A LAYMAN'S VIEW OF THE CRITICAL THEORY.

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I.

The critical theory here referred to began with Genesis. It was not long before it was applied to the Pentateuch, and it has since been extended in various directions. It assumes that certain ancient documents are of much later date than has ordinarily been supposed and that they are really compilations from different sources by other than their traditional authors. While its scope has been so broadened as to include not only additional books of the Old Testament but also some other ancient writings outside of the Hebrew Scriptures, the Pentateuch has been made so prominent in the general discussion that the words, "The Critical Theory," at once suggest it; and this paper will therefore have special reference to that portion of the Bible and the application of the theory to it.

Before proceeding to the elucidation of the matter in hand, it is necessary to deal with certain preliminary questions; for many will at once assume that a layman has no business to have any views on this subject, to begin with, and that he is inexcusably presumptuous if he dares to express them. This, at least, appears to be the case, if one may judge from the attitude of some members of the clergy when a layman ventures to mention the subject. To meet the difficulty, it will be necessary to speak with the utmost frankness and direct-
necessity, a thing from which modern usage makes one's whole nature instinctively shrink, unless it is a positive necessity. When such is the case, it should settle the matter, and the plunge should be made without further ado.

It has already been made clear in these pages⁴ that the critical theory originated with a layman. Jean Astruc, a French medical writer, born in 1684, occupied a professor's chair, but he had no affiliations with the clergy as such. The "Century Dictionary" has this to say of him:

"His most celebrated work is 'Conjectures sur les mémoires originaux, dont il paraît que Moïse s'est servi pour composer le livre de la Genèse' (Brussels, 1753), in which he divided the book of Genesis into two parts on the basis of the use of Elohim or Yahweh (Jehovah) as the name of God, holding that this difference in usage pointed to the fact that Genesis was made up of two parallel, independent narratives. His memoir formed the starting-point of modern criticism of the Pentateuch."

This should make it tolerably clear that the whole matter began as a layman's question. The work referred to was published in 1753, as stated, and a few years later, in 1780, J. G. Eichhorn, then a young man of twenty-eight, dignified the theory by adding thereto the epithet, "Higher Criticism," a term which still retains its hold upon the minds of those who advocate the documentary hypothesis. It seems to imply an intellectual superiority of a certain sort, and this is quietly appropriated, with more or less complacency, by many, as a kind of prerogative of the critical school.

What possible relation such a form of criticism can have to Theology, properly so-called, it is hard to see; for it claims the right to speculate upon and determine the origin, history, authenticity, character, etc., of the literary productions with which it deals, a procedure which has and can have nothing whatever to do with genuine theological ques-

tions. It is a matter of language, primarily; for style, including diction and phraseology, and the use of particular words and phrases, together with a consideration of the content of the linguistic expressions involved, form the ultimate basis, in the last analysis, for all the conclusions that are reached. The entire question, then, is a problem for linguists, not for theologians, except in so far as they are also linguists; and any man with a good linguistic training and a modicum of common sense has a right to an opinion on this subject. No man devoid of either of these things has such a right; for the mere fact that he is well versed in the teachings of any given text does not necessarily justify him in forming an opinion as to its origin, and any lack of balance in the domain of inductive reasoning is fatal, in the very nature of the case, to sound judgment in all such problems. This much should be self-evident.

Whether the writer is possessed of common sense or not must be determined by an examination of his literary productions. "By their fruits ye shall know them." When this question has been settled, it becomes a mere matter of his linguistic standing. But if a man has spent five years in postgraduate work at the Johns Hopkins University, beginning with a Greek major and ending with a Sanskrit one, it is, perhaps, safe to assume that he belongs in the general class designated by the term "linguist." If, in addition to this, he has succeeded in securing his doctor's degree and has later been made a charter member of the Phi Beta Kappa, it would tend to indicate that the university so regarded him, nor would the fact that a curious and unaccountable blunder in the Phi Beta Kappa Handbook placed his membership in an institution in Iowa which he never attended, militate against that conclusion. And, finally, if his thesis consisted
in the editing of some corrupt Sanskrit MSS., there is a furthur presumption that he was expected to become a member of the class referred to. The commendations of Kaegi, Pischel, and Wackernagel, bestowed upon the completed work, would not refute this conclusion.

As the course pursued was necessarily much more severe than that offered by a theological seminary, it is hardly presumption to suppose that any man who has taken it is at least on a par with ordinary ministers in the right to an opinion on the critical theory, and if he has a right to an opinion he also has a right to express it. There may be those who are disposed to question this right on the ground that the field covered has not been Semitic; but the futility of such a contention must be apparent when it is remembered that the fundamental principles of the "lower" or textual criticism, on which the "higher" criticism must ultimately rest, are the same for all languages. They are well defined and are no longer subject to dispute. As a linguist, then, the writer ventures to believe that he has solid ground under his feet in deciding to say what he thinks on this question.

His attention was first drawn to the matter in the Greek seminary, where the theory of Wolf was carefully considered. At that time the classical world was still in a state of unrest concerning the authenticity of Homer, and Professor Gildersleeve stood almost alone in his conviction that the poems were not a compilation from the works of various rhapsodists, as Wolf had taught for nearly thirty years and his followers had believed for over sixty more, but were, in fact, what tradition had always held them to be, the product of a master mind. With practically no supporters, Gildersleeve was holding his ground and holding it firmly, although he was doing so with extreme modesty and was giving his men
every opportunity to study the evidence presented by the other side. When he finally showed up the weaknesses of the linguistic argument, however, few of us had any question left as to the soundness of his conclusions or the utter unreliability of those of the opposition.

Quite recently an American scholar, Professor John A. Scott, has taken the pains to carry out to the bitter end the principles laid down by the school of Wolf. A brief report of his work can be found in the "Proceedings of the American Philological Association" (1909, p. lxxxiii). When all the material had been gathered together and the various forms of the language had been carefully sifted, as consistency demanded, the two poems showed the same stage of linguistic development; and, incidentally, most of the critical conclusions were found to be reversed, if the accepted canons were allowed to stand. The results have been generally accepted as final, and the late Mr. Andrew Lang, a well-known authority, admitted frankly in the London Morning Post that he had been convinced by them that the higher criticism of Homer was bankrupt. The world is coming back to the position of Professor Gildersleeve; and his judgment, which is recognized by all his pupils as something almost uncanny in its keenness and accuracy, is abundantly justified. Wolf and his followers had used a part of the material to prove one thing. Scott found that the rest proved the opposite. Together, each neutralized the other, and it appeared that the two poems were really of the same age and that they did not show the differences claimed by the critics. So far as Homer is concerned, then, the higher criticism is seemingly dead beyond any power of resuscitation and it only remains to attend the obsequies.¹

In this connection another matter may be mentioned. It was during the same winter in Baltimore, at a regular session of the Greek seminary, that we had a most impressive lesson. A grim smile lit up the professor’s face as he entered the room, and we knew that something unusual was coming. He sat down and spoke somewhat as follows:

‘I am going to take you into the sanctum sanctorum this morning, Young Gentlemen, and teach you how to make a reputation. “There are tricks in all trades”—but ours. Ours is all tricks. First, you are to get a plausible theory. Then work it up and publish. When you come to a point that is generally believed but that no one can possibly prove, say, “Every schoolboy knows.” When you reach one that you think is so, but you know that you cannot prove, say, “It is incontrovertible that.” You will soon have a call with a large salary, and it will take some other man, or men, twenty years or more to work the thing out and get at the truth. Meanwhile, you will have had your fine place and will have enjoyed a great reputation. When the other man at last appears, people will say: “Who is this little upstart? What does he know about it anyway? Doesn’t the great Professor So-and-so say such and such things?” By the time he succeeds in getting recognition, you will be dead and won’t care what happens; but,—

He stopped speaking, and the ominous sound of that “but” produced a silence that could be felt. Then he went on with a solemnity never to be forgotten:

‘Young Men, if you want to do anything worth while, anything that will last, don’t you work that way.’

Whatever others may have felt, one man in that assembly had his life motto given him that day. It was this: Better one piece of work well done that will remain when I am gone, even if it receives no recognition during my lifetime, than a library of books that must be relegated to the rubbish heap when I depart from this life and can no longer advocate their teachings.
The next experience with the critical theory occurred some years later, when a young Jewish friend came to my house for a brief visit. He was fresh from the seminary, and his head had been completely turned by the teachings of the higher critics. He could talk of nothing else. The satisfaction that he obtained was small, however, as he was met with the reply: "I have been through this under Gildersleeve in connection with Homer, and there is nothing in it." "Yes: but you haven't read Driver's 'Hexateuch.' If you had, you wouldn't say that." "Well, bring on your Driver, and I'll read it and accept what he says, if he proves his point squarely." The book was produced forthwith, and the reading was begun with a grim determination to know the truth. Every word was carefully weighed, and every example had to stand the test of a critical analysis.

Every one, without exception, broke down under the strain, and the book failed to show a single case in which the hypothesis that was put forward was necessary as an explanation of the facts. Instance after instance appeared, in which from one to five other explanations were easily discernible, and, as a rule, one or more of the other possibilities was not only more natural but also more simple and more probable than the one advanced. In spite of this condition of things, it was quietly assumed, without variation, that the hypothesis selected to account for the facts was the only possible one in the premises, and the inference was drawn accordingly.

To a logician this could have but one meaning. If the book were rewritten in syllogistic form, it would be unable to offer its readers a single three-legged syllogism from cover to cover. Every one, with monotonous regularity, would contain an ambiguous middle of some sort. But a syllogism
with such a middle term is not worth the paper on which it is written, and every tyro in logic must be aware of this peculiarity of ratiocination. No surrender to the critics was found necessary, and my Jewish friend has had nothing to say to me on this subject for over fifteen years in conse-

1Take, for example, the words, "unto this day." The reasoning will then be as follows. The expression, "unto this day," indicates a late origin for any document in which it occurs; it occurs in the Pentateuch; therefore the Pentateuch is late or post-exilic. This is a beautiful fallacy; for the middle term is anything but definite. The possibilities are of two sorts, and each has at least four subdivisions; for the words may be either original or an interpolation, and the time of composition may vary widely. Restricting the periods to the smallest number compatible with the facts, the possibilities are at least eight, namely:—(1) the words may be an integral part of a tradition or of an ancient document, as they sometimes evidently are (see below), which had been handed down for generations and was ultimately incorporated by Moses into his narrative, or (2) they may be an interpolation in such a tradition or document after its incorporation; then (3) they may be an integral part of some record made or some tradition begun during or soon after the conquest and later put into the present narrative, or (4) they may be an interpolation in such a record or tradition after it became part of the Pentateuch; furthermore, (5) they may be an integral part of some official record made in the days of the kings and then utilized as material for a connected history or they may be an editorial addition to such a record when so used, as appears from First and Second Kings, which Jeremiah may have compiled, or (6) they may be an interpolation in such a compilation, and, finally, (7) they may be what the critics imagine them to be, an integral part of a narrative made up from different sources in post-exilic times, as the Chronicles almost certainly were; or (8) they may possibly be an interpolation in such a narrative. If the first and second possibilities are now ruled out, as in a class by themselves and therefore not likely to be confused with the others, the syllogism will still have as many legs as a spider and be just about as interesting. It is a Paralogism in Extension, belonging to the group \textit{datisi} of Figure III, and is what is known as a Fallacy of over-hasty generalization. The fallacy consists in the failure to recognize the existence of any possibility but the seventh, although the eight given by no means exhaust the list. Thinkers ought not to be caught in this trap.
quence. For my own part, I am still puzzled to know whether I ought to admire Dr. Driver more for his quiet assurance in utterly disregarding all established rules in textual matters or for his wonderful nerve in persistently putting forward, to the exclusion of well-established principles, his own premises as if they provided the only tenable basis for sound reasoning in such a connection. Did he do this wittily, or was it a matter of honest ignorance?

This may seem like strong language, but it is the unvarnished truth, and there is no way of avoiding it to all appearance. The conditions actually found were exactly as stated above, and the silence of fifteen or more years has finally become oppressive. It did not seem to be any business of mine to take part in this discussion, and the thing was studiously avoided, until it began to look like arrant cowardice to remain quiet while others were blufféd into silence against their better judgment. The club usually employed for this purpose is the stereotyped phrase, "The assured results of modern scholarship." Whatever may be the general opinion on this subject, it can be truthfully said that one of the assured results — about the only indisputable one, in fact, and one that is painfully evident — is the insufferable arrogance, which this phrase is made to cover, inasmuch as it goes so far as to assume not only that the higher critical position is impregnable but also that no man who is a scholar would think of questioning its tenets.

The foundation upon which this assumption is based, can be formulated in another stereotyped phrase. Men constantly offer it as a final word in the matter. They say, "It explains so many things." To a casual observer, the documentary theory does explain many things; but no one can dig very deeply into the subject without discovering that
this explanation is only apparent and that it rests on nothing substantial. In time, it must begin to dawn upon the mind of the careful seeker after truth that the supposed explanation is a myth,—colossal in its proportions, indeed, but still a myth and one that is susceptible of a clear and satisfactory elucidation. The explanation that is afforded, is, in fact, as all other myths are, merely a fortuitous attempt to remove a difficulty; and it is based, as myths usually are, on a faulty conception of the premises together with an ignorance of underlying facts.

That Moses made use of older documents and of traditions that had already attained to a great age, no one will deny, since not only the Pentateuch but also every other literary production of the human race has involved this peculiarity. No book of any length was ever produced, of which a similar statement could not be made in a general way. To deny it is to assume for some one a degree of originality, of which divinity alone is capable. But if Moses made use of material already at hand, as he undoubtedly did, he simply showed the normal good sense that it is imperative for a leader to possess. To suppose that God would select a man who did not contain within himself such a capacity is to discount the divine intelligence, and that Moses did have all that is implied in these remarks is made clear by the internal evidence of the books themselves.

Five years before the discovery of the laws of Hammurabi, a paper appeared in these pages in which it was stated that "an early stratum of praë-Mosaic antiquity" was embodied in the "Sinaitic Code" of laws. The evidence adduced by Hayman in support of this contention seemed conclusive at the time, but it remained for the discoveries of 1901 to con-
firm his diagnosis. These revealed a set of similar statutes in use among the Babylonians, and the laws thus restored to history were doubtless duplicated elsewhere, at least in their general substance. They were therefore probably paralleled in the legislative enactments of Egypt, with which Moses must have been familiar, and some knowledge of which the people must likewise have possessed. Being a sensible man, he took these well-known legal forms as a basis for the new legislation and adopted the very phraseology of the enactments of past experience as far as that was possible. This, at least, is what the evidence seems to indicate. It was sufficient for the divine purpose to modify the spirit of the whole, and God does not demand unreasonable or impossible progress of any age.

The explanation thus afforded of Pentateuchal peculiarities must not be confused with the "documentary theory"; for that assumes a late compilation, post-exilic in character and more or less artificial, while this does nothing of the sort. It merely assumes that Moses was human and had what we moderns call common sense. If those who deal with this subject would bear this in mind, it would remove many unnecessary complications, and it might then be possible to reach a sound and generally acceptable solution of the problem.

In this connection, certain propositions, which are sufficiently self-evident to be called axiomatic, may be laid down. They are, essentially, the canons of validity by which all such theories must be judged.

1. No explanation of a difficulty can be regarded as satisfactory, if it produces other difficulties worse than itself.

2. No theory can be received as tenable, unless it offers a better solution for the problems involved than any other hypothesis that has been suggested in the premises.
3. No hypothesis can claim to be pertinent, if it can be shown that such a supposition is not necessary as a means of accounting for the facts.

4. No rejection of known and well-established principles of textural criticism can be permitted to take place for the sake of bolstering up a proposition of any sort or kind.

5. No proposition can assume to be final, if it has not taken cognizance of all the facts, including what may be termed the infinitesimals.

6. No assumption of reliability in results, where the foundation upon which those results rest is constantly shifting, can be justified by appeals to plausible contentions which do not harmonize with other pertinent considerations.

7. No canon can be accepted as sound, unless it is possible to get results that tally with known facts, when the said canon is applied to modern writings that exhibit the characteristics shown by those for which it was originally intended.

If these propositions contain anything that is unfair or anything that is not in strict accordance with the laws of reasoning, it should be an easy matter to expose the fault and explain the grounds upon which the statement containing it should be rejected. Mere assertion, however, is not argument, and it cannot be accepted as such any more than ridicule can, although some do not seem capable of comprehending the fact or of realizing that a plain and marked difference exists between argument and both of these other things. It may be said and said with truth that an axiom is an assertion; but it cannot be said that an assertion is an axiom, nor can it for an instant be claimed that an ordinary assertion is anything that resembles an axiom. Confusion should not be tolerated in this matter, and no beclouding of the issues should
be permitted. Underlying facts are not destroyed by such means, and they are the things that count.

One strong objection should be met at this point; for it is undeniable that many great names appear on the critical side. No other outcome was to be expected, however, as a single though somewhat complex illustration will abundantly show. It involves both Evolution and Astronomy. The general principles of a materialistic evolution based on chance were set forth by Leucippus over four hundred years before the birth of Christ. The doctrine was elucidated by Democritus, accepted by Epicurus, and later taught by Lucretius in his "De Rerum Natura." The original ideas were promulgated in Greek; but, before the beginning of our era, Lucretius translated them into Latin and incidentally taught certain remarkable things regarding Astronomy. One particularly interesting passage is thus rendered by Monroe:

"And herein, Memmius, be far from believing this, that all things as they say press to the centre of the sun, and that for this reason the nature of the world stands fast without any strokes from the outside and the uppermost and lowest parts cannot part asunder in any direction, because all things have been always pressing toward the centre (if you can believe that anything can rest upon itself); or that the heavy bodies which are beneath the earth all press upward and are at rest on the earth, turned topsy-turvy, just like the images of things we see before us in the waters. In the same way they maintain that living things walk head downwards and cannot tumble out of earth into the parts of heaven lying below them any more than our bodies can spontaneously fly into the quarters of heaven; that when those see the sun, we behold the stars of night; and that they share with us time about the seasons of heaven and pass nights equal in length to our days. . . . Nor is there any spot of such a sort that when bodies have reached it, they can lose their force of gravity and stand upon void; and that again which is void must not serve to support anything, but must, as its nature craves, continually give place. Things cannot therefore in such a way be held in union, o'ermastered by love of a centre" (I. 1052 ff., 1077 ff.).
Here is a great man combating the truth; but there is much more involved. Writing about fifty years later, Ovid, after describing chaos with some power, says:

"Flowing about, the liquid-moisture occupied the remotest (bounds), and encompassed the solid disk.

"When he, whatever (one) of the gods that was, divided the mass, thus distributed, and reduced the divided (mass) into its elements; in the beginning, the earth, lest it should not be equal on every side, he rolled up into the form of a mighty ball" (Met. i. 30 ff.).

'Disk' and 'ball' are both orbis; but Ovid seems to use the word in two senses so as to combine popular notions with philosophical theories.

Ideas that were more or less confused persisted for many years, until the doctrine that the earth occupies the central place in our system, which was first taught by Thales, was reaffirmed by Ptolemy about 140 A.D. It was then generally accepted. Thales was born about 640 B.C., and, although he was one of the seven wise men of Greece, his theory of the earth's sphericity was bitterly opposed as contrary to reason. The teachings of Ptolemy persisted, although Pythagoras, who was born about 582 B.C., had privately taught his disciples that the earth revolved around the sun as a center, both being spheres. It was not until the days of Copernicus in the middle ages that the truth was finally recognized, and it remained for Newton to formulate the doctrine of gravitation. For many centuries, then, great men linked themselves with teachings that are now looked upon as absurd and fantastic. They were once accepted as "the only tenable view."

But this is not all. The theory of Leucippus was invented

1 "Only tenable" views are dangerous things. Another one stoutly maintained the impossibility of deep-sea life. It was wrong.
to combat the teachings of Anaxagoras (c. 500–428 B. C.), who was the first of the philosophers to introduce 'mind' (intelligence) as a factor in the world problem, and many a great name can be found arrayed against his. "Design" in nature has been stubbornly opposed even in modern times, not to say recent; and only the investigations of the past thirty years have finally forced reluctant physicists to recognize its underlying principles, which now masquerade under the more "scientific" term "teleology." Verily, "wisdom is justified of her children."

All men have their limitations, and scholars do not escape this fate. As a matter of fact, they constitute two well-defined classes; namely, brilliant men and profound men. The former receive most of the emoluments, while the latter are the safer guides. Being profound, they are seldom heard of until they are well advanced in years or have already passed into the great beyond. With them, recognition is always late, because it takes depth to appreciate depth, and the process is necessarily a slow one. Shallowness has no such limitations. It is easily appreciated, and it may be met with éclat. Brilliance, indeed, is particularly liable to danger on this score, because it is especially susceptible to the temptation of being content with itself, a thing necessarily conducive to shallowness. For that reason, men of this type are almost never safe guides, and, in the long run, the world invariably recognizes the fact, since it has a habit of discarding their works soon after their demise. Their career is much like that of a rocket; for, although for a time they are the center of attraction for every eye, when once their voice is stilled they quickly pass into oblivion and are then speedily forgotten. There are exceptions, because disciples may continue to promulgate the error or half-truth and thus keep their mas-
ter's memory green. "A lie will encircle the earth while truth is putting on his boots"; but a plausible error will out-run a lie, and a plausible error well defended has as many lives as the mythical cat.

It is now in order to ask whether the critical theory measures up, in any satisfactory way, to the sevenfold requirement formulated above, and, if not, what its status, in the mind of a genuine thinker, ought to be. Does it so commend itself to the judgment that it appears equal to the task of meeting these tests? Nay: can it face a single one of the stipulations and come off unscathed? How about the last one? Will its canons work in modern instances? Hayman tried them with an ode by Burns, and a neater dilemma than the one that resulted no logician would care to ask for. Burns wrote the ode in April, 1786, and the incidents are known; but the canons disprove the facts, if they prove anything, and demand three men to do the work. Are such results conducive to confidence in the canons themselves? And is evidence based on arbitrary rules of that character satisfactory? Does it commend itself to a thinking man? Will such an one commit himself unreservedly to a theory which is satisfied so easily, as must plainly be the case in this instance?

Other similar tests have been made; but space is limited, and this is one of the neatest, if not the neatest of them all.1

1 The boldest thing that has yet been done, appears to be the work of a canny Scot. "Wit, learning, and brilliancy abound on every page. The Greek poetry is striking, original, and modern; the notes touch at every turn the weak spots of Homeric criticism. "By applying the methods of Robert, Bethe, Leaf, and Murray to poetry he has written himself, he shows that it is the work of many men in many ages" (Professor John A. Scott, in the Classical Weekly, Jan. 20, 1912, p. 94, reviewing Shewan's Homeric Games at an Ancient St. Andrews).
It is easily accessible; for it was published in the Bibliotheca Sacra.\(^1\) By the same tests, one "must deny the second part of 'Faust' to the author of the first part,"\(^2\) and even the seven stipulations formulated above might be torn asunder and assigned to different authors, with the probable addition of a redactor to glue the pieces together. Incidentally the hand of a lawyer would certainly be detected in the final result, although no such person had anything whatever to do with it. In the case of Max Müller, four distinct literary mummies can be exhumed with the help of that well-known spade of the critics, the linguistic argument. The first is a German, the author of "Deutsche Liebe," which was published in 1857. The second is also a German; but he writes in English, and his nationality only occasionally betrays itself. He can be found in "Chips from a German Workshop," a title which also points to the truth. The third is an Englishman of a poetic turn,—it matters little that the father of Max Müller was a poet,—who can be found in such volumes as "India: What can it Teach Us?" The fourth and last is an Englishman lecturing in German at the University of Strassburg after its refounding in 1872.

Attention was long ago called to three of these gentlemen by a great American scholar whose judgment is second to none in such matters. The fourth is equally plain. He is a poet philosophizing.

\(^1\) Where such is the case hereafter, the volume number and the pages will be indicated without further remark, to save space. A similar course will be pursued in connection with another valuable work that has recently appeared. \(^2\) It is by the Reverend John Urquhart and is entitled, "The New Biblical Guide." To avoid confusion, the letters BG will be used as a distinguishing mark, when this is referred to in the text. For Hayman's article, see vol. Iv. pp. 557 ff. See also p. 738.

\(^2\) See Ivi. 041, Rupprecht on the Pentateuch.
The other points must be considered briefly; for the space left is getting small. It is a well-known fact that the grounds upon which the critical theory rests have been repeatedly altered. The original position, as indicated above, took the divine appellations as a basis for the division of Genesis into two documents that are wont to be designated as J and E. Roughly speaking, this was soon found to be at fault, and the "redactor" was drafted into the service to meet the new needs. When that combination broke down, Hupfeld postulated a second "Elohist," to whom, with further help from the "redactor," was consigned the task of accounting for the mixed condition revealed in the supposed texts by the stylistic tests that had been devised. This, at least, is, in a general way, what took place. Exact details are hardly necessary, since the purpose in hand has reference merely to the changes that have occurred in the critical position.

Metaphorically speaking, a two-wheeled monorail car was devised at the start, the wheels being the divine appellations. The instability of this literary vehicle was soon so evident that a gyroscopic attachment was added, in the shape of an accommodating "redactor," which kept it steady on some curves but upset it on others. Then came the second "Elohist," with a counteracting motion, and the gyroscope had become a double-barreled affair, which enabled the car to travel anything from a tight rope to a crooked gaspipe. It began to do so and is still at it. The addition of other parts, like the "Priestly Code," which is commonly designated as P, may be regarded as the building up of the car body about the operating machinery, and the metaphor is complete. If the gyroscopes break down or are unable to perform their func-

1 See lvii. 652.
2 Cf. Betteridge on Zechariah, lv. 634 ff.
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Moving up another step, the question may be asked: Have all the facts in the case been given due weight? On this point, Urquhart has scored heavily. Others have done their part also. Among them may be mentioned Lias, who has made a painstaking examination of the language employed by the so-called "Priestly Code."¹ That part of the Pentateuch, as he clearly shows, does not sustain the claims that it is a post-exilic document. Its linguistic usages are not those of that period, and, when the collateral evidence is examined, the very material selected to prove that the "Code" is late, implies the exact opposite of this.

In various parts of the Biblical text, fossil remains of an early day can be found in abundance, and they are simply inexplicable on the basis laid down by the critical theory. No man, no matter how clever he might be, could employ antique expressions of various kinds and so weave them into the narrative that they would always tally, as these do, with later discoveries; and no man, unless he was on the spot at the time and wrote as he had seen and heard, could possibly be cognizant of the many borrowed words that are found in Pentateuchal narrative, although they do not occur elsewhere in the Scriptural writings. There are many phases of this subject, too many, in fact, to go into detail here.² These

¹ See lxvii. 20 ff., 269 ff.
² See iii. 18 ff. (Priestly Dues, Hayman); iii. 681 ff. (Final Chaps. of Deut., Watson); lv. 334 ff., 413 ff. (Tell-el-Amarna Letters, Metcalf); 389, 391 (Notes, Berle); lv. 29 ff. (Gilead and Bashan, Hayman); lxv. 401 ff., 611 ff. (The Plagues, Merrins); lxvii. 373 ff.
various peculiarities make up the infinitesimals that must be given due recognition, if an accurate outcome is to be secured. They affect the final result fatally, so far as the critical theory is concerned, even if nothing is said of the constantly neglected rules of textual criticism, which are referred to under the preceding requirement. A brief explanation may be in order.

In the olden days, when books were the work of scribes who copied them word by word, it often happened that some explanatory term or phrase or sentence was placed on the margin, to make the meaning clear, or to add some bit of pertinent information. It was then the habit, when a new copy was made, to incorporate such additions into the text itself, and this had some justification; for the scribe might inadvertently omit some portion of the writing and afterward add it on the margin. The copyist would not be able to distinguish the two kinds of additions without some outside help, and he therefore made no discriminations in his work. Many an interpolation has thus crept into the books that have come down to us, and the process, as a whole, has been pretty thoroughly determined. There is no longer any guesswork about it. True additions are always normal phenomena, and they invariably contain some natural thought or suggestion of the scribe or the copyist. As a rule, they are explanatory; but they are not necessarily of that character.

When the Book of the Law was found by Hilkiah the high priest, in the days of Josiah, shortly before the captivity,
it made a tremendous sensation, and men undoubtedly began to inquire whether what it said was true. Where investigation revealed the presence of objects or institutions mentioned in the book as having been set up in former times, it was the most natural thing in the world for a scribe to add the words, "unto this day," on the margin, as may have been done, possibly, in Gen. xxxv. 20; Deut. iii. 14, x. 8; etc. In many passages, however, no such process need be postulated, because considerable time is likely to have elapsed between the event and the record made of it, and, under these circumstances, the words are normal expressions which require no explanation. Examples are:—Gen. xlviii. 15; Ex. x. 6; Deut. ii. 22; Josh. vi. 25, vii. 26, viii. 29, x. 27, xiv. 14, xv. 63, xxii. 3, 17, etc. Of these, some may be doubtful; but most of them are fairly clear. The expression must have been a familiar one, and its use was therefore doubly natural. It is actually taken, however, as an evidence that the Pentateuch is post-exilic, although this involves two extremely improbable assumptions; namely, that every one of the things referred to still survived intact, and that no additions of any sort had been made to the MSS. by ordinary interpolation. Is such a method of procedure normal? Is it justifiable?

Interpolation must be postulated with extreme care because of the character of the writings and the nature of the people themselves; but it must have had some part in the sacred writings, since the scribes were human and subject to human frailties. Is it safe to assume, then, that the possibility of interpolation can be entirely disregarded? Can such far-reaching conclusions be based on this unstable ground? And if they are so based, is it the part of wisdom to accept them? It should be added that redactors are not
interpolators. They are not even editors in any true sense. They are, in fact, little more than wholesale plagiarists who have made a medley of their borrowings. There is much more in this matter of textual criticism; but it cannot be considered here. The masterly work of Wiener is especially important in this connection.¹

In reference to the third requirement, there is too much to be said to attempt it here; but the point will come up again in a later paper. It may be remarked, however, that it has long been held that the critical theory is not needed to account for the facts.² But if it is not needed, it fails to meet this requirement also. A typical illustration may make the point clearer. According to Num. xiii. 3, the spies were sent from the wilderness of Paran; but they started from Kadesh-barnea, according to Num. xxxii. 8, Deut. i. 19 ff., and Josh. xiv. 7. This is at once taken as a discrepancy, a thing that has been much overworked.³ The first passage is accordingly assigned to P and the others to JE. It makes no difference that they returned to “the wilderness of Paran, to Kadesh,” according to Num. xiii. 25 f.; for Driver quietly draws his pen through the middle of the verse and appropriates a piece for each of the previously determined “sources.”⁴ The character of this procedure speaks for itself, and comment is hardly necessary. Probabilities strongly favor the Biblical statement that Kadesh was in the wilderness of Paran; but what are probabilities in the face of a critical theory? In this

² See lxxi. 645 ff. (Hayman’s solution) and lvii. 639 ff. (Rupprecht’s).
³ See lxiv. 767 ff.
⁴ See lvii. 145 f. Assurance could hardly go further.
There is a current notion that the critical theory offers a better solution of the Pentateuchal difficulty than any other that has been formulated. Is it, however, any better than Hayman's or than Rupprecht's, each of which was referred to above? None of them are free from difficulties; but those involved in the critical theory are more in number and greater in extent than any that can be found in either of the other two views mentioned. On this point Rupprecht has dealt a staggering blow to the entire critical school. It bears on the first of the requirements herein formulated, just as fitness does on the second. Even at its best, the critical defense is weak, and its contentions cannot endure a careful critical analysis. The real task is only beginning to be realized. In fact, it has hardly been touched as yet. The weaknesses of the Wellhausen school have been exposed with a precision that was as relentless as it was unerring; but the process was fully justified, since nothing else would have accomplished the needed reform. Wiener has accordingly earned the enduring gratitude of thousands of thinking Americans, and his work is steadily gaining ground in this country. It will unquestionably stand.

This is but a hasty glance at the seven points suggested earlier in the present paper; but the intention at the beginning was rather to set others to thinking and to testing the theory for themselves, along the lines indicated, than to at-

1 He is admirably equipped for the purpose.
3 See Iv. 656 ff., and also lv. 515 ff.; lv. 140 ff.
4 See lxvili. 1 ff., 249 ff.
tempt to do over again work already admirably accomplished by able scholars. It was also the purpose of the writer to call attention to the wealth of material already at hand in this Quarterly; for it is not yet appreciated as it should be. The wonderfully effective work of Wiener has rendered much that passes for scholarship out of date, and the fact is slowly dawning upon many that have been inclined to accept the critical theory for want of something better. There is still much to be said on other phases of the subject which have been ably discussed elsewhere, and there is also much to be said on phases that have been almost entirely neglected by writers on the Pentateuch. A practical theory, tallying with all the facts and supplying the needed additional elements, where there seem to be such, can be formulated from the internal evidence of the Pentateuch itself, and it is hoped that this may be done in a continuation of the present discussion in an early number of the Bibliotheca Sacra. Before that is attempted, however, certain other facts must be considered, because they are fundamental and have been largely neglected up to the present time. They will be included in the next paper, the theory being reserved for the last.