

ARTICLE IV.

NEGATIVE CRITICISM OF DESTRUCTIVE CRITICS.

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INTRODUCTION.

AFTER study of the humanities at Amherst College I had theological studies during 1886-89 at Chicago Theological Seminary. There I became acquainted with Wellhausen's hypothesis as to the origins of Hebrew literature and with the naturalistic theory of the evolution of Israel's faith. I acquired no technical qualifications, such as those of theological experts or Old Testament specialists, for dealing with these problems. But for thirty years I kept in touch with scholars' discussions and read the works of the radical and of the conservative school. Perhaps my experience and conclusions may prove helpful to others.

The daring and brilliancy of the radical criticism, the plausibleness of its processes, their seeming science, and the supposed success in removing stumbling blocks appealed to me. The reconstruction of the story of regal Rome by Niebuhr and his successors, the rewriting of oldest Hellenic history by Grote and his followers, the recovery of the lost history and culture of Chaldea, Egypt, and Persia, made it a reasonable presumption that the traditional reading of the origins of Israel and its literature and religion was susceptible of similar restatement. But I was aware of the experience that scholarship had had with Baur's hypothesis as to the

primitive church, and with Wolf's theory as to the Iliad and the Odyssey. I remembered that neither had stood the test of time, and that the same fate might befall Wellhausen. I applied Aristotle's principle to the radical reconstruction of Israel's history. I held judgment in suspense. I decided to delay decision until more material for settling the problem of the Old Testament had accumulated, until time had tested the latest hypothesis, until external evidence and objective proof satisfactorily supplemented internal evidence and individual judgments by destructive critics.

About 1895, Hugh M. Scott, professor of history at Chicago Theological Seminary, publicly stated that Klostermann, of the University of Kiel, an advanced critic who ranks as high as Wellhausen, had confessed that the radical critics had been on the wrong track and had used an inadequate method. They had attacked their problem exclusively through literary analysis; whereas, in coping with problems of such subtleness, magnitude, and complexity as those presented by the Old Testament, one method cannot suffice. I never forgot Klostermann's confession. I clung to it as a clue through Ariadne's maze of Hebrew literature. In addition, I had already studied comparative religion independently, publishing the results in *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA*, and had become convinced that the religion of Israel is unique and miraculous, is supernatural as well as human in its birth and growth, and that the student of the Bible must assume the supernatural, and investigate Israel's literature not only as human and natural documents, but as God's revelation. The premise of some radical, naturalistic, destructive critics that the Bible is to be studied as the Koran or the Iliad conceals a fallacy that vitiates their processes and results.

Since 1906 my reading, especially in studies of the Bible

as literature in 1912-13, when I learned that revolutionary reaction against radical criticism had been in full swing for a decade, has confirmed the impressions of 1886-1905, that conservative construction of the case,—the traditional view of the authorship of the Old Testament books and the development of the Hebrew faith,—is sound in substance *when restated modernly and scientifically*, and that radical criticism is mainly in error and cannot stand. With every wish to accept the new light, if it be a star instead of an *ignis fatuus*, I find myself unable to follow this modern departure.

The lines of evidence that compelled me to these conclusions are both negative and positive. The negative evidence comprises the subjectivity and self-contradictions of the destructive criticism, the divergences of the radical critics, their proven incompetence as witnesses, the indeterminateness of internal evidence, and the want of external evidence in support. The positive evidence comes from the objective testimony furnished by archæology and history, the latest light from textual criticism, the facts of literature and logic, and the experience of the spiritual power of the Bible. These propositions form bold and broad generalizations. I shall try to justify them and vindicate myself.

There exists no occasion for fresh effort to verify the traditional views. The burden of proof, as Professor Wright of Oberlin remarks, falls so heavily on those who dispute the Old Testament's historicity, that replying to their objections is all that really is required. That positive function has been fulfilled repeatedly and successfully. The conservative critics have fairly refuted the destructive critics who challenged the traditional theory and assumed the heavy burden of proof for their denial. Archæologists, historians, students

of comparative religion as well as of comparative literature, scholars in jurisprudence, students of Scripture as literature, and theologians have held the constructive position against assault. But I shall seek first to sap the foundation of destructive criticism, and then to show the illogical fallacies in the radical processes. The burden of proof for this negative demonstration rests upon the challenger and denier. The phrases "radical criticism" and "destructive critic" are used to express the thought that the radical critic as differentiated from the conservative critic would destroy the traditional position, and that destructive criticism would reconstruct the religion, literature, and history, root and branch, and base the pyramid upon its apex.

TEXTUAL CRITICISM OF THE TEXT-BASE FOR DESTRUCTIVE
CRITICISM.

The text of the Hebrew Bible furnishes our starting point. The radical higher critic has proceeded as if the received text were a trustworthy witness whose testimony formed a firm foundation. But critics acknowledge that the assumption — it is nothing else — is baseless. Their testimony is virtually unanimous. Voluminous quotation is impracticable, but essential evidence may be cited.

Scholars have greatly erred in too exalted an estimate of the correctness of the Hebrew. It cannot at every point be the original. A text has become known that was current in Egypt in Jeremiah's day, and gives readings more than a century older than the Samaritan Hebrew of the Pentateuch. There exists no evidence that our Hebrew is identical with that recognized by the Samaritans when they seceded (*circa* b.c. 432) from the Jews. The Samaritan Pentateuchal text differs six thousand times from the received Hebrew. Again,

the variance between our Hebrew and the Hebrew that the Septuagint used is great. This Greek version, where agreements occur between it and other old translations or independent Hebrew codices, has a value against our Hebrew text that has been much less highly esteemed than it should be. The Septuagint possesses the greatest of values as witness to the early Hebrew. Evidence accumulates that Jerome (*circa* A.D. 400) in preparing the Vulgate had before him Hebrew manuscripts differing in many respects from that of the Massorettes. Fresh investigations recently into other old translations and recent discoveries of independent Hebrew manuscripts provide additional material for determining the truer text of the Old Testament. Such textual and higher critics as Estlin Carpenter of England, Rendel Harris, and a dozen others accordingly declared in the London *Times* of October 2, 1912, that many passages in our English Old Testament convey a meaning at variance with that of the original Hebrew, and that fullest use should be made of all existing material for the determination of the original and its meaning. Jewish aversion to saying *Jahveh* led frequently to our received text using *Elohim*. Sane reconstruction is often required. The future holds assurance of valuable discoveries. Each decade brings the lost autographs nearer. The reasonable presumption is that the older manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible contain the less inaccurate text.

Striking and significant evidence was presented by Klostermann in 1893. He complained that "Pentateuchal criticism assumes that the received Hebrew, beside which exist older texts, is identical with that of the author, and that linguistic diversities, especially in the divine names, the most variable element, originate, not in differences between manuscripts, but in diversity of sources. Analytical criticism

ignores the fact that in transmitting the Pentateuch stress was not laid upon purity of text. Confidence in the security of the results of criticism is too strong."

The situation was as if the Pauline Epistles had been employed, while the Greek was the incorrect text of Erasmus, and had been assigned to different authors on the strength of the use of *Christ*, *Jesus*, and *Jesus Christ*, passages using the first name being by one author, those using another coming from a second author, and those using the third issuing from still another writer. This sound argument from analogy against the supposed Elohist, Jahvist, and Jahvist-Elohist authorships of the Pentateuch, because it says *Jahveh Elohim*, *Jahveh*, and *Elohim* has never been answered. It shows that the radical method violates an accepted principle for the validity of reasoning.

Study of the trustworthiness of our Hebrew has but begun. Until it is completed, the destructive critic acquires no standing in court for literary analyses based on this text. Requirements of textual criticism form a deciding factor in higher criticism. Analysis of the Old Testament problem has been made without adequate examination into the solidity of the critical foundation. The witness, that is, the text, upon whom the radical critic relied for dissecting the text into diverse documents, is an incompetent witness *for that purpose*. Not before destructive criticism demonstrates that it really knows what the original authors actually wrote has it excuse for questioning the authenticity of the writings and the substantial soundness of the traditional position. Since the received text is untrustworthy, not in fundamentals or essentials, but in individual word or single phrase, a trustworthy text must be constructed. Until this shall have been attained, radical criticism has no right to reconstruct Hebrew

history, literature, or religion. Until a trustworthy text is reconstructed, conservative criticism stands justified in repudiating the destructive critic; especially as textual criticism, so far, sustains the conservative views. While a better text is building, conservative critics are entitled to regard and to advance their explanations as the preferable explanations. Meanwhile the evidence has been brought out with increasing fullness and force the past twelve years, and the process proceeds apace. Wellhausen in 1913 admitted to Dahse that *textual criticism has found what Wellhausen calls "the sore spot" in his theory*, and authorized Dahse to publish his confession.¹

A better text is being recovered by means of the Septuagint, Syriac, and Vulgate versions, under which lies an ancient Hebrew older and purer than that of the Massoretic, and that partly through discovery of independent Hebrew codices. This submerged Hebrew under those venerable versions, thus reappearing in the new manuscripts, shows that the clue imagined by Astruc — the occurrence of *Jahveh* and *Elohim* in Genesis and the resultant division into Jahvist and Elohist documents — does not exist. The Septuagint's latent Hebrew in three or four passages, especially in Ex. vi. 3, the Gibraltar of the radical hypothesis, where the Greek translation's Hebrew is supported against our Hebrew by an ancient Hebrew manuscript and by the Onkelos, Syriac, and Vulgate versions, destroys the imaginary clue afforded by the Hebrew text of the Massoretic.

These textual authorities and similar ones, almost all excelling our Hebrew in trustworthiness, repeatedly use *Jahveh* in the so-called priests' document, and in the supposed Elohist document where *Elohim* occurs in the Hebrew Bible,

¹ See *Expository Times*, vol. xx. p. 563.

and where radical criticism assumes the existence of differing documents. This variation shows that use of *Elohim* constitutes no proof that an Elohist author wrote an Elohim book. Consequently no higher critic, no matter how radical, defends the received text of the Hebrew Bible as the higher critic of the New Testament plants himself on the reformed Greek text. Genesis cannot on this quaking foundation of questionable text be dissected into post-Mosaic documents. The right readings render the invention of redactors, glossators, editors, a work of supererogation and labor lost. It is illogical and needless to suppose sources because *Elohim* appears here, *Jahveh* there, and to subdivide the supposed documents into fragments, frequent authors, and shadowy "schools" that wrote and rewrote for centuries. The current analysis, resting on little else than use of different divine names, cannot be maintained.

Schlögl, of Vienna,¹ has worked this out to demonstration. According to his investigations, in Gen. i.-Ex. iii. 12 the Scriptural Hebrew uses *Jahveh* 148 times, but in 118 of these passages other texts read *Elohim* or *Jahveh Elohim*. Our Old Testament text of Gen. i.-Ex. iii. 12 uses *Elohim* 179 times, but in 59 of these places other texts read *Jahveh*. Lastly, our text reads *Jahveh Elohim* 20 times, but in 19 of these passages other readings have *Jahveh* or *Elohim* alone. Three fourths of the first exhibit of destructive evidence are worthless, one fourth of the second useless, and nineteen twentieths of the third. Amid such variances of text the radical critic may not legitimately depend on our received Hebrew. The criterion that variant use of *Jahveh* and *Elohim* in the Scriptural Hebrew was supposed to supply vanishes

¹ Nivard Johann Baptist Schlögl is an Austrian Cistercian and a professor of Oriental languages and Old Testament exegesis (New Schaff-Herzog, vol. x. p. 247).

in the variance between that text and other texts of very many of the same passages. As Schlögl says, "It is quite unscientific to determine the analysis of a source by the names of God." Tisdall well remarks that "for sheer worthlessness as a test of authorship the use of the divine appellations by this text would be difficult to surpass"; while Aalders asserts absolutely that the criterion becomes "of no value," and Toy, of Harvard, one of the prominent radical critics, confesses that "the conclusion [that Astruc's clue must be abandoned] is not out of keeping with the tone of modern criticism. Our Hebrew text suffered greatly in transmission. The divine names have been changed in Chronicles, Psalms, and elsewhere; why not in the Pentateuch?"¹

These textual arguments of the lower criticism against the higher criticism, this objective evidence of text criticism against subjective radical critics, cannot be arrogantly waved aside by destructive criticism as traditionalism or unscholarliness. The evidences and arguments of conservative critics are scientific use of weapons that radical criticism did not use. The force of the reasoning from the textual variability of *Jahveh* and *Elohim* cannot be broken. Will the destructive critic, knowing this variability, yet on this shifting and shaking foundation still build hypotheses about the origins of Hebrew literature? The phenomenon demanding explanation is advanced as the explanation. It is the vicious circle at its worst.

ANALYTICAL CRITICISM OF RADICAL PROCESSES.

The problem is a layman's problem. Any man with good discipline in languages, with experience as thinker and writer, with sense and judgment, has the right and capacity to form

¹Christian Register, May 28, 1910.

opinions. Right reasoning is indispensable. Critical methods and results must justify themselves to laymen as well as to Scriptural scholars and theologians. Robertson Smith acknowledged that those are as competent judges as these. "The questions," he declared, "with which criticism deals are within the scope of any who read the English Bible carefully and think clearly and without prejudice." The radical critic asserts that the Bible must be tried as is any other book. Then destructive criticism must be subjected to the same standards for evidence, the same tests for the trustworthiness of testimony, as any other witness. It must satisfy judges, juries and lawyers, men of affairs accustomed to weigh evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Its criteria of judgment, its processes, must vindicate themselves to reason, logic, and facts.

The general laws of logic with which the radical methods have to comply are these: (1) No explanation of a difficulty that creates greater difficulties is satisfactory. (2) No theory that fails to provide a better solution for a problem than other hypotheses is tenable. (3) No hypothesis, if not necessary as explanation of facts, is relevant. (4) No rejection of established methods and principles of textual criticism, in order to buttress historico-literary criticism, is permissible. (5) No proposition that fails to consider *all* factors, even infinitesimals and imponderables, is final. (6) No assumption of reliability in results, when the foundation is repeatedly removed, is justifiable through plausible contentions that disagree with relevant considerations. (7) No canon that, when applied to modern books possessing the characteristics of the works for which the criterion was devised, yet fails to secure results tallying with known facts, is sound. These propositions express the principles of valid reasoning. The radical criticism

must satisfy not merely a single standard for soundness of judgment, but all. Failure even under one test subjects the soundness of its every argument to suspicion.

1. Does destructive criticism square with the requirement that no explanation creating greater difficulties is satisfactory? It alleges that such phrases in Hebrew books as "unto this day," in connection with primitive institutions or customs, must have originated within the text itself after Moses, even after the exile, and assumes that no additions had been made to the text from the margin through ordinary interpolations by copyists. This fact of experience should not be disregarded. But it is neglected. The radical supposition is that such later interpolations must be the work of some original author other than Moses. But this explanation involves difficult assumptions, while the conservative explanation does not. The difficulties in the destructive hypothesis are greater and more numerous than those in the traditional theory. The explanation that the literature of Israel is the outcome of the processes of authorship alleged by the radical criticism creates historical and literary difficulties. The destructive critic drives miracle from his premises, but it creeps back through his processes. These demand miracles for performing them. When radical criticism assumes that the book discovered in B.C. 621 and called "The Book of the Covenant" or "The Book of the Law" was Deuteronomy, although the natural inference is that this document was Ex. xx.-xxiii., possibly the Pentateuch, he adds difficulties to the problem. But explanations should not produce difficulties. The radical explanation accordingly is unsatisfying.

2. Does destructive criticism square with the test that no theory failing to provide a better solution than other hypotheses is tenable? Changes in the text, when these were made,

form a problem for solution. The radical hypothesis solves the problem through supposing that these changes imply different authors and sources. But faults of judgment by scribes usually originated such alterations. Such mistakes and the wish to conserve the text present a natural and reasonable explanation for the present condition of the Pentateuchal text. It is impracticable and incredible that many centuries after Moses men could have done in his style what the destructive critic credits them with. How should they learn the then obsolete terms of the Pentateuch? How did they who detested Assyria, Babylon, and Egypt know the facts about the remotest antiquity of those lands? The textual and conservative explanation of these features is the sounder, more reasonable explanation. The radical explanation is untenable.

3. Does destructive criticism comply with the law that no hypothesis, if not needed as explanation, is relevant? Consider Num. xiii. 3; xxxii. 8; Deut. i. 19; and Josh. xiv. 7. The first declares that the spies were sent from the wilderness of Paran, the others that they went from Kadesh-barnea. The radical critic asserts that the two statements are contradictions, irreconcilable discrepancies, originating from different sources and writers. But Num. xiii. 25-26 declares that the spies returned to the wilderness of Paran, to Kadesh-barnea, where Israel had remained during their absence. Kadesh-barnea was in the wilderness of Paran. Numbers xiii. 3 speaks of the larger and inclusive departing point, the remaining passages of the smaller point within. It is as if a man, according to one reporter, left Greater New York for Chicago, but according to another, started from Brooklyn. But the radical assumes that Num. xiii. 26, which refutes him, belongs partly to one supposed source, partly to another im-

agined author. The reasonable, natural explanation is arbitrarily set aside, in the face of textual and logical evidence, for an irrational and forced explanation. The destructive claim that here are parallel accounts and separate sources should be based on decisive evidence within the supposed documents, and the facts must obviously *demand* this explanation. But definite internal evidence distinctly favors Mosaic authorship. The probability, when parallels occur, is that Moses composed both. There exists no necessity for the supposition of separate sources and several authors. The radical hypothesis fails to square with the requirement that it shall be needed and relevant.

4. Does the radical obey the principle that no rejection of established rules and processes of text criticism to support historico-literary criticism can be allowed? He knows the variableness in the use of *Jahveh* and *Elohim* to be demonstrated by the other manuscripts and versions, yet rejects this textual and objective evidence. Such procedure is not tolerated with secular literature or with other sacred books. No fact explicable by canons of text criticism belongs to or may be used by historico-literary criticism. Instance on instance now adduced by the radical higher critic in support of his theories belongs to text criticism, is explained through its method or idea, and must be surrendered by historico-literary criticism. These items are so numerous that they alone wreck the radical hypothesis. Destructive criticism is less loyal to the requirements of textual criticism than is conservative criticism. It rejects established and accepted axioms of text criticism. This rejection is unpermissible.

5. Does the radical higher critic comply with the canon that no proposition that fails to consider all factors is final? He disregards the likelihood that scribes and copyists often

transferred terms, sentences, or phrases from margins of manuscripts into texts. Beyond doubt, many such interpolations have crept in. The destructive critic ignores this not negligible quantity, and assumes that interpolation means that the whole writing itself originated ages after the traditional author. But no other sacred writing was ever composed in such ways as the radicals imagine for Israel's literature. Evidently each resulted from earnest desire to preserve religious teachings unaltered. The critic should present some parallel or analogy for what, he claims, happened to the Pentateuch. Moreover, another imponderable excluded by the destructives is that in the sixth pre-Christian century the Hebrew of the Pentateuch was becoming obsolete, and yet the supposed exilic editors or authors manifested skill in using its diction. What was the source of their surprising skill with a dying language if the Pentateuch did not exist? The destructive critic fails to consider *all* facts. His conclusions are only provisional.

6. Does radical criticism proceed according to this canon: No assumption of reliableness in results whose base is constantly changed is justified through plausible contentions that disagree with relevant considerations? Radicalism has repeatedly changed the foundation of its hypotheses. Destructive critics have successively supposed for 162 years that the results secured on each basis were trustworthy. When these were successively shown unreliable, criticism rested its case upon irrelevant considerations. It tries to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. It stands without justification for its fast-and-loose dealing with this standard of logic.

7. Does the destructive critic regulate procedure by the criterion that no means or method of Biblical criticism that fails to secure results tallying with known facts is valid?

Apply the process of radical criticism to the poetry of Burns. Hayman¹ did so with an ode that Burns declared that he wrote in 1786. The result of the method that seems to show that Moses did not write Genesis, or Isaiah chapters xl.-lxvi. of his book, proves that Burns did not write Burns's poem, but that it was composed by three authors. Archbishop Whately had demonstrated by the same method that Napoleon I. had never existed. Robert Buchanan of England (1841-1901) applied the method to a poem of his own, and proved that the style of an author is not inevitably obvious even to contemporary critics. He felt that reviewers of his books were actuated by hostility. Accordingly he issued "St. Abe and His Seven Wives" anonymously. The critics who had damned Buchanan's known verse praised this nameless poem. He published another namelessly, on neither occasion altering his style, and this was also panegyricized. Not one reviewer recognized Buchanan's style, some attributing "St. Abe" to Lowell, and others the second poem to Swinburne.² My journalistic brethren raged like the heathen when they learned what vain things they had imagined. Shewan applied the method of Bethe, Leaf, Murray, and Robert in disproving the Homeric authorship of the Iliad, methods used by some Biblical critics for disproving the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, to poetry that he himself had composed, and demonstrated that his own verse was the work of many authors in many ages. G. F. E. Rupprecht has shown that the tests that deprive Moses of Deuteronomy, or Isaiah of his book, prove that Goethe, though he may have written the first part of Faust, could not have composed the second. Magoun has shown that the linguistic argument of the radical

¹ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, vol. lv. pp. 557-561.

² *Urquhart, New Biblical Guide*, vol. i. p. 76.

critics proves that Max Müller of Germany and England was four men and authors. Macaulay wrote the history of England, the lays of ancient Rome, the legal code of British India, and poems about Henry of Navarre and the battle of Naseby. But Hebrew authors, according to destructive critics, those carvers of cherry stones and filers of needles, had no such versatility. Each always wrote the same style. Variations in style betray diversity of authors. Moses, a broad-gauge man and mere statesman, could not have written a history of Israel, the laws in Leviticus and Numbers, the orations and songs in Deuteronomy, the pæan over Pharaoh in Ex. xv. 1-18, or Ps. xc.¹

Duplicate accounts are frequently imagined by the destructive critic and by him considered supports for his theory. But the Hebrew's antithetical balancing of clause against clause opens a way to a form or mode of composition that explains these supposed doublets. Even with ourselves, balancing declarations and identities of expression occur every day. No value as evidence attaches to them. Different kinds of compositions besides those in Hebrew literature have frequently been divided into parallel stories. Their origins and authorship are known. The result proves that parallelism forms no proof of separate sources.

Æneid i. 723 ff. illustrates the truth. Vergil wrote:—

"When the banquet's first lull was come, and the board removed, then they set up the huge bowls and wreathed the wine. A din rings to the roof—the voice rolls through those spacious halls; lamps hang from the gilded ceiling, burning brightly, and flambeau-fires put out the night. Then the queen called for a cup, heavy with jewels and gold, and filled it with unmixed wine; the

¹Magoun reduces this radical criterion to stark ridiculousness through showing that it "proves" his own articles to be by eight writers representing four nationalities and eight vocations, while the styles of his articles differ markedly.

same which had been used by Belus, and every king from Belus downward. Then silence was commanded through the hall."

The first of our parallel stories says that

"When the banquet's first hull was come they wreathed the wine. A din rings to the roof; lamps hang from the gilded ceiling, burning brightly. Then the queen called for a cup and filled it with unmixed wine. Then silence was commanded through the hall."¹

The doublet by Deuterovergil declares that

"When the board was removed, then they set up the huge bowls. The voice rolls through those spacious halls; and flambeau-fires put out the night. Heavy with jewels and gold, a cup which had been used by Belus, and every king from Belus downward, was filled."

This second source or duplicate account, according to radical criticism, must be from some separate source called the Great Unknown. It was woven, it must be supposed, into the older narratives by the Servian redactor in the fourth century of the Christian era, 400 years after Vergil's death. Uncritical and dogmatic traditionalists are the sole scholars to believe that it was written by Vergil.

In Shakespeare's time four playwrights occasionally worked together on one play. Each furnished what his particular talent was fitted for. Each with peculiar adroitness achieved what was entrusted to himself. The several parts were patched together with such ingenuity, that it frequently proves impracticable to tell one man's work from that of his fellows. This happened only three hundred to three hundred and fifty years ago and in literature written in our own language. If such joint drama cannot now be dissected by ourselves, how can destructive analysis of the Old Testament, which was written from twenty to thirty-five centuries ago and in other languages than ours, expect sober scholars and plain laymen to accept its splitting of this book or that into the works of sev-

¹ Magoun, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, vol. lxx. p. 383.

eral authors or schools? The futility of the destructive criticism claiming certitude for the results from such literary dissection is self-evident. The radical method fails to square with the seventh canon for logical validity. The process is unsound and untrustworthy.

Two negative criticisms upon destructive critics remain. One considers the value and the significance of tradition, the other the competence of witnesses and credibleness of testimony.

Radical criticism has made inadequate allowance for the conserving power of tradition and the trustworthiness of oral recollection and transmission. These factors play no small part in Oriental, especially in ancient, literature. India's Veda, for instance, which resembles Psalms and is almost as long as the Iliad and the Odyssey together, was transmitted orally for millenniums almost. Hindu priests know it by heart. The Mahabharata, a Hindu epic that approximates seven times the length of the two Homeric epics altogether, is to this day recited by itinerant minstrels. The Talmud, though it comprises almost 3,000 folio pages of print, was for nearly six centuries transmitted solely by word of mouth. It was, and is, Oriental procedure to commit sacred writings to memory. Possibly Homer's poems came to Peisistratos of Athens in that way. Finland's "Kalevala" went through the Middle Ages on the lips of the Finns. The successors of Moses, even if he had not written, could have handed down the whole literature of Israel from his day to Ezra's through oral tradition.

This trust in memory, its proven exploits, and the use of oral tradition would explain several problems of the Old Testament. The Jew was at pains to preserve the form and formulas of the original documents. The Mosaic law, though

it grew through the ages, is no composite of late excerpts from remote traditions and of later editorial additions. Rupprecht has demonstrated that as early as the days of the Judges a body of legislation existed. The Book of Joshua makes it plain that that law was sacred. The supposition that it was compounded as destructive criticism alleges runs athwart Oriental methods and character. If such composition was perpetrated, how did it escape detection for twenty-five centuries? What piety and ethics did the destructive critic's imagined forger—or forgers—possess, that he palmed off the documents as the work of Moses and God's word to and through His prophet?

The radical criticism requires miracles. It goes against Hebrew conservatism, human psychology, probability, Oriental methods of literary composition, tradition, testimony, the nature itself of the Pentateuch. Verbal memory filled a rôle in making the Old Testament that has not received requisite recognition. Variant specific statements as to incidental features of events do not constitute other accounts or parallel histories. As to such matters the position of constructive criticism is the natural supposition. It squares with tradition and literary evolution. The radical positions do not. The Pentateuch's character is what is to be expected from writers possessing vigorous verbal memories. For such persons logical forthrightness of language is difficult. They are disturbed neither by digressions, repetitions, nor want of orderly arrangement. They are distressed by omission of a single word, even of mere repetitions. This insistence on full verbal measure would account for Hebrew pleonasms and tautologies.

Destructive and radical criticism must satisfy the principles that decide the authenticity and credibleness of testimony.

These rest on the law of probability, which itself reposes in the witness's trustworthiness and intelligence. The witnesses for the radical criticism do not observe all facts, and are biased in favor of it through having made reputations from exploiting theories. Their competence as witnesses is but half what it should be. The conditional character of their testimony is damaging. Dr. Kent, of Yale, for example, in "The Student's Old Testament," hundreds of times uses such phrases as "it was *probably*," "the prophetic account *apparently*," "other indications *suggest*," "it *appears*," "it may be *assumed*," "it seems *probable*," or "the book *suggests* editing." Such guesses at facts would have no weight in law. Their assumption to be scholarship equals obtaining credit by false pretenses. A court would consider such witnesses incompetent, if not inaccurate, and rate their testimony as light, if not empty. The destructive critic essays to destroy the validity of tradition, the testimony of the documents when fully and fairly estimated, and the reasonable presumption that the records are honest. The burden of proof, an enormous burden, rests on him. He fails to sustain his contentions and compel convinced assent. It is a fact of meaning and weight that eminent jurists acquainted with Scriptural studies, keen lawyers, men of affairs accustomed to weigh evidence and sift testimony, do not accept the radical arguments. These change from allegations to pleas in avoidance. "Not proven by you" is a logical verdict against radical critics and destructive criticism.

CONCLUSION.

Nearly two centuries have elapsed since Astruc, a man of immoral life,¹ set afoot the radical hypothesis about the ori-

¹Orr, *Problem of the Old Testament*, p. 196; cf. *Presbyterian Review*, Jan., 1892.

gins of Hebrew literature. It has gained ground among scholars since Eichhorn developed the theory, and Graf, Kuenen, Reuss, and Wellhausen completed it. It glamors and dominates a large number of the collegians and Scriptural scientists born between 1865 and 1900. It will endure with them another decade, possibly a quarter of a century. But men born after 1900 will approach the problems of this literature in another atmosphere. They see the results of radical criticism, which boasts that they are "assured results of modern scholarship," tried by fire, weighed by time, and found wanting. Time is the essence of a contract, and time fights against the radical's contract to uproot the traditional views, as it fought against Baur and Wolf. When the final adjustment is made, the balance of debit and credit struck between the radical and the conservative critic, the second will have much less to surrender than the first.

Bissell, Green, Hoffmann, Kaulen, Orr, Robertson, Rupprecht, and G. F. Wright had before 1905 reasoned wisely and well against the Wellhausen view.¹ There existed endless diversities among the radicals about "assured results" as to the age of the supposed documents in the Pentateuch and the real extent of their literary dissections. The radicals acknowledged that much more was required for furnishing

¹E. C. Bissell was professor of the Old Testament at Hartford Theological Seminary, 1881-91, and at McCormick Seminary (Chicago), 1892-94. W. H. Green was professor of Biblical and Oriental literature at Princeton Seminary, 1851-59, and of Oriental and Old Testament literature, 1859-96. David Hoffmann is rector of Berlin Rabbinical Seminary, and author of a commentary and of other writings on the Pentateuch. Franz P. Kaulen was a chaplain to Pope Leo XIII. and editor of the second edition of Weltes and Wetzer's *Encyclopedia of Catholic Theology*. He had been a lecturer and professor of the Old Testament at the University of Bonn, 1863-91. James Orr was professor of church history in the Theological College of the Scotch United Presbyterians,

their house, but differed as to where and how this furniture could be had. Ten years ago critical scholarship, even among destructive critics, began to turn against radical criticism. During the decade a revolution has arisen. Eerdmans, a disciple of Kuenen and formerly a convinced defender of the destructive criticism, broke with it and now contests the regnant hypothesis at every point. Rudolf Kittel, professor of Old Testament exegesis at the University of Leipzig, confessed himself convinced of the soundness of the conservative objections to the radical argument against Gen. i. 10. Hugo Gressmann, lecturer at the University of Kiel on the Old Testament and on Syriac, declared that only in the most relative sense may Jahvist and Elohist be predicated of the supposed authors and their work. Johann Lepsius in 1903 asserted that the Wellhausen hypothesis could endure only for another decade. In 1913 came Wellhausen's own avowal of the "sore spot." E. F. M. Sellin, professor of the Old Testament at the University of Rostock, joined the doubters of the destructive criticism, particularly in regard to the Priests' Code (Lev.). It has been demonstrated that the radical criticism had set no such solid foundation, reared no such structure of secured results, as it flattered itself it had made. The little fox of text criticism has broken down the wall of radical historico-literary criticism.

But some radical critics practice a conspiracy of silence regarding their textual opponents. Alfred Bertholet, professor 1891-1900, and of apologetics and theology at Glasgow College after 1900. James Robertson has been professor of Semitic languages at the University of Glasgow since 1877. G. F. E. Rupprecht is (or was) a Lutheran pastor in Germany. He has written at least six works on the problems of the Old Testament. G. Frederick Wright was professor of the New Testament language and literature at Oberlin Theological Seminary, 1881-92, and of the harmony of science and revelation, 1892-1907.

fessor of the Old Testament at the University of Basel, and Karl Steuernagel, professor of the Old Testament at the University of Halle, ignore the argument from study of the text. Sellin, after acknowledging that Dahse has shown the variableness of the divine names, simply says that in many passages more care than has been applied is requisite for the theory of post-Mosaic documents in the Pentateuch! Principal John Skinner, author of a commentary on Genesis, feebly declares that the discrimination in the names of God is only one factor in the radical theory, and alleges that many of the destructive critics rate it a small factor. But Harold M. Wiener, a brilliant and finely trained Anglo-Jewish barrister, author of "The Origin of the Pentateuch," challenged Skinner to prove the second assertion, and the Cambridge divine failed to substantiate his statement. When he averred that the Septuagint has no such trustworthiness as the received Hebrew, his previous practice had refuted his present preaching. Dahse replied that Skinner himself in criticizing the Septuagint's Hebrew manuscripts had admitted their superiority and had revealed the worthlessness of the criterion of the divine names.

Dahse shows sound judgment in holding to the use of the names of God as the jugular of the radical criticism, and in regarding its other standards as secondary and problematic. Eerdmans acknowledges that Dahse is right. J. F. H. Gunkel, associate professor of Old Testament exegesis at the University of Berlin, a radical of the radicals, confirms Dahse and Eerdmans with this declaration: "Their [the Jahvist's and the Elohist's] difference is to be demonstrated principally through their language. The most important example is, that before Moses J says *Jahveh*, E *Elohim*." Steuernagel seeks to prove the soundness of the radical hypothesis through the

following argument as its chief argument: "If all narratives in Gen. i.-xix. which show *Elohim* be read consecutively and those with *Jahveh*, both produce fit coherence." He adds that from the difference in divine appellatives result two Elohist documents and one Jahvist document. E. F. Kautzsch, professor of the Old Testament at the University of Halle, distinguishes the Jahvist and the Elohist documents by "the nearly constant use of the divine names." Thus radical critics rest their case chiefly on the names of God. But this starting point has been proved fallacious. Accessory grounds of probability cannot correct the fallacy or eliminate errors.

Dahse, whose reputation is of the highest (German scholars rating him so highly that they unanimously chose him as Germany's fittest man to take Nestle's place as editor of the new edition of the Hebrew-Greek Bible), during 1903-12 compared manuscripts and texts with severest scrutiny. In his peculiar sphere he is almost a Tischendorf and a Westcott-Hort together. Wiener, a keen and subtle scholar whom his adversaries have not yet caught making a material mistake, during 1904-16 proved the justice of Klostermann's caveat of 1893. Eerdmans, Köberle, professor of Old Testament exegesis and of Oriental philology at the University of Erlangen, Noordt zij, Redpath, Schlögl, and Troelstra took the position of Dahse, Klostermann, and Wiener. Eerdmans has completely abandoned the radical method of determining the origin and meaning of the Old Testament. Troelstra has come out squarely in defense of the conservative attitude toward the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. The University of Utrecht, when its professor of the Old Testament died, who had been a destructive critic, appointed Noordt zij as his successor, who maintains the

historicity of the Old Testament. When it wanted a professor of comparative religion, it unanimously turned to Melvin G. Kyle, author of "The Deciding Voice of the Monuments," and a conservative critic and theologian. Nowhere has Kuenen's hypothesis been more seriously questioned than at his own university. Eerdmans, his successor at the University of Leiden, turned his back to Kuenen's idea. Troelstra, of the same institution, turned the guns upon the Jahveh-Elohim hypothesis and contends that the argument from the use of *Jahveh* and *Elohim* must be abandoned. Dr. Johns, of the University of Cambridge, remarks that "there is little permanence about the critical views. We had best confine ourselves to the latest presentation."

The results of criticism called settled results do not endure scientific tests. Much of the result is subjective, and lacks solid, logical foundation. Many of the settlements prove to be much less settled than they seemed a decade ago. Reaction is observable. Accepted assumptions are questioned under the pressure of opposing facts. A majority of archaeologists, many of whom, as Halévy, Hommel, Naville, and Sayce, formerly upheld Wellhausen, have joined the severest critics of destructive criticism. Some radical critics themselves revolt against the extremeness and extravagance of such scholars as Gunkel and Alfred Jeremias, lecturer on the history of religion and the Old Testament at the University of Leipzig. The systematic effort to pass speculative counterfeits as scholarship's lawful coin is an imposition. The extremists are forced by the new discoveries to consider the possibility of other systems and the revision of criteria erected by the destructionists. Excavations in the lands of the Bible demonstrate that radical criticism reposes upon quicksands. Many of its empty conjectures flee before archæ-

ology like mist before the sun. Welch, when installed at New College, Edinburgh, said: "That school so long dominant, that it had passed into an accepted position, is subjected to keen criticism. This has taken as its weapons those used by the school, the weapons of scientific accuracy."

The radical criticism once marched through the Belgium of traditionalism with the Prussian goose step. But one leg has been amputated at the hip by Surgeon-General Textual Criticism. The other leg suffers from varicose veins and the bleeding inflicted by Doctors Archæology, History, and Logic. Henceforth the radical higher criticism will need a crutch and only be able to limp. Wellhausen is on the road to the limbo of Wolf and Baur.