

ARTICLE VIII.

CRITICAL NOTES.

LOUIS AGASSIZ AND CHARLES DARWIN: A SYNTHESIS.

SOME time in the winter of 1859-60 Ralph Waldo Emerson, in the Newhall House in Milwaukee, asked me if I could procure him a copy of a book on Species which an Englishman had published lately — and he added, "From what I have heard it is likely to make the dry bones rattle." I told Mr. Emerson I had not seen the book, but that I was after it myself and had an order for it already in New York.

How this conversation happened to come about in a hotel in Milwaukee was because Mr. Emerson was stopping there to fulfill engagements for lectures in that city and in other cities round about. Why he asked of me the question he did was because I was President of the Young Men's Association before which he lectured. I was also chairman of the Library Committee of the Association — a somewhat exacting post, as that library was the only public library in the city.

I have given Mr. Emerson's description of the book he was after for he gave no name of author nor definite title to the book.

But in due time along came the book with a title which indicated that it was concerned with "The Origin of Species." The book has now been before the world for more than half a century. Perhaps it has filled Mr. Emerson's prophecy of it — "made the dry bones rattle." There has been more said about the disturbing influence of Darwin's book in theology and the unsettling of religious belief than facts will warrant. *Some* dry bones may have rattled, but they were neither as numerous nor as representative as is sometimes asserted. My bones never rattled. I passed through the time of whatever perturbation there was in thought because of Darwin's work

without agitation myself and I did not find myself lonesome. I found company in plenty in both church and schools. I found general disposition to give the subject calm and patient treatment and hold conclusion meanwhile in abeyance. I say this now with confidence that I knew the situation then, for I was in it as a young lawyer without theological prepossessions.

I read Darwin with approval. I could see no reason why the variations constantly occurring in vegetable or animal life might not become permanent under favorable conditions. But this did not mean to me that everything was "flotsam and jetsam," in a wild welter, without government, or tether of purpose, or end in view.

Here I worked by Agassiz. Before reading Darwin on "The Origin of Species" I had read Agassiz's "Essay on Classification," the original quarto volume. I learned from that, as scientific fact, that nature in its variations was held to *plan*. The variations in nature came to me as methods of expressing and *securing* that plan.

I do not see why Darwin's treatise should have troubled any one who could look from the beginning down through life and see that it was all in a *plan*, where type, order, family, genus, species, and variety were always registered and executed. There they were — radiata, articulata, mollusca, vertebrata — plans — there they were in the museums of geologic time, and there they are to-day with no sign that they are to be altered or abolished, — only to be confirmed and continued in every variation

"To the latest syllable of recorded time."

In vegetation the monocotyledonous endogen and the dicotyledonous exogen are on exhibition in geologic history "until this day." If I wanted to prove the existence of intellectuality in nature I would put in evidence Gray's "Botany." It bears evidence to variations indeed, but to variations held inexorably to the expression of plan — idea — in type, order, family, genus, species. The expression "the ori-

gin of species by variation" is liable to be misleading. Variations occur in species already existing. They are not a leap at once to something new without connection with the past. Burbank has given us a spineless cactus, but the cactus species was there before it became spineless, and the spineless cactus is cactus still. De Vries's new species of primrose is a primrose still, and takes its place in the plan exhibited in the time behind it. The child becomes parent, and what before was species becomes genus. The last variation in "the meanest flower that blows" is connected with a fixed order that runs back over space and through time. No variation has obscured the primal plan — it has only been a way of expressing it. Species may be originated by and in variations (Darwin), but variations are originated by and in species (Agassiz).

It is the merit of Agassiz that he was the prophet of this intellectual system in biology. It is the merit of Darwin that he showed us how the system is preserved and perpetuated against all the conditions that make against it. Agassiz and Darwin worked at the problem of nature from opposite poles — Agassiz was dominated by the idea of system; Darwin, by the practical method pursued for its realization. Both were right.

A FEW SUGGESTIONS.

There is a cry, "Back to the land." He will do most to forward it who will teach the farmer to *classify* as well as to raise and market his crops. The farmer who wants to keep his children from running to clerkships in the city, must show them that a farm is a whole university in its system of vegetable and animal life, that he and they, cattle, sheep, horses and swine, and rats and mice, and birds and fish, are but variations in the great type vertebrate, — teach them to see in timothy the palm tree and in clover the locust tree, — to see all the variations of endogen and exogen about them. Few are the farmers that are botanists or zoölogists! It is a disgrace to man that he has no vision of the *System* in which other types and orders of being are struggling with him. In

fact, are botany and zoölogy, to say nothing of entomology, taught anywhere so that the classifying ambition is quickened into life? Do the scholars in our high schools get the ambition?

What do the people that take to the woods or the seashore from the cities in the summer, bring back with them save the memory of a few esthetic sights and sounds, or some excursions marked by furious fun and frolic? The significance of the whole demonstration in nature with which they have been in contact is not grasped. Every year the sports from the corn in my garden are of surpassing interest.

A country minister will do as well to give a botanical synthesis of the vase of flowers he has before him on Sunday morning, and show their relationships in the system in which they are exhibited, as he will to try to settle the labor and capital question or refute or commend some of the results of the Higher Criticism of the Bible. The classification shown in nature is one of the most incontestable proofs of the existence of an order-loving and order-keeping God.

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THE TEXT OF GENESIS XXXI.

THERE have been preserved in the LXX and the Vulgate a number of variants to the text of this chapter which possess considerable intrinsic importance and bring us nearer to the original than we can hope to reach without their help. The following notes discuss some of these. No attempt is made to consider the instances of minor glosses or variant readings of inferior importance, attention being concentrated on certain outstanding difficulties.

Verse 24: "And there came [יבנא] God to Laban the Syrian in a dream of the night," etc. There is nothing here at first sight to arouse suspicion except the qualification "the Syrian." This had been used in verse 20, where, however, there is a literary reason. The implication is that the *Syrian* Laban is outwitted by the *Hebrew* Jacob. No such reason

can be suggested in the present verse; but if any difficulty were felt it would be easy to conjecture that the epithet had been added from the earlier verse by a glossator. The Vulgate, however, has a startling difference of reading, "*Viditque in somnis dicentem sibi Deum.*" Jerome, therefore, read, "And he saw [וירא] God in a dream," etc., a difference of one letter in the verb; and there is no trace of "to Laban the Syrian." In weighing this reading it must be borne in mind that if the scribes found it they would certainly have altered it, because of Exodus xxxiii. 20. If original, it would explain the gloss "to Laban the Syrian"; while, if the Masoretic text were the earlier, it is difficult to see how Jerome's reading was arrived at. It is therefore probable that the narrative in the first instance told of Laban's seeing a supernatural being. This reading seems to be of considerable importance to the textual history.

In verses 25-53 we find a very unusual number of cases in which the Versions suggest that transpositions have taken place. General observations arising from these will be made after the consideration of the passages in question, but it should first be said that, to some extent, the several scattered difficulties seem to be due to a common cause or causes, so that the individual variants should not be judged entirely without reference to the other difficulties of the section.

Verse 25: "And Laban came up with Jacob, and Jacob pitched his tent in the mountain, and Laban pitched [תקעו] lit. "struck": LXX translates "set"] his brothers [or "with his brothers"] in the mountain of Gilead." There is obviously something wrong here. The conjecture that we should read, "Jacob pitched his tent in the mountain of Mizpah," is faulty; because (1) the narrative requires the presence of Jacob and Laban on the same mountain, and (2) it will appear hereafter that Mizpah in verse 49 is no part of the original text. Procksch seeks to relieve the difficulty by omitting "And Laban . . . mountain," with the Septuagintal MS. g, but g's reading is merely an instance of homœoteleuton, due to the recurrence of the phrase ἐν τῷ ὄρει. It may, how-

ever, be noticed that c_2 omits "And Jacob . . . Gilead." The real clue seems to be furnished by Jerome, who translates: "*Iamque Iacob extenderat in monte tabernaculum; cumque ille consecutus fuisset eum cum fratribus suis in eodem monte Galaad fixit tentorium.*" The root of the trouble therefore appears to have lain in a transposition. Jerome's text obviously had "And Jacob pitched his tent in the mountain, and Laban came up with Jacob" (or perhaps "him"); and this is clearly right. If this and no more were the original text, we can understand how the reading of c_2 arose when the first clause fell out. The last clause, "And Laban pitched his brothers in the mountain of Gilead," will not be original, but will be due to glossing and attempts to improve the text.

Verses 26, 27. Laban's speech reads thus: "What hast thou done, and [RV, "that"] thou didst steal away unawares to me [ותגנב את לבבי] and didst carry away my daughters as captives of the sword? Wherefore didst thou flee secretly, and didst steal away from me [ותגנב אתי] and didst not tell me, and I had sent thee," etc. The Vulgate omits "and didst steal away from me," but otherwise agrees with the Massoretic text. The LXX, however, reads: "What hast thou done? Wherefore didst thou flee secretly, and steal away unawares to me, and carry away my daughters as captives of the sword? And if¹ thou hadst told me, I had sent thee away," etc. Both the Vulgate and the LXX omit "And" at the beginning of verse 28.

It will be seen how easily the phrase "didst steal away from me," which the Vulgate confirms the LXX in omitting, could have got into the Massoretic text after the displacement, either as the result of a note [ותגנב אתי] intended to signify that this was the place for inserting the clause beginning "and thou didst steal away," or as to the result of the omitted passage beginning "Wherefore," etc., being copied into the margin with the two following words, and being thus taken into the text at the wrong place. It is submitted

¹ לוא or לא for לא or לוא.

that the LXX text is preferable. The connection and order are superior to those of the Massoretic text: the style is more vigorous and less diffuse: the rarer word for "if" is more likely to have been mistaken for the common "not" than *vice versa*, and the partial confirmation lent by the Vulgate omission is also of importance.

Versa 31 is very difficult in its present position. Laban having asked (ver. 30), "Why didst thou steal my gods?" Jacob answers, "For I feared, for I said, Lest thou shouldst take away thy daughters from me by force," and then proceeds to reply to the last question. The Vulgate has "*Quod inscio te profectus sum timui,*" following this up with "*Quod autem furti me arguis*" in the following verse. These phrases are perhaps commentary rather than original text. "For I feared" and "for I said" are doublets. The former clause is omitted by most Septuagintal authorities, the latter by K 129 and the Vulgate.

If a conjecture may be hazarded — and it must always be remembered that a conjecture is on a very different footing from an ancient variant — it would be that here again we have the result of a transposition. This speech of Jacob's would fit in excellently after verse 28a thus (ver. 26 ff.): "What hast thou done? Wherefore didst thou flee secretly, and steal away unawares to me, and carry away my daughters as captives of the sword? And if thou hadst told me, I should have sent thee away with mirth and with songs, with tabret and with harp. But thou hast not suffered me to kiss my sons and daughters. And he answered, For I feared [or, "For I said"], Lest thou shouldst take away thy daughters from me by force. And he said, Thou hast done foolishly," etc. This makes an excellent connection, and is in harmony with the fact that the text of this section appears to have suffered considerably. But it remains a conjecture, nothing more.

Versa 32 reveals fresh differences of order. The Massoretic text has "With whomsoever thou findest thy gods, he shall not live: before our brethren discern for thee what is [לך מה: LXX Vulg, rightly, "What is thine," לך] with

me, and take it to thee. And Jacob knew not that Rachel had stolen them." The LXX had [Eth, "and now": bw Arm Lat, "therefore"] "discern what is thine with me and take it: and he discerned nothing with him. And Jacob said, With whomsoever thou findest [bw Boh^l, "are found"] thy gods, he shall not live [Eth^l inserts "and behold": Eth^e, "and behold I will hear thee" ¹] before our brethren. And Jacob knew not," etc. This with minor variations is the reading of D E L bw dpt fir k s Boh Sah Eth Lat. The Vulgate, agreeing otherwise with the Massoretic text, translates *nece-tur coram fratribus nostris*; i.e. it takes "before our brethren" with "he shall not live," and either paraphrases "he shall not live" or else translates a sterner expression. The latter appears the more probable.

There is obvious propriety in the close connection of the remark about Rachel, with the promise to inflict the death penalty. On the other hand, the words, "And he discerned nothing with him," found in the LXX, are an obvious gloss; for the narrative in both texts subsequently relates the search (ver. 33 ff.). We should therefore suppose that the passage ran: "And he answered, Discern what is thine with me, and take it to thee; with whomsoever thou findest thy gods, let him be put to death before our brethren. And Jacob knew not," etc. It is difficult to suppose that this connection of the brethren with the phrase about dying, attested as it is by both the LXX and the Vulgate, is not original; and certainly there are so many instances of inferior Massoretic order in this section that the more logical connection suggested by the LXX is to be readily preferred. As to the additions of Septuagintal authorities ("and now," "therefore") at the beginning of the speech, they seem to be due to efforts to remove the awkwardness which has resulted from the lesions to the text.

Verses 33-35 must be taken together. At the end of verse

¹This seems to have originated in dittography of the נ of נגר and the יה of יהיה in the script in which ך and ך were indistinguishable. The "I will hear thee" of Eth^e is probably a gloss.

34, the Massoretic text reads: "And Laban felt about all the tent, and did not find." These words are missing in all the Septuagintal texts except those of the Hexaplar group. They are certainly wrong where they stand, for the search in Rachel's tent is narrated in verse 35b, and the narrative clearly requires that 35a should immediately follow 34a, of which it is the sequel. Verse 34b seems to be a mere gloss, for the verb (פָּרַח) is used of the goods in 37. In verse 33 the Hebrew has, "And Laban came in the tent of Jacob, and in the tent of Leah, and in the tent of the two bondmaids, and did not find, and he went forth from the tent of Leah, and came in the tent of Rachel." On purely internal grounds this is certainly wrong, for he was not in the tent of Leah *after* his visit to that of the bondmaids, but *before*. Hence "he went forth from the tent of Leah" cannot be right where it stands, and the Vulgate omits it. The LXX reads, "And Laban [h omits] went in and searched *into* (εις) the house of Leah and did not find; and he went forth from the house of Leah and searched *into* (εις) the house of Jacob and *in* (ἐν) the house of the two bondmaids and did not find; and he went in too *into* the house of Rachel." There are several variations, and they must be considered in the light of the Greek. No translator would have written "searched *into* . . . searched *into* . . . and *in*." The text is therefore composite and has grown. "In the house of the two bondmaids" must be a later addition. It is noteworthy that E inserts it in the wrong place after the second "find." Next, "searched in the house" cannot be original in either occurrence. In the first place, n Boh read, "went into the house and searched": m Eth omit "and searched": E L bw k r Sah Lat Chr omit "into." Probably it is due to the Samaritan (see Von Gall's text *ad loc.*). In the second, E Eth read "came in," for "searched." M places the whole phrase, "and searched into the house of Jacob . . . bondmaids," under the asterisk, and F* omits it. On the other hand, the Armenian goes further, and places "and he went forth from the house of Leah" also under the asterisk. As these words are not in the Vulgate, it is prob-

able that the Armenian asterisk is not without foundation. While no certain conclusions can be drawn as to the original text, the facts seem to point to some inferences as probable. "And in the tent of the two bondmaids" and "and he came out of the tent of Leah" are both glosses. The difference of position as to Jacob's tent between the LXX and the Massoretic text makes it doubtful whether in the original text Jacob had a tent or not. The earliest text we can attain appears to be, "And he went into the tent of [? Jacob and of] Leah and did not find, and he went into the tent of Rachel." Possibly something of this sort was original; but in view of the other phenomena of the chapter it is also possible that some MS. from which all our existing texts are descended had suffered some little damage at this point. But on the whole I incline to the former alternative.

Verse 44 is notoriously in a bad state. It reads in the Hebrew: "And now come, let us make a covenant, I and thou, and he shall be for a witness between me and between thee." As covenant is feminine in Hebrew, the grammar is faulty. Moreover, the phrase is meaningless, because a covenant could not be a witness. The LXX here supplies the necessary clues. It adds the words "And he said to him [Boh omits], Behold [s c₂ omit], no man is with us, see, God is witness between me and thee." "No man . . . thee" occurs in the Massoretic text of verse 50, and is there entirely unsuitable. The sentence, "if thou shalt afflict my daughters or if thou shalt take wives beside my daughters, there is no man with us" is simply nonsense. On the other hand, it is quite easy to see that it fell out of the Hebrew in verse 44 through homœoteleuton, owing to the recurrence of "between me and between thee" (בני ובין). It then went into the margin, and was taken into the text at the wrong place. It should be added that in verse 50 the LXX has only the first few words of the phrase, and these have apparently come in through assimilation to the Hebrew. This also explains the "and he shall be for a witness" in verse 44, which has ousted the true text. Only the Ethiopic, a daughter version of the LXX,

has preserved the latter. It reads, "*sit concordia*," "let there be peace." The verse will therefore have read something like this: "And now come, let us make a covenant, and let there be peace between me and between thee. Behold, there is no man with us, see God is witness between me and between thee." Then the recurrence of the phrase "between me and between thee" led to an omission, and in the attempts to repair the resulting damage the word "peace" was ousted by "witness," and the last portion of the verse was taken into the margin and thence into the wrong context. The removal of verse 50b leads us to consider—

Verses 49 and 50. They run, "And the Mizpah [K 129 omits: Sam "pillar" *המטצה* for *המטצה*] which he said [K 75, 157 omit "he said"], The Lord [LXX "God"] watch between me and between thee when we are absent from one another if thou shalt afflict my daughters, or if thou shalt take wives beside my daughters." This makes no sense. But the Vulgate has, "*Intueatur et judicet Dominus*," etc., i.e. "The Lord see and judge." The differences of reading and the context make it reasonably clear that Lord and God are alike substitutions for "the Baal." Hence we should read: "The Baal watch between me and thee," etc. This makes admirable sense.

Verses 46-48, 51, and 52 next claim consideration. In verse 46 the Latin has "Laban" for "Jacob," while 1 n Arm have no name. Probably this is right, as the "brethren" were under Laban's leadership, and the name would not need to be expressed in the vivid oral prose of the old Hebrew. Moreover, verse 51 expressly says that it was Laban who put up the pillar. Then the LXX places verse 48a before 47. It is probably a mere gloss. Note especially the tameness of the *order*, "This heap is witness," *not* "witness this heap." Verse 48b is probably also a gloss, introduced, like so many others, by "therefore." It adds nothing to verse 47, and lacks the Aramaic name which would not be introduced by a glossator.

The LXX also has verses 51 and 52a immediately after 47.

This, again, appears to be right. The witness of the heap and pillar must be invoked either at the beginning or the end of the operative part of the covenant. It cannot be invoked at the end, because the invocation of the gods comes there. Consequently it must stand at the beginning. Further, the analogy of legal documents is entirely in favor of the earlier position. The Massoretic order is therefore indefensible.

The difficulties connected with verses 52 and 53 are considerable. The Hebrew literally means, "Witness is this heap and witness the pillar if I do not [אם אני לא] cross to thee . . . and if thou dost not [ואם אתה לא] cross," etc. This phrase "if . . . not" is appropriate in imprecations when such an expression as "the Lord do so to me and more" forms the other member of the sentence. That would constitute a strong affirmation on oath of the exact opposite of what is here required. But it is not in place after the word "witness," and the LXX at any rate did not so take it, for verse 52a does not immediately precede 52b. It has significant differences of reading. "For [γαρ] if either [τε: Lat *ergo* for τε γαρ] I [ἐγὼ omitted by c, Eth Lat] do not [Eth^c omits] cross to thee, nor [μηδε: Lat *vel* "or": Eth^c "and if"] thou dost not . . . the God of Abraham shall judge" (Eth and some MSS. "may the God . . . judge"). It will be observed that, except in retaining the puzzling "for," the Ethiopic MS. C has a reading that makes admirable sense, and it will be remembered that the Ethiopic is a pre-Hexaplar authority. The Vulgate confirms its double omission of the word "not." It reads, "*Si aut ego transiero . . . aut tu praeterieris.*" But then how did the "not" come in, and what is the explanation of the Greek γαρ, which presumably stands for a Hebrew י? I can only suggest that a conflation has arisen through the displacement of the phrase about witnessing. "Witness the pillar . . . that [כי] I shall *not* cross" is good sense. So is "or [= and τε] if I shall cross . . . may the God judge." But the various compounds represented by our existing texts are not. I think that the evidence of this verse really corrob-

orates the view that the Massoretic position of verses 51 and 52a is wrong.

I therefore believe the original of this passage to have run somewhat as follows:—

44 And now come, let us make a covenant, and let there be peace between me and between thee. Behold, there is no man with us, see God is witness between me and between thee.

45 And he took a stone, and set it up as a pillar.

46 And he said to his brethren, Gather stones. And they gathered stones, and made a heap, and did eat on it.

47 And Laban called it Jegar-sahadutha; but Jacob called it Galeed.

51 And Laban said to Jacob, Behold this heap, and behold this pillar, which I have cast betwixt me and thee;

52a Witness this [? the] heap and witness the pillar!

49 May the Baal watch between me and between thee when we are separated from each other.

50 If thou shalt afflict my daughters, or if thou shalt take wives beside my daughters,

52b Or if I shall pass over unto thee, or thou shalt pass over unto me this heap and this pillar for evil,

53 May the God of Abraham and the God of Nahor judge between us.

54 And Jacob swore by the fear of Isaac his father.

It only remains to point out that the phenomena of this section suggest quite unusual damage to the ancestor of the Massoretic text. They also emphasize the value of the various Septuagintal authorities (not forgetting the pre-Hexaplar Ethiopic) and the Vulgate to the student of the text, and confirm the view that the Samaritan and Massoretic texts belong to the same recension, and that the two other texts come (in the main) from other recensions.

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SOME METHODS OF THEOLOGICAL CRITICISM.

IN the theological interest, I wish to direct the attention of readers of the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* on both sides of the Atlantic to specimens of uncritical dogmatisms in recent theological criticism. With the personality of the writers I have no concern, and I therefore leave them anonymous: I

am only concerned with their methods of criticism. It will be remembered that I recently reviewed in this Journal Dr. George Galloway's "Philosophy of Religion," pointing out some grave defects.¹ Some of these criticisms I repeated in the chapter on Theism contributed by me to the Life of Professor Flint, of which the author is the Rev. Dr. Donald Macmillan, a distinguished biographer and historian of the Church of Scotland. In passing, I strongly recommend this work² to the notice of readers. Since I wrote, one writer (in a weekly London paper) has declared Dr. Galloway's work an "unqualified success," and competent "from end to end," and so forth. Let these inflated judgments pass. But when he claims to speak for "the world," for "the Church," for "those who think deepest and know most," and for "all approved judges," we say, — What an avalanche of pontifical authority! Is this a new method, in the free British press, of attempting to make a "corner" in criticism? The unreasoned opinion of this writer is to be the sole and only opinion. I know what sensible men will say.

Another example of uncritical dogmatism, but happily free from the taint of intolerance in the previous case — so far at least as the notice goes — is a notice of the same work (in a London quarterly) by a writer who presumes, he says, to criticize only the first part of the work. But, after disclaiming all authority, he proceeds to deal with the second and third parts of the work, judging them, all the time, in the uncritical dogmatist's style of lo! mastery here, and lo! competence there. That is to say, the self-acknowledged incompetence or lack of authority in respect of all but the first part of the work, straightway proceeds in the other parts, out of the bosom of that self-acknowledged incompetence, to issue certificates of "mastery" and "competence"! Could absurdity further go?

I have no concern with these unreasoned dogmatisms further than to say that it might be inferred by some, from these

¹ July, 1914, pp. 494-495.

² Published by Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton, London.

methods of dogmatic pronouncement, that I had done some injustice to Dr. Galloway's book by my strictures. I therefore return to the subject to say not only that I adhere to everything I then said, but that, if anything, I understated the case. For example, I said nothing of his opening historic survey of the philosophy of religion, leaving that to be covered by my remark that Dr. Galloway's theological interests are not great. How true my remark was, that survey shows. When I first read it, I frankly own I thought it the most superficial, strangely inadequate, and most hopelessly unsatisfactory thing of the kind I had read in thirty years' study of subjects connected with the philosophy of religion. And I think so still. In it is neither learning, nor knowledge, nor insight, nor judgment. The German references are ludicrously meager and inadequate, and destitute of any sense of theological perspective. The same may be said of the English references, while American thought and theisms do not come at all within Dr. Galloway's ken. The work belongs to "The International Theological Library," which here means British-American. A more insulting treatment of American theological work and intelligence could hardly have been produced. This survey provided for Dr. Galloway a splendid opportunity, which he utterly missed, with irretrievable loss to "The International Theological Library." I am not alone in thinking Dr. Galloway's theological interests by no means great, for there are British experts who do think so, and other experts in this country who view the tendencies of his colorless theism to a bare ethical residuum unsatisfactory. But, if there were no others, I should hold my opinions and convictions just the same, speaking, however, only for myself, and not for "the world," or "the Church," or any other presumptuous claims.

Another point which I then referred to only under the general charge of subjectivity is Dr. Galloway's use of the theory of values, the perception of whose significance is wholly hid from the writer of the second notice I referred to. He thinks Dr. Galloway has given us a "demonstration"

of "the truth" of religion. He is quite innocent of the perception that in the use of worths or values, these, as such, are not objects of thought, and give not knowledge of objective reality. Without objective truth being thus reached, how can there be "demonstration" of "the truth" of religion? Values, as used by Dr. Galloway, are sure to prove deadening to the student, who will certainly think, from the monotonous and not very live character of the discussion, that the values are put before him to be accepted (not lived). But, in taking over the theology of valuations in the way he has done — God Himself figuring only as a value, "the supreme value" — Dr. Galloway has espoused, in my judgment, defective theology and bad philosophy. It involves a drop and a break from Scottish and from Reformed Theology, and from Church orthodoxy in general. These things do not concern me; but I mention them in passing. But I think that it is matter for great regret that, at a time when orthodox theologians in Germany were casting off the baleful influences of the theology of valuations, the "International Theological Library," which has hitherto, and deservedly, enjoyed high public confidence, should have made itself the vehicle of introducing, and distributing, such cast-off German theological garments in our British and American theological Halls, with consequences that may be far-reaching. A "value" Deity is merely a God for us, not God as Lord of All, or God as He is in and for Himself. Of course, we all hold God-for-us, in His grace and love. But to rest there, is to lower the Deity by making Him a means to human end. God is not to be cast into the scale of goods or values like any other value. It derogates from Deity thus to forget the things involved in His absoluteness. When we have so valued the Highest, we shall soon have Christ as a value, though Dr. Galloway does not pursue this, and other results. And I think no competent theologian will forget the significant words spoken by Lotze about making Christ the equivalent of a value judgment. I think American theologians would do well to leave this teaching of a diminished or "value"

Deity to such British teachers as find it satisfy their ideal of competence. They can afford to do so; they have much better of their own. It is not that I reject the philosophy of values; by no means; in the philosophical sphere — the sphere of our human idealisms — values have their use and importance and there, in their appropriate spheres, I welcome them. But there, their precise character and limits are observed; and there, I will venture to add, only an extremely small number of minds can write of them in a way that is living, and not deadening or repressive. In other cases, we get the forms, and the phrases, and the plausibilities — not the inspiration. Dr. Galloway's theology tends to be too minimal in character; his metaphysic also tends to be minimal (e.g., his treatment of causation and substance, and his ruling out all metaphysical relation and significance from Immortality): his epistemology, dominated by values, makes knowledge, in the religious sphere, minimal; his ethic is not so adequately supported as to be more than a more or less unsatisfactory residuum. It is out of such a conjunction of minimal tendencies that a theology of maximal strength, soundness, richness, is to arise!

Dr. Galloway is, in one sense, a retrograde theologian, inasmuch as he has moved from the stand for "the rights and progressiveness of reason," which marked his earliest efforts, to the steady distrust of reason, which marks the present work. It will be said that he holds to God as personal and as ethical; yes, so, too, did Ritschl, whose theology I have yet to learn was sound, consistent, and satisfactory. Many of Dr. Galloway's presentations are ably, clearly, and usefully presented; the section on evil, for example, is perhaps better than might have been expected; but to talk, in sheer strength of unreasoned dogmatism, of the work in whole as an "unqualified success," is to talk demonstrable nonsense, which, however, any one is at liberty to do, if and when he will, so far as I am concerned. As there has been a dearth of reasoned opinion in this country, I respectfully invite competent and independent American

theologians to verify anything I have said, and form their own conclusions.

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LETTER AND SPIRIT.

IN the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA for October, 1915, the Rev. E. S. Buchanan writes as follows: "Textual discoveries have set us free from slavery to the letter that killeth, and made us ready (let us hope) for a stricter obedience in the future to the life-giving Spirit of love and liberty" (p. 544).

This is one of several recent suggestions that the letter of Scripture can be put in antithesis to the spirit; and the text is thus used as though, somehow or other, the important point was not the letter but the spirit of Scripture. On this, two remarks may be made: (1) the text in 2 Cor. iii. 6 has no reference at all to the Scripture but to the law. The Apostle is not concerned with the letter of inspiration as opposed to the spirit; and to use it in this sense is to convey an entirely false idea of the passage. As in the corresponding passage in Romans ii., the Apostle is contrasting the letter of the law in the old covenant with the inward spirit which is the characteristic of the new covenant, showing that Christianity is not a matter of outward observance to the letter of the law, but an inward devotion to the spirit. (2) In addition to this, the question may fairly be asked, How is it possible to contrast the letter of Scripture with the spirit, whether we think of spirit in relation to man, or the Holy Spirit as the source? How are we to know the spirit except through the letter? How are we to get at the inspiration of the thoughts except by means of the words? If there is any authority in the thoughts it must surely be expressed in the words, and the objections often raised to the inspiration of words are just as valid against the inspiration of thoughts. In 1 Cor. xiv. 37 the Apostle writes: "If any man think himself to be a prophet, or spiritual, let him acknowledge, that the things that I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord."

Here is the human element, "the things that I write,"—the words. Here is the divine, "the commandments of the Lord,"—the authority behind. For these two reasons, I suggest that it is time we ceased to use 2 Cor. iii. 6 in the way now mentioned.

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DERIVATION OF HAMARTIA.

IN Dr. Estes' article on "The Religious Ideas Peculiar to Christianity" in the last number of the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* (Oct. 1915), he evidently objects (p. 658) to what he calls "the popular lexicology which finds the idea of sin in the ultimate derivation of the Greek word from a root meaning 'missing the mark,'" and he further speaks of this as "a bit of definition which would be purely ludicrous were it not for its possibly serious consequences." Does this mean that Dr. Estes objects *in toto* to the derivation of the Greek word, or is he simply concerned with its inadequacy as a definition of sin? I notice that Thayer in his lexicon gives this meaning as the primary idea of the word, and that the same view is favored, if not advocated, by Dr. Bernard in his article on "Sin" in Hastings's "Dictionary of the Bible." Further, Professor Zenos, in the "Standard Biblical Dictionary," gives the first meaning of the Greek as "error" or "missing the mark," and Murray's Dictionary says that it is the first meaning in Classical Greek. Everyone knows that "missing the mark" is not an adequate (because incomplete) view of sin; and if this is what Dr. Estes means, no one would disagree with him. But the wording of his statement seems to imply that the derivation itself is regarded as objectionable. The almost classical definition of sin is "any want of conformity to the will of God," and we know that the Apostle defines sin as "lawlessness" (1 John iii. 4). Surely, therefore, this may be regarded as giving at least one aspect of sin, as further illustrated by the well-known phrase "are coming short" (Rom. iii. 23, Greek).

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