

principe est absolu, l'application est relative." It is not on texts henceforth that the controversy will be conducted, but "sur l'ensemble du fait évangélique et du fait chrétien."¹

ARTHUR C. JENNINGS.



ART. II.—THE BOOK OF GENESIS (*continued*).

IF the view which I have submitted as to the so-called system of chronology of the pre-Abrahamic times commend itself to the reader, or has any verisimilitude, the question of the antiquity of man will be one upon which the Bible will give us no information. It leaves us quite at liberty to accept whatever definite results the researches of science in this direction may establish. The scientific student can enter upon his investigations in a perfectly independent spirit, and with no idea that any conclusions he may arrive at will be counted as evidence either for or against the Bible narrative. In the same way, an indefinite or illimitable time is left for the development, so far as is necessary, of different languages and racial distinctions.

But a word of caution is also necessary, especially because those who accept the doctrine of evolution—I am not concerned for the moment with its truth or not—are only ready to accept it so far as it coincides with their own views. For if evolution and development mean anything, it is that by slow degrees stage after stage of development has led to higher and higher forms of life. If you are an evolutionist, you must believe that at some stage or other from the *anthropoid* mammal was physically evolved the mammal we call *anthropos*; if you do not believe that, you are no evolutionist, and have to allow that there is a gap in your system of evolution. At the same time you are confronted by the fact that, in every known case, the mental powers and spiritual gifts of the *anthropos* are in varying degrees, yet still always capable of being distinguished from (though it is not always possible to define accurately in human language the difference) the highest form of animal intelligence. You ask the man of science, When did this difference arise? He cannot tell you. He may be able to tell you of certain implements of a rude kind found hard by the skeletons in the drift gravel of the Pleistocene period, when remains of man first appear; but the skeletons themselves reveal but little as to the stage of mental, and nothing as to that of moral, development which the

¹ "Autour," etc., pp. 173-176.

animal man had reached. Besides, no other animal possesses the gift of language in the sense in which man does. Where did these gifts come from? and how did they arise? Science cannot tell us, and the remains discovered can give no information.

Now, to one who looks at things of that sort *ab extra* it seems that, if you take the principle of evolution as a working hypothesis to explain how this world of ours is ordered, you are only at the beginning of your difficulties. I am speaking now as one taking cognizance of such matters from outside. For instance, let it be granted that *anthropos* is evolved from *anthropoid*. This does not involve necessarily all the *anthropoids* of the same species; there are some left behind. It is only the fittest *anthropoid* that becomes the *anthropos*. Some of the *anthropoids* survive and perpetuate their species. How long is this to go on? and is it possible that, after all, there may be an inferior race which looks like *anthropos*, but is really *anthropoid*? Do we not find, for instance, in more districts than one in Africa, mammals that we class as *anthropos*, but that, if we had a free hand, we should class with the *anthropoids*? And, if this or anything like it be so, is there not suggested by it something like an answer to the *vexata questio* of the union between "the sons of God" and "the daughters of men"? May it not be possible that union was possible between an *anthropos* and an *anthropoid* of this left-behind race, and, also, may it not be possible that, in certain cases, the influence of the *anthropos* would be sufficient to make the resultant progeny rather of the *anthropos* type than of the *anthropoid*? In this way, might not only the fact that, if, as with most scientists, the universality of the Flood is not accepted, we meet with what we should call degraded races still surviving in the world, be accounted for, but also the fact that, when the *anthropos* meets in struggle for survival with such races, such inferior race, as in Australia and North America, dies out? In this way, too, or in some way like it, the old question asked by the scoffer, as to who Cain's wife was, may find its answer. I only throw these statements out as suggestions, in order to show how, in many ways, we are merely at present at the threshold of a great question, which, with all its difficulties, we may perhaps meet again later on in our investigations.

In his introduction Dr. Driver discusses

THE PATRIARCHAL PERIOD.

We are anxious to quote here one sentence from that discussion:

“The supposition that the writer (or writers) of Genesis may have based his (or their) narratives upon written documents, contemporary with the events described, does not alter the case: there is no evidence, direct or indirect, that such documents were actually used as the basis of the narrative; and upon a *mere* hypothesis, for the truth of which no positive grounds can be alleged, and which therefore may or may not be true, it must be apparent that no further conclusions of any value can be built” (p. xliii).

I quote these words in full because, if I understand them aright, there seems to me to lie hid in them a great fallacy. (1) To begin with, there is no evidence outside the Book of Genesis itself of documents having existed either contemporary or non-contemporary; (2) there is no evidence of such documents having been actually used; (3) there is certainly no direct evidence, at any rate as to Genesis, of their being non-contemporary, as the “Higher Critics” contend; and (4) the whole position of the “Higher Critic” is based upon a *mere* hypothesis, which may or may not be true, and it must be apparent that upon it no further conclusion of any value can be built. Certainly there are no conclusions sufficiently sure to “seriously diminish the confidence which we might otherwise feel as regards the historical character of the patriarchal narratives” (p. xliii).

Whilst we are at length left in rather a nebulous state as to the historic personality of the patriarchs, we are given enough statements to make us cling to a belief in them as real persons. The tenacity of memory amongst an unliterary people; the agreement on the whole of the two independent narratives J and E; the sobriety of these narratives; the great moderation in the claims made on behalf of the patriarchs; the fact that, though promised the land, they never take possession of it; the fact also that Moses, the great lawgiver, is not made the starting-point of the “Israelitish tradition”—all these will suffice, surely, to satisfy the mind of an ordinary reader of such an unsophisticated narrative (to say nothing of the accuracy of the topography and of the descriptions of Eastern life, which Dr. Driver says must not be taken for evidence) of its historicity.

The next point about which something must be said is

TRIBES REPRESENTED AS INDIVIDUALS.

On this point Dr. Driver writes with much more reserve and caution than some of the “Higher Critics.” The absurdities, for they can be called no less, to which some have been led in this regard can be best estimated when we say that one critic has pronounced Rachel and Leah (the wives of Jacob, according to the narrative as it has come down to

us) to be "a distinction without a difference," and both names to be "corrupt fragments of Jerahmeel" ("Encyc. Bibl.," 4004).

But even the more moderate statements must be carefully examined. Thus, Dr. Driver says: "Bethuel is mentioned as an individual . . . but his brothers Uz and Buz are tribes" (p. liv). But they are not said to be tribes in xxii. 21, but stand on exactly the same level as Bethuel. It is true that the names became the names of tribes and countries, but it does not necessarily follow that the tribe had not an eponymous founder; we certainly have no right to deny the existence of such persons. The Arabian tribes of the desert still look back to eponymous founders, just as, I suppose, the Scotch clans, which still remain so clannish, do. This will apply equally well to Dr. Driver's next assertion: "Keturah . . . is spoken of as Abraham's second wife (xxv.); but her sons and grandsons are tribes (xxv. 2-4)," p. liv). This, again, is not said, though it is implied by what is said (xxv. 6), that they were the founders of tribes. Again, in referring to Gen. x. (p. liv), he does not tell the English reader, what he does, indeed, tell him elsewhere (p. 112), but what ought to be repeated here, that the names can be classified as personal names, local names, and tribal names with either a plural or gentile termination. These differences must surely have had some meaning to the original compiler of the list, or, at any rate, in the sources from which he derived his list, whether they were oral or written. It is clear that in later times the children of an eponymous ancestor were called either "the children of the person," or, for shortness' sake, by his name. Thus, in Num. xxxii. 39, 40 (JE), we have the same people called "the children of Machir" (ver. 39) and "Machir" (ver. 40). In Num. xxvi. 29, the next passage quoted, it is said "Machir . . . begets (the country) Gilead" (p. liv), but the insertion of the words "the country" is quite arbitrary. The passage about Jephthah is more difficult (see Judg. xi. 2), but I incline to think that the passage is much plainer if we read גִּלְעָד אִישׁ גִּלְעָד instead of גִּלְעָד in the latter part of ver. 1, and translate "and a Gileadite begat Jephthah. And a woman of Gilead bare him sons." The same may be said, generally speaking, of the rest of the instances quoted (p. liv); and in treating some of them there is a lack of appreciation of the poetical surroundings in which they occur. The use of the same word for a country and its people is not limited to the Semitic languages. We say, for instance, England was victorious, meaning "the English people."

At this point I think we may stop to notice how the spirit of quite a different form of interpretation recurs in these

lucubrations of modern writers, who do away with the personality of the patriarchs, and look upon the account of them as a parabolical account of the history of tribes. Time was when people thought less of the actual history of the patriarchs and their real place in the affairs of their times, and more of them as types of the coming Messiah. They pressed their typical interpretation so far that even, for instance, the number of Abraham's "trained men" (Gen. xiv. 14) was held to be capable of a mystical interpretation. The result of this was that any typology in the Old Testament was discredited. Now, I should be the last person to say that there are no types to be found in the Old Testament. No doubt the persons who took part in the actions and the authors who originally described them were absolutely unconscious that they were types, but, when one action after another can be brought into line as contributing to a series of what we call types, I think we may reasonably conclude that men in the later generations of the world were intended under the Divine guidance to see that all those actions had a meaning beyond what they had to their own time, which was to meet with its full verification in later times. But the consequence of all this was that men failed to look upon the patriarchs as men of like passions with themselves moving across the field of history. Now again we are bidden to disbelieve, or, at any rate, in a great measure to ignore, their personal character, and to see in them simply puppets set up to typify various tribes and their histories.

In both cases an unequally balanced method of reasoning is at work. Eponymous ancestors, names of tribes, possible types, can all exist in the same narrative, and no one of these need necessarily oust the others.

We now reach the final section of Dr. Driver's introduction. Its subject is—

THE RELIGIOUS VALUE OF THE BOOK OF GENESIS,

and he includes under this head Inspiration and the Scope of Inspiration. In spite of himself, we might almost say, he is constrained to admit that the Book of Genesis is unique. It "is a marvellous gallery of portraits, from whatever originals they may have been derived. There is no other nation which can show for its early history anything in the least degree resembling it" (p. lxix). If this be so, then there is at least ground for wondering, after all, whether this uniqueness may not extend in other directions as well, and include the historicity of the information, short, simple, and unembellished as it is, as to the earliest times which the book professes to give us. It is scarcely necessary in these days to set up the

doctrine of verbal inspiration in the form in which it was asserted in earlier times in order to refute it. That is to prejudice the whole discussion.

But the idea, to most Christians, of the religious value of Genesis extends far wider than critical views will carry us. They see, it is true, the Providential guidance towards the foundation of a people to perpetuate, however imperfectly the individual may have contributed his part, true religion in the world. But they see more than this: they see the Divine purpose to regenerate the human race, and to restore its innocence, by and through an actual person, expressed more and more clearly even in those early ages (*e.g.*, *cf.* iii. 14 with xlix. 10). They, at any rate, can also see, not from one instance, but from many, how the Almighty was indicating by His providential guidance of the world's history, under types and figures, His purposes to be carried out in future ages for the redemption of mankind. If they can see all this, and the vast majority of Christians think they can do this—and spiritual insight (thank God for it) is often to be found where critical insight is lacking—then it will be a long time before they will accept the awfully dangerous doctrine which is presented to them to-day, that in an admittedly inspired book you may have set before you religious truth and scientific and historical error. The science and the history of this book are not the science and history of the twentieth century; at the same time, we feel quite sure—and the opinion is a growing one—they are not opposed to it. The book is not in its intent and in its contents a scientific or a historical manual; its purpose is a much higher one, and that purpose it will be found more and more to fulfil, without in the least traversing any *absolute* truth which science or history may finally arrive at. A divinely-inspired book could, we feel sure, never do that.

I have thus far dealt only with the introductory matter, as it presents to us the so-called results of modern criticism. But before discussing other matters—as I intend to do, if the editor will permit me—it seems to me that one point should be mentioned here.

Behind all these questions there looms a much weightier matter, which is for the most part left out of sight altogether. The religion of the inhabitants of the earliest ages of the world—was it arrived at by a process of evolution, say through fetichism or animism, or whence did it come? If it came by evolution, and the popular forms of polytheistic religion in Egypt, Babylonia, and Greece were evolved from such baser forms, how do you account for the fact that there seem to have existed side by side with them purer esoteric

forms of faith as far removed from the popular forms as the religion of a cultured, intellectual Roman Catholic Englishman is from that of an Irish or Spanish peasant or a South American? Will not analogy rather teach us that the same causes have been at work, and that the popular religion is a *corruptio optimi*, as even the esoteric form may be in a less degree?

Or, again, if religious belief is developed by an evolutionary process, how comes it that the first man, according to the Biblical records, is in close communion and intercourse—it may, indeed, be childlike intercourse, but it is none the less intercourse—with a God, to connect whom with totemism, fetichism, or animism, would be arrant blasphemy? And if we do not allow the revelation of God by Himself to man at the beginning—and I do not see how we can do this if we apply the principles of evolution to religion—then it seems to me that we are perilously near to, even if we do not actually arrive at, attributing religious untruthfulness as well as scientific untruthfulness to the Book of Genesis. Here is the *vera crux* for which, as it seems to me, there is only one solution.

HENRY A. REDPATH.

(To be continued.)



ART. III.—THE “PILGRIM’S PROGRESS” AS A MANUAL OF PASTORAL THEOLOGY.

IS a knowledge of the “Pilgrim’s Progress” ever required from candidates for Holy Orders? Yet where, in the same compass, shall we find more shrewd, yet highly spiritual, teaching? where shall we meet with more thoroughly practical, yet more entirely Scriptural, advice and exhortation upon that life which should be, *par excellence*, the life of the Christian pastor? What, I believe, makes the book so extremely valuable as a manual for the pastoral life is its remarkable combination of such very different qualities, each of which is found exhibited in it to a very high degree. And when we remember that it is now more than 200 years since the book was written, it is truly wonderful how very little of it can be pronounced as antiquated, or can be regarded as out of date. The whole allegory may be taken as a signal proof of the identity of (1) the teaching of the Gospel, (2) absolute truth, and (3) the most complete or perfect wisdom—in other words, the highest and deepest common-sense. Where else, for instance, shall we find such a combination of