

# BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

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## ARTICLE I.

### THE LOGIC OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE.

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WHEN the last trench has been dug and the last gun fired, when the U-boats cease from troubling, and attention is turned from counsels of destruction to those of restoration, will the Entente nations find themselves in possession of any definite policy for the shaping of their future? or, are they doomed to a succession of events similar to that which, through the last hundred years, conducted Europe, step by step, from the Congress of Vienna to the disruption of 1914? To put it in another way, Are we, the People, whose battles are now in progress, so setting our house in order that we shall enter the period of reconstruction with a well-considered plan, or are we simply "drifting"?—becoming ever a little more bewildered as we approach the most critical period of all?

#### I.

Both sides of this antithesis are represented in current thought. There are those who, either from a pessimistic habit of mind or from sheer discouragement, persistently shut their eyes on what they declare to be a hopeless outlook; and, on the other hand, there are those who think they see something better in the future,—something that may legitimately

inspire hope, and give us, at least, an object to live for. There is a widespread conviction, a mingling of feeling and belief, that radical changes are awaiting us as the outcome of this war, that the international relations of society are to be made over, and that the several states of the world hitherto antagonizing each other will, by some means, be brought into more vital coöperation.

This general idea has been shadowed forth or explicitly stated in a great variety of ways; — tentatively in The Hague Conferences, theoretically in the different associations for the promotion of peace and world order. It can hardly be called a policy, it is too indefinite; and, as an ideal, it stirs men neither by its novelty nor by its promise of easy realization, — “A parliament of man, a federation of the world”! It has an antiquated sound. It has long reposed in the curiosity shop of things once cherished and lovingly stored, and it is now recalled only in default of anything else that can meet the emergency.

What, then, do we get out of this consensus? Not indeed a proof, but the establishment of a claim to attention, and a presumption. It indicates that experience, the logic of events, converges, in the mentality of many thoughtful men, to practically the same issue. And, if we interrogate this issue from the world-process point of view, it is abundantly indorsed.

Everything points to it as the next great advance in orthogenic evolution. In a general way, because every step upward, in the process at large, has been in the line of more complete, more inclusive organization; and specifically, because the history of human society in all its successive stages embodies and emphasizes this law. The whole trend of civilization, moral, economical, and social, is towards it, and it offers for credentials unimpeachable precedents. The forma-

tion of the United States by the union of thirteen mutually antagonistic colonies is, in its main features, almost a parallel case. It is therefore easily apprehended, eminently attractive, and full of sweet reasonableness.

Why then, we have to ask, do all the peace conferences, from those of The Hague downward, end so feebly? After a flow of good counsels, why is the stream swallowed up, as it were, in a desert of negations and futilities? A careful analysis of the situation would undoubtedly supply a multitude of answers to this question, each with a grain of truth, but, withal, throwing little light upon the subject; and it is not our object to darken counsel with words. Practically, the great obstacle to progress has been the reluctance of the several states to consider seriously the creation of a central tribunal with *power behind it*. Whenever The Hague conferences have approached this thorny part of the subject they have passed by on the other side; and when the less responsible bodies of our peace-and-order leagues have taken it up, the result has been a no-thoroughfare question. The proposition discussed has been, not, How can peace be promoted, but, How can it be enforced? and about this the difficulties have piled themselves up, like great drifts.

In the *Atlantic Monthly* for August, 1915, there appeared a critical review of some of these, which commends itself by its candor and thoroughness.<sup>1</sup> The numerous suggestions hitherto made for the prevention of war by international agreements are noted with respectful consideration; and over against these are set down the difficulties that seem to render them impossible. The *impasse* is summed up something as follows: All analogical suggestions derived from courts of law, federal compacts, or leagues of mutual support, while

<sup>1</sup> "Questions for Pacifists," by Gen. H. M. Chittenden.

theoretically attractive, lead necessarily to a consideration of the means by which the awards of the contemplated court could be carried into effect: and immediately, a host of impracticabilities spring up to block the way. The following is a condensed list of some of these as given by General Chittenden:—First, an international police force being an indispensable agency of such a league, how would such a force be made up? If of already organized units, — vessels of war, regiments, and so forth, — contributed by the several states, there would be the complicated question of command, with its fruitful sources of friction. Second, “On whom would such a force rely for munitions of war and all the vast equipment necessary to make it efficient? To whom would it look for funds? If dependent on contributions and without power to enforce, its existence would be precarious. Where would be its rendezvous, or base of operations? Surely not scattered among the different States and no State would consent that it be located in any other.”

Now, however these and other equally difficult questions (some of them strikingly set forth in the Senate speech of Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, February 1, 1917) are answered, or left unanswered, one thing is manifest. A league to enforce peace precludes the realization of the most cherished part of the original scheme; that is, the reduction of armaments. I can see no way of extricating ourselves from these difficulties, so long as we occupy our chosen point of view — the point, that is, of canvassers of a hypothetical future in which all the factors have absolutely free play. In such a field, there being no subordination through necessity, no forceful pressure of limitations, there is a hopeless deadlock. In other words, we can never think the thing out beforehand. But there is another point of view. If we cannot

solve the problem by direct frontal attack, we may find a way of getting inside the lines.

The fact is, we are already inside. The problem is no longer a purely speculative one. It is in process of solution by very real factors. That which, for some years antecedent to the war, was known as the *Entente Cordiale*, a pact between Russia, France, and England for the preservation of the peace of Europe, is, if I mistake not, the very thing that has been so ineffectually sought, it is this very thing in an advanced stage of development. It has passed through the earlier stages of a league to *preserve* peace, and is now in the throes of a league of colossal proportions to enforce it. In its first rôle it was a failure. In its second it is moving heaven and earth to retrieve that failure, — to restore, if possible, a peace lost through the inadequacy of its safeguards.

There are two ways of forecasting the future of this movement. One is severely business-like, paying little heed to the ideal inspirations that actuate men. The other sees in these powerful and abiding incentives. Both are true and useful, but each without the other is sorely deficient, — a thing that goes on crutches. To understand the height and breadth and depth of the *Entente Cordiale* one must idealize it. Looking beyond what it is, we must take a firm grip upon that which it is capable of becoming: we must recognize the fact that we have in it a magnetic center, the living principle of a growing coöperation, the potency of an ever-increasing enthusiasm, giving to collective humanity something worthy of its highest allegiance, and to the individual the inspiring consciousness of contributing to the achievement of great things. There is about it, even now, with all its imperfections, a foreshadowed sublimity that bids fair to surpass anything that has hitherto

emerged from modern conditions. Its heroic sacrifices, its splendid restraints, its outbursts of loyalty, its steadfastness in the face of reverses,—these aspects of it we are beginning to see and to feel, and in the days to come they may be the themes of our poets and composers.

But it has also its natural history,—its plain, halting, inadvertent history. Like Abraham, it went forth not knowing whither it went. It was the outcome, so far as its framers were concerned, of very mixed motives. When it began, in 1891, as the dual alliance between France and Russia, it carried a totally different meaning to the people of the French Republic and to the Czar of Russia. To the former it was the acquisition of a powerful ally for revenge, and for the recovery of Alsace; to the latter a coalition for the support of The Hague policy of disarmament. And when, some years later, this was made known, the disappointment of France was so profound that her interest in it dropped to a very low ebb. England, joining this pact in 1904, created the Triple Entente. But her differences with France, always aggravated by Germany, made it a practically lifeless thing until 1911, when the Agadir incident waked the dreamers to the portents of the situation.

Then, indeed, it became alive. Russia, France, and England grew together, became increasingly *one* in understanding and purpose. The Entente was *beginning* to have a soul. Its immediate objects, broadly stated, were to insure peace by preserving the equilibrium of the great European Powers, and, specifically, to form an adequate combination against the threatened aggressions of Germany. Its impelling motive was the conviction that, otherwise, the events of 1866 and 1870 were about to be reenacted on a far grander scale.

There is nothing particularly high about these motives.

They did, it is true, bring into play a large measure of self-restraint, they substituted an attitude of friendship for one of enmity. But the Allies did not rush together because they loved each other. They were driven together by mutual necessity, by the pooling of self-interests that had, under other circumstances, pitted them against each other. In short, the Entente was the result of coercion. It was brought about by the stress of circumstances just as really as the unity of the German Confederation was brought about by the personal sagacity and force of a great statesman. It was, in fact, a reaction from this. In his admirable book, published just before the war, Mr. W. Morton Fullerton says of Bismarck: "He did more than create an approximately united Germany, he destroyed Europe,"<sup>1</sup> — a very true description of the more immediate effects of the policy of blood and iron. But, in the light of subsequent development, it tells only half the story. In uniting Germany by force, Bismarck, at the same time, united all the rest of Europe against Germany and against the fallacies for which the German Empire stands. Not, indeed, at once, but gradually, by the inexorable logic of events.

## II.

The most important aspect of the Entente is its unquestionable reality. It is not simply one of the things dreamed about as desirable. It is a growing, strength-accumulating entity, with power behind it. Let us not forget what it has already done. Had it not been for the solid, unflinching resistance of Belgium, France, Russia, and England in 1914, we should have had a speedily subjugated France, a Russia forced to grant every concession, the Balkan States, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia practically added to the German

<sup>1</sup> *Problems of Power*, p. 30.

Empire, and all the expenses of the operation taken out of the conquered nations.

Lost opportunity, ever looming larger, and infinite forebodings of humiliations yet to come would have sullied the past and haunted the future of every man, woman, and child, not too busy, or too shallow, to think. To have been doomed to slavery under such masters! The shame of it, the humiliation of it, the long-drawn-out, hopeless misery of it! Do we begin to imagine what we have escaped?

Nor is this the full measure of our indebtedness to the Entente. Besides interposing itself as a living barrier against a world calamity, it has supplied to our civilization, in its direst need, a moral precedent of incalculable value. I am not now referring to the enthusiasm of sacrifice, corporate and individual, which has of itself been an inspiration to the world; but to the persistence of loyalty, the whole-souled subordination of all interests to *one purpose*. It was the union not only of the resources and activities of the Entente nations, but a welding together of their sympathies. Their distrust of each other was dissipated, their antipathies atrophied, their fixed antagonisms memories. The logic of events had opened new vistas, new possibilities of living and working together. As Mr. Sydney Brooks puts it, "Less than fifteen years ago, England and France were scowling at one another from Newfoundland to Madagascar with every symptom of rancorous hatred. Less than eight years ago England and Russia had between them the barrier of their insensate past. Today, all three of these countries are united in an alliance that will bear, I say it deliberately, any and every strain."

Like everything else pertaining to this war, the whole of this statement is so amazing that we cannot get used to it.

But it is particularly the concluding affirmation that holds our attention and gives us pause. Is it possible, we ask, that a coalition, flung together by stress of circumstance as this has been, can be counted upon to stand "any and every strain"?

It is not, indeed, so difficult to believe that, as an anti-German pact, it may hold together for the accomplishment of its anti-German purposes. For the cohesive forces acting within it have been so constantly reinforced from without by the German methods of conducting the war, that its rupture seems less and less possible. But, when the external pressure is taken off, when the comparatively simple work of destruction has come to an end, will this composite power of the Entente be equal to the work of reorganization? Having suppressed the wonderful nation that, fresh from the problem of organizing itself, has essayed the inclusion of the rest of the world in its synthesis, can the Allied Powers, acting collectively, give to Europe, or to any group of its great nations, an order that no one of them has ever been able to realize for itself? Will they not be somewhat in the predicament of the child who, having taken his mechanical toy apart, would like to know how to put it together again? It does indeed seem so; and the seeming continues just so long as we keep our attention fixed on the particular kind of organism that Germany is.

The matter can be seen correctly only when we adjust ourselves to the fact that the one kind of unity possible to the Entente nations is of an entirely different order from that achieved by Germany, — different in its scope, in its ideals, in its methods, and radically different in its tendencies. It is the difference that separates absolutism from liberalism. That is, it probes to the very heart of the whole matter.

It is not that liberalism and absolutism are unqualified opposites. This they certainly are not. The former is a composite entity, an amalgam, so to speak, of rights and obligations, of liberty and control. It is at present in process of finding itself; and, like so many other isms of our day, exists in very different stages of development in different minds. Men are asking, What is socialism? What is the nation? What is Christianity? What is religion? and we may well ask, What is liberalism? for a true understanding of the combination of qualities involved in an ideal liberalism will go far toward the answer of kindred questions. During the last century, liberalism has been passing through the embryonic stages of a veritable metamorphosis; and each stage has been regarded by people more impressionable than thoughtful as the final one. To divest one's self of this idea of finality is a prerequisite for its enlightened study. For, necessarily, when we regard one stage, one phase of a developing thing as the whole of it, we fail to grasp its reality. Not, that the half truth, working quite by itself, is altogether mischievous. It has its most important part to play in evolution. It is the awakener, the compeller of attention, the inspirer. The messages of the great poets and seers that rouse men out of the lethargy of commonplace, decadent lives, abound in half truths, which owe much of their efficiency to their separation from the other half with which they have to work in harness. The world could ill spare the independent, insistent energizing of these one-sided ideas. Men will not be enthusiastic about that which they *recognize* as a half truth. For the present it must represent the whole truth, *the saving truth*.

The idea of liberty began its career as a very slightly clothed half truth. It was at first little more than a negative

idea, that is, freedom from restraint. The thirteen American colonies, the nucleus of the United States, were coerced by dire necessity into admitting just so much of the hated element of control as would presumably enable them to work together. When, however, the Articles of Confederation proved insufficient, they moved on to the formation of the Constitution, and liberalism had taken definite shape. In France the half truth expressed itself as Liberty, Fraternity, Equality. And so nearly was this formula held to be the *whole* truth that revolution after revolution had to be experienced before it could make any workable compromise with the other half. Of its first experiment in the art of self-government, the Constitution of 1791, Hazen says: "The administrative decentralization was so complete that the efficiency of the national government was gone. France was split up into eighty-three fragments. . . . Mirabeau expressed his opinion in saying that the disorganization of the kingdom could not be better worked out."<sup>1</sup>

What seems to be going on in the world is a gradual change of proportion between two kinds of motivity. Periods of absolute rule tend to grow shorter, are interregnums between the more enduring ones of liberalism; while liberalism, on every return to ascendancy, shows itself stronger, steadier, more self-restrained, more wisely constructive and with longer looks into the future. We must never forget that the world is moving, — that, after one of these marked periods of reaction and recovery, society does not settle back into the old grooves. Ideas that were the certitudes of liberalism a few years ago have become, in some cases, the cast-off clothes of its present. It has passed into and through

<sup>1</sup>Charles Downer Hazen, *The French Revolution and Napoleon*, p. 141.

and out of cycles not only of political misconceptions, but also of economical crazes that have made necessary new theories of control and brought about changes that give it a far stronger basis to build upon.

Nor is it less true that our *bête noir*, absolutism, appears to us in many guises, — some of them savingly beneficent. There is the absolutism of early development, the absolutism of recuperation and discipline, and there is also the absolutism lustful of inordinate power, which is a disease. In none of its forms is absolutism quite at ease with itself, but shows intermittent leanings toward its rival. Each of these two learns something from the other. Each envies at times the specific characteristics of the other, and would be glad to borrow: absolutism the elasticity of liberalism, and liberalism the unity of purpose and decisiveness of absolutism. To discover a political system that shall unite these two in such manner that each shall restrain and at the same time reinforce the other has been the very partially attained ideal of political philosophers: and for even this partial attainment we have, for the most part, to thank the buffeting of events.

One of the most obstructive agencies in this matter has been the misleading appearance of finality that each of these principles, when in the ascendant, brings to bear upon the imagination. Each is capable, in its day, of inspiring a state of great exhilaration and energy. Each is a stimulant of high potency; and when men are powerfully under the influence of the one, buoyant in the success it has generated, the other is apt to be hated as its negation. The thought of helpfully uniting the two has hardly a chance until it is forced upon the attention by some unavoidable choice between two evils. Let us clearly recognize the fact that the ultimate and most worthy object of this war is not to expel from the

world the principle of control, nor, on the other hand, to establish in perpetuity any particular phase of liberty that the importunate present may demand, but the achievement of such a union of these two that they will be strong to withstand and divert into life-giving channels the restless energy of man. This is the ideal liberalism toward which we seem to be moving.

The bearing of this examination of liberalism on the stability of the Entente, which is its concrete expression, is not far to seek. Liberalism is essentially synthetic. It stands for a goodly number of words that begin with *co*: combination, coöperation, coördination, coherence, continuity, consolidation, and some others. It is a growing, energizing principle that has sprung into existence between the two extremes of absolutism and radicalism. It brings wandering half truths into vital relations to each other, and makes sections of the people, hitherto opposed, think together, and act together. It is, in the long run, the vanquisher of both the above-mentioned extremes, into which it strikes its roots, gradually breaking down and absorbing them; for, with all their appearance of unity and at times of strong organization, these are always tending to dissolution because their inner principle is separateness.

This is more evidently the case with radicalism, because the ends of its adventures are usually so much nearer the beginnings. Its aims are never intelligently constructive, but always opposed to the existing social order. It is at the mercy of exploiters, who lead it blindfold, in mad rushes, to its undoing. Its helpful function in the body politic has been almost wholly that of a counter irritant — its stimulation of the vital forces of a too easy-going and too readily satisfied liberalism.

The unstable element in absolutism is not so readily apprehended; but for that very reason it is more interesting. One of its great sources of weakness is its artificiality. Liberalism has been shaped by the interplay of the most variant social forces, modifying, stimulating, and educating each other, while absolutism is the rigid outcome of one will, one set of interests, one line of success which under modern conditions becomes ever more circumscribed, after a short though it may be a brilliant career. Nothing about the hitherto little known German Empire of our day has been more distinctly a revelation than the fact that, in so far as it has passed under the spell of Prussia, it is an intellectual serfdom, that all its thoughts, all its views of itself and of its relations to the rest of the world, are artificial products, superinduced upon and bred into a whole people by a system that owns and tyrannizes over every one of them, in the interests of a diseased individualism—the individualism of an autocracy expanded into that of a nation, and kept alive by a uniformity of training that resembles mechanism. German unity was not the product of a natural development, nor can it have the life and adaptability of nature. It was carefully thought out and put in commission, not by the people, but by the blood and iron of Bismarck. The other kind, the natural kind, was not suited to the Prussian autocracy.

The phenomena of hypnotism supply us with the most helpful analogy for comprehending its nature. The crime against personality is the same in both cases. The chief difference is that ordinary hypnotism is only temporary, while that of the state has to be made permanent. For dynastic purposes it was not sufficient that all the people should be fooled some of the time or that some of the people should be fooled all the time. All of the people must be

fooled all of the time; and, to achieve this, it became necessary for the state to resolve itself into a laboratory for the production of hypnotic insanity on a large scale, by a process called *Kultur*.

The process worked admirably for a time. Both the hypnotizers and the hypnotized were proud of it, though it involved sacrifices. They lived in a new world, believed themselves to be the exalted ones of the earth and all others its refuse. Their Kaiser was the representative of God. They were the super-race, the world's masters. Old things had passed away. The sober days when they regarded other men as their equals, when such commonplace virtues as good faith, gentleness, and kindness were highly esteemed, when they delighted to honor the intellectual superiority of their philosophers, poets, and composers, as if it constituted their chief claim to distinction,—these things had passed like the dreams of childhood, and in their place had come the new era of manly consciousness, the knowledge of their true greatness. Shining armor was the symbol of the new, the dreamy stoop of the professor that of the old.

But the end was not yet. In the running of a great falsehood, it is not the first steps that cost. It is where the falsehood has to adjust itself successively to new aspects of truth that difficulties thicken. The Prussian laboratory had great skill in adjusting its forms of insanity to a shifting environment; but matters became complicated. The basic hallucination, that of national greatness, was not yet an accomplished fact on which the Hohenzollern could lie down and rest. It was a thing of vast promises to be redeemed at the expense of the prospective beneficiaries. This, it is true, had been foreseen, and a belief in sacrifice for the state as the supreme virtue of man had been bred into the brain tissue of the

German people with a thoroughness that left nothing to be desired.

Nor was this all. When the lure of the future seemed to be growing a little dim, it was powerfully reinforced by the loom of impending danger. A glorious future was before the German people if they unreservedly sacrificed themselves; but, on the other hand, a dreadful fate if they did not. The envious, blood-thirsty nations that hemmed them in were already conspiring for their subjugation. It was admirably contrived, but with an embarrassing accumulation of mendacity. The nation was frenzied with the pressure of the forces it had called into being. There was no going back. *Forward* was the word. The time had come for the realization of the dream. Again the laboratory of lies was equal to the occasion. The war on which they were entering was to be a short one, — a military frolic, or, for those who preferred it, orgie. "The wines are good down there," they said. And so they went forth in their bravery of outfit and valor, — the German armies and their lies together, to find out the truth, to pound it out on the unyielding shores of a continent that they had taken to be a fog bank.

The Entente! How different the reality from the appearance! A league of peaceful nations, having no desire for conquest, no dream of grandeur to make good, but sternly willing to face the truth. What is the secret of the strength of these unwarlike nations? One word expresses it — *coöperation*, the very reverse of the ideal of Germany, which is isolation. To a Prussianized Germany the conception of a state that unites itself with other states on a basis of reciprocity and mutual limitation is *anathema maranatha*. Not that Germany is willing to let other nations alone, but that its only mode of union with them is that of absorption. It

approves the Utopian scheme in which the lion shall lie down with the lamb, but the lamb must be inside the lion. The liberalized nations are not, at bottom, antagonistic to each other. They do not affect to despise each other. They can tolerate the idea of a sovereign power above the family of nations to regulate and coördinate its diverse tendencies, and this is their strength.

### III.

The more attentively we study the situation, the more clearly we shall see that the very diversities of the Entente allies that appear, at first sight, to disqualify them for coalition are, in reality, their qualifying characteristics. The partial separateness of their interests, their heterogeneity, their former antagonisms, their empirical grouping,—it is just these apparent handicaps that are needed to offset and control the centripetal tendencies sure to follow the establishment of a strong central power. It is the mutual limitation of variant forces, not the obliteration of differences, that insures a strong organization.

In a valuable article in the *Hibbert Journal* (July, 1915), the author, Mr. I. T. R. Marriott, says that, whatever may be the outcome of this conflict, "it is undeniable that it has revealed in its fullness and completeness the majesty of the omnipotent State." May we not add that it has *elevated* the ideal of the state to a position never before occupied save in the aspirations of a few impracticable dreamers? For a wonderful illustration of the efficiency of state deification we have to thank the Prussians. But for the elevation of the ideal of the state to a higher stage of evolution we have to thank the coalition of the Entente. It is just this ideal of the worshipful state, enlarged and glorified, to which we

must look for the cohesive principle that shall make all nations to be of one family. It is not a new principle. On its lower ranges we call it patriotism, on its higher, toward which we are moving, we have no name for it, because the words that might have been used have been specialized. But may we not call it, and perhaps more helpfully than by another name, *the higher patriotism*? The overstate transcends the governments of the separate nationalities as that of the Federal Government of the United States transcends those of its individual members,—not to their weakening, but to their fuller realization. Its broader interests are not antagonistic to theirs. Their strength is its strength, and its strength is their strength. Increasing allegiance on the part of the diverse members, each supplying in its aptitudes and outlooks something that is needful for the whole, enriches and consolidates the whole.

This, I take it, is the meaning, more or less undefined, of all our leagues for effecting a limited control of the several states of the world by a central tribunal established by the consent of all. And the value of these various leagues is threefold. Firstly, they express, intensify, and disseminate the conviction that some such tribunal is the demand of the crisis through which we are passing, they make the thought of it familiar, put our imaginations in training for it, turn us from the separateness of purely national interests and compel attention to those of the common welfare. Secondly, they help to dispose of many questions and misconceptions that inevitably rise to block the way of such a radical innovation; and, thirdly, they gradually open men's eyes to apprehend the magnitude of the revolution in human affairs that the resistance of the Entente nations to the powers of darkness has inaugurated.

But as to the *organization* of a permanent tribunal. That must be attended to *by the Entente*, in the due order of public business.

When the fighting has come to an end, we shall find ourselves living under a new *régime*, a *régime* embodying authority and power and the wisdom of experience. The *Entente Tribunal* will have entered on the initial stage of its existence. It is not a brand-new organization summoned from the vasty deep of conflicting views for the formulation of specific agreements governing the international relations of a future about which we have only a speculative knowledge. The snare such a scheme lays for us is most ably set forth in the speech of Senator Lodge, already referred to.

The nations of the Entente will have formed a council of provisional government that will meet the requirements of each exigency as it arises. This council will be composed of men representing the Entente as a *whole*, men accustomed to work together, and to see things from the standpoint of its solidarity. May we not believe that such men, chosen by the natural selection of events, may be trusted to call to their assistance the best ability in every department; thus giving the people of all the nations confidence that the interests of the future will be neither compromised, on the one hand, nor neglected on the other?

The Entente, if it conquer, will find itself with a most difficult work of readjustment on its hands. It will be in possession of great power and commensurate responsibility, which it must exercise as a unit. It cannot abdicate the one nor by any means shirk the other. It is the Entente that has achieved peace, and it is the Entente that remains the one hope of the world for retaining it in the higher interests of humanity. In the prosecution of the war, the allied states

have been forced, separately, very high up on the scale of autocracy, and, in the return to normal conditions, they must collectively retain and make use of that power. They may, in this respect, be compared to a man who has had to climb for his life up the perpendicular front of a ragged cliff to escape submersion by a tidal wave. When the water has receded, a return to the level from which he started has to be executed with great care. It is not simply a matter of getting down—that in itself is not difficult. He has simply to let go his hold, and gravitation will do the rest. The problem is how to return without detriment. He must test each foothold and each handclutch in such a manner that there shall be no breaking away underneath and no dislodgment of the cliff above him.

So the representatives of the Entente in the days of reconstruction will be constrained to descend from their height of power gradually, testing each step of the way; and, if those whom they represent, the people of the loyal nations, are wise, they will, though eager to return to ante-bellum freedom, restrain their impatience. And, furthermore, they will see that the post-bellum reconstruction cannot be the mere repetition of the conditions out of which they drifted into the war, that it must contain elements of restraint then lacking, and that its aims throughout must be vastly higher, if they would avoid falling back into a situation worse than that in which the war found them.

If any one questions the truth of these representations, I would advise reading the account of the Provisional Government of the National Defense, during the Paris Commune of 1871,<sup>1</sup> carrying along with this a running study of what has been transpiring in Russia since the abdication of the

<sup>1</sup>See Hazen, *Europe Since 1815*, chap. xv.

late Czar, and still further supplementing these by a knowledge of what the *radical* Socialists of this country, under the leadership of such men as Hillquit and Berger, are doing to undermine the constructive work of the Entente. The majority report of the convention of the Socialist party in St. Louis, in April, branded the declaration of war by our Government as a crime against the people of the United States and against the nations of the world, and pledged the convention to continuous, active, and public opposition to the war. While we are keenly alive to the danger of the open foe in front of us and fighting it for dear life, we must not forget that we are constantly menaced by a more insidious enemy in our rear,—one that is represented in all the nations, and using the liberty and protection afforded by the more liberal ones for cultivating sedition and disintegration.

The future of Germany, under favorable conditions, seems to me far less problematical than that of this widely-disseminated and inflammable radicalism, whose exploiters use the names *liberty* and *democracy* for the most nefarious purposes. We have good reason to believe that a liberated Germany will work out its own salvation. For the present it has an hypnotized solidarity. But that will vanish with the Prussian sword. Underneath its glamour of greatness and its swagger of invincibility, may we not believe that Imperial Germany still hides a sanity that needs only the lifting of the Hohenzollern spell to become the continuation of an illuminating and inspiring past? About seventy years ago the real Germany was expressing itself in the Parliament of Frankfort. This was a representative body, chosen from all the states of the German *Bund* by manhood suffrage. It embraced many eminent men. Its deliberations extended over more than a

year's time; and, as its outcome, it presented to Frederick William IV. a scheme of constitutional government, with the proposition that Prussia should become its sponsor and administrator. But the Hohenzollern would have none of it. Prussia coveted the position, but it would not receive it with the restraints of a limited monarchy attached or as a gift from the people. It would accept nothing short of absolute power. And this it achieved by military subjugation and the transformation of the ideals of a whole people.

Just as the magnificent visions of the French Revolution were lost sight of in the Napoleonic craze for glory, so the wholesome, sane aspirations for a Germany, united by a liberty-fostering government, were captured by Bismarck. But as the ideals of France survived the temporary eclipse, so Germany, replete with a suppressed passion for national freedom, may, under the guidance of responsible leaders, become a potent factor in the Higher International that is to be. The inherent, upward-pressing principle of liberty, after a period of great overturnings, may be capable of revitalizing the German mind in a way that would be impossible to any influence, or set of influences, working only from the outside.

Not, that the Entente does work wholly from the outside, or antagonistically to the genius of the German mind. Its inmost soul is benignity. There is a magic touch in its contact, a vitalizing breath in the spirit that emanates from it. Its very name inspires,—*Entente Cordiale*. "Peace on Earth, Good Will to Men." A mingled baptism of fire and regeneration, a casting down of obstructions and a building of a highway for the nations. Men, with all their inventive forethought, could never have contrived such a thing as this. But one day they awake to find themselves living under it,

and gradually they come to the consciousness that its coördinating power is a well-established, growing reality that is capable of bringing to pass the apparently impossible; that it is a boon of inestimable value, that it demands from us at the present time and hereafter our supreme devotion and loyalty; and this, not alone for what it can do for the nations collectively in the promotion of order, but for what it can do for the soul of every well-disposed man who lives under its influence. "United we stand, divided we fall," — racially, nationally, individually. We become our true selves only as we unite organically with our fellow men. And in this blessed *Entente Cordiale* we are for the first time really and permanently uniting.

Permanently? Yes, and as regards this, there are just two things more that seem to me worth saying because our *faith* in the Entente is such a vital matter, and at the same time so open to attack. Not simply from the rumors that now and again come to us of the likelihood of a separate peace, but, worse than these, from the abiding misgiving that haunts us when we think of the fate of other alliances that have promised great things, — that, notably, of one hundred years ago, called "Holy"! What is to prevent our Entente from becoming an equally vain thing? — a question that requires a book rather than the concluding paragraphs of an essay to answer. The thing that seems to me worth saying is this.

The "Holy Alliance" was the work of one man — Alexander I. of Russia, — and the expression of only one mood of that one man. It had no root in the convictions or desires of the other crowned signatories, whose real intentions were outlined in a nearly contemporary document, of sinister import, called the "Quadruple Alliance." And what is true of this is true of all the other compacts of that day. The

personal element controls everything: the note of ownership, of business transactions, of bargains between sovereigns, is dominant. "*L'État c'est moi*," said Louis XIV. "I am the French Revolution," said Napoleon. The conferences between Alexander of Russia and Napoleon at Tilsit and Erfurt read as if these two men were the only ones to be considered in the arrangement of Europe. The Congress of Vienna was characterized by a contemporary as a "cattle market"; and its center was again one man — Metternich.

There could hardly be a more pronounced contrast to this than the alliance of the Entente — *not* the conception nor the work of one man, but a *growth*, in which the convictions, the principles, and the aspirations of great bodies of the people of diverse languages, have, after years of incubation, found consciousness and expression. The one is a fragile thing that may be shattered by a signal defeat. The other is a tree with a vigorous root-system that can survive all the reverses that affect its visible outgrowths. Promising branches may be broken off and it is a foregone conclusion that some of its developments will be other than those we have foreseen. But the root-system has come to stay. Francis Bacon said of prophecy, "It hath springing and germinant accomplishments." So also hath the Entente. It is a Gospel written in events. It is a revelation that surprises us at every step by evoking unaccustomed meanings from groups of facts with which we have long been in unresponsive familiarity. Its sources of inspiration lie very deep.

The other observation that seems to me worth while is closely related to what was said in the earlier part of this article about *tendency* and the important part that the study of it should play in any attempted forecast of the future.

The Entente is the creation and the *embodiment* of that

liberalism that has wrought such transformations for good in the separate states in which it has grown up and that, in these later days, has entered upon a higher international stage of its career. The two are the soul and body of one reality. A pregnant fact! for it permits us to supplement our logic of probabilities with a pragmatic confirmation. Liberalism has a past. If we want its credentials we have only to look into the record of the century which lies between the Congress of Vienna and our own time.

One hundred years ago the French Revolution had apparently spent its force. Absolutism controlled everything.<sup>1</sup> And now, at the end of a century, what are its assets? Notwithstanding its possession at the outset of all the wealth, all the armies, all the strongholds, all the prestige, backed by the consummate skill, first of Metternich and then of Bismarck, there is nothing to show but isolation, failure, the impending disruption of two of its foremost exponents, while the third, in the process of liberalization, is leagued, heart and soul, with the Entente in a struggle to free itself, now and forever, from the toils of its age-long evil genius. Under the most favorable circumstances, despotism has had its supreme opportunity; and the logic of events has demonstrated that the type of civilization which it represents has none of the characteristics of a true development. On the other hand, liberalism, crushed to earth at the beginning of the century, without power, without leadership, discredited by its excesses, with all the material forces and diplomatic skill of Europe massed against it, comes before us in this present year of our Lord as the great organizer, the experienced administrator, the pioneer into realms of political and

<sup>1</sup> "England remained a land of the old régime until 1832" (Hazen, *Europe Since 1815*, p. 410).

social regeneration that have hitherto been the despair of its idealism. The contrast between what has appeared on the surface and what has been growing like a coral island underneath, is all the more striking when contrasted with the spectacular, dazzling constructions of Prussia.

It has always been easy to demonstrate the inevitable collapse of liberalism from the assumed premises of absolutism; and at every setback in the career of one of its representatives the inevitable is declared to have arrived. But, after a temporary submergence, it is there again breasting the waves with a new vigor. To those out of sympathy with it, each new advantage scored is attributed to the luck of its "happy-go-lucky policy." But when we try to estimate the meaning of the long train of a century's vicissitudes triumphant, there is a strong suggestion of

"a divinity that shapes our ends,  
Rough-hew them how we will."

It seems, indeed, to be a manifestation of the great creative mystery of nature, into which man has been woven as a consciously coöperating factor. And, contrasted with it, all the clever schemes of absolutism with their carefully thought-out adjustments and clearly foreseen issues, seem no more than a skillful piece of human mechanism.

*"I will bring the blind by a way that they know not: I will lead them in paths that they have not known: I will make darkness light before them and crooked things straight. These things will I do unto them and not forsake them"* (Isaiah xlii. 15).