ARTICLE IV.

'ΑΓΑΠΑΩ AND ΦΙΛΕΩ:
(A SUGGESTION FOR JOHN XXI. 15–17.)

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I.

It is a well-known fact that two different verbs meaning 'to love,' are found in the last recorded conversation of Peter and Jesus. Of the reason for their use much has been written and more has been said. That the two verbs differed somewhat in their signification is the general consensus of opinion; but no practical agreement has ever been reached as to what the difference really was. The explanations that have been offered, as found in the commentators, are widely divergent, in appearance at least; and some have accordingly concluded that the words, as they appear in the text, involved no real difference of meaning. One scholar, being convinced that some have indulged in "wild guessing" in this connection, has undertaken to prove that the words were really synonymous. (See Vol. xlvi. pp. 524–542.)

But even if it were generally agreed that the words did not differ in their content and that their combined use in this passage was merely an accident, would it not still be possible that such a solution, convenient as it undoubtedly is, might itself not be entirely free from the guessing element? To begin with, it would plainly ignore the fact that the words of Jesus, as they stand, appear to form a distinct anticlimax; and it would also ignore the additional fact that the use of the two
verbs is evidently intentional, since the form employed is that of a direct quotation.

Two of Peter's replies are alike. The third, due to his agitation, differs quite decidedly, in certain important particulars, from the other two. His grief at the third question is thus described:—

εὐπνήθη ὁ Πέτρος δι᾽ εἶπεν αὐτῷ τὸ τρίτον φιλεῖς με;

after which it says: "And (καὶ) he said (εἶπεν 1) unto him," etc. (see below), thus plainly connecting his third answer with his distress. Was the mere repetition of the question a sufficient cause for his pain, or for the evident vehemence of his last protestation?

The three questions read as follows:—

1. (λέγει) Σὺμων Ἰωάνου, ἀγαπάξ με πλέον τούτων;
2. (λέγει) Σὺμων Ἰωάνου, ἀγαπάξ με;
3. (λέγει) Σὺμων Ἰωάνου, φιλεῖς με;

Peter's replies are:—

1. (λέγει) Ναὶ, Κύριε, σὺ οἶδας δι᾽ ὁμίλῳ σε.
2. (λέγει) Ναὶ, Κύριε, σὺ οἶδας δι᾽ ὁμίλῳ σε.
3. (εἶπε) Κύριε, πάντα σὺ οἶδας, σὺ γυνώσκεις δι᾽ ὁμίλῳ σε.

Christ's corresponding admonitions are:—

1. (λέγει) Βῶσε τὰ ἄρνια μου.
2. (λέγει) Πολλαπλασά τὰ προβατία μου.
3. (λέγει) Βῶσε τὰ προβατία μου.

If it was merely accidental, the use of two verbs in this brief dialogue was certainly peculiar; and, if the two words were really synonymous, the example is one of the most unique in literature. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the

1 To facilitate linotyping, an approximate transliteration has been freely used. It is sufficiently exact for practical purposes. The text used is that of Westcott and Hort.
question from a new angle in the hope that it may throw some light on the difficulty. If the method used has ever been employed before, the author has no knowledge of it.

What is meant by love? While this is not an easy matter to determine, an approximate answer is possible. Man is a composite,—a combination of body, soul, and spirit,—and all that he does and feels is more or less complex. His motives are usually mixed, and the skein is often hard to unravel. It remains true, however, that the physical can be distinguished from the intellectual, and that these, in turn, can be distinguished from the spiritual. The three may sometimes blend into a composite whole; but the constituent elements can still be recognized, even if they cannot be sharply differentiated. The point may be made more clear with the help of an illustration drawn from the solar spectrum.

A ray of sunlight is white and is apparently a unit. And yet a prism divides it into seven elements. Of these, three are known as the primary colors; namely,—red, yellow, and indigo. The red and yellow blend into orange, the yellow and indigo into green and blue, and the indigo and red into violet. It is impossible to say exactly where one begins and the other ends; but the three principal tones, the red and the yellow and the indigo, are plain and unmistakable, to all, at least, who are not color blind. In a similar way the acts and feelings of men, although apparently simple, are in reality complex; but they may be capable of analysis by means of some appropriate prism.

Love is peculiarly susceptible to treatment along these lines; for it is clear that it contains three elements, one physical, one intellectual, and one spiritual. As the different elements predominate, the character of the love changes. The love of

1 Usually called blue. See below.
husband and wife should correspond to the pure ray of light, white and perfectly blended. It should have all the elements combined in their due proportion. If the figure is carried out, other kinds of love may be said to show their own characteristic colors. Love on the physical plane may thus be compared to the red of the spectrum, love on the intellectual plane to the yellow, and love on the spiritual plane to the indigo.

As the colors of the spectrum shade into one another, so do these forms of love; and it is often hard to determine where each element begins and where it leaves off. As the red which blends with the indigo in the solar spectrum becomes invisible and the fact that there is such a blending is lost sight of, so the physical and the spiritual elements of love may sometimes strangely blend and the fact may escape notice. The distinctive color, or characteristic, is clear, however, in either case.

Love on the physical plane is a narrow and selfish thing. It is necessarily restricted; for it originates with passion and may degenerate into lust. Love on the intellectual plane is broader and higher and is of a totally different character. It may be selfish; but it is usually not conspicuously so. It is the love of friendship. Love on the spiritual plane is the broadest and highest of all. It is characteristically unselfish and it defies limits and bounds. Here must be grouped all self sacrificing love of whatever sort; for here and here alone can such love be found. It rises above the intellectual and it so far transcends the physical that it overcomes natural antipathy and conquers disgust and even loathing. The offensive leper and the unfortunate victim of many another repulsive disease would perish unheeded but for this form of love. It makes possible a kindly benevolence toward our enemies, and it radiates good will to all God's creatures. It is the "love" so beautifully described in 1 Cor. xiii.
For purposes of comparison, it may be allowable to represent the physical type by the letter \( A \), the intellectual type by the letter \( B \), and the spiritual type by the letter \( C \). \( A \) may degenerate into the purely animal; \( C \) may rise to the exaltation of the Seraphim; \( B \) lies between the two extremes. Concentric circles extending outward at appropriate distances from the center, which may be used to indicate self, or an inverted pyramid rising upward in appropriate sections from the apex, which may also be used to indicate self, will serve fairly well to illustrate the interrelation of the various types, although either diagram will be defective; for the \( B \) type does not necessarily separate the other two, and fixed and definite boundaries are impossible. The two extremes may combine with no apparent intermixture of the \( B \) element, although the resulting combination is by no means one to be desired. It may be compared to the violet of the spectrum. See below.

Sentimentality, jealousy, suspicion, and constant bickerings, are natural outgrowths from such a mixture. Without the steadying influence of the \( B \) element, conjugal love is a failure; and yet in the love of the sexes this element is apt to be ignored. The other two are thus made conspicuous, as in Tennyson's lines from "Locksley Hall":

\[
\text{"Many an evening by the waters did we watch the stately ships,}
\text{And our spirits rushed together at the touching of the lips."}
\]

This will have its application later on in connection with certain uses of words signifying 'to love.'

That these three forms or types of love exist, no one can deny. They must be instantly recognized by all, as soon as attention is called to them, provided the observers are not color blind, so to speak, in these matters. That the types will be mixed in real life and that they will often be confused with
one another must be self evident. So long as human nature is what it is, no other condition of things is possible. A nice use of terms is not a prevailing virtue as yet in human society; but a loose use, on the other hand, although it is so common, is not usually a correct one. Such a use, moreover, never really destroys the inherent capacity of words for fine discriminations, until such time as the sense of the original is hopelessly lost. "Aggravate" is constantly employed colloquially in the sense of 'tease,' or 'annoy,' and this meaning of the word is recognized in standard authorities. No one, however, will assume on this ground that "aggravate" and "tease" are synonomous, unless he is painfully ignorant of the facts. It is possible to go even further. Accurate users of words have no real synonyms. They select their terms with care and mean exactly what they say.

When Mrs. Johnson exclaimed: "Why, Dr. Johnson, I am surprised!" he turned from the maid whom he had been caught kissing and said: "No, my Dear, you are amazed. I am the one that is surprised." The point of the remark is self-evident. Her use of the word was a common and a well-established one; but his fine discrimination made the true sense of the "synonyms" simple and clear. When thus brought together and used as he used them, they do not and cannot mean the same thing.

A similar statement may be made concerning the words "like" and "love," which are loosely spoken of as synonyms. When any one says that Mary "likes William and Peter, but she loves Joseph"; it is safe to say that the most ignorant of English-speaking persons will recognize at once that there is a distinct difference in her feelings in the two cases. He will do so, even if he is himself in the habit of saying, "I love cake," or "I love ice cream," or "I love ham." It is even
safe to assert that a mere child will feel the difference clearly and correctly, although it may be impossible for him to define it.  

To assume the opposite is to show a decided lack of knowledge of the working of untrained minds. The common people recognize primary colors with a precision that is astounding to the uninitiated. In this they resemble children, who are apt to go to the root of a matter with a directness that is little short of the unerring accuracy of instinct. Where there is a lack of precise knowledge, the feeling for a word is often intensified. A ward heeler will smile at such terms as "ballot-stuffer," "ruffian," "repeater," "tough," and "villain"; but tell him that he is "no gentleman," and he will be apt to prove it on the spot with his fists. The word gentleman, in all probability, he could not possibly define with accuracy; but he has a vague idea of what it means, and its significance is intensified accordingly.

Young people who have been guilty of bad manners will admit it readily. They have been known, however, to become furious over such a statement as this:—"What happened last night might have been taken as an insult. It was not so intended. It was merely an evidence of a lack of good breeding." These words, spoken calmly and deliberately, had a stinging effect simply because the exact meaning of the expression, "a lack of good breeding," was beyond the ken of the persons referred to. They had a faint idea only, and they were therefore more seriously disturbed.

The same general principle may be carried still further, as it was on one occasion by Daniel O'Connell, who utilized it to silence for once the famous Biddy Moriarty. Such epithets

A boy of eight and another of ten did so recognize it when questioned.
as, "Heartless old heptagon," "whisky drinking parallelogram," "old diagonal," "convicted perpendicular," "porter-swiping similitude or the bisection of a vortex," etc., were quite beyond her own powers of vituperation; and, being entirely unable to do justice to the occasion, she gave it up. Her very inability to fathom the words made them overwhelming. It is not safe, however, to infer that a person has no true feeling for words which he cannot define. His feeling for them may surpass, at times, that of others who can define them, and in some instances his usage may actually be more accurate than theirs. The great masters of English have not always been scholars; but they have always had a wonderful sensitiveness for words, although many of them have known comparatively little of etymology or of the history of the language.

It is a dangerous thing to take a word out of its environment and attempt to define it. This may be regarded as axiomatic. A word's meaning depends upon what its user puts into it. But it is unsafe to assume that he puts no more into it than he can define. It is at this point that the feeling for words manifests itself. It may even take a scholar to explain to a man what he himself means; but, when this is correctly done, he will recognize the fact. A choice diction is not always a mark of education. Some of the greatest scholars have had a wretched style, while others who have come up from the ranks have excelled in this particular. "Sprachgefühl" is a gift. It is not primarily a result of training. Training is necessary; but no amount of training can supply a natural lack of capacity for such things. There are men who cannot take regular steps in walking. Their rhythmical sense is defective, and their gait shows it. Others cannot help taking regular steps; for their whole being is attuned to rhythm.
Such phenomena must be allowed for by all broad minded persons. Although he was a great scholar, the style of Archbishop Trench does not compare favorably with that of Rudyard Kipling or with that of Jack London. The bearing of these facts will be apparent below.

If due allowance is made for the effect of the personal equation in all such matters, can it be said that language has recognized the three great sub-divisions or kinds of love? Undoubtedly it can. What but the $A$ type can be referred to by the word "passion"? Where can "friendship" be placed, if not in the $B$ class? And where does the "love" of 1 Cor. xiii. belong, unless in the great $C$ division? Omitting others, the corresponding Greek words are,—

$\delta\rho\omega\ (\delta\rho\omega)\quad \phiιλ\lambda\ (\phiιλ\epsilon\omega)\quad \alpha\gamma\acute{\eta}\ (\alpha\gammaαπ\tau\omega)$

Passion is plainly due to some physical attractiveness. Neither the intellect nor the soul has control in the feeling. It is a question of body primarily. Love that can be called passion apart from a body is unthinkable. Such love must be capable of becoming purely animal in its degenerate state, and it is therefore on the physical plane. Its range is narrow, and, if proper care is used, it can always be recognized.

When it comes to friendship ($\phiιλ\iota\alpha$), definition is less easy. The feeling referred to is not confined to friends in the strict sense of the word. In a strange land it is aroused by the presence of a fellow countryman. In a strange state a man from the same part of the country is enough to call it into being, especially if he happens to be a fellow townsman. Men of the same race feel it for one another, as do members of the same fraternity and graduates from the same school. Co-religionists entertain the same kindly regard for one another, and it is evident that its basis must be some kind of a fellow feeling. Men who think and feel alike on any subject are naturally
drawn together by this kind of an attachment. The physical has little to do with it, as has also the spiritual. Both of these elements, especially the latter, may be present in some degree; but they do not dominate. It is chiefly a matter of intellectual similarities, of kindred likes and dislikes, and of harmonious tastes and viewpoints.

When love (*agape*), in the exalted sense, is meant, definition becomes yet more difficult; and it is perhaps impossible to improve on Paul's wonderful description of its characteristics. Its sweep is too vast for ordinary words; and the investigator is lost in the labyrinth of its possibilities. It is akin to devotion, or even to adoration, on one side, and to benevolence, or even pity, on another. In one of its forms it is the love of a mother for her erring child. In another, it is the kindly interest which a benevolent man takes in his foe. It expresses God's love for human beings, their love for Him, and the Christian's love for the heathen. All that is deep and pure and unselfish in what is called love may be regarded as on this plane. For that reason definitions of an apparently conflicting nature may be given of this type of love without really transcending its bounds. There are other possibilities also; but they must be left for the present.

Love of the *A* and *B* types can be easily and sharply differentiated. In both Greek and English this is usually done. It is not always, however. Not only in newspaper parlance but even in literature the word friend will occasionally be met with employed as a synonym for "paramour." Such a usage is recognized in standard authorities; but it is plainly a euphemism, and the words are by no means synonymous. There is nothing immoral in friendship, and the word carries no such suggestion in any of its meanings. Its use in such a connection is plainly a cloak for what the writer wishes either to obscure
or to ignore. As a colloquialism the usage is too low to be considered. A similar phenomenon may be observed in Greek; but it is the verbs rather than the nouns that are affected. See, however, below.

A rare use of this kind may in time become so common as to influence the meaning of a word unfavorably. In the days of King James the word love had sunk so low that it was not deemed advisable to use it for the *agape* of 1 Cor. xiii., and the English equivalent of Latin *caritas*, ‘regard,’ ‘esteem,’ ‘loving favor,’ was accordingly employed. This term, “charity,” has now become narrow and technical, and “love” is coming back into its own. The word *agape* has had a similar history, as is indicated by its use in modern Greek. The reason is not far to seek. It is to be found in the natural limitations and associations of words.

In courtship neither *eros* nor *philias* was available. The latter, indeed, might imply kissing; but it was mostly kissing of a conventional sort and presumably between members of the same sex. As such, it meant little more than is now involved in a hand shake. “Friendship” is no word for a lover. But if *philias* was too distant a word, *eros* was quite the opposite. Its associations were immoral, and it could be appropriately used only among the vile or the *Hetairai*. It would have been little short of an insult to use it as a means of expressing a lover’s feelings. *Agape* alone was left, and *agape* was accordingly employed. English usage has so many points in common that the reason should be clear.

Among the Greeks marriage was usually arranged on a business basis, a method which is hardly conducive to an ideal union; and “husband” and “lover” were not necessarily embodied in a single person. The “lover” would naturally

1 Other words of a similar meaning were in use, though not available.
insist that his feeling was *agape*, although it might be patent to the rest of the world that it was *eros*. The natural consequence was a gradual degradation of the former word. In English the time was when “love child” was a common expression for an infant born out of wedlock. It registered a certain sad truth with respect to conventional marriages; but it also had a demoralizing effect both upon the word love and upon its users.

That the Greeks fully recognized the underlying truth is attested by the words which they used for a lover. It had reference to love of the *A* type only. No other kind of love was known to them, or to any people of their time. No other kind could be known. The conception of a lover actuated by a genuine *agape* was foreign to their thoughts, and no such word from this base was in use. The thing itself did not exist. A lover, therefore, could not be named in this way until it did, or until the word *agape* had sunk to the level of their experience. This much should be clear; for they were the founders of art and of literature, and their feeling for language has seldom been equaled in the history of mankind. This fact is attested by almost every page of their written works.

A true marriage includes the whole of love; but true marriages are not as common as they might be. Some one element is apt to predominate, and that one element is too often of the *A* type. If it were not, divorce would be less frequent. A genuine *agape* never leads in that direction, and the *B* element has no such outcome. Our proverbs bear witness to the truth of these statements. “Love that has only beauty to keep it in health is sure to be short lived and is apt to have fits.” Certainly; for it is of the *A* type. It lacks stability. The kindly sympathy of friendship and the unselfish

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*Σπαρτής. A friend was a φίλος (φίλη).*
devotion of a true agape are necessary as adjuncts, if the union is to last. Schiller is right when he sings ("Das Lied von der Glocke"):—

"Die Liedenschaft fleht,
Die Liebe muss bleib'n;
Die Blume verbliht,
Die Frucht muss treib'n."

Again, "Love me little, love me long." This too is sound; for it implies a large proportion of the B type and little of the restless A. It also precludes an inordinate or distorted C element; for the C element can be perverted, just as caution can degenerate into cowardice, or self love into selfishness.

"Friendship sometimes leads to love, love to friendship never." This cannot be agape, and it must be approximately eros, or some form of love strongly tinged with the A element. Friendship of the deepest and best sort may develop from what was originally merely an external but a thoroughly kindly interest. Such an interest may be classified as agape. Love of the A type leads to jealousy, murder, suicide, and other crimes. The C type cannot do this. Its whole nature is contrary to these things. The ignorant and degraded seldom rise above the A type. The base never do. In most men the types are mixed in varying proportions. This becomes apparent in married life. Some men are devoted to their wives, some make "chums" of them; some admire their beauty and only that, some share all their business secrets with them; some make slaves or playthings of them; some look upon them as really their "better halves"; and some regard them and treat them as equals, no more, no less.

Here may be found ample grounds for a loose use of the word love. In spite of this fact, however, its constituent
elements may still be perceived. Red and yellow and indigo, if mixed in varying proportions, together or in pairs, will blend into different shades or different colors. The artist, however, knows how the final result originated, and he can tell its constituent parts. It is so with love. Its primary tones can be distinguished in the composite whole, and those skilled in such matters can analyze the form, whatever it may be. A form may be incorrectly classified, as must be apparent even to a casual observer. Its strongest characteristic will determine its approximate type; but, because of the limitations of language, there will sometimes be unsatisfactory features involved in the classification. The natural affection of kindred is something more than friendship and it is remote from passion. It must therefore be called love; but some other term might be more exact if it were available.

Such instances are common; for language is not a perfect instrument. As a single note must answer for the sharps and flats on a piano, so a single word must often suffice for things which really differ. Minute detail must be ignored to avoid unwieldiness. Out of this fact grow certain ambiguities in language, as well as many opportunities for misinterpretation. Here again the solar spectrum may be helpful. The primary colors are ordinarily given as red, yellow, and blue; but indigo combined with a little yellow becomes blue, which in turn combines with yellow into green. Indigo and yellow, suitably proportioned, will produce green, while indigo and red will combine into purple or violet.¹

"Blue," then, includes both shades,—the blue proper and the indigo. No distinction is made, because the blue is not analyzed into shades by the ordinary observer. A single word

¹These statements can be verified by means of the Clerk Maxwell tops or better yet by mixing colored inks.
1907.]

Agapao and Phileo.

is therefore made to do duty for two closely associated things. Words expressing love are often used in a similar way. It is the simplest method of meeting a difficulty. When Socrates inquired of Theodote where she got her support from, she replied (Xenophon, Mem. III. xi. 4):

'Edv τις φίλος μοι γενόμενος εὗ τοιείν ἐθέλη, οὗτος μοι βίος ἐστι.

This is a euphemistic use of φιλος, and yet the word was meant to retain much of its original force.

In a passage of the Septuagint (Prov. v. 19), philia is used of conjugal love. Eros was out of the question; for it implied the very kind of love that was under condemnation. Agape would have been euphemistic and therefore suggestive of wrong doing. Philia alone was left, and it came the nearest to expressing the underlying thought with its suggestion of 'cherishing.' Philia was accordingly employed.\(^1\) The use of words in such passages is rarely the result of a deliberate and careful weighing of terms. It is rather the outcome of an instinctive feeling that this or that word best conveys the thought. The reasoning, so far as there is any, is often subconscious, and there is no occasion to suppose that this passage is any different in this particular from many others. All that is necessarily involved, is a fair degree of sensitiveness to the requirements of language on the part of the Septuagint translators. The accuracy of their feeling for words is tested by their use of them, when they come to be weighed in the light of reason.

From these considerations it must be clear that counting statistics can never determine the meaning of a word in any particular instance. Red and green and brown may appear to be alike to a man who is color blind; but those who have per-

\(^1\) Φιλος had certain unhallowed associations which forbade its use. It meant 'friendship,' however, as well as 'affection.'
fect vision know that they are not the same. Statistics may seem to show that words are synonymous, provided a surface view is taken; but a deeper look will soon dissipate such a notion. The background and the environment of the word, as well as its fundamental meaning, must be taken into the account. Snap judgment has no place in such matters. It may seem to afford an easy way out of a difficulty; but it is not accurate, and it never really settles anything.

It so happened that there was no occasion for the use of *eros*, *erao*, and *erastes* in the New Testament. For this reason they are not found. In addition to what has been said of the last of these words, it may be remarked in passing that so long as *agape* retained any of its exalted meaning such a conception as an *agapetes* was impossible, especially in a passionate race like the Greeks. It is not enough to say that the agent noun from *erao* sufficed, and that no other noun was needed. No other noun was possible, under the prevailing conditions, without a clear perversion of language; and the Greeks were far too artistic to blunder in such a matter. In this whole field it will be found that they selected with unerring accuracy the root best adapted for use in any given case and made their words accordingly. Analogy had its usual influence; but language will cease to be language when phenomena of this kind disappear.

As *philos*, when used as a substantive, meant primarily, 'a dear one,' it is clear that the corresponding verb must have occupied a similar sphere. It appears to have meant originally, 'to cherish,' 'hold dear,' 'regard with loving favor.' It then seems to have acquired a secondary meaning, 'to treat kindly,' 'welcome,' 'express loving favor for.' The verb thus had

1 The word is properly an adjective signifying 'dear.' It is so used in Homer.
two well defined senses,—‘to love as a friend’ and ‘to treat as a friend.’ As a kiss was the conventional way of showing friendship, it was but a short step to the implied signification, ‘to kiss.’ In this last sense and in this alone it has survived in modern Greek.

This fact of itself is sufficient to show that *phileo* and *agapao* were never true synonyms. If they had ever become so, one of them (*phileo*) would have perished entirely instead of surviving in a perfectly distinct sense. No such meaning as ‘to kiss’ was ever associated with *agapao*. If it had any relationship with other Greek words, it was probably connected in some way with a verb signifying ‘to admire.’ Whatever may have been its history, it is clear that it was used to express the idea of loving where the basis was something more than the physical attractiveness indicated by *erao* and also something more than the good fellowship of *phileo*. Like any other word, it must have been sometimes misapplied; and, like any other word, it must have been frequently used where it imperfectly expressed the thought, no better word being available.

If its fundamental signification was suggestive of admiration, it is easy to see why *agape* was a lover’s word. It would thus suggest not only the unselfish $C$ type of love but also something of the $B$ and whatever of good there was in the $A$ type. Figuratively speaking, it would cover all the blue of the love spectrum, including the blue-green and the violet. The presence of the red element in the last form would not be conspicuous and it would therefore not be offensive. In

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1 The meaning ‘to kiss’ was not Homeric. Cf. “Il.” xxiv. 478; “Od.” xxi. 224; etc., where he uses χυστεία.

2 ἀγαπαῖ.
the autumn the violet of the rainbow is sometimes so pronounced that it actually obscures the blue. In a similar way the agape of a lover may have sometimes so asserted its violet character that the true color of agape, blue, was almost forgotten. Such temporary variations are distracting; but they should never be allowed to obscure the truth.

That they are allowed to obscure it is unfortunate; but it is nevertheless true. Men are prone to surface views, and it is easy to judge by appearances without looking for the deeper things which really govern in every phase of life. It is for this reason that so many details have been necessary in preparing the way for a consideration of the facts concerning the passage under discussion. There is a trite saying to the effect that figures won't lie but statistics will. Any view of the statistical kind must therefore be accepted with caution. But so must every view which does not consider all the possibilities in any given case. It has accordingly seemed best, even at the risk of becoming somewhat wearisome, to refer briefly to these many sides of the subject in hand, which are necessarily involved, although the fact may not be apparent at the start.

Violet would doubtless have represented the true meaning of this word, if it had been confined to a lover's use. It was not so confined. It appears first in the Septuagint, and it properly meant, 'love,' as opposed to passion,—'brotherly,' or 'unselfish love.'

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]