ARTICLE III.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

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The philosophy of religion propounded by the immortal Kant must be pronounced a thing most fearfully and wonderfully made. Interesting and ingenious in the highest degree, it yields at almost every turn the contradictory and unsatisfactory. We know how largely determined the character of Kant's philosophy of religion was by atavistic influences, combined with those of the pietism and rationalism of Germany of the eighteenth century. His own personality was contributive of that love of liberty in harmony with law, which led him to lay supreme stress on the will to do good.

In our critical references to the work of Kant, it is not forgotten that, as Kuno Fischer said, however Kant may have varied in his thinking about the knowability or demonstrability of God, "there was not a moment in the course of the development of his philosophical convictions when he denied, or even only doubted, the reality of God." No more are we unmindful of the testimony of Zeller to the way in which Kant at every time held to the Being of God (das Dasein Gottes). Most important of all is Kant's own view of the matter, that "it is indeed necessary to be convinced of the existence of God, but it is not equally necessary to demonstrate it." Kant's arguments did avail against a Deity that stood in external and mechanical relation to the world. But such is not the God of the theistic philosophy of to-day, who, as self-conscious and personal Spirit, is at once immanent and transcendent. Far
from complete or final, the theistic proofs yet meet a need of reason. The argument for the Divine existence is a vast and complex synthetic one—a whole of many parts—and the force is in the whole, not in any of the parts, each of which has yet its place and value.

The Ontological argument did not at all receive from Kant the effective treatment which has often been supposed. Kant missed seeing that being is given, not predicated, in the affirmation of this argument. He sets out under the misapprehension that Anselm asserted that what exists in intellectu exists also in re, whereas Anselm maintained that existence is of necessity in the concept of God. There was truth behind the existential judgment of this argument which Kant never saw. It was a rasher thing than he supposed to say that is always is the copula merely of a judgment. Hegel did much better when he found the highest proof for the truth of a concept in its being a necessity to thought, and concluded therefrom to its necessity of being. Kant has the merit, however, to have cut away defective metaphysics at certain well-known and tolerably obvious points, but he was wrong in supposing that what we necessarily think, and think as necessarily existing, has no title to validity. It is no question of mere conceiving, as is frequently supposed; it is one of necessary thinking. To say that "existence cannot be clawed" out of thought is very obvious and beyond challenge in the case of mere imagining, but that is not thinking at all in the sense of this argument. It is thought dealing with the real—the existent, and the necessarily existent. The truth is, Kant's position is both illogical and irrational. To deny the passage to existence from necessary thought of necessary existence would be a far more astounding feat than Kant dreamed. To what meaningless confusion would thought, in its ultimate principles and work-
ing, be reduced if it should be held—as Anselm deemed impossible (nequit Eum non esse cogitare)—that God can be conceived as non-existent, and this argument treated in the fictitious Kantian mode. The idea of this argument should never have been classed with those born of individual fancy, and its uniqueness and solitariness lost sight of. But the standpoint of mere abstract thinking assumed by Kant, in respect of the relation of ideality involved, is too low to be conclusive.

Strange it is that we still have Kant's argument about a hundred dollars in concept being accounted as good as a hundred dollars in purse repeated as though it had some vestige of value. Hegel rightly urged that, in dealing with God, we are treating of an object wholly different in kind from any hundred dollars, and that, in fact, no particular notion or representation whatsoever is comparable to the case of the concept of God. Hegel further thought it would be strange, if the concrete totality which we call God, should not be rich enough to include so poor a category of being as that here involved. Thought itself seems to demand a unity of things which shall be ultimate, and this argument is but an effort to give logical form to our belief in such an Ultimate. God is the Ultimate which thought so demands—is the ultimate concrete totality. There is in him a principle which gives unity to the discrete multiplicity of the world. This is more and other than making him a mere name for the All. But the weakness of the Ontological argument, taken by itself, remains, no doubt, in the fact that it can lay no determinate quality on this Being that is above reality, to justify our marking Him off as God.

The Cosmological proof was, to Kant, a mere begging of the question—one in which a First Cause for all that is “contingent” was sought in an “absolutely necessary” Being. Such
an overstepping of the limits of the sense-world to make said inference to a Cause for the "contingent," Kant could not approve. No more could he accept the conclusion to a First Cause from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes or conditions, since, of course, we cannot make such a transfer of subjective principle to things objective. When we make such a transfer, Kant deems it a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, and, as such, discredited. But Hegel, properly as we think, declares that if thought cannot go out beyond the sense-world, it were more needful to show how thought ever found its way into the sense-world. The truth is, there was no real warrant for Kant's assuming that causality cannot carry us beyond the impressions of sensuous experience. It is always pertinent to ask where, on such a view, would be Kant's own warrant for taking causality to be even subjectively necessary? The very existence of non-empirical necessary ideas is proof that the kingdom of reason is not of this world. Kant's stress on the infinite series of causes is really irrelevant, the question being strictly one of the warrant for a First Cause, as determined by the lack of self-existent and necessary being on the part of the universe. Kant's objection to transfer of thought necessity to a necessity of existence lacks in daring, consistency, and insight, for what thought or reason must of necessity think, is to be taken as true—is elsewhere, in Kant's own teaching, so taken as true. There may, of course, still be raised the question whether the world can be an effect of anything outside itself, but the real quest is for a Ground of the possibility of all things finite. It boots nothing that Kant, with his restricted causality—i.e., to sensible experience—would have deemed an intra-mundane Cause illusory: modern science and modern thought have taught us to pass from phenomena to their supersensuous Ground.
Kant had already found the non-sensuous cause of our sensations in a *transcendental object*, even though this object was to him a mere *nescio quid*. He accounted such a non-empirical causality necessary. To this object he refers our whole possible perceptions. Should the action of this *transcendental cause* be phenomenized, the results will be in perfect accord with the laws of empirical causation—a position which finds precise parallel in Hume. Kant denies significance to the principle of efficient causation in the sensuous world. But, with its subjective origin, he, unlike Hume, claims for the principle an objective value as related to objects of sensible experience. Kant, no doubt, admitted the need of something which is Cause of this phenomenal world, but the strange thing is that this same Kant, who recognized the principle of efficient causation in assuming the *transcendental object*, declines to find this primal and self-subsistent cause in God. Our thought is not now content without reaching the ultimate Ground of these sense phenomena. The spiritual character of the infinite and all-causing Force is thus brought into view. But when we thus enter the realm of spirit, purely physical and mechanical categories cannot have place, and so the Cosmological argument does not set them to do metaphysical—and for them impossible—feats. Because principles transcend the sensuous sphere, they are not therefore to be treated in the Kantian mode as only subjective. Kant, however, felt the inevitable character of the question as to the source (*Ursprung*) of the Unconditioned, for the world, as finite world, cannot be its own ground, and cannot be the cause of spirit. Only in God, as Prime Source and ultimate Sustainer, is its want—*ἀρτέτα*—found.

Of course, the real strength of the argument is drawn, as Leibniz properly divined, from the contingency of the world.
This world of experience is not a perfect cosmos. It is not wholly rational and necessary, and we must recognize the contingent. This contingent or dependent character of the world is evidenced in Nature, both as unified whole, under the most complete generalizations known to science, and as viewed singly in any of its parts. We know limitation as surely as we know being. Everything is, in its turn, conditioned by something else, and is made what it is by its relations to other things. The number of relations is indefinite, and the complete rationality of such relations, as a system, is past finding out. While an underlying nexus of force makes everything also causal in its turn, yet there is no trace of existence, independent and non-conditioned. Parts of existential phenomena, everywhere throughout the universe, depend upon other parts not less dependent. No aggregation of these dependent existences can possibly make an independent and non-conditioned universe. Clearly, a universe so finite and dependent must have its Cause or Ground beyond itself. In whole, it must have an independent, self-existent Cause, as necessary correlate of its finitude.

The Teleological argument Kant treated not fairly, when he did not allow it to rest content with evidencing intelligence. Kant quite failed to appreciate how synthetic is the mode of this proof, building up from the principle of sufficient reason in a way distinguished from the ontological and cosmological proofs. In his "Critique of Judgment," Kant failed to keep in mind that the a posteriori argument need not give infinity of intelligence, but only intelligence in the Primal Cause of all things. His procedure really amounted to deriving the principle of finality in nature from the a priori concepts of morality. His initial error is to have connected nature with freedom as necessary to produce finality. His ultimate error was to have
found in finality no objective result, but only a subjective necessity. The subjective necessity had its home only in Kant's imagination. We might as reasonably argue against the evidences of will, purpose, and design, in other human beings. Trendelenburg properly pointed that the object itself is, after all, needed, according to Kant himself, to say when this wholly subjective principle of finality is required. It was a gratuitous assumption on Kant's part to suppose that the argument was to carry us to a transcendental object, instead of merely bringing us, experientially, into contact with the Divine Mind or Intelligence. Kant's objection to this proof as yielding only an Architect, not an absolute and originative Creator, is not at all to the point, since this proof is only concerned, in its strict and proper sense, with the order, purpose, and harmony of the world as due to reason or intelligence. Kant had been better employed in doing something to transcend Kantian dualism of inner and outer, instead of leaving Hegel's higher view of Nature to do this for him.

Kant's criticism of the traditional proofs is thus far less damaging than has often been supposed, and philosophers have allowed themselves to be imposed upon to a needless and not altogether creditable extent. Turn we now to his treatment of the Moral Proof. In his "Critique of Judgment," Kant has it that for this world, with such end as it bears, a Moral Author—or God—is to be acknowledged. And in his "Critique of Pure Reason," he says: "Belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature (Gesinnung), that the former can no more vanish than the latter can ever be torn from me. The only point to be here kept in mind is that this act of faith of the intellect assumes the existence (Voraussetzung) of moral dispositions. If we leave them aside and suppose a mind quite indifferent with respect to
moral laws, then the inquiry raised by reason becomes merely a subject for speculation, supportable, as such, by strong arguments from analogy, but not by such that to them the most stubborn scepticism must yield." Conscience as the touchstone of revelation was, indeed, finely set forth by Kant, and the final outcome of his philosophy is a moral interpretation of the universe.

This does not keep us from thinking his Deity stands, both in his "Metaphysics of Ethics" and his "Critique of Practical Reason," in a relation to ethics which is too external, and even superficial. His moral postulates were not postulates of life, but of philosophy. And yet, in rejecting merely intellectual grounds of theological belief, he was really falling back upon the vital interests of religious life. Religion becomes, in fact, purely a matter of faith, with Kant, and such faith is strangely left without the support that intellect might be expected to render. Kant fails to put his moralistic proof under the law of historic development, with the growing moral insight which such development brings, under working of that law of moral freedom which distinguishes the life of man's spirit from that of nature. This genetic point of view must be kept in mind, if we are to overpass Kant's standpoint, and to observe how far we are from being able to presuppose morality and its commands to be given as a priori content of the purely practical reason. Kant had a quite too great horror of bringing in the will of God to explain moral law, for why should we conceive such laws as other than reflecting, and harmonizing with, the Divine nature? The ultimate sources of morality were by him inadequately conceived. He almost expunges rather than explains moral obligation, and only introduces Deity when he is in straits to effect an adjustment of the natural and moral elements involved. Also, the large part played
by happiness, in Kant's thought, has been made more clear, with the effect of making our regret more keen at the place he gave eudaemonistic considerations in his system.

It is a great merit in Kant to have done so much for the moralistic theory of religion, guarding it as the apple of his eye in his "Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason." But, with all its fine moral postulates, his philosophy of religion strangely fails of any adequate treatment of the knowledge of God in speculative or metaphysical ways. Religion cannot be so reduced to terms of morality. At the same time, the merit is his to have preserved the worth of personality by his fine postulations for the moral consciousness. For the range of Kant's practical reason is ethical rather than religious. It is not to be supposed that we can in any wise impose the moral law upon ourselves, when the ethical ideal in us is, in its absolute power and worth, to be run back and grounded in the Absolute Moral Ideal. Kant failed to keep the moral reason from becoming too abstract and humanistic: he might have kept the principle of moral autonomy and subsumed it properly under religion, had he adequately conceived the nature of man's soul. Kant strangely missed seeing the theoretic character of the moral proof, as drawn from Divine manifestation in moral law, else he would not have set it upon a separate plane from the other theistic proofs. He further failed to appreciate that such belief in God, as the moral proof really brings to us, must be shot through with elements of reason far beyond his imaginings.

The mistakes or misconceptions of Kant, however, do not blind us to his great positive merits. He rightly found the norms of morality in man's rational and spiritual nature. Detached errors, such as we have been pointing out, need not detract from appreciation of his work in whole, and in its
higher qualities. How truly congruous is moral law with the essential nature of man was strikingly brought out by Kant, who nobly set it above ephemeral utilities. To conscience Kant gives back the Absolute, which he had taken away from reason. But it must, of course, never be forgotten that Kant never really transcends the dualism of experience, never really effects a higher synthesis between form and matter, between duty and inclination, between moral ideas of a really religious origin and moral ideas of judicial type. No doubt, he declares that no contradiction remains, but that is not to take away the duality— to carry the synthesis beyond the sphere of mere feeling. It was left for Fichte to continue and complete the work of Kant in this respect. The moral reason, as ideal, Kant rightly takes to be autonomous—self-legislating in the sphere of morals. But, between the moral reason and the Absolute, he has made an impassable chasm, so that morality and religion are unbridged. The noumenal world he had made a Grenzbegriff— a regulative concept marking out the limits of our knowledge.

But now he tells us that what the moral ideal—the moral consciousness—demands, must be true and may be known. Certainly his practical divorce or separation of these two kinds of reason—the theoretic and the practical—is unwarrantably great, even though he might himself acknowledge them to be, in the last resort, one. The notions of necessity and universality in moral action appear cold and bare in Kant's thought, which needs light and warmth from the synthetic processes and unifying powers of the mind. I do not complain so much of the individualistic character of his ethical thoughts as is done by those whose chief care is for social ethics. For the individual must do that only which he could make a universal norm. And the individual must work out his
own ethical salvation, it seems to me, first of all in an individualistic way. That is beginning, no doubt, rather than end, but it is a needful beginning, and secured, as such, by Kant without yielding to what is subjective, aimless, and capricious. Besides which, it is to be noted how much Kant had got away from needs of the individual, in his later enunciations of the moral postulates, to the moral needs of the universe.

But Kant was not very consistent in his use of the postulates, and so does not always increase the weight of his reasoning. Kant's ethical depth and purity lead him up to high appreciation of the religion which takes all its duties as Divine commands. A too legalistic conception, however. Also, it seems to me to have been—for individual experience—a suggestive view that Kant took, when he found in great religious truths or doctrines something to be repeated as ethical processes in the inner lives of good men. But the ethical must get beyond this individual aspect. History and experience alike show the need of human development for man's apprehension of the full content of the moral law of Kant. Kant's philosophy of religion was marked by lack of historic sense when he took the history of religion to start only with Christianity, which for him began the universal. But his philosophical conceptions are, in the religious sphere, lacking in warmth and vitality, and do not carry him beyond the icy region of the moral reason. His religion stands unredeemed by a single grand infusion or dash of Schleiermacherian feeling. This is the more remarkable, inasmuch as Kant left the moral law as, in reality, something felt, rather than intellectually apprehended or grasped. Some more adequate recognition of feeling should thus have been easy to him.

Even Spinoza does more justice to the affections than Kant, notwithstanding that Spinoza's own love of God is a still too
intellectual thing. Not, of course, that it is meant to represent Kant as wholly wanting in recognition of emotional experience or affectional power, but that his treatment is wholly insufficient. He has, for example, a noble and interesting passage, in "Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason," in which he says that spiritual edification can scarcely be anything save "the ethical effect wrought upon our inner man by devotion." After showing that "this effect cannot be the mental movement or emotion (for this is already involved in the conception of devotion)," he goes on to point out that "edification must therefore be understood to mean the Ethical Purchase that devotion takes upon the actual amendment and building up of the moral characters of mankind." The significant words follow: "A structure of this sort can only then succeed when systematically gone about: firm principles, fashioned after well-understood conceptions, are, first of all, to be laid deep into the foundations of the heart; from these, sentiments corresponding to the weight and magnitude of our several duties must rise, and be watched and protected against the snares and wiles of appetite and passion, thus uprearing and upbuilding a new man—a Temple of God." And this great penetrating thinker adds, "Evidently this edifice can advance but slowly, but still some traces of superstructure ought to be perceptible." Every one must stand with Kant, in his rejection of spurious devotion, whereby man, in the noblest part of him, is weakened, not strengthened. But Kant's Deistic setting made mystical elements of religion quite foreign to him.

Faith in God is, in "Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason," held to be necessary to the belief in the triumph of good. Not with what is called total depravity, but with a tendency to evil in man's nature, does Kant concern himself. The reality of evil is for Kant ever menacing the sure ad-
vance of the moral life. But this postulate of faith in the Divine avails not in the end, for Kant's consuming zeal for human freedom leads him at last to look merely to an infinite process for the vanquishing of evil, without, that is to say, Divine assistance. This is no perfect triumph of good, but a prolongation of the struggle. And indeed it is a fault of Kant that he is so prone to make the good so much a thing merely regulative or potential. Further, Kant's moralism centers man too much in himself—in marked contrast with religion—hence it is so easy for Kant to make much of evil, with its moral culpability, and take no real account of sin. Man's discordant relations to God are terra incognita to Kant, man's discord being, in Kant, only with himself. Kant would not be troubled by exterior punishments: what he does not like is self-condemnation, for that would affect our cheerfulness and arrest our moral energy. He thinks radical evil in us carries with it guilt, in respect of which we are liable to punishment, at once necessary and morally hurtful. Harmony is restored, thinks Kant, by the idea of the Son of God or God-pleasing humanity. Our actuality is thus replaced by something better or higher, God regarding us in the light of this idea rather than according to our actual works.

But this replacement Kant works out in no satisfactory way. He leads us, no doubt, into a realm of desire for goodness, but, in his desire to escape atoning elements, conducts to no actualization. Redemption is not, with him, a question of the Christ suffering for man's sins, but of man redeeming himself by the suffering of his own better or higher being. Reconciliation exists for us, in Kant, only in the shape of self-redemption by means of our own moral volition. The idea of humanity well-pleasing to God is obviously too far removed from our actuality to influence our moral renewal to any great extent. What
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Kant fails to take any due and proper account of, is the fact of the loss of moral strength entailed by guilt not being in any proper way or sense atoned for. Peace of conscience and joy in God are thereby rendered inchoate and imperfect. Kant’s whole treatment here is interesting for the way in which it foreshadows the Christian redemption in principle, but it is presage and nothing more, his ideal Christ an ideal, and nothing more. The value of Kant’s thought continues, however, to be that he taught men to find the highest good, not along the pathway of knowledge pure and simple, but rather along the lines of moral activity—the moral disciplines of the will.

One of the most valuable features of “Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason” is its thought of the Kingdom of God, which has since been so fruitfully developed. It was a most pregnant and suggestive thing for Kant to say there is nothing good in the world save a good will alone. It is now better understood, however, that will never is without an intellectual element, nor intellection without will, if only the desire and will to know. The good will, as we know it, is never blind in its strivings after the moral ideal, but always illumined by intellectual idea and conception. Kant, with all the excellences of his brilliant threefold analysis of reason, was yet, in his schismatic treatment of rational faculty, far from any adequate appreciation of the grand ultimates of religious thought and experience. Even the ethical and aesthetical moments, on which Kant laid such emphasis, lead us at last to a perfect and synthetic unity in the religious Ideal, of which there is in Kant no sufficiently firm, full, and steadfast apprehension and appreciation. There is always more in man, as really rational and religious, than is perfectly explicable in terms of reason, but Kant had only a very inadequate appreciation of this fact. Such being the case, it was more easy for Kant to fail of see-
ing the impossibility that the rich content and development of religion could spring out of so formal a principle as that of moral reason. A more distinctive place, and a more specific and peculiar function, must be claimed for religion than to be subsumed under ethics.

Still, Kant's work was, for his time, transcendentally great. Only, the excess of purely moral reason in his religion transforms it into a defect, for the element of reason is neither properly fused with, nor related to, historical and experiential elements in his system. The error—which still lives on in high places—must be left behind of thinking the Kant of the Critique of Practical Reason corrector of an earlier Kant of the Pure Reason—the error of thinking an absolute dogmatism (that of the categorical imperative) was, in Kant, the transformation of a radical nihilism. For Kant was, before everything, and at every stage of his career, a moralistic philosopher, and by no means became so only at close of his lengthy inquiries. Kant never got beyond the need of a Deus ex machina, itself a proof, surely, that the theoretic and the practical reason had never been properly related and harmonized. Reason must be treated as one, and its sweep and sway taken as universal, but the rationality must be seen of giving full scope and play to the functionings of the emotional and volitional sides of our nature. For these latter have their own light and worth even for the reason, since life is deeper than intellect, and gives reason so much of its zest and interest. Kant properly held knowledge to be coextensive with empirical science of nature, and, as such, incompetent to deal with theological truths, which must rest on faith. Faith he alleged to be a function of the human spirit not less original and significant than logical thinking.

The whole three Critiques of Kant really furnish only build-
ing materials for an enduring philosophic edifice, and must not be taken as the structure itself. His "Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason," which has importance as giving us, far more than has been recognized, his philosophy of religion, is a fruit or result of his entire criticism of reason, though insufficient and unsatisfactory in consequence. In the matter of revelation, Kant approximates to Lessing, to whom, be it said, he owed much, and from whom he might have learned more. The necessity of revelation lay, for Kant, in what he called the "radical evil" dwelling in human nature. He posits the principles of indwelling good and evil as ground of perpetual moral conflict. Evil is so unquestionable a fact in human experience that Kant does not hesitate to make it the initial point of his philosophy of religion. But the ideal of the good—whose triumph and kingdom are secured by the sacrifice of Christ—is that whereto Kant would bring man. Whatever is needful for the realizing of this moral ideal is held, in his philosophy of religion, to be true. Thus, at the behest of conscience, the Absolute is, in a sense, restored to reason. Not, indeed, as immediately given in experience, but only necessary postulate. It was in speculative blindness that Kant, Samson-like, brought down the whole temple of metaphysical knowledge of God. His philosophy of religion has paid a heavy penalty for this destructiveness. His moral postulates, as mere moral necessities, can nowise compensate the loss of any knowledge of God as transcendent Being.

Adequacy of a philosophy of religion on such a purely moralistic theory is a patent impossibility. If religion could be reduced to the position of mere appendix to morality, as in Kant, we might be found going on, with Fichte, to make of God no more than the moral order of the world. Weber indeed remarks that the real God of Kant is Freedom in the
service of the ideal. But Kant never reached a real freedom; freedom's relation to natural causation he did not properly understand; the true idea of freedom could not stand open to him, since the vital connection of religion and morality was not apprehended by him. Jesus is, to Kant, but the exemplar of the ideal just spoken of, and highest representative of humanity. And this ideal springs out of our rational being. But the weakness of Kant's philosophy of religion lies primarily in the tendency to resolve religion into the service of the moral ideal—the fulfilment of moral duty and action—oblivious of the fact that religion, in the first instance, does not consist in such exterior action, but in attitudes of will and states of feeling. Kant, in the same manner as Lessing, underestimated and misconceived the value of the historic element—its true place and relation. He quite—and strangely—failed to relate it to the immanent Divine principle in us, which he expressly recognized. "Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason" can only be an unsatisfactory a priori construction if the Kantian mode of dispensing with historic mediation is to be adopted.

Yet one can sympathize with his sense of the evils of historic Christianity, and it is easy to see how true religion, as universal, becomes contrasted with historic faiths that only partially represent it. Full of interest and significance is Kant's philosophy of religion, even though it be unsatisfactory in many respects. Chief of the unsatisfactory aspects is Kant's strange failure to find room for the consciousness of God—absolute principle of all reality, and most concrete object of our thought—within the human consciousness, and so to raise the individual, in his religion, forever far above himself, and his own purely individualistic references and tendencies. Besides, it has been the approach of ethical Deity to man, that has most
surely guaranteed, even at mediational cost, the moral power Kant seeks.

Widely contrastive is Kant’s thought to that of Spinoza, with his faith in an eternal order, and his absolute certainty of the substance unveiled to the scrutiny of reason. Kant’s faith is in moral law, the power which enables us sublimely to transcend sense, and the power by which Kant would build up the spiritual world he had destroyed. He lays this Divine Moral Order upon us with resistless might, making us treat it as absolutely real, absolutely Divine and Moral. For it is to our conscience his God reveals Himself. Kant’s faith is a fine thing, as an active postulate, or a free spiritual construction, yet never can we bring ourselves to believe that only in this one particular way has God revealed Himself, and not also in the superb workings of theoretic reason and speculative insight. Such reason is also God’s gift, and indeed is there any higher? True, it is not self-sufficing, but must be linked to the light of conscience, but reason and conscience so united—as, in the complex being called man, they should always be—they will jointly bear us to heights otherwise unattainable and unattained. We cannot therefore acquiesce in the one-sidedness of Kant’s moral stress. Excellent as it is in many ways in itself, it is neither true nor just in its relation to the revelations of reason or intellect—or rather, in its independence of them.

A satisfying philosophy of religion is possible only when, to the moral elements emphasized by Kant, justice is done to the emotional elements of Schleiermacher, and the claims of objective truth represented by Hegel. Not without reason was it that a well-known German religious philosopher once remarked that the Kantian mode of treating religion was to make it merely a sort of dry-nurse to morality, to be shown to the door as soon as morality got stronger upon her legs. Kant,
no doubt, has the merit, in his critico-speculative way, to make the moral faith of reason appear at a rational grounding of religion, in which—more than in Hegel—reason appears in its practical, and not simply theoretic aspect. But the two aspects are sundered far too completely, and set forth in far too abstract and one-sided fashion. His practical reason, as the "Critique of Practical Reason" clearly shows, gives itself its own laws, and the constitution and necessity of our own nature are left us as the only ground of obligation. This, although Kant says the moral law is for all beings, even for the Supreme Intelligence. How subjective and relative our moral consciousness must in value be, when we are practically left as our own lawgivers, is obvious.

It still abides the great merit of Kant to have sounded the supreme worth of the moral life in the way he did. The postulates of the practical reason are, with Kant, not really arbitrary, but are demands of reason itself in our efforts to realize moral end. In this self-attesting experience rather than in any metaphysical reality—whether spirit, matter, or substance—does Kant seek a principle of unity, and find a new ideal. And no more powerful influence, for the ethicizing of its conceptions, has been exercised on subsequent philosophy of religion, than that exercised by Kant. It was quite in the spirit of Kant that Schleiermacher declined to make religion a thing of knowledge, even the highest knowledge. How entirely is the atmosphere that of Kant, when Martineau is found affirming that "we are entitled to say that conscience reveals the living God, because it finds neither content to its aspirations nor victory in its strife, till it touches His infinitude and goes forth from his embrace." But Martineau profits by Kant's mistakes, when he goes on to say how sickly and desolate moral ideals are, that are nothing else, and to deduce there-
from the need of religion, as carrying us far beyond the power of moral reason alone. Kant has borne the palm among modern ethicists, and has given to modern theistic philosophy its most vitalizing influences, after every deduction is made for the defects of his presentation. This is Kant's enduring title to gratitude in the sphere of the philosophy of religion. It is, of course, a different thing from the worth of his system itself, but it is something sufficiently great.