

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

ARTICLE I.

AUTHORITY.

BY ARNOLD V. C. P. HUIZINGA, THOMPSON, CONN.

“Without authority—the objective norm of truth and value—and faith—repose in it as our immediate standard—life could not well be lived. Is it not strange, therefore, that those who are willing slaves to the idols of our day should clamor for freedom from all restraint, and raise an outcry against all legitimate authority?”

It was quite characteristic of our age, and certainly of the gathering assembled, when Dr. George A. Gordon raised a storm of approving applause at the International Congress of Religious Liberals held in Boston, September 22-27, 1907, with the remark “The loss sustained by the Christian world through the reign of authority is incalculable.” It is said on every hand that for a true development of the inner life, one may not be subject to any outward restraint. We must strike out along our own lines,—not walk by chalk-marks, but according to our own nature. We are to be true to our own selves. Inasmuch as we ourselves are the acting party in all things, we are not to be determined by arbitrary directions. The very idea of personality, of responsibility, of private initiative, of individual significance, the entire personal equation, opposes itself to any pressure of external restraints.

In ethical theories this individualism is represented in
Vol. LXVII. No. 268. 1

the pleas for self-realization. The vague notion of self-realization, however, can hardly become the basis of social relations and morals, if conceived according to the phrase which proclaims "society *versus* the individual," and always insists that corporate society is to a large extent incommensurable with personal individuality. There is no allowance made for inter-determination, that the individual may be determined as well extrinsically as intrinsically; and again that these determinations sustain the closest relation each to the other is left out of account. The atomistic conception of the individual is insisted upon. It has been said that this "mere individual" is an abstraction of logic, with which philosophy has burdened the world. It is, however, more correct to maintain that the notion of the isolated, separate individual has become persistently prominent in popular views.

In modern literature the individual claims are prominently brought forward, and their indulgence advocated at the expense of traditional social restraints. "Self-realization" figures large as a motto in modern realism. Love overrides law. Even the passions should know no restraint. Insistently is dwelt on things as they are. As the Christian understands that in weakness is strength, so it should be observed that in realism its strength is its weakness, in that its passion for reality discards idealism to the extent of leaving us in a mass of disordered conflicting facts, of which the most faithful portrayal will create only the most jarring discord. Whatever claims, therefore, the realistic schools may make as representative of an æsthetic appreciation of life, it must be firmly maintained that they fail of that harmony which is required by the beautiful, just as they fail in that right proportion and emphasis which is required by the truth.

Authority always involves a ruling principle which subjects

the individual to its regulations, though this need not necessarily involve the suppression of his natural functions.

Liberty is a negative idea which denotes the absence of restraint. It cannot, therefore, be an aim in itself. It may be fully realized in the experience of the individual when he finds himself entirely in accord with the codified, larger experience of society. Such a condition would exclude the possibility of conflict, and legislation *ab extra* would be superfluous. But this is practically inconceivable either in single cases or among any people in general. On this account the dreams of anarchistic societies, which would dispense with all laws, are purely ideal and could be realized only at the very end of social progress. As an attainable social state, they are indeed "diablement idéal."

It is equally evident, however, that neither laws nor governing bodies can be considered as ends in themselves, since they are simply a kind of tangible, objective medium of adjustment between the single, individual life and the corporate wisdom of longer and larger experience. As Fichte well remarked, "The state will ultimately end as will all human institutions which are merely means; the aim of all government is to make government superfluous."

The alleged antithesis between individual life and social authority is as unwarranted as are the extreme claims for and emphasis on their respective positions. The customary antitheses that we meet in every-day life tend to cause a certain one-sidedness which emphasizes one view at the expense of the other. The reaction from the old conception of "mankind in general," to which corresponded a "typical man," has left us only an aggregate of individuals. From the fact that we do know social morality as an objective code of observances (as public opinion, etc.) only from the individuals which con-

stitute society, it has been wrongly inferred that the single individual by himself exemplifies the functions of man as in society; for, as Enrico Ferri says, "in psychological phenomena the union of several individuals never yields a result like that which one would expect from the sum of them severally."

In a time of thorough sociological and psychological study the capitalized and transmitted experiences and their unceasing reactions upon the individual life are investigated. Thus we make use of such expressions as "social mind," "collective consciousness," "national spirit," "Zeitgeist," "public opinion," "conventionality," "folk-psychology," all of which are pregnant metaphors, whose meaning cannot be explained by the phenomena of individual psychology. Of course the individual's consciousness is affected by the relation he bears to others. Professor Baldwin observes rightly, "Modern psychology as studies in religion and sociology demonstrate the interdependence of individual and society," but "in ethical (and religious) judgments the social sanction is administered by the individual conscience."¹ Although, therefore, in Professor Baldwin's study in psychology the growth of the individual soul is traced in genetic method till all the essential features of the moral and religious man have appeared, he leaves the moral issues with the individual. Thus his valuable prize essay, while clearing away the opposition between society and the individual, vindicates a personal responsibility.

It has often been asserted that there is no such thing as individual morality, and Roman Catholic scholars have charged against the Protestant position an extreme individualism, which is not held by the evangelical churches of Protestantism. The content of a strictly individual morality or religion is indeed quite inconceivable. The content and form

¹ *Mental Development*, chap. x.

of moral and religious life are derived from the relations in which individuals are placed. The tendency, however, to seek *the origin* of the moral and religious life in the social relations under which it develops, is faulty. Scholars holding very different points of view agree that the moral sentiment, and therefore the religious impulse, is unanalyzable, not reducible to social effects. And though such genetic theories have often been supported by a large array of alleged facts, they have never proved to be convincing.

The question is like the transferring of the emphasis in the Lord's command: "Thou shalt love thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbor as thyself" (Luke x. 27). The modern socializing tendency has shifted the emphasis from the first command, which is basal, and which in a sense includes the second. It begs the question by the conclusion that the resulting social morality is to be identified with the loving of God, because it is the way in which to express itself.

Professor H. Visscher gives expression to this idea in a recent work on comparative religion.¹ While recognizing that our age rightly, to some extent, approaches religion as an organic development, especially in the field of comparative religion, he observes that most social facts that are codified expressions of social life, such as language, law, and customs, as well as the forms of religion, are *not made* by man, but have rather grown to be what they are.

The analogy between the physical and psychical, between matter and spirit, can never lead to an identification of the genetic processes of the two spheres, especially when there is an evident inclination to subsume the spiritual under the material. The complex expression of religious life is a result of

¹ *Rellgie en Gemeenschap by de natuurvölker* (Utrecht, 1907).

the social life, and regulates the individual, who is, however, autonomous neither in language, law, morality, nor religion. All these expressions of social life go back to the psychic life of the individuals that compose society. *Religio subjectiva* concerns primarily man as man; it assumes social forms simply because man lives in society and it thus fits in an organic whole. But it is a wholly wrong view that endeavors to explain religion and morality in themselves as an outgrowth of social forms. If man is incurably religious, then we can hardly make religion and morality in its essence an epiphenomenon of social life. They rather cement and control social life. And this is the meaning which a Frenchman expressed in the words: "Le Saint Esprit c'est Dieu social."

Even Spencer, though championing the cause of individualism under the phrase "man *versus* the state," freely admits the organic relation and natural interplay between the individual and the *milieu* in the midst of which he has grown up. In his "Principles of Psychology" (sects. 208, 216) he says: "The individual cannot sunder a conjunction thus deeply rooted in the organization of the race"; hence, he is born into the world with those psychical connections which form the substrata of "necessary truths." In his "First Principles" (sect. 53), he says: "Absolute uniformities of experience generate absolute uniformities of thought." Thus it may be seen that, however much the absolutely personal element is centered in every individual, however entirely unique and one's own, yet each realizes his personality among men as a social being. The ethical and religious contents of man's life have been developed and have taken form historically in social relations.

The individual finds a standard for comparison, and material to assimilate, in the terms of life as expressed in the

personal experiences and judgments around him. And these principles, often authoritative, influence his unconscious application, as he strives consciously to realize his ethical ideals and religious life under the stimulus of personal relations. The importance of the individual standpoint is thus brought out, and the claims for personality are rendered significant, because of the prime factor of individual life in social life. But we must also perceive that the authority of society is fraught with life-experiences akin to those known to the individual, and this renders the social, ethical, and religious codes less external as regulative law. Professor Giddings made a contribution to the study of societary phenomena in his conception of "consciousness of kind," but failed to give it a proper setting in social life. It is plain that the question whether authority should be lodged with the individual, or with the legal constructions of larger experience, cannot be treated in categorical fashion. We must rather inquire how the individual is related to the "stored-up, codified racial experience." Professor James says: "The legal tradition enters the mind of the vast majority of citizens in a vague way at best. It is clearly conscious in the thought of a special class only, which, however, may be regarded as the social organ of that particular function of the collective mind." That this relation, however, is an essential and real one, is assumed in all educational efforts, which aim so to adapt the individual to his surroundings that he may fit in the social setting with the least waste of mental energy. Dr. G. E. Vincent says in an essay entitled "The Social Mind and Education": "Education sets before itself the task of relating the individual intrinsically to the social tradition so that he may become an organic part of society."

Revelations, claiming supernatural origin, are understood

to arise *not* from human experience, but to have been projected by God into human life as normative and infallible standards, i.e. possess Divine authority. A distinction between direct and indirect revelation rests upon a false psychology, since it involves the idea of unmediated revelation. Revelation to be revelation at all must, from the nature of the case, be mediated by some form to the recipient. We cannot even conceive of consciousness without an implied content. The subject-consciousness involves an object. The customary distinction aims, however, rather at a difference between original or final and derived authority. The first, being self-revelation, finds man; while man finds the latter only after the first is established, and as corroborative evidence. Of course, all derived social authority, relative in form and emphasis, is in the end warranted by Divine Authority; but social life as a whole does not go to the source of this final authority. That Divine revelation has to come in the same way as all other knowledge affords no sufficient reason for classing it with other knowledge. This is indeed neglected by those who treat Christianity as mere historic fact and the Bible as mere literature. When historical Christianity and the historical revelation of the Bible become merely descriptive terms, then both may be conceived of as made of a piece with all other historic events, as purely human products. If such a procedure be adopted, it should be borne in mind that the supernatural origin claimed for both has been dismissed at the start, inasmuch as these events are presumed to be brought wholly within the limits of the historic past. Where the inadequacy of historic explanation is perceived, while this procedure is still insisted upon, resort is taken to allowing traditional inspiration in a merely nominal sense, in order to bolster up the fact of revelation. To keep the closed circle of historic events

in which we may trace how men successively conceived of God, not without his divine impulses, and yet to affirm a self-revelation of God to man as an impact which either had no result at all, or resulted in the same faulty human products, seems an illogical device. It is difficult to see the help or need of a Divine inspiration the outcome of which is just as faulty as all other mere human knowledge. And yet such is the logic of that view which retains a belief in inspired men, but not in an inspired book. One may go the whole length with the Roman Catholic Church and vest the church (i.e. the clergy) with this authority. In that case the authority of the Bible is subordinate to the inspired priest; but another priest is another Christ! We are not now concerned with the question whether these claims of supernatural origin can be vindicated in the face of modern criticism. All that concerns us at present is whether the authority of Christianity and of the Bible can be retained along with the invalidation of these claims. It will be readily seen that we face here again the same problem of causal connection. Did Christ and the Bible come to be recognized as authoritative because of inherent original authority, or is this recognition the projection of a faith-state which made authoritative what was not so in itself, and even elaborated a theory of Divine origin and inspiration in its defense? It would leave us to explain, whence this strong sense of authority.

The subject of authority has often been argued in historic situations when there was urged a revolutionary break with existing *forms* of authority, though never with authority itself. It is according to the conviction in civic matters that every institution descended to us from the past descends to us upon trial. The Dutch in their abjuration of Philip II. of Spain coupled happily the meanings of the expressions

“Divine Authority” (*Goddelijk gezag*), which is absolute and original, and “human authority” (*menschelijk gezag*), which is relative and derived. They inserted in the document, which admitted Philip II. as their rightful ruler, the requirement that he too must observe the rights of his subjects, without which he is no prince (*sonder dewelke hij geen prinse en is*).

Government and civil authority, it is evident, were conceived of as a restraint upon the evil which would unsettle society, and an encouragement to the good works which conduce to its welfare. It therefore appeals invariably immediately or mediately to God for its sanction. This principle is asserted in almost all declarations where oppressive authority has been dislodged, this being always ostensibly done on the claim that the existing authority was usurped, and thus devoid of the supreme sanction without which no human authority can endure. The authority of all authority is God, conceived as the permanent element in all change, and as controlling all change. This is notably the case with that remarkable document the “Declaration of Independence” of the United States of America. In all changes, the protesting party appeals against “the powers that be” in behalf of its claims to the authority which is not merely human. Even “the consent of the people” is based on the principles for which the Creator purposed them to live in society. The reversal of this relation employs usually an unwarranted assumption, in that it elevates this felt need or sense of right into the causal ground of authority.

In this light shines the Bible passage Romans xiii. 1-5:—

“Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers: For there is no power but of God. The powers that be, are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil.

Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is the minister of God to thee for good: but if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake."

The recognition of all authority of fact is evidently not a blind recognition, in violation of conscience. It plainly means the reverence of the established powers as agents of God. Christ himself allowed unmistakably each man the prerogative of his judicial authority. In an incident bearing on this subject, recorded in Matthew xxii., when the Pharisees asked him, "What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Cæsar, or not?" Jesus left the decision with them, saying, "Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's; and unto God the things that are God's." He addresses himself to their capacity of "inner verification." He also clearly teaches, however, that men are responsible for the conclusions they reach in the use of their minds, inasmuch as these are for them individually final. But the ultimate appeal is always to God, because he announces himself in the heart of every man. The unsophisticated mind feels that "he removeth kings, and setteth up kings" (Dan. ii. 21); he is in all and over all, supreme on earth as he is in heaven. Indeed!

"By me kings reign,
And princes decree justice.
By me princes rule,
And nobles, even all the judges of the earth."

Proverbs viii. 15, 16.

The need of this ultimate authorization has been felt by both church and state alike in the exercise of earthly power. The church ruling over the corporate body of believers who give assent to her order and doctrine does not need to establish her claims. But what is her authority over those who are outside?

Some have answered, It is to "go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in," forgetting that, in view of her mission, the compulsion of the church cannot be one of outward restraint. The church endeavors to win people: the state controls people. There is thus a wide chasm between church and state. To the church belongs the higher, more definite sanction, but to the state the wider range. To the church is given a positive commission to fulfil, to the state mainly the vindication of its laws. The state therefore remains always more impersonal in its regulations than the church, and, having power of fact, may vindicate its authority by a rational rule of its subjects. A difficult question is raised as to whether the state shall rule the church, or the church the state. May the admittedly more impersonal rule of the state be allowed authority over the church, which claims a more personal relation with the Source of all authority? Or may the church, including only the believers, extend her rules, naturally more specific, over the whole of society? A practical, working solution has, of course, been found by allowing church and state to some extent their own respective spheres, even where either of them sways superior power. A *practical* merger of the two functions is the true solution,—all the secular, governmental functions sanctioned and permeated by Christian belief and principle.

The struggle for authority between secular and ecclesiastical power has found its classic expression in the rivalry of Emperor Henry IV. and Pope Gregory VII. for supremacy in earthly matters. The great success of von Wildenbruch's work "Heinrich und Heinrich's Geschlecht" may be accounted for largely, apart from its merits, by the interest felt in the theme. The Germans of our day went through a renewal of the same struggle in the *Kulturkampf* with Bismarck

and Windhorst as respective champions. Bismarck's words in the Reichstag, "Nach Canossa gehn wir nicht," are characteristic.

Gregory's letter, sent in 1075, upbraiding Henry for neglect of papal decrees, was headed: "Bishop Gregory, servant of the servants of God, to King Henry, greeting and apostolic benediction: — that is, if he be obedient to the apostolic chair as beseems a Christian king." To this, Henry replied the next year by a letter, beginning, "Henry, King not by usurpation but by holy ordination of God, to Hildebrand, now no pope, but false monk," and ending: "I, Henry, King by the grace of God, together with all our bishops, say unto thee, 'Come down to be damned throughout all eternity.'" Later, when in 1107 at Chalons the questions of investiture were discussed, the Pope declared by the Bishop of Piacenza: "To invest with the ring and the staff, since these belong to the altar, is to usurp the powers of God Himself. For a priest to place his hands, sanctified by the body and blood of the Lord, in the blood-stained hands of a layman, as a pledge, is to dishonor his order and holy consecration." It has often been observed that this quarrel occasioned the phrase "by the grace of God" to be attached to the proclamation of rulers. So it did, but it is a superficial inference to argue that with the phrase was originated the belief or meaning which it expresses. The struggle was too keen, too passionate, to have sprung out of a newly invented belief, to which the phrase might have given rise.

When the objective norm, the legal code, conventional morality and new religious formulas are framed in keeping with the changes of contemporary opinion, they become liable to error, and must be subject to subsequent correction. Thus they cannot well claim the confident submission of the indi-

vidual as possessing rightful or reasonable authority. Yet the tendency to-day is to regard the sanction of society as final, both in ethics and in religion. Both morality and religion are becoming more and more conventional. In this the extreme conclusions of sociological theories run into a pantheistic philosophy that does not allow of an "otherness" in the verdict to which consciousness testifies, and which thus destroys an objective sanction. Yet, as Professor Ladd truly remarks, in his "Theory of Reality": "Man's conception of Reality must be derived from his cognitive experience with concrete realities — subjected to reflective treatment." And again: "Cognitive experience with concrete things contains at its roots, if anywhere it is to be found, the beginnings to a true answer of the metaphysical problem." In the face of the "personal equation," the saying that there is no greater tyranny than an equality forced upon those who are not equal, is perfectly true. Montaigne in the time of the "discovery of man" spoke the pregnant words: "Everyone must have 'an inner touchstone' [*un patron au dedans*] by which to judge his actions." Fouillée rightly remarks in his "Psychologie des peuples européens": "M. Guyau and M. Tarde have strongly insisted that we are under the dominion of continual suggestion, coming from the environment in which we live. . . . We disagree with those who reduce the whole of sociology to a study of these forms, and we believe that the study of its psychological foundation is essential to sociology." Dr. Philip Fogel brought out in an able essay in the *American Journal of Sociology* the metaphysical element involved in sociology, ignored by Professor Giddings.

There is something of awfulness about the thought of the lonely pursuit of each individuality, facing the issue of life singly, seeing through one's own eyes, and accepting the re-

sponsibility for its own life. Indeed, if life is our own in the last instance, we cannot live it by proxy, cannot resolve it into a mere component part of social life. The pinch of individuality is with us, and with the "I" goes a conscience which is more than a social verdict. It is something which concerns me directly, to which I must make a personal response and thus incur responsibility.

"Yes! In the sea of life ensled,
With echoing straits between us thrown,
Dotting the shoreless watery wild,
We mortal millions live alone."

All the endeavors to make conscience a resulting inner response to external environment, whether in social interpretation, or legal explanation, or evolutionary analysis, fail to account for its authoritative, apodictive commands. Conscience neither seeks its authority from the things of the world, nor endeavors to justify its laws by them. For one surely does not reason one's self into an obligation which requires sacrifice even unto death. To be sure, the actual ethical responses are considered primarily, or at least mainly, emotional, but this does not account for the strong sentiment of the objectiveness of obligation, and sanction of duty and ought. But more than this, the social self is always transcended by the ideal self. As Professor Baldwin remarks: "The social influence which determines the development of conscience almost entirely in its earlier stages is itself transcended, in the rational or self-conscious organization of the moral life: so that the conscience becomes not merely a social self, but an ideal self."

The subjective activity in the assimilating of the ethical verdicts under criticism and comparison has been widely discussed in recent studies in the analysis or development of conscience. The existence of heterogeneous codes is no longer

considered a valid argument against the validity of conscience, since we find the authoritative claim in the personal application of every form. Although the individual moral norm is one's own construction out of the available ethical judgments to which the person turns, this standard exercises absolute authority. On the validity of its unconditioned demands, the individual will stake his life. "Belief," says Professor Baldwin, "is the personal endorsement of reality." Pascal's dictum, "Vérité en deça des Pyrénées, erreur au delà," loses its force upon close observation, and Bentham's remark, "Conscience is a thing of fictitious existence supposed to occupy a seat in the mind," results from the legal conception which regulates the acting individual *ab extra*.

It is plain that there must be an inner indication of outer import, which gives an authoritative dictum. On all sides we have primarily the subjective reference, for the moral and religious life announces itself as a private and individual concern in individual experience. The legal command "Thou shalt" or "Thou shalt not" is to be obeyed only as responded to by the "I ought" or "I ought not" of the individual. The specific application of the right is left with the individual, and cannot be rigidly controlled by the normative and mandatory legal construction under which the personal conscience has developed. Moral, religious, and civil law are to be maintained, rather than carried out, because the exclusive uniqueness of the individual refuses to be completely subsumed under law. And although Kant proclaimed an erring conscience a chimera, his impersonal categorical imperative falls back on the concrete experience of single individuals. When he admits that judgment may err as to the form in a particular duty, he lifts conscience out of the moral judgment as such, and identifies it with the ultimate principles of Practical Rea-

son. This is the will-form as carried by the acting individual, and requires personal application. In our age of enthusiastic social study, those who have not gone to the extreme of lodging authority in ethical and religious belief in the "collective consciousness" and its stored-up wisdom of custom and tradition, translate the Kantian will of Practical Reason into a social will. Yet, these customs admittedly yield a determination not of an absolute and final, but only of a relative kind. We have the attempt, therefore, to unite subjective will with the impersonal order of social content. And this raises the question again as to the final decision, or the seat of authority. Each man is the child of his age only as to the form of his problems. Maurice in his lectures on casuistry calls attention to the fact that, in behalf of ethical and religious improvement, appeals are made to public opinion to enforce the claims of the individual conscience on the one hand, and on the other to the individual conscience to bear up public opinion; showing, thus, that the point of leverage is with the individual, embodied in social ethics.

The worth and authority of the individual agent is assumed to be derived from, and sustained by, the community in the evolutionary views, though it is admitted that "natural selection" has been overemphasized in its dual operation with "the struggle for existence" or "adaptation to environment." How are these functions related? How does the struggling individual find his place in this unfinished world, according to the plan of the whole? Is it to be computed, or is the world's explanation to be apprehended only by faith? Spencer's evolutionary definition of conscience as being "the control of the less evolved feelings by the more evolved ones" projects from without those principles that we must find within. Moreover the decision as to which is the more evolved feeling is made

by an individual reacting rather than acting. Dr. P. T. Forsyth, in an able article entitled "Some Christian Aspects of Evolution," in the *London Quarterly Review*, October, 1905, dwells on this point. He says:—

"The doctrine of evolution substitutes process for effort. We are caught in a tendency which, we are taught, no effort can control. We are borne along on a tide against which we cannot swim. We learn the fruitlessness of moral struggle against these age-long forces that have submerged so many of the best moral attempts. We climb a climbing wave. We are creatures of the time and the world. We lose the moral vigor which resists a majority, the public or the priest, and the moral sympathy which helps to its feet the inferior race or the struggling right. We learn to distrust truth itself. It is all relative only, something in the making, and something which we can make. And it is all over with truth when man feels himself its creator. His truth is not worth martyrdom then, for it is too changing to be an object of faith; and it is hardly worth propagandism, for it will change ere he can convert an audience, to say nothing of a generation. Reality gives way under our feet, and standards vanish like stars falling from heaven. Growth, it comes to be thought, does not issue from being, but being from growth. Man becomes his own maker, and he has a moral fool for his product."

In philosophical, ethical, and religious questions, we are thrown back on the individual, as our starting-point. And the main objection against sociological theories such as imitation, consciousness of kind, social forms as suggestion, and different evolutionary theories, is that the initiative and interpretation is always without. Conscience, as the basis of moral and religious life, may be ruled by law, but is not produced by it. A law-abiding citizen may be of flavorless morality. This appeal to the personal consciousness is always assumed in the practice of life. The attempts at social betterment address themselves to the individuals as private persons. Those who seek the betterment of society in education, and in improved conditions, tacitly assume that the individual will be first to respond to the aim of ethical and

religious effort. On this score, the principle of social settlement is radically false, though it may work some good through inconsistency. One cannot apply to the slum population a law of life taken from artificially transplanted characters who remain as moral leaders still dependent for success on the disposition of those whom they try to improve. The effort to make the display of moral excellence an inducement to improvement on the part of the socially unfortunate is based upon faulty psychological principles. The initiative in moral and religious life must spring from within; in the response of will we find our obligated responsibility. Both the tempting and the being tempted are factors to be dealt with. But no temptation obtains where individual inclination does not respond to evil surroundings, nor is there aspiration after virtue if the good is not perceived as such. Professor A. T. Ormond has expounded well the psychological ground in conduct as vitalized social forms, like imitation, consciousness of kind, etc. He has shown that they all involve and refer to an inner activity of the subject. He says, in an article on the "Social Individual":—

"The touch that makes us kin is an inner touch, while the objective and outer motive that leads to the touch is either an imitative movement or a representation that is rendered capable of a reference to the inner consciousness of another by means of prior association with inner experiences of our own. . . . The internal or appreciative moment of the social life, as related to our fellow-creatures in which sphere the ethical life functions, lies with the individual, and this reaction of the individual involves his whole personality."

Again, in his "Foundations of Knowledge," Professor Ormond says:—

"We are obliged to trace the primary root of the sense of kind to the self in some primary individual nature, that in becoming internally conscious becomes also the 'fontal type' of all ends which it seeks objectively." "The reaction of the subject-consciousness

is a reaction as a whole, and self-apprehension will be a function of this mode of reaction. If we are sure of our self-activity, we have that assurance because we grasp it in an act of immediate intuition. It cannot be disputed, then, that we know the fact of our self-activity. . . . If in the reactive consciousness, self-activity, and not simply activity that has no label, is revealed, then it is clear that we have a qualification of the content as a whole which renders it not merely a 'that,' but a 'what.' The fact that the activity is taking the form of a self shows that it is not formless, but is defining itself as a whole."

Because Kant failed to give the categorical imperative specific form, and because the normative principle of his ethics lacks content, the sage of Königsberg has been severely criticized by Höffding. The Danish scholar uses this point of the Kantian ethics to attack what is strongest and most true in Kant's ethical teaching, namely, its affirmation of an objective, authoritative norm, which alone makes possible a categorical imperative. Höffding says in his "Problems of Philosophy: "In our estimation of worth and our purposes the inner nature of our feeling and will is revealed. As the concept of purpose depends on the concept of worth, so also the concept of the norm depends on the concept of purpose. The norm is the rule for the activity which is necessary to attain the purpose. It was a fatal thing for the treatment of the problem of worth when Immanuel Kant reversed the relation and tried to derive the concept of purpose from the concept of the norm [of law]. This is a psychological impossibility." It is well, after all, that Kant's categorical imperative remains an impersonal dictum without content, for it has ever been the fatal blundering of casuistry to define specific duties and to enjoin them as obligatory. To the individual is left the application of the ethical law, as he feels it, and as it presents itself to him. Höffding, however, makes here the fatal blunder of lapsing into descriptive science by

insisting that the concept of purpose cannot be derived from the concept of norm (of law). This is to ignore the fact that ethics is a *normative*, not a descriptive, science. By defining norm as "the rule for the activity necessary to attain the purpose," the normative element becomes a fiction, inasmuch as the norms are severally made dependent on the agents who adopt them merely to reach certain ends which they do pursue. Indeed! not always those which they ought to pursue. This procedure gives a method rather than a normative standard. It is psychologically impossible to explain the sentiment of *ought* from what *is*. The feeling of ought is an original, unanalyzable fact. The revelation of God at the heart of man is the original source of all religion, and also of the original source of all obligations and duties, of whatever specific content they may be. No strictly rational ethics, therefore, is possible. We cannot, even in theory, be good without God. The postulate, involved in every ethics, that the individual destiny at best coincides with the larger good, and conversely, assumes a theistic basis. And so does the originality of the moral sentiment in its commanding authority. Ethics discloses what is before us and behind us, the moral nature of what bears us and what leads us. What ought to be is felt to be the basis and ground as well as the goal of all that is. In the science of ethics, first and final causes are seen to be one; and thus in the ethical nature the heart of reality is laid bare. It is safe to predict that, in our age of indifference towards philosophical discipline, we may expect a reawakening of metaphysical studies through interest in ethical questions. Only when ethics rests on the religious basis of theistic belief have the English words "duty" and "ought" meaning, in that they bring in the One who is Creator and Judge, to whom is *due*, to whom is *owed*, to whom we pray that He "for-

give us our debts as we forgive our debtors." Eduard von Hartmann says in "Das Religiöse Bewusstsein der Menschheit," "All facts point to the circumstance that the ethical consciousness of man has developed exclusively on the basis of religious conviction, that ethics nowhere has arisen without this, and that in its specific coloring it has everywhere been conditioned and determined by religion." To conceive of the purpose for which we are created, "the chief end of man to glorify God and enjoy Him forever," affords an objective, authoritative norm. The impossibility of its psychological explanation only corroborates the fact of its being a primordial rule inherent in the nature of God. But a rule which we form as a consequence of our own desires can never figure as such a norm, for such a rule would be merely describing the functioning of our desires in our purposes, the record of a subjective, unethical condition of fact. Höffding, in common with the general tendency of our day to give wide scope to theories of values, inclines to subjective and individualistic views, which logically result in individualistic pleasure-pursuits. Against this tendency, the rigorism of Kant's ethical law stands as a wholesome truth. For the ethical life, far from being a *primrose way* determined by *transient pleasures*, should be accepted as *an exacting task* under the demands of *the Infinite!* We are to learn to will our duty, not to shape our duties to our wills, for then what we call duties become simply our desires. Not whatever satisfies desire is good. Desire itself is to be brought to a test. As Professor Palmer tentatively puts it: "Pleasure probably is nothing else but the sense that some one of our functions has been appropriately exercised. Every time, then, that a volition has been carried forth in the complex world and there conducted to its mark (*and taken its inward effect*) a gratified feeling arises." Pleas-

ure, then, should rather be treated as an incident expression of the proper discharge of our function, our duty, "given us by something which we cannot alter, fully estimate, or with damage evade."

Höfdding well declares it a psychological impossibility to derive the concept of purpose from the concept of law. Instead, however, of attempting to subsume the law under its contents, which are but its specific expressions, showing the way in which we get this experiential evaluation of the law, he might rather have paused to reflect whether or not the ethical law of right and wrong is unanalyzable because original, and have recognized that God is the ultimate lawgiver and authority, as of old!