ARTICLE VII.

HERBERT SPENCER, THE APOSTLE OF AGNOSTICISM.¹

BY PROFESSOR GABRIEL CAMPBELL.

In the personality of Herbert Spencer, the opportunity to study interrelations of mind and body, thinker and thinking, is perhaps unsurpassed. His extensive writings covered a vast variety of subjects; in published criticism his ideas were contested by his contemporaries; a copious Autobiography has developed the personal interpretation of himself; now, following his decease, has appeared an array of theses characterizing, from without, the man and his work.

HEREDITARY INFLUENCES.

Mr. Spencer was the product of nonconformist ancestry, his father even dissenting from the Dissenters, the son displaying an impulsive antipathy to authority, political as well as religious, expressions of adoration finding in him, he avers, no echoes. The father followed the grandfather as a teacher. He was inclined, however, more to speculation than to instructing along critical lines of logic and fact. The grandfather was predisposed to melancholy moods, the father to sundry eccentricities, physical impairment in each case evidently the cause; broken health burdened the father's advancing years.

Infirmities inherited prevented Herbert from attending school and devoting himself to books. He was consequently

¹This Paper was part of the Program of the American Philosophical Association at its annual meeting in Philadelphia, December 28–30, 1904.
debarred from becoming a scholar in philosophy or an expert in science. The father speculative, the son was a castle-builder. Dwelling with intense concentration upon some problem, he would with remarkable facility construe and construct, all the more successfully because he was kept free from the confusion of conflicting opinions which ample booklore would have brought to view.

YOUTHFUL DEVELOPMENT.

In lieu of academic training, young Spencer entered an engineering office, and for a number of years had experience in railway management. This afforded him occasion to participate in political life as well, his duties from time to time calling him to London, where he had the privilege of meeting members of Parliament who were personally, or as representative of committees, influential in guarding the interests of railway companies.

Meantime, with a passion for expression (not to say dictation) he begins to write for the press. A series of articles appears in the Nonconformist radically criticising existing government policies. By the time he was two and twenty these articles were issued independently, under the title, "The Proper Sphere of Government." With the enthusiasm of youth he is impelled to enter upon a scheme, more or less wild, for the extension of individual right and suffrage. He is restrained, however, by friendly advice from thus practically throwing himself away.

CHAMPIONSHIP OF EVOLUTION.

Quite early in his mental growth, Spencer is attracted by the teachings of Lamarck, which were then in the air, especially his evolution hypothesis. Evolutionism struck the evolving Spencer as the solution of the riddle of existence, seemingly accounting for the origin and development of all
the varying phenomena, not only of planetary systems, but likewise of systems religious, political, social,—solving for theology the enigma of creation and revelation. To explain the world, its process, its products, in terms of evolution,—this becomes the absorbing ambition of the opening manhood of Herbert Spencer.

Catching up the neo-Hegelian expression of Von Baer, that nature's working law is from homogeneous to heterogeneous, he proceeds to expound environing conditions. From homogeneity to heterogeneity—the very terms sound like an explanation. One is reminded of the clown in the circus who, with a profoundly polite bow, informed his auditors that the next performance would be something else. But just what, just why, the heterogeneity? After a time Spencer recognizes that his formula is inadequate. There is dissolution as well as evolution, redistribution primary and secondary; the old formula must be superseded. To the child mind the acorn looks like a simple unit. Goethe sees in it an oak and following forests of oak. Spencer is obliged to confess to Martineau that the homogeneous unit is indefinitely complex. Indeed, Rosenkranz thought we began with chaos.

PHILOSOPHY AND EVOLUTION.

In the history of thinking, the theories of the development of the world are no novelty. From Kant (father of Lamarck), Leibnitz, and Spinoza, we trace back to Aristotle and Democritus, Heraclitus and the Ionic School. Philosophers have recognized in nature a uniformity of method and means. Philosophically considered, Evolution is simply a new name for an old theory. Agassiz insisted that Plato gave us the Science method. Aristotle applied logical concepts. Kant showed that the absolute canons of our intelligence are an

unconditioned, a conditioned, and a union of the two. Hegel followed with the evidence that the unfolding of the absolute itself is by pursuing the working method of all logical progress from thesis to antithesis, thence to synthesis.¹ When Darwin's book "The Origin of Species by Natural Selection" appeared, in 1859, as outcome of his specialty work, Spencer found that he (Spencer) had gone astray in his theory of organic evolution. Although Darwin was thought to lack frankness because he retained the name of his work while acknowledging that Natural Selection does not account for the origin of any species whatever, his modesty and sincerity are marked.

**DIFFICULTIES OF EVOLUTION.**

Darwin acknowledges that "our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound," and that "Any one whose disposition leads him to attach more weight to unexplained difficulties than to explanation of a certain number of facts will certainly reject the theory."² Wallace finds a positive non sequitur the outcome of his examination of comparative brain development. Virchow opposes a proposition to recognize Evolution as Science, saying that his knowledge as a specialist in anthropology leads him to declare that every advance in the prehistoric has led anthropologists further from the possibility of connecting man with lower forms.³ Dana, the geologist maintains that, in case the connecting links ever existed, their annihilation without trace is so extremely improbable that it may be called impossible. Weismann, acknowledged authority on germ plasm and heredity, comes to the aid of Natural Selec-

¹ For the historical development of our present thinking consult article "Philosophy in America: Its Character and Mission" in the Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. XIII. p. 496.
² Darwin, Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, pp. 165 and 430.
tion with the discovery that the secret of variations is intrin-
sically matter of germ relationship, germinal selection.¹

At the present time, Professor De Vries, of Amsterdam, in his voluminous work "The Theory of Mutation," argues that variability is result of intrinsic characteristic.² As an expert botanist, he is endeavoring to discover the special peculiarity of a plant's life which is determinative of a new kind. If De Varigny is correct in teaching that a long period, and many tests,³ would be required to prove conclusively we had the permanence of a species, and not a mere fugitive variety, a solution is not immediately at hand by this means.

If specialists encounter so many obstacles in establishing the technique of the evolution of nature, possibly a non-
specialist may proceed with greater ease. In defiance of his failures, Spencer finds his belief constantly revived. He braves the tide of difficulties, acknowledging frankly that he is liable to be tyrannized over by a resolution once formed.

Before he had fully devoted himself to the Evolution idea, he had published, when about thirty years of age, a book on "Social Statics." It compassed in a summary way the social, moral, political, and religious fields. He emphasized the absolute sovereignty of law, insisting that, to attain happiness, the primal requisite was adaptation. His contentions were more or less socialistic. While the citizen may ignore the state, the state may hold all property. Notwithstanding its radicalism, the book was received with more favor than any of his later works.

BUILDING A SYSTEM.

Gradually the crowning ambition of his life has been ma-
¹ Weismann, Germinal Selection (Open Court Publishing Com-
pány).
² De Vries, Die Mutations Theorie, especially the second volume.
turing. The truth of evolution asserted a priori must be established a posteriori. By compassing the entire arena of knowledge, we may substantiate our claim. And now Spencer begins to build, to evolve this amazing but satisfying structure. As initial volume in the encyclopedic enterprise, our author publishes his “First Principles.” For the differentiation of Religion and Science he would separate the unknowable from the knowable. That is true of which the opposite is inconceivable. As appearances without reality are unthinkable, an absolute reality is necessarily postulated. We are conscious of an eternal source of energy, which, however, is unknowable. Force, space, and time pass all understanding. How heat and light become modes of consciousness it is impossible to fathom. Mental and bodily life are but subdivisions of life in general. Evolution is the most universal law of manifestation of the unknowable. Principal Caird drew from Spencer the confession that to declare what is unknowable will require a complete or absolute knowledge of the powers of the mind, namely, infallible certitude as to the competency of our intellection.

The discussion of first principles forced upon Spencer the inquiry as to knowledge. To the problem What is Mind? he now devotes himself. Having inherited from his father an ingrained tendency to seek for physical causes, he follows the mental life to its corporeal setting, and determines upon the thorough exposition of Biology. Here his insufficient information is supplemented and rectified by the friendly assistance of Professor Huxley. If Huxley, knowing the facts, demolished Spencer's ideas, the calamity was accepted cheerfully, the latter submitting his chapters for correction to Professor Huxley and also to Sir Joseph Hooker. In this way the elaborate discussions were brought well into line with the biolog-
Herbert Spencer, [April,

ical attainment of the day, Huxley remarking somewhat facetiously, that there was no telling how many brilliant speculations he had been the means of choking in an embryonic state.

THEORY OF THE MIND.

In his Psychology, Spencer shows the influence of Bain and Lewes. Mind is at once identified with and distinguished from nerve. Mind as such, however, is relegated to the category of the unknowable. It did not seem to occur to our author that this unification of mind with the infinite and eternal source of energy was inferentially recognizing its immortality. While upon occasion, he refers to spirit in man, spirit is never interpreted as master of its corporeal environment. A cerebral center of inhibition capable of thwarting any and all solicitations, where a free spirit sits enthroned, sovereign over the ego, bringing into affiliation the non-voluntary and the voluntary, enabling self-direction, man's supernal endowment, does not commend itself to Mr. Spencer's vision.

While our author would acknowledge Reason as arbiter, he prefers to designate consciousness as the ultimately authoritative. But consciousness informs us of results, not of causes. The absolutely real, as vehicle and source of all energy, is, of course, causal. Rational intuition, to which he frequently refers, is involved in such import of the term "consciousness." It ought to be isolated. Not consciousness but the intuitions of reason give us the causal, the unconditioned, the infinite and eternal reality. Now this consciousness of the absolute he calls positive, and yet declares the absolutely real cannot be known. Spirit, he admits, is better apprehended than matter. Still it does not potentiate spiritual vision. Even our ideals of absolute perfection are merely fictions. Time and space he characterizes betimes as necessary forms of intuition; our intellection of space being clearer, he admits, than
that of logical relation. At the same time he would explain these intuitions as essentially outcome of inherited experience. Here he violates well-established evidence that experience cannot give the universal and absolute. While he fully differentiates himself from Mill's Empiricism, Spencer is obliged to intimate that communication is possible. Breaking with Materialism, he is, nevertheless, in darkness. Every advance of science, he declares, but brings us into deeper nescience. Indeed, not only is rational intuition confounded with consciousness; knowing is never clearly distinguished from feeling. Neither is feeling critically analyzed; the corporeal is not recognized as preceding knowledge, the mental as following it. While emotion has its corporeal relations, its specific form is determined by the intellection which is its cause. This he fails to specify. Failure to discern the rational intelli-

c tions is, of course, failure to interpret the rational emotions; hence the failure to explain for us the aesthetic sentiments as resultant of rational ideals of perfection and freedom. As for man's moral and religious nature, with its boundless sweep of the emotive life, it is substantially overlooked. For whether God be knowable or not, ideas of his infinite perfectness fill the mind with strongest emotions. Virtually, then, Spencer would make his psychology strengthen his former claim that we have to do with a God who cannot be known. Consciousness, he concludes, gives us the infinite and eternal source of energy, but does not enable us to interpret it.

AGNOSTICISM METEORIC.

Evolution was accordingly heralded as the overthrow of the intellection of a creator, as dissipating the fantasy of a self-

revealing God. For a time in the latter half of the nineteenth century this teaching achieved no little notoriety. Thus characterized, Evolution was flung derisively at pulpit and
pew. It proved peculiarly acceptable, however, to a number of Mr. Spencer's associates. George Eliot had prepared the way by her translation of Strauss's "Life of Jesus," which, in the guise of German learning, gave to the Founder of Christianity a merely mythic setting. The translator had lost her faith. Mill finds this position of Spencer in line with his own empirical theory of divine existence. The Comptist Lewes recognizes Spencer as successor of his French master. Tyndall and Huxley are grateful for the defense of their scientifco-religious quandaries. The latter christens the religion of the unknowable, Agnosticism. Tyndall would see in matter the prophetic potency of all life, and suggests a science-test of prayer. To these names may be added Matthew Arnold and Professor Romanes.

But this illumination of a generation ago was short lived. George Eliot hesitates to use the word "unknowable." While she adopts her friend Spencer's ethics in regard to marital relations, in her last days she prefers the Light of Thomas à Kempis, as the shadows gather. Mill finally writes "Essays on Religion," in which he substantially rejects the so-called agnostic position. Professor Huxley confesses he cannot connect the living and the non-living; he can see miracle all abroad in the unsolved mysteries of nature, and maintains that evolution validates an Ethics above and beyond the merely cosmical. Tyndall acknowledges that the proper satisfaction of the demands of man's religious nature is the problem of problems at the present hour. He frankly asserts that it is when his mind is clearest he is most deeply impressed by convictions of a divine presence. Arnold writes a poem protest-

1 For a discussion of the relation of Hamilton in Scotland and Mansel In England to this movement, the reader is referred to the article "Calderwood the Critic of Agnosticism," Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. lviii. p. 580.
ing that no priest should travesty his closing hours. Arnold's whim is gratified. Setting out on a Sunday excursion, he drops lifeless at the railway station.

Professor Romanes, in some respects the most learned ally of them all, for the above named were rather specialists than scholars, in his book, "Thoughts on Religion," announces a complete revulsion from his former speculations, and the championship of theism and the teachings of Christianity.

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL.

From this labored attempt to make Psychology fortify Agnosticism, Spencer comes now to the objective discussion, the evolution of man in the social-civic realm. To complete his Sociology, a vast body of information is gathered from the history of developments ancient and modern. Several assistants were occupied in this work for a period of years. The arrangement of the mass of material was a herculean task, including, as it did, historical detail as to ceremonial and institutions civil and religious, as well as social. While these numerous volumes are a great storehouse of ethnic data, much of the material is wanting in critical value. Spencer would explain organic functions in the social order by the organs and functions of the human body. A summary statement of his sociological conclusions forms one of the volumes of the International Scientific Series, and is perhaps the most valuable handbook he has produced.

In his political views, Spencer shows a gradual change as result of years and experience. The erratic radicalism of youth growing increasingly conservative, he becomes reconciled to existing government. He cannot work with either political party, however, seeming to lack a practical sense of existing conditions. After exhausting himself in an impracticable anti-war movement, we find him soliloquizing that he
was made to think, not to act, lacking the tactful temper. But, we answer, Of what value thinking that is impracticable?—castles that are not habitable? Indeed, Spencer would regularly decline to read what antagonized his fixed notions of things; he would resent conversation on similar grounds.

Of our own democratic government his prophecy was pessimistic. On the one hand, the stupidity of the public passed his comprehension; on the other hand, education only increased men's capacity for roguery, to play the boss and ruin matters.

Modern systems of school training are, in his opinion, fundamentally vicious. In his essay on "Education," he aimed to encourage study of the scientific and practical. At the same time he would quite desert the interpretation of humanity in its higher ranges, the classic development of language and art, ethics and religion.

**SPENCERIAN ETHICS.**

Although Ethics is virtually a content of Spencer's Sociology, he fears to leave the exposition there, and hastens, before completing the social development, to publish an installment of ethics independently. Here he strives to exalt his subject by distinguishing absolute from relative ethics, and emphasizing justice and the higher moralities. At the same time, responsibility without freedom of choice behind it is dubiously moral. Indeed, his absolute ethics is not based on a necessary principle, intuitively recognized, which would bring man as spiritual into affiliation with an eternal divine kingdom of righteousness. It is rather the cosmical evolution of the utilitarian animal, heir of course of the best (ethnic) results of the past. It is a misnomer to call such ethics absolute.

To acknowledge that our highest intellection is in terms of the absolutely real would be to admit that we apprehend the
unknownable. This, of course, is to be avoided; and yet the honor of ethics is to be maintained. Darwin, who had been called the "prince of wrigglers," claimed that Spencer was a dozen times his superior in the master art of wriggling.

CURRENT RELIGION DEPRECATED.

But clearly the main object of Sociology is to verify the development of man in the religious arena. In religion, Spencer had seen only inconsistencies. Now he proposes to make the agnostic displace the revealed, of which he specifies absurdities:

1. It was an inconsistency for the cause of thirty million suns to bargain as a man with Abraham.—Was then God so great that he could not be definite? Can he not speak to his children, tempering the utterance to the capacity? Does he not habitually speak in the form of a man? Would not bargaining be explanation of rewards and penalties?

2. It is inconsistent for a Deity to be pleased or angry as to singing his praises.—But is not a parent rationally happy when a child comes into harmony with the good and the beautiful, indignant when the child rebels?

3. Adam's guiltless descendants are damned.—Mr. Spencer believes in transmission of penalties. He suffered all his life results under hereditary law. If, however, he had read his Bible carefully, he would have found that children are not punished spiritually because "the fathers ate sour grapes." In this very particular the Hebrew prophet brilliantly describes God arguing his case in the court of man's conscience, verifying his exact justice.¹

4. A few accepted a "plan of salvation" which a majority never heard of.—But our complainant would not revere a supreme ruler who had no method. If a majority never heard

¹ Ezek. xviii. 1-4, 19-25.
of the plan, they are to be judged in perfect fairness by the light and law they possess.

5. God looks on calmly while myriads suffer eternal torments.—Leibnitz maintains that it is the necessary prerogative of freedom to be able to choose evil as well as good, and that God was just in creating man with such capacity. If now man is immortal, his capacity so to choose, so to rebel, is unlimited. Freedom of an immortal will demands eternal safeguard. And does not science show that man’s free choosing tends to a fixity of results? Man’s choices may be self-destructive. A God of love offers rescue to those who will receive it. The freedom to refuse remains intact. The possible results of such unrestricted liberty are pictured in strong language; it may be, not too strong. God doubtless recognizes in the evils of this present time that all is well. Doubtless the gain unspeakably outweighs the loss. In the eternal regimen, are not the innumerable multitudes those that are saved?¹

RELIGION OF AGNOSTIC EVOLUTION.

Spencer’s antagonism to existing religious beliefs was strongly fortified by the translation of Strauss, which appeared so thoroughly satisfactory that he did not care to consider replies. He was evidently quite unaware that Dorner was but one of a troop of German scholars whose published answers turned the tide so completely that the aged Strauss bewailed that the Germany which eulogized his youthful production had now risen up against him. In England, however, the favor for Strauss continued. It was Spencer’s intention to give such naturalistic account of man’s religious beliefs as would dispel current notions regarding inspiration or special interposition by the Divine Being. His resulting evo-

¹Rev. vii. 9-17.
The higher evolution appeared to meet the case so well, that he declared it had brought him out of the woods in which he had lived since his boyhood.

But do defective inspirations of mythology argue that all is delusion? Recognition of general inspiration does not exclude the special. Spencer devotes himself overmuch to lower stages of progress. His intensest poetic delight was in allegory of terrestrial phenomena. Poetic renderings of the spiritual life he cannot enjoy. He does acknowledge that there is consciousness of the most real, a verity, at the basis of religion. But excluding, as he does, God, freedom, and immortality, while he confesses that religion, with its convictions and priestly functions, has been indispensable in developing civilization, we are not surprised that he himself stood aloof, and that even the ministrations of the Church of England were not desirable for his funeral. Out of the woods, but into the desert.

The higher evolution.

What this treatment of Evolution needed was evolution. The highest developments were slighted. History shows us progress, clearly marked, in theistic ideation, the dynamic in Egypt, the intellectual in Greece, the spiritual in recent time. If men have idealized the anthropomorphic, are not all the capacities of human personalities in the infinite source? Spencer even saw evidence of a diffused omnipresent consciousness. But has God exhausted his affection in making the heart of the mother? Cannot the infinite source love a child as much? Nay, more? Does not the total result inhere in the cause?—man godlike, God anthropomorphic? It is impossible to deduct man's capacities from God. What, now, do we know best, the perfect or the imperfect? The artist proves that beauty is unity in variety. The imperfect is unlimitedly
inscrutable. No object is knowable completely; possibly none more completely than God.

We must note, however, that in a certain sense Spencer's dictum is correct. Without doubt the critical philosophy is veritable in teaching that the idea of God cannot be substantiated by science alone, by the mere logic of the understanding. An exclusively scientific evolution does not validate theistic ideas. It is incompetent to recognize absolute origin, a first cause. The higher spiritual vision must surmount the field of Science. Mere scientific evolution has no power, finds no power, of self-origination. No eviction of the Creator was possible. Should creation occupy a million ages, all the more needful, all the more wonderful, the divine omnipresence. And the higher developments of man in the great nations have shown constant evolution of monotheism out of polytheism. This Spencer must pass by. In advance he has declared God cannot be known. The infinite, the eternal, omnipresence, omnipotence, absolute cause, even consciousness, are recognized, almost synthesized. His disciple, John Fiske, here parts company with his master; declaring the consummation of evolution is to rise through nature to God, and to discover in man the promise and potency of an immortal career. When Dana asserted that the geologist stood face to face with the Creator, he spoke not as a scientist, but as a full-orbed man. Indeed, there is nothing in genuine science, nothing in genuine evolution, to incline our best scientific men to disparage, much less to set aside, our intelligence of a spiritual, personal God as he reveals himself to his children. Such is the published opinion of competent specialists like Alexander Winchell,1 Joseph Le Conte,2 and G. F. Wright,3 for example.

1 Winchell, Reconciliation of Science and Religion.
2 Joseph Le Conte, Evolution and Its Relation to Religious Thought.
3 G. Frederick Wright, Scientific Aspects of Christian Evidence.
SPENCER FIGHTS ADVERSITIES.

Unmistakably here we meet Spencer's lack of spiritual insight, an impairment increasing as he advanced in years. Darwin confessed his own loss of higher vision, as a result of disuse. Aristotle insisted that θεωρία, or transcendent beholding, which enables us to interpret the highest reality, requires discipline. Christ declared it is through service, doing the will, that the light, the intellect of the Divine, is perfected. Here the antithesis between Spencer and his contemporary Gladstone was remarkable. In far-seeing practical wisdom, Gladstone had no peer in England. As literary critic, his intellect of mythologic gods gave him the progressive realization of theistic ideas; in revealed religion, he found an impregnable validity.

We can scarcely overestimate Spencer's want. As we consider his many adversities, our profound sympathy is aroused. In his fine physique, which bore him beyond the fourscore years, there dwelt insidious inherited defects. His splendid brain was correspondingly lacking in mental inhibition. Godless, wifeless, childless, practically homeless, with no authoritative voice saying "I am the resurrection and the life," he suffers collapse after collapse; victim of insomnia, the invalid retains his amanuensis and, working by fits and starts, dictates and publishes. Swamped financially, berated by critics, he announced the abandonment of his "Synthetic Philosophy." John Stuart Mill offers to see that the expense of his successive volumes is met. Others proffer financial aid. To be an eleemosynary philosopher does not accord with Spencer's ideal of self-respect. He declines. Finally, Professor Youmans, his ardent patron in this country, settles upon him a sum sufficient to insure his forthcoming issues. Although suspected by ministers and politicians,
reproached by experts in science, contemned by scholars in philosophy, he yet, by an amazing persistency, pushed on, producing much, very much, that is sagely devised.

APPROPRIATION AND DISCUSSIONS.

During my studies of Philosophy in Berlin University (1870-72), I constantly attended the monthly meetings of the Philosophical Society. None of my fellow-members appeared to have any knowledge of Herbert Spencer. Ten years thereafter, Professor Michelet, for a long time Secretary of the Society, delivered an address on "Spencer and his Relation to German Philosophy," saying that, until the beginning of the year, he had never heard of Herbert Spencer, who, ignorant of German thinking as well as of the development of historical philosophy, had much in common with recent speculation. Michelet's treatment was not unkindly critical; it was explanatory and fair.¹

Besides the many controversies with his countrymen into which our author was drawn, perhaps the most noteworthy discussions were with Professor Weismann ² in Germany, and Dr. Carus ³ in America. Spencer felt that the claim of Weismann that acquired characters are not transmissible, if demonstrated, would destroy one of the chief supports of the evolution theory. Indeed, Wundt, the foremost Psychologist of Germany, intimated that it would remove the foundation almost completely.⁴ Spencer recognized his audacity in attack-

³ Carus, Kant and Spencer (Open Court Publishing Co.), p. 71.
⁴ "Die Annahme einer Vererbung erworben character ist uner-
ing an expert. The expert held his own of course.

Dr. Paul Carus, member of the American Philosophical Association, criticised Spencer’s misinterpretation of Kant. As Spencer was not able to read German, his retort was without critical weight. He could only withdraw with the insinuation that Dr. Carus might possibly be in error as to Kant’s teaching. The spectacle of a philosopher to whom the German language and the most ample philosophy in the world was virtually a sealed book, was indeed a phenomenon in the present age. Dr. Carus suggested somewhat trenchantly that the appreciation of Spencer is inversely as the knowledge of philosophy. Among the able critics of the Spencerian Agnosticism may be mentioned Professor James Ward 1 of the University of Cambridge, and William M. Lacy 2 of Philadelphia.

FINAL SOLUTIONS.

In closing his Autobiography, Spencer expresses a wish that a solution of the great mystery may be found. Is it not the greatest mystery of all that he should fail to apprehend the Divine ongoing in that religion which is opening the eyes of the blind the world over? Is the fault in the evidence which is satisfying the multitudes, the brightest minds, or is the fault in himself? If the existing facts which are all-sufficient for prophets and saints and martyrs cannot secure Mr. Spencer’s credence, what solution would convince? Is not this the problem of problems?

1 Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism. Gifford Lectures, two volumes.

He frankly states that the contemplation of unlimited space awakens a feeling of dread. The last words of his last book are, “I shrink.” He fails to see that what

“Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glows in the stars and blossoms in the trees;
Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Lives undivided, operates unspent,”

is a God of Love. His fellow-citizen Tennyson exhorts:—

“Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet—
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.”

And may we not trust that this noble man, this would-be reformer, who through so many years so bravely bore the ills of his inheritance, when the veil was lifted, recognized that Evolution, after all, opened the way not for the Unknowable, but for the transcendent revelation of the beautiful, the right, the good,—God, Freedom, and Immortality?