

ARTICLE X.

NOTES.

IS EVOLUTION CALVINISTIC?

IN 1902, the Presbyterian General Assembly adopted an explanatory and supplementary creed, the genius of which was, "Away from Calvin." Stress was laid on the love of God; there was no direct surrender of the doctrine of predestination, but the tendency was clearly shown not so much by what was said, as by what was not said, in the new creed. At subsequent assemblies, the trend of thought in the church has been unmistakable, as evidenced by the final admission of the Arminian Cumberland Presbyterian Church to the Calvinistic fold. In a most logical review of the situation, President Patton, of Princeton Theological Seminary, the foremost theologian of the opposition, said, "I am compelled to conclude that when the General Assembly declared there was a sufficient agreement between the confessions of faith to warrant a union of these two bodies, no possible construction can be placed upon that action other than this, to-wit, That the union shall take place upon the basis of what is generally known as the evangelical faith of Christendom, and not upon the basis of the Calvinistic system contained in the Westminster Confession of Faith. No argument is needed, therefore, to show that the union of the two churches on the plan now proposed is to all intents and purposes a surrender on the part of the church which I have the honor to serve of its traditional position as a witness to the truth of the Augustinian or Calvinistic system."

It would seem, therefore, that Calvinism is growing distasteful to a large number of the Presbyterian clergy. It has long been distasteful to, and rejected by, the clergy of many other churches, Wesley long ago saying, "Calvin's God is my Devil." But it is hard to see how these churches can escape

Calvinism, and harder yet to see why the church that makes the Scriptures the only infallible rule of faith and practice should stand so ready and willing to cast overboard this doctrine, for which it has stood ever since its foundation. There can be only two valid reasons for rejecting Calvinism,—either it is contrary to the Scriptures or it is contrary to science.

Of the first of these reasons it is hardly necessary to say more than a word. Buttressed by an impregnable array of Scripture of which the strongest passages are found in the Pauline Epistles, can it be that the new thought in the Presbyterian Church considers the doctrine unscientific? The usual course of one dissatisfied with the teachings of the Bible is to turn to science, and in the much-discussed conflict between science and religion endeavor to find a refutation of that which is distasteful. But is the doctrine of predestination contrary to science? Does science offer hope for the dissatisfied theologian?

In addition to the argument for the rational necessity of such a doctrine in any theistic conception of the universe, it is possible to go a step further, and assert that here, at least, is a dogma that is thoroughly scientific. Aside from the purely philosophical considerations on which it may be based, is the wide scientific acceptance of it as a corollary to the law of evolution. One is compelled to accept it, or something essentially like but even more distasteful than it, or repudiate science along with revelation.

The very first proposition of evolution is that, while certain creatures are, by their innate, inherent unfitness, imperfection, or mediocrity, singled out for extinction either proximate or remote, others are endowed with superior attributes, and survive in the struggle for existence. Nor is it a question of heredity alone. Environment is not determined by the creature for itself any more than is heredity. Both are extrinsic from the lowest amoeba as well as the highest and most complex organism.

As to this endowment, it can occur from only one of two causes, either by mere chance or by the working of a universe-

mind pursuing a definite purpose. If it is attributed to mere chance, one rests his theory of the universe on pure accidentalism; if to the universe-mind, on an unmitigated fatalism. In either case one holds a theory that is nothing more or less than predestination stripped of theism. If, for the universe-mind, one substitutes the idea of an immanent God, one arrives irresistibly at something essentially not different from Calvinism. It is unescapable.

But, it may be urged, while this is true in the physical and biological worlds, it is not true in the psychical; that here at least, while a choice of heredity cannot, a conscious choice of environment can, be made. Yet a glance at modern psychology will disclose how impossible it is to reach such a conclusion. The discussion simply narrows down to a consideration of the theories of the will, and of these there are still only the two alternatives—indeterminism and determinism.

The indeterminist theory holds that the will is absolutely uncontrolled, and determines each action anew, with no reference to the rational purpose of either the creature or the universe. A better and more accurate term is "accidentalism." It is simply free-will run riot. Everything that the creature does is uncaused. It defeats its own purpose, for the essential concept of will is its rationality. The opposing theory is determinism. Spencer said, that, without law governing will, there could be no such thing as a rational psychology, and postulated, as the very fundamental proposition of his system, determinism in its broadest form. Mechanically stated, the theory is nothing less than that every action of the mind is due to an arrangement of the brain cells over which the subject has no control. The three manifestations of mind—intellect, feeling, and will—are thus reduced to mere mechanism. Choices are essentially the same as reflex actions, and, in substance, our belief that we are free agents is a pure delusion.

It is true that various other theories have been advanced, but they are all reducible ultimately to one of these two. Professor James seems inclined to an Hegelian reconciliation; for, while affirming his belief in the freedom of the will, he is

forced to admit that a rational psychology must be founded on determinism. Professor J. Mark Baldwin, after stating the arguments for what is called immanent determinism, says that they are metaphysically sound, but he prefers a theory which he calls "freedom as self-expression." Immanent determinism is simply that there is in man a "realization principle," that all his acts are outward expression of an inward working of the purpose of the universe. But Professor Baldwin's "freedom as self-expression," which is certainly the most fascinating theory advanced, is nothing but a compromise of indeterminism and determinism. No separate choice is unrelated to any previous choice, but all are correlated. No choice arises *de novo*, but in accordance with character fixed by an accumulation of acts in the past, which has placed the actor in such a state of development that, given a certain condition of affairs, his controlling motive will dominate, and he will act in a certain way. This theory seems to avoid the mechanical Scylla of determinism and the irrational Charybdis of indeterminism.

But the advantage is only seeming. Man *does* what he *is*, sums up the theory. The thief steals because he is a thief, having schooled himself in thieving. The difference between this and strict determinism is that the thief *schooled himself*. The difference from indeterminism is that, having schooled himself, he *must steal*. The advantage over determinism is that a new habit can be formed, a new departure can be made. Individual initiative is claimed thus to be established. But the theory is inadequate in its explanation of regeneration. The persistence of the thief in thieving is as readily explainable under either the self-expression or the determinist theory. The former has the advantage of palatability. But if character is reformed, as we know it is, how can the first act of change be the act of self-expression? At this point, as we shall see again, the same issue between indeterminism and determinism arises again. The advantage that the theory of self-expression as a whole has over indeterminism is that it is rational. Nothing could be more irrational than a belief that every act is un-

related to every other. There is even method in the madness of a lunatic. There can be no question of the advantage of this theory over indeterminism. It remains to analyze the seeming advantage over determinism.

In so doing we at once bring the argument back to the main thesis, by asking whether the self-expression theory is not essentially deterministic, and hence not in conflict with the doctrine of predestination. It is all right to assert that choices are internal, and not external, as long as the chooser follows a certain logical trend. But how does a choice contrary to a uniform trend of character arise? Wherein lies the advantage over indeterminism, if such choices are always open and often accepted? It is not conceivable that a choice should be made contrary to the purpose of the universe. It is equally inconceivable that it should be a matter of indifference. Yet, if it is wholly internal, it must be one of these two. We are, therefore, forced to conclude that it is either a matter of mere chance or it is in accordance with the fixed and determined purpose of the universe-mind. It must be in accordance with the purpose of the universe, if purpose there is, and it must be external. If it is not, one is forced back on accidentalism. If it is in accordance with the universe-mind, one is forced to fatalism. If, however, one is a spiritualist instead of a materialist, and a dualist instead of monist, in his interpretation of nature; if one holds a theistic conception of the universe,—behold, he has nothing short of predestination as the outcome of his reasoning. The separate acts by which character is built up, the *milieu* in which character develops, heredity and all the other factors, and finally the question of regeneration of character,—all present, sooner or later, the sharply defined issue between determinism and indeterminism, between predestination and free-will.

It is often urged that the refuge is indeterminism for the individual, but determinism for the mass, and hope is sought, in the great law of averages, of vindicating both doctrines. If we were not progressing, if we were stationary, it would be quite plausible that the sum total of indeterminate actions

would average a certain more or less definite thing. But if the average is changing in one direction, and the mass progressing, how is that advance and progress to be explained on any other theory than that it is determined? Every individual choice contributes to that progress. None is opposed to it in the sense that it can thwart it and make it regress. None is a matter of indifference to it, for it can be only the slight preponderance of choices one way, slight but constant, that constitutes the slow development we see. It is inconceivable, therefore, that even in the mass every individual choice should not count. Does not, therefore, the same power that controls the changing average control the individual whose contribution changes the average? Were the individual contribution different, the average would be different—infinitesimally different, but different nevertheless. If there is a fixed purpose in the universe, individual contributions must be determined.

To bring the argument back to the starting-point, how can the Presbyterian who accepts the Scriptures escape predestination? Not by fleeing to science, unless he casts logic to the winds, along with revelation and theism. Even so great an evolutionist as John Fiske has said, "Evolution is essentially Calvinistic."

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EVOLUTION AND FREEDOM.

A GREAT difficulty in the minds of many people who would like to accept the evolutionary interpretation of life is that it seems to deny the freedom of the will. That many interpreters of evolution reduce the moral life to a mere mechanical process cannot be doubted. Herbert Spencer said: "Man has been, is, and will long continue to be, in process of adaptation, and the belief in human perfectibility merely amounts to the belief, that, in virtue of these processes, man will eventually become completely suited to his mode of life. Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity." According to this

interpretation, the moral development of man is not due to any free choice between ideals, but is caused by the necessity which man is under to adapt himself to his environment. It is a purely mechanical process. The same laws operate in the human race that operate in the animal kingdom. As lower forms of life are developed by their struggle for existence, so mankind must progress under the same laws. All of Spencer's sociology and ethics are treated under the laws of his biology. There is no recognition of the higher laws of human freedom. Man never becomes greater than a supreme animal struggling with nature to adapt himself to his mode of life. The causal force in all his progress is this blind struggle.

Are we compelled to accept this conclusion if we adopt the evolutionary theory? To accept such a conclusion would mean the rejection of Christianity, for there is no place for sin and redemption under such a philosophy. Do the facts compel us to follow Spencer?

A complete view of the evolutionary process must not only take account of the development of man and the forces which have produced him, but also of what man is as we see him at the present time. Our study of the origin of man must be supplemented by a study of what man is. It is a defective philosophy which finds all of its conclusions in the cell and the history of the animal world and does not take into account the testimony of the human consciousness. Truly the total mind of Lincoln is as important as the individual cells which compose his brain, and the testimony of his consciousness is as important as the history of his animal ancestors, for the study of the philosopher. We may not doubt that man's moral and intellectual nature is the result of evolution, but for a study of ethics it is far more important to know what that moral nature is than to know the processes by which it came to be what it is. Professor Rice truly says: "We must find the foundation of ethics and consequently of religion, not in ontology but in psychology; not in the assumption of a spiritual entity absolutely distinct from the bodily organism, but in the inexpugnable belief of personal freedom and responsibility. The *ego*

believes itself, and cannot help believing itself, to be free and responsible and that necessary belief affords a foundation for ethics and religion, which is altogether independent of any metaphysical dogmas as to the essence or the essences of the *ego*, and equally independent of any biological hypotheses as to the process by which the *ego* came into existence." And Wundt says, "In the investigation of volition we are exclusively restricted to the human consciousness." There may be something that closely resembles the human will in the higher forms of animal life,—we believe there is,—but these beginnings cannot explain to us the final product. That must be studied in itself, in order to learn what it is. The final answer to this question must come by an appeal to our own minds.

There is nothing inconsistent with the general theory of evolution in supposing that its final product is a self-conscious, free, human being. As we survey the evolutionary process we find nature constantly introducing new forces. At first the controlling force seems to be gravitation; then chemical forces are introduced; later, vital forces; and the final control seems to be the rational, free will of man. This is a continuous, progressive change, one force possibly producing the one above it. Certainly each new force presupposes the earlier form. Chemical forces would have been powerless without the integrating action of gravitation, which constantly brought material within its reach; vital forces were dependent for food upon the action of the chemical forces; finally, the human mind demanded the physical body for its action. Each new force has grown out of, and been dependent upon, the older. Yet each force when fully developed was *new*, entirely unlike that out of which it had grown. Whether this final product, rational man, is a free, moral agent or still in bondage to the physical laws, is a question which is not to be determined by a study of the forces which have preceded man, but by a study of man himself.

Dr. Samuel Johnson disposed of this question of freedom with the remark, "I know I am free, and that is the end of it."

Ultimately this is the argument upon which all who believe in the freedom of the will must rest. It is true that we cannot say that we are conscious of freedom. All we can affirm is, that we freely choose to act in a certain way, while we believe that it was possible for us to have acted in the opposite way. I choose to rise, put on my hat, and walk down the street. Consciousness tells me that I might have made the opposite decision and remained in my study. I am conscious of this self-activity which culminates in a deliberate choice. I give expression to this consciousness in the language "I can." It is because of this that men claim their conduct as their own as nothing else is their own, and deliberately contemplate their conduct as good or bad.

This is one of those ultimate facts beyond which we cannot go. I think, I feel, I will,—these are facts which we cannot fully analyze, and whose essential nature we cannot understand. But they are all facts which must be accepted if we are to trust consciousness at all. If we cannot treat the testimony of consciousness to the freedom of self-activity, how can we trust it in regard to any other thing? If the testimony of consciousness can be trusted, then our problem is proven; if it cannot be relied on, then nothing can be proven. We cannot believe that such a fundamental testimony of consciousness can be an "illusion." We must trust it as that which is nearest to us, which is the most certain of all things, and without which nothing else could be certain.

Those who will not accept this testimony of consciousness have great difficulty in accounting for the feeling of obligation which is in all men. The most fundamental thing in consciousness is this feeling of ought and ought not which, under the influence of the intellectual processes, develops into the feeling of obligation. How came this sense of obligation into existence? Bain says, "I consider that the proper meaning, or import, of the terms [duty, obligation] refers to that class of action which is enforced by the sanction of punishment." Herbert Spencer resorts to the same device to account for the origin of this feeling. The primitive policeman, standing

over men to enforce the laws of the community, gradually led them to feel by the constant performance of certain acts that they were right and must be done. "The baton of the primitive policeman, the ostracism of primitive society, and the hell of the primitive priest" are the forces to which we must trace this feeling of obligation, which is universal in mankind.

But there is one thing in this line of argument which is difficult to explain on any such hypothesis. How did society come to employ this policeman and this priest? How did society get that sense of duty and obligation which the policeman was to enforce? There was no need of an officer of the law until men felt that there was a duty which should be performed, and a law which the members of a community were under obligation to obey. How came the primitive priest with his hell? There must have been a sense of right and wrong before there were threats of sending men to hell or any hope offered of a future reward. Indeed, such an analysis reveals to us the fact, that the sense of obligation must have preceded the fears awakened by the forces of society. They were produced by this ought feeling, and hence they cannot be used to explain the origin of it.

This sense of obligation is a part of human nature: it does not rise from external conditions. When there come before us ideals, and we are conscious of being free to choose between them, then we impose a duty upon ourselves, and feel that we are responsible for our choice. We have been intrusted with our own interests and the interests of others; we have been intrusted with the forming of our characters; and out of the consciousness of these facts there rises the feeling of accountability. It matters not how we came to be free. Once give us the consciousness of freedom, and it is hard to see how men could be without this sense of obligation. As Professor Bowne has said, "The idea of moral obligation is a necessary function of a free intelligence in any world where conduct is possible."

We are not to be blind, however, to the objections which are offered by the opponents of the freedom of the will.

John Fiske, in his "Cosmic Philosophy," gives expression to a common argument against freedom: "To say explicitly that volition does not follow the strongest motive is to say implicitly that motive does not follow the line of least resistance, which is to deny the persistence of force." The fundamental defect in this statement is that it identifies the laws of the physical and the spiritual nature. But the two are not identical. Even different laws in the natural world do not operate in the same way. Laws of chemistry and astronomy are not identical. The mode of action is different, and must be described in different ways. The failure to make this distinction is the defect in many writers, who try to describe the human race under the same laws which govern the inorganic world. The human will is a psychical phenomenon, which is not controlled by the same laws or forces which operate in chemistry or astronomy. Nothing could be better evidence of this than the very terms which we are compelled to employ to describe the two things. All physical objects must be described in terms of mass or velocity; but, when you try to describe the will in terms of either mass or velocity, you speak a language which has no meaning. It is true that all physical force follows the line of least resistance, but it does not follow that psychical phenomena are governed by the same law. Not until we can demonstrate that the will is the same in essence as physical force can we assert that the will is controlled by the strongest motive. It is the belief of man, that he has the power to choose between two conflicting motives, and to follow, if he desires, the weaker of the two. There is no fact in the whole realm of experimental or physiological psychology which contradicts this common experience. If it is denied, it must be done by assuming that the will is governed by the same laws as physical things, but this is only an assumption.

Furthermore, those who make this objection to the freedom of the will fail to make any distinction between a physical cause and a motive. They regard the will as subject to the law of natural causation as the iron is subject to the law of the magnet. But the will belongs to a different sphere, and has

nothing to do with physical causes. The physical world is controlled by causes, but the will deals with motives. As Wundt has reminded us, "Between cause and motive there is a very great difference. A cause necessarily produces its effect; not so a motive. A motive may either determine volition or not determine it." Gravitation will compel the water to run down hill, but a motive cannot compel a man to follow it. Motives can ask to be heard in the court of consciousness, but no motive can dictate to the judge of this court what his decision shall be. At best, motives have nothing but a persuasive power; they cannot compel action.

When this argument of causality is closely examined, it will be found to rest upon a certain conception of the self or of consciousness. Speaking of the illusion of the freedom of the will, Herbert Spencer says, "The illusion results from supposing that at each moment the *ego*, present as such in consciousness, is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas which there exist." According to this view, self has no unity, no unifying power. Self is simply the sum of the feelings and ideas of which we are conscious at any moment. There is no actual, abiding self. What is called self is simply the streams of feelings which are constantly rising and passing away. Hence the will is "nothing but the general name given to the special feeling that gains supremacy and determines action." Every action is caused by the strongest feeling that at any moment is present.

Certainly there is nothing in the theory of evolution that would compel us to accept this conception of self. Let us not forget what evolution is. It is simply the history of the steps by which the world has come to be what it is, and therefore the nature of self is to be determined only by a study of the product. The best testimony of consciousness is this, "I am not thoughts, but I think; and I who think am the same who thought yesterday." This reality of the unity of self is a prerequisite of all judgment. Professor Bowne gives a good illustration of this. Take the judgment that *a* is *b*, *a* and *b* each being a particular state of consciousness. Such a judgment

can be possible only when there is a conscious self, *C*, which is neither a nor b, but contains both in the unity of its own consciousness. To say that consciousness is composed simply of successive states of consciousness can have no meaning. They must all be embraced in an abiding self before there can be a judgment. "As for our thinking existence," says Locke, "we perceive it so plainly and so certainly that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to me than my own existence. I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain; can any of these be more evident to me than *my own existence* (in which they are all somehow connected *as mine*)? If I doubt all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence. Experience then convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, an internal, infallible perception that we are." This abiding self deliberately sets before itself ideals of action, and it has the power to determine what end it shall pursue. It is not under the category of causality: it is its own cause. It is not determined, but determines the ideal it shall follow. It is a center of conscious activity, which is "impregnable by any assaults of mere force."

The law of heredity has often been used as an argument against the freedom of the will. It is said that heredity gives those elements which determine the quality of one's personality. It determines one's physical features, it shows itself in man's temper and the intellectual powers. It determines the very fiber of one's being. What reason, then, have we for supposing that it does not influence the will? Our lives are determined for us by our ancestors, and our characters must be shaped for us by these forces. If a man is born with a love for the pure and beautiful, he will choose these things. On the other hand, if he is born of a vicious parentage, unless some unseen power interferes, he will choose the things that are base and evil.

But it does not follow that a man must be like those elements which he inherits. President Schurman has truly said: "Emphasize as you will the bulk of the inheritance I have received from my ancestors, it still remains true that in moral

character I am what I make myself. On stepping-stones of their dead selves men rise to higher things; and neither our ability to do this nor the consciousness of that ability implied in the freedom of the will, is effected in any way by evolution." My ancestors give me the material for my physical frame, for my intellectual and moral life, but they do not give me my character. What they have given may make the formation of my character easy or difficult, but it is for me to fight the battle and form the character. I may inherit a craving for physical excitement, but the very knowledge of this fact is a warning to me against intemperance, rather than an excuse to come home drunk. Man cannot inherit a character: he can only inherit a tendency toward a certain character. His parents may have given him a tendency toward a violent temper; but it is for him to determine whether he shall submit to this tendency, or shall subdue and calm it.

How many who have been the offspring of criminal and vicious generations have gained a noble and lofty character! Their attainment is the result of a terrible struggle. Heredity has compelled them to travel a thorny pathway. But they have possessed a power greater than the law of heredity, which has enabled them to win the victory. Mrs. Ballington Booth's story of the reformed criminals, many of whom have regained manhood and made good fathers and husbands and men who could be trusted in places of responsibility, shows the power of the human will to rise above the weakness of inherited qualities. Marcus Aurelius, born of a long line of vicious ancestors, rising in his purity; Jerry McAuley, the hardened criminal of Sing Sing, reversing his career and filling the earth with his deeds of love and service; John Bunyan, turning from his downward course to live a saintly life; the unnumbered men who have risen from the slums of our great cities and immoral homes to places of honor and usefulness,—all testify to a power possessed by every man which enables him to overcome evil tendencies which he inherits and form a character high and noble.

Thus we are lead to see that evolution is in harmony with

the Christian conception of human accountability. "Lo, then, each one of us shall give an account of himself," is the verdict of science as truly as it is the verdict of the Apostle to the Gentiles. God is not pushing humanity forward by material and irresistible forces. He does not even compel a forward movement. Rather He invites men forward and leads them by the power of ideals. Man must decide whether he shall reject or accept the ideals that are before him. He has power to do either. To do one is sin; to do the other is righteousness. For his choice he alone is accountable. God can only invite; he must follow or be lost in the struggle for moral survival.

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THE HIGHER CRITICISM OF LADY HUNTINGDON AS HYMNIST.

THERE is great need that Christians and churches, pulpit and press, hymnists and compilers, should awaken to the fact that there is a new literature of hymnology, which ought to be accompanied by a new and widening hymnal scholarship. The researches of critical scholars, of investigators like Daniel Sedgwick and successors to him, have been published. They are voluminous, informing and accurate, destructive and constructive. There is a higher criticism in hymnology, which deals with texts, authorship, editions, dates, alterations by authors themselves and compilers. Its conclusions are various: the critics are not agreed among themselves. The conclusions reached, in some instances, are radical, destructive of traditions, but conservative of the truth. Antique opinions, and allegations of disputed and doubtful facts, are put upon the defensive. Some of them are demonstrative of the untenable. It is not easy to make the necessary concessions. Old associations of a pleasant and profitable kind are too old to yield easily and gracefully. They ought not to yield except to proofs, good and sufficient. A long line of unbroken traditions

on any subject has some value, although it may not be very great.

For more than one and one quarter centuries, the hymn,

“When thou, my righteous Judge, shall come,”

has been assigned to Lady Huntingdon. A few additional hymns have been attributed to her. It seems rash to undertake a demonstration that she did not write it nor them; that the proof of her authorship is insufficient and unsatisfying; that her possession of the poetic gift, the hymnal faculty, in any degree equal to the production of a good poem and an abiding hymn, is yet to be proved. Such proof as there is that she was a poet and hymnist is of the indirect kind. It consists of testimony rather than of her own authority, her actual productions, and the authority of her biographers. A list of her alleged hymns once existed, but has been lost; and thus the very evidence that would settle, or tend to settle, whether she wrote the great hymn under discussion, and what additional hymns she wrote, is wanting. In 1878 Doddridge wrote to his wife, that he had “stolen a hymn” which he steadfastly believed to have been written by her, and which he would not fail to communicate. But he did not communicate, or at least the knowledge of what he did communicate is wanting. Hence some hymn usually attributed to Doddridge may belong to Lady Huntingdon. Rev. Josiah Miller (1838–80), in his “Singers and Songs of the Church” (1869), says, that “although the Countess was not much known as a hymn writer, yet it is proved beyond doubt that she was the author of a few hymns of great excellence.” But his book fails chiefly in omissions, in the pursuance of researches far enough, and in this instance he does not furnish the proof nor the hymns. Hence his history is dogmatic, due to an *ipse dixit*. If his statements are true, what is unaccountable in any event becomes still more so, viz., that “The Life and Times of Selina, Countess of Huntingdon,” by A. C. Hobart Seymour (1787–1870) should not furnish the conclusive proof. The Rev. John Julian (1839—), Vicar of Wincobank, Shef-

field, England, best known as the editor-in-chief of the great "Dictionary of Hymnology," says, "It is most uncertain that she ever wrote a hymn; and it is quite clear that upon reliable evidence not one has yet been ascertained to be of her composing. . . . The most that can be said of the authorship of

‘When thou, my righteous Judge,’

is, that it is *Anon.*”

The hymn in question is a selection from a lengthy poem on the Judgment Day. It is divided into two parts, and the hymn is from the second part. The first line of the poem is.

“We soon shall hear the midnight cry.”

Selections from Part First were also used as a hymn. Both hymns were omitted from all editions of the Lady Huntingdon Collections, previous and subsequent to the fourth, variously assigned by conjecture to 1772 and 1774. There are writers who have stated that

“When thou, my righteous Judge,”

was published in the original edition of her hymn-book in 1764, but there were no original hymns in that edition. Subsequent to 1772 or 1774 there were editions in 1778 and 1780. She was responsible for the edition of 1780, and was assisted by her first cousin, Hon. and Rev. W. W. Shirley. Having printed the hymn in the edition of 1772 or 1774, it is hardly probable that she would omit it within a few years without giving a reason. The omission, unaccounted for, counts against her authorship. The tendency of her hymnals was to increase the number of hymns contained in them, although in the second edition many of the Inghamite and Moravian hymns were withdrawn in favor of Watts and Wesley. The third edition included several by Shirley, for the first time, and the fourth edition (1772 or 1774) contained a few more, together with additions from Cowper, Grigg, and W. Williams of Wales. Both hymns were published in 1775, in an "Appendix," by Rev. Lawrence Coughlan, to a "Selection for the Use of the Congregation of Cumberland Street [London] Chapel," by

J. Bazlee, one of the ministers of Lady Huntingdon's Connection.

After 1775,

"We soon shall hear the midnight cry"

seldom was included in Collections, but

"When thou, my righteous Judge,"

appeared in Rippon's famous Collection of 1787, and has reappeared often since in Great Britain and America, surviving in some of the very latest hymnals, including the Oberlin "New Manual of Praise."

Two facts are indisputably clear concerning the relations of the Countess to hymns and hymnodies:—

1. She was a compiler. Rev. W. T. Brooks (1848—), the friend of Daniel Sedgwick (1814–79), a learner of all that Sedgwick could teach, and a diligent student of hymnal texts, editions, and authorships, says that there is no absolute proof of her editorship of any collection before that of 1780, although it is likely that she and Shirley were jointly responsible for the second edition (1765), the edition of 1770, and the edition variously assigned to 1772 and by himself to 1774. Previous to 1780, the preachers had been allowed to make their own collections. Thus Rev. Thomas Maxfield published a collection in 1766, 1768, and 1788; Revs. Herbert, Taylor, and W. Jones published one in 1777. These facts will serve to explain why Bedell's "Church Hymnary" assigns

"When thou, my righteous Judge,"

to 1765; and why Richards' "Songs of Christian Praise" assigns it to 1772. As originally published in the edition of 1772 or 1774, it began,

"O! when my righteous Judge shall come."

2. She was the friend, associate, and helper of hymnists. On this point, all that needs to be said is well said, as might be expected, in his "English Hymns," by Rev. S. W. Duffield: "Among her friends and associates were Cennick, Toplady, Berridge, Haweis, Watts, Perronet, Doddridge, Walter

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Shirley, Rowland Hill, DeCourcy, Williams, and James Hervey. It is as the centre of this group of hymn writers that she becomes a most conspicuous figure in the religious history of her time. There is not a shadow of doubt that in her house and society is found the *nexus* of that wonderful list of hymnists, as in the Middle Ages such centres were found at St. Gall, Cluny, and St. Victor; or, as in Germany, Luther was the crystallising point during the Reformation, even as Newman has been in our own days for the High Church Party in England."

The Countess has been credited with the authorship of
"Come, thou fount of every blessing."

It was in the first edition of her hymn-book (1764). We repeat that there were no hymns by herself in that edition. Daniel Sedgwick, who was illiterate in everything save hymnology, and in that attained the rank of first authority, sometimes betrayed the disadvantages of his illiteracy. He professed to have a manuscript of her friend, Diana Vandeleur Bindon, in which it was assigned to her. Without going into the details, suffice it to say that investigators have established the claim of Rev. Robert Robinson (1735-90) to the authorship of this hymn, so that it is no longer in debate. Lady Huntingdon did not write it. One of the convincing facts as to Robinson's claim is not only that he asserted it in giving a catalogue of his writings, but under such peculiar circumstances as these: In the latter part of his life, he was riding in a stage-coach, and encountered a lady who plied him with questions, arguments, and appeals on the subject of doctrinal and personal religion, against his will. Finally she quoted his own hymn, and he responded: "Madam, I am the poor, unhappy man who composed that hymn, many years ago; and I would give a thousand worlds, if I had them, to enjoy the feelings I had then." His unhappiness is supposed to have been occasioned by doctrinal doubts and several changes of denomination. He must have written the hymn by the time he was twenty-nine, for he was born in 1735, and the hymn was published in 1764.

The Rev. C. S. Nutter, a Methodist master in hymnology, says that "the hymn,

'When thou, my righteous Judge,'

will continue in the name of the Countess of Huntingdon, unless positive proof to the contrary is presented." The hymn is continued in her name by Robinson in "The New Laudes Domini," 1892 (1162). It has disappeared from most of the more recent hymnals. We cannot say why. It relates to the Judgment. It is heart-searching and solemn. It is in the first person singular. It is the soul's questioning of itself. The first two stanzas are interrogatory. The last two are prayerful for pardon, expectant of an answer of peace and blessing, and of ultimate praise to God for a home in his presence. The tune attached to it is a grand one. It is "Meribah," by Lowell Mason, and characterized in Brown's "Descriptive Index of Hymn Tunes" as "familiar, easy, devotional, useful." Hymns that can be sung with acceptance, relating to the Judgment, are not so numerous that they can be discarded without warrant. This is so good as tested by time and history that we are disposed to ask the compilers to give a good reason for its omission.

The story is told of a soldier in the hospital who, in his dying moments, raised himself, and in a strong voice exclaimed, "Here!" The surgeon asked him what he wanted. "Nothing," he answered. "But it was roll call in heaven, and I was answering to my name." His thought was that of the hymn,

"What if my name should be left out,
When thou for me shalt call?"

The anecdote is a sufficient illustration of the fact, that the hymn has been and may be very practical and helpful.

The case of Lady Huntingdon in relation to hymns and hymnody is exactly analogous of that of Rev. Dr. Nettleton (1783-1843). He was also evangelical and evangelistic in a pronounced sense, he was a compiler of the "Village Hymns," from which "more hymns of the older American writers have passed into English collections than from any

other source." To him was attributed, on no other ground that that, like many others, it appeared anonymously in his compilation, the authorship of

"Come, Holy Ghost, my soul inspire,
This one great gift impart."

Rev. F. M. Bird, the first of American hymnologists, says: "He knew and could appreciate a good hymn, but it is doubtful if he ever did or ever could have written one." On the other hand, Rev. S. W. Duffield says that the hymn in question "can safely be considered an original production, and it does honor to its author." There is not much safety in pure conjecture. The higher criticism in hymnology is not entitled to that degree of freedom, and it will not concede it. Conjecture and inference, with equal propriety, in both cases, might attribute other anonymous hymns in the respective collections to the same authors. If authorship is in doubt, let it remain so, until verified fact and ascertained truth and real history compel the change to a known name. JAMES H. ROSS.

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