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ART. I.—THE STORY OF GERGES.

In matters of religious belief, polite acquiescence is becoming less and less fashionable. The day is gone by when a ready-made creed was accepted without examination. And as contrasted with a silent indifferentism, it may at least be said that Christianity has in open scepticism a foe whose measure she can take. Nor should it be overlooked that an attack is seldom made upon any of her defences, but the completeness of the reply leaves her doctrinal position unshaken. The believer retires from the conflict to re-read his Bible, and while perhaps having to correct many crudities of purblind exposition, and having to erase from between the lines not a little that he has, through the tyranny of conventionality, been led to read into the text of Scripture, he finds his faith in that text itself deepened and strengthened, at the same time that it has grown more discriminating, wiser, humbler, and so worthier of the name.

In religious circles loud are the lamentations over the advancing scepticism of our day. If, indeed, our lamentations have reference only to the attacking party, they are reasonably called for. "Woe to that man by whom the offence cometh." But if regard be had only to the cause that is thus assailed, there is less room for apprehension. Truth has an immortality within itself, and asks leave of none to let it live.

It should, moreover, be borne in mind that the precious heritage of dogma which has come down to us is, as such, largely the outcome of controversy. In Apostolic times the doctrines of the faith were held, so to speak, in solution. Analysis had not yet taken the place of synthesis. It was under the pressure of conflict that the creeds of the Church were precipitated, and thus the science of theology came into being.

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The incident referred to in the heading of this paper has lately supplied the causa bellii for an attack upon the historical basis of Christianity in the pages of a well-known review. That this wider issue is to be regarded as involved in the narrower one, proper to the incident in question, is stated in no equivocal language by Professor Huxley himself. Writing in the March number of the *Nineteenth Century*, he thus measures the importance of the question of the miracle in its bearing upon the question of the faith which is pledged to its acceptance:

Therefore, behind the question of the acceptance of the doctrines of the oldest heathen demonology as part of the fundamental beliefs of Christianity, there lies the question of the credibility of the Gospels, and of their claim to act as our instructors, outside that ethical province in which they appeal to the consciousness of all thoughtful men. And still, behind this problem, there lies another—how far do these ancient records give a sure foundation to the prodigious fabric of Christian dogma which has been built upon them by the continuous labours of speculative theologians during eighteen centuries... Whether the twentieth century shall see a recrudescence of the superstitions of medieval papistry, or whether it shall witness the severance of the living body of the ethical ideal of prophetic Israel from the carcase, foul with savage superstitions and cankered with false philosophy, to which theologians have bound it, turns upon their final judgment of the Gadarene tale.

The above passage is interesting, as showing how important, in the opinion of the writer, is the defence of the miracle in the field of Christian apologetics. It is interesting also for another reason. Behind the doctrines postulated by the story lies, we are told, the question of the claim of the Gospels "to act as our instructors, outside that ethical province in which they appeal to the consciousness of all thoughtful men." It will be observed that here is a distinct admission of the claim of the evangelic records to "act as our instructors" within the ethical province. Keeping this before us, we shall probably experience some surprise to find Professor Huxley directing his attack against the ethical aspect of the part enacted by the chief Actor in the scene. Ground which he has conceded to the Christian he is hardly acting within the restrictions of that concession to invade. His allegation is that our Lord, causing the destruction of the swine, was inflicting loss upon innocent persons. Gadara being substantially a Gentile town, the inhabitants were exempt from blame in keeping these animals, and consequently the act by which they were deprived of them was immoral.

Overlooking the inconsistency between the character of this assault upon the history before us, and the acknowledgment of the ethical value of the history as an integral portion of the Gospels, we may notice that this line of argument is one from which the great majority of opponents of revelation have
almost invariably shrunk. The supreme beauty of the moral character of the human Jesus as portrayed in the records of the Evangelists has been recognised by most of those who rejected His high claims, or in one way or another impugned the authority of the New Testament accounts of Him.

A broad glance over the pages of Professor Huxley's contributions to destructive criticism reveals, roughly speaking, three positions, with which the present paper may seasonably deal. The space allowed forbids more than a rapid treatment of each in turn. These three positions may be stated thus: First, that the act of Jesus Christ, issuing in the destruction of the swine, involved a violation of the rights of property, and was therefore immoral; secondly, that while it is of no consequence to which of the three rival places—Gadara, Gerasa, or Gergesa—we assign the supposed miracle, the balance of probability leans strongly towards Gadara; thirdly, that the universality of a given belief (e.g., demonology) tends to invalidate that belief.

These positions shall be taken in the order given, though the first in a measure depends upon the second, the question of the ethnical nature of the population of the district materially modifying our views regarding the intention that lay behind the action of Christ. For the present, therefore, let it be assumed that the contention that the people of the place which was the scene of the transaction were wholly or mainly Gentiles, and that consequently the rearing of swine in their case was not culpable, is a well-grounded one. Assuming this to have been the case, are we shut up to the inference that their destruction was unjustifiable, and that in permitting it our blessed Lord's conduct was open to grave exception?

One other concession we are less able, for the purposes of our argument, to make. In considering the moral question, Professor Huxley, of course, reasons from the postulate that the chief Actor was an ordinary man. His Divinity is not debatable. Without this it is readily granted that the task of defending the action of Jesus Christ under the accepted circumstances would be less easy, inasmuch as His personal authority would without this be immeasurably depreciated.

We touch here a subject of no little complexity, and it befits us to tread with the utmost reverence. In the eyes of a Christian, the character of Jesus Christ appears so infinitely sacred a subject that he can hardly persuade himself the very defence of it is not akin to profanity; yet while it needs not our defence its detractors may.

It is necessary carefully to bear in mind that, though the Son of God, stepping down into the human sphere, submitting to the inevitable limitations inseparable from that sphere,
accepted as His general rule of conduct the code of morality previously imposed upon men by Divine sanctions, the dual relationship, represented by His personality, looking Godward through His Divinity, and manward through His humanity, introduced elements into His conduct which necessarily traversed that code along certain lines.

God is good, and goodness, which is the essence of all true morality, flows from Him as its Source, and the moral law is but the Divine character codified. Notwithstanding, there are attributes of the moral character of God which cannot be predicated of a good man; and, on the other hand, there are moral qualities in a good man which cannot be thought of as resident in God. For virtues may be divided into relational and non-relational (these adjectives more exactly express our meaning than “relative” and “non-relative”); and of these, while the latter, such as holiness, truth, are proper both to the Divine and the human natures, the former, being the moral outcome of variable relationships, can only be common to both natures, in so far as the relationships which beget them are common to both. Amongst ourselves, a virtue may conceivably be turned into a vice by mentally altering a relationship. It is a military virtue in a soldier serving in the ranks to yield obedience to his superior officer. It would be a military vice for a superior officer to obey, in place of commanding, the private. As the Supreme Being, it is not competent for us to think of the human virtues of humility, obedience, submission, patience (in the sense of self-restraint in suffering or endured wrong), as essentials to the Divine character. For in virtue of His omnipotence God is raised above the field of action to which these essentials of human morality are proper. Patience presupposes possibility. Where there is none to defer to, submission has no place, nor obedience where there is none to command.

With thus much of reservation are we obliged to accept the dictum of a prominent modern freethinker: “I will never bring myself to think of that as good in God which is not good in man.” The little that is offered in the foregoing paragraph is enough to persuade us that, so far from all the elements in human goodness being equally good, when conceived of as belonging to God, there are elements which not only cease to be good when imported into the idea of God, but are subversive of other elements indispensable to that idea.

With these considerations before us, let us now turn to the subject of the so-called “rights of property.” I say advisedly “so-called,” because no human rights are absolute; and all social codes are drawn up with the understanding that they
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are not absolute. I own a piece of ground, but the rights vested in that ownership are strictly limited. If it be a freehold, those rights are as nearly unlimited as they can be; but still they are far from absolute. In a score of directions I may attempt to exceed my rights, and be hedged in from doing so. Deterioration of neighbouring property, "ancient lights," the safety of adjoining premises, by-laws of the place where the freehold is situated: one or more of these deterrent considerations may give me a very palpable sense of the strictly limited nature of my rights of ownership. It is not lawful for me to do whatever I will with mine own. For I may not sink a mine, I may not erect a powder-magazine, nor an "Albert Gate" mansion, nor even a shop perhaps, upon my land. Moreover, another and a higher ownership impinges upon mine, and might any day most legally absorb it. Theoretically, every citizen is the property of the State, and hence all that belongs to him is the property of the State. If Parliament adopted communism to-morrow in its extremest form, the holding of private property would immediately become illegal, and any attempt to retain it would become criminal. Individual sufferers by the change might complain bitterly of the hardship it inflicted upon them, but none could allege its illegality, for the rights of the State acting through its legalized channels of legislation override those of the individual.

It is evident, therefore, that absolute ownership is not to be found amongst us. What, then, becomes of this when used as a plea against the exercise of His power whose lordship over our persons and our goods is absolute? Our tenure of life itself is entirely dependent upon the Divine will, which is the fount of all law. The frequent wholesale destruction of property permitted in the providence of God may at times perplex us. But we believe that such destruction is perfectly capable of vindication, and that when and where that vindication is vouchsafed, neither the wisdom nor the goodness of God will be found to have failed. Substitute the impersonal abstraction of a Providence for the act of the personal Jesus, and a natural for the supernatural instrumentality, and the attack is at once shifted from a single act of an individual agent to the wide subject of the moral government of the universe, a field which we may well be excused from entering.

Further, it would be quite open to us to urge that Jesus Christ did not destroy the swine, but the evil spirits. True, He permitted the spirits to have their wish and work their will upon the herd. But can Christ be said to do all He permitted? Can God be said to do all He permits? He permits sin. Does He therefore sin? He permits us to be
tempted. Does He therefore tempt? Surely it is only with the wildest confusion of misstatement that God can be said to do all He permits others to do. Again, how much better is a man than a beast, or than a herd of beasts? In the heat of his assault upon the morality of the permitted death of the brutes, Professor Huxley has nothing to say about the beneficence of the cure of the wretched demoniacs. "Is not the life more than meat?" Let all the beasts of the forest and the cattle upon a thousand hills—all of them, on the Psalmist's authority, Jehovah’s possessions—go to purchase deliverance, if need be, for a single one of Satan’s captives. Let all lesser beings die for the sake of that being for whom the highest of all beings, God Incarnate, Himself died.

Let this much suffice by way of meeting the ethical charge.

II. I venture to take exception to the acceptance of Gadara as the presumed scene of the incident. Professor Huxley registers his opinion in a footnote (Nineteenth Century for March, 1891, p. 456) that the true identification of the place "is of no consequence." Considering that the whole weight of the evidence for the prosecution is made to rest upon its identity with Gadara, as opposed to the other two suggested spots, it is difficult to see how the question of the place can be so immaterial. Whether as an abstract inquiry it be of much moment is another matter. But it certainly would appear to be of very considerable consequence to an argument the coherence of which is involved in the choice of one of the three, and is destroyed by the selection of either of the other two.

There are two replies possible to the reasoning based upon the presumption that the event took place at Gadara. We may meet this by the denial that it took place here, or granting that it did take place here, we may deny that the population was exclusively or mainly Gentile, and that, therefore, the keeping of swine was a legitimate occupation. This latter method of reply has been adopted by Mr. Gladstone in his article on the subject in the February number of the Nineteenth Century. He expands at considerable length this reply, enforcing it by the aid of wide reading. At the same time he does not ignore the force of the former reply, viz., the direct denial that Gadara was the scene. As, however, his paper contains but a passing approach to this inquiry, it may prove useful to accentuate this denial. To an unbiased mind the counter-evidence brought forward in this article must appear all but conclusive. With this before us, it seems to me impossible to accept Professor Huxley's contention that Gadara was Gentile in such sort that the swine-owners must themselves have been Gentiles.
But we turn now to the other question. Is there any strong ground for believing that Gadara was not the place where the event occurred?

The evidence from the manuscripts is conflicting. Alford adopts "Gadarenes," "Gergesenes," "Gerasenes," in the three Gospels respectively. The revision of 1881 reads "Gerasenes" in St. Mark and St. Luke, altering "Gergesenes" in St. Matthew into "Gadarenes." Epiphanius read "Gergesenes" in St. Mark and St. Luke, and "Gadarenes" in St. Matthew, adding, however, that "certain copies" of this Gospel had the reading "Gergesenes." The Alexandrine Codex has "Gadarenes" in St. Mark and St. Luke, while the concurrence of the Vatican and Codex Bezae—a combination always to be respected—pleads strongly for "Gerasenes" in those two Gospels. The Sinaitic reading in St. Luke, and, as corrected by its latest hand, in St. Matthew and St. Mark, is "Gergesenes." On the whole, the bias of the great uncial manuscripts appears in favour of "Gadarenes" in the first Gospel, "Gerasenes" or "Gergesenes" in the second and the third. The testimony of the manuscripts is not much assisted by the older versions, these being also divided.¹

In weighing the evidence for a particular reading, every textual student is aware that it is necessary to take into consideration to which side the probability of alteration leans. And the question here is by no means a hopeless one: which of these three contending words is the most likely to have crept into the text? Gadara was an important town, and gave its name to a wide district round. And it is clearly more likely that the better-known than that the less-known of two places should have been substituted for the other. It is harder to believe that, had Gadara been the original word in all the synoptists, Gergesa or Gerasa should have replaced it, than that, Gergesa or Gerasa being found in the original copies, Gadara should have replaced it.

Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the name of no town is mentioned by any one of the Evangelists. The phrase used to describe the locality is in each case a vague and general one—"The country of the Gadarenes," or "the

¹ Professor Huxley has scarcely made sure of his ground in his note on page 456 of the March number of the Nineteenth Century. Without quoting any particular Gospel, he cites Professor Porter, that "the most ancient and credible testimony clearly pronounces in favour of Παραγηγή. This reading is adopted by Tischendorf, Alford, and Tregelles." Does the above evidence amount to so clear a testimony for this reading, while in two out of the three Gospels the "most ancient and credible testimony" pronounces against it? By a similar oversight Professor Porter has misread his editors. He is correct in citing each of the three to the extent of one Gospel out of three. Tischendorf and Tregelles both have Περασηγή in St. Mark and St. Luke.
country of the Gergesenes." Such an expression might cover several villages, or even towns, the principal town dominating in terminology the rest in the district.

Now, modern travellers have discovered a spot on the east side of the Lake of Galilee which exactly meets all the topographical requirements of the narrative, which certainly cannot be said of the site of the town of Gadara itself. Along the eastern side the hills recede to half or three-quarters of a mile from the shore, except at a single spot between Wàdy Fìk and Wàdy Semakh, where they approach within forty yards of it. Here there is no broken cliff, but a steep, even slope. At this spot the mere impetus of a mad rush downwards would suffice to carry the animals into the water. Mr. Macgregor,¹ who carefully examined this part of the shore in his canoe, thus describes the place:

Here for a full half-mile the beach is of a form different from any other round the lake, and from any I have noticed in any lake or sea before. It is flat until close to the edge. There a hedge of oleanders fringes the end of the plain, and immediately below there is a gravel beach inclined so steep that when my boat was at the shore I could not see over the top, even by standing up, while the water alongside is so deep that it covered my paddle (seven feet long) when dipped in vertically a few feet from the shore.

A mile to the north of this spot, at the mouth of Wàdy Semakh, the ruins of an old town may be seen, to which the Bedawin give the name of Khersa or Gersa. The existence of this town was known to Origen, to Eusebius, and to Jerome. Origen, indeed, boldly suggests that Gergesa is the true reading, and though Professor Porter² disparages this as a "mere conjecture," it has commended itself to such authorities as Weiss, Volkmar, Farrar, Tristram, Stanley, Thomson. The last-named traveller, who spent twenty years in the country, makes out a strong case for Gergesa. He writes:

In this Gersa or Obersa we have a position which fulfils every requirement of the narratives, and with a name so nearly resembling that in the Authorised Version of St. Matthew as to be in itself a strong corroboration of the truth of this identification. It is within a few rods of the shore, and a mountain rises directly above it, pierced with tombs. The lake is so near the base of the mountain that the swine, rushing madly down it, could not stop, but would be hurried forward into the water and drowned.³

Dean Stanley's account agrees substantially with Dr. Thomson's, though he inclines to the opinion that the Wàdy Fìk, a little south of the Wàdy Semakh, satisfies the necessities of the history better.

¹ "Rob Roy on the Jordan," p. 424.
Turning now to the site of Gadara, we encounter insuperable topographical difficulties. Accepting Um Keis, on the hills south-east of the lake, as its modern equivalent, we look in vain for the required conditions. The place is sixteen miles from Tiberias, situated near the river Jermuk, the ancient Hieromax. Three hours' stiff walking is needed to cover the ground between the south end of the lake and this spot. How such a place could have been described by St. Luke as "over against Galilee" it is not easy to see, and still less to invest the possessed herd with such powers of endurance as would be needed to carry them down a mountain gorge for an hour and a half, across the deep Jermuk at the bottom, and then, with such remnants of the supernatural impetus as were left them, along a level plain for several miles, in order to reach the lake in which the Gospel narrative requires them to find their grave.

If anyone cares to urge that St. Matthew tells us that the swine were "a good way off from them," and that accordingly we may place them at Gergesa, while retaining Gadara as the scene of the cure of the demoniacs, I can only remind him that according to the Twentieth Article it is not lawful "to expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another;" and that St. Mark informs us that the herd "was there, nigh unto the mountains"—i.e., the mountains where the demoniacs lived; and that St. Luke relates how the townspeople met and conversed with the swineherds in the place where they found Jesus Christ and the men He had healed.

III. The methods by which Professor Huxley endeavours to attach discredit to what he pleases to call "the heathen demonology" of the story before us call for some remark. In treating of the subject he has free recourse to the arts of pleasantry and banter, sheltering himself behind the plea that though "assuredly: ridicule is no test of truth, it is the righteous meed of some kinds of error." We must, however, be allowed to place such appeals to the sense of the ridiculous amongst those "rhetorical artifices" which, he assures us, "have long ceased to take effect" upon men of science.

Such a manner of approaching Scripture cannot be deprecated too strongly. Nothing is easier than to weaken a cause in the eyes of a reader with the slightest prepossession in favour of destructive criticism by turning the laugh against received beliefs; and no expedient is better worn than that of concealing the weakness of one's position by the deftness of

1 "Ἡτίς ἥτιν ἀντιποίναν τῆς Γαλαλαίας.
2 μακρῶν ἀπ' αὐτῶν."
one's use of sarcasm. The "gravity of the problems ultimately involved in the discussion." of this subject, to quote Professor Huxley's own phrase, ought surely to restrain us from the use of these methods in dealing with it.

If the pursuit of science, of which he is so prominent a representative, teaches one thing more than another, it tends to strengthen the conviction of the circumscribed limits within which our researches move. It fosters what we may call a wholesome agnosticism in the scientific sphere. And it has to be noticed that the whole subject of demoniacal possession lies in a plane along which science has made next to no advance. While the physicist tells us much of physical life, and the psychologist tells us less of psychic life, what has either to say that is other than speculative about the links that connect the two, and the laws of action and reaction by which reciprocal influences are maintained between them? And if we are thus ignorant of the nature and working of the laws which govern this union as it exists in ourselves, are we in a position to decide that a spiritual agency, foreign to ourselves, cannot work upon us through the spiritual part of us, which (qua its psychic nature) may be presumed to offer scope for its operation?

It must be admitted that the main difficulty of the story before us is to be found in the action of the devilish nature upon the bestial. But, as Archbishop Trench writes, "perhaps we make to ourselves a difficulty here, too easily assuming that the lower animal world is wholly shut up in itself, and incapable of receiving impressions from that which is above it. This assumption is one unwarranted by deeper investigations, which lead rather to an opposite conclusion—not to a breaking down of the boundaries between the two worlds, but to the showing in what wonderful ways the lower is receptive of impressions from the higher, both for good and for evil." And the same writer adds in a note:

How remarkable in this respect are well-authenticated cases of clairvoyance, in which the horse is evidently, by its terror, extreme agitation, and utter refusal to advance, a partaker of the vision of its rider. With what electric swiftness does the courage or fear of the rider pass into the horse; and so, too, the gladness or depression of its master is almost instantaneously reflected and reproduced in his faithful dog. It is true that we might expect, as we should find, far less of this in the grosser nature of the swine than in those creatures of nobler races. Yet the very grossness of these animals may have been exactly that which best fitted them for receiving such impulses from the lower world as those under which they perished.1

It is to be apprehended that many amongst us who accept

1 Archbishop Trench, "Notes on the Miracles of our Lord," p. 187 (edit. x.).
revelation in its entirety are hardly prepared to regard the personal agency of the spirit-world, that of angels bad or good, as so extensive as the Bible appears to warrant our believing it to be. Herein we have a distinctly personal activity recognized as at work beneath almost everything that affects the condition and course of men through life. Job is afflicted: the Bible lifts the veil, and shows us the agency in operation behind this affliction. His children are killed: the same agency is discovered behind the elements. The Assyrian host lies dead on the plain before Libnah's walls: an angel's hand had done it. St. Paul is troubled with some unknown physical trial—epilepsy, or weak sight, or impaired utterance: in his view this trouble is "an angel of Satan." Other passages need not be added, though these are but few out of many of a like import. And it will not do to say that this angelic agency was part of a miraculous dispensation, and proper to no other. On the contrary, it is represented as running parallel with nature. In fact, we are called upon to hold that there is nothing natural but has the supernatural at its back. Nature is merely the gorgeous drop-scene which hides the real actors from our sight—a drop-scene which may at any moment be lifted, to reveal the mighty drama of the spirit-world playing out its awful rôle.

And, after all, this acceptance of lower spiritual agency is prepared for by the belief in a personal First Cause, if not actually embraced in it. Referring primary causation to a Person, we may, without undue tension upon probability, refer intermediary causation to a similar agency.

We pass now to the points made much of by Professor Huxley—that the belief in demoniacal possession was formed by the Jews in Mesopotamia, and after the Babylonish captivity "completely interpenetrated the Jewish mind, and thus became inseparably interwoven with the fabric of the synoptic Gospels." It is startling to find that so careful a thinker should have fallen into so serious an error of judgment as to take the Gospels to supply a rescript of the popular creed of the day in which they were produced. So far from their teaching coalescing with Jewish modes of thought, that teaching traverses those modes at almost every turn. The first utterances of Jesus Christ, as recorded in St. Matthew's Gospel, astonished His hearers on the ground that He taught with originality and the authority of an original thinker, "and not as the scribes." Every sentence of the Sermon on the Mount is a home-thrust at some popular prejudice or canon of Scripture interpretation. And as time went on it became more and more apparent that, however "completely interpenetrated." with popular conceptions His hearers were, He
Himself was perfectly independent of them, and ready, wherever they prejudiced His mission or obscured His message, to ride roughshod over them. To instance two common errors of the day: a superstitious Sabbatarianism and the lowered conception of the Messiah: how much of the public teaching of our Lord was taken up in combating these. How much of the open opposition which He had to encounter is explained by the tenacity with which the Jews held to these errors? It is clear that in the utterances of Christ there is no servile echo of current sentiments. In place of this there is a remarkable independence of existing modes of thought.

And yet we find distinct references to spiritual agency on the lips of Christ. He spoke of the woman bowed with a spirit of infirmity as "bound by Satan those eighteen years." This expression respecting a suffering woman, who did not fall within the class of strictly-called possessed persons, instructs us to see the dark handiwork of hostile spirits even in the more ordinary of bodily visitations. On the other hand, there are allusions to Satanic dominion over men which imply even a worse thraldom than that of these madmen of Gergesa. Note those portentous passages, here relating to the Twelve Apostles: "Satan asked to have you, that he might sift you as wheat;" there relating to the lost soul of the traitor: "One of you is a devil;" and that later awful statement of the Evangelist, who reclined nearest to Christ and drank deepest of His spirit, in which is described Judas's completed moral and spiritual wreck: "After the sop Satan entered into him." In these cases, though no external mania, no tumultuous frenzy, betrayed the hell that ruled within—though the sound body waited on the sane mind—yet the inner citadel of the spirit had been voluntarily yielded to the foe in unconditional surrender; the man was in reality in worse case than had he been raving in the clutches of demoniac possession. The foe was in his case satisfied to leave him in undisputed keeping of the lower departments of his being, only because he was so sure of his hold upon the higher—his body unleashed, his intellect unmaddened, because he had his heel upon that to which both are subordinate, the soul.

But the transition from the working of evil spirits upon the highest department of man's being to their working on the lower is no violent one. We may expect beforehand that the latter powers would be included in the former. By parity of

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1 St. Luke xiii. 16.
2 Revised Version of St. Luke xxii. 31. The margin even, "obtained you by asking," is warranted by the Greek, ἐξηράνθω σαμία.
3 St. John vi. 70.
4 St. John xiii. 27.
reasoning we find it possible to overstep the barrier between the human and the brute nature. The Creator has put all beasts of the field in subjection under man's feet. Setting his foot upon the most lordly part of the lords of creation, how easy may not the great Adversary find it to subdue to his will the creatures that have been rendered subject to those fallen lords!

As to the objection that belief in demoniacal possession is encountered among all nations, however far sunk in superstition, we have yet to learn that the universality of a tenet's acceptance invalidates that tenet. We have rather leaned towards the persuasion that such elements as all false faiths possess in common may be reasonably regarded as survivals of a primeval revelation, and that accordingly the characteristic of universality in any given belief affords at least some presumption of its truth, rather than any confirmation of its falsity.

ALFRED PEARSON.

ART. II.—GENUINENESS AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE BOOK OF DANIEL.

(Concluded from page 480.)

HAVING fulfilled the task of tracing the pedigree of the witnesses on both sides of the disputed question, we proceed to examine the minor points of evidence in the same order as before. Those of an external character claim our first notice.

1. The place which the Book of Daniel occupies in the Hebrew canon. It has been shown that the Scriptures of the Old Testament were divided into three classes—the Law, the Prophets, and the Holy Writings; and that Daniel was not reckoned, as we should have supposed, in the second, but in the third class, and that this is a proof of a depreciation of the value of the book. The reasons that have been adduced to account for this arrangement are various. It is urged that Daniel was not officially a prophet; but this would have excluded Amos also, who tells us that he was neither a prophet nor the son of a prophet. Again, it is advanced that Daniel was an interpreter of visions and dreams, and not a prophet in the strict sense of the word; and many modern critics are of opinion that the subjective character of the book is more suited to a place among the "holy writings" than among the