

forgeries, which represented Popes acting with plenary authority before the decrees of Gratian and Valentinian, served to throw an ecclesiastical cloak over the political and social system established by the Emperors on the petition of the Popes. But the Œcumenical Councils of Constantinople and Chalcedon, as well as all ecclesiastical history, remind us that any pre-eminence recognised by the Church in Rome and Constantinople was allowed them solely because those cities were imperial residences.

Mr. Puller proceeds to recount the cases of Meletius and of Acacius, both of which are as incompatible with the existence of Papal supremacy, at the date of their occurrence, as the cases of Basilides and Apiarius. Those who are still unconvinced may with benefit trace the subject further under Mr. Puller's guidance.

F. MEYRICK.

ART. II.—CAIRD'S ESSAYS.

PART II.

PASSING over, for the moment, any discussion of the most elaborate of all the essays contained in the first volume—"The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time"—we may now proceed to examine the second volume. This is entirely devoted to philosophical problems, and is divided into two main divisions: (1) Cartesianism, (2) Metaphysics. Both of these have seen the light before, in the pages of the "Encyclopædia Britannica," and both are, we regret to say, reprinted without alteration from that great but cumbrous "Thesaurus." This regret is all the more keenly felt because, since 1883 (the date of the first publication of "Metaphysics"), several excellent pieces of criticism have appeared which merit deep attention. Not to speak of Seth's "Hegelianism and Personality," a book no metaphysician can afford to neglect, we have had various searching papers in *Mind* and elsewhere, and two or three books of capital importance, notably Dr. Martineau's "Study of Religion" in 1888, Dr. J. H. Stirling's Gifford Lectures in 1890, Professor James's most suggestive volumes on "Psychology" in 1891, and Dr. W. T. Harris's monograph on the "Logic of Hegel" in the same year.¹ Accordingly, most admirable as is Professor Caird's luminous and subtle contribution to the knottiest problem which can occupy the intellectual faculties of man, one naturally misses

¹ To these must now be added Mr. F. H. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality," a brilliant and thoughtful essay in metaphysics.

many side-touches of that penetrating criticism of the thought of the time, which no one knows how to employ better than Caird himself. As I am anxious to proceed to this study of metaphysic, it will be enough if a rapid glance alone is given to the essay on "Cartesianism," which occupies the first hundred or so pages of the second volume.

The subject matter of Cartesianism naturally divides itself into three major divisions, according as we deal with the founder of that philosophical system, Descartes himself, or his immediate disciples, Malebranche and Spinoza. The debt which modern philosophy owes to the impetus given it by Descartes can hardly be overrated; from whatever aspect we view it, and no matter how much we differ from the deductions drawn by Descartes from his own principles, we cannot deny him the credit of having broken down the barriers, raised by the pseudo-Aristotelianism of the schoolmen, against the development of a living thought as realized in close contact with the actual world. His "COGITO, ERGO SUM," Gassendi notwithstanding, contains the germ of a sound philosophy, though it may be doubted whether Descartes ever realized the fulness of meaning wrapt up in his celebrated aphorism. In his own developments and counter-developments, explanations and counter-explanations, Descartes often lost sight of the main issue; he often failed to bring forth from his treasure-house the stores contained within; he was for the most part unable to render *explicit* the truth *implicitly* contained in those few words—"I think, therefore I am." For his mechanical view of nature, his imperfect grasp of the relations subsisting between subject and object, and his arbitrary conception of God—dragged in, it would seem, as a sort of *Deus ex machinâ*, to clamp together the unyielding elements of his imperfect thought—ultimately landed him, in ethics as in metaphysics, into an explication of things which, instead of being a reconciliation of diversities and antagonisms, is a dualism which can give no *rationale* either of mind or matter.¹ "At best," says Caird, "his unity is a unity which is the result of abstraction."

Caird's running commentary upon the dogmatic of Spinoza (pp. 332-333) is very useful in throwing light upon the distractions and irreconcilable elements of a philosophy which, despite all the severe criticisms passed upon it, has ever retained an undoubted fascination over the minds of many. "Spinoza's ethics," says Dr. Stirling,² "have deeply influenced the progress of philosophy, especially since Jacobi recalled

¹ Cf. Caird's "Critical Philosophy of Kant," vol. ii., p. 75.

² Annotations to his edition of Schweigler's "History of Philosophy," p. 411.

attention to it in Germany; but after all, perhaps, his work of the greatest *historical* importance is the 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.' The latter work has constituted the very arsenal of the *Aufklärung* whether French or German." Doubtless our interest in Spinoza is not weakened, when we realize that his bent towards philosophy was not conditioned by motives purely intellectual. Some true and abiding object of love, something in which he could find a perfect and eternal joy—this was his primary search.¹ True, the lines of thought tracked out in his logic lead to something quite different. His *intent* was so to correlate the finite things of time and sense, as to make them intelligible only in and for an infinite intelligence; the *actual sum* of his philosophic achievement is to "dissolve all things in an ultimate abstraction of Being." This logical failure affords Caird the text for an instructive sermon, though his interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine does scarcely adequate justice to it as a foreshadowing of that truth which Spinoza himself seemed to gaze upon with an almost rapt vision. His whole philosophy is simply to make explicit those views of God and man which were implicit in his own mind. The attempt failed; for it was precisely in its lack of subjectivity that his system was ultimately found wanting. And yet we cannot but discern, as Principal Caird points out, a singularly profound meaning in those apparently mystical utterances in which Spinoza seems to gather up the final result of his speculation—"God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love;" "the intellectual love of the mind to God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself." And he can say this, with an entire conviction of its truth, notwithstanding the fact that his whole philosophy is a virtual denial, on the one hand, of any reality to independent finite existence; and, on the other, is content to define God as simply unbroken extension, unbroken thought—thought and extension being at the same time the dual attributes of a single infinite substance. Hence, for Spinoza, true knowledge consists merely in seeing things under the form of eternity; for him, too, no living God remained, seeing the word "God" was really nothing beyond a term in a geometric series, robbed of spiritual content and glowing with no moral fervour. And yet, of all antitheistic writers that have lived, it is upon him that our eyes love oftenest to rest with a lingering affection, and dwell with a strange repose.

The essay on "Metaphysic," which we may now deal with, occupies some 150 pages, and contains a great deal of hard reading. Yet no one, having once started on his voyage of

¹ Cf. the remarks of the Rev. Dr. Caird on p. 9 of his luminous monograph on "Spinoza" (1888).

discovery over the "perilous sea" of metaphysical problems here presented to the serious student, would lightly abandon the quest—so full of infinite interest is it to grapple with the intricacies of thought, piercing them to their depths, so fascinating a thing is this iron toil of speculative endeavour.

After an introductory sketch of the origin of the term "metaphysic," and of Aristotle's account of it as a science of the first principles of knowing and being, Caird proceeds to consider the subject under four main relations—the relations, that is, of Metaphysic (1) to Science in General, (2) to Psychology, (3) to Logic, and (4) to the Philosophy of Religion. What we note as of special interest in the first part is a searching criticism of Aristotle, to whom every branch of human science is so profoundly indebted. Less suggestive, in some ways, than Plato, less exquisitely alive to the poetic interpretation of Nature's stern facts, Aristotle was assuredly the first who fairly *grappled* with the problems of knowing and being, and essayed to define the relations existing between intelligence and the intellectual world. If he failed finally to solve those problems, if he was at last unsuccessful in his interpretation of those relations in their fulness and complexity, he at least indicated the method by which his successors must set about the mighty task. His philosophy was the first attempt at presenting a *systematic* as opposed to an *abstract* theory of the world; it avoided, too, that stumbling-stone of the a-priorist, namely, the withdrawal of philosophy from a healthy contact with actual experience. He failed chiefly in his reduction of "being" to a mere form, in which all differences, in place of being correlated and explained as necessary factors in the living web of existence, were simply absorbed. Abstract identity was for him, in point of fact, the last stage of being, instead of that "concrete unity of differences" which receives the particulars into itself only to their reaffirmation. With Aristotle, moreover, the pure intelligence, which is the *prius* of all things, is merely regarded as theoretic; while it was left for Hegel to discern that for it to *be* anything it must be conceived of as a living principle, capable in self-consciousness of accounting for itself. "In this way," remarks Caird (vol. ii., p. 520), "Hegel was enabled to understand the necessary unity of thought or self-consciousness with the world, and to heal the division of phisic from metaphysic which Aristotle had left unexplained." But it was this inherent dualism in Aristotle which, when his speculative theory fell into the hands of barbarians and schoolmen,¹ helped to bring discredit on philosophy at the hands of

¹ For an admirable, if brief, survey of the transition from ancient to modern thought, compare Wallace's "Logic of Hegel," Introd., pp. 144-150.

modern scientists and disciples of the *Aufklärung*. Nor is that breach between science and philosophy yet healed, as everyone knows; in our day science has done so much for our bodies that we, utilitarians to the finger-tips, are quite content to think that enough. But (to use Hegel's words) philosophy must supplement the scientific manner of knowing by another manner; because a scientific manner of knowing does not satisfy the whole demand of intelligence. This is to many a vexing and puzzling thing, this proper comprehension of the relations between science, as popularly understood, and philosophy; and I cannot but think Caird's commentary just here is most helpful, if duly pondered; nothing, for example, could be more satisfactory than the following (p. 442):

Philosophy goes beyond science just because, along with the idea of the relativity of things to the mind, it brings in the conception of organic unity. Its highest aim is, therefore, not merely (as Kant still held) to secure a place for the supersensible beyond the region of experience. It is to reinterpret experience, in the light of a unity which is presupposed in it, but which cannot be made conscious or explicit until the relation of experience to the thinking self is seen—the unity of all things with each other and with the mind that knows them.

Side by side with these words we may set another passage, where, after pointing out how the principle of subjectivity in religion, and the objective principle in science, correct and supplement each other, Caird excellently sums up as follows (p. 464):

What is wanted to clear up the confusion on both sides is the growth of the perception among *scientific* men, that the objectivity they are seeking cannot be mere objectivity (which would be unmeaning), but an objectivity that stands in essential relation to the intelligence; and, on the other hand, the growth of the perception among *religious* men, that the subjectivity of religion only means that God, who is the objective principle by whom things are and are known, is a spiritual Being, and can, therefore, be revealed to the spirit.

If it is true—and the contrary I hold to be unthinkable—that thought, which is self-consciousness, is the key to unlock the secret of the universe, then not less true is it that “self-consciousness is something which makes us individuals in a sense in which individuality can be predicated of none but a self-conscious being.” But this truth, simply considered in its metaphysical aspect, has but a speculative interest until it be shown that, upon this very universality of consciousness, rests the possibility both of science and morality. Caird, who appears to put the matter in a nutshell, concludes the argument thus: “All science is just a contemplation of the world *in ordine ad universum*, and not *in ordine ad individuum*; and all morality is just action with a view to an interest which belongs to the agent, not as this individual, but as a member

of a greater whole, and ultimately of the absolute whole in which all men and all things are included."

Regarded in this way, we see that only so far as man is viewed as a self-conscious being can he relate himself to God, the absolute self-consciousness, the infinite genetic pulse into which all individual self-consciousness is retracted, but never for a single instant lost. In this (the Christian) view, God ceases to be the *abstract*¹ unity in which all difference is swallowed up, but is found the *living* Spirit which relates all things to Himself, and in whom and for whom all things are.

To go into further detail as regards Caird's most pregnant and suggestive essay is not possible; an adequate notice would run well-nigh to as great a length as the original essay. I have marked for special mention an excellent critique—pp. 486 *sqq.*—on the Aristotelian view of thought in its relation to the world. A single sentence which declares that "the *esse* of things is not their *percipi* but their *intelligi*" shuts a vast deal in a small space. It is, indeed, well to remember that an analysis of an object in no case exhausts its meaning and content; for it is as true to say that the object of thought becomes mediated *by*, and changed *in*, thought, as to say that thought is determined by the object to which it submits itself. Without thought finite things simply become emptied of all meaning; they are, strictly, unintelligible. And yet, obvious as this is, how many so-called thinkers either ignore the truth or remain unconvinced of it! One is tempted to suppose that Ovid's lines must find a place in the thoughts of some of these gentlemen, *on occasions* :

Video meliora proboque,
Deterior sequor.

Caird's "Metaphysics" closes with a brief commentary upon the Hegelian method, as employed to bring about the solution of the problem of existence,—that *ζήτησις ζητησέων* of all earnest men. The references to Hegel by name are not numerous throughout the essay, but Caird is more deeply indebted to that prince of thinkers than to any other philosopher of any country or any age. It was Hegel who, having mastered (as no one else had mastered) the teaching of the "Critical Philosophy" of Immanuel Kant, set himself to supply its deficiencies, and to complete the work which Kant had only begun. What the world owes to the dialectical method pur-

¹ Hegel's use of the words "abstract" and "concrete," admirably philosophical as it is, requires to be attended to with care, inasmuch as it differs from the ordinary usage. Dr. Sterrett, in a volume of rare insight, "Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion," comments (p. 36) very clearly on this very matter.

sued by Hegel can never, perhaps, altogether be estimated; science, history, æsthetic, philosophy, ethic, religion—all have, in their turn, been profoundly affected by his masterly activity in their several provinces, and his almost superhuman insight into the principles which underlie the life of the world. For all that, prejudice is still rife against him, coming not least from the hands of those who have battered on him most. Dissatisfied with those systems which ended in an avowed or covert dualism, and, at the same time, fully conscious that a philosophy drawn from the springs of Eastern¹ mysticism could never solve the mystery of Nature and spirit, inasmuch as it sanctioned the practical diremption of spirit and matter by withdrawing spirit from matter, and by regarding the latter as but a time-worn illusion of the finite sense-consciousness, Hegel resolutely set to work to find what that genetic pulse of the universe might be, which should be at once self-determined, and also capable of finding in itself its own justification and affirmation. Such a genetic pulse—such a living, active principle—must (to borrow Caird's own words) "be a unity at once self-differentiating and self-interpreting, which manifests itself in difference, that through that difference it may return upon itself." In other words, the object of all Hegel's iron toil was to get at the Concrete Notion.² Nature must be shown not as something exterior to God—merely externally depending on Him, so to say—but as that in which He has chosen to manifest Himself; and the spirit of man must be shown to be vitally related to God, who works in and through the finite spirit. Thus will God appear to us as He veritably is—not an "*absentee*" Deity, sitting on the confines of space beyond the ken of man; *that* is a fallacy which Agnostics and the antitheistic mob had better keep to themselves; but—the universal focus of all life, the centre of all thought, all will, and all conceivable relations; no mere external Cause of

This mighty sum of things for ever speaking,

but the internal life, fulness, and energy of the grand Whole.³

¹ "Philosophy of History" (tr. by Sibree), pp. 163, 177. The absolute of Indian thought is the emptiest of abstractions. Compare Dr. W. T. Harris's "Critical Exposition of Hegel's Logic," chaps. ix., x., and see Hegel's "History of Philosophy" (tr. by E. S. Haldane), vol. i., pp. 146-148.

² See some admirable remarks on the Hegelian philosophy in Dr. J. H. Stirling's "Secret of Hegel," vol. ii., pp. 514 *sqq.*

³ The ordinary undifferentiated belief regards God as having manifested Himself *to* man; the intellectual consciousness as having manifested Himself *in* man; while the Christian synthesis—hereby declaring its true philosophic import—looks upon God as having manifested Himself both *in* and *to* man.

Caird is (apparently) disposed to regard the following as the weightiest objection to a metaphysic like Hegel's—namely, that it seems to involve a claim to absolute knowledge, whereas we are only too painfully conscious of the actual limitations of our intelligence. But in the same breath, almost, he is enabled to dispose of that objection; for, as he says, what the Hegelian metaphysic does is to give us the assurance that the problem to be solved in human life and thought is not insoluble—as it is, for example, when we attempt to bring in any dualistic philosophy to untie the knots and unravel the confused strands of that problem. Where, perhaps, one *does* at times feel qualms is in the fact that the Hegelian dialectic seems too easy. How will it explain that hardest of the riddles of the Sphinx—sin? Can it exorcise that grim phantom? Hegel, indeed, clearly recognises¹ sin and its consequences; but his philosophy seems, in some ways, to give an inadequate *rationale* of its presence in a divinely-ordered universe. The mystery of evil we cannot allow to be insoluble to finite thought; but, so far, it has assuredly baffled speculative thinkers.

I have reserved till the end the essay on "The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time," though in Caird's collection it is placed in the first volume—not the most suitable place, however, in my opinion. Though perhaps open to criticism in more than one direction, it must be regarded as a lucid and admirable performance, taken in the bulk. But before we can assume the task of discussing the "*Problem of Philosophy*," we must first ascertain what philosophy itself is. To this very difficult, but amply pertinent question, various replies have been accorded. After Hegel's mighty labours, one cannot but believe that any proposed solution of that question must be futile which does not realize that, in the very being of philosophy, is involved an unwavering search for one idealistic *principle*—the radical of thought—applicable to all things that are in heaven or upon earth, and adequate to its own complete realization.² In other words, philosophy is simply the struggle to put thought into things.

Now that we have arrived at some definition of philosophy,

¹ See a striking passage in the "Logic" (ed. Wallace, p. 47): "The doctrine of original sin is a profound truth; though modern enlightenment prefers to believe that man is naturally good, and that he acts right so long as he continues true to nature."

² No student of Plato will need to be reminded how different all this is from the Platonic *idea*, which presents us with no nerve of thought whatsoever, but, transcendental and removed from the ken of man, remains in cold isolation from the concrete. Plato's ideas never *move*. As for his "secret," it is, in a sort (as Dr. Stirling notes), simply generalization. Cf. Grote's "Aristotle" p. 560 [2nd ed.].

we may pass on to a consideration of what that problem of philosophy is which we have to face. Science, negative, analytic, and more or less destructive in its methods as it must inevitably be, is totally insufficient to satisfy man's aspirations and his higher life. The province of science is the finite and the things of the finite; it asks no more. But it is just when science has reached its term and limit, and there appears nothing beyond the wall of visible fact but a realm of blank immensity and darkness unfathomable, that philosophy steps in and shows us that "all our knowledge of the things of time is, so to speak, on the background of eternity itself." If it be true (and it *is* true) that God hath set eternity in men's hearts, then the dominating philosophy of the modern schools never can, never will, *satisfy* man. Alone and unreconciled, science can but deal with series of facts, which it is its business to collect and classify, while these are bereft of all meaning so long as they stand alone. And so, to use Caird's words (vol. i., p. 191),

The need for philosophy arises out of the broken harmony of a spiritual life, in which the different elements or factors seem to be set in irreconcilable opposition to each other; and the task of philosophy is to regain such a view of things as shall reconcile us to the world and to ourselves.¹

Modern Agnosticism can never really harry or distress men with a feeling that perhaps, after all, God—if there be a God—is an unknowable something, if once they realize that without the deep underlying thought manifested in things, the infinite in the finite, all existence ceases (for us, at least) to possess any significance. A *true* philosophy takes the facts of the various sciences, co-ordinates them, gives them their place in the boundless economy of Nature, and relates them to Him, the immortal and invisible God, to whom and for whom and in whom all creation exists. The very thought of God is that which *cannot not-be*. What knowledge, indeed, were worthy the name if God were unknowable?

Such a synthesis supplied by Christianity alone is objective, and no mere piece of empty subjectivity such as was the synthesis set forth by Comte. The fact is, the positivist clique nourishes a philosophy which seems (to me, at least) one huge abstraction; for it is a divorce of the finite from the infinite, the material from the spiritual. Truly, for the spiritual no room is found *at all*; and an arbitrary limit is set upon man's thought beside. But to be conscious of a limit is *ipso facto* to

¹ This view has been admirably dealt with, and sympathetically expounded, by Prof. Henry Jones, in a recent paper in *Mind* (N. S., vol. ii., No. 6), on "The Nature and Aims of Philosophy." See esp., p. 170.

transcend it; and you cannot separate the finite from the infinite, as is proposed, any more than you can separate the two ends of a stick. Such a separation is only possible by an effort of abstract thinking, based upon no reality in actual fact. Caird's concluding remarks upon the contrast evinced between Greek religion and Christianity are valuable. He shows how striking an analogy the modern movement from faith to reason bears to the movement of ancient thought. But Sophistic failed because it was purely destructive and analytic, without root in itself; Christianity can fear no overthrow, notwithstanding the vain babble of some idle folk just now, because it has not merely beautified certain types of human nature, but actually brought down the Divine into the world under the form of an individual life. Thanks to Christian philosophy men may feel that no longer are they isolated units, with their lives nought but

A watch or a vision
Between a sleep and a sleep,

but that they are, through the reconciliation achieved by Christ Himself, indissolubly bound together in the unity of the Divine life, and that their freedom consists in individually furthering an "increasing purpose" perpetually running through the ages. This is the only view under which, fallen as we are on evil and pessimistic days, we may hope to bear up under the burden and mystery of life. Christianity, too, has shown us God, not only as the self-conscious reason of all that really is, but as the inspiring Life of all that is noble, all that is true, all that is lovely and of good report in the world. Thus do religion and philosophy join hands in immortal fellowship; for, as Hegel triumphantly proclaims, logic is in the main a theology; the philosophy of history a vindication of God in history; and the philosophy of religion the vindication of God in the minds and hearts of men. I cannot do better than conclude this imperfect sketch of a great subject than in the eloquent words of the late Dean Milman from a sermon preached before the University of Oxford in 1865:

I cannot and will not believe but that the advancement of mankind in arts, in science, in knowledge, in the knowledge of itself, the history of our race, the limits of our intellectual faculties, the powers of our language, in the intercommunion of family with family of nations, in civil and religious liberty, and in all that expands and elevates our being, will eventually harmonize and enter into closer fellowship with the religion of Christ.

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