ARTICLE V.

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY PRAGMATISM.
CRITICALLY CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO PRESENT-DAY THEOLOGY.

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When Professor McCosh of Princeton fame wished for a specific American, a national philosophy, which should be distinctively characteristic of our land, he little anticipated the speedy realization of his desire, still less the particular nature of that philosophy which, with some reservations, may be fairly called American. Pragmatism is a specifically American Weltanschauung, a philosophic wisdom which as such is formulated and sustained on our native soil. It not only fits the temper of the great republic, but it found here nurture, development, and formulation. It has endeavored to give an account of itself, to justify itself in a consistent way. Professor Pierce, Professor James, and Professor Dewey are the representatives of this school. The pragmatic literature up to very recent time was rather limited, and even now consists mainly of articles scattered through the various philosophical magazines, it being rather in keeping with the pragmatic attitude, not to let reason expand its explanations into bulky volumes, as did the old school. A short historical review of the rise of pragmatism will enable us to understand the better its temper, its teaching, and its setting.

The evolutionary theories influenced potently the ethical conceptions; especially did they affect the attitude towards the inherited wisdom of tradition, as represented in dogmas, creeds,
laws, teachings, etc. Evolution will not be fettered by the worn-out *superstitio* of the past; it faces the present and makes hopefully for the future. Things are not static, they evolve, and in the various interplays emerge the things that are to supersede those that have had their day. "History," said Höffding, "is the great voting-place for standards of value." We that are making history, subject to the process of development, are therefore concerned with the regulative standards. Where are they found, and what part are they to play in our life? In no department of study are displayed more amazingly superficial explanations than in the current views held about the evolutionary doctrines. Of course there are different views, and justly so. Darwin put side by side in the accounts of his theory the famous phrases "struggle for existence" and "natural selection," which coöperating factors result in the "survival of the fittest." It is safe to say that in the subsequent discussions of the evolutionary theories it has been agreed upon that the latter factor, "natural selection," has been overemphasized. The assumption in the determining power of natural selection is the reasonableness of the universe, that is to say, if the development is working at all to a specific end.

But it will be seen that this factor, made prominent at the expense of the individual agencies which play their part in the milieu of these given determining environments, assumes also the function of the individual. This evolutionary philosophy becomes thereby strictly monistic. The "struggle for existence" and "natural selection" are one. Self-determination is an illusion. We are driftwood on the evolutionary currents. Our discrimination as to the obligatory control of the less evolved feelings by the more evolved ones is imaginary. Moral wisdom is to be displaced by passive adaptability to environ-
ment. But it stands to reason that the categorical "ought" is not so easily disposed of, nor the undeniable verdict of personal integrity. Man does function with free will as a responsible rational being, and as he responds in his choices to his environment so is he responsible. He cannot let go of himself, and let this evolutionary process develop him. We, therefore, are thrown back on a guiding principle by which we may conduct ourselves in the affairs of life. But as all things are in the making, as much as we ourselves, yea, as even God Almighty has been proclaimed to be in the process of becoming, we can only get an unfinished code, a provisionary standard, to be outgrown by and by. The regulative standard, which we adopt to judge our actions, is subjected to these very actions to which we carry it for a successful approach. It is much like Adam striding across the stage to be created. We are left to work out our tasks in a world of pure experience. James tells us:—

"Whether experience itself is due to something independent of all possible experience is a question that pragmatism declines to answer."  

Truth becomes on this pragmatic basis a relation between different parts of experience. This, however, is a vague and unsatisfactory definition of the greatest and central concept of all philosophy, viz. to search for the principles by which reason may obtain a true knowledge of things. We are constrained therefore to inquire about this relation between the more and the less fixed parts of experience, if this pragmatic truth is to guide us instead of the obsolete truth which pretended to be a sufficiently true and reliable copy of a trans-empirical reality known in experience. This assumption of thought was too bold, and it is asserted that pragmatism rises upon the

breakdown of this old representative view of knowledge. Professor Dewey calls attention, in an address, to the fact that Kant's famous dictum, "Perception without conception is blind, conception without perception is empty," has resulted in a deadlock. He urges to turn to the meaningful aspect of knowledge — we are to consider for what end it is itself there. And his answer is:—

"The individual must work a definite and controllable tool. This tool is science. But this very fact constituting the dignity of science and measuring the importance of the philosophic theory of knowledge, conferring upon them the religious value once attaching to dogma, and the disciplinary significance once belonging to political rules, also sets their limit. The servant is not above his master. When a theory of knowledge forgets that its value rests in solving the problem out of which it has arisen, viz. that of securing a method of action; when it forgets that it has to work out the conditions under which the individual may freely direct himself without loss of the historic value of civilization—when the nature and method of knowledge are fairly understood, then interest must transfer itself from the possibility of knowledge to its application to life. . . . The Kantian epistemology has formulated the claims of both schools in defining the judgments as the relation of perception and conception. But when he goes on to state that this relation is itself knowledge, he stultifies himself. Knowledge can define the percept and elaborate the concept, but their union can be found only in action. The experimental method of modern science, its erection into the ultimate mode of verification, is simply this fact obtaining recognition."  

It is in place to remark at this juncture, that in this statement there are a few assumptions which require a more elaborate justification than pragmatism has yet been able to give. For one thing, it goes without saying that even theoretic knowledge is not detached, and we do well to remember here that Kant's philosophic thinking did not limit itself to the "Critique of Pure Reason," but included the "Critique of Practical Reason" and the "Critique of Judgment." In fact,

1 John Dewey, The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge.
Kant's own testimony was that he not so much had given to the world a completed system of philosophy as materials on which subsequent thinkers might build. In his preface to the "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics" Kant gives as his opinion that "it must, after all, be one and the same reason which is at work, only applied differently." This is exactly what Fichte did with Kant's material. Unifying the conception of the theoretical and the practical reason as they appear in Kant, Fichte subsumes all reality under the unity of the life, whether in knowledge or merely in existence, whilst for Kant self-consciousness is only the unity to which all human knowledge is referred.

So the explanation of things is in their \( \tau \varepsilon \alpha \lambda \sigma \zeta \), not in the imperfect time-beginnings. The phenomenal world of sensibility relates therefore not to a \( \text{Ding an Sich} \), a contradictory, unrelated noumenon, but its true disclosure is in the world of duty within. This true noumenon is the real final cause. And subsequent ethical study has corroborated that "Our deepest insights into the heart of reality are of an ethical nature." Kant's "Ding an Sich," we may say, was by Fichte deduced from the necessity of the moral consciousness. Things in themselves are "as we have to make them." Fichte's idealism does not claim to be dogmatic but practical, determining not what is, but what ought to be. This position he argued strongly in his unfortunate atheistic controversy at Jena, identifying God with the moral world-order:

"That there is a moral order of the world, which assigns to each rational individual his determined place and counts on his work, is most certain, nay is the ground of all other certitude. The living and operative moral order (\( \text{ordo ordinans} \)) is itself God; we need no

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other God, and can conceive no other. There is no ground in reason for going beyond this world-order to postulate a particular being as its cause."

This high-class pantheism of an all-pervading Zielstrebigkeit, to be espoused by man, is much in keeping with evolutionary teachings. And it is worthy of note that Fichte deduced the theoretical knowledge from the practical. Fichte counted himself primarily a man of practical interest. As for Kant the suprasensible is an assumption concerning that which is in behalf of that which ought to be; so for Fichte the ego limits itself in order to overcome the limitation, the theoretical is only in behalf of the practical, or that which is exists only because of what ought to be.

It is easily seen that this teaching of the duty of unremitting exertion appeals to people who have work to do. America, untrammeled by much tradition, with a constant demand for work, specially welcomes the doctrine of "the strenuous life," as in matter of fact it does practise the same. The chief executive of the nation, Theodore Roosevelt, has taken up the motto with predilection and expects great things from it for the nation, because America is engaged in the making of a civilization and has yet great tasks before it. In this plastic civilization, action, even at the risk of taking chances, must needs be the paramount issue in life. Reflection and meditation are out of place. They fit rather an established order of things. Inactive wisdom of leisurely culture is a wasteful expenditure of human energies, capacity gone to seed. Not, what do you know, but what can you do, and what are you prepared to do, is the American requirement. Latent energies, contemplating wisdom, granted it is there, merits derision and scorn in the land of hustling activity, when it is not applied, not practised. Knowledge is only in order to be more effective.
'Not only know, but also practise what you know.' It must be serviceable, as it is subservient to the tasks and needs of life. But these tasks and needs dictate and call out, they are favorites who respond promptly to accept them. Those who compute and theorize about the facts of life are not in demand.

Professor Münsterberg, an observer and psychologist, in "The Americans" calls attention to the fact of this imperious demand to shape the things that come to hand:—

"The freely acting individual must not be prevented by a stronger force from using the strength he has. Everything which excludes free competition and makes the individual economically helpless seems immoral to the American. That is old Anglo-Saxon law.

"If the whole outward life is pervaded by this pioneer spirit of self-initiative there is another factor which is not to be overlooked: it is the neglect of the aesthetic. Any one who loves beauty desires to see his ideal realized at the present moment, and the present itself becomes for him expressive of the past, while the man whose only desire is to be active as an economic factor looks only into the future. The bare present is almost valueless, since it is that which has to be overcome. It is the material which the enterprising spirit has to shape creatively into something else. The pioneer cannot be interested in the present as a survivor of the past; it shows to him only that which is to do, and admonishes his soul to prepare for new achievements. On Italian soil one's eye is offended by every false note in the general harmony. The present, in which the past still lives, fills one's consciousness, and the repose of aesthetic contemplation is the chief emotion. But a man who rushes from one undertaking to another seeks no unity or harmony in the present; his retina is not sensitive to ugliness, because his eye is forever peering into the future; and if the present were to be complete and finished, the enterprising spirit would regret such perfection and account it a loss—a restriction of his freedom, an end to his creation. It would mean mere pleasure and not action. In this sense the American expresses his pure idealism in speaking of the 'glory of the imperfect.'"

Rudyard Kipling, in his poem "An American," hits off the predominant American pragmatic trait with disregard for knowledge and law in the face of the supreme commands of "the instant need of things." He is making a civilization and
shall meet the case; he rises to the occasion, and expects to be equal to it when it presents itself; he crosses the bridge when he gets there, and wastes no time in schemes and plans beforehand. He underrates such procedure as unpractical; for if his theoretic method may not be called for use, there is an entire waste, and if required, law and method is only learned in the act, at the hand of life’s requirements as experience teaches them. Kipling, of long residence in America, lets the American Spirit speak:—

"The cynic devil in his blood
That bids him mock his hurrying soul;
That bids him flout the Law he makes,
That bids him make the Law he flouts.

He turns a keen untroubled face
Home, to the instant need of things.

Lo! imperturbable he rules,
Unkempt, disreputable, vast—
And, in the teeth of all the schools
I—I shall save him at the last!"

The American spirit is removed by whole diameters from the mood of the soliloquizing Hamlet, whose meditative, reflecting mood kept him irresolute and inactive. Mr. Beck, in a lecture on Hamlet, brought this very lesson strikingly home as a wise counsel to the students of Princeton, urging this splendid body of young men to bear in mind the injunction,—

"Let us then be up and doing
With a heart for any fate;
Still achieving, still pursuing,
Learn to labor and to wait;"

lest

"The native hue of resolution
Is sickled o’er with the pale cast of thought;
And enterprises of great pith and moment,
With this regard, their currents turn awry,
And lose the name of action."
This "Get up and do something!" is the American's profound faith in the theme of Faust, that

"The ever-active, striving soul
Works out his own salvation."

Faust in the translation of John's Gospel writes first: "In the beginning was the *Word*"; then, "In the beginning was the *Thought*"; after which he tries, "In the beginning was the *Power*"; but, feeling the Spirit's aid, it becomes clear to him to write boldly, "In the Beginning was the *Act*.

Fichte's view of the world as the theater on which the moral destiny of man is to be wrought out, the world as the sphere and object of human activity, fits in with the American temper. We are immediately certain of the law of duty, the world becomes only a reality to us by means of that previous certainty. Life begins with action, not with thought. We do not act because we know, but we know because we are to act. By this free determination in the effort after moral perfection, we lay hold on Eternal Life. But this world of duty is infinite, every finite exertion has a definite aim, but beyond it appears still a higher. It is well to consider here the remark of Forberg in "Fragmente aus meinen Papieren" (Dec. 7, 1794). He writes:

"Fichte seems really determined to work upon the world through his philosophy. The tendency to restless activity which dwells in the breast of every noble youth he would carefully nourish and cultivate that it may in due season bring forth fruit. He seized upon every opportunity of teaching that action—action—is the vocation of man. Strictly speaking, this principle is false. Man is not called upon to act, but to act justly; if he cannot act without acting unjustly, he had better remain inactive."

And it has indeed been asserted that ignorant good-will has caused more harm in the world than deliberate wickedness. It may be urged that in this consideration the problem of knowledge is not kept strictly theoretic; and if by this it meant a
disinterested, indifferent view as to knowledge, the remark is quite to the point. It is exactly the strength of the pragmatic attitude that it turns practical considerations in view with regard to knowledge which bear directly on the volitional life, and thus involves moral considerations. As we directed attention to the influence of the evolutionary theory on the pragmatic thought and attitude, we may state the analogous relation here more definitely.

Pragmatism, looking toward results in the milieu of the agent’s activity, entertains a favorable bias towards the guidance by outside influences, surroundings, environment. Forthcoming results hold the key to and the criterion of truth. Of course, it is not asserted that the individual response is merely mechanical, but the more complete, the guiding truth is to be found in the environment. Barring the discussion of the metaphysical implications of his famous theory as did Darwin himself, "Natural selection depends on the survival, under various and complex circumstances, of the best-fitted individuals, but has no relation whatever to the primary cause of any modification of structure," we find that Darwin's hypothesis directs attention exclusively to results, the effects of natural selection between variations, but concerns itself little with the origin of variations. However, in the purpose disclosed in results, in the effects aimed at, we see a close relation to their cause. Being is disclosed in the doing. Effect leads back to cause, as much as cause points to result. What ought to be lies behind all that is as its first cause, its raison d'être, and in time before all existence as its final cause. First and final cause are but two aspects of the same thing, the nature of which the ethical world of ends discloses more truly than does the study of origins.

The teaching of the utilitarian school of ethics, which valuates conduct in results, computed to be conducive to "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" under the assumption that individual happiness and permanent total happiness coincide, was reproduced in less static form, and without the attempt of forecasting results. The subjective reference was made of less account as the objective reference was assuming greater importance. The evolutionary hypothesis, elevated into a metaphysical dogma, has been worked out in monistic fashion, reducing the subjective importance and all that goes with it. Knowledge becomes more an indication, an expression of evolutionary development, than an individual, initiatory reaction upon environment. Still, the instincts have been called to account, and emotions and will have been given intellectual interpretation. This circumstance is witness to the fact that strong individual responsibility is felt, that the individual must intellectually justify his actions as a rational free agent. Therefore, even if all the world, including man, exhibits Zielstrebigkeit, there is left with the individual an adjustment to fit in the scheme of things. Judgment has to be exercised; he cannot plunge himself in the evolutionary currents and expect to be evolved as he knows and feels he ought to be developed. The ought-to-be is not as explicitly with us as it is before us, however much the final cause asserts itself in consciousness as the first cause. Kant says in his "Critique of Judgment":—

"Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal, this is, the rule, the principle, or law, is given, the judgment which subsumes the particular under it is determinant. But if only the particular is given, for which the universal has to be found, the judgment is merely reflective. The principle of judgment, in its relation to the forms of things which come under empirical laws in general, is thus the idea that in all its manifold variety nature is purposive. That is to say, nature is conceived as if the unity of its manifold empirical laws were due to an intelligence."
Now, in his "Critique of Practical Reason," Kant says that finite intelligence may gather the meaning of this Universe-purpose, of this Infinite Intelligence who framed the order of things in which we find ourselves. Pure Reason cannot provide information as to the specific forms and contents for our conduct.

It fails in supplying authority to our will, as it lacks in wisdom to survey the situation exhaustively, the part as related to the whole. Therefore Practical Reason, the conscience, leads us. He raises the question, whether our knowledge then is actually enlarged by practical reason, and that which is for speculative reason transcendent, immanent for practical reason. He answers, "Undoubtedly it is, but only in relation to action."

What Kant left divided appears in Fichte united, and in the pragmatic frame of mind successful action as the test of life's wisdom is manifestly the only criterion. Now, in the evolutionary theory natural selection in showing results leads to the recognition that not every adaptation, not every form of struggle, is permitted. Mankind is led from lower to higher forms of struggle, and from the vantage ground already gained we may see and estimate the worth of the less developed forms. This goes of course on the assumption that history is fraught with purpose. The pragmatic faith in the essential rationality of the universe is not primarily exercised because of the deliverances of the inner world in response to the underlying meanings of the world, but — and it would seem rather illogical unless a thoroughgoing monism is accepted as is not generally done — because the outer world and its doings is corrective educator, yea formative of the inner world. Baldwin argues this ably. He says:

"The pragmatist must either frankly swallow the camel of a real environment which the knowledge-function may then both truthfully and also erroneously reflect—a step which would involve him
In all the epistemological litigation of the representative theories of knowledge—or he must find some guarantee for the reality of the mental principle which is not 'rein pragmatisch.' This latter is the better course; the present writer adopts it as a limitation on his pragmatism." 

That the world without should be creative of mind and psychical processes is too often refuted to be considered, and as we had occasion to remark was deliberately ignored by Darwin, whatever may be the implications, if indeed evolution is elevated into a metaphysical dogma. Darwin declared the origin of life an insoluble problem and would so certainly declare the origin of conscious life. At any rate there is no metapsychic, as we cannot get a τοῦ ἀτό, and we are demonstrably ignorant as to the relation of mind and matter.

The implication of a continuity in experience leads us logically back to the position that an exhaustive knowledge of the past enables us to forecast exactly the future, as Tennyson expresses so tersely in "Flower in the Crannied Wall." Of course we do not know exhaustively, but this raises a question of proportion, and not of disagreement or possible discrepancy between past and future. It is not to be admitted that our knowledge should be discredited because it is incomplete.

This argument against pragmatism, however, falls to the ground when the bolder evolutionists bring consciousness within the sphere of evolution. Then this continuity is broken up, or rather, not allowed. As Woodbridge remarks in an admirable paper on Evolution, before the Philosophical Club:—

"If in consciousness we have the process of evolution itself become conscious, we have grounds for claiming to have an immediate experience of what evolution is. That process would thus appear to be, not the unfolding of a past, but the successive achievements of an effective present whose achievements have the character and value they disclose wherever they become apparent or are realized." 

1 The Limits of Pragmatism.
The antithesis of pragmatism between thinking and "concrete ways of living," on the other hand, comes in for much severer criticism on this theory, and thought processes are to be allowed far more claim than the pragmatists do allow. Indeed, in such a scheme of pantheistic, evolutionary monism, thought itself, so far from being subservient, becomes the highest product and end of the universe. And Hegel insisted on interpreting the cause by its effect, the lower by the higher forms. He could derive therefore little help from the untried experiences in which resides the unassimilated wisdom, for the sake of which pragmatism is ready to sacrifice the overbold assumptions of traditional knowledge. However, his panlogism, not yet worked into thoroughgoing evolutionism, contained practically all the future in the past. Only on the strength of this circumstance he could work the bold deductions of his trichotomy, but it held him also to the boundless assumption of the Immanent Dialectic stated in his "Logic":—

"Philosophy of the Absolute is a representation of God as He was in His eternal essence before the creation of the world or of a finite spirit; as all things were made by Him, and He is before all things and by Him all things consist."

It is the exorbitant claim of the panlogistic motto: "Whatever is real is rational, and whatever is rational is real." It is as much in contradiction to this bold assumption of the identity of thought and being, which makes the laws of thought the laws of things, as in the opposition to the rigid fixity of a static view of things that pragmatism has found especial favor. The pragmatist considers time as a mode of pragmatically derived reality, and makes it real in the same sense that other abstract or conceptual modes are. Thus he can deny the reality of future, undiscovered possibilities of existence, viewing them simply as projections from realities already with us. In the doing of things, in action, the restraint of plan is laid aside; it
never fits exactly because logic-chopping reflects a too narrow view of this various, rich world, which besides is in the making. The old world-view, however, observes, Yes: in the making, but on the theme a structure of God's eternal plan. Against Pierce's emphatic declaration, "What all modern philosophy does is to deny that there is any esse in futuro," we quote Psalm cxxxix. 15-16:-

"My frame was not hidden from thee,
When I was made in secret,
And curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth.
Thine eyes did see mine imperfect substance,
And in thy book were all my members written,
Which day by day were fashioned,
When as yet there was none of them."

In no particular situation can the logical problem be defined, because thought reaches out beyond it, fitting the part into the whole. On this point, Baldwin observes: "I think pragmatism is not able as such to explain the general or 'universal' aspects of reality."1 My able colleague, Dr. Urban, says in this connection:—

"While the concrete details of empirical knowledge may be due to 'utility selection,' as practicable 'workables,' yet the structural principles of thought cannot be so accounted for. They have no application as generals, and so would for the pragmatist have no 'adequate' reason for being."2

Pragmatism, then, asserts itself strenuously in reducing both time-honored claims of knowledge as reliable, though merely representative and incomplete. Inasmuch as progress looks forward, we cannot carry the past into the future, nor may we mortgage the future with the past. Just as life is richer than thought, so is the universal, absolute truth — if it were there already as a formed, final quantity — larger and vaster than our understanding of it, or what limited experience can dis-

1 Limits of Pragmatism.
2 Psychological Review, July, 1897.
close. This latter pragmatic view is well defined by James Mark Baldwin in "The Limits of Pragmatism," a paper read before the Joint Seminaries, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, December 1, 1903. Says Professor Baldwin:—

"Broadly speaking, inquiries are pragmatic which, with more or less thoroughness, make such conceptions as thought, existence, truth, reality, etc., relative to antecedents, consequences, modes of function, ends. All such determinations are not only ends reached in a movement, but also means yet to be reached; and all of them, considered thus functionally, as terms of genetic organization, in so far forbid definition in a static, absolute, once-for-all, fixed system."

It asserts that pragmatically determined cognitions of truth exhaust all of reality.

But is pragmatism able to construct reality retrospectively? Is reality given in any system of concrete, practically derived truths? Or does there always stand over a remainder, a puzzling tertium quid, an esse in futuro? Professor Höffding argues in his "Problems of Philosophy":—

"As the concept of purpose depends on the concept of worth, so also the concept of the norm depends on the concept of purpose. The norm is the rule for the activity which is necessary to attain the purpose. It was a fatal thing for the treatment of the problem of worth when Immanuel Kant reversed the relation and tried to derive the concepts of purpose from the concept of the norm (of law). This is a psychological impossibility."

We must observe against this that the notion of a derived "norm" is contradictory. Höffding's norms are not metaphysical ultimate considerations: they are utilitarian worth-estimates within the temporal sphere. It is also psychologically unsound to speak of a "derived norm." Whatever figures truly as a norm has the authority of evaluating standard, primordial, underived. I cannot refrain from quoting here my honored teacher, Professor W. Brenton Greene, of Princeton, who says in his admirable sketch of "Christian Doctrine":—
"The law in the violation or neglect of which sin consists is not our own happiness, nor the greatest good of the greatest number of beings, nor yet the eternal fitness of things, nor even our own reason: it is that toward which all these point and on obedience to which all these depend, the law of God, the expressed will of Him whose nature is, as we saw, both the ground and the standard of right (Rom. ii. 15; iii. 19).

"How God's operation can always be thus congruous with the nature of all His creatures and with all the laws of their action will appear when we remember, that God has planned whatever comes to pass and constituted whatever is (Eph. i.; John i. 3), that the essence of everything and the relations of all things are comprehended by Him (Ps. cxxxix.; Heb. iv. 13), and that He is ever present and active within the inmost constitution of all things (Acts xvii. 28).

"Let it therefore be plainly understood that the will of God is our underived norm, Christ the supreme law of life.

"'Our wills are ours we know not how; Our wills are ours to make them thine.'

Will and purpose are but different aspects of the individual response to the norm, which always was acknowledged in the sincere petition, 'Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven.'"

It seems to be exactly the crux of the whole matter that human will endeavors to usurp the authority which rightly belongs to Him who is Creator and Judge of his creatures. The element of faith cannot be dispensed with, it is central, even in the exercise of reason. In vindication of the old theology I would quote from the same work of Dr. Greene:—

"In God, as in us, there is a distinction between will and power (Eph. i. 9). He does not do all that He can; He does only what He has purposed. Because God is self-determined or free, He cannot purpose contrary to His nature any more than we can (2 Tim. ii. 13). He has power enough to do wrong, but He lacks the will to do it; and He could not will to act wrongly or unreasonably; for His self or nature is perfectly righteous and reasonable. God is ever all that He Himself ought to be, and He never appoints for any of his creatures less than ought to be appointed or more than may rightly be appointed (Dan. ix. 14; Rom. ii. 5, 6). This is so because He is essentially and necessarily righteous. He does not determine what is right arbitrarily; He expresses and illustrates it naturally; for it is the most vital element of His life. Whatever He wills,
therefore, is right; for He can will only in accordance with His nature, and this is the right itself. Hence what God is, is both the ground and the standard of right. What God is, is right, and we ought to do right because of what God is (Lev. xix. 2; Matt. v. 48).

B. Bosanquet, the well-known English philosopher, observed against the pragmatic view (and in his controversy with J. M. Baldwin he classes the genetic views along with it):

"The formation of new reality seems to me a contradiction in terms; but the discovery of reality new to us, and the adaptation of intelligence to it, is surely a fact which no one has ever denied, and which in general is hardly worth affirming, but if the genetic point of view means (a) that new reality is not merely discovered, but created, that action on the external world, and social selection, are the determinants and criteria of truth, then I fear there can be no truth between us."

It is in fact exactly the point, not 'How do we come to think something'; but what is the test of its truth? Baldwin argues this close relation of genesis and nature in an able article, "The Origin of a Thing and its Nature," which appears in substance in his "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology" under the subject "Origin versus Nature." He is quite felicitous in bringing out the retrospective and prospective reference involved in the opposing views, which obtain as much in every branch of science as they do in the field of philosophy, history, and theology. Baldwin quotes with approval Lotze's position that the problem of philosophy is to inquire what reality is, not how it is made,

"If we only remember," says he, "that we must exhaust the empirical 'how' to get a notion of the empirical 'what,' and that there still remains over the 'prospect' which the same author has hit off in his famous saying: 'Reality is richer than thought.' To desiderate a what which has no how—this seems as contradictory as to ask for a how in terms of what is not."

He commits himself to a possible solution in what he calls

1 Psychological Review, 1895.
"æsthnomic idealism," giving the following tentative propositions. He says in substance:—

"Of the great historical solutions that of the intellectualists leans to the retrospective, that of the voluntarists to the prospective; a consistent affectivist theory has never been worked out—aesthetic experience being made the metaphysical praxis both of science and of value."

"1. All statements of the nature of 'things' get their matter mainly from the processes which they have been known to pass through: that is, statements of nature are for the most part statements of origin.

2. Statements of origin, however, never exhaust the reality of a theory, since such statements cannot be true to the experiences which they state unless they construe the reality not only as a thing which has had a career, but also as one which is about to have a career; (which of course cannot be done) for the expectation of the future career rests upon and is produced by the same historical series as the belief in the past career."

Along with the italicizing of some clauses we would remark here, that the ultimate interpretation of even the lowest cannot be given except on principles that will also explain the very highest. An evolutionism which, like Spencer's, tries to explain the complex in terms of the simple, the heterogeneous from homogeneous, leads us back to an undifferentiated mode of existence where Hegel might step in to proclaim his "being equal to non-being." In fact, we must disallow that the "what" of a thing is given wholly or only in its behavior, a thing is not exactly what it does, its reality is not exhausted in its functions. There is a tertium quid, a residuum which Professor Baldwin freely recognizes, but not enough honors. Indeed, no event begins or ends, but a process is going on, reality is or includes a time-process. If then we take any time-process and consider its beginning, we are dealing with a partial fact which requires thought to connect it with the reality as a whole. We indeed want "to see life steadily, and see it whole." For the cause of the origin of a process, therefore, we must look in
two directions: to its results and antecedents both. Unless we are two-faced Januses we must focus the twofold reference in the present event, indeed, believe reality is there. Experience so far from shutting us out from "das Ding an Sich" brings us together with reality. "Das Sein hat das Mein." There being no metapsychic, we believe reality as directly disclosed. The pagan idea of a causal series _ad infinitum_ finds nowadays little favor with philosophic thinkers. This law of causality confesses never to arrive at its true originating cause, and the boasted law, "Every event has its cause," therefore is to be put out of court on its own showing.

And here the old school is in order with its affirmation that thought not only reveals reality, but is a unique mode of reality itself. Of course this need not be pushed to the extreme of Hegel's fundamental identity of thought and reality. Yet, the development of thought is a mode of reality, which is to be realized in the system of thought in which we share. In raising the question of the ultimate origin of the universe do we not require a _tertium quid_ to yet antecedent history to get the very first beginnings agoing? Where does that come in? It means purpose, will, _τέλος_, end, aim. It means all that _science as a descriptive function_ emphatically disallows, when limiting the term science very rigidly and narrowly to this registration of fact. Ideally, of course, by impartial description of an impersonal observer. This raises the question whether we can assume such a narrow view of science. Baldwin says:—

"All attempts to rule out prospective organization or teleology—the belief in the correspondence between reality and thought—from the world would be fatal to natural science, which has arisen by a series of provisional retrospective _interpretations_ of just this kind of organization: and fatal also to the historical interpretation of the world found in the evolution hypothesis; for the category of teleology thus understood is but the prospective reading of the same series, which _when read retrospectively_, we call evolution."

Vol. LXVI. No. 261. 4
We hold, with the old school, that the disclosure of reality comes to us along with, nay in, experience. This is not doing in favor of the prospective categories what we deny the naturalist the right to do in favor of the retrospective ones.

Professor Baldwin, leading in genetic psychology, seems to favor his branch of investigation, however, when he says in the above-mentioned article:

"The category of organization by which design proceeds is also distinctly an outcome of the movement or drift of experience towards the realization of career."

And also,

"It does not follow from that because a mental way of regarding the world, i.e. the way of prospection, is itself a genetic growth, therefore it is a misleading way, for the same might be urged against the categories of descriptive science, i.e. the retrospective, which have had the same origin."

Quite true, only they are not applied to the meaning, the purpose, aim, and end of the behavior or process. They do not render a verdict, do not appraise or evaluate the occurrence. Any genetic or developmental account of thinking necessarily makes the thought function utilitarian, instrumental, adaptive. Now, in reducing thought to this function, in genetic accounts as much as in pragmatic philosophy, we lost our regulative standard. Bosanquet's point here is well taken:

"Because Pragmatism says, as I understand, that the only ends of action are those which consist in change wrought upon the external world, and that, to these, cognition is a means. For me, cognition, as a harmony in our experience, has the character of an end of action, though not the whole end. But external change is never an end."

We say the absolute truth comes in along with, nay in, the very experience. As to the nature of the problem—time-honored as it is—there is little trouble in the camp. We are here before an essential issue as to implications. Kant did well to destroy once for all the idea that the First Cause should
figure as a mere link to a series of conditions in time and space. But he begged the question in his solution by lifting the Absolute out of all and any relation. We are glad that Kantian thinking made plain that the question of absolute origin cannot be answered, for the simple reason that it cannot be intelligently asked. But the question is exactly that greatest of all problems which lurks here, and may be stated in the simple phrase, How can the Absolute have change and yet not itself be subject to change? This is the same question which appears in the controversies on Freedom of Will and Predestination, Time and Eternity, the many and the one, Becoming and Being.

Now, we want to emphasize at this point that it is *petitio principii* in favor of the time-element to endeavor the settlement by bringing the supernatural within the range of the natural. Just as much as when the "negative theologies" cut the relation asunder and preclude the asking of the question; or as it would be to make all the time-elements divine, which seems to be the drift of the compromising endeavors of contemporary thinking.

It is a movement with enough of aggressive boast and assurance. They have the field, their problem is solved by avoiding it. They stand foursquare on the facts of the seen. The portent of these very facts and their implications, the home of truth within, and the verdict of conscience are slighted as available for science and claimants for consideration. The criterion of truth is set aside; the search for absolute, independent truth and enthusiastic devotion to it are abated. At this time-junction of commercial activities, which intensify the international relations; of industrial development, stimulating trade; of hustling activity, resplendent with material achievements, the reflective temper is naturally disowned. Speculation is not in favor. We have no use for it. Ah, quite so, but of
old the question ran, What is the use of us? As answered in the Catechism, “The chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy Him forever.” Can we really say, in modern setting, What’s the use? as did Pilate, What is truth? Strenuous activity; unparalleled industrial and commercial development, involving an intercourse which compares and criticizes, as it also brings valuable new views; socializing tendencies, along with the study of social science and psychology, especially in its experimental and analytical field; ethical and moral movements, with demands for social justice—all of these factors have emphasized the reversal of the old question in pragmatic, utilitarian, sometimes (expedient) prudential favor. The question now is, not, what is wanted of me, or even of the whole community, but what do I want, and what is serviceable to the welfare of the community. So in theology Christ no more accredits his message, but his message must accredit him. All, even God Almighty, is brought before the bar of man’s moral and intellectual judgment. The useful, the serviceable, the expedient, is made ultimate, and—as time and conditions change—it, the very ultimate reality, must change to follow suit. The one true originating Cause, whom we used to confess as “I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth,” has been dethroned. An evolutionary current agoing, a process in the midst of which we find ourselves, is ruling supreme. Origins must take place continually as truly as must sufficient reasons it is said truly, but the inquiry as to the destiny, either of individual or of society, is never made a serious subject of discussion. It involves the punctum stans, not of time, and notions of the unconditioned, unchangeableness of God. His sovereignty, predestination, and his eternal decrees are too unyielding, too rigidly exacting, to fit in with this plastic time-juncture. For after all there is a “will-to-
believe," and there is nothing profounder on this point than the saying of the Old New England Puritans in regard to belief: "He could if he would, but he could not would." It is plainer and more concrete than Aristotle's description of man as a principle of desiring thought, or of thinking desire.

In pragmatism, man as thinking desire is abroad. Bowels and brain have exchanged functions. Our religion is sentimental, not reasoning. Thinking has even been avowedly disclaimed in the Ritschlian motto "Religion without metaphysics." This movement of the Ritschlian theology has coöperated powerfully in this direction, furnishing the new evolution, which assumes in clever disguise — whatever be said to the contrary — an anthropocentric position in theology, making man judge and rate according to sentiment and subjective experience. Says Höfﬁding in "Problems of Philosophy": "All worth rests on the relation of events and of conditions to life at its different stages, to the existence and evolution of life" (p. 154). The very nomenclature of the new school of theology is significant in that valuation and practicality is the predominant note. Unfortunately a division is made between the Werttheile and Seinurtheile, the value-judgment and existential judgments, and the Umwertung aller Werte is allowed free range in the Christian religion according to the song of Schiller's "Weltweisen":

"Einstwellen, bis den Bau der Welt
Philosophie zusammenhält.
Erhält sich das Getrêbe
Durch Hunger und durch Liebe."

And these are the predominant determinants in the pragmatic religion of to-day, "Hunger und Liebe" in its broadest meaning in their individual and social significance. "Hunger und Liebe" are needs, and for human needs all other authority must go.
It is interesting to know how boldly this is proclaimed by some of these "Weltweisen" whose worldly wisdom is foolishness with God. Says Dr. Eugen William Lyman, in "The Influence of Pragmatism upon the Status of Theology":—

"The recognition of the mere possibility that new values may arise, which may even be discontinuous with the old, does not mean the recognition that there have already arisen needs calling for such values; it merely asserts the sovereignty of this additional practical need that, when new needs do arise, they should be satisfied by their appropriate values."

It is evident that Professor Lyman feels, however, that "there are bounds of ordinance set for all things, where they must pause or rue it," for he goes on to say: "It is true that the maintenance of a right proportion in values may require the subordination of new needs, but at all events," he asserts again, "they must not be suppressed in advance by a priori reasoning." To conclude then with a splendid piece of a priori reasoning: "This priority of needs to values is already an element in the standard value of Christianity." The eventual need of a need is sufficient warrant for Professor Lyman to disown the traditional Christian philosophy.

Of course, there are all types and degrees along the line, but the objective reference by which we recognize experience is generally let down in experience itself, and is applied mainly by the rule of instinct as much as of thought. The purposiveness of human thought has found a practical criterion over itself. William Longstreth Raub, in an article "Pragmatism and Kantianism," observes as "the greatest apparent difference between Pragmatism and the Kantian theory the fact that in the latter the categories are considered a priori notions of the understanding, while for the pragmatists they are derived from experience." We are no more searching for truth; we are engaged in the "Umwertung aller Werte," just as Nietzsche
proclaimed philosophic virtue to reside in taste, in the appetite which gives birth to the desire, which creates a preference for a determined thing, and assigns to this thing its rank and value.

The German boast that this "valuation-theology," as it might be aptly called, would carry the Anglo-Saxon world within one generation, has almost literally come true. But especially America has given way to it. Dr. James Orr has done great service to the Church by his able criticism of the Ritschlian Theology. Of all the British theologians he was the only one who thoroughly familiarized himself with this dangerous movement, and persistently attacked it. Indeed, the evangelical faith of Scotland and of the world owes gratitude to the labors of Professor Orr in its defense.

According to Mr. Schiller, who "dabbles in pragmatism," as Professor Baldwin truly remarks, the true is the useful, the efficient, the workable; but again needs, instincts, wants, play a large part. Man, grown large, displaces God's sovereignty. The former notion of Absolute is displaced by that of a concrete or functional absolute. The notion of static perfection has given way to a perfection which may be defined as inexhaustible capacity for development. "The Absolute of to-day is perfect in the sense of embodying infinite potentialities, promises for the future." There is no such thing as final consummation. Everything is in the making. The glory in the imperfect, in the changing forms is proclaimed. Logically the very evolution runs to an uncertain end. Yet, it must be something very static and secure after all, which holds even in our day the pragmatic theologians and especially the Ritschlians, whose notion of the Kingdom of God looms so large as

1 Garvie's book "Ritschlian Theology" is a later sympathetic exposition of Ritschlianism.
the ordering, ruling function of God’s fixed plan in this world. It is, as Tennyson says:

"One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off divine event
To which the whole creation moves."

Else their boundless faith in the rationality of the universe falls to the ground. But what the poet expresses in sentiment,—

"Ob Alles in ewigem Wechsel kreist
Es beharret im Wechsel ein ruhiger Geist,"

what faith sings in profound conviction,—

"Change and decay in all around I see;
O Thou who changeest not, abide with me,"

that we believe we have ground to trust as true to fact.

The theologians of the old school, to be sure, meanwhile have to await the general recognition of the actuality of Perfection, the Truth as it is in Jesus, who said, “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life.” But we are confident that “Jesus, ruler of all nature, of God and man the son,” will be acknowledged again by the Christians as the concrete personal standard of perfection when Christian experience shall have deepened. Whatever else may be in the making, let us hope that His Light create order out of the chaotic state of contemporary religion. Yet, if this is to be, “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.”