it is cast, the words in which it is framed. The Prayer Book has
no rival amongst the liturgies of Christendom as an expression of
simple piety and scriptural faith.
In the matter of archaisms Prayer Book revision is overdue. But
there is that about the structure of its main services, its insistence on
sincerity and personal religious experience, its use of a tongue "under-
stood of the people," its emphasis on the part that each worshipper
is called upon to fulfil, and its fidelity to, and quotation of the Bible,
that is a constant recall to the immediacy of our religion. Its stately
and impressive language sets a standard rarely, if ever, reached since
it was drawn up, though it does not forbid or quench, outside its
liturgical offices, the spirit of freedom in prayer too little exercised
to-day; whilst for use in the Prayer meeting there is no book of prayers
to compare with it. The ministry of the Word to which it points, and
on which it is based, preserves the prophetic note as an essential
part of worship, and is joined with that of the Sacraments in its
devotional scheme. The Prayer Book still speaks to the deepest
needs, and opens up the highest flights of the soul. Penitence, forgive-
ness, adoration, praise, listening to God's voice, waiting on Him in
prayer and, in the Holy Communion, the memorial of Christ's death
"till He come," the reception of the "dear tokens of His passion,"
the self-oblation of the communicant, the sense of the living presence
of Christ by His Spirit, and of our fellowship with the whole Family
of God, cleanse, satisfy, strengthen and nourish the Christian life in
all its aspects.
But no liturgy can do more than bring us to the fountain of living
waters. That the Anglican Liturgy has done for countless Christian
people, and is doing to-day.

The Supernatural and the Natural.

(With Special Reference to the Modern World).

By The Rev. E. Steinly, M.A.

The Supernatural may be defined as "the world which has values
which stir the sense of the holy and demand to be esteemed as
sacred." It stands in contrast with the world perceived by
the senses, the values of which are merely comparative. The division
of environment into Supernatural and Natural is thus the work of
religion.

To affirm the existence both of the Supernatural and of the Natural
is to affirm that man stands both within, and yet apart from, the
flux of his sense-experience. His life floats upon the ever moving
stream of time, and yet he is conscious that this is so. Moreover,
the possibility of breasting that stream is present to his consciousness
because a reality outside the power of its flow bids him in its own right
to be more than a mere float.

There are not a few, of course, who maintain that man transcends
his natural environment and yet deny the reality of the Supernatural. They will agree, at the very least, that man is an animal who uses tools and who, in consequence, never passively accepts "the arrange­ments life (has) made for him." Some, though not all, will strongly assert that man is a rational animal, even more than he is a tool-user, and that his ability to use tools is merely the outcome of reasoning about the means of livelihood. Whether tool-using is the outcome of reasoning or reasoning the outcome of tool-using, however, it is obvious that man is in part the master as well as the slave of his environment. He transcends, even as a man, the world around him. Yet a definition of man merely as a tool-using or a rational animal does not do justice to man's capacity for transcending himself as well as his environment, nor does it explain his "victory over immediate association, and immediate advantage and immediate impression." There is an essential homelessness of the human spirit, no matter how much it tries to master the world of nature, whether by tool-using or by reasoning. In the last resort, only one thing "challenges in its own right man's submission to his environment and that is the sacred " or Supernatural.

Any doctrine which implies the denial of the Supernatural is rightly called naturalist. Those who make the denial may with the ancients believe that man is essentially a rational animal, or with many moderns that tool-using is the essential mark of man, and that his reason is but an analysing instrument "unsuit for understanding any reality of a creative nature." Again, those who deny the Supernatural may merely put man on a level with the higher animals, or, again, they may deny that anything other than mechanical necessity is to be found in nature. Whether they be rationalists, intuitionists, vitalists or materialists, however, if they deny the reality of the Supernatural, they all are no more than naturalist in outlook.

Although it is the religious interest in man which causes him to assert the reality of the Supernatural, it by no means follows that those who deny the Supernatural are necessarily non-religious. The fact is that man, just because of the homelessness of his spirit in the natural world, is incurably religious, whether he affirms the Supernatural or not. He must needs seek for a city which has foundations whose builder and maker is as if it were God, even while denying that God exists. Naturalism, therefore, can be a religion no less than a philosophy. Stoicism, the greatest naturalist movement in the ancient world, may be called either a philosophy or a religion." In Marxism, despite its atheistic outlook, "we are in contact with a religious idea." In every species of naturalism, however, religion is no longer a means for apprehending a real Supernatural, but is purely an imaginative device for introducing an element of absolute value into a sphere where the values are all comparative. In other words, naturalism, as St. Paul declares, exchanges the truth of God for a lie, and worships and serves the creature rather than the Creator. At the same time, the very inability of naturalism to dispense with religion is itself an indirect testimony to the reality of that Supernatural to which even false religion bears witness. Perhaps it might be truly asserted that the religious element in all semi-authoritative naturalism is a kind of shadow cast by the really authoritative Supernatural on
interpretations of the world made by those whose faces are turned away from the light.

II.

In the ancient world man was understood "primarily from the standpoint of the uniqueness of his rational faculties."8 The Greeks were nothing if not rationalist. "With them the dominating tendency from the beginning to the end of their creative period was the assertion of the power of thought to find unassailable truth and to organize individual and social life in accordance with their findings."9 "Whatever was unintelligible was no part of nature."9 Into this category there seemed to fall both pure "matter" and pure "change." Greek thinkers sought therefore for a permanent determinant of both "matter" and "change" and thereby they developed a doctrine of cause which reached its final formulation in the philosophy of Aristotle.10 Matter is the vehicle of a conceptual determinant or Form. But since, in every growing thing the Form is originally but latent or potential, and becomes actual only after a process of growth, it is necessary to speak of two causes of that motion whereby what is potential becomes actual, namely, an agent of motion or Efficient Cause, and a goal of movement or Final Cause. The Formal, Efficient and Final Causes are identical ideally, but actually they never coalesce, save in the region of the heavenly bodies, owing to the resistance of Matter to Form. In that region things did not change, and beyond it was that highest region of pure Being, from which matter and motion were excluded also.

In the great movement known as Stoicism, rationalism enclosed itself in naturalism. The identity of Being and reason remained, but Being, termed Phusis or Nature, by which was meant a "Process of Growth,"11 became indelibly marked with what Sir Arthur Eddington has called "Time's Arrow." This stress on process rather than on actuality, an "eternal effort towards perfection"12 as a modern writer describes it, suggests that Stoicism was really a system of rationalized vitality rather than of reason, for Phusis was in all creation, in beetles no less than in man. At the same time, the "completely negative attitude"12 of Stoicism "toward the passions and the whole impulsive life of man"12 enabled Stoics to have before their eyes the ideal Wise Man, "who acts without desire,"13 but only at the cost of making each man's life a mere rôle in an unknown drama, and so unreal. Even so, Stoicism ended by assuming "that there is a beneficent purpose in the world,"13 that is, by groping after the Supernatural it professed to deny.

III.

In the modern world, man is no longer understood primarily from the standpoint of the uniqueness of his rational faculties, nor is there any sustained attempt to find a permanent determinant for "matter" and change. On the contrary, man is regarded as rationalizing, rather than reasoning about, his activities, and both "matter" and change are declared to be the very stuff of reality.

(I)

By the modern world is meant the world since the period of the Renaissance. It was in that period that the reaction against reason
began. There was, as Professor Whitehead observes, "a recoil from the inflexible rationality of mediaeval thought," and "a return to the contemplation of brute fact." How was it possible to contemplate, however, "brute fact," that is, data which were not primarily that of thought, and which could not be resolved into concepts? It was at least possible to contemplate the behaviour of "brute fact." The more such behaviour was contemplated, the more it seemed to be akin to the automatic behaviour of the parts of a machine. In due course, it was possible to construct imaginatively such devices as would enable the observer to anticipate the behaviour of brute fact, and even carry it "beyond the limits which unreflective experience can reach." So there arose and developed the work of the scientist in contrast to that of the philosopher.

Once the investigation of the behaviour of "brute fact," and the construction of devices to anticipate, and so control, that behaviour, had got well under way, it was inevitable that there would be a profound revolution in the notion of cause, as that notion had been formulated by the rationalist Greeks. Hobbes began the revolution by affirming that what "is not Body is no part of the universe," thereby repudiating the idea of Form or Essence. Descartes next declared that "the species of cause called Final finds no useful employment in physical or natural things." The Efficient Cause remained, only to be stripped of its former glory by being detached from Form, with the result that motion became an ultimate fact in the universe. As for matter, it was enthroned as king in place of Form, and instead of being a non-existant that "neither is nor is not," but is just "not yet," it became "something hard, solid and tangible," possessing, to use Professor Whitehead's phrase, "simple location in time." The universe thus became reduced to two ultimates, "matter" and "motion," neither of which was the vehicle of any conceptual determinant. All that thought can do in regard to them is to assist in constructing imaginative devices for anticipating, and so controlling their observable behaviour.

Science took complete charge of both matter and motion. There still remained the cogitating mind, however, which somehow had unearthed these two ultimates. Having performed this miracle of knowledge, must it henceforth remain "confined to its own private world of cogitation?" Yes, said the empiricist Locke, in effect, since all that we can know of matter are the sensations and ideas which the unknowable "substance" that we call matter induces in our minds. Bishop Berkeley, the arch-empiricist, however, pointed out that, since we never have experience of this "substance," we have no cause to think that it exists. Thereupon, he proceeded to argue that the existence of anything consisted in its being perceived, not by our finite minds, however, but by infinite universal Mind. In this way, Berkeley brought back the Supernatural as the ground of all existence, and swept from his view any world of matter at all. Kant attacked, not the conclusions, as did Berkeley, but the assumptions of empiricism, by pointing out that what we call perception is really a kind of reasoning, howbeit unconscious, since in any act of perception, it is we who provide from our minds both the "forms of intuition" (space and time) and the "principles of understanding" (causality, quantity,
etc). To a world so known, Berkeley's conclusions apply, but, argued Kant, there are noumena, as well as phenomena, to be known, not however either sensuously or intellectually, but only by the free exercise of the will. In that free exercise, Kant argued, we are in touch with a demand that is not just hypothetical but categorical, that is to say, unconditional or absolute. Kant also thus asserted the reality of the Supernatural, but to him, the Supernatural was one, not of mind but of Law. With Hegel, the rationalist attack upon empiricism reached its highest pitch of intensity. For him, the empirical world, being the world as it presents to us plurality, is but one of phenomena. By contrast, the real world is "a single unified whole, comprehending within itself all distinctions." This single, unified whole is the Absolute. Thus, in the end, "there is no true noumenon or phenomenon, there is nothing that is unknowable." (II)

Meanwhile, Science continued successfully to investigate the behaviour of "matter" by using, as the basis of investigation, the hypothesis that the world is like a machine, and mechanical causation is the key to the working of all its parts. From investigating the behaviour of "matter," scientists turned to investigate that of organisms, and ultimately of man himself, without changing either their principles or their methods. The Behaviourist in psychology, for example, treats the living organism as functioning like an automatic machine. "It will, that is to say, only 'behave' in so far as it is caused to do so by a specific stimulus." It is, of course, "pertinent to point out that, if all thought is accurately and exhaustively described as a set of responses to stimuli . . . then this applies also to the thought which constitutes the Behaviourist view of psychology." The present-day psychologist conducts his investigations on the supposition that "the human personality is like an iceberg; only a small part appears above the level of consciousness, the remainder is below." This remainder," known . . . as "the unconscious" is not only the larger but also the more important part" and "may be said to determine the contents of the conscious." Hence, "the components of human behaviour to which (the psychologist) penetrates by analysis are unconscious . . . He is driven by his scientific purpose to describe how this unconscious energy, in accordance with the operation of determinate natural laws, gives rise to consciousness . . . All our conscious intentions will then appear as "rationalizations" of primary unconscious tendencies."

Freud interprets these primary unconscious tendencies "in individualistic and sexual terms." Their abode is described by him as "a chaos, a cauldron of seething excitement." It has "no organization and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctive needs according to the pleasure principle." In that case, mankind "is or may be, a volcano as well as an iceberg." Marx regards these primary unconscious tendencies "as basically collective and economic." They are expressed in the productive relations of society which, according to Marxist doctrine, are the basis upon which "the superstructure of culture and philosophy, of religion and morals, is reared." To a Marxist, man is a tool-using
rather than a reasoning animal. Consciousness merely reflects the productive relations of men, which in turn are the outcome of that technique of production which has evolved from man's capacity to use tools. Hence, concerning Hegel's doctrine, Marx wrote, "In my view . . . the idea is nothing other than the material when it has been transposed and translated inside the human head." 24

Both the Freudian psycho-analyst and the Marxist sociologist, though materialist in theory, are really humanist in faith and practice. The former attempts to bring the repressed elements of life in the unconscious into the conscious, in the belief that they can be there re-educated. The latter looks forward to an age of reason, replacing this age of rationalization. Each postulates the need for a new kind of consciousness, Freud to replace the "superego" and Marx to replace the present "super-class." Marx goes further. He proclaims the speedy advent of the rule of that new or classless consciousness. It is really his divinity, in whose name he denies the Supernatural. 25

So Marxian man is the image and likeness, not of God, but of society.

(III)

In the modern world, the protest against rationalism has taken a romantic as well as a materialistic form. In Romanticism as distinct from materialism, the concept of organism has displaced that of matter. The concrete is thereby opposed to the abstract, since, in science, matter has become an abstract entity. Wordsworth is a romanticist in that he "opposes to scientific abstractions his full concreteness." 26

In sociology, Romanticism "asserts the vitalities of nature against the peril of enervation through rational discipline." 27

On the one hand, the romantic protest achieved nihilistic proportions by defying "every principle of form and order" 27 in the name of vitality regarded as self-justifying. The prophet of this nihilistic romanticism was Nietzsche. On the other hand, romanticism asserted the primitive and organic forms of unity against the universalities of rationalism. Fascism is "the cause of the nation, the national organism—racially conceived in Germany as a body of pure blood." 28

In Fascism, however, there is often more than a dash of nihilistic romanticism also. For example, the hidden lie of society is overcome by "the robust and 'honest' lie," 27 the value of truth being thereby utterly disavowed.

There remains Bergson who, though rejecting alike romantic nihilism and romantic primitivism, does so on grounds not of reason but of intuition. By intuition, Bergson apparently means immersion in the stream of a life-force, termed Vital Impulse, which exists not through but in change, and which gives rise, not to the Uniformity of Nature, as Intelligence asserts, but the Variety of Nature. 28 This principle of "novelty growing out of novelty," however, "remains wholly negative . . . until some such notion as growth or development is brought in." 28

Concerning Bergson's positive treatment of it, a modern writer asserts that "it is difficult to exclude the suspicion that . . . Bergson is really introducing . . . the . . . causes which Aristotle used." 28

(IV)

The change from the mediaeval to the modern era marked, as we
saw, a protest against the pretensions of rational man. In his place moderns have, in the main, installed *homo faber*, reduced to abstract and mechanical proportions in materialism, interpreted concretely and organically in Romanticism, and related, not to the Supernatural but to some super-individual form of human life. Modern man does not, in other words, possess any transcendent individuality, because he is not interpreted in terms of a God who, as will and personality, reveals himself to man from beyond himself.

We are prone to reduce "mind" to "instincts," as we have reduced "matter" to "atoms." But there are extremely few examples of instinctive behaviour in human life. Nearly all human activities require to be learned." In other words, human nature has a history, and "is not nearly so natural as it looks." What is the ultimate truth about that history? It is that "as regards anything we are in ourselves naturalism is true," and "a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast," but as regards the full stature of our human nature, that is "constituted by the self-disclosure to this poor dust of the Spirit of the living God." We are prone to reduce "mind" to "instincts," as we have reduced "matter" to "atoms." But there are extremely few examples of instinctive behaviour in human life. Nearly all human activities require to be learned.

"Thou hast fashioned me behind and before, and laid Thine hand upon me." These words of the psalmist express that faith in the transcendent Creator and Judge of man upon which is built the Biblical witness to the revelation of God in history, as of One Who is "what each individual heart has already dimly perceived in its sense of being judged: as the structure, the law, the essential character of reality, as the source and centre of the created world against which the pride of man destroys itself in vain rebellion." History, as St. Paul indicates, is the revelation of the wrath of God on the sinful pride of man. The final question concerning man, therefore, is "whether there is a resource in the heart of the Divine which can overcome the tragic character of history and can cure as well as punish the sinful pride in which man inevitably involves himself." Because of its witness that God in Christ takes man's sin upon Himself and into Himself, "the Christian faith regards the revelation (of God) in Christ as final."

"The most important of all verities is the verity that cannot be argued." The Supernatural is this kind of verity. For "the spiritual life of man is, in every part and mode of it, a derived and dependent life... man is a being whose centre lies not in himself but in God. 'O Lord,' exclaimed Jeremiah, 'I know that the way of man is not in himself.' The prophet's words are not argument but witness. Apart from that witness, humanism debouches into sub-human naturalism and even nihilism. In the power of that witness, however, it rises to that freedom and "measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ" of which the super-class or superman of modern forms of naturalism is but an idolatrous and tyrannous counterpart.

2 Ibid., 85.
3 Ibid., 82.
4 Ibid., 85.
5 Ibid., 83.
THE DOCTRINE OF MAN

BY THE REV. J. RUSSELL HOWDEN, B.D.

THERE are two principal divisions in all Christian teaching and preaching. One is the doctrine of God, and the other is the doctrine of man. It is this latter which we are to consider in the present paper.

Our teaching about man will necessarily include the consideration of man's origin, and our ideas as to the nature of man will naturally be coloured by our ideas about this. There are two principal views on this. One is the doctrine of Evolution and the other the doctrine of Creation.

Creation implies the direct act of God, and, therefore, is essentially miraculous.

Evolution, in the common use of the word, pre-supposes the activity of nothing more than natural causation. Of course, even in saying this one has to beware of an ambiguity into which it is so easy to slip. And the ambiguity is this, that until we are quite clear as to what we include within the sphere of the natural, it is confusing to begin to talk about the supernatural. However, leaving this on one side, it is generally thought that the idea of evolution precludes any direct Divine activity. Indeed, in its extremist form the doctrine is usually so expressed as to eliminate the idea of God altogether.

On the other hand, it is to be remembered that a good many Christians believe in some form of evolution as a method of the Divine