

## ARTICLE V.

## PARLIAMENTARY LAW A WORLD INSTITUTION.

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EVERY man in the United States has a personal concern in parliamentary law. So does every woman who believes in woman suffrage, or who is or desires to be a member of a woman's club, or of a charitable, missionary, or maternal association, or of a Pomona grange, or of any other kind of woman's organization which transacts business. So does every boy in the United States. So does every girl who expects to become such a woman as is mentioned. Still further, so does every man and woman, every boy and girl, in every country which has a parliamentary branch of government. So does every man and woman, boy and girl, in every country which is under despotic government, for only by action under forms of parliamentary law giving the training necessary for self-government can despotism be permanently overthrown. So does every man and woman, boy and girl, in every tribe so unorganized as not to have a form of government, for only through action in which the principles of parliamentary law reign can development occur from unorganization to organized government and to the institutions of civilization. When a savage chief, with the silence of his hearers, addresses them upon matters of common concern, there is the vital germ of parliamentary procedure. So parliamentary law is world-wide and world-old in its age and importance.

Universal as parliamentary law is in its importance to mankind, it has an intellectual magnificence which corresponds

with its universality. Comparing the development of the organized common sense of the race with the evolution of the physical creation from nebulous star-dust, Parliamentary Law may fittingly say, with Wisdom:—

“I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning;

. . . . .

When he marked out the foundations of the earth,  
Then I was by him as a master workman;

. . . . .

And my delight was with the sons of men.”

Not even the form of beginning the expression of the organized common sense of men can be made without bringing into play the principles of parliamentary law. When a man stands forth from the midst of a company assembled with a common purpose, but without a means of expression, and calls the meeting to order, proposes that a certain man be chairman and puts the question, then a beginning of order has been made, without which nothing can be done. Before that, there was intellectual chaos, taking the company as a whole. It was a status like that of nebulous star-dust before rotation of the mass had begun and before gravitation began.—if such a condition be conceivable. Order, “Heaven’s first law,” is the first and supreme law of the intellectual evolution of organic humanity, in all its seriousness and dignity. Order, through all the subsequent evolution of organized action, always remains the primary and essential condition of parliamentary action. To the maintenance of order every other consideration of business must give way, and only with reasonable order can any business be transacted. Order in parliamentary procedure is as gravitation in matter—universally present as a fundamental condition, never inoperative, never to be suspended.

It is readily admitted that in practice this ideal condition

has repeatedly and notoriously failed to hold good, even in the highest parliamentary bodies in the United States,—to our shame be it confessed. But, in reality, there is at such times a successful rebellion whereby parliamentary law is overthrown and men return or degenerate to a mere animal condition. Immediately with the restoration of order and the reënthronement of reason, parliamentary law resumes its scepter; and the truth in question has been conspicuously illustrated by its temporary eclipse.

Parliamentary law occupies a wonderfully high place in the evolution of democracy, and it is certain to hold that place as long as democracy exists. It stands on its own merits, worthy of the study and familiar acquaintance of every one who lives under or who aspires to enjoy a democratic form of government. As a matter of psychology it is of high and unique value. By it alone is definite form given to that complex personality composed of the many personalities of the people, for by it are put into action the intellect, the emotions, and the will, which make a unit of the many. Through the form of expression made possible by parliamentary law, and from as many different points of view as there are persons who contribute by their knowledge and their judgment to the consideration of the problem in hand, the combined intellect of the many acts as one and comes to a definite conclusion regarding the facts under discussion. Acted upon by the facts, the emotions stir the will; and so the complex personality, through the forms of parliamentary law,—and only through that law, or principles embodied in it,—determines that something must be done. The executive officers of this complex personality organized as a unit have the duty of carrying out its will; and so all the attributes of personality, reinforced by a weight of authority far beyond that of

any individual person participating, are put into operation. So it becomes established that the judgment of the people, or "the sense of the meeting," is really and practically of higher worth than that of any individual person of those who have shared in the result and who have merged their own personalities in the one personality of the whole. Through the principles of parliamentary law alone has such a result been possible, even though the refinements of that law are unknown and unpractised by those who have shaped the action of the organized body.

Parliamentary law is the means whereby a mass becomes obedient to reason and is differentiated from a mob. It signifies self-restraint, self-command, the reign of law and order, intelligence acting through reason and directly toward its object. It reveals the intellect, the emotions, and the will acting in harmonious coöperation. But a mob, tossed by passion, without reason, or with so little glimmer of it as not to be worthy of respect, uses its will through passion alone, without self-restraint, and so commits its terrible outrages, its crimes, and its destruction of justice. It is true, be it admitted with regret, that even under the forms of order and reason, in perfect accord with parliamentary law, most regrettable acts are done. A striking instance recently was that act of the Legislature of Massachusetts whereby, in twenty minutes from its introduction, a bill appropriating \$500,000 for purposes of the war with Spain was rushed through House and Senate under suspension of the rules, was signed by the Governor and became law, — a childish and ridiculous act of which doubtless the people of Massachusetts will yet be ashamed as the men who did it were proud of it at the time, acting under the impression that it would reveal to the world the readiness of Massachusetts to plunge into war and would

tend to strike terror into the hearts of the enemy. But, as the act was under parliamentary law, and that law was strictly followed, if a single member had objected, the proceedings could and would have been arrested. Supremacy of law was there; and the illustration reveals the might of this law, if brave and sensible men are at hand, to restrain ill-considered action.

Parliamentary law is a product of many minds, during a period covering many hundred years, trying to put into the most practical and equitable form the methods of transacting parliamentary business. It is the concentrated essence of common sense, fair play, and business efficiency in its particular field. To those who are unfamiliar with its application it doubtless seems to be complex, arbitrary, and perhaps even contradictory. But long familiarity makes the observer wonder at the successful application of plain common sense in so many details and in such a comprehensive manner. Whatever the mystery which seems to envelop any particular rule, when it is analyzed and put in its relation to the just and speedy transaction of business, it will be found based on satisfactory reasons and to be demanded by fair play to all parties. From the beginning of action — the making of a motion, seconding it, and acting upon it by amendment or by other motions by means of which it may be disposed of without coming to a vote at the time upon the merits of the proposition — up to the direct vote, yea or nay, every step is marked by reasons which have been heated in the fire of discussion, and hammered on the anvil of experience and of thousands of applications, until its quality is of the very purest and it will stand whatever strain is put upon it. This is true in the main, whatever minor exceptions can be found in theory and whatever injustice may occur in any particular matter in the exigencies of practice.

Over and over again, in many large and important deliberative bodies of the world, have these principles been in constant operation, tried under a thousand different conditions, open to amendment as a thousand minds have seen opportunity, or a thousand critical moments have suggested, and they rightfully make their demand upon the allegiance of all mankind as an embodiment of the highest reason, the most refined sense of justice, and the most businesslike methods agreed upon for protection of the rights of all and the accurate and dignified transaction of business.

At the same time, it is true that there is constant evolution toward a higher ideal and a more practical application of the principles of justice. A marked illustration is to be seen in the assertion of broad rights over against technicalities in the relation of majorities and minorities. An excellent instance of development is seen in the experience of the Massachusetts House of Representatives whereby definite principles for the restraint of filibustering have been worked out through heated and exasperating experience. If the tyranny of a majority is intolerable, as it is asserted to be by many critics of the democratic form of government, the tyranny of a minority is doubly so. Yet strict adherence to the forms of parliamentary law gives minorities many opportunities to hold majorities helpless in their grasp for a long time until the form of the law shall have had its perfect work. It is quite possible for a skilfully handled and combative minority, in many cases, to defeat completely the will of the majority, and so the democratic idea of government is entirely subverted. This is done under the plea of justice and the protection of the rights of the minority under parliamentary law.

The illustration mentioned occurred in 1885 when the bill was on its passage to establish for Boston a police commission

to be appointed by the Governor. It was a novel step for the Legislature. It involved undoubted interference with the right of local self-government. But the prevalence of reeking immorality in the city under the existing administration had made many good citizens desperate, and they determined to call in the aid of the State Government. The division of the House was mostly on party lines, Republicans for the bill and Democrats against it, though some Republicans were notable exceptions. At different stages in the progress of the bill there were hot collisions, and at the last the fighting temper was supreme. For three days in succession there raged the wildest disorder ever witnessed in the House. Every parliamentary device available to the minority was resorted to by them in their desperate and persistent filibustering. The last straw which broke the back of the patience of the Republicans was the practice by the Democrats of a device which would have prolonged the session to the end of the calendar year and have prevented the passage of the bill and of all other legislation if the obstruction had not been removed. A member asked to be excused from voting upon a question. Another member asked for a roll-call upon the request. This was ordered, and then came a request to be excused from voting on that roll-call and that a roll-call be had on that excuse. Then was made a request to be excused from voting on the roll-call on the previous request for a roll-call on excuse from voting on a roll-call; and so roll-call was piled on roll-call to the number of six before the first one had been had, and it was clear that every man of the whole ninety odd in the minority might ask to be excused and a roll-call be ordered on every request, and that, on other questions, the device might be worked to the end of time. Each roll-call would occupy about fifteen minutes. So the Republican majority was forced to take the bits in its

teeth. At a caucus at the noon recess they determined upon their course; and immediately after reassembling only Republicans were recognized by the Speaker, and the bill was forced through, amid the most violent demonstrations from the overridden minority.

It is true that the bill was so obnoxious in principle that the precedent has been followed in only one case, that two similar bills have been vetoed by the Governor, and that the practice of governing cities by the State is still condemned. But the principle of majority supremacy has been thoroughly established, as it seems to be also in the House at Washington, that the forms of parliamentary law are not to be used for the prevention of legitimate business. A new principle has been set up over all technicalities, in order to prevent filibustering, namely, that the rights of minorities to the protection of parliamentary law are exhausted when full debate has been permitted. Reasonable opportunity for debate must be allowed. But the debaters are to be held to direct discussion of the question and must not waste the time of the assembly by dilatory speeches. It is for the chair to say whether a reasonable opportunity has been given, and it depends upon the support which the majority gives to the rulings of the chair whether filibustering is prevented. It is true that this power is dangerous, especially when in the hands of an excitable presiding officer, or one of despotic disposition, or an extreme partisan. But it has been proved to be absolutely imperative, as well as absolutely just, to put a stop to persistent filibustering after all reasonable debate has come to an end.

This development of parliamentary law is clearly right. A parliamentary body is in existence for the transaction of business justly and promptly. Its duty is to hear reasons for and against pending propositions. When those reasons have been



presented in an adequate degree, it is for the assembly to act, and no minority has a right to obstruct the transaction of business by a mere factious delay made possible by a strict interpretation of parliamentary law not designed at all for such conditions. A minority's rights are protected by reasonable debate. They are exhausted, as far as debate is concerned, when reasonable time has been occupied. Then it is time to vote, and if the minority wastes its time by refusing to use the opportunity for debate, its blood must be upon its own head. Responsibility for action and for the general advancement of the public business is upon the majority. If the minority believe that the public interest is sacrificed by the majority's action, their remedy is not in parliamentary obstruction, but in an appeal to the popular sense of justice and fair play. This is a highly important development of parliamentary law, and the fact that it has come at so late a date illustrates how that law may be in practice hundreds of years without being established upon important particulars. It is to be presumed that other developments of large importance to liberty and progress will yet be made as demanded by the exigencies of experience.

Parliamentary law is still developing on what may be called its moral side, and a pertinent illustration is in the disuse of the motion to postpone indefinitely, as in the case of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, although the motion has standing yet, doubtless, in many assemblies and societies. The objections are that the motion is both needless and immoral. On its face, it purports to be a courteous and not unfriendly motion to delay till later, as if it might permit the subject to be taken up again. But that purpose is amply met by the motion to lay on the table. The motion to postpone indefinitely has that character of friendly hatred which inquires solicitously, "Art thou in health, my brother?" and drives the knife up to

the hilt under the fifth rib. Again, it gives its supporters two opportunities to vote upon their real proposition. If they are defeated at first on the motion to postpone indefinitely, they can hustle for a majority upon the straight yea and nay vote. If they win by means of their plausibly and deceitfully worded motion, then the subject-matter is as dead as if it had been struck on the head by a broad axe. It is probably the fact that the smooth wording of the motion secures votes which a direct "no" would not secure, and yet the effect of the vote, when carried, is precisely the same as a straight "no." Therefore the motion has been discarded as not to be tolerated by honorable men.

One of the great reasons why the humanities have held their place so many years as subjects of study in the face of the seemingly more practical branches is that they deal with language, and language is the coin of thought, tried and polished by generations of service. Thus the study of language brings the pupil into close contact with the brains of the race more than any other study. In a somewhat parallel way the practice of parliamentary law is of large advantage in its intellectual, moral, and political bearings. Its principles have been wrought out into its short and sharp expressions by the usage of so many minds during so many years that he who learns to use it skilfully gains greatly thereby in his intellectual and moral strength and becomes better qualified for political life.

Parliamentary practice, for the development of certain admirable qualities of mind, is unexcelled by any other study which can be undertaken. It is logical to exactness. It is definite to a hair, in the main, whatever minor exceptions may be found where it is still vague. It is polished like a knife by constant usage. It is keen and decisive, so that its conclusions are indisputable, as a rule, whatever the exceptions are where

its principles have not been clearly wrought out. It is easily comprehended by average persons when once its principles have been grasped. It holds the mind to its task. It develops concentration, logical power, and alertness. The student must be broad in his vision. He must be quick in his apprehension. He must be prompt and accurate in his decision. He must be thorough in his analysis. He must be resourceful in his store of facts and in his wit in using them. Parliamentary practice thus does more than most of the studies in the schools to bring out the most manly, the most desirable, and the most necessary qualities of mind which people must use in their daily living. It is an excellent preparation for the real encounters in life when a man must meet men in bargaining, in setting up will against will, in assurance, in quickness and firmness. Probably no other study is capable of doing so much in a short time as this to make an all-around, active, accurate, and well-furnished man of affairs in meeting other men and dealing with them; and upon one's ability in that respect depends half of his success in life as a man among men.

But the moral benefit of the study of parliamentary law is as high as the intellectual. No other study approaches it in its practical teaching of order and justice. Order comes first, and every one who enters into the spirit of his study will gain a fresh and powerful sense of the necessity and rightfulness of order. He will insist upon the preservation of order and the enforcement of law far more than one who has not had such a vision of the vital importance of this first law of heaven. So a direct political consequence of the moral bearing of parliamentary law is to make men better citizens. It is necessary for a parliamentary gathering as a principle of action, and it is equally necessary for the welfare of the body politic as a whole. Order must be enforced, and the practice of parliamentary law

goes far to make a man both to sympathize with the law-abiding spirit and to submit himself personally to the authority of the law, and so to do his share, by example as well as by precept, in maintaining the good order of the community and in compelling respect for law and for the government, always promising that the government is worthy of support.

Parliamentary practice promotes that personal self-restraint which is imperative for a successful business man or a valuable citizen. In the assembly, every ebullition of temper hurts him who displays it. He cheapens himself before his associates. He advertises himself foolishly in the worst way. His prestige goes down. No member can afford to yield to his temper. Not only do these subjective considerations operate to hold him in restraint, but the presiding officer will put restraint upon him if he cannot restrain himself, and again he is disgraced publicly. He must be in order, and if he cannot restrain himself, he must be held by others. This power of self-restraint promotes capacity for self-government in political affairs in organized communities. Without it the self-government of a city and the independence of a nation are alike impossible. It is a part of the maintenance of order. It compels men to sit still and hear themselves and their ideas denounced, ridiculed, and misrepresented, provided only that the attack is under the form of parliamentary practice. It teaches men to control their tempers, or, at least, to wait in an orderly and respectful manner until their time comes when they can reply to the attack. Great provocation must be resisted in silence while the mind is working to meet the attack, not by violent and wrathful words, or a small-minded hurling back of the charges, but by brain-filled shell from the intellectual cannon which shall shatter and annihilate the antagonist, or by that soft word which turneth away wrath and that ap-

peal to reason which convinces, disarms, and makes friends.

So the list of moral qualities might be enlarged which are imperative in parliamentary practice. Absolute justice between man and man must be exercised. Courtesy, as well as order, is secured by the principle that no member shall address another, but that every remark must be addressed to the chair. All of the proceedings for questions of privilege, for points of order, for the order of business, the precedence of motions, and other details have their moral bearing for the attainment of exact truth, efficiency, and sound judgment when the conclusion of this unit of many persons is reached. In process the method is wonderful; in result it compels adherence. In both mental and moral aspects the ways and the results of parliamentary procedure are of high quality.

Now, the world has great need of the qualities which are promoted by the study of parliamentary law. Whatever the gain individually to the persons who reap the benefits of its practice, that gain cannot but be a material asset of the public. It is therefore a fair question for the educators of the country whether it would not be both for the intellectual and moral benefit of the schools, and for the public welfare as well, if the practice of parliamentary law were introduced into the high schools, and perhaps into the upper grade of the grammar schools. Many pupils complete their education in the grammar schools and go directly from them into the active life of wage-earning and then into the duties of citizenship. If a period once a week were set apart when all the school were made an assembly, with a pupil in the chair and the teacher among the members on the floor to guide, illustrate, and enforce, much would be learned in a short time which would have a lasting effect upon the personal life and would be of permanent benefit to the citizenship of the country. No hard mental operation

need be made of it. No text-book need be used, beyond having a parliamentary manual at hand for reference. Learning should be by oral explanation and practice. The principles are so plain and so easily learned that a whole school could be depended upon to catch them quickly and to apply them with encouraging accuracy. Debate should be had, but partly as a form for the content of parliamentary law. Encounters of wit and of inventiveness would stimulate the pupils, while the interest of real contests would make them alive and would give zest to the hour. Such an exercise might be made fascinating, looked forward to with pleasure, and left behind with a large degree of profit. Considering the function of the public schools to secure the mental and moral training of the pupils in relation to the fitness of this subject to secure these results, while it also helps to prepare for citizenship, it is reasonable for our educators to consider whether some other subject might not well give way for an hour a week, at least.

Now we pass to the last particular in which the practice of parliamentary law is of vital importance,—the political. Its intellectual and moral force is felt in this field in its full intensity, and the political consideration is added to the others. Now, if any one truth stands out clearly in the political development of late years, it is that our government must be more than ever a concern of all the people, and that this tendency is destined to increase for an indefinite future. This is the meaning of the spread of the idea and of the practice of governmental regulation of monopolies. It inspires the enforcement of the interstate commerce law. It sustains the popular enthusiasm for Mr. Roosevelt's aggressive policy for the control of corporations, no matter whether or not he is right in his details, or whether or not the corporations like his policy. Public service corporations must be under the regulation of

the public. On the other hand, the public must know how to regulate those corporations. The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Vermont case raises the probability that public control of private corporations will be greatly enlarged. Urgent demand is now made upon our citizens for far higher qualities of statesmanship than they possess. Public business demands their time and thought as never before. They must take up their responsibility or they will become the slaves of the despotism of wealth. The contest is real and vital to the welfare of the masses and to the existence of a true democratic form of government. Supineness and neglect by the people will fix child labor as a permanent institution, will establish railroad despotism over Congress, the state legislatures, and all mercantile business. Protection of labor against the demands of capital will be impossible with untrained citizens. Voters must give freely and patriotically. Recent efforts for infrequent elections and legislative sessions are emphatically and dangerously in the wrong direction. Sound judgment in public affairs is developed by practice, under the inexorable laws of mind, just as truly as in other fields of action. A pianist might as well expect to become more expert by practising only at long intervals; an athlete might as well expect to develop his muscles most effectively by exercising once a week, as a people to have a competent knowledge and judgment of government and its problems by giving only infrequent attention to them. Massachusetts seems to have passed the crisis of the hostility to its wise policy of annual state elections and annual legislative sessions, for the effort in the House of 1907 for biennial elections had only two votes out of 240 members. A New York daily, commenting upon Governor Hughes's effort for biennial legislative sessions, adds: "It remains a fact, however, that

the best legislative body in the country, the General Court of Massachusetts, sits every year." The cost and the disturbance of frequent attendance to political needs are nothing to the immense gain.

This is an era of general complaint because of the failure of municipal governments in the United States. Nearly all of our large cities have scandals of administration. Yet every one of them can easily have an honest government if it chooses. It is merely a question of getting a majority vote for honest men. How great is the failure of our voters in their plain and easy duty, and how false and hollow is the claim of American patriotism, are strikingly illustrated by the impossibility, in so many cases, of securing that majority vote. All the disgrace which attaches to a citizen because he lives where crime is unpunished, where liquor is on the throne, where the police protect vice that they may share its profits, and where contractors rob the people by fraudulent contracts does not arouse a majority to overturn the corrupt administration.

Considering this situation, and recognizing the value of associated effort to promote knowledge of public affairs, it is evident that if there were a general revival all over the country of local organizations which should combine the functions of good government associations, of village improvement societies and of the old-time debating clubs, it would raise the efficiency and purity of the body politic in a material degree. It is not necessary that the membership be large. Half a dozen persons are enough, if no more can be had. It would be better to have a small membership in order that every member might frequently have a personal share in the proceedings. Never can there be a lack of material for the consideration of such organizations. As long as we are a democracy, it will be suitable for such an assembly to discuss any topic — from the



international relations of the United States to the world state which is now in process of evolution, or the regulation of corporations by the United States government, down to the setting out of shade trees and the picking up of waste paper in the streets.

Such organizations would both debate and do business, and the members would enjoy the benefit of the discussion and of the action. They would do something for local betterment. Propositions involving the expenditure of money by the organization and action by the officers would be made, would be considered under parliamentary law, and would be voted upon. Their merits would be under the fire of debate. Knowledge of public affairs would be promoted greatly. The practice of public spirit would be fostered. With it would go the intellectual and moral benefit attaching to the practice of parliamentary law, while over and above all would be the practice of acting in unity as a single body, developing from many personalities that one personality which makes effective the judgment and the will of all united which would otherwise be useless energy.

Our country to-day is in great need of just such a revival as this. Not only adults, but young people of high-school age would be valuable members of such organizations, and they would contribute as well as receive benefit. If every village had such an assembly, if every city were thickly dotted with them, and if meetings were held frequently, taking constant interest in public affairs, the tone of civic morality would be raised and the public intelligence regarding public men and measures would be enlarged, while it is possible that the improved way of spending evenings and the practice of holding the mind to subjects worthy of the consideration of reasonable beings might save the country from much immorality and

from the development of criminal tendencies. The nation as a whole and every community down to the small village could only gain by such a revival.

But the benefits would be felt in other countries, for such development would be as suitable and timely as for our own. It is reasonable to presume that the Philippines, with their strong desire for complete national independence and with their readiness to adopt what would help them to that patriotic end, would make their own a practice which would do more than any other possible thing but independence itself to prepare them for the genuine exercise of national self-government. Our government certainly would not interfere in the slightest with the full development of such helpful organizations, for they would be solving for us the Philippine problem in the very line marked out by the positive assurance of President Taft in at least one public address. Local affairs in their widest application, matters of agriculture, various industries, public adornment, sanitation, education, road-building, public finance, and whatever enters into the life of an organized people could be discussed with all the benefits of parliamentary practice, fostering intimacy with public affairs, formulating a policy of public administration for the future, and, most of all, developing the habit of democratic action which would be the mainstay of the actual government hereafter. If a revival of parliamentary study and debates upon public affairs in the United States could cause a similar growth in the Philippines, the result there would be ample compensation and our effort would be doubly profitable.

But it is reasonable to predict that other countries would also gain by our influence, though the time of waiting might be prolonged until national development reached a higher level. But certainly the Japanese avidity in seizing what is

good in Western civilization is warrant for believing that the organization of the people for their evident strength and profit as a self-governing nation would come in due time, while the awakening of China, the establishment of newspapers and of schools gives promise that such a powerful means of popular advancement would be adopted in that country also. In other nations, perhaps the development would be slower and under possible opposition by the government. But it would be a sure addition to the strength of the Russian people if their city agitators were to organize associations for local improvements wholly apart from politics, which would not in any way threaten the government. The practice of acting together, of discussing propositions and of voting upon them, of abiding by majority decisions, of conducting meetings with dignity and order and according to rule, suppressing passion and strengthening the power of self-control, all this adds to the value of the citizens as an asset of the nation.

In our own country many persons are members of various organizations — social, fraternal, industrial, political, literary, religious, and so on. We are a much organized people. This development has been wholly natural. The several functions filled are necessary to the rounding out of our organic life in these many aspects. So it is with every people. If any of them is to advance toward its highest possibilities, it must be under the forms of organization where parliamentary law rules. Only by that road can they reach the goal. Be it recognized, in the light of this evident truth, that the principles of parliamentary practice, though perhaps formulated earliest by certain people, are not the property or right of any race or nation. They are not European, Asiatic, African, American, Australasian, or Polynesian. They are human. In them there is nothing to arouse the prejudice of any human being, Jew or

Mohammedan, Christian or infidel, idolater or fetish-worshiper. They are broader and deeper than all divisions whose cleavages separate the human family. They are as deep as the unity of the race, and that underlies and outmatches in strength all the divisive forces. Parliamentary principles are not only universal, but indispensable for the progress of communities and of nations to their highest self-governing capacity. They have their connection, too, with the saying of wonderful depth of practical meaning which applies to all political matters, as well as to intellectual, moral, and religious conditions, whose author may perhaps be guessed by some persons: "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."