

## ARTICLE VIII.

## CRITICAL NOTES.

ROMANTIC PSYCHOLOGIZING.<sup>1</sup>

The literature of the psychological analysis of religion continues to grow, though it cannot be said that the additions are making any notable contributions to the subject. Professor James's "Varieties of Religious Experience" covered the subject so thoroughly, and gave such a mass of material, that it is likely that the new books for some time to come will do little else than thresh over the materials which are found in that marvelous book. Professor Pratt frankly acknowledges his indebtedness to Professor James; and, even if he had not, his book shows everywhere the influence of the Cambridge professor.

The present volume is suggestive on many accounts. For one thing it has a frank and straightforward tone, which is not dropped when he approaches the practical aspects of his views. Most of the psychologists either have not endeavored to define the practical outcome of their views, or, when they have approached a point where the practical application seemed to be the next thing, have avoided it. But Professor Pratt knows where he is going, and does not hesitate to tell you about it; and for this reason his book, which is intended for untechnical as well as technical readers, will appeal to people who have little knowledge of psychologic science as such. Moreover, he writes a chapter on conclusions which is but a practical application and illustration of the results of his point of view, and this too is exceptional.

It has always seemed to the present writer that Coe and Star-

<sup>1</sup> *The Psychology of Religious Belief.* By James B. Pratt, Ph.D., Assistant Professor in Williams College. 12mo. Pp. 327. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$1.50.

buck, and others like them, seemed afraid to face the practical results that were to be expected from their views. Doubtless this is not the case, but so it has seemed; and, for that reason, Professor Pratt's book is likely to be more effective in clearing up minds that are beclouded on this matter, than were the volumes of the two authors just named.

But the clarification likely to result is not likely, in the minds of many, to be in the acceptance of Professor Pratt's views, as will be shown presently. It is more likely to result in the defining of views, and the recognition of the fact that the one thing most needed now in the philosophical world is a new statement and announcement of a-priorism, and some fresh utterance upon the original powers of the human intellect. Physiological psychology and its various adjuncts have had their innings, and it is time we heard a little more of the other side, though the other side is not wanting exactly. The abandonment of the intellect and the intellectual judgments, the general discrediting of all forms of intellectual authority in religion, was to be expected with the general onslaught on creeds, and the general refusal to accept finalities from councils, synods, and bishops. Indeed, as far back as the publication of Kidd's "Social Evolution," it was seen that the battle was on between a form of religious approach which was based on the intellect and that which bases itself on the emotions.

It will be well, in reviewing Professor Pratt's book, to take his chapter on conclusions first, as showing certain things which lie on the very surface of this inquiry. He says that "there is a general reaction against uncritical acceptance of the authority of tradition in all fields of thought," and cites the changed political views and conceptions, in which the great state papers of American history are held as evidence of this fact, in politics as well as religion, philosophy, and science. And all these things he thinks are due to "psychological atmosphere of the times." He thinks that any disposition to hold to the former views of these documents is a symptom of the attitude of mind, which in religion may be

designated "the religion of primitive credulity." This is the main illustration in the closing chapter, as indicative of the changed attitude of mind in public matters.

Now it so happens that just here we have the best possible opportunity of judging Professor Pratt's accuracy in judging what the current psychological forces are, and what they are producing, and it is hardly too much to say that he could not possibly have been more unfortunate in his choice and analysis than he is in this one. Whom would Professor Pratt choose in this land to-day as the clearest expositors of the sound political theory of democracy? Would he or not take men like the late Carl Schurz, like Moorfield Storey, like Professor Sumner, like Professor Laughlin, and others of this type? And yet these and a great many more like them, comprising for the most part the soundest and most thorough-going students of political theory, are almost to a man agreed that the popular departure from the ideas of the Declaration of Independence, which Dr. Pratt styles of the nature of the "religion of primitive credulity," is one of the most deplorable evidences, not of advancing thought, but lack of thought and power of discernment, which this country has ever seen. So far from abandoning the Declaration of Independence because it is no longer in accord with their political thought, it is rather because of their lack of thought that the masses have acted concerning these ideas as they have. The proof for this conclusion is also at hand. If the reaction from the doctrines of that great document were due to advanced thought, we should expect greater evidence of political independence and judgment. The critical attitude is universally accompanied by the extremes of individualism. But, as a matter of fact, side by side with the imperialism which has embarked on a colonial policy, now seen to be ruinous and utterly foolish, is the increased concentration of power in a single individual to the almost utter abandonment of some of the elementary ideas of democracy. There has been no time in the life of the present writer when political independence was less in vogue than now! No time when the president of the

United States could have or would have dreamed of having so much power concentrated in him as is the case at the present moment! To hold that this results from the critical attitude of the newly awakened political intellect of the land is something little short of ludicrous. In fact, the very illustration which Dr. Pratt has chosen is the one which his opponents would most naturally have chosen with which to confute him. Party government, party subservience even by men who know better, never did their deadly work more effectively than now. Nor are the literati exempt in this very matter. A college professor not far from the beautiful spot where Professor Pratt himself has his locus wrote not so very long ago in a private letter, when a block of United States Steel was given to the College, that he deplored it, since it made the dealing with certain forms of the tariff more difficult and delicate, if it did not interdict them entirely. Even the literati are fearful of being individual and determinate as regards the present political conditions. If Professor Pratt can find no better practical illustration of awakened critical powers, he is sorely pressed indeed.

But before we leave this part of the discussion, it might as well be said now, as at any time, that this field, one of the best for the study of the prevailing opinions and psychological conditions in the land, is almost entirely neglected by Professor Pratt. In Part II. of his book, where this subject might have been profitably considered, he ventures into a field for which he obviously lacks full equipment. In the matter of religious belief as it existed and exists among primitive peoples, as well as the religions of India and Israel, he has obviously accepted second-hand views, and has not allowed for great varieties of interpretation, which are not only equal in value but equally suggestive, whether soundly grounded or not. There is no department where greater uncertainty prevails at this moment than in the fundamental conceptions involved in the history of religions. There is in this part altogether a lack of all-round knowledge. Nobody who knows the *Ausgangspunkt* of modern literary criticism of the Bible,  
Vol. LXV. No. 257. 11

but knows also, that it is filled with stupidities and pedantries which are insufferable in anybody but higher critics, a fact which the critics themselves recognize. With the advanced critical views for the most part, the present writer has absolute sympathy. He believes in general in the work of the critics, and has absolutely nothing to fear from them or their work. But the naïve assumptions of this portion of Professor Pratt's book and his ready acceptance of the dicta of just one form of higher criticism are almost as good a proof of the attitude involved in the religion of primitive credulity as is his examination of the present status of the Declaration of Independence. It would not be absolutely fair to say that Part II. of this book is valueless; but it is fair to say that others have stated these views very much better than Professor Pratt has, and that students of the history of religion cannot help feeling that here the author merely recites the views of others which he has but partially assimilated. The views themselves are open to great criticism in many aspects.

The technical part of the book is the best, though this also has a certain indefinable fragmentary character, which makes it unsatisfactory in a way which is hard to define. Where the chapter becomes vital and deals with fundamental matters, we are met with a quotation from Professor James, or the thing emerges without having brought us anywhere. Professor Pratt is a believer in the religion of feeling; and, reduced to lowest terms, his position is about as follows: All intellectual processes are necessarily more or less faulty, and, since none of them can be infallible, no enduring religion can be based upon them. That is to say, a religion which is primarily intellectual must be a religion of authority, and a religion of authority is substantially impossible. The "religion of thought" can never have the attribute of finality, which is essential to religion. Belief as such is not a matter of evidence, but of a psychological process, of which it may be affirmed in general that the subject will believe as much as he can. What he believes and why he believes are accidents rather than results of choice. Hence the "religion of

thought" is untenable. The stages preceding the "religion of thought" are grouped under the title "religion of primitive credulity," already alluded to above. It is merely the child-like and uncritical acceptance of what one is told, and does not involve scrutiny nor the critical faculties. The abiding form of religion is "the religion of feeling," which is, in effect, some personal experience, in which the only evidence is personal experience and which cannot be subjected to review or criticism. What form it takes depends upon circumstances; but, being inward and personal, "it is not subject to the law of the mind, neither indeed can it be," to paraphrase a well-known passage from St. Paul. Under this view the Bible will still be interesting, but not authoritative; and, in general, religion will be simply the personal expression of some form of devotion. His position is admirably summed up in the statement in the conclusion: "In abandoning reason as the sufficient basis for religion, we are forced back on the region of feeling and of instinctive and unreasoned demands and intuitions. Here must Religion take up her stand and make her fight. From this quarter she must draw her chief supplies or be starved into surrender."

The most striking fact about this general position is that it leaves so many loopholes that one can scarcely know where to begin. Take, for example, the historical facts of Christianity, whatever one holds them to be. The history of the literary documents is surely a matter of evidence, is it not? And after the documents have been subjected to the test by which evidence is judged, there remains again the evidence of the validity of the material of the documents themselves. What becomes of a religion of feeling merely, when we are dealing with matters of evidence? Now, to be sure, absolute certainty, like the certainty which can be obtained in a problem in geometry, is not to be obtained in anything but the pure sciences; but surely the facts of religion, especially of a religion like Christianity, must involve certain intellectual conceptions of religion *per se* by which we go about discussing the evidence for or against a religion. And if any intellectual

basis of religion is to be found whatever, it must be a basis which is grounded in the use of the reason. Doubtless there is an ultra-rational element that enters into the personal acceptance of any faith, and which arises probably in what we call the religious feeling. But to assume, from this fact, that there can be no sufficient basis in reason for religion, is simply to turn the religious life into bedlam. And bedlam it is, where the rational limitations which are everywhere discernible in the New Testament are discarded. And to the modern bedlam nothing has contributed more than the prattle about the psychological basis of religion. There is probably no sect that could subscribe more readily to Professor Pratt's doctrine than the Christian Scientists,—one more of the curious phenomena of an age "whose critical faculties are alert," and whose "skeptical instincts" are rejecting everything right and left which savors of authority! As a matter of fact, here again, Professor Pratt has not read the signs of the times aright. Credulity flourishes in this very age as it probably never has; and, oddly enough, it was Professor James who appeared before a committee of the Massachusetts Legislature in opposition to a law which forbade the practice of the healing art by Christian Scientist practitioners, without previous examination by the State Board of Health. The same thing is true when one examines the enormous output of "fake" medicines, the wholesale quackery on every side. These people, according to the "psychological atmosphere of the times" as described by Professor Pratt, have thrown "authority" overboard. Indeed they have, rational authority. But they are one seven times more subjects of superstition, and have abandoned reason in religion and medicine and almost everything else, quite to the fulfillment of Professor Pratt's theory. Thus in medical practice, as in political practice, we have exactly similar phenomena,—the abandonment of rational standards of reason as the basis of religion, accompanied by the most grotesque and absurd forms of superstition! Dean Briggs thinks the same phenomena can be seen in the theories of education; and thus these three fields—education, medicine,

and religion—afford at the present time a very fair illustration of the way “feeling” works as a practical standard. Not that religious feeling is not a real thing, and capable of analysis, and that it has not a form of authority, which is as true and vital as the reason itself. For terms of personal contentment and personal inward satisfaction, it is probably paramount. The present writer has so contended in an article to which Professor Pratt’s book refers. But to properly estimate and give due weight to the feeling in religion, is not to abandon the reason. That very feeling itself must come under the critical scrutiny of the reason.

It is, however, when Professor Pratt comes to deal with this matter in relation to belief, that its utter inadequacy is best understood. Belief is itself a total of many elements; and a belief which did not have a rational basis, one grounded in reason, would soon disappear. It is doubtless true that many of the things which the present age has rejected have lost their rational force. It is doubtless a mistake, and a serious one, that some teachers are trying to force intellectual assent to things which cannot be rationally justified or even made reasonably attractive. But this is very far removed from the abandonment of the reason. And to imagine that a religion which rests upon unreasoning and unreasoned instincts can ever be in any real sense a religion is to ignore the history of religion entirely. It is here that Professor Pratt’s inadequacy to the subject appears. That the intuitions are to have a larger place than the prevailing philosophy allows them must be admitted. Indeed that is the great present need. But to suppose that this again involves the rejection of reason in religion is a very mistaken point of view. Professor Pratt seems to hold that belief is a thing which can be manufactured to order, and that it can be taken up or rejected according to will. Now the “will to believe” can do many and wonderful things. But for the most part it has been exhibited under conditions distinctly pathological. And this “will to believe” in practical operation is really, for the most part, a diseased state, which cannot be properly reckoned into any sound ex-



amination of religion. If Professor Pratt will look into the history of the Romantic School in Germany, and will go carefully into the lucubrations of the men like Tieck, Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Hardenburg, especially the story of "Lucinde," both in the literature of the time and in real life, he will see what a sorry emergence the unchecked primacy of feeling produced. In fact the Danish critic Brandes discusses this very question in his chapter on "Romantic Duplication and Psychology," and this is his estimate: "Since the Ego is not an innate but an acquired conception, founded upon an association of ideas, which has to maintain itself against constant attacks of sleep, dreams, imaginations, hallucinations, and mental derangement, it is by its nature exposed to manifold dangers. Just as disease is ever lying in wait for our bodies, so madness lies in wait at the threshold of the Ego, and every now and again we hear it knock. It is of this correct psychological theory . . . . . that the Romanticists, though they do not define it scientifically, nevertheless have a presentiment. Dreams, dipsomania, hallucinations, madness, all the powers which disintegrate the Ego, which disconnect its links, are their familiar friends. Read, for instance, Hoffmann's tale, 'The Golden Jar,' and you will hear voices issue from the apple-baskets, and the leaves and flowers of the elder-tree sing; you will see the door-knocker making faces, etc. . . . . We seem to see man's spiritual life spread and split itself up fan-wise into musical high and low spirits." We see Tieck, he says again, "composing dramas like so many puzzle-balls," and Kierkenggaard "fitting one author inside another in Chinese-box fashion on the strength of the theory that truth can only be imparted indirectly," and so on to the end of the chapter. And he adds, "The human being is only a group held more or less firmly together by association of ideas, and as a mind he is a complete whole; in his will all the elements of the mind are united." The simple truth is, that these men became priests of obscurantism in religion, in art, in literature, in everything they touched, but they furnish the finest examples known of the primacy, that is the unchecked primacy,

of feeling, to the debasement and abandonment of reason. These are the men who sneered and disparaged Lessing, Schiller, Goethe, and all the rest of the noble rational galaxy who have made Germany the nation of thinkers she is.

It would be quite unfair to give the impression that Professor Pratt does not see the possibility of these things, for he says that "the religion of feeling, in its calmer, more refined, more normal condition, must not be confused with its extremes and its excrescences." He knows that there have been pathological mystics; but what he does not seem clearly to perceive is that the moment the religion of feeling becomes supreme in the public thought, it instantly does go to extremes, and we have at once the very manifestations which he deplures. And every historical reaction from stiffness and sterility in the intellectual conception of religion which has accentuated the emotions has resulted in just the crudities and excrescences which Professor Pratt does not see are the usual concomitants of emotional religion. It is only when these reactions have been dealt with on their intellectual side, that reasoned advance has been made and religion has progressed. The emotional reactions have flared up and gone out; and, while some increment did result to the religious life, it was, as a rule, evanescent because it was not reasoned advance. The history of revivals shows this; and, where the advance is a sound one, it is merely the bringing up of an intellectual reserve which had not previously uttered itself publicly.

Professor Pratt's closing words about the absence of men from the churches are peculiarly wanting in full understanding of the problem. And it is hardly quite worthy of a Williams College professor to call the sale of Harnack's "Wesen des Christenthums" and Delitzsch's "Babel und Bibel" evidence of an "atmosphere laden with interest in religious questions." Harnack's book sold 60,000 copies and Delitzsch's 100,000, but Dr. William "Chloroform" Osler's "Principles and Practice of Medicine" sold, according to a trade report, over 105,000 copies! Does this indicate that the "psychological atmosphere" is laden with interest in medical

questions? On this theory, no feeling is necessary at all. We need only to get the trade reports of the best sellers! The reasons why men are not in the churches are many; and, it Professor Pratt will accept the results of a *questionnaire* which the present writer made some years ago in Boston in which replies were received from nearly five hundred men, he will probably be surprised when he is told that the cost figured in one form and another in three-fourths of the replies. The economics of church-going have not received the attention which they will receive sometime; and in the present industrial conditions and the prevailing economic system will be found the explanation of many things which Professor Pratt, with many others, seems to imagine are due to changed views of the Bible and religion. In fact, many years of a ministry, which has been peculiarly a ministry to and with and among men, has convinced the present writer that the intellectual changes have had the very least to do with the matter. As a rule the intellectual questions which have to do with faith and religion and their acceptance and rejection are discussed more freely in the churches than anywhere else. And of late many churches have themselves opened their own doors as a forum to their opponents. But this has not been the matter at all. In this review it is not the purpose to discuss that question, but it will suffice to say that Professor Pratt gives no intimations of knowing the elements of that question.

But he has written a book which is frank, straightforward, open, and without reserve. He states what he thinks with no appearance of dreading consequences or regret at having to leave behind something which he is sorry to lose. In short it is a true transcript of his heart as well as his mind, and therefore will be a book of influence, and will cause thinking concerning the problem which it discusses. As such it is to be welcomed. It will probably be true, as he says, that "spiritual insight will be recognized as the only sure basis of religious belief"; but spiritual insight will have to include history, historical evidence, the rise and determination of the norm of religious judgment and praxis, and the establishment of

standards which will create and maintain not mathematical but moral authority, which while not dictatorial will nevertheless in effect be final. Such authority will tend to be crystallized in objective symbols, the chief one for the Christian being the Bible. And while this, like all other symbols, will be but a symbol, subject to the correctional judgment, and conscience, and experience of the church, it will continue to represent substantially the final authority for the faith and practice of Christian men.

*Salem, Mass.*

A. A. BERLE.

#### THE "FOURTH DAY" IN GENESIS.

THE peculiarities of the "fourth day" in Genesis (i. 14-19) have often been wondered at, and various efforts have been made to explain them. For one thing, no life is mentioned. This, however, need occasion no difficulty. The life of the preceding period had perished at the beginning of this one, and the life of this period had likewise been blotted out long before man appeared on the earth. Some exceptions there were; but exceptions can be ignored in general statements. Working with a limited vocabulary and knowing nothing of these early forms of life, the author of Genesis could hardly be expected to improvise anything on the subject. These forms did not concern him. The renewal of life which took place in his "fifth day" did concern him, and he appears to have treated that part of his work with due accuracy. A concise popular general statement concerning creation is not the same thing as a modern geological treatise, and it is unfair to assume that it is, or to be too exacting about minor details. The author is therefore justified in omitting all mention of life. He confines his attention to a single astronomical change,—the completion of the present arrangement of the heavenly bodies with respect to the seasons, the days, and the nights. Some fundamental alteration in the solar system seems to be implied, and we know that it was a period of convulsions and cataclysms. Tracing the action of the tides back analytically, Sir George Darwin came to the conclusion a few years ago that the earth and the moon

were once a single pear-shaped body rotating in about five hours. Astronomy now confirms this hypothesis, as Dr. Lowell has recently shown;<sup>1</sup> for in no other way could the surface of the moon have obtained its present roughness, which indicates an amount of original heat out of all proportion to its mass. If it broke away from the earth after both were fairly cool, as present conditions seem to indicate; an explanation has been found for much more than the condition of the moon's exterior, since it may now be possible to account for the presence of so much land in the Northern Hemisphere, for the disturbances and heat which produced our mines of anthracite and graphite, for the fluctuations in the earth's crust which formed the mountains of this period, for the destruction of Paleozoic life, and in all probability for the strange inclination of the earth's axis to the plane of the ecliptic. Instead of contradicting the nebular hypothesis, then, as he has been accused of doing, Moses has met its deeper requirements in a most remarkable way. Present relations in the solar system cannot antedate the separation of the earth and the moon. They were impossible before that time. A five-hour period of rotation, if that supposition is correct, when combined with the other conditions of that remote day, would preclude all such seasons and time relations as we now have, and their establishment might easily be considered as the completion of the solar system. Although we know better, we still say that the sun rises and sets, and it behooves us to be reasonable. What we may well ask, is, How did Moses come to make such a statement at this particular point?

*Cambridge, Mass.*

H. W. MAGOUN.

#### A JEWISH TEMPLE IN EGYPT, B.C. 525-411.<sup>2</sup>

Great interest has been aroused among biblical scholars by the recent discovery of three Aramaic papyri found at Elephantinê, near the First Cataract of the Nile. They prove to have been written only twenty-four years after Nehemiah's

<sup>1</sup>The Century, Nov., 1907, pp. 122 ff.

<sup>2</sup>Condensed from an article by the Rev. S. R. Driver, D.D., in the Guardian, November 6, 1907.

second visit to Jerusalem (432 B.C.), and bring us nearer to the Old Testament than any inscription hitherto discovered. As Professor Driver remarks, "we are sensible, as we read them, of being in an atmosphere very similar to that into which we are brought by the Aramaic letters and edicts in Ezra vii. 11-26 (B.C. 458); iv. 11-16; 17-22 (shortly before B.C. 444); and even by the earlier ones of Ezra v. 6-17; vi. 2-12 (B.C. 520)." These "have just been published by Dr. Sachau, Professor of Semitic Languages, and Director of the Oriental Seminary, at Berlin (*Drei Aramäische Papyrus-urkunden aus Elephantine*, Berlin, 1907, with many valuable notes). These documents were found in a chamber of a house excavated from under the mound, which now marks the site of the ancient Elephantinê."

"The first of the papyri consists of thirty lines, written as the facsimile shows, in a clear and bold hand. It is a petition addressed by the colony of Jews at Elephantinê to Bagohi—the Bagoas of Josephus—the Persian Governor of Judah, to crave his intervention on their behalf. The 'temple of the God Yahu'—of course, Yahweh, or, in the pronunciation with which we are more familiar, Jehovah—in Elephantinê, in which they worshiped the God of their fathers, and to which they were intensely devoted, had, to their great sorrow, been destroyed; and they ask Bagohi's intervention and assistance to get it rebuilt. . . . From the description here given, it is evident that it was a substantial and handsome building, with pillars of stone, and seven stone gates. It was used not, like a synagogue, for prayer only, but also for sacrifice; it had an altar, upon which burnt-offerings, meal-offerings, and frankincense were regularly offered; mention is also made of gold and silver bowls, bearing the same name as those used in the Temple at Jerusalem, for tossing the sacrificial blood against the sides of the altar."

From the narrative it appears that the "Jewish colony had been settled in Elephantinê, and their Temple had been built there, for more than 120 years, from before the conquest of Egypt by Cambyses in B.C. 525. When Cambyses entered

Egypt, he observed the same goodwill towards the Jews there which his father Cyrus had shown towards the Jews of Babylon; the temples of the gods of Egypt had been destroyed by him, the temple of Jehovah had not been touched. But three years before the date of the petition, in 411, when Arsam—probably the Arxamēs, mentioned by Ctesias as Governor of Egypt when Darius II. became King (in 424)—had gone for some reason to the Persian Court, the priests of the ram-headed Egyptian god Chnub took advantage of his absence to bribe Waidrang, who was chief in command at Elephantinē, to destroy the Temple of the Jews. Waidrang . . . thereupon summoned his son, who was commander of the garrison in Syene, on the opposite side of the Nile; and he came with a body of troops, who ruthlessly destroyed the fabric of the Temple, and appropriated the gold and silver vessels, and other articles of value belonging to it, themselves. The Jews had at the time sent a letter to Bagohi, and also to Jehohanan (the Johanan of Neh. xii. 22), the high-priest at Jerusalem, and his brother Ostan or Anani, and the nobles of Judah, for assistance, but had received no reply. Since its destruction, naturally, no sacrifices could be offered in the Temple, and the Jews in their trouble had mourned and fasted and prayed to Yahu continuously. Their prayers had to some extent been answered, for some disaster had overtaken Waidrang, he had lost his possessions, the Egyptians who had wished evil against the Temple were slain, and the Jews (in Biblical phrase) had 'seen their desire upon them.'

"The Temple, however, still remained in ruins, and the Jews had no permission to rebuild it. They pray Bagohi, therefore to send authority to Egypt enabling them to do this. And they promise, if he does so, to offer sacrifices in his name in the restored Temple, to pray for his welfare, and to grant him a fixed payment on all the sacrifices offered in it. They seem, however, to hint to Bagohi that they have arranged to make him a present for his good services (so Professor Sachau). They have also, they add, sent to interest Delaiah and Shelemiah, the sons of Sanballat, the Governor of

Samaria, the well-known opponent of Nehemiah, in their behalf. In conclusion, as if to remove any difficulty which Bagothi might feel in acting contrary to a colleague, they assure him that Arsam, the Persian Governor of Egypt, had no knowledge of what had been done to them." Their petition was successful.

"It is surprising to find that there was a Temple in Egypt in which sacrifice was offered for more than a hundred years. The famous Temple at Leontopolis, in the Delta, built by the high priest Onias III. between 170 and 160 B.C., after his deposition by Antiochus Epiphanes, in imitation of the Temple at Jerusalem, had a precedent which, till this discovery at Elephantinê, was entirely unsuspected. Who were the original founders of the colony at Elephantinê? Were they refugees of the Ten Tribes? Or were they Jews who had found a home in Egypt after the destruction of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans in 586? The Jews in Egypt (including 'Pathros,' the 'Land of the South'—Upper Egypt) are severely denounced by Jeremiah (ch. xlv.) for their idolatry, and especially for their devotion to the Queen of heaven, and destruction is foretold for them; but there may have been some among them who were still faithful to the God of their fathers. Whatever the origin of the colony, which before 525 B.C. had penetrated 400 miles south of the modern Cairo, and established itself at Elephantinê, its members did not feel with their brethren in Palestine, or deem themselves bound by the law of Deuteronomy (ch. xii.), which prohibited sacrifice of every kind except at the Temple of Jerusalem. Professor Sayce has remarked that they could claim for their altar the sanction of Isaiah (xix. 19). It is, however, important to observe that the prophet's vision is not of a Jewish altar in Egypt in the midst of a heathen population, but gives expression to the loftier ideal of the devotion of the entire Egyptian people to Jehovah (see vv. 21, 23-25)."