ARTICLE III.

SCIENCE AND HIGHER CRITICISM.

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"Prove all things; hold fast that which is good" (1 Thess. v. 21).

This maxim of Religion is also fundamental in Science. It expresses briefly the essential spirit of what is recognized as the "scientific method" of investigation; the method which, rightly employed, has in our age vastly advanced man's dominion and knowledge in every department of human welfare.

HIGHER CRITICISM TO-DAY.

Higher criticism of the Bible must be judged by the effects it has already produced, and the certain consequences that must follow, the realization of the claims which its votaries insist that it has conclusively accomplished. These are set forth in Dr. Orr's recent book,1 a work which lays the religious world, all honest inquirers after truth, under profound obligation. He tells us it is the result of study of Higher Criticism in all its schools and phases for thirty years; and "the conclusions of the critics force themselves on every one's attention, and it is a matter no longer of choice, but necessity, to pay regard to their opinions" (p. xiv).

The matters in contention between these destructive critics and Christian believers, as he states them, directly or indirectly, are:

1. The whole question of the value of the Bible as an

inspired and authoritative record of God's historical revelation to mankind. Has God spoken, and does the Bible convey to mankind his sure word for our guidance? Have the Scriptures of the Old Testament any longer the value for us they had for Christ and his disciples? (p. 6).

Or, as these destructive critics contend, must we concede that, as the result of the critical discussions of the past century, historical foundations of the Old Testament revelation have been subverted; that neither the Pentateuch nor any part of it was written until several hundred years subsequent to the death of Moses? Must miracle and the supernatural be eliminated from the Scriptures? Must man's changing and erring thoughts about God henceforth take the place of God's words to man? Are the erstwhile "lively oracles" of God simply the fragmentary remains of a literature to which no special quality of divineness attaches, and is the supposed history of salvation a piecing together of the myths, legends, and free inventions, of an ignorant age? Dr. Orr's review of the cult (in the 539 pages of his book) shows that the extensive body of higher critics now in the ascendant, who arrogate to themselves the title "modern," answer the questions last above with an unhesitating "Yes." The mass of believing Christians answer such challenge with an emphatic "No."

2. He states the effects this destructive criticism has produced upon many who perhaps, as he says, "have given too easy an assent to current theories simply because they are the theories of the hour," which he describes thus:

"There is no gainsaying the fact that, historically, it was in rationalistic workshops mainly, that the critical theory was elaborated, and that, from this circumstance, a certain rationalistic impress was stamped upon it from the first. . . . Most of all is it true of the type of theory which is at present the dominant one,—the theory which,
to indicate the line of its origin, we might describe as the Vatke-Graf-Kuenen-Wellhausen one,—that it is rationalistic in its basis, and every fibre of its construction. Yet it is this theory which, chiefly through the brilliant advocacy of Wellhausen, has for the time won an all but universal recognition in critical circles on the Continent and in English-speaking countries. Its arguments are adopted, its conclusions endorsed, its watchwords repeated with almost monotonous fidelity of iteration by a majority of scholars of all classes,—in churches and out of churches, High Church, Broad Church and Low Church, sceptical and believing” (p. 17).

Here, then, we have the conditions and controversy to which higher criticism of the Bible has brought not only the religion of Israel, but Christianity itself also, at the present time. It is obvious that, if these claims of the “modern” or destructive critics of the Bible are established, and carried out to their logical and inevitable consequences, they must, as Dr. Orr says, “prove subversive of our Christian faith and of such belief in, and use of, the Bible as alone can meet the needs of the living Church” (p. xv). He adds, “If these theories are to be dealt with satisfactorily, it can only be by going at first hand to the sources, tapping the stream, as it were, at the fountain head” (p. xvi).

One, and apparently the most, prolific cause of the destructive theories of these critics is the alleged parallel pre-Pentateuchal narratives which the critics contend are the sources of, and which by being bodily combined have produced, the first five books of the Bible. We propose in this article to apply the scientific method of research in examining these alleged sources of the Pentateuch, and, in that immediate connection, the sources of the destructive theories of these critics.

We do not find that such higher criticism of the Bible has ever been tested as to its verity by the ordeal of actual trial, as required by the maxim “Prove all things; hold fast that which is good.” We know the claims and contentions of
such critics have been met by learned and able arguments; but have they ever been subjected to the exacting demand and ordeal of the scientific method and Bible maxim which relentlessly require proof, and counsel holding nothing as "good" or verity on mere argument or debate? Ascertaining and establishing truth or fact from evidence constitutes "proof." Securing proof from evidence is the distinctive function of the science of jurisprudence. The rules, tests, standards, and methods of jurisprudence, in dealing with evidence, are the axioms which the experience and sagacity of ages have established as the best means of discriminating truth from error.¹ They may be described as the machinery of juridical science by which it attains and establishes results. Thereby the Science of Jurisprudence takes a disputed question out from the indeterminate sphere of argument or debate, and, carrying it forward, advances it to issue, test, and the ordeal of trial. The result of trial establishes, from evidence, verity as to the matter in contention. This is what is seen constantly in litigation in courts of justice, where the result is formally announced and enforced.

But this function of juridical science is not limited to compulsory litigation in courts of justice. It is available for trying and deciding any and all contentions between disputants when truth or fact is to be ascertained and established through evidence. This may be illustrated by the use made of juridical science by Abraham Lincoln in his oration at Cooper Institute in 1860. In the heat of political strife over slavery, the South, appealing to Washington's warnings against local prejudice, charged the dominant political party of the North with sectionalism. Mr. Lincoln in public discourse employed this machinery of juridical science to test and try that charge.

¹A. P. Will, Evidence, p. 1.
Identifying himself with that party at the North, and addressing the South, Mr. Lincoln said:—

"You say we are sectional. We deny it. That makes an issue; and the burden of proof is on you. You produce your proof; and what is it? Why, that our party has no existence in your section, gets no votes in your section. The fact is substantially true, but does it prove the issue? If it does, then in case we should, without change of principle, begin to get votes in your section, we should thereby cease to be sectional. You cannot escape this conclusion; and yet are you willing to abide by it? If you are, you will probably soon find we have ceased to be sectional, for we shall get votes in your section this very year. You will then begin to discover, as the truth plainly is, that your evidence does not touch the issue."

Mr. Lincoln by the use of the machinery of juridical science brought forward what was before befogged in debate to issue, trial, and decision as conclusively and certainly to the public, those who were affected by it and who in fact constituted the tribunal, as though the judgment had been announced by a court in session.

The "issue" is of supreme importance in the machinery of jurisprudence. It consists of the exact point in dispute between contestants, stated as a proposition, affirmed by one party, denied by opponent. The "issue" thus enables each contestant to produce his evidence, to make "proof" of his contention. On the evidence, or failure of evidence, juridical science determines the controversy. If a party to the "issue" cannot produce evidence to prove what he affirms, judicial science determines the affirmation untrue. The affirmation is set aside, held for naught, as was illustrated by Mr. Lincoln's use of the "issue" in the case just stated. By employing the method and machinery of juridical science, we shall (as at present advised) approach the examination of destructive higher criticism of the Bible from a new basis, by a method not heretofore used. It is a basis and means, how-

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1 Gould's Pleading, 279.
ever, which the maxim and science expressly call for, that
which, from evidence, evolves "proof," and thereby de-
termines controversy.

The simple questions we propose to examine are: Has the
cult of destructive higher criticism of the Bible ever complied
with, or can it now comply with, the requirement of the
maxim; viz., make "proof" of its alleged foundation and the
claims which its advocates insist it has established on that
alleged foundation?

We propose to bring these questions to the ordeal of issue
and trial. For such ordeal, in such case, juridical science
requires the selection, for "the issue," of a question that under-
lies the controversy—one on which other and subordinate matters
hinge.¹ This feature of higher criticism of the Bible, initiated
by Astruc (A.D. 1753) and formulated by these critics, asserts
that before the Pentateuch or any part of it was written, one
called Elohist (or E) had composed a narrative of the
matters in the Pentateuch, in which E habitually and con-
stantly employed the divine name Elohim to designate God,
and one called Jehovah (or J) had also composed a parallel
narrative of the matters in the Pentateuch, in which J habitu-
ally and constantly employed the divine name Jehovah to
designate God; that the alleged E and J narratives as sources
were embodied from alternate sections of each narrative in pro-
ducing the Pentateuch; that the alleged alternation of those
divine names Elohim and Jehovah in the Pentateuch is the re-
sult of so embodying alternate sections of those two alleged
parallel narratives in it; that, by sundering the Pentateuch on
the criteria or test of the names Elohim and Jehovah, they now
manufacture an E narrative and a J narrative, between which
narratives so manufactured they claim there are discrepancies,

¹ Greenleaf, Evidence, sec. 3.
contradictions, and variances, from studying which these critics evolve and deduce the destructive conclusions with which they attack the Bible. Such preexistence of the alleged E and J narratives, i.e. before the Pentateuch was written, seems to furnish a controlling point of dispute between higher critics and Christian believers for the "issue" here.¹

Dr. Green says of this point of dispute:—

"The alternation of the divine names Elohim and Jehovah is made by them [these critics] the key of their whole position. This is the starting-point of the partition, and of the entire hypothesis of the separate documents. All the other criteria are supplementary to this; they are worked out on this basis, and find in it whatever justification and proof of their validity they have. All hinges ultimately, therefore, on the exact transmission of these fundamental and determining words. . . . If there is anything that must be absolutely fixed and resolutely adhered to, if the document hypothesis is to stand, it is the accuracy of these divine names which are the pillars on which the whole critical structure rests."²

Divesting the dispute between the destructive higher critics and believing Christians of all other contentions and reducing controversy to the simplest single question that underlies the dispute, we may make the alleged existence of the said E and J narratives before the Pentateuch was written the "issue" between those parties on which other disputed questions hinge.

ISSUE PROPOSED.

The "issue" then may be thus stated: Higher critics of

¹ Critics postulate additional entities as participating in composing narratives alleged to have been embodied in the Pentateuch, as second Elohist (B), priestly writer (P), Deuteronomist (D), etc. (see William H. Green, Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch, p. 88; Orr, Prob. of the Old Test., pp. 202–206). But, as examining such additional alleged sources of the Pentateuch would be only duplicating examination of the alleged E and J sources, brevity and simplicity lead us to limit the examination, as we do, to those two (see Orr, op. cit., p. 65).

² Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch, p. 90.
the Bible allege that the said supposed E and J parallel narratives existed before the Pentateuch was written. This allegation we deny. That makes an issue. It is an issue of fact. Such issue is to be determined by evidence. The explicit question is, Is it a fact that the alleged E and J narratives existed before the Pentateuch was written? The affirmative and burden of proving that allegation of fact to be true by competent relevant evidence rests upon these higher critics. If they cannot prove those allegations true, by valid evidence, juridical science shows they fail and that that alleged fact, and all their claims built upon it, must be held false,—be set aside and held for naught, like the baseless fabric of any dream. This is what juridical science accomplishes. This is its function. It provides the "issue," and so furnishes rational and just opportunity to each party to present his evidence to sustain his contention in the dispute. When the production of what is offered as evidence is concluded or the failure of evidence is disclosed, juridical science pronounces the result, which is judgment against the affirmant, if he cannot produce evidence to prove his allegations true.

CRITICS' PROPOSED EVIDENCE EXAMINED.

What evidence do the higher critics produce to prove that the alleged E and J narratives existed before the Pentateuch was written or existed? None. What these critics propose as evidence to prove their affirmations true is found in their abundant publications. They do not even pretend to produce any direct or positive evidence to maintain that allegation. What Dr. Orr says of the alleged entities E and J is true of the alleged narratives of E and J: "Neither history nor tradition knows anything of them." One will be surprised to find how Dr. Orr repeatedly convict the destructive higher
critics of resorting to the *petitio principii*, to maintain their unfounded claims.

We are here dealing with what these critics aver are the sources of the Pentateuch. One of those critics, Westphal, is quoted by Dr. Orr as author of a work entitled "Sources du Pent," in which that critic seems to have inventoried alleged certain achievements of this higher criticism of the Bible. After enumerating (1) four sources of the Pentateuch narratives,—by Elohist, second Elohist, Jehovah, and Deuteronomist,—he names (2) "the admission of the fact that each of these sources before its entrance into our Biblical books, existed as an independent writing."

This claim of the critic that the verity of the alleged pre-existence of the alleged E and J narratives was proved by admission, betrays a lamentable ignorance of judicial science, of what evidence is, of what verity is. Verity of alleged facts is not established by admission. A party who makes an admission as to an alleged fact may be forced to receive the consequences of the admission as though it were a verity. But such admission is absolutely powerless in proving the alleged fact an actuality. Galileo had asserted that the sun was central in our system and that the earth moved around it. Under the pressure of ecclesiastical tyranny, Galileo, with great solemnity, admitted as fact that the earth stood still—did not move—and that the sun revolved around the earth. But that admission did not make or prove it true. The admission was utterly futile for proving that the earth stood still as an actuality. Neither did nor can any admission by any man or body of men, at any time or any place, that the alleged E and J narratives existed in fact before the Pentateuch was written, prove that in fact they so existed or that the allegation is true.

*Prob. of the Old Test., p. 208; Sources du Pent, vol. ii. p. xxvi.*

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We do not overlook nor forget that these critics insist that they do produce matter as evidence to maintain the contention at issue on their part. And what is it? Stating it in the form of propositions that can be dealt with, tested, and tried by juridical standards, it may be thus designated:

No. 1. That sundering out from the Pentateuch consecutively the sections or parts in which the divine name Elohim occurs will produce an intelligent, consistent, and accurate narrative of the matter of the Pentateuch without breaks or chasms, and a like parallel narrative of the matter of the Pentateuch will be produced by sundering out of the Pentateuch successively the sections or parts in which the divine name Jehovah occurs; that the two narratives, so manufactured by the critics, verily constitute the alleged E and J narratives.

No. 2. That, as a result of No. 1, these critics insist they show that the Pentateuch must have been produced by simply embodying therein, in alternate sections, the alleged E and J narratives.

No. 3. That the alternate occurrence of the divine names Elohim and Jehovah in the Pentateuch was caused, and is explained, by the embodiment therein of the alleged E and J narratives in the manner alleged in their propositions No. 1 and No. 2.

It must be remembered that we are trying issues of fact, which can be tried by evidence only. But these propositions No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 are not evidence, nor is either of them evidence. They are mere theories, mere unproved hypotheses. Juridical science utterly rejects theories and unproved hypotheses as evidence. But these critics bring the matter of

\(^1\) Green, Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch, pp. 89, 109, 118.
these three propositions forward, to maintain the issue on their part, and we will give the propositions juridical considera-
tion. These three claims fall at once under the maxim "Prove all things; hold fast" only those which are made good by "proof."

We deny these alleged propositions Nos. 1, 2, and 3. We deny that sundering out consecutively from the Pentateuch the sections in which the name Elohim occurs will produce a consistent, intelligent, accurate narrative of the matter of the Pentateuch, without breaks or chasms, and deny the like allegations as to so sundering out from the Pentateuch the sections in which the name Jehovah occurs.

We assert that even if such alleged Elohist and Jehovahist narratives could be thus manufactured by such partitioning of the Pentateuch, it would not prove that such two narratives so manufactured were the alleged E and J narratives, or that they were the source of the Pentateuch or of any book of the Bible.

We further deny that the proposition or hypothesis No. 3 of the critics can be allowed as evidence to explain the alleged phenomenal alternation of the divine names in the Pentateuch, for the reason, applicable here, that an hypothesis has no force in ascertaining fact or to explain or account for alleged phenomena, only as such hypothesis excludes every other explanation and every other hypothesis, save the one under consideration.¹

Here, then, we have three new and collateral issues raised by the contentions of the critics, when we are trying the one fundamental issue, i.e., the alleged pre-Pentateuchal existence of the alleged E and J narratives. Here, again, the affirmative and burden of proof are upon these critics.

¹Greenleaf, Evidence, sec. 11.
No. 1 is to be tried by testing the hypothesis upon the Pentateuch to determine whether partitioning it by the criteria of the alternation of the divine names will work. Can it work? Is it workable? The test can be made by any one, remembering that, in our English translation, the word LORD, printed in small capitals, stands for the Hebrew word Jehovah, and the word God, with capital initial, stands for the Hebrew word Elohim.

The scheme of hypothesis No. 1 contemplates applying the hypothesis to the whole Pentateuch; but applying it in a few instances may enable us to determine whether the hypothesis will work or is workable. If, on actual trial, the hypothesis will not work in one instance, it explodes the hypothesis; disproves its validity. We will test it by applying it to the record of the trial of the faith of Abraham (Gen. xxii.). Higher critics sunder out the first fourteen verses of the chapter to make part of their proposed Elohist narrative. Sundering the chapter differently does not relieve the difficulty produced.¹

Reading Elohim in place of God, and Jehovah in place of LORD, the record is (Am. Rev.): "Elohim did test Abraham,"—required the sacrifice of his son on a mount "I [Elohim] will tell thee of." Abraham journeyed to the place "of which Elohim had told him." Isaac asked for the lamb. Abraham answered, "Elohim will provide the lamb." When they came to "the place Elohim had told him of," Abraham bound Isaac, and laid him upon the altar, and Abraham "took the knife to slay his son." At this crisis, "Jehovah," by the voice of his angel and speaking in the first person, called, "Abraham! Abraham!" and said, "Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou anything to him; for now I [Jehovah] know thou fearest Elohim, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son,

¹ Orr, Prob. of the Old Test., pp. 234, 235.
thine only son, from me [Jehovah].” "Abraham called the name of the place Jehovah-jireh.... In the mount of Jehovah it shall be seen."

Here the title Elohim, including its pronouns, occurs six times; the title Jehovah, including its pronouns, occurs five times. The record of this transaction is one only and inseparable. Consider verse 12. Jehovah says, “For I [Jehovah] know thou fearest Elohim, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me [Jehovah].” This records a single indivisible judgment of God. He announces that Abraham fears Elohim, because Abraham withheld not his son from Jehovah. The reasoning results in the judgment. The thing recorded is one judgment, inseparable, and both divine names are inextricably embodied in it in one verse describing the judgment. This troubles the destructive critics. The application of their hypothesis to the Genesis record does not work, cannot work, is flat failure. The critics cannot by any sophistry or philological ingenuity prevent the failure, which they concede, by the expedients to which they resort (to be presently noticed) to surmount the difficulty. One plain failure condemns a proposed hypothesis. But in unnumbered cases this hypothesis of the critics in attempting to partition the Pentateuch into parallel narratives by the criteria of the alternation of the divine names Elohim and Jehovah fails,—will not work,—is not workable.¹

We will notice particularly one more instance,—the record of Jacob’s vow. At Bethel, Jehovah, standing above the ladder, bestowed a great blessing on Jacob, addressing Jacob in a dream, speaking in the first person. Jacob, in words following with literalness the language Jehovah addressed to

¹ See Green, Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch, where he illustrates the failures by instance after instance, pp. 92-98; and Orr, Prob. of the Old Test., pp. 233-236.
him in the dream, made that language the substance of the condition of his vow. Passing by much of the record of this incident upon which the hypothesis in question will not work, we note the result of attempting to apply the hypotheses on verses 20, 21, and 22 (Gen. xxviii.).

Higher critics sunder these verses out of Genesis to be a part of their manufactured Elohist narrative. The verses read: "And Jacob vowed a vow, saying, If Elohim will be with me and will keep me in the way I go, and will give me bread to eat, and raiment to put on, so that I come again to my father's house in peace, then shall Jehovah be my Elohim; and this stone, which I have set for a pillar, shall be Elohim's house, and of all that thou [Jehovah] shall give me, I will give the tenth unto thee [Jehovah]." Here Elohim occurs three times, and Jehovah with its pronouns occurs three times.

Here is recorded one sole, single, inseparable act—Jacob's vow. The divine names Elohim and Jehovah are inextricably embedded in the vow, each three times. Considered juridically, the word "if" joins indissolubly the vow to the condition, and the condition to the vow. The condition feeds the vow, is the consideration that makes the vow obligatory. Strike out the consideration, the vow is naught. Strike out the vow, and the consideration has no function. Neither the obligation of the vow, nor the condition it rests upon, is anything without the other. Neither vow nor condition has any function except as constituting the vow a unit.

The critics' hypothesis applied here is clear, flat failure. The failure in this and other instances is conclusive. The critics' hypothesis as to the criteria of the alternation of the two names—the basis of their proposition No. 1—is false by actual demonstration, by applying the hypothesis, and thereby demonstrating its positive failure. The hypothesis is not only
unproved, and so condemned, but it is positively disproved by
the ordeal of actual test. This is conclusive that the hypothesis
(the critics' foundation of proposition No. 1) must be rejected
and held for naught. Therefore all schemes, conclusions,
theories, and claims built upon or dependent upon that false
foundation must also perish with it.

EXPEDIENTS AND DEVICES BY CRITICS TO CURE FAILURES.

These critics, however, contend that by expedients and de-
vices they surmount or remedy all the failures of their
hypothesis No. 1 to work. These expedients, schemes, and
devices require more than casual consideration; for it may well
be questioned whether conservative writers and scholars have
adequately apprehended the intrinsic and germinal vice and
evil that inhere in the expedients and schemes proposed and
employed by these critics in manufacturing from the Pentateuch
these two alleged parallel narratives, variant often, as they
manufacture them, in phrase, style, diction, and allusion,—
variances caused by the manufacture itself. It is these alleged
parallel narratives so manufactured that furnish opportunity
for unbounded scope of imagination to critics for presuming
and imputing motives and purposes to the supposed authors of
such manufactured parallel narratives to fit anything,—any
concepts or schemes the destructive critic may choose to
evolve, from the product—the narratives they themselves so
manufacture. This evil will be disclosed more distinctively in
a quotation we propose to make later from Dr. Green dealing
directly with alleged parallel narratives, manufactured from
an original single one, illustrating the ease with which false
conclusions, contradictions, and discrepancies may be produced
by the methods of the critics, and by manufactured narratives
made by them.
What are the expedients and devices brought forward by these critics to remedy the failures of their said hypothesis to work? Stated in propositions that may be dealt with by juridical tests, they are:

(a) These critics invent and allege the existence and acts of a personage they designate as Redactor (or R), who works upon matter already written, and prepares it for publication, putting it in literary form.

(b) They invent all possible acts, neglects, errors, and misdeeds of their alleged functionary,—the redactor,—by which every failure of their said hypotheses to work, or be workable, they claim to remedy or cure.

To illustrate, we may note how the critics attempt to remedy the failure of their hypothesis to work on the record of Jacob's vow. Conceding the failure of their hypothesis to work here, they attempt to cure it by asserting and insisting that, before Genesis was written, the alleged E and J narratives actually existed—(a brazen begging of the very question we are trying). They resort to *petitio principii* again by insisting that there was nothing in the alleged E and J narratives that warranted inserting in Jacob's vow the words "then shall Jehovah be my God," and that their alleged redactor wrongfully wrote those words in Genesis. Thereupon these critics of the Bible alter the Bible record, as Dr. Green says, "arbitrarily," by striking out (of Genesis) "then shall Jehovah be my God."¹ Dr. Orr says that these words of Genesis "are forcibly excised" from the Bible by these critics.²

In the case of Abraham above stated, the critics aver that they cure the failure by insisting (without any evidence whatever to justify it) that the redactor wrote in Genesis one

¹ Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch, p. 95.
² Problem of the Old Test., p. 234.
divine name when he ought to have written the other. As Dr. Orr states, this functionary redactor is invoked by these critics to "interpolate," "to alter," to correct, what the critics claim were mistakes in the Bible record, and so they change the record to fit their hypotheses ad infinitum.

These critics do not claim any principle or standard by which to test any alleged act of their invented redactor beforehand. When their hypothesis as to the alternation of the divine names fails to work, in any instance, these critics invent and insist upon any scheme, device, or expedient that seems to them adapted to cure or remedy the failure, and charge it to their functionary, the redactor, and so relieve their trouble, and make what is actual failure appear to be success. Dr. Orr aptly compares these expedients of constant resort to invention of acts, neglects, errors, of their invented functionary R to like resort to invented epicycles of the Ptolemaic astronomers, to sustain their false claim that the earth was central, and the sun moved around it. When any fact, or conclusion from facts, showed the Ptolemaic theory untrue, those astronomers, to relieve their trouble, invented epicycles to explain and surmount the difficulty.

Such inventions of epicycles were really inventions of subterfuges to make what in fact was false appear to be true. The comparison by Dr. Orr is most just, and assists us in understanding the character and quality of the violent and baseless expedients these critics resort to to attempt to remedy the unnumbered flat failures of their hypothesis to work when put to actual test. The record of matters we, as well as the critics, are dealing with, lies at the foundation of faith in the Christian religion and of the Christian church. The element of ethics is inevitably involved in the matter under examina-

¹ Prob. of the Old Test., pp. 221–226.
tion; it cannot be eliminated nor ignored. We will try to illustrate the ethics of these expedients of the critics.

When a dishonest accountant being required to produce a balance-sheet finds when provisionally prepared it demonstrates that the accounts will not balance, he invents a false item to go into the accounts, so that when it has passed through the journal and ledger into the balance-sheet, it shall exactly fit the discrepancy, and cause the balance-sheet to appear to show the accounts to balance. He thus causes his dishonest accounts to appear honest. That expedient in commercial terms is known as "forcing a balance." The essence of such dishonest transaction seems to describe the essence of the unnumbered fictitious inventions of these critics, invented to make what is false appear to be true, to make the flat and positive failures of these hypotheses appear to be successes. This is done by these critics even to the extent of expurgating, altering, adding to, and changing the Bible record—mutilating the Word of God. When the little damsel was requested by her Sunday-school teacher to define mendacity, using Scripture expressions, she answered, A lie is "an abomination of the Lord," but "a present help in time of trouble." These invented doings of the critics' redactor seem to fall within both branches of the damsel's definition.

Remitting further consideration of the ethics of these inventions of the critics, let us see how the inventions fare when subjected to the ordeal of trial by the rules and standards of juridical science. The critics' new propositions (a) and (b) come inevitably under the exacting grip and demand of the maxim which calls upon the critics to prove their propositions,—make them "good" by "proof" or they cannot be "held" for any purpose. We deny the alleged redactor and deny his alleged performances. This again produces new collateral
issues. Here, again, the affirmative and burden of proof rest upon these critics. What evidence do they produce to establish as fact that their invented functionary R existed, and especially acted as they allege? None. The judgment of judicial science, on failure of evidence, is, *ipso facto*, that the critics’ allegations (*a*) and (*b*) fail, are invalid, repudiated, and all claims, inferences, and conclusions founded on them must be held for naught.

But this is not all. The very expedients the critics resort to, to remedy failures of their hypotheses, are suicidal,—result in plain *felo de se*. Take, for illustration, the critics’ attempt to remedy the failure of their hypotheses, when applied to the record of Jacob’s vow. To cure that failure, the critics strike out of the Bible record in Genesis the words “then shall Jehovah be my God.”

The book of Genesis is an Ancient Document. The rule of jurisprudence regarding ancient documents is stated by Greenleaf.

“Every document, apparently ancient, coming from the proper repository or custody, and bearing on its face no evident marks of forgery, the law presumes to be genuine.” “An Ancient Document, offered in evidence in our courts, is said to come from the proper repository, when it is found in the place where, and under the care of persons, with whom such writings might naturally and reasonably be expected to be found; for it is this custody which gives authenticity to documents found within it.1... The presumption of law is the judgment of charity. It presumes that every man is innocent until he is proved guilty; *that everything has been done fairly and legally, until it has been proved otherwise*; and that every document, found in its proper repository, and not bearing the marks of forgery, is genuine. Now this is precisely the case with the Sacred Writings. They have been used in the church from time immemorial, and are thus found in the place where alone they ought to be looked for. They

come to us, and challenge our reception of them as genuine writings, precisely as Domesday Book, the Ancient Statutes of Wales, or any others of the ancient documents recently published, under the British Record Commission, are received. They are found in familiar use in all the churches of Christendom, as the sacred books to which all denominations of Christians refer, as the standard of their faith."

The contention of these critics is that their hypothesis of the alternation of the divine names will work on the Ancient Document the book of Genesis, but when they strike out from Genesis the clause "then shall Jehovah be my God," what is left is no longer the book of Genesis, on which that hypothesis is being tested, but by that expurgation it has become another and different book; different by the expurgation of the very matter which shows the hypotheses will not work. That the hypotheses will work on the expurgated relic is entirely immaterial. It cannot support in the least the contention of the critics, any more than would their showing that the hypothesis would work on a chapter in Josephus or on a fable of Æsop. To propose to a competent court that an hypothesis that would not work on a passage of Genesis as it is would work if the clause that prevented its working was stricken out, would not only make the proponent the laughing-stock of intelligent hearers, but, if persisted in, would receive merited rebuke from the court. Yet that is what these critics have succeeded in palming off as true, it seems, upon many in the ministry and many engaged in educational work. This expurgation from Genesis of Jacob's vow is only one of un-numbered instances of like changing the Bible record by these critics to make failures of their hypotheses to work appear to be successes.

We next consider the critics' contention No. 2, i.e., that, because a narrative can be partitioned, and two new ones be

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1 Testimony of Evangelists, pp. 7-8; Evidences, secs. 34, 142, 570.
manufactured from the severed parts, therefore, the original must have been composite, made from the two thus manufactured. The falsity of this contention of the critics has been demonstrated. Dr. Green has taken the parable spoken by Christ on the Prodigal Son, and demonstrated that by merely employing the methods (including use of redactor) of the critics, the language of the parable can be partitioned into two complete narratives, designated respectively A and B; agreeing in some points and disagreeing in others, and each having its special characteristics. We quote in part what Dr. Green shows is accomplished by the operation.

"... The only deficiencies are enclosed in parentheses, and may be readily explained as omissions by the redactor in effecting the combination. A clause must be supplied at the beginning of B, a subject is wanting in ver. 13b, and ver. 25b, and the verb 'said' is wanting in ver. 23. As these omissions occur exclusively in B, it may be inferred that the redactor placed A at the basis, and incorporated B into it with only such slight changes as were necessary to adapt it to this purpose.

"The differences are quite as striking as the points of agreement. A distinguishes the sons as elder and younger; B makes no mention of their relative ages. In A the younger obtained his portion by solic-

1 We regret that lack of space prevents our giving the entire parable as partitioned by Dr. Green. See his Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch, pp. 119–124; also The Bible Student and Teacher, May, 1907, vol. vi. pp. 355–359.


**A**

11. A certain man had two sons: 12. and the younger of them said to his father, Father give me the portion of thy substance that falleth to me.... 13. And not many days after the younger son gathered all together ... and there he wasted his substance with riotous living....

14b. and he began to be in want.

16b. And no man gave unto him.

**B**

(A certain man had two sons):

12b. and he divided unto them his living.

13b. And (one of them) took his journey into a far country.... 14. And when he had spent all, there arose a mighty famine in that country.... 15. And he went and joined himself to one of the citizens of that country; and he sent him into his fields to feed swine. 16. And he would fain have been filled with the husks that the swine did eat.
itation, and the father retained the remainder in his own possession; in B the father divided his property between both of his sons of his own motion. In A the prodigal remained in his father's neighborhood, and reduced himself to penury by riotous living; in B he went to a distant country and spent all his property, but there is no intimation that he indulged in unseemly excesses. It would rather appear that he was injudicious; and to crown his misfortunes there occurred a severe famine. His fault seems to have consisted in having gone so far away from his father and from the holy land, and in engaging in the unclean occupation of tending swine. In A the destitution seems to have been chiefly want of clothing; in B want of food. Hence in A the father directed the best robe and ring and shoes to be brought for him; in B the fatted calf was killed. In B the son came from a distant land, and the father saw him afar off; in A he came from the neighborhood, and the father ran at once and fell on his neck and kissed him. In B he had been engaged in a menial occupation and so bethought himself of his father's hired servants, and asked to be made a servant himself; in A he had been living luxuriously, and while confessing his unworthiness makes no request to be put on the footing of a servant. In A the father speaks of his son having been dead because of his profligate life; in B of his having been lost because of his absence in a distant land. In A, but not in B, the other son was displeased at the reception given to the prodigal. And here it would appear that R has slightly altered the text. The elder son must have said to his father in A, 'When this thy son came, which hath devoured thy substance with harlots, thou didst put on him the best robe.' The redactor has here substituted the B word 'living' for 'substance' which is used by A; and with the view of making a better contrast with 'kid' he has introduced the B phrase, 'thou killedst for him the fatted calf.'"

This illustrates the method of operation in manufacturing alleged parallel E and J narratives. It is not necessary to multiply illustrations, for this one cited, and a like analysis by Dr. Green of the parable of the Good Samaritan show the method and means by which critics effect partition of the Pentateuch, and how, in thus manufacturing alleged ante-Pentateuchal narratives, E and J, they themselves in the very process of manufacture produce alleged discrepancies and contradictions where none really exist, and where none could be created, had the writer of Genesis used one ancient narra-

\[1\] Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch, p. 122.
tive only, either oral or written, as a source in writing the book. It is the vice of manufacturing two or more narratives of the same matters of the Pentateuch that gives destructive critics the means and opportunity to imagine, conceive, create, and deduce alleged divergencies, contradictions, and destructive conclusions, with which they attack the verity of the Bible. This may explain why the critics hold so tenaciously to their theory of parallel narratives of sources of the Pentateuch. Higher critics treat parallel documents as witnesses. One says, "How blind to what we might learn from the divergencies of our witnesses the man who can do no better than to hurry to the rescue with the harmonistic suggestion."¹ This they do, by simply sundering what properly belong together. A method of critical analysis that can be made, by the critics' manipulation, to prove everything, even a literary unit, a parable of Christ, to be composite, is thereby condemned. It demonstrates that such method of analysis cannot be trusted or allowed as a means or method to prove anything.

By the critics' proposition or hypothesis No. 3, they contend that they account for what, they assert, imperatively demands explanation, viz., phenomenal alternate occurrences of the divine names Elohim and Jehovah in the Pentateuch: and that they thereby further support their contention of the preexistence of the alleged E and J narratives, as parallel sources of that portion of the Bible. In the early part of Genesis (the first five chapters) we find conspicuous instances of alternate occurrence of the divine names, but not afterwards.

In juridical science, an hypothesis is a theory proposed in explanation of facts or phenomena in a case.² But, as hereto-

¹ B. W. Bacon, The Sermon on the Mount, p. 73.
² Anderson, Law Lexicon, p. 519.
fore noted, an hypothesis is not admissible and has no value,—is not admissible in administering jurisprudence,—unless it excludes every other explanation of the phenomena and excludes every other hypothesis but the one proposed and under consideration. Hence this contention No. 3 of the critics involves the primary inquiry whether the alternation of the divine names in the Pentateuch, even in the first five chapters of Genesis, is phenomenal in fact or whether, on the contrary, the situation, conditions, and subject-matter recorded, and the relation of Deity thereto, and the literary character of the record do not rationally and fully account for, and explain, all alternating occurrences of the divine names.

Bible students, including extreme critics, agree in discovering a discrimination in usage in the Bible between the names Elohim and Jehovah. "God Elohim denotes the Divine Being in his relation to the universe at large, as creator, preserver and governor of all his creatures and all their actions." In the other relation, "Jehovah denotes God as he reveals himself to man, especially in grace."

The Bible record exhibits the discrimination by usage—the usage of the writer in employing for record one or the other divine name according as one or the other name as so discriminated was related to the subject-matter being recorded. But, as the relation of Deity to such subject-matter was not always one only of those aspects, but sometimes involved that of both, either was used or both divine names were recorded together, according to the subject-matter successively, as seen in the record.

The question recurs, Is there any other explanation of the

1 J. D. Davis, Bible Dictionary, p. 565. In line with this, see Driver, Introduction, p. 13; Kuenen, Hexateuch, p. 56; Orr, Prob. of the Old Test, p. 225; Green, Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch, p. 105.
alternate use of the names Elohim and Jehovah in the Penta
tateuch, except the hypothesis of the critics, that it was caused by embodying in it alternate sections from the alleged E and J narratives? If any other explanation is established, it repudiates the critics' hypothesis. Biblical writers, in classifying periods covered by the Pentateuch, set off the period from creation to the birth of Noah, embraced in the first five chapters of Genesis, as "The Antediluvian Age, Gen. i.–v." 1 Genesis of that period is not full history of the time, but records a series of episodes plus one unique chapter of genealogy.

The first chapter of Genesis and the first three verses of the second chapter record the episode of Creation. It names six successive creation periods, in each of which mighty acts of creation were wrought. During all the time occupied in these creation periods, until the sixth period, there was no human being in existence to whom God could appear as "Jehovah"—God of revelation and grace. The relation of Deity to the Creation Episode was specifically that of Creator (Elohim). The subject-matter and conditions recorded, and the relation of God to them, suggested as the appropriate divine name, Elohim, and Elohim is used throughout. This rationally and fully accounts for the use of Elohim in this episode, and we can confidently say that that is all there is of it.

The next episode is Genesis ii. 4–25; that which records the planting of a garden by God, his installing man in it, and starting man on his career to subdue to man's use the powers God had set in the world, and to attain and establish moral character, such as should fit man to apprehend, love, commune, and covenant with Jehovah. This last was to be

1 Green, Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch, p. 30.
accomplished by test and trial of man, his meeting temptation to disobey, but overcoming and obeying because his Creator (Elohim) so commanded. The subject-matter of this episode, and the relation of Deity to it, rationally required the discriminating name Jehovah, and with literary appropriateness the record has Jehovah throughout that episode. But the episode embraces also the apprehension of Deity as Creator, which shows him rightful lawgiver for man. Both aspects of Deity are here distinctly related to the subject-matter; both names are suggested, and Elohim is added to Jehovah all through this episode. But this is not all. The name Elohim is added to Jehovah in apposition. Apposition is the addition of a parallel word or phrase by way of explanation or illustration of another. This accords with the situation and seems reasonably to justify adding the name Elohim to Jehovah in this episode. The rhetorical use of apposition is distinctive in Hebrew literature, as shown in Psalms, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, etc. This prominent element of apposition in Hebrew literature might be deemed sufficient alone to account for the addition of Elohim to Jehovah in this episode. So, too, does the subject-matter and the relation of Deity to it. Again we say confidently that the use of the divine names together (Jehovah Elohim) in the second episode is clearly accounted for by the subject-matter and condition recorded, and the relation of Deity thereto, and no hypothesis is required or permissible to explain it.

The next episode (Gen. iii.) is that of the temptation of Adam and Eve, their failure, and God's dealing with that failure. As literature, the record of this episode consists of dialogue and narration. The duty of one recording dialogue is to record the names the speakers use, in the dialogue, verbatim et literatim. It is quotation. The writer, the
editor, does not select the words, but records the selection of names made by participants in the dialogue.\footnote{1} Genesis is an Ancient Document, and the legal presumption is that the record of the dialogue in the document has thus been made correctly,\footnote{2} and there is no evidence to the contrary. This record begins with dialogue. The tempter, called Serpent, employs the name Elohim in the dialogue with Eve, and Eve uses Elohim in her replies. That accounts for the use of Elohim in that connection. The narrative part of the chapter has the divine names again in apposition (Jehovah Elohim). The subject-matter is the command of "Jehovah Elohim" of chapter ii.; disobedience by Adam and Eve, and the penalty therefor. This episode grew out of the episode recorded in chapter ii. and is directly connected with it. The subject-matter, conditions, and the relation of Deity to them and dialogue, fully explain this employment of the divine names as recorded in this episode, and no hypothesis is required or juridically admissible in the matter.

The next episode records the birth of Cain and Seth, the worship by Cain and Abel; the murder of Abel, and God's judgment upon Cain (Gen. iv.). The record here embraces monologue and narration. The recorder's duty regarding monologue is identical with his duty in recording dialogue, i. e., to record the names the speaker uses. The legal presump-

\footnote{1} In his Notes Critical and Practical on Genesis, Professor George Bush considers and accounts for the observable variances in the use of the divine names which he seems to have found only in the first five chapters of Genesis, for he names each of those and no others, and notes in explanation of those variances the distinction in composition between narration and recording personal discourse, dialogue, or monologue and states the rule, "When a quotation is made, then, as the fidelity of history requires, the name used by the person introduced as speaker is inserted" (vol. i. p. xxxiv).

\footnote{2} Greenleaf, Evidence, p. 22.
tion is that the duty was here performed correctly and there is no evidence to the contrary. At the beginning of the chapter upon the birth of Cain, Eve said, "I have gotten me a man from Jehovah," and that name is continued in narrative to verse 25, at the end of the chapter. At the birth of Seth, Eve, speaking in the first person, says, "For Elohim hath appointed me another seed instead of Abel, whom Cain slew" (ver. 25). Monologue accounts for those alternations of the divine names. The choosing the names was the choice of Eve, not the selection of the writer or editor of Genesis. In the narrative part of the record of this episode the divine name Jehovah is employed, following its use by Eve. The relation of Deity to the subject-matter suggested the name Jehovah, which regards him as receiving worship from man and dealing with men as Ruler and Preserver. The situation, conditions, and subject-matter, the relation of Deity to them, and monologue, fully account for the alternation of the divine names in this chapter.

The next chapter (Gen. v.) is the unique combination of genealogy and chronology during the Antediluvian Age. The chapter begins with the creation of Adam, and appropriately continues the name Elohim spoken by Eve in preceding chapters. "Enoch walked with Elohim" and "was not, for Elohim took him." The relation of Deity to the subject-matter was that of Elohim (Creator), and Elohim is retained. But when the genealogy comes to the birth of Noah, the record again has monologue. Lamech the father, speaking in the first person, calls his son's name "Noah," saying, "This same shall comfort us concerning our work and toil of our hands because of the ground Jehovah has cursed." The legal presumption is that the divine name quoted in the monologue was chosen by Lamech, and not by the writer of Genesis, and
was truly recorded, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Here again the subject-matter, condition, and relation of Deity to the matters involved and monologue fully and rationally account for the alternation of the divine names in this chapter, as we have now seen they do in every episode in the Antediluvian Age. There is neither need nor permissible place for the critics' hypothesis to account for the alternations.

The importance of this explanation of the cause of alternation of divine names in the record will appear more vividly perhaps if we consider the significant fact that the alternations caused by quoting names used by speakers in dialogue or monologue is *double* the number occurring in narration.  

Nowhere else in the Bible do we find any such apparently phenomenal series of instances of alternation of the divine names as are found in the first five chapters of Genesis. It justifies the conclusion that, had it not been for such apparently phenomenal alternation of the names in the Antediluvian

1. Gen. ii. 4 from “Elohim” to “Jehovah Elohim” in narration.
2. Gen. iii. 1 from “Jehovah Elohim” to “Elohim” in dialogue.
3. Gen. iii. 8 from “Elohim” to “Jehovah Elohim” in narration.
5. Gen. v. 25 from “Jehovah” to “Elohim” in monologue.

Change of divine names caused by quoting names used by speakers in dialogue or monologue, 4; occurring in narration, 2.

This is approximately the ratio throughout the Pentateuch. A rapid scrutiny of Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers disclosed one hundred and forty changes of divine names caused by quoting names used by speakers in such discourse, and eighty changes occurring in narration, a ratio of 7 to 4.

Deuteronomy (excepting the last chapter) is monologue throughout. It begins, “These are the words Moses spake,” and so continues. The name Moses uses is “Jehovah thy Elohim,” with appropriate inflections of the pronoun. In some eight instances when Elohim is used alone, as in ch. iv. 33, 34, it is still used in monologue. The last chapter is narration of termination of Moses’ life, and employs the divine name Jehovah only.
period, we should never have heard of the critics' partition theory, or of the alleged E, J, et al. narratives as parallel sources of the Pentateuch.

To one who looks no deeper into matters embraced in the Antediluvian record than to merely count the number of alternations of divine names, those alternations may seem phenomenal. But when they are considered in connection with the situation,—quoted dialogue, monologue, subject-matter, and the relation of Deity to what is there recorded,—there is nothing phenomenal in the frequent alternations of names there seen. That frequency is rationally and completely accounted for by the conditions and subject-matter recorded and the relation of Deity thereto, as well as by recording the names speakers used in dialogue and monologue. Such thorough examination of the subject-matter recorded, the relations of Deity to it, and of the literary character of the record is merely the application of the Scientific Method of examination to the record, and what is embraced in it. That method, carried through the Pentateuch, will, and does, explain every other instance of alternation of the divine names throughout the whole.¹

The limits of this article preclude continuing such test to other instances in the remainder of the Pentateuch, and it is not necessary, for the tests can be applied successfully by any one sufficiently interested to be thorough.

¹ See all instances of alternation of the divine names in Genesis examined by Dr. Green, in his Unity of Genesis.