THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

ARTICLE I.

THE INVASION OF SENNACHERIB.

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[The great length of Professor Fullerton's very able and scholarly article interferes somewhat with the variety desirable in the make-up of the present Number. But the danger of his position's being misunderstood at the conclusion of the first half of the discussion, and the desirability of massing the Notes at the end of the article, render it unwise to divide it, especially as this is the end of the volume.—The Editor.]

Two recent monographs upon Sennacherib's invasion of Judah ᵅ remind us, in their widely divergent views, that the problems which cluster about this Assyrian Waterloo still wait for an authoritative solution. But was it a Waterloo? First impressions have always the disadvantage of immaturity. On the other hand, they may reflect the self-evident facts of a passage more accurately because they were not as yet blurred by a mass of subordinate details. May I be permitted to sum up the impressions which a first study of the biblical and Assyriological material bearing upon the question just asked has made, and offer a suggestion or two, which may have a bearing upon the ultimate answer? Whether or not the suggestions will commend themselves, it is at least worth while to attempt a more precise formulation of the problems involved than has been done, so far as I know, by our English and American writers.

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I. The first impression made upon me is not a pleasant one. It is that the biblical narrative of Sennacherib's invasion in its present form is unintelligible and self-contradictory (I use unqualified language to correspond with the definiteness of the impression). According to 2 Kings xviii. 13–16, Sennacherib overran the territory of Judah, and captured all the fortified cities. Hezekiah, in consequence of the straits to which he was reduced, sent his capitulation to the Assyrian monarch at Lachish, confessed his "sin," and offered to pay any fine the Great King might see fit in his clemency to impose, provided the Great King would depart from him. The Great King saw fit to impose such a heavy fine that the poor sinner was compelled to strip the temple in order to pay it.

According to xviii. 17–xix. 37, Sennacherib sent an expedition under his leading general or generals against Hezekiah to demand his surrender. The Rab-shakeh, who acts as spokesman, impersonates all the arrogance of the greatest military power of the age. Hezekiah is charged with having revolted from his master, and the uselessness of further resistance is pointed out. Neither Hezekiah's own strength, nor Egypt, upon whom he relied, nor Jehovah himself, will avail to deliver him out of the hands of the invincible world-conqueror. Hezekiah seems to have appreciated the force of these arguments when informed of them by the committee who had been treating with the Rab-shakeh, and in despair he turned to Isaiah for advice. The prophet urges him not to fear, for Jehovah will send a spirit, and the Assyrian king will hear a rumor, and will return, and fall by the sword in his own land. Thereupon the Rab-shakeh withdrew to his master, the implication being that Hezekiah refused to surrender, though this is nowhere stated. But, contrary to expectation, the crisis was not over. Sennacherib, hearing of the advance of Tirhaka king of Cush, again
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sends to Hezekiah, and renews his demands, this time by letter. The same considerations are urged as before, and the unfortunate king is again driven to seek the divine assistance.9 Hezekiah presents the blasphemous letter before Jehovah in the temple, and prays that Jehovah will vindicate his honor against the Assyrian.10 Isaiah, this time apparently supernaturally appraised of Hezekiah's prayer,11 again counsels resistance, hurls defiance at the Assyrian in a poem of great power;12 offers to Hezekiah a sign of confirmation,13 and also an unqualified promise (in prose) that Jerusalem should be immune.14 Isaiah did not have to wait long for the vindication of his prophecies. It came in two ways: (a) "On that night" (the night of the day on which the prophecies were uttered?) the Angel of Jehovah smote in the camp of the Assyrians one hundred and eighty-five thousand souls; (b) Sennacherib returned to Nineveh, where he was eventually murdered.15 Thus the narrative in xviii. 17–xix. 37 presents us with a most dramatic climax. On the one hand, the blasphemous arrogance of the Assyrian and his pride of power stand out more and more clearly as the narrative advances. On the other hand, the prophet's faith in Jehovah seems to gain new strength with each successive shock. But it is not till the very close of the narrative that we learn how completely this faith was vindicated.

According to xviii. 13–16, Hezekiah is humiliated, and Sennacherib is triumphant. According to xviii. 17–xix. 37, Sennacherib is humiliated, and Hezekiah is triumphant. Can two accounts be more diametrically opposed?16 At one point, indeed, they appear to agree: in both accounts, Sennacherib is at Lachish.17 But this apparent agreement only serves to emphasize more acutely the fundamental difference. In xviii. 13–16, Hezekiah sends word of his capitulation to Lachish. In xviii. 17 ff., Sennacherib sends his demand upon Hezekiah to surren-
der from Lachish. How is it to be explained that Sennacherib sends to Hezekiah to demand surrender immediately after Hezekiah has surrendered? The two parts of the narrative are contradictory and its sequence unintelligible. Am I to allow this first natural impression made by the biblical narrative to be obliterated by harmonistic devices?

1. It has been said, by way of attempted explanation, that Hezekiah did, indeed, surrender (xviii. 13–16), but subsequently revolted; or at least, that Sennacherib suspected treachery, and that he sent his expedition under the Rab-shakeh either to maintain or regain his control of Jerusalem. But the question of the Rab-shakeh is, "On whom have you relied that you have revolted?" 18 not, "that you have again revolted." If xviii. 17 ff. is read by itself, there is not a hint that the present revolt of Hezekiah was a second attempt to throw off the Assyrian yoke after a previous submission.

2. Again, it has been suggested that the surrender of Hezekiah in xviii. 13–16 was not complete. The territory of Judah was indeed lost, and the indemnity paid; but Sennacherib was not satisfied with this, and demanded the surrender of the capital also, possibly out of a desire to secure his rear against an anticipated advance of Egypt. But this attempt to make a distinction between a partial surrender in verses 13–16 and the demand for a complete surrender in verses 17 ff. is again opposed to the implications of xviii. 13–16. There is nothing in verses 13–16 to indicate that Hezekiah's capitulation was not as complete as Sennacherib desired. Hezekiah confesses his sin, and offers to pay whatever Sennacherib pleases, and Sennacherib takes him at his word.

3. Hence a further assumption has been made that Sennacherib subsequently changed his mind, and in xviii. 17 ff. demanded what was not in the original bond. On this view the
The reason for the Rab-shakeh's expedition is found in the treachery of Sennacherib, rather than in the faithlessness of Hezekiah. So far as I have observed, no harmonistic scheme has been advanced which does not depend upon one or more of these assumptions. Do they satisfy?

In the first place, not one of them has any basis in the biblical text. They all rise out of the abyss that yawns between xviii. 13–16 and xviii. 17 ff. without visible means of support. In the next place, these assumptions which seek to explain the position of xviii. 13–16 before xviii. 17 ff. are fundamentally inconsistent with the spirit, if not with the letter, of xviii. 17 ff. At first sight it might be thought that xviii. 13–16 would serve as a fitting background for the narrative in xviii. 17 ff. The fact that all the land but the capital had been conquered would throw the bravery of the defenders of Jerusalem, in refusing to surrender the town, into stronger relief, and thus the two narratives might be thought to supplement each other. But the fact is, the defenders of Jerusalem were not brave at all. On the contrary, they were panic-stricken. Only one man was able to face the impending crisis with composure, Isaiah the prophet. In his implicit confidence in Jehovah he promises the king absolute immunity. The whole purpose of the narrative is to magnify the signal character of the deliverance wrought by Jehovah in answer to the faith which the prophet reposed in him. But if Hezekiah had really been just before so terribly humiliated that he was compelled actually to strip the temple to satisfy the greed of Sennacherib, the prophecies of Isaiah, promising absolute immunity for Jerusalem and hurling defiance at the retreating Sennacherib, would have rung very hollow, I fancy. With land desolated, and temple plundered of its treasures, the virgin daughter of Zion would hardly have been in the mood to despise Sennacherib or laugh him to scorn.
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She would have been much more likely to regard herself, as she looked over her land desolated, her cities burned with fire, as in very truth like a hut in a vineyard, a lodge in a cucumber- patch. If the prophecies in xix. 7 and 32 are to be restricted simply to the capital as contrasted with the land of Judah, they would lose half their meaning. Instead of a signal deliverance, Hezekiah would have escaped only by the skin of his teeth. In that case it is a pity the angel of the Lord did not arrive sooner. The narrative in xviii. 17 ff. is clearly unconscious of any contrast between desolated land and saved capital; in other words, it is entirely unconscious of xviii. 13–16, and can be placed after it only at the expense of the dramatic propriety which we have seen is the chief literary characteristic of xviii. 17 ff. At least this is my strong impression, and it seems to have been also the impression of the Redactor of Isaiah and of the Chronicler. The former omits the statement of the actual submission of Hezekiah, though he retains the reference to the desolation of the land of Judah. The Chronicler goes a step farther. He not only omits the surrender of Hezekiah, but changes the express statement in xviii. 13, that Sennacherib seized the fenced cities of Judah, so as to read: "Sennacherib, king of Assyria, came and entered into Judah, and encamped against the fenced cities, and thought (or proposed) to win them for himself."

In view of the above considerations, I feel bound to adhere to the first impression made upon me by the biblical narrative in its present form. It remains for me unintelligible and self-contradictory.

II. On the other hand, when I turn to the Assyrian record of Sennacherib's campaign, the first impression made upon me is that of intelligibility and self-consistency. The record is found, in more or less complete form, in five inscriptions: the
Rassam cylinder (dated 700 B.C., only one year after the campaign which it records); the great Taylor cylinder (dated 691); the Kujunshik Bull inscription (undated); the inscription of Constantinople, containing only a brief reference to this campaign, and Cylinder C (both undated). The Rassam, Taylor, and C cylinders are verbally almost identical, and it is natural to suppose that the two latter go back to the earlier Rassam cylinder as their original. The Bull inscription is again almost identical with the Taylor cylinder, though it contains a few interesting little details not found in the other sources. Our Assyrian account of this campaign is, therefore, in the fullest sense a contemporary source. There is also a bas-relief, which depicts Sennacherib sitting upon a throne, and "receiving the tribute of Lachish." In the above inscriptions there is the following sequence of events:

1. The conquest of Phoenicia. In place of King Elulæus of Zidon, who had fled, Sennacherib places Ethobal upon the throne. The submission of various Phoenician towns is received, and, in addition, the kings of Ashdod, Ammon, Moab, and Edom "kissed the feet" of the Great King. It would seem also, that Gaza either already was, or at this time became, pro-Assyrian.

2. Sennacherib next attacks Ashkelon, deported its king, Zidka, "who had not submitted to his yoke," and all the royal house, and restored Sarruludari, its former king, to the throne. Certain other towns belonging to Zidka were also conquered.

3. He then advances against Ekron. The Ekronites, it is stated, had deposed their king, Padi, who was faithful to Assyria, and sent him to Hezekiah of Judah, who had him shut up in prison. But, before Ekron could be taken, a new enemy had to be reckoned with. The kings of Egypt, i.e. the Delta princes (note the plural), aided by the king of Melucha, or
West Arabia, including the Sinaitic peninsula, came to the relief of the revolting Palestinian principalities. But this diversion was in vain. A battle was fought at Altaku, the Eltekeh of the Bible. Egypt was defeated. The commanders of the Egyptian and Arabian chariots and the sons of one of the Egyptian kings were taken prisoner. The complete nature of the victory is seen in the fact that the towns Altaku and Timnath were reduced immediately after the battle, and Sennacherib was able to proceed with the more difficult task of capturing Ekron. When that doomed city finally fell, it was treated with the greatest severity. The leaders of the party who had deposed Padi were impaled about the town, and the common people were deported, though amnesty was granted to the Assyrian sympathizers, of whom there seem to have been some still remaining in the town. Padi, whom Hezekiah had yielded up, was now restored to the throne.88

4. Sennacherib now turns his attention to Judah, and deals it a terrific blow. Forty-six fortified towns, besides numberless smaller towns, were taken. Two hundred thousand, one hundred and fifty of their inhabitants did homage to the conqueror.88 Hezekiah was shut up in Jerusalem "as a caged bird," and a blockade of the city was established. The conquered territory was divided between the kings of Ashdod, Ekron, where Padi had regained his throne, and Gaza. Hezekiah, reduced to these straits and with revolt breaking out among his mercenary troops, gave up the unequal contest. A tribute of thirty talents of gold and eight hundred talents of silver was imposed, the royal treasures were plundered, and the royal harem was deported. Sennacherib seems to have had the booty and the captives sent after him to Nineveh, Hezekiah having despatched an ambassador with the tribute and the formal surrender.88
Several inferences would appear to follow from the above account:—

1. The occasion of the campaign was a coalition of Palestinian states, supported by Egypt, against Assyria. These states were Phœnicia (Zidon), Judah, and the Philistine cities of Ashkelon and Ekron, with their dependencies. Ashdod, Moab, Ammon, and Edom held aloof. Of the revolting states, Judah, next to Phœnicia, was undoubtedly the strongest. We know from the Bible** that Hezekiah dominated the Philistine cities, and this is abundantly confirmed by the Taylor cylinder. It is to Hezekiah that the Ekronites turn over their dethroned king for safe-keeping. Forty-six fenced cities are referred to as belonging to him, as against three cities belonging to Zidka of Ashkelon. In the inscription of Constantinople, only the conquest of Phœnicia and Judah is mentioned, as if these were the chief objects of the expedition.*** The large numbers of the population and the ability of Hezekiah to hire a mercenary soldierly also witness to the relative power of Judah at this time. In fact, we might easily infer, from the attention which Sennacherib paid to him, that Hezekiah was the real head of the insurrection.****

2. Again, the sequence of the narrative is evidently intended to be chronological, at least that is the natural interpretation. At only two points is there anything even to suggest the contrary.

(1) It might seem, at first sight, that it would have been more natural to attack Ekron first, which lay to the north, rather than the more southerly Ashkelon. But it is altogether probable that Sennacherib was operating in various divisions against these towns, and the attacks may well have been carried on simultaneously.****** Ashkelon, however, seems to have fallen before Ekron, probably because Sennacherib pressed the siege
more strenuously, as he wished to cripple the southernmost districts before the anticipated intervention of Egypt.\footnote{\(2\)}

(2) Again, Padi is spoken of as having been rescued from Jerusalem, and restored to his throne in Ekron, before the conquest of Judah, which such an event presupposes, is described. But this proleptical reference to the restoration of Padi is easily and naturally explained as due to topical reasons, the reorganization of Ekron being described in connection with the account of its conquest.\footnote{\(4\)} To hold that the reference to Padi is chronological, and that therefore the conquest of Jerusalem preceded that of Ekron, and that the present sequence which places it last is unchronological,\footnote{\(41\)} is certainly very strained, and not to be adopted without the strongest reasons.

3. But if the sequence of T is chronological, then the conquest of Judah is the last act narrated in the history of this campaign, and it closes with Judah completely humiliated, and Assyria completely triumphant.

4. Finally, if the sequence is chronological, a further interesting inference may also be drawn as to the main object of the campaign. Sennacherib says nothing of an advance into Egypt after the victory of Altaku. Two reasons may be assigned for this. Either he was unable to press home his advantage, the victory having been bought too dearly,\footnote{\(43\)} or he did not care to do so, the object of the campaign being to crush the Palestinian revolt, and not to invade Egypt.\footnote{\(44\)} The Taylor cylinder decidedly favors the latter supposition. Altaku must have been a decisive victory, for Sennacherib immediately after it was able to carry on the campaign against Ekron and Jerusalem with vigor and success. The attempted relief expedition of Egypt had evidently failed completely. The fact, therefore, that Sennacherib did not follow up his success against Egypt does not warrant the inference that he was not able to do so,
but rather that he did not care to do so. To crush Ekron, and particularly Judah, seems to have been his immediate object. The expedition of 701 was a Syrian and not an Egyptian expedition. This view also agrees well with the importance we have already seen to attach to the kingdom of Hezekiah at this time. Thus the Assyrian record impresses me very strongly as being an orderly, intelligible, self-consistent, and historically probable narrative.44

III. But if the foregoing interpretation of the Taylor cylinder is a correct one, I cannot escape a very serious conclusion, namely, that the Taylor cylinder and the biblical narrative in 2 Kings xviii. 17–xix. 37 are in irreconcilable contradiction. The Assyrian narrative represents the campaign as ending in a signal triumph. The biblical narrative represents it as ending in a signal disaster. The inscriptions state that Jerusalem was closely invested: "Him [Hezekiah] I shut up as a caged bird in Jerusalem his capital, fortifications I erected against him, and made those who came out of the door of his town to turn back." The Bible implies, at least at xix. 32,46 that the Assyrian will not come near to the city: "He shall not come unto this city, nor shoot an arrow there, neither shall he come before it with shield, nor cast a mount against it. By the way that he came, by the same shall he return, and he shall not come unto this city, saith the Lord." Both of these narratives cannot be correct. They are mutually exclusive. But, curiously enough, just as one point of contact was found between the two discrepant sections of the biblical narrative; 46 so here, also, there is an apparent point of contact between the biblical and the Assyrian records. Both refer to an intervention of Egypt. But just as, in the former case, the agreement served to throw the disagreement into stronger relief, so also here. According to xix. 9, the news of Tirhaka's advance seems to have compelled
Sennacherib's retreat. According to T, Sennacherib won a decisive victory over Egypt. Further, the Bible names the one Egyptian or rather Ethiopian king, Tirhaka, who was the real ruler of Egypt. T speaks only of the kings of Egypt or the Delta princes, never alluding to Tirhaka. If Sennacherib had conquered this powerful monarch, or even come into collision with him, we would have expected some reference to this important fact in the Assyrian record. Thus, both in general and in detail, we have thoroughgoing disagreement between the two sources. Am I then to discount the Assyrian representations in favor of the biblical? This has often been done. It is not claimed that Sennacherib manufactured victories out of whole cloth. A certain measure of success is credited to him. But he is held to have exaggerated his successes, and to have glossed over his reverses. Now it must be admitted that the Assyrian kings were quite capable of using whitewash, and it is maintained by the majority of scholars that Sennacherib's own record of this campaign is an unwilling witness against his claim of complete success. In particular, three arguments have been urged in support of this view: 1. The failure of Sennacherib to press on into Egypt after the battle of Altaku; 2. His failure to take Jerusalem; 3. The fact that Sennacherib himself speaks of a blockade, rather than a regular siege of Jerusalem, from which it is inferred that he was not only unable to take the city, but was even prevented from regularly investing it. The first two arguments, be it noted, are really arguments _a silentio._

1. Schrader, for example, maintains that “those who can read between the lines, can perceive, from the narrative of the Great King, with tolerable clearness, that the success of his enterprise against Egypt is no very striking one.” But only those can read all this between the lines who have adopted Schrader's view, that the main object of the campaign is the
attack upon Ekron and Egypt, and that "the enterprise conducted against Hezekiah forms to a certain extent only an episode in the campaign."** Of course, if this is true, the failure of Sennacherib to follow up his victory at Altaku, and to advance into Egypt, is probably to be attributed to his inability to do so, and Altaku must be reduced, with Schrader, to a "Pyrrhic victory." It is only a consistent development of this view of the parenthetical character of the attack upon Judah, when Schrader further suggests that T "purposely shifts the chronological order of events, and ends with a reference to the rich tribute, as though this set the seal to the whole narrative."*** In other words, the present order of T, by which the conquest of Judah is placed last, is due to an attempt to cover up an unsuccessful issue of the campaign by emphasizing an earlier, temporary, and incidental success. But, to me, this all seems to be read into the text rather than out from between the lines. It may be true, but I would never have dreamed of such an interpretation of T, and I doubt if Schrader, or those who followed him, would have done so, if T had been the only source at their disposal. If one were disposed to read between the lines of Schrader, would he not find there a strong subjective bias which is responsible for this drastic treatment of T? T itself, as we have seen, suggests an entirely different conception of the purpose of the campaign, and one which robs Schrader's inferences from Sennacherib's failure to advance into Egypt, of all justification.

2. The second argument, however, also suggested by Schrader, but more powerfully developed by Meinhold, is more weighty, as it does seem, at first sight, to have a basis in T itself. Meinhold accepts the interpretation of T advanced above, according to which Hezekiah is the ring-leader in the anti-Assyrian demonstration, against whom Sennacherib's expedition is
chiefly directed. From this correct premise he argues as follows: "It is clear, from Sennacherib's own narrative, that he did not conquer Jerusalem, the real center of the revolt. He must have been compelled (genÖthigt), for some reason or other, to content himself with his [Hezekiah's] tribute. For if he had been able to do as he wished, he would certainly not have permitted Hezekiah, the real head of the Syrian revolt, to get off more easily than Zidka of Ashkelon, who was carried into captivity. He certainly would not have treated his [Hezekiah's] nobles, so far as he found them guilty, more considerately than the nobles of Ekron, who were put to death, and whose corpses were strung up about the town. Accordingly the [Assyrian] account itself suggests that something like that narrated in Herodotus and 2 Kings xviii. 17–xix. 9a actually occurred." 84

We are not at present concerned with this reference to Herodotus, or with Meinhold's limitation of the biblical narrative to 2 Kings xviii. 17–xix. 9a, but only with the conclusion that the Assyrian text itself suggests some sort of a failure in Sennacherib's expedition. But, after all, is there any indication in T that, even though Jerusalem was not taken, Hezekiah's surrender was not as complete as Sennacherib desired? Several assumptions underlie the argument of Meinhold.

(1) It is supposed that Sennacherib would have treated Hezekiah as he did the king of Ashkelon, and Hezekiah's supporters as he did the citizens of Ekron, if he had been able to do so. It is therefore inferred that he was not able. But such an inference is by no means necessary. It would appear that Hezekiah did not wait for the city to be sacked. The blockade was sufficient to bring him to terms. Hezekiah did not resist to the bitter end, as Ashkelon and Ekron had done. Hezekiah may very well be thought of as having submitted in time to save his throne. The words of Tiele are pertinent in this con-
nection: "The Assyrian kings were regularly accustomed immediately to spare every rebel, even the most obstinate, who voluntarily or of necessity surrendered and delivered the presents demanded." Sennacherib had dealt Hezekiah a crippling blow, had overrun his territory, and subsequently divided it among the kings whom he had set up over the Philistine towns. He had broken Hezekiah's power. If the Jewish king, by a timely surrender, relieved him of the necessity of assaulting Jerusalem, he may well have allowed him to keep the few chips of his throne which were still left. In this connection it is worth while to remember that affairs in Assyria had been getting into bad shape, due to the intrigues of the irrepressible Merodach-baladan, and Sennacherib probably wished to hasten home at the earliest possible moment, in order to meet this new crisis. Since Hezekiah had submitted, this Assyrian Shylock could afford to forego the last pound of flesh which his evil temper might have led him to demand, in order to set out at once for the East. But such a withdrawal from Palestine does not argue a failure of the expedition, but only a willingness to give up the pleasure of a vengeance which was not strategically necessary to the complete success of the campaign.

(2) Further, T distinctly speaks of the surrender of the royal harem. This implies the complete humiliation of Hezekiah, a virtual surrender of the city. He is thus treated exactly like Zidka of Ashkelon, except that he is allowed to continue to reign. But since there was no rival claimant to the throne of David, as there seems to have been to the throne of Ashkelon, the difference in treatment is easily explicable, as conditioned in a measure by the different internal conditions of Jerusalem and Ashkelon. Similarly, a new king was imposed upon Zidon, but it is distinctly stated that the old king had fled. The milder treatment of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, as compared with
the punishment visited upon Ekron, can easily be explained by
the timely surrender of the town. It is, of course, customary to
say, that, in describing the deportation of the royal harem, which
implies the surrender of the capital, Sennacherib is drawing the
long (Assyrian) bow. He may be, he may be exaggerating
his successes, and glossing over his failures. But, so far as I can
discover, there is nothing in his own statements to indicate this.
My strong impression is that those who read such impli-
cations out of his narrative have first read them into it, and
that this would never have been done, had not scholars been
more or less under the influence of xviii. 17 ff.

3. As to the third argument, what has already been said
will show how little weight need be attached to it. The fact
that Sennacherib only blockaded Jerusalem, and did not regu-
larly besiege or assault it, is fully explained by the timely sub-
mission of Hezekiah, coupled with the desire of Sennacherib
to hasten home in order to meet the aggressions of Merodach-
baladan. He evidently did not wish to be detained by what was,
after the submission of Hezekiah, the quite unnecessary and
very tedious task of besieging Jerusalem.

I conclude, therefore, that 2 Kings xviii. 17 ff. and T as they
stand are mutually exclusive, and only by an exegesis which
violates both the spirit and the letter of the two sources can
they be brought into harmony. A decision must be made be-
tween them. Remembering the possibilities of falsification on
the part of the Assyrian kings, and having, of course, a natural
bias in favor of the Bible as against a cuneiform tablet, shall
I reject Sennacherib's account in favor of the Redactor of the
book of Kings? In the present instance I cannot conscientious-
ly do so, for T differs in the same way from the narrative in
2 Kings xviii. 17 ff. as 2 Kings xviii. 13–16 does from it. It is
not simply a question between an Assyrian source and the Bible,
but between an Assyrian source and one of two divergent narratives in the Bible. Now the fact is that T agrees as completely with 2 Kings xviii. 13–16 as it disagrees from 2 Kings xviii. 17 ff. (1) In both T and 2 Kings xviii. 13–16, the towns of Judah are ravaged, T contributing some interesting statistics on this subject, and adding that Jerusalem itself was blockaded. (2) In both, Hezekiah must pay a heavy indemnity. At this point, even the exact amount of the tribute is almost alike. Thirty talents of gold is common to both. The agreement in this particular favors the supposition that the difference in the amount of silver, three hundred talents in the Bible as against eight hundred in T, is to be explained as due to the difference in weight between the Hebrew and the Assyrian silver shekel. Yet this method of harmonizing should be adopted with reserve. The agreement in the amount of gold, considering the completely independent character of the two sources, is sufficiently remarkable. (3) In both, Hezekiah evidently retains his throne. (4) In both, Jerusalem is spared a sack, and Sennacherib personally remains at a distance from the capital. According to 2 Kings xviii. 13–16, Hezekiah sends his tribute to Lachish. According to T, he sends it by an envoy, Sennacherib evidently not being present before Jerusalem. Only at this point is there, also, an apparent disagreement as, according to T, the envoy appears to go to Nineveh, not to Lachish. But T is here admittedly obscure. In spite of this incidental divergence, there is hardly a case where the independent Assyrian and biblical records more perfectly agree.

But if it was difficult to harmonize 2 Kings xviii. 17 ff. with xviii. 13–16 when these two sections were considered by themselves, it is quite impossible to harmonize them when 2 Kings xviii. 13–16 is supplemented by T. It has been shown that only by making assumptions entirely opposed to the spirit of
xviii. 17 ff. can the humiliation of Hezekiah be thought of as having preceded the embassy of the Rab-shakeh. The position of xviii. 13–16 before xviii. 17 ff. is highly unnatural when the biblical narrative is considered by itself. But T tells us that the conquest of Judah ended the campaign, in other words, xviii. 13–16 would have to follow, and not precede, xviii. 17–xix. 37. This, of course, means that the discrepancy already existing, if the biblical sequence is preserved, is emphasized to the point of absolute irreconcilability which no assumption can alleviate, if 2 Kings xviii. 13–16 is combined with T. But it is to be observed that the Assyrian record does not create the difficulty. It only makes it more poignantly felt. Harmonistic devices by which it is sought to sandwich the different accounts into each other impress me as being quite futile. To take just one crucial difficulty. Did the expedition of the Rab-shakeh recounted in 2 Kings xviii. 17 ff., occur before or after the battle of Altaku recounted in T?

(1) It could scarcely have taken place after the battle,60 for Hezekiah is represented at 2 Kings xviii. 20 as still relying upon Egypt. But he certainly would not have done this after the defeat of Egypt. The only way to avoid this difficulty is to distinguish the advance of Egypt under the Delta princes (princes of Musri?) from a subsequent advance under Tirhaka (mark well and inwardly digest), and suppose that Hezekiah was still relying upon Tirhaka, in spite of the defeat of the Delta princes at Altaku. This means that we must hold to a further stage in the campaign of Sennacherib in which he is opposed, not to the Delta princes, but to Tirhaka himself.61 But this supposition has already carried us out into the roomy spaces of pure speculation. There is no hint of such an appendix to the campaign in Sennacherib’s own record, and it must be further supposed that he has judiciously deleted it. But there is
nothing in the biblical text, either, that of itself warrants such a conception of events. In other words, we are asked to assume a further stage in the campaign of which neither Sennacherib nor the Bible informs us, and then assume that Sennacherib has deleted it because it was unsuccessful. Is this quite fair? Clearly the supposition of still another stage in the Assyrian campaign has its origin, not in exegesis of the sources, but in a purely harmonistic necessity—a very suspicious origin.

(2) Again, the embassy of the Rab-shakeh cannot well be placed before the battle of Altaku. (a) If it were, and if the humiliation of Hezekiah (2 Kings xviii. 13–16=T, col. iii. lines 11 ff.) were placed, as T demands, after the battle, Isaiah's promises to Hezekiah at the time of the embassy would have been completely discredited. (b) If, on the other hand, the humiliation of Hezekiah were also placed before the battle and before the Rab-shakeh's embassy as well, we are back at our old difficulty of accounting for a demand to surrender after the surrender has been made, and are face to face with a new complication, for T demands a different order of events. (c) Finally, the expedition of the Rab-shakeh cannot be identified with the invasion of Judah in 2 Kings xviii. 13–16=T, col. iii. lines 11 ff. and placed before Altaku, for this will not only contradict the sequence in T, but in the Bible as well, which plainly distinguishes the two episodes. Thus the scheme which would place the embassy of the Rab-shakeh before the battle of Altaku is intrinsically improbable, and conflicts with the natural sequence of T. Therefore I can find no place for the events narrated in 2 Kings xviii. 17 ff. in Sennacherib's campaign of 701. The two narratives are mutually exclusive. Which one must I accept? In view of the trend of the discussion thus far, only one answer is possible—the Assyrian. But, be it observed, this is
due to no perverse reaction against everything biblical in favor of everything extra-biblical. It is due to the inherent difficulties of the biblical narrative itself, and to the fact that the Assyrian record agrees with one part of the biblical record as against another part.

IV. The next logical step would, therefore, seem to be to reject the narrative in 2 Kings xviii. 17–xix. 37 as late and altogether unhistorical. The more important arguments which have been drawn from the narrative itself, apart from its relationship to xviii. 13–16 and the inscriptions, to support this conclusion, are: its theological characteristics, e.g. its advanced monotheism and Deuteronomic character; its exaggeration of the marvelous (one hundred and eighty-five thousand men slain in one night); its probable anachronisms; its too minute predictions, which argue to a date subsequent to the events referred to; and the fact that 2 Kings xix. 36, 37 seem to imply that Sennacherib was slain immediately on his return to Nineveh, whereas he lived twenty years after the campaign of 701. But, as these arguments are all, more or less, disputable on exegetical, historical, or dogmatic grounds, I do not wish to push them to the front, though I am free to confess that, taken together, they impress me, and incline me to believe that we are dealing here with a later prophetic legend of the same general character as the Elijah and Elisha legends.

There is another point, however, which is not so complicated with critical presuppositions. I refer to the peculiar and suspicious parallelism running between the two embassies to Hezekiah, together with the duplication of Isaiah's prophecies and even of their fulfillment. After the Rab-shakeh returns to his master, and the crisis is apparently over (2 Kings xix. 8), the whole fiery trail must be fought through once more. A new demand to surrender is made upon Hezekiah, the same
threats as before are indulged in, Hezekiah must again lay the desperateness of his case before Jehovah, as if he had never received an assurance of the divine assistance from Isaiah, and Isaiah must again encourage him. Most singularly of all, the account of the second embassy is related without any reference to the first embassy, except in the one word "again" (xix. 9b), and that is more than doubtful text-critically. We would certainly expect Isaiah to remind Hezekiah of his former assurance of deliverance. But there is not a hint, either in the prayer of Hezekiah or the promise of Isaiah, that a precisely similar episode had just transpired.

There is, it is true, one very marked difference between the two embassies, but that raises a new difficulty. The first expedition was conducted by Sennacherib's leading generals, the second demand for surrender was made through letters. But did Sennacherib hope to effect by a mere letter what he had failed to accomplish by his leading generals "with a large army"? Here, indeed, refuge might be taken in the ambiguity in which the Rab-shakeh's expedition is enveloped. Was it purely diplomatic, or was it a military expedition? The "large army" would suggest the latter. But it does not seem to have done anything but march up the hill, and then march down again, like the famous army of the king of France, and at xix. 8 it vanishes wholly from view, only the Rab-shakeh being mentioned. Did the army return with him, or stay behind, or was it after all a real army? By some scholars it has been reduced to a mere "escort" of the Rab-shakeh. In that case the absurdity of Sennacherib's expecting to accomplish by a clay tablet what he failed to accomplish "with a large army" would be in a measure relieved. But the phrase "large army" is certainly opposed to the idea of a mere escort. Köhler, on the other hand, rests his case on the large army,
and supposes that Sennacherib, pressed by Egypt, sought to accomplish by peaceful means what he had failed to accomplish by force. But it strikes me, if that had been his game, he would have been a little more polite and conciliatory in his address the second time, whereas he repeats the same threats which he had made the first time. Thus the second embassy has really no meaning after the first embassy, and must therefore be regarded as a duplicate account. This view is further confirmed in the duplication of the prophecies of Isaiah and of their fulfillment.

In vi. 7 the retreat of Sennacherib and his violent death are announced in prose. This belongs to the narrative of the first embassy. In vi. 21–27 only his retreat is referred to, though the implication is that he was unable to accomplish anything. This is in poetry. This prophecy really says less than the prophecy in vi. 7, for it does not refer to Sennacherib's death. We would expect some advance over vi. 7; but, while there is an advance in the rhetoric, there is none in the promise. In vi. 29–31 there is unquestionably a new thought introduced, namely, the ultimate relief of the land. But it is introduced in a most abrupt and awkward way. In verses 21–27 Sennacherib is addressed, in verses 29–31 Hezekiah is addressed, without any formal indication of the change of address, which is really necessary in order to avoid a very unnecessary obscurity. The prophecy in verses 29–31 culminates with the rolling period in verse 31b (cf. ix. 1–6), as if Isaiah had now finished his assurances. But this proves not to be the case. Still another prophecy is given us (ver. 32–34), in which the retreat of Sennacherib is for the third time promised, though, in this case, coupled with the promise of the absolute immunity of the capital. I cannot avoid the impression that there is a lack of any real organic unity between these various prophecies. They are entirely uncorrelated, and in the last three cases are in contexts
which seem to be mutually exclusive. Verses 29–31 are impossible after verses 21–28, and verses 32–34 are not natural after verses 29–31, with its concluding period (ver. 31b). Thus we seem to have parallel rescensions of Isaiah’s prophecies, just as we have parallel accounts of the two embassies.

Finally, we have what are, in reality, two fulfillments: (a) verse 35, and (b) verses 36, 37. In the first, the Assyrian army would appear to be totally annihilated: in the second, Sennacherib returns to Nineveh, and is murdered by his sons. It is undoubtedly true that, if interpreted strictly according to the letter, these two fulfillments may be construed, not as contradictory, or even parallel, but as supplementary. Sennacherib’s army was destroyed, but he himself escaped, only to fall a victim to a conspiracy of his own sons. But certainly, after reading that the Assyrian army awoke in the morning, and, behold, they were all dead corpses (did this make the grimly humorous impression upon the ancient reader which it makes upon us to-day, I wonder, and was it intended to make such an impression?), it is a little unexpected to find Sennacherib starting off home. Can the writer of verses 36, 37, really be the same as the writer of verse 35? Verses 36, 37, are the fulfillment of xix. 7, and certainly refer back to this first prophecy: whereas, the absolute annihilation of the Assyrian army in verse 35 corresponds to the assurance of absolute protection in verse 32.

I cannot escape the impression that we have in the narrative xviii. 17–xix. 37 a literary mosaic, composed of duplicate accounts of the embassy demanding surrender, of Isaiah’s prophecy of encouragement at that time, and of the vindication of his prophecy. These are all combined into one narrative, which has a certain dramatic propriety and power (observe the effective way in which the parallel prophecies and fulfillments are massed at the end of the narrative to heighten the effect),
but which is not susceptible of a strict, historical interpretation. In other words, I am confirmed in my impression that at xviii. 17 ff. we are dealing with a narrative that is in its present form a legend rather than strict history."

But must I then deny all historical value to 2 Kings xviii. 17 ff.? When I am brought face to face with this question, two new and, to my mind, very serious difficulties confront me.

1. How can I account for the rise of such a legend if there is no historical truth back of it? How could the complete humiliation of Hezekiah and the signal triumph of Sennacherib have been changed to the complete humiliation of Sennacherib and the signal triumph of Hezekiah?

2. The difficulty of rejecting xviii. 17 ff. is still further increased by the well-known story of Herodotus. Sethos, a king of Egypt, was attacked by Sennacherib, "king of the Arabians and Assyrians." The warrior class, whom Sethos had angered, refused to come to his aid in this extremity. But Sethos, relying upon a promise of aid from his god, which was given to him in a dream, collected an army of artisans and trades-people, and marched to Pelusium, where he encamped. The narrative continues: "As the two armies lay here opposite one another, there came in the night a multitude of field-mice, which devoured all the quivers and bow-strings of the enemy, and ate the thongs by which they managed their shields. Next morning they commenced their flight, and great multitudes fell, as they had no arms with which to defend themselves." Herodotus claims to have seen a statue erected to King Sethos with a mouse in his hand commemorative of this event. The legendary character of this narrative is very obvious, and its difference in form from the biblical account is equally so. However, the coincidence that the two entirely independent accounts should both connect the withdrawal of Sennacherib in some way with Egyptian in-
fluence, and should preserve the reminiscence of some great nocturnal calamity that befell the army of Sennacherib, is a really remarkable one and serves to support the biblical narrative. At this point the critical solvent is employed to disintegrate all living tissues which the above considerations might suggest are still to be found in the Hebrew narrative. Meinhold's treatment is the most characteristic and thoroughgoing.

Adopting the principles of Stade's analysis of 2 Kings xviii. 13–xix. 37, which have become axioms for all subsequent investigators, he divides the biblical material into three distinct sources: (A) xviii. 13–16; (B) xviii. 17–xix. 9a, 36, 37, the first embassy and prophecy with its fulfillment; and (C) xix. 9b–35, the second embassy and accompanying prophecies and their fulfillment. Narrative A agrees with the Taylor cylinder, and represents the historical facts most accurately. Narrative B represents Sennacherib's attempt to conquer Jerusalem as unsuccessful, the Assyrian king being compelled to retreat by the advance of Tirhaka, king of Cush (xix. 9a), and dying in Nineveh at the hands of his own sons. Narrative C agrees with B in representing the Assyrian invasion as unsuccessful, but attributes the failure to the annihilation of the Assyrian army by a miraculously-originated plague. This third narrative already comes under suspicion on account of its parallelism with the second narrative, its advanced theological conceptions, etc. But the story of Herodotus seems to support its reminiscence of Sennacherib's misfortune. In particular the mention of the mouse in the Egyptian tradition has been supposed to offer direct corroboration of the biblical account, as it is claimed that the mouse was a symbol of the plague. Hence Meinhold subjects the legend in Herodotus to a most searching criticism, and in the main succeeds in depriving it, so far as the mouse is concerned, of any satisfying corroborative value.
incident of C being thus robbed of any independent support, its origin is explained as due to theologizing tendencies, and to the inclination to mould history to suit prophecies that were really unfulfilled in their letter. For example, popular theology interpreted Sennacherib's attack upon Jerusalem as blasphemy. Such blasphemy must be punished by God himself. The surest sign that it was God's punitive power which was manifested was found in the plague, which could only be sent by God himself. This a priori theologizing was directly favored by the prophecies of Isaiah. The immunity of Jerusalem is the subject of a number of prophecies ascribed to Isaiah (e.g. x. 5 ff.; xiv. 24 f., 28 ff.; xvii. 12–xviii. 6; xxx. 27 ff.). More particularly, xxxi. 8a would suggest the destruction of Assyria as described in xxxvii. 6; x. 24 would suggest the plague; xvii. 14 would suggest the destruction in one night. The people, unable to believe that Assyria was unpunished, or that these prophecies were not fulfilled, gradually developed the legend of their fulfillment on the basis of these suggestions in the prophecies themselves. The reference to the plague is therefore dismissed as henceforth unworthy of a place in any historical treatment of this subject; and the third narrative as a whole is rejected as utterly untrustworthy as against B and A.

But can B be defended any more successfully? Here, it is true, the marvelous is much less in evidence. The departure of Sennacherib is attributed apparently to the news of Tirhaka's advance, rather than to a divine interposition. There are also a number of details in B which seem to point to a fairly reliable source, e.g. the references to Lachish and Libnah, to Shebna and the Rab-shakeh, the natural and highly original speech of the latter, the reference to Aramaic as the natural language of diplomacy at this time, etc. All of these lend an air of historicity to B which awakens our confidence in it. Nevertheless, and
here lies the difficulty, B as a whole is really as inconsistent with A and the Taylor cylinder as is C. This is expressly admitted by Meinhold. Why not then reject B also? At this point Meinhold seeks to check the momentum of his own criticism. He is too fair-minded to ignore those details just referred to, which vouch for a measure of historicity in B. He also cannot escape the impression that, after all, something happened. He even falls back on Herodotus again. The plague is indeed rejected, but "the agreement of B with the statement of Herodotus that the return of Sennacherib was connected with Egyptian affairs, is, after all, too astonishing to permit of one's regarding this as an absolutely unhistorical legend." The main reason for this halt in Meinhold's criticism is found in the failure of Sennacherib to take Jerusalem. This, according to Meinhold, implies that something happened to prevent him. Accordingly Meinhold holds to the following historical kernel, namely, the demonstration against the town, the speedy withdrawal of Sennacherib at the advance of the Ethiopian army, the death of Sennacherib at the hands of his sons, and their flight to Armenia. With the latter points we are not especially concerned. As to the two points first mentioned, we have already examined the bough from which Meinhold has managed to cull this shrivelled bit of fruit and found it rotten, and I submit that if 2 Kings xviii. 17 ff. is to be referred to 701, we must deny that the few berries that appear to be at the topmost boughs which Meinhold has spared us at the clubbing of the olive tree, are really there. But I instinctively shrink from this absolutely negative conclusion. It is too much like a *reductio ad absurdum*.

1. I cannot persuade myself that the remarkable coincidence between the Bible and Herodotus as to an Assyrian misfortune has no foundation in fact. Granted that the two narratives refer
the misfortune to two very different causes, granted the Greek coloring of the Herodotus legend, granted that the reference to the mouse does not afford any independent support to the biblical idea of a plague, nevertheless the two narratives agree on the really crucial point, that there was a great misfortune which overtook the Assyrian army, and which relieved both Hebrews and Egyptians at a critical period in their history. Yet I can find no place for such a serious misfortune in the campaign of 701. At this point the criticism of Meinhold sets in. He, too, is impressed with the coincidence between Herodotus and the Bible; but he, too, can find no room for such a great misfortune in 701. He therefore seeks to tone down this misfortune referred to in C to simply a failure of Sennacherib to take Jerusalem and his withdrawal to Nineveh, occasioned partly by the advance of Tirhaka, chiefly by bad news from home. "This sudden return of Sennacherib, who had to be content with only the tribute of Jerusalem without being able to exact its full punishment, appeared to both Egyptians and Hebrews as the work of their God." In other words, the great misfortune of C and Herodotus is simply the exaggeration of Sennacherib's withdrawal referred to in B. But I contend that the cause in this case is not adequate to produce the effect. We have seen that Sennacherib's withdrawal was not really compulsory, that it is wrong to speak of a failure of the campaign of 701, that, on the other hand, the actual situation as known from A and the Taylor cylinder effectually vetoes the view that the legend of an Assyrian misfortune could have grown up naturally out of any known historical circumstance in the campaign of 701. This campaign was altogether too disastrous to the Jews to permit of their developing a legend of it in which they gloated over the disaster of the Assyrians.

2. The same observations may be made in reference to the
second narrative. Granted that there is no mention of a great Assyrian misfortune in B, yet it is certainly implied. The complete failure of Sennacherib to subject Hezekiah is almost as prominent in B as in C, and is correspondingly inconsistent with the established facts of the campaign of 701. It is true, as Meinhold points out,⁸⁹ that the presence of the Rab-shakeh with a large army would correspond well with the blockade of Jerusalem recounted in T, but he must himself admit that "the outcome is just the opposite, in A and T Hezekiah submits humbly and sorrowfully." But it is as difficult to explain the complete immunity of Hezekiah in the second narrative out of such a situation as it is to explain the positive Assyrian misfortune in the third narrative. And yet the details of B impress even Meinhold very favorably. In consequence, he practically admits that he does not know what to do with the second narrative.⁹⁰ on the one hand, its details make a favorable impression; on the other hand, its main point is absolutely inconsistent with the campaign of 701. Being unable to accept Meinhold's theory of a partial failure of Sennacherib's expedition as a starting-point for a legendary exaggeration, shall I then reject these historical details? I cannot but feel that such a position would be eminently unsatisfactory, and would never command the respect of fair-minded men.

3. Again, and for the same reasons, I can find no satisfaction in Meinhold's theory of the influence of Isaiah's prophecies upon the growth of the present legend. Not that I would deny the possibility of the form of Assyrian misfortune being gradually conformed in the popular tradition to the letter of assumed Isaiahic prophecies,¹⁰⁰ but I cannot admit the probability that history would be created ex nihilo to suit prophecy, and I can find nothing in 701 which the popular imagination could lay hold of and reformulate in order to correspond to the letter of
prophecy. On the contrary, all the facts of Sennacherib's expedition are directly opposed to the promissory prophecies of Isaiah, which are assumed to refer to this period. This leads to a final consideration.

4. I cannot persuade myself that Isaiah was so utterly discredited as he would have been if he had prophesied the immunity of Jerusalem and the overthrow of Assyria in connection with the campaign of 701. Here, of course, I realize that I have exposed myself to attack from two quarters.

(1) It will be contended by many that the prophecies in 2 Kings xviii. 17–xix. 37 are not genuine. So far as their form is concerned, this may be admitted; yet Meinhold has justly urged that not sufficient attention has been paid, in this connection, to the group of prophecies cited above, which clearly promise the overthrow of the Assyrian and the immunity of Jerusalem. I know that the genuineness of these prophecies also has been denied, but I am not yet quite prepared to take stock in the Hackmann-Marti General Smelting and Reduction Company, unlimited. Isa. x. 5–15; xiv. 24–27; xvii. 12–xviii. 6 have passed through the furnace for me at least without the smell of fire upon them, and these are sufficient to support the view that Isaiah did anticipate the destruction of the Assyrians and the deliverance of Jerusalem.

(2) It will again be charged that, in being unwilling to admit that Isaiah was entirely mistaken in the crisis of the nation's history, I am influenced by purely dogmatic and subjective considerations. I do confess to a reluctance to admit that in this particular crisis Isaiah played such an utterly misleading part, yet I suppose that we must be prepared in these days to sacrifice the truth of the ideal to the truth of the real, in the hope that the real will ultimately prove to be the ideal. But, in the present instance, my unwillingness to admit such a fiasco
on the part of Isaiah is based on an historical consideration. In an article in the *Journal of American Theology*, I have shown that the most probable time for Hezekiah's reforms is to be found in the period subsequent to the campaign of Sennacherib. Isaiah's influence over Hezekiah before 701 was scarcely sufficient to induce him to inaugurate these reforms. But if Isaiah had been so woefully mistaken as he would have been if he had made such unqualified promises of deliverance in 701, would not his prestige have been completely destroyed? Would he ever have been able to exercise the controlling influence over Hezekiah and the national life which we must hold he did for a time exercise? In view of all these considerations, I can find no place for either the facts or the prophecies of Isaiah recounted in 2 Kings xviii. 17–xix. 37 in 701. Both facts and prophecies are utterly inconsistent with the situation in that period as we know it. I cannot believe that the prophecies of deliverance date from the campaign of 701; for, in that event, Isaiah would have been so discredited by the actual course of history, that it is impossible to believe he would ever again have exercised any controlling influence in Judah, and yet it is altogether probable that he did exert, for a time, such an influence. I cannot believe that the facts were a legendary exaggeration of a partial failure of Sennacherib in 701, for I do not believe there was such a failure. On the other hand, I cannot deny that Isaiah did anticipate an overthrow of the Assyrians and a deliverance of Jerusalem, for there are certain prophecies of Isaiah which I must accept as genuine which contain these anticipations, nor can I reject the fact of some sort of a great misfortune that befell Sennacherib, for the independent testimony of Herodotus seems to me to corroborate this. But if I can neither deny the essential truth of the facts or the prophecies, on the one hand, nor fit them into the historical situation
of 701 on the other, what am I to do? This leads to the final stage of our argument.

V. Do narratives B and C refer to the same expedition as A and the Taylor cylinder?

It is the merit of Winckler to have opened up a new path here, as in so many other cases in the study of the Old Testament; or, perhaps it is more accurate to say that he has reopened an old path, almost untrodden since the days of the Rawlinsons. Winckler also adopts the principles of Stade's analysis, as Meinhold does, but makes narrative C begin with xix. 9a instead of with xix. 9b. The reference to Tirhaka will therefore belong to C. The second narrative is then still referred to the campaign of 701, but the third narrative is connected with a later expedition. Thus Winckler, in principle, returns to the view of those who hold that B and C refer to two different events, only he holds that they refer to two different campaigns, rather than to two different events in the same campaign. The remarkable parallelism between the two accounts is explained as due to the fact that they have become gradually conformed to each other in the course of transmission. The three reasons which lie at the base of Winckler's view are: 1. That C is inconsistent with the expedition of 701; 2. That it is supported in its most striking feature, the overthrow of the Assyrians, by Herodotus, but Herodotus is equally inconsistent with the expedition of 701; 3. That C refers to Tirhaka in connection with this campaign of Sennacherib. The first two arguments have already been sufficiently treated. The third argument remains to be considered.

On independent grounds, Winckler has shown that Tirhaka could not have been suzerain of Egypt as early as 701. He became so about ten years later. This conclusion seems now to be generally accepted. Here, then, is a new datum of great
importance. It has already been shown negatively that C cannot be explained out of the situation of 701. We now have a positive datum which seems to require a later date for this narrative. But, singularly enough, critics and apologists alike have united in opposition to Winckler's theory of a later western campaign of Sennacherib.

(1) There is no evidence, it is claimed, that Sennacherib ever made a campaign into Palestine after 701. His inscriptions are silent on the subject. But this argument from silence is of no great significance when it is remembered that the records for the last eight years of Sennacherib's reign fail us altogether.

Since Tirhaka did not come to the throne till c. 691, the campaign must have fallen just in this blank period of Sennacherib's reign. Hence, even if there was no extant hint of a later campaign, it would be unsafe to urge this against Winckler's postulate, which is based on the biblical and Egyptian data. But there is not wanting indirect monumental testimony to the fact of a later western campaign. Esarhaddon distinctly refers to an Arabian expedition of Sennacherib his father against a fortress of Aribi called Adumu (the biblical Dumah of Isa. xxii. ?). The land of Aribi was situated in Northwestern Arabia, between Palestine and the Euphrates Valley. If we may argue from Esarhaddon's own expedition into the same region, it is probable that Sennacherib came into Aribi from Syria, and that his ultimate motive was to weaken the Egyptian influence in this quarter. Here, then, we have a western expedition of Sennacherib indirectly vouched for, though until recently it could not be authenticated from his own inscriptions, an expedition, moreover, which would very naturally bring him into close proximity to Palestine. Fortunately, an inscription recently brought to light by Scheil contains a reference by Sennacherib himself to this campaign. It adds nothing, it is true,
to what was already known from Esar-haddon's statements, but it corroborates the fact of the campaign, and admonishes to the exercise of caution in rejecting facts probable in themselves which may not have been referred to in the inscriptions of Sennacherib thus far discovered. It must be admitted that these casual monumental allusions are to an Arabian expedition, not to a Palestinian expedition, but it certainly cannot be considered "kühne Phantasie" to bring the two into connection. The point is that this campaign must have occurred in the later years of Sennacherib's reign. There seems to be no room for it before 691, for our records down to that year are very full. When, therefore, the Bible brings Tirhaka and Sennacherib into collision, and when it is remembered that Tirhaka did not come to the throne until 691, it seems the most obvious historical combination to connect the Arabian campaign of the monuments with the Palestinian campaign of the Bible.

(2) But does the mention of Tirhaka in the Bible really demand a date for C subsequent to 701? This has been denied. It is claimed that Tirhaka may have acted in 701 as viceroy of Egypt or as co-regent with his father, and attention is regularly directed to the fact that he is called, not Pharaoh, but king of Cush, as if he had not yet gained the throne of the Pharaohs. That Tirhaka can have acted in the capacity of viceroy or co-regent in 701 may be admitted, but that he did so must be doubted. There is absolutely no evidence for such a view, apart from the assumed necessity of dating C in 701, and the title "king of Cush." But as the necessity of such a date for C is open to serious question it does not seem advisable to assume a co-regency or viceroyalty of Tirhaka on the basis of C alone. On the contrary, since C itself seems to refer to another campaign than that of 701, and since we know that Tirhaka did not succeed to the throne till c. 691, the natural infer-
ence is that C is to be dated sometime subsequent to 691. That Tirhaka was called king of Cush, and not Pharaoh, by no means implies that he was not in supreme authority in Egypt at the time to which C refers. The biblical writers did not use the title "pharaoh" with any careful discrimination. At 2 Kings xvii. 4, So is called Pharaoh when he certainly was not Pharaoh, and Tirhaka may well be called king of Cush, as marking his peculiar origin, even at the time that he was Pharaoh. This argument from the title "king of Cush" has little weight in my mind to prove a viceroyalty or co-regency of Tirhaka as early as 701, as compared with the testimony of the Taylor cylinder in the opposite direction. We have already noticed a peculiar difference between the Taylor cylinder and C. Whereas C speaks of Tirhaka, T knows only of the Delta princes in 701. It is they who advanced against Sennacherib at Altaku. We hear nothing of Tirhaka. This is very strange if he occupied such a controlling position of influence in Egypt at this time as is usually assigned to him. Tirhaka always showed himself an uncompromising adversary of Assyria. Why, then, does not Sennacherib notice him if he were the real head of Egyptian affairs? No satisfactory answer is given to this question. It must be assumed that the collision with Tirhaka came at a later stage in the campaign after the battle of Altaku, and that Sennacherib deleted any reference to it, as it turned out disastrously for the Assyrians. But is this not becoming a trifle complicated?—to assume a regency of Tirhaka before his formal accession to the throne, on the basis of an assumed necessity of dating C in 701, and then to assume that Sennacherib omitted to mention him as his antagonist at that time because, in the assumed final stage of the campaign after the battle of Altaku, Sennacherib suffered a reverse? Is it not simpler and more
natural to refer C to a campaign subsequent to Tirhaka’s accession to the throne?

(3) But it is further objected to Winckler’s theory, that the reference to Tirhaka does not belong to C, but to B, and B is dated by Winckler himself in 701. Here the question is raised as to the exact dividing line between the two narratives. This must be at verse 9, where the account of the second embassy begins; but is it at xix. 9a or 9b? This is a purely literary question, and in the nature of the case no absolutely fixed conclusion can be reached. All that can be fairly required is to show that there is at least as good reason for taking xix. 9a with what follows, as there is for taking it with what precedes. Two arguments have been urged for taking xix. 9a with what precedes. The first and most obvious is that Isaiah’s prophecy that Sennacherib shall hear a rumor and return to his own land is fulfilled when Sennacherib hears of Tirhaka’s advance. Again, it is said, that xix. 9a agrees better with the spirit of the first narrative, which permits human agency in the overthrow of Sennacherib, than with the second narrative, which ascribes Assyria’s destruction to divine power alone. But it is only when verse 9a is separated from what follows that it can be interpreted of the immediate human cause of Sennacherib’s withdrawal. If taken with what follows, it cannot be construed as giving the real reason of his retreat, and therefore cannot be brought into contradiction with the tendency of the second narrative. If, now, verse 19a is examined more closely, the question may fairly be raised whether it was originally intended to be regarded as the fulfillment of xix. 7 through human agency as distinguished from immediate divine intervention. If the present text be retained, there is, as we have seen, a break between verse 8 and verse 9a. The subject of waj-jish-ma’ has changed. Further, verse 8b is left very strangely unexplained.
Why did Sennacherib remove from Lachish to Libnah? What is the object of the statement in verse 8 anyway? If it be said that it explains how the Rab-shakeh came to withdraw from Jerusalem, this is an explanation which needs an explanation. For what has Sennacherib’s withdrawal from Lachish to do with the Rab-shakeh’s withdrawal from Jerusalem? We may guess, but we are not informed. What follows does not tell us, as we might expect it would. In other words, there is a distinct gap between verse 8 and verse 9. This gap is widened if the reading of the LXX. at verse 9a is adopted; for now a new event is introduced, namely, the advance of Tirhaka, without any indication of its connection with what has gone before.

We have already seen the hand of the Redactor in the waj-ja-shobh of verse 9b, which connects the second embassy with the first. It seems to me altogether probable that he is also responsible for the waj-jish-ma‘ of verse 9a. He also saw in verse 9a the fulfillment of verse 7, and changed the text to its present form, in order to bring out this connection. Accordingly, it is the Redactor who suggests that verse 9a is the fulfillment of verse 7, and hence belongs to the preceding narrative. But he is as little to be trusted in this view as he is in his view of the relationship of the second embassy to the first, indicated by his insertion of waj-ja-shobh. In reality, verse 9a has no more to do with what precedes than verse 9b. In view of these considerations, it would seem highly inadvisable to reject Winckler’s theory, because of his literary analysis of the documents, when positive historical arguments are seen to favor it.

(4) Finally, there is a chronological objection to Winckler’s theory. If, as seems altogether probable, Hezekiah’s accession year was 720, and he reigned twenty-nine years, his last year would be 692. It is scarcely possible that the campaign could have taken place in 692, for then Sennacherib was too much en-
ggrossed with the Elamite and Babylonian wars, which were still undecided. The victory of Chalule was not won until 691. Hence, if 720 be accepted as Hezekiah's accession year, and Hezekiah was still reigning subsequent to 691, an error must be accepted in the length of his reign as given at 2 Kings xviii. 2. This is inconvenient; for, though the synchronisms in the biblical chronology are undoubtedly to be rejected in their present form, the lengths of the various kings' reigns seem to be better supported in this part of the history of the monarchy, from the fall of Samaria to the fall of Jerusalem, than in any other. Nevertheless, the uncertainty of any arguments or objections based upon the biblical chronology of the royal period generally is so great that I cannot feel that historical combinations probable in themselves should be rejected for chronological reasons alone. So far, therefore, as the dating of C is concerned, my impression is that Winckler has decidedly the best of it as against his opponents. But why not assign B also to the later campaign? It is true Winckler's second and third arguments are not available for the later dating of B. On Winckler's analysis, B does not mention Tirhaka, nor does it contain anything in its present form which is analogous to the Herodotus legend. But the first argument is still in force. B is as inconsistent with the established events of 701 as is C. Winckler himself admits the inconsistency, and when he attempts to insert B into the campaign of 701 he only brings into yet clearer light the impossibility of doing so. Thus, for example, he very properly holds that the surrender of Hezekiah (A) cannot precede the demand for surrender (B). Hence he places A immediately after B, i.e. after xix. 8, which of course is in flat contradiction to the entire conception of events in the second narrative. Further, if the Assyrians were compelled to withdraw involuntarily without taking Jerusalem,
as B implies, it is difficult to see, as Winckler himself realizes, why Hezekiah should then pay tribute. The danger was over. Hezekiah might well strip the temple to buy Sennacherib off, but he scarcely would have done so in order to present the Great King with a thank offering. Accordingly I would suggest that B as well as C deals with Sennacherib’s second western campaign, a suggestion long ago made by Sir Henry Rawlinson, who was also following first impressions in the new study of the monuments.

And what are the objections to a return, after having boxed the compass of historical combinations, to the point from which the criticism of this campaign originally started? So far as I can see, there are only two arguments of any weight against this supplement to Winckler’s theory: (a) the fact that, in both A and B, Sennacherib is said to be at Lachish. “It is hardly to be supposed,” says Schrader, “that Sennacherib on both occasions [i.e. on two separate campaigns] made exactly the same spot his head-quarters, and also that Hezekiah despatched envoys to him both times just at the moment when the Great King was staying at this place, no earlier and no later;” (b) the notice that the Rab-shakeh came with a great army corresponds to Sennacherib’s statement that he blockaded Jerusalem in 701, and hence favors this date for B. But this reference to the Rab-shakeh really furnishes an indirect argument for the theory of two campaigns. Difficulty has been repeatedly found with the introduction of the Rab-shakeh and his large army. Was the mission of the Rab-shakeh military or diplomatic? It is difficult to say. A great army is indeed mentioned, but it was seen to be a rather ghostly affair, without body or vitality. Further, this great army, if it is a great army, not only contradicts the express statements of C (xix. 32), but also seems to be an alien element in B. The very fact that so little is made of
it shows this. Finally, if B is dated in 701, on account of the agreement of the reference to the great army with the Taylor cylinder, on the other hand B differs entirely from T in its description of what the army did or rather did not do. According to T, it ravaged the cities of Judah in the most ruthless manner. According to B, it vanishes from the scene without accomplishing anything at all. Does not this very illusive army in B, which makes trouble only for the exegete, suggest that reminiscences of two distinct campaigns have been blended in B, in one of which Jerusalem really was invested (701), in the other of which the Assyrian army was only able to make a demand upon Hezekiah to surrender through an envoy sent from a distance? Thus this army of the Rab-shakeh which has been summoned to curse the theory which would date B subsequent to 701, may, like Balaam, turn and bless it.

It is probably the first objection urged above, the coincidence in locality, which, more than any other consideration, has prevented critics from recognizing what seems to me to be the true state of affairs. Schrader's formulation of the argument is partly incorrect. Hezekiah did not twice send envoys to Lachish. In one case he does (A), but in the second case it is Sennacherib who sends envoys from Lachish (B). But, on the supposition that A and B refer to two different campaigns, it is true that Sennacherib would seem to have been twice in Lachish. This argument from coincidence in locality may be met in either of two ways. First, it may be held that "Lachish" in 2 Kings xviii. 14 is an incorrect gloss, which was introduced from xviii. 17 ff. This view is no more violent than to suppose that the references to Lachish in xviii. 17 and xix. 7 are glosses from xviii. 14, as Winckler maintains, or that Sennacherib in A is a mistake for Sargon, as Kleinert maintained.120 It is really no more violent than the various harmonistic assumptions by
which it has been sought to reconcile A and B. In this particular case the non-originality of "Lachish" might be supported by the independent testimony of T, which seems to speak only of a tribute sent by Hezekiah to Nineveh. I do not forget that the inscription of the famous bas-relief cited above, which depicts Sennacherib receiving the submission of Lachish, has been urged in support of A. But this argument assumes that the relief refers to the campaign of 701.\textsuperscript{180} If there was a later western campaign, I fail to see why it might not just as well refer to that. It is certainly noticeable that neither the Taylor cylinder nor the Bull inscription, though each purports to be a detailed record of the expedition of 701, mentions the conquest of Lachish, especially when this victory was considered to be important enough to be commemorated by a special bas-relief. Yet the supposition of a gloss at xviii. 14, though long ago suggested by Klostermann and admitted as possible by Meinhold, is open to the objection that it is adopted as the result of a theory. But to assume glosses in the interests of theories when the text is not open to suspicion on independent critical grounds, is always an unsatisfactory method of argumentation. It does not convince the skeptical. In the present instance, moreover, the assumption of the proposed gloss is rather against exegetical probabilities, for the introduction of a reference to Lachish aggravates the contradiction between A and B. We would not expect such a gloss. It is psychologically unnatural.

Hence, on the whole, I prefer, secondly, to challenge Schrader's assertion that it is unnatural to suppose that Sennacherib twice made Lachish his head-quarters. Why is this unnatural, if a second western campaign be once granted? Lachish was a strong strategical position; so much so, in fact that Richard Coeur de Leon twice made it a base of operations in his day.\textsuperscript{181} History does repeat itself sometimes, and what
was possible for the Crusader was equally possible for his Semitic predecessor. I am aware of the well-merited odium which attaches to harmonizing by duplication. There was a blind man healed as He was entering Jericho (Mark) and there was a blind man healed as He was leaving Jericho (Matthew). Ergo, there were two healings (and two Jerichos?). This style of settling scriptural difficulties is fortunately on the wane. Yet, in the present instance, I am strongly inclined to adopt the theory of two Assyrian occupations of Lachish, for the reason that it enables us satisfactorily to account for the confusion of two separate campaigns in the present form of our biblical narrative which has already been suggested by the introduction of the "large army" of the Rab-shakeh into B. Lachish being referred to in both A and B, the Redactor, and following his lead the majority of biblical scholars, supposed that both narratives dealt with the same campaign, and, in spite of the obvious difficulties in the way, A and B have been accordingly united. The silence of T and the Bull inscription as to Lachish would favor assigning the bas-relief to the second expedition. In that case a new evidence, though admittedly a precarious one, would be gained for the second campaign.

It should be carefully observed that, if Winckler's theory is qualified in the way above suggested, narratives B and C must again be regarded as parallel accounts of the same event, not as accounts of originally different events gradually assimilated to each other in the course of transmission. In other words, Meinhold's view, which is the usual view of the literary relationship of the two accounts, must be adopted. And, after all, this is the more probable view. But are we not then driven to accept Meinhold's negative conclusions? This will depend on whether xix. 9a is taken as the conclusion of what precedes or the introduction to what follows. If xix. 9a, supplemented by
verses 36 and 37, is regarded as the conclusion of B, and B itself is parallel to C, the logical result is the equation of the destruction of the Assyrians in C with the simple withdrawal of Sennacherib at the news of Tirhaka’s advance and his subsequent murder in B. In other words, C, which is admittedly late in its theologizing conceptions, must be supposed to have exaggerated the simple retirement of Sennacherib from Palestine into an awful, miraculously-wrought disaster. But the very neatness of this logical process suggests artificiality, and such historical sense as I may have protests against Meinhold’s syllogistic conclusion. I cannot escape the conviction that some disaster, more terrible than Meinhold’s critique allows us to infer, lies at the foundation of C and Herodotus. The disproportion between the historical kernel admitted by Meinhold and the legendary accretion is too great. Meinhold himself seems to realize this. Hence his endeavor to read into the Taylor cylinder hints of a real failure in the campaign. But this interpretation of T has been shown to be erroneous. There was no failure in 701. The disproportion between the historical kernel and the legendary growth is left unaccounted for. Hence I must question the premises from which Meinhold draws his logically correct but historically doubtful conclusion. The parallelism of the narratives I admit. Meinhold’s division of the narratives I challenge. If Winckler’s division of the two sources at xix. 9a, instead of at 9b, be adopted, what may be called Meinhold’s minor premise will be destroyed, and his conclusion will no longer follow. When once verse 9a is taken with what follows, xix. 32 can no longer be regarded as parallel to it, and the two events can no longer be regarded as being in the improbable relation of historical cause and legendary effect. The historical cause has been lost. Narrative B is left unfinished at xix. 8. A part of its conclusion is probably to be
found in verses 36 and 37. But the retreat described in these verses must itself be accounted for. Either an actual victory of Tirhaka or more probably a plague that broke out in the Assyrian camp compelled Sennacherib's retreat. This was probably related in B, but was deleted with the exception of verses 36 and 37, in favor of the more marvelous version of the event preserved in C. Such an event will furnish us with the necessary historical starting-point by which to account for the form which the legend finally assumed in C. Thus the truth must lie somewhere between the positions of Meinhold and Winckler. C and B are parallel narratives, and C is an exaggeration of B (Meinhold), but not to the extent which Meinhold maintains. Assyria did suffer a great disaster, of which C and Herodotus are the legendary reminiscences, the more historical account having been partially deleted from B. But this misfortune was so great that no room can be found for it in 701 (Winckler). Hence not only C (Winckler), but B also is to be assigned to a second western campaign. This is confirmed by the mention of Tirhaka, which demands a date later than 701 (Winckler), and by indications of a later western campaign in the monuments (Winckler). The relationship of Tirhaka to the Assyrian disaster must remain undetermined. Our present narratives only bring him into connection with Sennacherib's embassy to Hezekiah. Was he the instrument of this disaster, or did he only take advantage of some natural calamity that overtook the Assyrian army?¹⁸⁸ The loss of B's conclusion prevents any decisive answer to this question, though the latter view seems to be the more probable. However that may be, the question with which our discussion originally started can be answered decisively. Assyria did meet with a Waterloo, but this was not in the campaign of 701, but in a later campaign.¹⁸⁴
NOTES.

1 Nagel, Der Zug des Schachb gegen Jerusalem (Leipzig, 1902); Prahek, Schachb’s Feldzüge gegen Judah (Berlin, 1908). The latter work is an elaboration of the author’s articles in the Expository Times, Vols. xii. and xiii. (1901–02), and is valuable for orientation.

2 The word implies that Hezekiah had revolted, though there is no reference to this in the preceding context.

3 The text is doubtful; cf. the parallel passage (Isa. xxxvi. 2 ff.).

4 2 Kings xviii. 21–25; cf. verses 32b–35. In verse 25 the Rabshakeh assumes that Jehovah himself has empowered Sennacherib to undertake this expedition, and therefore will not deliver Hezekaiah. In verses 32b–35 Jehovah is represented as being unable to resist Sennacherib, and hence Jerusalem will not be delivered. There is undoubtedly a formal contradiction here. This may not be inconsistent with the character of the Rabshakeh (Kittel). Yet it is worth noticing that verses 32–35 are substantially found again in the so-called second embassy (xix. 10–13), while in this latter passage there is no parallel to verse 25.

5 The word ruach may refer to the disposition of Sennacherib, which is to be changed, or perhaps better to a spirit or influence which is to effect this changed disposition, a spirit of fear; cf. the spirit which deceives Ahab (2 Kings xxii.).

6 2 Kings xix. 1–7. 7 2 Kings xix. 8.

9 The parallel (Isa. xxxvi. 9) omits this word, and in place of it repeats the verb “he heard.” For the significance of this change, vid. infra.

10 2 Kings xix. 10–14. This second embassy appears to be more blasphemous than the first. Contrast xix. 10 (God deceives) with xviii. 30 ff. (Hezekiah deceives); cf. note 4, end.

11 2 Kings xix. 15–19.

12 No message to Isaiah is referred to; contrast 2 Kings xix. 1 ff.


15 2 Kings xix. 32–34. Thus there are four prophecies relating to the same subject: (1) verse 7; (2) verses 21–28; (3) verses 29–31 (note the abrupt change in the person addressed between verses 21–28 and verse 29); (4) verses 32–34. In verses 7a, 28, and 33 the thought is of the withdrawal of Sennacherib, in verse 7b of his death, in verses 29–31 of the relief and future glory of the land, and in verse 32 of the immunity of Jerusalem. Nagel’s attempt (pp. 47–52) to find a logical sequence of thought in these prophecies is artificial.

16 2 Kings xix. 36, 37. Observe that verse 37 is the final and complete fulfillment of the prophecy in verse 7b.

17 The accounts are also formally distinguished in an interesting way. In xviii. 13b–16 the name of the Jewish king is regularly spelt
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Hisqisqa, in verses 17ff. it is spelt Hisqisjahu. In verse 13a it is also spelt Hisqisjahu; and this fact, together with the further fact that the verse is found in Isa. xxxvi., though verses 14–16 are not retained, has led many writers to take verse 13 with verses 17 ff. But verse 13b is essential in order to explain verses 14–16, and, on the other hand, it is really incompatible with verses 17 ff. (vid. infra). Since the synchronism in verse 13a betrays the hand of the Redactor, this will account for the spelling of the name of Hezekiah in this clause.


"Cf., for example, the schemes of Schrader, Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament, i. 302, 305; McCurdy, History, Prophecy, and the Monuments, ii. 291; Rogers, History of Babylonia and Assyria, ii. 200; Kittel, Geschichte der Hebräer, ii. 311; Köhler, Lehrbuch der Biblischen Geschichte des Alten Testaments, ii. 2. 442, note 1; also the commentaries on Isaiah of Delitzsch, p. 300, of Dillmann (5th German ed.), p. 313, and of Kittel, König, pp. 290 ff., and Nagel’s work, pp. 46, 60 ff. The subsequent references to these authors will be to the works here cited.

The one argument urged in favor of the assumption that Sennacherib acted treacherously in this affair is drawn, not from the present passage, but from Isa. xxxiii. 1–12 (so Delitzsch; Dillmann; McCurdy, p. 291; Kittel, p. 313; and especially Köhler, p. 442, note 1). Here is a spoiler and a treacherous spoiler. Here are disappointed ambassadors and a wasted land. But who is this spoiler and why are the ambassadors disappointed? What is the historical background of this prophecy? It must be guessed at. The prophecy is an exceedingly obscure one. There is absolutely nothing by which to identify the treacherous spoiler. Granting that the characterization of the enemy as a spoiler and what is said of the fear and distress of the land will fitly describe Sennacherib and his campaign of 701, yet the passage will hardly serve as a proof of Sennacherib’s treachery in this campaign and for this reason. The prophecy in Isa. xxxiii. is referred to the campaign of 701 because of what is known of this campaign from 2 Kings xviii. 13 ff. and from the Assyrian sources. But there is nothing about the treachery of Sennacherib recorded in these sources. His treachery is only an assumption made to bridge over two incompatible passages in Kings. But treachery is the most prominent characteristic of the spoiler of Isa. xxxiii. The mere reference to a spoiler and to the desolation of the land would be satisfied by Tiglath-pileser as well as by Sennacherib. Why then is the background of Isa. xxxiii., which emphasizes in particular the treachery of the spoiler, indentified with Sennacherib’s campaign of 701? Only because it has been inferred from Kings that he was guilty of double dealing. In other words, the very obscure passage Isa. xxxiii. is first interpreted on the basis of a certain in-
terpretation of the narrative in Kings which involves an assumption, and then is utilized to support that assumption. This is certainly an illogical procedure. So long as Isa. xxxiii. is of doubtful interpretation, and must rely for its explanation on a certain theory of the meaning of the narrative in Kings, it cannot be fairly utilized to support that theory. Reduced to its simplest terms, the method which would utilize Isa. xxxiii. to justify the sequence in 2 Kings xviii. 13-16 and 17 ff., is to support an assumption by a guess. The above discussion is based on the supposition that Isa. xxxiii. is a genuine prophecy, but this is by no means certain. Nor is it certain that Isaiah made any such promises of deliverance in 701, but this consideration anticipates our discussion.

"2 Kings xix. 21.

* Isa. 1. 7, 8. Cf. also McCurdy's description (p. 285) of the destructiveness of this campaign.

"The rather flippant tone of this remark would have led to its deletion on the revision of this article, had not I found that the latest defender of the biblical sequence, Nagel, still follows Köhler's method of avoiding the meaninglessness of xix. 32 after xviii. 13-16. Köhler (p. 250) holds that the Rab-shakeh having withdrawn (xix. 8), Isaiah now promises in xix. 32 that Sennacherib will not come again (1) to molest Jerusalem, and even McCurdy maintains that xix. 32 does not prove "that the narrator supposed that no siege had preceded." But surely would not xix. 32 have had a slightly brassy sound, just a little tinkle of the cymbal in it, if Hezekiah had just been compelled to yield up the palace and the temple treasures to Sennacherib? It is not contended that there are no hints of a desolated land in the narrative begun at xviii. 17 ff.; cf. especially xix. 29, where the cultivation of the soil which had been interrupted by the Assyrians was to be again resumed, and the fact that the Assyrian army under the Rab-shakeh had reached the walls of Jerusalem, from which one might easily infer that the land had been previously devastated. It is obvious, also, that xix. 32-34, when interpreted strictly according to the letter, refers only to the immunity of Jerusalem. But what is maintained is that there is no thought of a contrast between ruined land and saved capital. If such a contrast had been in the mind of the writer, how natural it would have been for him to place a reference to the conquered Jewish cities in the mouth of the Rab-shakeh instead of, or at least in addition to, the reference to foreign towns (2 Kings xviii. 32-35)! Moreover, such a contrast would, as it seems to me, defeat the whole tendency of the narrative, as it culminates in the complete overthrow of the Assyrians (xix. 35-37), in fulfillment of the promises of Isaiah (cf. Meinhold, Die Jesajaerzählungen, 59 and 75 ff.). The tendency of the narrative is to emphasize the fact that the Assyrians were unable to
accomplish anything. But is there not, after all, a latent contradiction between these hints of a desolated land and the advance of the Rab-shakech’s army up to the very walls of Jerusalem and the tendency of the narrative taken as a whole?

2 Kings xviii. 14–16.

Isa. xxxvi. 1; 2 Kings xviii. 13; cf. Schrader, ii. 306, n.; Tiele, Babylonisch-assyriscbe Geschichte, ii. 316; Dillmann, 313, for admission of tendency omission at this point in Isaiah. Meinhold (p. 58) argues that the omission is due only to a desire to abbreviate, since 2 Kings xviii. 13 is retained in Isa. xxxvi. 1, although it also is opposed to the spirit of xviii. 17 ff. On the other hand, the Redactor of Isaiah might regard xxxvi. 1 as heightening the effect of Hezekiah’s refusal to surrender (cf. supra, p. 581), and therefore might feel justified in retaining 2 Kings xviii. 13, whereas 2 Kings. xviii. 14–16 is directly contradictory to xviii. 17 ff., Hezekiah doing in the former case what he refused to do in the latter, and therefore was rejected.

2 Chron. xxxii. 1.

Cf. Nagel (p. 3 ff.) for the mutual relationship of the inscriptions. He explains the slight material differences in the Bull inscription as due to oral tradition, or to information which a contemporary of the events could easily insert. The references in what follows will be to the lines in the Taylor cylinder (designated as T). For this cylinder, cf. Kellinschriftliche Bibliothek, ii. 91–97. For the inscription of Constantinople, Ibid., 119; for the bas-relief, Ibid., 115; for the Bull inscription, cf. Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament, i. 254 ff. Unfortunately the Basseam and C cylinders are not accessible to me.

T, col. ii. lines 34–56. The omission of any reference to Tyre in this connection is rather remarkable. Did Sennacherib attack Tyre at this time? Winckler (Altorientalische Forschungen, 2te Reihe, 65 ff.) and McCurdy (op. cit., 281 ff.) seek to utilize Josephus, Antiq. i. 2, to authenticate an attack on Tyre. But the passage is very doubtful, and in Die Kellinschriften und das Alte Testament (2te Auflage, 62, n. 4 and 94, n. 2) Winckler inclines to refer the account of the siege of Tyre to the period of Esar-haddon and Assurbanipal. If Tyre itself was attacked by Sennacherib, the only reason for his failure to mention this fact must be his desire to slur over a failure in the campaign (Winckler, McCurdy). But if, as Winckler holds, Zidon was at this time really subject to Tyre, Sennacherib may have contented himself with reducing Zidon, and so crippling Tyre without attempting to take it, as it was naturally strongly fortified, and he did not wish to be detained too long by the siege operations which would be necessary if it were to be reduced (cf. Rogers, 185, and Tiele, Babylonisch-assyriscbe Geschichte, 290). In that case we cannot
argue from his failure to mention Tyre to a failure in an attempt to
conquer it.

* T, col. iii. line 25.
* T, col. ii. lines 58–68. The towns here described as belonging to
Ashkelon would geographically more naturally belong to Ekron. Mc-
Curdy (pp. 290 ff.) suggests that the Assyrian annalist has here made
a mistake.

* Whether these kings are really kings of Musri rather than rulers
of Egypt is a question that has no vital bearing upon the problem
before us, and may therefore be left in abeyance.

* T, col. ii. line 69–col. iii. line 1.
* The phrase here used seems to refer only to homage rendered, and
does not imply deportation and captivity; cf. Myer, Die Entstehung
des Judenthums, pp. 108 ff., followed by Rogers, ll. 199, n. 2.

* T, col. iii. lines 11–41. The translation in lines 34–41 is some-
what doubtful. Is it "he [Hezekiah] let the tribute be sent after
me" or "I [Sennacherib] let the tribute be sent after me"? The
first person is favored by Tiele, 318, n.; Winckler, Alttestamentliche
Untersuchungen, 82 and n. 2; Prásek, 23; and Bezold in KB, ii. 97;
cf. Schrader, l. 296.

* 2 Kings xviii. 8.  ** Cf. Meinhold, 92.

* Rogers, ll. 195; Prásek, 20.
* Cf. Tiele, 315; McCurdy, ll. 284, 287.  ** Cf. Tiele, 315.

* So Winckler, Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen, (ATU), 31;
Tiele, 231; Meinhold, 99 ff.; Rogers, ll. 189, 200; Nagel, 35 ff.

* So Köhler, 488; McCurdy, ll. 429; Kittel, Könige-Bücher, 290.
These writers seek to discredit the sequence of T, because of the po-
sition of the references to Ekron and to Padi. But certainly it seems
much fairer to accept the general sequence of T as chronological and
explain the position of the reference to Padi as due to topical rea-
sions, than to reject the sequence of T and place the conquest of Jeru-
salem earlier in the campaign because the account of Padi’s restora-
tion presupposes it. Kittel (op. cit., 290) also adduces the omission
of temporal particles at col. iii. line 11 (contrast line 1), as an evi-
dence of the unchronological character of the sequence in T at this
point. But col. ii. line 58 is not introduced by a temporal particle
either, and yet the conquest of Ashkelon must surely have followed
on the reduction of Zidon. As little is it possible to discredit the
chronological sequence as a whole, because of the difficulty referred
to in note 30. Nagel (pp. 35 ff.) accepts the chronological sequence
of C.

* Schrader, l. 300; Kittel, 290.
* Meinhold, 96; Rogers, ll. 199; and cf. also Winckler, ATU, 29.

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"Tiele, 292, 315, Meinhold, 96.

"The presence of the Rab-shakeh, on the other hand, before the very walls of Jerusalem, would seem to agree with the statements in the monuments. But Nagel himself argues (p. 41) that it is the prophecies of Isaiah in xviii. 17 ff. which stand in the foreground, and which furnish the point of view from which the narrative as a whole is to be judged. We are not, therefore, at liberty to qualify the contradiction between Sennacherib's statement of his investment of Jerusalem and 2 Kings xix. 32 by introducing the episode of the Rab-shakeh. There is confusion at this point within the biblical account itself; cf. supra, note 23, and Meinhold, 77.

"Vid. supra, p. 579.

"Cf. Tiele, 290. If the reference is to kings of Musri, then the difference would be even more emphasized.

"Cf. Winckler, ATU, 27, 35. Nagel, 96 ff., very properly urges that Winckler is here guilty of an inconsistency when he explains the silence of Sennacherib as to Tyre as due to the desire to cover up a reverse, but refuses to apply the same explanation to the case of Tirhaka. But if the position adopted above (note 28) be accepted, Nagel's charge of inconsistency becomes no longer applicable.

"Cf. Sargon's well-known attempt to cover up his defeat by Merodach-baladan, Keilinschrifftliche Bibliothek, ii. 37, compared with 277.

"T, col. iii. lines 20-23 (cited above, p. 584), are now usually interpreted of a blockade rather than a formal siege, the regular word for siege not being employed here. So Winckler, ATU, 31, and after him Rogers, ii. 201; McCurdy, li. 431; Prassek, 14, 20; Kittel, Koenigsbucher, 289; Duhm, Jesaia. Rogers utilizes this distinction between a blockade and a siege in order to avoid the contradiction noted above between T and 2 Kings xix. 32. But this is to tone down the blockade to an unwarranted degree. Sennacherib states positively that he erected fortifications against the city.

"Schrader, i. 306. 

"Ibid., 299.

"Ibid., 301; cf., also, Kohler, 441, n. 1, and Nagel, 99.

"Meinhold, 100; cf., also, Schrader, i. 300; Kittel, Gesch. li. 321 ff.; and Nagel, 37.

"Tiele, 318; cf., also, McCurdy's statement (li. 290) that the severity of the treatment of Ekron was "quite rare in the history of the Assyrian policy in Palestine." On the other hand, it is only fair to remember that Sennacherib had an unusually vindictive temper, even for an Assyrian; witness his atrocious sacking of Babylon. His more lenient treatment of Hezekiah may therefore have been determined, in part at least, by some other cause. Vid. infra.
The "rumor" in 2 Kings xix. 7 has been explained as referring to the news of these domestic troubles (so Winckler, ATU, 32, note 1; Cheyne, Introduction to the Book of Isaiah; McCurdy, ii. 302).

Schrader, i. 301; Tiele, 292, 318; Cheyne, 235; and McCurdy, ii. 431, as well as Köhler, 441, note 1 and Nagel, 100, all view this mention of the harem with skepticism.

Urged by Winckler, ATU, 31; Prasek, 21; Rogers, ii. 201, note 2.

If the first person be adopted (see note 34), there need be no contradiction between 1 and 2 Kings xvii. 14. Hezekiah may have sent his tribute to Lachish (Kings), but Sennacherib, having already set out for home, had it forwarded after him to Nineveh. There is nothing improbable in such a supposition.

The view of Kittel, Gesch., ii. 311; Rogers, ii. 199 ff., Nagel, 108 ff.

So Rogers, ii. 202, and Nagel, 51, 97.

The only exegetical argument for such an extension of the campaign is drawn by McCurdy, ii. 301, and Nagel, from 2 Kings xix. 24, where the verb is read as a future, "I will dry up the Nile arms," etc. The verb is pointed future, it is true, but this Massoretic conception of the verse is clearly against the context.

The view of Schrader, i. 303; Winckler, ATU, 43; McCurdy, ii. 295, 297; Köhler, 436 ff., 247, note 1.

E. g. Tiele (p. 293) frankly confesses that Isaiah was deceived when he promised Hezekiah absolute immunity.

Cf. especially the very exalted view of God in 2 Kings xix. 15-19. The existence of other gods is here denied. They are wood and stone. This is the view of Deutero-Isaiah, scarcely of Isaiah himself, certainly not of his contemporaries. Again, the inviolability of Jerusalem for Jehovah's sake and for his servant David's sake is an essentially Deuteronomistic idea growing out of the centralization of the cultus in Jerusalem since the times of Josiah. Isaiah's view of Jerusalem was quite different. It was not sacrosanct. David himself had encamped against it, and it was to be again a shambles; cf. Isa. xxix. 1. The "altar-hearth" is here a symbol of the slaughter that is to take place in Jerusalem; cf. Duhm, ad loc., and so even Calvin.

McCurdy (ii. 299 ff., 428) seeks to tone down this statement: (1) by correcting 185,000 to 5,180; (2) by deleting the demonstrative "that" in xix. 35, after the LXX.; and (3) by striking out the reference to the night as a later addition, because it is omitted in the parallel passage (Isa. xxxvii. 36) and in Chronicles. Granting the somewhat unusual mode of expressing the numbers, this text-critical operation cannot be accepted because it is against the spirit of the narrative, and because it is against the context. The reference to the awakening in the morning is preserved in Isaiah as well as in
Kings, and certainly implies that the destruction happened in one night. It is juggling with words to hold, as Delitzsch does, that the destruction may have continued through a longer period of time. Marvel also attaches to the figure of the prophet. In xix. 20 ff. he does not need to be told of Hesekiah's prayer, but is ready at once with the answer, as if he were gifted with omniscience.

"1 Kings xix. 24 seems to imply the conquest of Egypt. The verb is translated, it is true, "I will dry up," in accordance with the Massoretic pointing, (retained by McCurdy, ii. 301, and Nagel, 18,) but the context shows that it should unquestionably be read as a past. In that case the conquest of Egypt is an accomplished fact. Dillmann explains the statement of Sargon's victories over Egypt at Raphia, but we would expect a reference here to Sennacherib's own victories. Moreover, Egypt was not really invaded until the times of Esar-haddon and Assurbanipal, which suggests that xix. 34 was composed at a considerably later date. Attention is also called to the practical identification of "Hebrew" with the language spoken in Judah at xviii. 26. This would be natural only after the Northern Kingdom had been destroyed for some time, and it is questionable whether the twenty years that had elapsed since the fall of Samaria would be sufficient time for the development of this mode of speech. In this connection the probable dependence of xviii. 21 upon Ezek. xxix. 6 may also be noticed (cf. Meinhold, 81). Nagel's laborious defense of the priority of Kings, or rather of the Isaiah parallel, is amusing rather than convincing. Those who use walking-sticks should give heed to it.

"Cf. xix. 7 and 37.

"It is true that the "and he dwelt in Ninevah" (xix. 36), might in itself allow the supposition that considerable time elapsed between the arrival of Sennacherib in his capital and his murder, but the point of the judgment would in that case be largely lost. It was to be a punishment for his blasphemous attack upon Jerusalem, but it would hardly have been so construed if the author had not thought that it occurred in immediate connection with the sin which occasioned it.

"The factors in determining the original text of 2 Kings xix. 9—Isa. xxxvii. 9 are the following: (1) the sudden and unmediated change of subject at waj-fish-ma' of verse 9a. In verse 8 the subject is the Rab-shakeh, in verse 9 it must be Sennacherib, but there is no formal indication of this change, as we have the right to expect. (2) Isaiah has waj-fish-ma' at verse 9b, in place of waj-fa-shohb of Kings. At first sight the reading of Kings might seem to be preferable to the reading of Isaiah: (a) because the waj-fish-ma' of verse 9b is redundant after the waj-fish-ma' of verse 9a; and (b) because, if waj-fish-ma' of verse 9b were original, we would expect in verse 9a
The statement of a fact, and not of a rumor. But if the text of Kings is adopted, the difficulty of the subject of the first wasj-fish-ma, is left unexplained, and it is not easy to see how the second wasj-fish-ma became substituted for the very important wasj-fish-shobh, the only word that connects the two embassies together into a literary unity. If we now turn to the LXX. text of the Isaiah passage, we find in verse 9a a statement of a fact, and not of a rumor ("And Taraka, king of Ethiopia, went out to war against him, and he heard," etc.). This at once dispenses with the wasj-fish-ma of 9a, whose subject was seen to give trouble, and offers a proper foothold for the wasj-fish-ma of 9b. It seems to me clear that the text of Kings is accordingly to be emended after the LXX. of Isaiah (so also Meinhold and Marti). The wasj-fish-ma of 9a of Kings' text is then probably to be explained as due to the desire of the Redactor to emphasize the fact that the rumor of Tirhaka's advance is the fulfillment of the prophecy in verse 7, and the wasj-fish-shobh is also due to the Redactor, who thus unites two accounts which were originally independent of each other. That the wasj-fish-shobh of Kings is also retained in the LXX. of Isaiah will not vouch for its originality, as it is clearly due to conflation.

"Köhler (p. 251) and Nagel (p. 55) argue that the different mood of Hezekiah, in the first embassy panic-stricken, in the second calm and courageous, substantiates the present sequence. The assurance of Isaiah is supposed to have produced this change of temper. This is possible, yet it is strange that Hezekiah's prayer makes no recognition whatever of what God had already promised him through the prophet. He does not pray as if he had just before received a promise and is now asking God to redeem it. The temple scene is related as if he were now laying the matter before the Lord for the first time. The changed temper of Hezekiah is probably to be explained in quite a different way (vid. infra).

"Urged by Köhler (p. 249), as proof that the two accounts are of different events.

"Cf. Tiele, 317; Dillmann, 321. According to McCurdy (ll. 297), Sennacherib sends letters "to reinforce" [1] the demands of the Rab-shakeh," the latter having been withdrawn with his army to prepare for the Egyptian advance. But this would only expose the weakness of Sennacherib, and so far forth weaken the effect of Isaiah's bold defiance.

"So Schrader, 1. 303, 305; McCurdy, ll. 291 ff.; Kittel, Gesch. ll. 311; Tiele, 294; Dillmann, 314; Köhler, 249; Nagel, 114.


"So Cheyne, Introduction, 236; Rogers, ll. 201; Praëek, 23 and 27 apparently attempt to harmonize; e. g., the Rab-shakeh had a large army, but he preceded it.
P. 240, note, and 447.

"Can verse 33 be really a gloss from verse 28? Probably. So Duhm, Meinhold, 26, and Marti.

"So Nagel, 56.

"Ein Volkswitz," Duhm and Marti.

If this view be adopted, we may understand more fully the significance of the differences which have been pointed out between the two accounts. (1) In the first embassy the Rab-shakeh with a large army, in the second merely couriers with letters (xix. 23 is a part of the poem which is an interpolation in the second embassy, and in its reference to the messengers is more like the first account). An epistolatory correspondence agrees better with Isaiah's prophecies of immunity, especially with xix. 32. The deliverance is complete. Sennacherib comes nowhere near Jerusalem. He only sends letters. We now begin to see the reason for the confusion observed in notes 33 and 45. We are dealing with different sources. (2) Hezekiah's calmness in the second narrative. This is more in keeping with the later ideas of an ancient saint than is his panic in the first narrative. This difference arises not out of actual, different historical circumstances, as Köhler and Nagel would have us believe (see note 71), but out of different theological conceptions. (3) The blasphemy of the letters as compared with the blasphemy of the Rab-shakeh. While xviii. 32-35 are repeated at xix. 10-13, xviii. 25, in which the Rab-shakeh professes to have the sanction of Jehovah, is omitted in the letters. Thus only the words of defiance are found in the second narrative (cf. notes 4 and 9). Whether the view of Duhm, Meinhold, and Marti is true, that xviii. 32b-35 really belong only to the second narrative, since these verses contradict xviii. 25, may be left in doubt. Cf. note 4. Winckler, ATU, 40, holds that xix. 10-18 is the secondary passage. Thus Sennacherib's unqualified blasphemy, on the one hand, his complete impotence (only letters) on the other, Hezekiah's calmness and the total overthrow of the Assyrians,—all fit together into a consistent picture, whose differences from the narrative of the first embassy are due not to changed historical circumstances, but to changed theological conceptions which idealized the past. Cf. especially Meinhold, 27 ff.

Zeitschrift für Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 1886.

2 Kings xix. 22-28 is evidently interpolated into this second narrative (cf. even Köhler, 247, note 1). Its general point of view is more like that of the first narrative; cf. xix. 23 (the blasphemous messengers) with the speech of the Rab-shakeh, as contrasted with the blasphemous letters of the second narrative; also cf. xix. 28 with xix. 7.

That a miraculous plague is intended in xix. 35 is admitted on all hands; cf. Ex. xii. 21 ff.; 2 Sam. xxiv. 14 ff.
The three main arguments for regarding the mouse as a symbol of the plague are: (1) 1 Sam. v. and vi., which are supposed to furnish evidence of this symbolism of the mouse in Palestine; (2) Apollo, the plague-sender, is addressed as smintheus, or “mouse,” in Iliad, i. 39, which is held to be a witness to the general belief in the connection between the mouse and the plague; and (3) the statement in a fourth-century writer that the mouse was the hieroglyph for destruction. This is supposed to prove the use of this symbol, especially in Egypt. Per contra, (1) the text in 1 Sam. v. and vi. is very doubtful. Whether the reference to the mice is original is a debatable question. It is quite possible that all the references to the mice in these chapters came in from the LXX. (cf. H. P. Smith, Samuel). But if the references are retained, the mice would not seem to be a symbol of the plague, but an additional plague; cf. especially vi. 5a (struck out by Wellhausen as a gloss). (2) Again, it is very precarious to argue that the mouse was a symbol of the plague because Apollo, the plague-sender, was called smintheus, for he was also called sauroktonos, and lukeios, and parnophios. But neither lizards, nor wolves, nor grasshoppers can be regarded as symbols of the plague. In this connection, attention should be called to the fact that the gnawing of weapons by mice, and analogous mouse stories, are often met with in Greek legends; and in this particular incident there can be little doubt that the story of Herodotus is colored by Greek thought, though there is still left the mouse in the hand of the statue of Sethos (to which Herodotus alludes), which might be quite independent of Greek ideas. (3) As to the one direct evidence that the mouse was the Egyptian hieroglyph for plague, Meinhold cites Wiedemann to the effect that this identification is very questionable, and further calls attention to the fact that the mouse is said to be a symbol of destruction generally, and not of the plague. Cf. Meinhold, 33–42, for full discussion, and also Budge, History of Egypt, vi. 151.

Cf. Meinhold, 42–45, and 103 ff.

The text-reconstructions of Duhm and Marti at this point are gratuitous.

Cf. the favorable opinions of Tiele, 294; Winckler, ATU, 40, note 3; Meinhold, 67, 76–78.

“‘It is as clear as day that Narrative B as a whole has no place by the side of Narrative A or the Taylor cylinder’” (p. 101; cf. also pp. 33, 79, and 83).

P. 100; cf. 102 and 78. Vid supra, p. 589 ff.

Cf., also, Kittel, Könige, 291. Pp. 78, 100.
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For such a conformation, cf. the curious difference between Matt. xx1. 2–7 and Mark xi. 1–7. In Matthew the reference to both ass and colt is emphasized even to the incongruous idea involved in the phrase "upon them" (verse 7), in order to secure a stringently literal correspondence with Zech. ix. 9.

The genuineness of Isa. x. 10–34 is more dubious. The passage is a mosaic and in its present form of undoubtedly late compilation. But some of its fragments may very well be Isalianic.

Oct. 1905, p. 637 ff. Isa. xviii. 22, which supposes that the reforms had preceded, is unquestionably a gloss. It may be noted that in this same article (p. 639) it was freely admitted that a prophet was quite capable of making mistakes on occasion.

Contrast the waning of prophecy after the failure of Haggai and Zechariah in their attempt to set up a Messianic kingdom under Zerbubabel. Cf. Sellin, Studien zur Entstehung der Jüdischen Gemeinde, li. 185 ff.

It is a singular fact that neither Kohler nor Nagel seeks to utilize Herodotus as corroborative of the Bible. It is a phenomenon which I have often observed that those apologists who are most unready to admit a legendary element in the Bible are often the readiest to feel the legendary in extra-biblical narratives. I can easily understand how a critic will sense the legendary in Herodotus, but I fail to understand how the same critic will defend the strict historicity of the biblical account, except on the supposition that the sacred and the familiar have deadened his critical senses.

Prasek, 34; Budge (History of Egypt, vi. 144) dates accession year between 693–691; Petrie (History of Egypt, The XIXth–XXXth Dynasties, p. 296) adopts 693.

Schraeder, 306; Meinhold, 101; Nagel, 66.

Kellinschriftliche Bibliothek, ii. 130.

Prasek, 40; Rogers, ii. 214; Weber in his monograph Sancherib, Der alte Orient, 6 Jahrgang, Heft 3, p. 22.

Nagel, 68.

The Taylor cylinder covers Sennacherib's campaigns down to 691, in which year the inscription is dated. So the Arabian campaign must have happened after that. Scholars have usually placed it within the last eight blank years of the reign. Weber (p. 21), on the basis of Schell's newly discovered inscription, places it between 691 and 689. But the chronological data are as yet very uncertain.

It is interesting to note that Herodotus speaks of Sennacherib, in the legend already quoted, as King of the Arabians and Assyrians.
which seems to connect the Arabian campaign with the Egypto-Palestinian campaign. Tiele (307, note 1) disputes this combination originally suggested by Niebuhr, but without giving any reasons for his opinion.

121 Kittel, Könige, 291; Meinhold, 78; Nagel, 67; Petrie, 296.

122 This is the mistake which Petrie makes. He does not realize that the Bible, instead of supporting a co-regency in 701, throws doubt upon it. There is no contemporary Egyptian evidence of such a co-regency. Petrie adduces Tirhaka's statement that he was sent north at the age of twenty. He further estimates (though it is hardly more than a guess) that Tirhaka was born c. 721. Accordingly, he would have been sent north in 701, and Petrie assumes that at this time he was sent as co-regent. But this is altogether speculative, and Budge's view (p. 143) is equally probable that he was sent north in 701 to gain control of Egypt after the defeat of the Delta princes at Altaku.

123 Vid. supra, p. 588. 124 Kittel, Könige, 291.

125 Dillmann, Duhm, Kittel, Meinhold, and Marti, all divide at verse 19b.

126 Cf. especially Meinhold, 23, and also his Jesaja und seine Zeit, 18 ff.

127 Köhler (p. 249) conjectures that Sennacherib had instructed the Rab-shakeh to join him as soon as he heard of his removal from Lachish. Klostermann, ad. loc., interprets the shama' of xix. 8 as the beginning of the fulfillment of verse 7. The air seems to have been filled with all sorts of "rumors"; cf. note 56.

128 Meinhold seems to be guilty of an inconsistency at this point. At page 23 he argues, on the basis of the present text of verse 9a, that it is to be taken with what precedes as the fulfillment of verse 7, but at page 71 he emends the text of verse 9a after the LXX.

129 To those who adopt 714 as the fourteenth year of Hezekiah, on the basis of 2 Kings xvii. 13, as Prášek does (pp. 15 ff.), the chronological difficulty will be entirely avoided. But I cannot avail myself of this method, since 2 Kings xviii. 13 seems to me to be quite unreliable. The safest datum for determining Hezekiah's accession year remains Isa. xlv. 28-32, and this points to 720 (ATU, 135-142). But when Winckler (Kellinschriften und das Alte Testament, 274) seeks to date Sennacherib's second campaign in Manasseh's reign, I am unable to follow him.

130 Winckler is quite unsatisfactory at this point. He supposes that Hezekiah, even though Sennacherib had withdrawn, resolved to surrender as he saw himself surrounded by enemies, and only Jerusalem spared to him.

131 Herodotus, l. 384, and note 1. As a matter of historical interest,
It may be worth while to give Rawlinson's reasons for his view: (1) the apparent separation of the expeditions in Second Kings (xviii. 18 and xvii. 17); (2) the improbability of an attack on Jerusalem immediately after the payment of a ransom; (3) the fall of Lachish on the first occasion, its apparent escape on the second; (4) the improbability of national vanity going to the length of seeking to conceal an enormous disaster under cover of the proudest boasts; (5) the impossibility of a triumphant return with two hundred thousand captives to Nineveh after the loss sustained and the hasty flight that followed. It will be seen that arguments (2) and (4) have been utilized. The others are obsolete.

126 P. 306. 127 P. 102. 128 Cf. notes 23 and 45.

129 Winckler, ATU, 45; Kleinert, Studien und Kritiken, 1877, pp. 167 ff.

130 Cf. especially Prášek for this assumption.

131 Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, 234 ff.

132 Cf. pp. 596 ff. Marti urges the improbability of A and B really referring to two different events against Winckler's theory of two campaigns.

133 Tirhaka claims supremacy in Palestine, and we have two lists of his giving conquered Palestinian cities. But these seem to be cribbed from the lists of Sety and Rameses II. (Petrie, 296 ff.). Petrie does not allow more than a sphere of influence for Tirhaka in Palestine; yet, if Sennacherib did suffer such a reverse, there may be something more in Tirhaka's boasts than Petrie is willing to allow.

134 At first sight it may seem that but little good wheat has been sifted out from the biblical narratives by this lengthy discussion. But to one acquainted with recent developments in Isaiah criticism, the importance of the conclusions arrived at will be obvious. If there were two campaigns of Sennacherib, one of them ending in disaster for Judah, the other in disaster for Assyria, we will have two foci from which to describe Isaiah's eschatological expectations. Prophecies of disaster on the one hand and deliverance on the other, which have been alike referred to the campaign of 701, in defiance of all the demands of psychology in exegesis, may now find their explanation in the fact that they originated out of entirely different historical situations. Meinhold was right in starting his projected series of Isaiah studies with the narratives in chapters xxxvi. and xxxvii. It would be well worth while to reinvestigate the prophecies of Isaiah, not in the light of Meinhold's conclusions from these narratives, but rather in the light of Winckler's theory of two campaigns of Sennacherib. The cultivation of this most attractive field of investigation must, however, be deferred until a more convenient season.