

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTES.

DR. SANDAY AND MODERNISM.

It is with a sense of profound disappointment, and possibly painful astonishment, that many will read Dr. Sanday's recently published "Apologia" in reply to the Bishop of Oxford. The effect of the utterance will probably be greater in America than in Oxford, where Dr. Sanday's relaxing hold of the Apostolic Creed has for some time been known to his friends. There is a parallel in the case of Dr. Salmon, the late Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, who, like Dr. Sanday, departed in his last years from some articles of the faith that he once held and taught.

Is there a reason discoverable for Dr. Sanday's declension? It seems to lie in an imperfect realization of our human limitations. We are face to face with a formidable array of modern thinkers who fiercely assail the "supernatural," as they call the attested miracles of the Christian documents. These thinkers have at their head in Germany Dr. Harnack, and Dr. Harnack's position seems in the main to be that of Dr. Sanday. It is a position of compromise. Part of the Gospel story is true: part is false. To use Professor Burkitt's words to the present writer: "The Gospels are a mixture of good and bad."

Dr. Harnack will accept the Evangelists' account of the moral heights of the nature of the Son of God; but he will not accept their story of his miracles. Dr. Sanday has the same difficulty as Dr. Harnack. But if we grant that Christ is both Son of Man and Son of God, the difficulty about miracles vanishes. If we are told that a man, a simple peasant, with his own unaided hands lifted a ton weight, we are incredulous; but if we are told that the same peasant using a

steam crane lifted twenty tons, we merely remark, "There is no difficulty about believing that." So if we postulate *Manhood in conjunction with Godhead* — which has been the confession of the Christian church from the days of St. Paul until now — the whole difficulty of belief in miracles vanishes.

Christ is still the rock of offense and the stone of stumbling. The natural mind has from the beginning resisted the claim of Christ to omnipotence, voiced in the well-known utterance, "*All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth*" (St. Matt. xxviii. 18). Yet the whole Christian revelation is built on this foundation. The Arian position, taken up by Modernism, destroys the hope of the Christian, and therefore the hope of the world. Arius was deservedly detested by the generations that succeeded him for his blighting influence on churches and nations. His sudden and fearful end as recorded by the church historian Socrates is a fact that his followers have never attempted to disprove.

In his recent pronouncement, Dr. Sanday, in company with Dr. Harnack, comes dangerously near the intellectual position of Arius, and by his attitude of negation is proving before the world the truth of the words of the Lord Jesus: "*No one can come unto me except the Father [and the Holy Spirit] draw him.*" Pure reason can never lead the soul to Christ, which can only be the work of the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father. We know that St. Paul's utterances were dictated by the Holy Spirit; Dr. Harnack's and Dr. Sanday's utterances are dictated by their own human (and therefore fallible) minds, which, in contradicting parts of St. Paul's testimony, are opposing their own views to the mind of the Holy Spirit of God. The Apostles taught that we ought to obey God rather than men: Modernism, in exalting reason above revelation, proclaims that we ought to obey men (if they are experts) rather than God. It is a fearful position to take up. It is to jettison all the lifeboats and lifebelts that took our fathers safely to the shore, and to risk our all on the supposedly unsinkable ship of human critical judgment. It is to defy and deny the Ruler of the sea, and claim that we, who

are his creatures, have the same power that he has over the waves. It is to come near to the pride by which the angels fell; and to have forgotten the Apostle's warning that "*God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble*" (1 St. Peter v. 5).

And what, after all, is man? or what is man's knowledge? Can it vie with the knowledge of him who is in the bosom of the Father, whose handiwork we are, and whom unnumbered worlds obey? Dr. Sanday would be the last to claim for himself infallibility; but he actually sets his own judgments against eighteen centuries of Christian thought and experience which have testified, with St. John, that the Word of God is the Truth. Deeper truth, higher truth, than Christ himself, there can be none; and we incur a dread responsibility if, in the name of truth, we resist him who has declared himself to be the Truth, and without whom the whole human race would still be plunged in an outlook of despair and darkness.

Does Dr. Sanday realize that, by his attitude of negation towards some of the miracles of the New Testament, he is casting doubt upon them all? Does he realize that he is opening the door for a whole array of Despairs to enter the human heart and take possession? What is there left for the weary, the sinful, the heavy laden, if Christ be not what he claims to be — one in power and love with the Creator of the universe? An infirm Christ, or an erring Christ, or a fallible Christ can be no Saviour. He must be, both in descent and ascent, Higher and Mightier than we, if he is to lift us up to God.

If Christ in his human nature be not risen, we are still in (the power of) our sins, and all who have gone before us trusting in him have perished. But if he is thus risen — as our hearts tell us he is — then he is the first fruits of them that slept, and we shall follow him, and be with him — *His servants shall see his face, and his name shall be in their foreheads*. This is the goal of the Christian race. And if there is no bodily resurrection, there is no race to run, for there is no real or tangible goal.

There is power in the human intellect, influenced by the spirits of error, to dissolve by an intellectual solvent all the great facts recorded in the documents concerning the Son of God, on whom the world's salvation stands. But, thank God, there is also his Holy Spirit, whose work is to recombine and reconstruct the Person of Christ in our hearts. When we are led by the Spirit of God (as one of our poets has testified),

That One Face far from vanish rather grows,
Or decomposes but to recompose,
Become my universe that feels and knows.

We have been reminded recently that "man fleeth as it were a shadow." The great ship the Empress of Ireland has sunk with a human freight of nearly a thousand souls. Yesterday they were with us: to-day they are gone from us. Philosophy seeks in vain for an answer to the question "Whither are they gone?" But St. Paul, with his conception of Christ as his personal Saviour, can say, "*To me to live is Christ, and to die is gain*" (Phil. i. 21).

The faith of St. Paul has been the faith of thousands, yea, tens of thousands, in the past; and it is the faith of tens of thousands to-day. The faith in Christ of St. Paul gave him the victory over sorrow, over sin, and over death itself. In all tribulations he confessed that he triumphed through Christ, who loved him. Every conquest was achieved *in Christo*, and *per Christum*. This is still the only faith that saves humanity. The half-faith of Dr. Sanday leaves us at the mercy of life's cruel mutations.

Thank God, the faith of St. Paul — held to-day by millions in its entirety — is not their own discovery, but God's gift to them, *who hides from the wise and prudent what he reveals to babes* (St. Matt. xi. 25).

Dr. Sanday's work I have followed as a pupil for many years with loving interest; but when he leaves Christ for philosophy, his pupils dare follow him no further. All my own study of the documents of the Christian faith has but the more confirmed my mind in the conviction that we have a true

and unshakable historic basis for our belief in the Virgin birth and physical resurrection of Christ. Our feet stand on the Rock, and that Rock (which is Christ) will resist all the storms that beat upon it. Those who cling to the Rock will be saved in the time of flood; the others will be carried away. "It fell not, *because it was founded on the Rock.*" Its immovable Foundation was its salvation.

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DR. DRIVER ON THE NAMES OF GOD IN THE PENTATEUCH.

THE ninth edition of Dr. S. R. Driver's "Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament" contains some addenda including a discussion of some length on the Names of God in the Pentateuch avowedly in reply to Dahse and the present writer. The edition is dated October, 1913, but unfortunately I did not become aware of its existence till April, 1914. It is always unpleasant to have to controvert the views of one who has passed away, but it is extraordinarily unpleasant in a case where, as here, the author has for some years been employing questionable methods for the purpose of bolstering up a theory. Yet public duty demands that Dr. Driver's last work should not be allowed to pass unnoticed. I shall, however, deal with the matter as briefly as possible.

The first point to be noticed is that, though Dr. Driver wrote an answer to Dahse, he did *not* read the book he was answering. This is very evident from his argument on page xxxiii, where he proceeds on the assumption that Dahse has said nothing about the Joseph narratives, although a whole section of his book (*Textkritische Materialien*, pp. 122-143) is devoted to them, and a footnote (p. 129) hints at the possibility of further discussions in a future publication. In the footnote on page xxvi, too, Driver quotes "Dahse, as cited by Skinner." Had he troubled to read Dahse himself, he would have found most of his contentions answered by anticipation.

It is necessary to lay some stress on Driver's behavior in this matter, because there is a tendency to rely upon his judgment on the part of those who lack the leisure or the ability to examine these questions for themselves. It has been supposed that he was a reliable and competent expert who reached his conclusions only after careful and exhaustive study. This, however, is by no means the case. For, as already remarked, in this discussion Driver did *not* even read the work he professed to answer, and he gravely misrepresented Dahse's attitude, as also the positions of most other conservatives. His expressed opinion, therefore, deserves no more weight than that of anybody else who undertakes to pronounce judgment on matters of which he is ignorant.

A large part of Driver's discussion is occupied with an outline of Skinner's arguments in the *Expositor*, and in view of the replies that appeared in that magazine (December, 1913) and the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* (April, 1914), it is unnecessary for me to deal with this here. In the rest, Driver contributes little that is new. For the most part, he repeats old platitudes and arguments that have been effectively answered time and again. But a couple of points require notice. In November, 1910, Driver wrote some addenda to his "Genesis." These were reviewed by me in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* for October, 1911 (pp. 713 ff.). To my certain knowledge, Driver read this review; for I sent it to him in proof, and we had some correspondence about it. Now I find that there are a couple of passages where this review has led him to modify what he had already written.

On page 716 I wrote as follows: "Even Dr. Driver himself lets the cat out of the bag on the next page. He is arguing that the distinction between the Divine appellations is of very little importance, and he writes: 'In view of the smaller number of criteria distinguishing J and E, the varying use of the Divine names is of relatively greater importance for the analysis of JE than it is for the separation of JE from P; but there are many cases in which it is not the only criterion on which critics rely for the purpose.' That is, Dr. Driver

well knows that there are many other cases in which it is the only criterion. (With regard to the other criteria he says no word as to the facts and arguments put forward in the article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October, 1910, to which his attention had so recently been directed.) ”

He has now modified his statement to escape this argument, and writes: “In view of the smaller number of criteria distinguishing J and E from each other, the varying use of the Divine names is of relatively greater importance for the analysis of JE than it is for the separation of JE from P; but *it is a mistake, which no well-informed writer should make, to represent it as the only criterion on which critics rely for the purpose*” (p. xxvii, my italics). Note that in his anxiety to save the critical theory he has avoided the implicit admission that the distinction in the Divine appellations is in many cases the only criterion on which critics rely. Yet he knew as well as any man that this was in fact so, and he never attempted to put forward any reply to the concrete cases that I had advanced in “*Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism.*” This sort of statement prevents the whole truth from reaching his readers and all who could be influenced by his opinion.

Another point on which Driver's attitude is similar must be shortly noticed. In his *Genesis Addenda* he remarked that, in using Septuagintal material, it was necessary to show: (1) that the variant really rested on a Hebrew original; and (2) that it was preferable to the Massoretic reading. He added: “It is impossible to think that, with at most two or three exceptions, in the instances adduced by Mr. Wiener these conditions are satisfied, or that there is any reason for supposing that the variants contained in them cast doubt upon the readings of the Massoretic Text.” To this I replied (pp. 720 f.): “Dr. Driver omits to explain how condition (1) can be more completely satisfied than by producing a Hebrew text containing the variant, which, as already remarked, I have done in twenty-seven cases, besides producing other corroboration in some other instances. As to condition (2) I have shown in at least eleven cases that the variant is super-

ior to M. T. (*op. cit.*, pp. 17 f.), and Dr. Driver has not found the heart to discuss any of them! That is what his 'at most two or three [unspecified] exceptions' is worth!" Now he has slightly modified his phraseology and says: "hence, except in a *very* few cases, quite insufficient to invalidate the general trustworthiness of the Mass. text, it is impossible to admit that in the variants adduced by Wiener and Dahse the two conditions mentioned above are satisfied, or that there are any sufficient reasons for holding that they cast doubt upon the readings of the Mass. text." In a footnote to the "*very* few cases" he refers to Skinner on xiv. 22; xxxi. 42, 53. Though he does not say so, these three are among the eleven I had adduced, and to that extent he has admitted my contention. The other instances he still does not discuss, except by repeating Skinner on xvi. 11; and of the passage (xxviii. 20) where Skinner had admitted Dahse's contention he says nothing at all. Once more he is found misleading his readers.

With regard to the importance of the question of the supposititious "P," Driver speaks with two voices. On the one hand, he writes that "Elohim is but *one* out of more than *fifty* phraseological criteria alone": on the other, he continues to contend (p. 21) that the Tetragrammaton in Gen. xvii. 1; xxi. 1b must be due to "the compiler or even a scribe," on the ground that the only alternative is that "an inference, dependent upon an *abundance* of criteria, extending throughout the entire Pentateuch, should be a mistaken one." With this passage too I had pressed him in reviewing his Genesis Addenda (Oct. 1911, p. 717), and here again he can say nothing. For the rest his other forty-nine criteria possess no force whatever. Thus to take the very first of them (LOT, p. 131, No. 2) "kind" (כִּי). He cites a number of passages in which it occurs, and, after some references to Leviticus, he adds: "Hence Deuteronomy xiv. 13, 14, 15, 18." Now *ex hypothesi* the Deuteronomist lived *before* the priestly writer. Either therefore he succeeded in plagiarizing what did not come into existence for centuries after his death or else both D and

P drew on existing material. In either case it cannot be contended that the word differentiates either of the supposititious documents from the other. But there is just this much truth in the critical contention. The text of the Pentateuch has been heavily glossed by men who loved to repeat familiar phrases, and this is in part responsible for the unnecessary iteration of old familiar tags that add nothing to the sense but detract from the beauty and simplicity of the narrative.

A further illustration of this may not be without interest. Simultaneously with this edition of Driver's Introduction I received a book published by the Cambridge University Press entitled "Joshua the Hebrew and Greek Texts" (which I hope to notice hereafter). It is by Mr. S. Holmes, of Jesus College, Oxford, and Dr. Driver read the proofs. Now Mr. Holmes's thesis is that the Greek Joshua is better than the Massoretic, and on an early page (5) I find him arguing for that superiority on the ground that in chapter xix. there is a sixfold omission of "after their families" and a fourfold omission of "tribe." (He might have strengthened his argument by considering the testimony of the Vulgate.) I turn to Driver's fifty phraseological marks, and I find that "after their families" is No. 13 on the list. It is not exclusively P (occurring, for instance, also in JE), but the bulk of the occurrences are in P. In a footnote he argues that it is "the frequency of the combination which causes it to be characteristic of a particular author," and that it was of course known to JE. Now what becomes of this argument, if, in a single chapter of Joshua, where it occurs twelve times, the LXX is to be preferred in omitting it six times? Of course the LXX itself does not necessarily represent the original in this matter. The phrase may originally have been inserted by a glossator in one or two passages and have found its way into the remainder through successive amplifications, some of them earlier than the separation of the Egyptian text. The other word—the phrase used for tribe—occurs in Driver's 45, where it is claimed that "P" "nearly always" has this and not the synonym. If it is due to glossing four times in a

single chapter, how can any weight be attached to the statistics of the relative occurrence of the two words in "P"?

It is unnecessary to deal further with this note of Driver's, except to protest, in conclusion, against his false assumption that, apart from the question of the Divine appellations, no vital point in the critical position had ever been rendered insecure. No man had better reason than Driver to know that arguments had been put forward against the Wellhausen position which neither he nor any of his colleagues could answer. Whatever may have been the sincerity of his original convictions, in latter years, in reliance on the enormous vested interests in the Universities and elsewhere which are committed to Wellhausenism, he trusted entirely to his power to ignore all opponents.

HAROLD M. WIENER.

"STUDIES IN THE SEPTUAGINTAL TEXTS OF LEVITICUS."

MR. NORMAN McLEAN, one of the editors of the larger Cambridge Septuagint, has kindly furnished me with additional information on two of the points touched on in the articles which appeared under this heading.

On page 500 of the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* for July, 1913, I spoke of the importance of the MS. of Genesis which Holmes cited as 20, and which appeared to present the text used by Chrysostom. Mr. McLean writes that "this Codex Dorothei is no longer in existence, or at any rate is unable to be traced. I made a great effort to find if anything was known of it in Russia and even wrote to the late Monsieur Pobiedonostseff, but he was unable to help me."

On page 525 I said that no MS. containing the text of ejsvz extended beyond the Octateuch. Mr. McLean writes: "As a matter of fact our Manuscript e contains not only the Octateuch but also Kings, Chronicles, Esdras, Esther, Judith and Maccabees. You are right as regards the others, but of course there are Catena Manuscripts of Kings and later books, which, I imagine, contain the same sort of text." My statement in regard to e followed Swete on page 149 of the

second edition of his Introduction, which now stands in need of correction on this point.

H. M. W.

DOES THE OLD TESTAMENT CONTAIN TRACES OF
ANIMISM?

UNDER this caption a deeply interesting brochure has just appeared from the pen of the Rev. G. C. Aalders, D.D., which not only adds another name to the list of Dutch scholars whose able articles in defense of the integrity of the Old Testament have been given a place of late in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, but is also a notable contribution to the growing literature upon this subject. Modern thought takes the religion of Israel as a part of the "science of religions," and infers that, since animism is (supposedly) the most ancient form of human religion, traces of it must appear in the sacred books of Israel. Says the author: "This involves the question between evolution and Revelation." He who believes that Israel is the people to whom were committed the oracles of God, and that Israel's religion was revealed by God himself, cannot accept the thought that animism in any form was ever a natural and normal link in the chain of development of the religious representations in Israel. But this does not end the matter.

It may be asked whether he who accepts revelation may take it, *a priori*, for granted that the Old Testament contains no traces of animism. He may deny that the religion of Israel developed in a natural way from such animism. But might it not be possible that among the several idolatries and superstitions which were repeatedly practiced in Israel, animistical representations and usages had a place? According to the sacred record itself, Israel's religion did not always harmonize with the revealed religion. Hence it is not correct to say that the acceptance of Revelation excludes, *a priori*, the possibility of animistical traces in the Old Testament.

But it may also be asked whether the rejection of Revelation and the acceptance of Evolution forces one to the other *a priori*, that the Old Testament must show traces of an earlier animism. The most radical Evolutionist may readily admit

that it is possible and thinkable that Israel's religious literature contains no convincing traces of animism, and yet be sure in his mind that at one time there was an animistic period in Israel.

At this point, therefore, Revelationists and Evolutionists may meet as men of science, who, objectively and without regard to any other question, face the question: Does the Old Testament show actual traces of animism? When it concerns facts, and not inferences or conclusions drawn from facts, liberal and conservative men of science can stand side by side. Facts are facts to us also who accept Revelation. Our unconditional belief in the Scripture does not alter the facts. Our interpretation and combination of facts are governed thereby, but the facts themselves we neither deny nor modify (p. 7). We also would know the facts and squarely look them in the face. Hence we confine ourselves to the question in its baldest form: Do we find in the Old Testament scientifically-supported data which show empirically the existence of animism in Israel?

The author takes animism in its widest sense, as including all phenomena which are related with the primitive conviction, religious or philosophical, of the existence and operations of spirit and spirits in nature; he takes animism as the collective name of the theory of soul stuff, ancestor worship, fetichism, totemism,—everything, in brief, that belongs to the primitive method of thought regarding spirit and spirits (p. 12). And after a cursory review of some less serious arguments in favor of animistic traces in the Old Testament, he divides those which are more serious into the following groups:—

In the first group are those which are derived from the representations of and the customs relating to death. This includes the Old Testament representations of the human soul and the state of the soul after separation from the body, the usages of mourning, necromancy, etc. The second group consists of those which indicate traces of fetichism, homage paid to sacred places, mountains, springs, stones, trees, and animals; the third consists of the proofs which are sought in

the name and the conception of *El* and *Elohim*; while the fourth group embraces the several other religious usages directly or indirectly, such as, the sacrifice, consecration or sanctification, the Mazzoth-Meal, the prohibition of pairing dissimilar animals, etc.

For lack of space we confine ourselves to the author's treatment of a part of the first group. What we call the psychology of the Old Testament, says he (p. 19), might point back to the animistic manner of thought. The *nephesh*, really the breath of man, is the life. This life originates in that the soul is breathed into the body formed from the dust of the ground. Again, the soul is taken as being bound to the blood. What there is of animism in this representation of the soul is not very evident. In his "Biblische Theologie," Stade declares: "The representations of men as nature beings are of a severely animistic stamp. But for this he gives no proof. The identification of soul and breath, and of soul and blood, may at most be taken as a naïve psychology, but it is no animism. Animism goes out from similar naïve psychological representations, but from this it does not follow that these naïve psychological representations must necessarily go hand in hand with animism. Animism is characterized by the belief in a special power exercised by souls or spirits" which must either be feared or sought. Had Israel stood on the level of that very naïve psychology, it would prove nothing regarding Israel's animism. It should first be shown that Israel also attributed this special exercise of power to souls or spirits.

But are the psychological representations in the Old Testament as naïve as some would have us think? The identity of soul and breath exists merely in the etymology of the Hebrew word *nephesh*, and this proves as little for psychological representations of Israel as the current use of the words "sunrise" and "sunset" marks us as adherents of the Ptolemaic instead of the Copernican system. Rather than teaching us the identification of soul and blood, the Old Testament gives us good grounds to believe that it distinguishes between the

purely animal, vegetable, and sensitive life and the higher life of the divinely inbreathed rational and immortal soul. Genesis ii. 7 can hardly intend to show anything else than the difference between what took place in the creation of man and of animals, and thus to differentiate the human soul from the animal soul. There is much to commend the thought, worked out by Professor Geesink, that Genesis ii. 7 puts the formation of man from the dust on a line with the formation of animals. Hence man partakes of the animal life, while the *nephesh* is characterized as a something higher which constitutes his superiority over the brutes. This representation far excels the primitive animistic manner of thought which puts the soul of all living things on a line with the soul proper. It is supported, moreover, by Leviticus xvii. 10-14, which bases the prohibition to eat blood upon the fact that the soul of the flesh is in the blood. But this deals with the soul of the animal. Hence it is not fair to quote this passage by itself as a proof that the Old-Israelitish thought identifies blood and soul. To be accurate, one should say: "The Old-Israelitish thought identifies blood and soul *in the case of an animal*. Oort himself was impressed with this. He acknowledges that this was taught directly of the animal only, but tries to include man by saying: 'From the nature of the case this applies equally to man.'" We consent to this in so far as man shares animal life. But the fact that the identity of soul and blood is expressly taught of the animal and not of man must have a reason.

But the prohibition to eat blood itself is made the proof of animism, since, according to the purely animistic view, no strange soul may be assimilated. Among animistic peoples blood is tabu in a very high degree because it contains an especially large amount of soul stuff. From the Old Testament prohibition to eat blood it is inferred that originally animism must have prevailed in Israel. Leviticus xvii. 11, however, states two reasons why blood should not be eaten. One is that the life of the flesh is in the blood, and the other: that the blood is an atonement upon the Altar. The first is

taken as the ground of the second. Animal blood makes atonement because the soul is in the blood. Hence the chief reason of the prohibition to eat blood is that the blood is applied to the Altar, and the reason of this application is that the soul is in the blood.

Now when Israel's legislation itself states these reasons for the prohibition to eat blood, what right can sanction the arbitrary substitution for these of others borrowed from animism? Evidently it is not the witness of the Old Testament itself which leads to the supposition that the animistic manner of thought was current in Israel, but the comparison with what is found among other peoples. Suppose Israel had customs and morals in common with other peoples, must the same thought necessarily lie at the root of them in both cases? May not certain customs have an outward, formal likeness and yet be essentially of an altogether different character? And when the Old Testament expressly states the reason for a custom which is also common to other peoples, what scientific necessity can demand, that this Old Testament witness be ignored, in order to put in its place a motive borrowed from those of other peoples?

Summing up the matter on page 60, the author says: "The results arrived at are fairly negative. Actual traces to prove empirically the presence of animism in Israel cannot be shown. This does not say that there never have been traces of an animistic manner of thought in Israel. Falling away from the revealed religion the popular belief of the people may have contained certain animistic representations, though this cannot be stated as fact. In any case we may be sure that these animistic representations have never exerted any far-reaching influence in the life of the people. If they were present they were undoubtedly highly sporadic. We reach this conclusion by the lack of actual traces of these animistic ideas in the Old Testament, and also by the general consideration that there is no hint in the canon of animism as such or of warnings against its practices. This fact, which no one can deny, places us before the dilemma that either animism

and the service of Jehovah tolerantly existed side by side (Eerdmans), which is absurd, or that animism did not prevail in Israel, save perchance in a measure of absolute insignificance."

"But this we venture to assert, that the usual description of the animistic basis of the Israelitish religion lacks every foundation *in fact*. This description bears a purely hypothetical character. Does not Kautzsch himself, in his exposition of the 'Traces of a pre-Mosaic Religion of Israel' in Hastings's Dictionary, declare: 'That in almost every instance we have here to deal with hypotheses and not with facts, so that our task will be in reality to determine the greater or smaller degree of probability attaching to any hypothesis?'" Would that every one were ready to acknowledge this as frankly as he. But, alas, experience teaches that Gruneisen is almost too gentle when he says: 'We should not judge the defenders of the animistic theory too harshly for not deriving their conviction from the study of the Old Testament, for they lay no claim on this.' 'I know,' says Eerdmans, 'that there are those who do not like to see a world of thought, long passed into the background, unveiled, or at least deem it of little importance.' Does not this carry the imputation that they who do not agree with the author willfully close their eyes before an unquestionable truth which he has brought to light? In the face of this I repeat, with Kautzsch, that, with respect to this question of Animism in Israel, we have to deal with hypotheses and not with facts, and thereby maintain the scientific right of those who bow before facts, but refuse to yield to hypotheses which are devoid of good grounds and unacceptable to the consciousness of faith."

Interesting, however, and helpful as articles of this kind are, one cannot help but wonder not only that there is need of them, but also that this need is really very great.

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WAS ST. PAUL IN PRISON AT EPHESUS?

WHERE was the Apostle Paul when he wrote to the Philippians to thank them for their bounty, and when he sent the runaway Onesimus back to Philemon, bearing the scrap of papyrus that contained the appeal to his master in behalf of the newly converted slave? Plainly enough, he was somewhere in prison (Philemon 1; Phil i. 13). It has been usual to assume that, of two possible alternatives, namely, Cæsarea (Acts xxiv. 27) and Rome (Acts xxviii. 30), the second is to be chosen. There seems to be, however, good ground for saying that neither of these two places answers all the requirements as well as a third, namely, Ephesus; for, while there is no direct statement in the New Testament that Paul was in prison at Ephesus, there is much indirect testimony which, collectively, is very cogent.

That Paul was imprisoned more than twice, or even thrice, is implied in his expression "in prison more abundantly" (2 Cor. xi. 23). In the same Epistle (2 Cor. i. 8), which was probably written soon after Paul's three-year residence in Ephesus (Jülicher), he speaks of an affliction in Asia, which weighed him down exceedingly, in which he despaired even of life. And in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (xv. 32), written while at Ephesus, Paul mentions a circumstance not elsewhere alluded to, namely, that he fought with wild beasts at Ephesus.

The sixteenth chapter of Romans was doubtless a short letter addressed to the church or individuals at Ephesus. Instances of such brief letters of commendation, with monotonous repetition of greetings, are found among recently discovered papyri.¹ In this chapter it is stated that Aquila and Prisca had laid down their own necks for Paul's life (ver. 4). It is likely that this unexplained act of devotion to the Apostle at a crucial hour occurred in Ephesus, and that they were at Ephesus when this greeting came to them. For, as is well known, this worthy couple left Rome before 50 A.D. at the

¹ See Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East*, pp. 158, 226, for examples.

edict of Claudius, and went to Corinth, whence they went with Paul to Ephesus (Acts xviii. 2, 18, 26). In view of the hypothesis that Paul was imprisoned at Ephesus, the expression "Andronicus and Junia . . . my fellow-prisoners" (Rom. xvi. 7) is significant.

An examination of the letter to Philemon reveals some evidence to support the theory of an Ephesian imprisonment. Paul expresses his intention to visit Philemon soon. He asks that a lodging be prepared (Philem. 22). Had Paul been at Rome in prison at that time, he could not have expected to reach Colossæ in the near future, for his plan was to push on toward Spain (Rom. xv. 24, 28), and he doubtless fulfilled that plan. A study of travel conditions in the first century A.D. makes the supposition probable that Onesimus, when he ran away, would go to Ephesus rather than undertake the arduous and expensive journey to Rome. Note the difficulty and danger that attended Paul's own journey thither.

The existence of a ruin whose masonry dates from a period preceding the Apostolic Era, and which bears the local name of "Paul's Prison" (*φυλακὴ Παύλου*) is taken by Professor Deissmann of Berlin, and many others, as an additional piece of evidence to support this view.

If the letter to Philemon was written from Ephesus, it is likely that the affectionate epistle to the church at Philippi was also written from that city of Diana. Timothy is included in the address of Philippians (i. 1), and it is known that he was Paul's helper during the Asiatic ministry (Acts xix. 22; 2 Cor. i. 1), but Timothy was probably not with Paul in Rome. Luke and Aristarchus were the Apostle's fellow travelers on his voyage (Acts xxvii. 1, 2), and it is quite certain that Timothy was ministering elsewhere when Paul was undergoing his last imprisonment at Rome, as the two Epistles to Timothy witness.

Furthermore, while imprisoned at Rome, Paul was at liberty to preach the gospel (Acts xxviii. 30), for he lived in his own hired house. But while undergoing the severe trial at which he hints in his letter to the Philippians, he himself

is not free to preach, although others, some with one spirit and some with another, are preaching the Word (Phil. i. 12 ff.). There might have been a good reason why he did not describe minutely his troubles. The Philippians evidently know the details of "the things which happened" to him (i. 12). For a somewhat regular exchange of letters and messengers was taking place, as was the case when Paul was in Thessalonica (iv. 16). At least one other letter is assumed in iii. 1. Epaphroditus has been sent to them and has returned (iv. 183). Timothy is shortly to follow (ii. 19). Paul expects to hear again from them soon, to know how they flourish. From such a distance as Rome this regular exchange of correspondence and messengers could hardly be maintained. In ii. 24 the Apostle expresses his intention, if Providence permit, to see the church at Philippi himself "shortly." But on the supposition that he was at this time in Rome, the same clash with his announced plan to visit Spain occurs as seen above.

We do not understand that during his first imprisonment at Rome Paul entertained any fear of an adverse decision. His appeal to Cæsar was taken with the confidence that he had done nothing worthy of death. Even the Roman officials agreed in this (Acts xxvi. 32). But when he writes the Epistle to the Philippians he is in prison (Phil. i. 13), and is apparently facing a crisis which may result in his death (i. 21 ff.). He weighs the advantages of living or dying. He is "in a strait betwixt two." But he hopes to live, believing that he is needed still in the development of the European churches. In this "strait" the Christians at Philippi are following his course sympathetically (i. 7; iv. 14), and send him a present to help him in his time of trial. Note also Paul's expression, "sorrow upon sorrow" (ii. 27).

It is true that this supposition of an imprisonment at Ephesus may be discredited in some quarters by an appeal to the fact that nothing of a specific statement of it appears in the New Testament. But it must be recalled that there is very little related of the events that attended Paul's three-year

ministry at Ephesus. There is the encounter with the seven sons of Sceva, who tried to imitate Paul's works (Acts xix. 13 ff.), but this cannot be what Paul refers to in his speech to the elders at Miletus (xx. 19), namely, "trials which befell me by the plots of the Jews." Nor can the uproar caused by Demetrius the silversmith be thought of as the cause of "many tears"; for Acts xix. 30 leads one to believe that Paul was not in the midst of that disturbance. On the supposition that it was necessary for Paul to use discretion in referring to his imprisonment at Ephesus, may it not be that there is a veiled reference to it in the remark to the Ephesian elders, as he leaves them at Miletus, "And now I go bound in the spirit unto Jerusalem"?

The reference in Phil i. 13 to the Prætorium has been supposed to point conclusively to Rome. But the word is constantly used to designate royal residences, as witness Matt. xxvii. 27; John xviii. 28, 33; xix. 9; Acts xxiii. 35. These Prætorja are palaces of Roman governors. The Prætorium of Phil i. 13 may easily have been at Ephesus.

The expression "those of Cæsar's household" also offers a slight objection to the Ephesian hypothesis. But it is possible that the term includes slaves and freedmen of the royal family who lived elsewhere than at Rome. Very likely such persons formed special groups in the Christian communities at large centers of Roman authority.

Pauline chronology is one of the difficult problems of New Testament criticism. Results attained stand constantly in need of revision. In this essay only two of the Apostle's letters have been considered; but if the above argument be sustained by further investigation, it is likely that the accepted dates of some other Epistles may be revised. If the above exposition does not convince, it at least offers matter for serious study. The supposition of an imprisonment suffered by Paul at Ephesus has advantages that commend it to all students of New Testament chronology.

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