objects.

This belief that anything in the world, including doctrine, Bible, and church, must be open to criticism Tillich calls the Protestant principle, and makes it central in his theology. Not least, the Protestant principle of the Reformation demands that Protestantism itself be called in question. Thus Tillich declares, 'The need for a profound transformation of religious and cultural Protestantism is indicated. The end of the Protestant era is . . . not the return to early Christianity, nor is it the step to a new form of secularism. It is something beyond all these forms, a new form of Christianity, to be expected and prepared for, but not yet to be named.'

A further factor in Tillich's elaboration of the Protestant principle was his early love of philosophical enquiry. In his *Autobiographical Reflections* he recalls how philosophy came to his aid in his early theological discussions with his father, who was a Lutheran pastor. He had begun to feel an intolerable pressure from his father's theological conservatism. But his father also shared the classical Lutheran view that a genuine philosophy could not conflict with revealed truth. Tillich recalls how long philosophical discussions developed between them, until 'from an independent philosophical position a state of independence spread out into all directions'. He describes this experience as a 'break-through to autonomy which has made me immune against any system of thought or life which demands the surrender of this autonomy'.

Thirdly, Tillich sees his task as one of mediation. He stresses this with special force in his long autobiographical essay entitled, sig-
significantly, *On the Boundary*. He wishes to stand as mediator and interpreter on the boundaries between theology and philosophy, between religion and culture, between Lutheranism and socialism, between the intellectual life of Germany and that of America, and so on. Tillich wages war against division and compartmentalism. Indeed fragmentation and taking the part for the whole is for Tillich directly symbolised only by the demonic. His aim, therefore, is to heal the divisions which obscure our vision in such a way that we no longer see life and thought as a single wholeness. Lack of knowledge or lack of a wider concern, he believes, narrow our horizons until, instead of a wholeness, we see everything in terms of self-contained compartments and specialist areas. And, for Tillich, this partly explains why modern man, in an age of technology and specialisation, fails to ask questions about Being, or about the God who is the Ground of all Being.

Fourthly, very brief mention may be made here, by way of an introduction to later discussion, of Tillich's attempts to do justice to three sets of insights which he draws from thinkers who influenced him. In one direction he owed a large debt to the psychology of Jung, whose view of symbols and of the unconscious profoundly influence Tillich's own approach to the symbols of religion. In a direction which is not altogether different, Tillich also owes much to Schleiermacher's view of religious experience. Carl Braaten reminds us that Tillich kept alive the memory of Schleiermacher at a time when the latter 'was glibly dismissed as a mystic'. Finally, in a quite different direction Tillich looks to Martin Heidegger for categories of thought or conceptual schemes which can be used in theology. Or, more accurately, he accepts Heidegger's proposal that language about 'Being' or 'God' will transcend the categories of subject-object conceptual thought. Thus this lends support to his attempt to by-pass cognitive discourse about God in exchange for the language of symbolism.

When we put these four sets of themes together, it is not surprising that some express admiration for Tillich's work, whilst others view him as an enemy of the gospel. Thinking of his work as apologist and mediator, for example, T. M. Greene describes Tillich as 'the most enlightening and therapeutic theologian of our time'; while W. M. Horton calls him the brightest hope for a theology of ecumenical reconciliation. On the other hand, thinking of the Protestant principle, Kenneth Hamilton declares, 'The one thing that Tillich never means by “Christian theology” is an authoritative message to be accepted.' "To see Tillich’s system as a whole is to see that it is incompatible with the Christian gospel." Not surprisingly, again, some Roman Catholic writers make this point. Tillich leaves us with the question: how far can we extend our theological horizons before our theology ceases to be Christian? How many ingredients can we squeeze into religious thought before it explodes under its tensions? We should certainly not dispute the fact that Tillich was aware of these
difficulties and that he intended to avoid them. The question of his intention, however, differs from the question of his success.

2. Apologetics and the Problem of Openness

We have already outlined the method of apologetic question and answer adopted by Tillich in his Systematic Theology. We must now look at some of its difficulties. Tillich freely admits that the selection and framing of his questions have a pronounced effect on the form and content of his answers. He describes this question-answer relationship as one of interdependence. But thereby he invites immediate suspicion from both sides. Many theologians believe that Tillich’s questions restrict his answers selectively, and thus lead to distortion. On the other side, a number of philosophers believe that an advance knowledge of his supposed answers loads and biases his framing of the questions.

Partly by way of anticipating such criticisms, Tillich insists that the content of his answers ‘cannot be derived from the questions, that is, from an analysis of human existence. They are “spoken” to human existence from beyond it. Otherwise they would not be answers’. He invites us to test his apologetics by asking regularly, as he himself does, ‘Can the Christian message be adapted to the modern mind without losing its essential and unique character?’ He asserts, ‘It is necessary to ask in every special case whether or not the apologetic bias has dissolved the Christian message.’ In reply, however, it has to be stated that Tillich’s method of correlation has shaped his answers into a form which is not always satisfactory to other theologians; even though each particular issue must be assessed on its own merits.

From the side of philosophy, however, the problem is still more serious. When he first began working on the Systematic Theology in 1925, Tillich tended to think of ‘the philosopher’ as one who was most concerned with the kind of problems and methods that Heidegger takes up in Being and Time. But even though his best-known works came from his later American period, we have no evidence to suggest that Tillich has ever radically changed his picture of the philosopher whom he is addressing. If we compare the philosopher of Tillich’s writings with the philosophers of today, we become increasingly aware that only some of them, and probably very few of them, would fit easily into the category which Tillich has in mind. Certainly this is true in Britain and America, where philosophers like Heidegger are worse than a rarity.

Perhaps the truth is that Tillich has been stranded above the tide-line by the rapid decline of interest in metaphysics or ontology. In the Dynamics of Faith, for example, Tillich claims that the philosopher has ‘a vision of the universe and of man’s predicament within it’. ‘Philo-
sophy, in its genuine meaning, is carried on by people in whom the passion of an ultimate concern is united with a clear and detached observation of the way ultimate reality manifests itself in the processes of the universe." But such a definition of philosophy does not seem to describe the subject as it is usually carried on in the Anglo-American tradition.

If the philosopher, or the questioner, is called on to combine a passionate seriousness with intellectual openness, so is the theologian. Tillich declares, 'Every theologian is committed and alienated; he is always in faith and doubt; he is inside and outside the theological circle." We cannot doubt that Tillich himself intends to stay partly within the theological circle of Christianity. His own place in German politics and his repudiation of Hitlerism provide one kind of reminder that he would never sell his theological integrity. But is it possible for the theologian really to live 'in faith and doubt' simultaneously? Two facts must be admitted. Firstly, doubt can have a cleansing and positive role in theology and religion in making possible self-criticism. If doubt were never present, one would never examine and test one's own ideas, and seek to improve on them. Secondly, every apologist stands outside the theological circle as an exercise in sympathetic hypothesis. But Tillich does not simply say, 'If I were outside the theological circle . . . '; he really stands there. This can only be done, however, by exchanging the traditional idea of faith as trust and commitment for Tillich's distinctive notion of faith as 'ultimate concern'. In one of his last seminars he remarked about Christian commitment, 'The word has to me a very bad sound. I do not like it. . . . We cannot commit ourselves to anything absolutely.' For example, a vow for life is 'impossible, because it gives to the finite moment in which we are willing to do this an absolute superiority above all other later moments in our life'. To demand commitment is to overlook 'the relativity of human religion'.

Tillich's willingness to exchange these two concepts has many difficulties especially in the light of his claim that he does not surrender any part of the Biblical kerygma. For example, Paul's emphatic language about death and resurrection with Christ loses its point if the Christian can return at will to his previous perspectives. On the other hand, Tillich would doubtless point out that to the Jews Paul became as a Jew, and 'to those outside the law I became as one outside the law' (1 Cor. 9: 20-21). Whilst it is tempting, therefore, and perhaps necessary, to challenge Tillich's surrender of the importance of commitment, it is more urgent to examine what he proposes to put in its place, namely the idea of ultimate concern.
TILLICH's notion of ultimate concern is bound up with his view of God and with further considerations about apologetics. We may introduce the subject by describing an apologetic viewpoint with which even the most conservative thinker can sympathise. Sometimes, Tillich argues, the unbeliever imagines that he has rejected God, when he has rejected only a child's picture or a theologian's concept. He thinks that he has settled the matter of 'God' once and for all, when all he has settled is his attitude towards a certain idea. Thus Tillich bids the enquirer to re-open his search with the realisation that Divine reality lies beyond the 'god' of a particular conceptual scheme. ‘For a time we may be able to hurl him out of our consciousness... to argue convincingly for his non-existence... But ultimately we know that it is not he whom we reject and forget, but that it is rather some distorted picture of him.’

It is in order to do away with these distorted images that Tillich tries to re-arrange some of the traditional symbolism about God. Only by using a sufficiently creative, flexible, and ‘non-absolute’, set of symbols can we avoid confusing ‘god’ with ‘God’.

The same argument, however, can also be turned inside out, and applied with equal effect to the correspondingly opposite position of the believer. Just as the unbeliever can be sidetracked into the rejection of a mere symbol, so the believer can be sidetracked into the acceptance of a mere symbol, putting the symbol in the place of God. The more agreeable he finds the symbol to be, the more serious is his predicament. Mere satisfaction with a religious symbol does not necessarily guarantee a validity beyond that of a successful piece of psychiatry. Tillich is well aware of such a danger, and bluntly describes it as idolatry. He roundly declares, ‘A god whom we can easily bear, a god whom we do not have to hide, a god whom we do not hate in moments... is not God at all.’

Tillich is certainly not alone in stating this problem. But the answer to it which he puts forward involves a radical re-definition of theology. The title of one of his books The Shaking of the Foundations expresses, from the believer's point of view, precisely what Tillich wants to do. He wishes to shock him into assessing his situation from an entirely new angle. The question of what doctrine a man believes, or of which religion he embraces, will not, Tillich insists, point to a solution; for anyone can think of reasons for retaining a sufficiently attractive doctrine. What really counts is a man’s attitude towards whatever it is that he happens to believe. Only if this attitude is one of ‘ultimate concern’, can he claim to be avoiding the peril of idolatry. If this expresses his outlook, everything else will fall into place. Whatever the specific content of his beliefs, provided that they call forth an ultimate concern, they constitute valid symbols to point him to the 'God' beyond 'god'.
'Ultimate concern,' constitutes a technical term in Tillich's vocabulary. Sometimes it functions as little more than a synonym for faith. Thus Tillich declares, 'Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned; the dynamics of faith are the dynamics of man's ultimate concern.' But it also means something more. Tillich insists that it can refer both to the human attitude of faith, and to the divine object of faith. He declares, 'The ultimate of the act of faith and the ultimate in the act of faith are one and the same.'

Tillich's critics, with some justice, seize on this as a deliberate piece of ambiguity which Tillich formulates to exploit to his own theological advantage. If one wishes to defend it, or to understand it sympathetically, it can perhaps only be explained against the background of Tillich's notion of the holy, and its relation to his own early experiences. In his 'Autobiographical Reflections' he recalls the beautiful Gothic church in which his father was a successful pastor, and the parsonage and church school which belonged to it. Such surroundings, he explains, gave him a sense of the holy, an experience which he later described as no less than 'the foundation of all my religious and theological work'. He continues, 'When I first read Rudolf Otto's Idea of the Holy I understood it immediately in the light of these early experiences. . . . It determined my method in the philosophy of religion, wherein I started with the experiences of the holy and advanced to the idea of God, and not the reverse way.'

All this helps us to understand why Tillich defines ultimate concern with deliberate ambiguity. He stands in the same religious tradition as Otto and Schleiermacher. Otto's description of the holy entails a description of human attitudes and feelings towards the holy. But Otto insists that these attitudes point to something beyond man himself. Tillich protests that it is precisely at this point that Schleiermacher has been widely misunderstood. His notion of 'feeling' in religion was never 'mere' feeling, but God-directed feeling, a feeling-of the ultimate. Heidegger, too, takes up this very issue. It is only because feelings have come to be regarded as 'mere' feelings that he finds himself compelled to coin new terms such as 'feeling state' or 'ontological anxiety'. Tillich, then, is not alone in insisting that this ambiguity cannot be avoided, but it places him firmly by the side of Otto and Schleiermacher.

This inevitably raises enormous problems about trying to distinguish 'right' views of God from wrong ones. At least, it does so from the traditional or orthodox point of view. For we no longer have a theological criterion in terms of rational cognitive content. God is whatever is the object of ultimate concern; he is whatever is the source of the experience of the holy. Thus Tillich writes, '“God” is the name for that which concerns man ultimately. This does not mean that first there is a being called God and then the demand that men should be ultimately concerned about him. It means that whatever concerns a
man ultimately becomes god for him." But if such a view presents problems from an orthodox viewpoint, it nevertheless entirely accords with Tillich's own system of theology. Suppose, for example, that we were to suggest that his own experience of the holy arose only from childhood fancies about the numinous in sacred buildings. He would reply that different men need to begin with different religious symbols. We need not regard expressions of ultimate concern as rivals from which men can choose only one. For none of them is literally to be identified as 'God'. We can test objects of ultimate concern by one criterion only. They must point beyond themselves. As soon as any object ceases to do this, it loses its status as an ultimate concern.

This explains, further, why Tillich can never identify ultimate concern with a fixed area of doctrine. A man's concern for a doctrine can clearly become an end in itself, and can thereby cease to point to God. 'Protestant theology,' Tillich maintains, 'protests in the name of the protestant principle against the identification of our ultimate concern with any creation of the church, including the Biblical writings.' Instead, he suggests what he calls 'two formal criteria of every theology'. Firstly, 'the object of theology is what concerns us ultimately. Only those propositions are theological which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of ultimate concern for us.' His second criterion simply relates ultimate concern to 'being or non-being'. 'Our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or non-being. Only these statements are theological which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of being or non-being for us.' In Tillich's vocabulary, 'being' and 'non-being' share similar dual-purpose functions to those of 'ultimate concern'. Sometimes 'being' connotes primarily the feeling of overcoming doubt or anxiety, whilst 'non-being' describes a man's feeling that his existence is somehow under a threat. On the other hand, 'being' and 'non-being' also denote realities beyond man out of which such feelings supposedly spring.

Ultimate concern, in Tillich's thinking, is however a broader category than that of the holy. Sometimes it seems to represent any concern which so grasps hold of man that it unites all his energies and aspirations in one all-embracing demand or goal. Thus in one of his sermons he compares Mary's concern with the 'one thing', with Martha's concern about many things. But would not such a concern include any totalitarian system, such as Marxism for example?

As if to forestall such a difficulty Tillich elsewhere defines ultimate concern as 'the abstract translation of the great commandment: 'the Lord, our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength'.' Nevertheless, as Tillich sees it, this 'translation' of ultimate concern still covers a remarkable range of attitudes. He comments, 'I have sometimes explained it successfully... as taking something with ultimate seriousness... What, for
instance, would you be ready to suffer or even die for?' He continues, 'You will discover that even the cynic takes his cynicism with ultimate seriousness, not to speak of the others, who may be naturalists, materialists, communists, or whatever.' In practice Tillich believes that objects of ultimate concern will meet two conditions. On the one hand, they must be of such a character that a man is prepared to sacrifice everything for them. But on the other hand, they must also point away from themselves to something which lies beyond them. It is with special reference to the second of these conditions that Tillich turns to Christianity.

4. God and Christian Faith

If Tillich has defined 'the criteria of every theology' in terms of form rather than content, how can anything be said about the distinctiveness, let alone the uniqueness, of the Christian faith? Looking back once again to Schleiermacher, he declares, 'Liberal theology is right in denying that one religion can claim finality, or even superiority.' Tillich even follows the logical consequence of this in questioning the attempts by Christian evangelists to convert men of other faiths. He concludes, 'Christianity as Christianity is neither final nor universal. But that to which it witnesses is final and universal.'

Nevertheless, Tillich claims to write as a Christian apologist. He believes that 'Apologetic theology must show that trends which are immanent in all religions and cultures move towards the Christian answer.' He adds, 'Christian theology has a foundation which infinitely transcends the foundations of everything in the history of religion which could be called "theology".' This foundation is the appearance of Jesus as the Christ. In Tillich's view, the symbol of the cross constitutes a supreme and unsurpassable expression of ultimate concern. In his death on the cross, and in the life which was orientated wholly towards it, Jesus as Christ pointed away from himself and beyond his own finitude as Jesus of Nazareth. Tillich writes, 'Christ is Christ only because he did not insist on his equality with God, but renounced it. . . . Christian theology can affirm the finality of the revelation in Jesus as the Christ only on this basis.'

This means that, on Tillich's interpretation, Christianity is ultimate only insofar as it denies its own ultimacy, supposedly following the example of Jesus in pointing only to God. Tillich admits that this involves a tension. He calls it 'the tension between Christianity as a religion and Christianity as the negation of religion'. He argues, however, that this reflects the paradox of the cross. The symbol of the cross expresses man's acceptance of his finitude, and affirms the ultimacy of God alone.

Tillich claims support for his interpretation of Christianity from its
doctrine of justification by grace through faith. He describes this as 'the article by which Protestantism stands or falls' and as 'the principle which permeates every single assertion of the theological system'. According to Tillich's account of this doctrine, it means that to subscribe to a given creed not only contributes nothing to a man's standing with God, but is also to be suspected as a false religious claim or intellectual good work. God, he asserts, 'cannot be reached by intellectual work, as he cannot be reached by moral work'. All that matters is that 'man must accept that he is accepted; he must accept acceptance'.

It must be said in passing that this argument is unsatisfactory. At this point, as at certain others, Tillich is following too uncritically the path of his theological teacher, Martin Kähler. Kähler insisted that justifying faith could not be said to depend on theological or historical knowledge, since in this case the scholar would have an advantage over the simplest Christian believer. But to claim that justifying faith contains an element of intellectual belief is not in practice to turn faith into a work. The writer to the Hebrews is not putting forward a disguised doctrine of merit when he claims that, 'Whoever comes to God must believe that he exists . . .' (Heb. 11:6): he is simply unpacking part of what it means to come to God. Similarly, to say that faith contains an element of belief is not to make faith into a special kind of work, but to explain part of what is involved in being justified by faith. Faith in Jesus Christ as Lord becomes meaningless if this carries with it no content of cognitive belief about Jesus Christ.

Just as Christ, for Tillich, is ultimate only in so far as he points away from himself to God, so nothing can be said about God himself which is 'ultimate' except that God is 'being-itself'. 'Nothing else can be said about God as God which is not symbolic.' In one direction Tillich is trying to do justice to the godhood of God; to his transcendent otherness. God is not the kind of being who can be spoken of in the same terms as one of his creatures. Thus Tillich writes, 'The being of God cannot be understood as the existence of a being alongside others or above others. If God is a being, he is subject to the categories of finitude, especially to space and substance. Even if he is called "the highest being" in the sense of the "most perfect" and the "most powerful" being, this situation is not changed. When applied to God, superlatives become diminutives. They place him on the level of other beings while elevating him above all of them.'

It is for this reason that Tillich cannot accept what he calls the 'supranaturalist' view of God. According to such a view, God brought the universe into a being at a certain moment, governs it according to plan, and interferes from time to time in its ordinary processes. Tillich comments, 'The main argument against it is that it transforms the infinity of God into a finiteness which is merely an extension of the categories of finitude.' But Tillich equally rejects
naturalism or pantheism. God is not to be identified with the totality of things, for this, too, would deny the infinite distance between the whole of finite things and their infinite ground." The basic intention of his doctrine of God, is to formulate a third view, which goes 'beyond Naturalism and Supranaturalism'.

How new is Tillich's problem and solution? In one sense, philosophical theologians have always been aware of the fact that, if justice is to be done to divine transcendence, God cannot be thought of either as one object among others within his own universe, nor as a being entirely outside the universe and therefore unrelated to it. Tillich admits that the traditional arguments for the existence of God perform a useful service in sharply posing this dilemma. But he goes further than most other theologians when he argues that simply to make God an object of conceptual thought is thereby to locate him within the universe as one among others of his creatures. He writes, 'In the cognitive realm, everything towards which the cognitive act is directed is considered an object, be it God or a stone. The danger of logical objectification is that it never is merely logical. . . . If God is brought into the subject-object structure of being, he ceases to be the ground of being, and becomes one being among others. . . . He ceases to be the God who is really God.'

Tillich, of course, has accepted the terms of the problem as it was set by Martin Heidegger. It is therefore of crucial importance to note that his so-called atheism comes not in the context of theology, but in the context of philosophical questions about 'conceptuality' (Begrifflichkeit), or categories of thought. This is why Tillich asserts, 'To argue that God exists is to deny him.' We 'know' God not by conceptual thought but through ultimate concern. This is one reason why language about God takes the form not cognitive discourse but of religious symbols.

5. Religious Symbols

TILLICH prefers to speak about religious language in terms of symbols, rather than in terms of models or analogical discourse. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the use of analogy involves cognitive discourse in which God is spoken of through the employment of concepts. But as we have seen, in Tillich's view God does not remain 'God' when we try to describe him or make assertions about him by means of concepts. The use of symbols supposedly avoids this problem. He writes, 'Religious symbols . . . are a representation of that which is unconditionally beyond the conceptual sphere. . . . Religious symbols represent the transcendent. . . . They do not make God a part of the empirical world.' They transcend the realm 'that is split into subjectivity and objectivity'.
Secondly, although the point is less obvious, Tillich owes much to the psychology of Jung. Jung believes that modern man is suffering from a starvation of symbols. Part of the sickness and confusion of modern consciousness stems from the decay of images and symbols which once had a vital power. The end-result of this trend, Jung argues, will be paralysis and breakdown. For symbols are vital for the necessary interplay of conscious and unconscious. Thus Tillich insists, following Jung, that a sacrament, in contrast to a bare word, if it is alive, ‘grasps our unconscious as well as our conscious being. It grasps the creative ground of our being’. Since God is also, for Tillich, the ground of our being, the symbol which reaches through to the unconscious may be said to point to God. When these two sets of considerations are put side by side it is not surprising that Tillich asserts, ‘The centre of my theological doctrine of knowledge is the concept of symbol.’ ‘Religious symbols . . . are the only way in which religion can express itself directly.’

Tillich provides several closely-parallel accounts of symbols and in each of these he lists the same five or six characteristics of the symbol. Firstly, like any ordinary sign, a symbol represents something else, and thereby points beyond itself. But secondly, a symbol also differs from conventional signs, because it supposedly ‘participates in that to which it points’. In trying to explain this elusive idea, Tillich suggests only the analogy of how a flag ‘participates in’ the dignity of the nation. (Presumably we should think here especially of the place of the flag in American life.) This in turn suggests a third characteristic, which Tillich describes as ‘the main function of the symbol, namely, the opening up of levels of reality which otherwise are hidden and cannot be grasped in any other way’.

In view of its implications for religious language, we must examine more closely what is implied at this point. Tillich draws on examples from the realm of art. Instancing a Rubens landscape, he comments, ‘What this mediates to you cannot be expressed in any other way than through the painting itself.’ He continues, ‘The same is true also in the relationship of poetry and philosophy. The temptation may often be to confuse the issue by bringing too many philosophical concepts into a poem. Now this is really the problem; one cannot do this. If one uses philosophical language or scientific language, it does not mediate the same thing which is mediated in the use of really poetic language without a mixture of any other language.’

In this case, what can we say about a man who has no soul for aesthetics? Tillich’s answer is to define a fourth characteristic of symbols. As we have already indicated a symbol penetrates deeply into the unconscious. If it is the right symbol for the man concerned, it can actually create the very capacity which it demands. Thus Tillich asserts ‘Every symbol is two-edged. It opens up reality, and it opens the soul.’ ‘It opens up hidden depths of our own being.’ On this
basis 'every symbol has a special function which is just it, and cannot be replaced by more or less adequate symbols'. Symbols can thus be terrifying in their power. They can create or destroy. They can heal and integrate life, and stabilise it. But they can also disintegrate and disrupt it.

The fifth and sixth marks of the symbol concern its birth and its eventual decay. Tillich draws widely on modern psychology, especially as we have said, on the work of Jung. Symbols, he believes, 'grow out of the individual or collective unconscious and cannot function without being accepted by the unconscious dimension of our being. . . . Like living beings, they grow and die'. This applies certainly to religious symbols: 'Religious symbols open up the experience of . . . depth in the human soul. If a religious symbol has ceased to have this function, then it dies.' Thus a changed relationship with God usually demands new symbols in religion. Alternatively, changes may be demanded by new cultural outlooks, as for example when 'king' has undesirable connotations in an extremist republic.

There are considerable difficulties in Tillich's view of symbols if it is taken to be a comprehensive account of language about God. No-one doubts the power of symbols, or their value as supplementary linguistic media supporting what is otherwise conveyed in cognitive discourse. But Tillich's view of symbols is the keystone of his theology. His theology and his view of religious symbols support and corroborate each other. I wish to claim, and shall now try to show, that Tillich's account of religious language brings sharply into focus the very difficulties which most seriously beset his theology as a whole.

6. Some Major Problems

To begin with, Tillich stresses that religious symbols cannot convey 'information about what God did once upon a time or will do sometime in the future'. Symbols do not enable us to make reports about historical events; they are 'independent of any empirical criticism'. But Tillich's whole attitude towards history, and to Christianity as the proclamation of historical events, is ambiguous. Admittedly, his theology of Christ as the New Being presupposes the incarnation: 'Jesus as the Christ is . . . an historical fact.' But on the other hand, under the influence of Albert Schweitzer's pessimism about questions concerning the historical Jesus, he once set himself the task of asking 'how the Christian faith should be viewed if the non-existence of the historical Jesus should become historically probable'. That there should still be such a thing as Christian faith he seems to have assumed. For, he states, 'while Christian faith guarantees a personal life in which the New Being has conquered the old, it does not guarantee his name to be Jesus of Nazareth'. Thus the impossibility of using symbols to
make cognitive statements about acts of God in the person of Jesus does not distress Tillich. Indeed it harmonises with, and supports, his whole approach. But if symbols are ‘the only way in which religion can express itself’, this linguistic vacuum is a serious difficulty for those who stand in a more orthodox theological tradition. To declare the saving acts of God in history is central to the communication and expression of Christian faith.

The fact that symbols cannot communicate descriptions of historical events is part of a larger problem arising from Tillich’s attitude towards concepts and conceptualising. Can there be such a thing as a form of language which does not entail conceptualisation? The question raises some highly sophisticated issues, which must not be confused with one another.

Firstly, it is a basic axiom of general linguistics since at least the work of Ferdinand de Saussure around 1900 that language functions, or has meaning, on the basis of convention. There is no ‘natural’ correspondence between language and reality. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain such phenomena as polysemy (in which one word has several distinct meanings), homonymy, arbitrariness in grammar, historical change in language, and the fundamental fact that there are different words for the same object in different languages. The first principle of language-study, de Saussure insists, is ‘l’arbitraire du signe’. I have underlined the importance of this view for theology in an article published elsewhere. But Tillich’s attempt to by-pass conceptualisation in religious language rests partly on his belief that symbols ‘participate in’ that which they symbolise. In other words, he believes that whilst signs depend only on convention for their meaning, symbols have some direct and natural connexion with reality.

At least one writer has rightly taken Tillich to task on this point. Vincent Tomas discusses his view of symbol with reference to the example of the unicorn tapestries in The Cloisters in New York. This tapestry, admittedly, has ‘an innate power to symbolise a delicate and graceful animal with one horn. But it is in no way literally connected to such an animal, nor can it participate in the delicacy and grace of such an animal; for there is not, and never was, such an animal. . . . A unicorn that is “in the picture” cannot participate in . . . the unicorn “outside the picture” that it points to; for there is no unicorn outside the picture. . . . All symbols “point beyond themselves”, but . . . the object pointed to may not exist’. I suspect that what Tillich means here is that, whereas signs rest on conventions and speech-habits adopted by the individual, symbols grow out of very widespread and primitive uses of signs which become so ingrained as speech-habits of the group or even perhaps the race, that they can, in accordance with Jung’s conclusions, find responsive echoes even in the unconscious mind. But to say that symbols are related to the unconscious is to say something different from making an
ontological claim that symbols ‘participate in’ the reality to which they point. In other words, it is to say something about their power but not about their truth.

When we return to the question about conceptualisation, we note that a second fundamental principle in language and communication is the necessary place of semantic opposition or contrast. A word refers to this rather than that; a sentence distinguishes this state of affairs from that state of affairs. To make this point is not to be committed to a propositional view of language; it is to recognise an elementary axiom of linguistics and linguistic philosophy. Without difference of meaning, there can be no meaning. It is perhaps almost in partial recognition of this principle that Tillich allows for the possibility of at least one non-symbolic statement about God; for otherwise ‘the whole argument would lead into a vicious circle’, and ‘religious language be dissolved in a relativism’. But what, in practice, can be said without symbols? Tillich permits only one non-symbolic statement about God, namely that ‘God is being-itself... Nothing else can be said about God as God which is not symbolic.’

But what state of affairs is being distinguished, contrasted, or excluded, by asserting that God is being-itself? In practice Tillich cannot intend this statement to function as a descriptive assertion, for this would undermine all that he has said about our not conceiving of God as an ‘existing’ object. His uses of the words ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ or ‘non-being’ are similar to Heidegger’s; and according to Carnap and Ayer, in Heidegger’s philosophy these tend to function simply ‘to denote something peculiarly mysterious’. In other words, Tillich’s one non-symbolic assertion about God simply brings us back to his own notion of ultimate concern, in which a psychological attitude is given some supposed basis in a reality beyond man himself.

We are saying, then, that if we abandon ‘concepts’ it is difficult to see how we can say that God is this rather than that, and that Tillich’s allowance for one non-symbolic statement about God fails to solve this problem. But before we leave this subject we must add that Tillich commits yet one further linguistic blunder. A third generally-accepted principle in linguistics is that the sentence, or more strictly the speech-act, is the fundamental unit of meaning rather than the word. Again, I have argued this point in detail elsewhere. A symbol such as ‘king’ or ‘the new being’ does not say anything until it takes its place within a network of other words and utterances. The failure of Wittgenstein’s early ‘picture theory’ of meaning brings this home no less clearly than the structural semantics of de Saussure and Trier. But within what kind of discourse do symbols function, according to Tillich?

It is possible to feel much more sympathy for the attempts of Heidegger, especially in his later work, to arrive at a notion of non-objectifying language when he speaks of this as creating ‘worlds’ of reality which
are prior to the Cartesian split between subject and object, which is entailed in cognitive conceptualisation. For Heidegger, followed by Heinrich Ott and partly by Fuchs and Ebeling, allows for the creation of such ‘worlds’ not through single symbols, but through poems, parables, or extended works of art. Moreover, far from emerging from the unconscious, as in Tillich’s theology, Heidegger’s ‘language-event’ is born out of a newness, a ‘happening’ which confronts, challenges, and corrects, man’s own existing pre-conscious suppositions and orientations.

But we must say more than this. Each in his own very different way, Paul van Buren and William Hordem have shown that particularising language is not only harmless but positively necessary if we wish to speak about persons as persons. Symbols may point us to womanhood, beauty, gentleness, and so on. But these general archetypal qualities do not describe a specific person. As Hordem rightly comments, ‘When we turn to persons we are primarily concerned with the individual. A young man does not fall in love with a specimen of the class of females, aged twenty, good-looking, likeable and so on. On the contrary, he falls in love with Mary Jones.’ To report on the ‘self’ of a person we do not list ‘class’ characteristics like ‘middle-aged businessman’; but ‘we must start telling stories about him. We describe a situation and how he acted in it’. This is why, Hordern concludes, when the Bible speaks about God as a person it calls attention to ‘the particularity of the Judaeo-Christian revelation’. It tells of how God acted in specific situations; it does not so much pass on ‘general truths’ about his nature.

It has been suggested that one of the key problems which makes Tillich’s theology unsatisfactory is his failure to come to terms with ‘the stumbling-block of particularity’ which Christian revelation presents. Biblical history is precisely the history of God’s doing and choosing this rather than that. Yet Tillich regards particularity as something which undermines the otherness of God and makes ‘God’ into a mere god.

The other key problem in Tillich’s theology arises from his attempt to relate God, as the ground of our being, with the unconscious ‘depths’ in man. The impression was perhaps given by J. A. T. Robinson in Honest to God that this is mainly a matter of changing our imagery of God, so that language about God ‘up there’ may be replaced by symbols pointing to God ‘within’. But these are not simply two alternative ways of speaking about the same God. The God of Tillich’s system is very different from the God of orthodox Christian theology. Once we exempt symbols from the criteria offered by rational thought, ‘God’ may be nothing more or less than the upsurging of unconscious images, yearnings, or fears. These may give us a sense of the holy; or they may suggest something quite different. But Tillich seems to fall into the very trap which he most sought to avoid, namely that of making
God in man’s image.

Two writers underline the extent of this problem in different ways. Firstly, Bevan reminds us again that the power of symbols are no guarantee of their truth. Sufferers of certain mental illnesses, for example, may turn anything or everything into symbols. They may see ‘things around them charged with a meaning which is sinister and terrifying... As they look at a table or a door, they are horribly afraid....’ But these ‘symbols’ have no basis of truth. Secondly, in spite of Jung’s approach, other psychologists also speak of the ‘jungle lawlessness’ of the unconscious. In some cases, E. N. Ducker claims, to tell a man to seek for God as the ground of his being is a ‘diabolical mockery’; he needs to reach outwards and upwards beyond himself to his saviour and deliverer.

In the face of the Biblical warnings about the deceitfulness of man’s ‘heart’ (lēb, kardia), it is likely that Tillich’s anxieties about the distorting effects of conceptualising ‘God’ pale into insignificance beside the possible distortions entailed in seeking him through symbols and ultimate concern.

We have not exhausted the problems raised by Tillich’s account of religious language. For example, we might ask how his rejection of commitment relates to the use of commissive language in such self-involving utterances as ‘I believe’ or ‘I promise’. Can we dispense with commissive language in religion? If not, must we not bring back the idea of ‘commitment’, even if it remains disguised in the form of self-involving utterances? We do not have space at our disposal to discuss these questions further, but enough has been said to reveal the existence of serious problems in Tillich’s account of theology and of religious language.

7. Tillich and Anglicanism today

At the editor’s request, I add a concluding note on the relation between Tillich’s theology and Anglicanism today. At first sight it seems that Tillich is concerned only about larger questions which involve the nature of Christianity itself, and its relation to secular culture. Further, many aspects of his thought remain distinctively Germanic, in spite of his many years in the United States. Nor is the impact made in the Anglican Communion by J. A. T. Robinson’s Honest to God entirely relevant to questions about Tillich, for I am not convinced that that book succeeded in conveying what was most important about Tillich’s thought. Certainly, as we have seen, it is not simply a matter of changing our ‘image’ of God, but of more far-reaching and fundamental questions. However, it is possible to identify some basic themes which do have some relevance to Anglican concerns.

Firstly, Tillich’s theology raises questions about doctrinal comprehensiveness and its relation to the place of doctrinal or confessional
norms. Article VIII of the Thirty-nine Articles calls attention to the value of the three creeds, and the 1920 Lambeth Conference described the Prayer Book as ‘the Anglican standard of doctrine and practice’. On the other hand Tillich rejects the idea of defining ‘theological norms’ in terms of a given doctrinal content. Provided that he is the object of ultimate concern, ‘God’ may be indeterminate and theologically almost all-inclusive. No one set of symbols of God may be more ‘final’ than another, as long as they point away from themselves. It is precisely because of this breadth, or comprehensiveness, that some have seen in Tillich’s theology an inspiration for the ecumenical movement, and an argument for dispensing with creeds and confessions.

Our discussion has shown, however, that neither Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern nor his language about ‘being’ fills the vacuum left by the removal of the traditional theological norms. Indeed he is scarcely justified in calling these ‘norms of theology’ at all. For in the end, whatever his intentions, it is difficult to distinguish ‘God’ in Tillich’s theology from the focal point of a man’s sincere religious aspirations. ‘God is the name for that which concerns man ultimately.’ Admittedly some regard this approach, and its connexions with Schleiermacher, as the right one. But since many others do not, it cannot be said to command the universality of appeal which is its one supposed virtue. Tillich’s approach, in this respect, has value chiefly in warning us of the existence of a dead-end if we seek to dispense with all confessional norms.

Secondly, Tillich’s theology raises questions about the relative place and authority of the Bible, the clergy, church laws, and denominational traditions. On the one hand, Tillich does not wish to set aside theological tradition or to ignore it. He writes, ‘The denominational tradition is a decisive source for the systematic theologian, however ecumenically he may use it’. In this respect he stands with Anglicans over against those who wish to return to the first century to begin again de novo. Although he insists that creeds are not ‘norms’ of theology, ‘nevertheless even Protestant churches must formulate their own creedal foundation and defend it against attacks from the side of its own representatives’. On the other hand, we have seen that Tillich uses ‘the Protestant principle’ to call in question the ultimacy and finality of any merely finite or churchly institutions in contrast to God himself. In one direction, this may seem to militate against the Anglican tradition about the authority of the Bible, for Tillich includes the Bible among authorities which cannot be ‘final’. In another direction, however, Tillich’s relativising of other churchly authorities, side by side with his affirmation of the relevance of denominational tradition, endorses the Anglican via media. Articles XX and XXI (cf. also XXVI), whilst they defend the limited authority of the church and of general councils, also insist that councils ‘may err’. Totalitarianism in church life has never been a feature of Anglicanism, and Tillich rightly shows that this
is a principle which owes much to the Reformation. Certainly on this basis episcopacy cannot be a necessary part of the 'esse' of the church; even if it is acceptable as part of the 'denominational tradition'.

Thirdly, Tillich has interesting parallels to, as well as certain differences from, the Reformation and Anglican views of the word and sacraments, of justification by grace, and the priesthood of all believers. He does not wish to separate too sharply between the priest and the ordinary believer. For example, 'The ordinary believer who is grasped by the divine Spirit can be a medium of revelation for others.' Further, 'Every believer is a saint in so far as he belongs to the communion of saints . . .; every saint is an ordinary believer, in so far as he belongs to those who need forgiveness of sins.' Because the church participates in the ambiguities of life in general, and yet also represents the 'unambiguous life of the Spiritual Community', Tillich also endorses the traditional distinction between the visible and invisible church (cf. Article XXVI). We have already seen that justification by grace through faith is of crucial importance to him; and indeed that if any criticism is called for here, it is only for overpressing or overapplying this doctrine. We have seen, too, that Tillich stresses the positive value of the sacraments, not least because as symbols they reach through to make a bridge between the conscious and the unconscious. He speaks approvingly of how the preached word should accompany the sacraments, and of 'the duality of Word and sacraments'. They should not be regarded as merely mechanical means of grace. But he also believes that the sacramental symbol is 'older than', or 'precedes', the verbal symbol. This entirely accords with his 'non-conceptualising' view of symbols; but we have criticised his approach at this very point. By contrast, the Reformers themselves insisted that in duality of word and sacrament the sacrament depended on the word for its intelligibility. However, Tillich's points of divergence from the Reformers are less surprising, in view of the character of his system as a whole, than the many points at which he wishes to endorse these insights. It is significant how often this twentieth-century 'ecumenical' theologian looks back for inspiration and guidance to the Reformers and most especially to Luther.

Finally, we can see perhaps a further parallel between Tillich's theology and Anglican traditions about the relation between the church and secular society. This applies in two ways. Firstly, neither Tillich nor the Anglican theologian sees the church as an inward-looking, self-contained, ghetto community. In England, at least, the church is so to speak part of the nation, in the sense that according to the traditional pattern of parish life, concerns of the church and of the nation may overlap. Tillich contrasts this 'ecclesiastical' type of church, favoured by Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, with the 'sectarian' type favoured by the 'evangelical radicals'. He writes, 'The ecclesiastical type of church is the mother from which we come. This is quite
different from the churches of the radical enthusiasts, where the individual... is the creative power of the church.” According to latter view, ‘the visible church must be purified and purged... of anyone who is not spiritually a member of the church. This presupposes that we can know who is spiritually a member of the church. But this is something only God can do. The Reformers could not accept this because they knew there is nobody who does not belong to the “infirmary” which is the church.’

This harmonises, further, with Tillich’s conviction that Christian theology relates to every dimension of man’s life in the world, whether this be history, art, philosophy, politics, psychology, or sociology.

The other way in which this parallel shows itself is in the importance given to reason and rational argument in Tillich’s apologetics. Tillich rejects the view that the gospel can merely be ‘thrown like a stone’ at the hearer. As in classical Anglican theology, Tillich believes in reasonableness and rational persuasion in presentation of truth. This is not to be confused with the quite different view that God can be reached by reason without revelation. But Tillich tries to stand where the hearer genuinely stands, and to engage with him in apologetic discussion and argument. If he addresses himself too narrowly to questions asked only by a previous generation in Germany, this does not invalidate the general principle. Even though its content remains the same, the gospel, as Tillich saw, must be presented in fresh terms to each new generation.

4 Ibid. p. 70.
8 Ibid.
9 See the chapter headings of P. Tillich, On the Boundary—An Autobiographical Sketch (Eng. London 1967) which is a revised translation of Part I of The Interpretation of History (New York 1936).
10 For Tillich’s view of Schleiermacher see especially P. Tillich, Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology (London 1967) pp. 90-114.
11 Ibid. p. xxx.
12 C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall (eds.) op. cit., p. 50 (T. M. Greene), and pp. 43-44 (W. M. Horton).
14 Ibid. p. 227.
16 One writer maintains that, according to Tillich, question and answer are interdependent in form, but ‘so far as their content is concerned (they) are separate and independent”; cf. B. Martin, Tillich’s Doctrine of Man (London 1966) p. 29. But in contrast see S.T. vol. 1, p. 68: ‘The method of correlation
explains the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions and
theological answers in mutual interdependence.'

17 S.T. vol. 1, p. 72.
18 Ibid. p. 8.
19 Ibid. There is also an important summary of Tillich's reply in Systematic
21 Ibid.
22 S.T. vol. 1, p. 13 (Tillich's italics); cf. 11-14.
p. 195.
24 Ibid.
26 Cf. S.T. vol. 1, p. 40ff. For a discussion of Tillich's positive attitude to the
Bible, cf. also D. H. Kelsey, The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology (Yale 1967)
pp. 1-8. Among the numerous discussions of Tillich's double outlook of
G. D. Kaufman, 'Can a Man Serve Two Masters?' in Theology Today, vol. xv
28 Ibid. p. 50 (my italics).
29 Many other writers have made the same point, notably Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
31 Ibid. p. 11.
32 P. Tillich, 'Autobiographical Reflections' in C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall
(eds.) op. cit., p. 6.
33 S.T. vol. 1, pp. 18, 47 and 170; cf. J. Macquarrie Studies in Christian Existen-
tialism (London 1966) pp. 31-42.
34 S.T. vol. 1, p. 234.
37 Ibid. p. 17 (his italics).
op. cit., p. 7ff.
41 Ibid. p. 8.
42 S.T. vol. 1, p. 150.
43 P. Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions (Columbia,
USA 1964) pp. 94-95.
44 S.T. vol. 1, p. 150.
46 Ibid. p. 21.
47 Cf. P. Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions, p. 79.
48 S.T. vol. 1, p. 149.
49 P. Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions, p. 81.
51 Cf. S.T. vol. 2, pp. 204-207, and Systematic Theology vol. 3 (London 1964)
pp. 238-243.
52 S.T. vol. 3, p. 238.
53 Ibid. p. 242.
55 The extent of Kähler's influence on Tillich is considerable, although perhaps
not always appreciated. Cf. P. Tillich, On the Boundary, pp. 47-49 (or The
Interpretation of History, p. 32). Paul Althaus exposes the difficulties of
Kähler's position in an excellent essay 'Fact and Faith in the Kerygma' in
pp. 201-212. Several other essays in this book relate to this question.
57 S.T. vol. 1, p. 265; cf. especially pp. 234-279. Tillich summarises the basic
points in S.T. vol. 2, pp. 5-11, and in Theology in Culture, pp. 59ff.
58 S.T. vol. 1, p. 261.
Ibid.
Ibid. p. 7.
S.T. vol. 1, p. 191.
Ibid. p. 227.
Ibid.
P. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 42; cf. Theology of Culture, pp. 54-55.

Ibid.
P. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 42; cf. Theology of Culture, pp. 54-55.