


method of bringing men to religion by means of clubs, whose ostensible object is to provide amusement, is doomed to failure. Many such clubs have ended in cutting themselves loose from any sort of religious influence. If only we could remember that religion does not mean having something done for you, but doing something, and especially for others! It is not by what we give, but by what we demand, that Christianity is strengthened.

The ideal parochial relief committee would be largely undenominational, and would not be too closely connected with any definitely spiritual organization. Religious work should rather be directed to the building up of character; and probably the best work which the clergy can do is "to train men to take part in public work in the Christian spirit. Ultimately it is the moral factor that counts."

I have drawn attention to this book at considerable length because I believe it may be an excellent help, not only to the clergy, but to Church-workers generally. It deals with an immense variety of subjects. The principles which it enunciates, as I have already said, are sound; and it is evidently written from considerable experience in the work with which it deals. That work is not only a difficult, but actually a dangerous, one, because it is impossible to say with regard to it, "If I don't do much good, at any rate I can't do much harm." The diseases of the social body from which we are at present suffering are mainly the result of unwise—that is, of unintelligent—action in the past and in the present. If only those who feel called to charitable work would realize the far-reaching effects of their actions, something would be gained. In this, as in so many other spheres of activity, we need that humility of spirit which is anxious to learn. This book will help to teach how much there is to be learnt, and how vitally important it is that we should learn all we can.

W. EDWARD CHADWICK.



ART. VII.—VARIATIONS IN THEOLOGICAL TERMS.

LANGUAGE, articulate speech, is the glory of man, one great distinction between him and other living creatures, yet from its nature full of uncertainty, liable to involuntary misuse, so liable to intentional misuse that everyone is familiar with deceit wrought by words used in seeming sincerity. Words are but the shadows of things which they represent,

and as many of them differ widely in their origin, so also do many vary largely in their meaning from time to time. Thus, what was intended for our service may become, and often does become, our master. Thus, oftentimes it comes to pass that men become involved in angry controversy through some mere verbal misunderstanding, having taken the same word in different senses, and never thinking to ask for mutual explanation. And this, which is a fruitful source of trouble in private life, in society, in science and in art, becomes a far more serious evil in theology. In days of intense activity and energy eager spirits get involved in some partisan action before they have had time or opportunity to inquire into the various meanings of the terms which they are using. Then, regarding themselves as the chosen instruments of Heaven for reviving some so-called catholic practice, or for entering some protest against something which is unfamiliar to them, they soon lose the "unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." Confusion, strife, ill-will, rear their baleful heads.

"Ephraim envies Judah, and Judah vexes Ephraim," while the common enemies of mankind are emboldened to carry on their destructive work. Doubts and denials of the faith, evil living, with its attendant shame and misery, take courage when they see the forces which should restrain them engaged in tearing one another in pieces. The forty-and-two thousand of the men of Ephraim who fell at the passages of Jordan through calling Shibboleth "Sibboleth" are a handful compared with Christians of the latter days who have perished through variations in theological terms.

Among the words which have wrought destruction, one is especially connected with the great and distinctive act of Christian worship—the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper—the word "Mass." It is of uncertain origin. It cannot be traced to the earliest ages of the Church. First, as to its origin. The Hebrew derivation מַסָּה—Reuchlin's theory—may be dismissed with Gerard Voss's observations that no Hebrew theological terms find their way into Latin save through Greek, and that there is no corresponding Greek word; moreover, that the word does not occur in Tertullian and others likely to have received words from a Jewish source. In later Latin the termination *io*, through laziness, often degenerated into *a*. Thus, S. Cyprian¹ uses *remissa* for *remissio*. In this way some derive *missa* from *missio*, for *dimissio*: "Ite, missa est"—*i.e.*, "dimissio fidelium." But about a century afterwards we find a most important instance of *missa*, which does not

¹ Ep. LXXIII.

confirm this derivation. S. Ambrose, writing to his sister Marcellina,¹ is describing the attempts made to seize the Christian basilicas. Despite the riot, he will not be disturbed in his service. "Ego tamen in munere mansi, missam facere cœpi. Dum offero, raptum connovi a populo Castulum quendam. . . ." He would hardly have said, "I began to make the dismissal." Also the dedicatory use of *offero* by such writers as Prudentius² and Sulpicius Severus³ seem to justify the Eucharistic interpretation of *missa* here. At the same time, there are other derivations and uses, quoted by Gerard Voss, Bingham, and others, which do not appear Eucharistic. If *missa* be a degenerate form of *missio* for *dimissio*, it ceases to create either reverence or horror. But if the Ambrosian use conveys the meaning of the Victim offered, our thoughts may turn undistracted to the one perfect and sufficient Sacrifice, incapable of repetition, offered on Calvary once for all (*ἅπαξ προσερχθείς*, Heb. ix. 28) for the sins of the world and of each of us. Here enters the variable word "sacrifice," variable rather in its later usage, for all earlier instances are narrowed from its etymology, which might include many outward acts of worship, to that which was the great central act, the slaying of a victim, in ratifying a covenant, or offering propitiation for sin. And in this sense the use of the word in connection with the Lord's Supper seems free from ambiguity. For no one would say that, in the strict letter, we offer a sacrifice at the Lord's Supper. No life has been destroyed at that ceremony, and by the operation of it. So an eminent writer of the last century, Archbishop Potter, when he uses the expression "commemorative Sacrifice," at once corrects himself, and says, "or, rather, commemoration of a Sacrifice."

Most catch-words and party designations have undergone many a twist from their original meaning, a fate quite good enough for them; but it is a different thing when we come to words of the most profound significance, and yet in different utterances having different significance. This is indeed a dangerous ground to tread. A suggestion, however, may be made—one that in the prevailing distraction may work good, and cannot well work harm. Let collections of the words in question be made from the Fathers and other ancient writers. It would then be seen what a delusion the "one word, one meaning" doctrine is. Truth would then begin to shine forth, not one-coloured, indeed, but varied as the rays of the

¹ II. 853, Bened. Ed., II. 154, Froben.; Ep. XXXIII.

² Cath., V. 150.

³ Dial., II. 2.

same light when they have fallen on the facets of a diamond. Controversialists would see what there is to be endured in the views of their opponents.

Many verily are words of this character. One will here suffice for mention. A full collection of the word *substance* as it occurs in the Christian writings of the first three centuries might do something to dispel the evil passions which that wonderful word and its compounds in especial have raised in our unhappy world. To trace *substantia*, a post-Augustan word, we must, of course, go back to its Greek origin, *ὑπόστασις*, a commonplace word enough in its early uses, for sediment in liquid or foundation for a building. In the hands of Aristotle, however, it began to assume the meaning which greatly concerns us, that of a certain invisible, intangible reality, which underlies (I wish I could say understands, for then I should be on the Aristotelian lines) all matter and every collection of matter. Not that it exclusively at any time possessed this philosophical meaning, but it was so held as to be easily transmitted to *substantia*. With regard to this all-important word and its English representative *substance*, there seem to be traces of two distinct phases of meaning—one material, the other Aristotelian and immaterial. For the former Tertullian says, “*substantia . . . coronarum flores agri*”;¹ in the Vulgate of Ps. lxix. 2 and lxxxix. 15 it reverts to the “standing-ground” meaning of *ὑπόστασις*, the word in the Septuagint; while in later days a material sense is used by Lord Bacon, and by Locke and Bishop Stillingfleet, as it seems to me, in their controversy. An early instance of the immaterial use may be found in Arnobius,² where it may be regarded as equivalent to *οὐσία*, as it is in the Latin translation of St. Clement of Alexandria (of whatever antiquity this translation may be), where the words *ἀσώματόν τι* are clear for an immaterial sense. A reminder that in the Nicene Creed *consubstantialis* is the rendering of *ὁμοούσιος* will suffice to show an authoritative interchange of the two words. St. Augustine has the words “*substantia Dei*.”³ In later days Aquinas says: “*Anima est forma substantialis homines*,” while references for the immaterial use can be given from Sir Thomas Browne,⁴ Cudworth,⁵ Locke, and Gibbon.⁶ The material use, is of course, the popular one. I asked a friend lately what he considered the substance of Magna Charta. He immediately replied that it signified the parchment and ink with which it was written; to which I answered that the

¹ De Cor. Mil., V.

³ Comm. in S. Joh. i. 1.

⁶ Thesis for B.D., 1624.

² Adv. Gentes., VII. 28, l. 22.

⁴ Rel. Med., 33, 36.

⁵ C. viii.

same ink, differently arranged, on the same parchment might mean his death-warrant. I shall gratefully receive any instances of *substantia*, or its cognates or derivatives.

Few words have wrought more havoc in the Christian world than that ancient and glorious appellation *catholic*, a word used while yet the Bishop of Rome was content to be a Bishop among Bishops. Whereas it meant "universal," how often now do we find it used of some custom or some expression peculiar to a special time and place. For such time and such place, doubtless, it had its good and right use; but those who so used it are silent about its universality. The want of sympathy with the mental constitution of those whose taste for externals differs from ours leads frequently to bitter controversy. Who shall set a limit to these things? Is it not become necessary for Christian men to recognise that our Lord lived and died for men of all temperaments? To some God has given the faculty of being largely influenced by outer objects. From others, gifted with perhaps keener abstract ability, this is in part withheld. Surely we should learn a little self-denial in the regulation of our temperaments, and to say, in the words of the Apostle: "*All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient.*" In this spirit the lover of externals would moderate his action if he felt that it caused his brother to offend. In the same spirit, he that loves them not would refrain his tongue from expressions of contempt, lest insult should breed insult. And one piece of advice may be given—*never overstate your case.* Unquestionably this has been done in calling the ceremonial use of incense a catholic practice. Here I would quote, out of a considerable selection of passages, one from Tertullian, who writes thus to a heathen adversary:

"For as you ought to show why you give incense to the gods, so also it follows that you should make it plain that the gods have some cause why they do not reject it, not to say why they so earnestly desire it. Someone will say, perhaps, 'We honour the gods by it.' But we do not require your feeling, but that of the gods; nor do we ask what is done by you, but what is required by them." And then, after the manner of the Christian apologists of his day, analyzing the material of incense, he shows that such corporeal matters ought not to be offered to an incorporeal God.

Now, whether the views of this ancient Christian apologist are to be accepted or rejected, one thing is clear—that at the time of his writing his treatise the use of incense in Christian worship was unknown in his part of the world (North Africa) about the time of the great Nicene Council; so that the word *catholic* seems quite inapplicable to its use.

This is not the only instance of the quiet assumption of such high-sounding words. I say nothing for or against the use of incense in itself. It may be capable of being defended on other grounds. All I plead for is that it should not be defended on a false ground.

All symbolism is liable to abuse. Indeed, symbols are a kind of dumb language, and thus liable to misuse, even as uttered sounds.

Upward through symbolism the human soul has been raised to the knowledge of an unseen God; downward through symbolism it has sunk into mere materialism.

J. J. RAVEN.

FRESSINGFIELD VICARAGE,
SUFFOLK.



ART. VIII.—AN OCTOGENARIAN'S VIEW OF THE RITUALISTIC DISPUTE.

THE peculiarity of the position of one who is an octogenarian, and something more, in relation to our unhappy divisions, consists in this: that his memory carries him back to the period before the thirties—that is, to the rise of the Oxford School of theology, out of which was developed the ritualistic party. The writer has thus a clear recollection of the state of the Church before the rise of the present disputes. There were then two distinct parties, the old High Church or orthodox, as they perhaps preferred to call themselves, and the Evangelical or Low Church. The High Church element often consisted in little more than an extreme dislike of every form of Dissent, while the Low Church principle was mainly seen in a tendency to fraternize with Dissent, or at least with those whom they regarded as orthodox Dissenters. But it was in their theological views that the difference between the two parties was chiefly apparent, the so-called orthodox preacher, while giving a cold assent to the doctrine of the Trinity, contenting himself for the most part with moral teaching, dreading all approach to enthusiasm. The Evangelical, on the other hand, insisted much on personal religion, on justification by faith in the Atonement by the Son of God, and on the direct influence of the Holy Spirit in the conversion of the sinner, and in a continuous process of sanctification. The difference between the two parties within the sacred buildings was apparent only in the utterances from the pulpit. There were doubtless two opposite doctrines on the efficacy of the sacraments, the one resting it on the mere *opus*