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ARTICLE IV.

PROFESSOR PARK'S THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM.

BY THE REVEREND FRANK HUGH FOSTER, PH.D., D.D.

THE most impressive part of Park's theological lectures, and the scene of his greatest service to theology, was in the discussions to which the progress of our review now brings us, viz. those upon

THE ATONEMENT.

The theory of the atonement had already undergone a complete change in the New England Theology in consequence of the controversies which resulted from the introduction of Universalism into America. Twelve years after Edwards' death, there had appeared in New York a certain James Murray, who soon transferred his principal activity to New England. He derived the doctrine of universal salvation from the premises of a strict Calvinism.¹ He argued: Christ's death procures salvation for all for whom he died, in strict justice, because he paid the exact equivalent of their punishment. But Christ died for all men. Therefore all men are already saved; and all they need is to be brought to the knowledge of this fact. The conclusion of this argument the New England theologians could not accept because it was unbiblical. The minor premise they could not deny, because it was the plain teaching of the Scriptures. Hence they were driven to the revision of the major proposition, which had been generally

¹ For a full view of this connection of Universalism with the history of New England theology, cf. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xlv. (1888) p. 670 ff.; and vol. xlvi. (1889) p. 83 ff.

accepted among them as among all other Calvinists. In making this revision, they did not go back to the beginning of the topic and start from a new principle, although they had such a principle in the theory of virtue which Edwards had left them, but were led by the particular circumstances of the controversy to redefine the old terms and preserve, in general, the tone and method of the older theology. At many a point the influence of the new theory appeared, as when general justice was explicitly defined by some of them as benevolence. But they still employed chiefly the analogies of earthly governments in the formulation and defense of their positions. And their new theory received the name of "the governmental theory."

By the time that Park appeared upon the scene the theory of virtue was much better understood. Its application to the character of God, and the development of the system of Christian duties in accordance with it, had given it a new scope and importance. Professor Park had a larger comprehension of its meaning and of the range of its application than any of his predecessors had had. It might have been a question of great interest, when he first began the presentation of his views upon the atonement, what he would do; whether he would reject all idea of atonement in deference to the supposed requirements of the love of God which should need no propitiation; whether he would develop it afresh from the theory of virtue as a starting-point, exhibiting its ideal side and setting it free from a certain bondage to mechanical relations in which it had hitherto been confined; or whether he would let it stand substantially where his predecessors had left it. His historical sense, and his intense admiration of his predecessors and loyalty to them, finally cast the scale in the last direction. He continued to use the governmental

analogies, which were rapidly becoming offensive to his times; and this fact, more than anything else perhaps, prevented him from coming to an understanding with the greatest thinker upon the atonement among his contemporaries, Horace Bushnell, or from doing much to prepare for the new epoch that was coming. There is something sad, if not tragic, about this, for Park studied every new writer upon this theme diligently, and has left incorporated in his lectures what he considered best and truest among their contributions to the theory.

As always, Park began with definition. The atonement is "that sacrifice of the God-man which is substituted for the punishment of men, and which therefore forms the sole ground on which God is justified and satisfied, and the chief motive by which he is influenced and by which he exerts an influence, in directly blessing men."

The definition is highly technical. By "directly blessing men" is meant converting and saving them. The "sole ground" is the last cause on which God directly depends for blessing men. The term "propitiation" is later defined in exactly the same words as atonement except that the words "and by which he exerts an influence" are omitted. He hastens in this connection to guard against the idea that God antecedently to atonement was "too angry to favor sinners." "God is made propitious by the sacrifice of Christ in the sense that it is made consistent and justifiable for him now to bestow blessings which it was not antecedently consistent for him to do. Therefore it is figuratively that God is propitiated. He is propitiated in the sense that the atonement is a new motive for him to bestow blessings upon men. Also in the sense that he changes his outward conduct just as if he had changed his moral purpose."

The definitions also introduce a number of weighty modifi-

cations of old conceptions of the atonement. Park employed the word "satisfied" in his principal definition. But satisfaction was not the rendering of the strict equivalent in distributive justice. On the contrary, he defines "satisfaction" as "that sacrifice of Christ by which it is made consistent with God's blessedness that he waive the exercise of distributive justice." What he meant by distributive justice has been fully explained in a former article.¹ He was thus gradually stripping off the artificial distinctions which had formerly encumbered the theory. He completed this process by his rejection of the application of the idea of imputation to the atonement. Christ's righteousness could no more be imputed to us than Adam's sin. In both cases the law holds that character is not transferable, since it is always produced by the individual choice. Something is done for us by the obedience of Christ, so that we receive the benefits of his death. But neither that obedience nor any other is imputed to us, for it is forever his obedience and not ours.

One other element which needs to be noted before we proceed to the more systematic development of Park's argument is the largeness of outlook given by his conception of the atonement as having relations to the entire universe. The suffering of Calvary was not an event done upon a small planet in one corner of the stellar universe, without relation to other worlds and beyond the knowledge of other intelligent beings. Neither did it provide for the salvation of men alone nor, much less, for the salvation of some limited portion of the human race who might happen to hear of it. But it was the display, once for all, of the divine character, and it formed the ground of all forgiveness which should anywhere take place throughout all space and time. When God has

¹ Vol. 1x. (1903) p. 689 f.

once made himself fully known, then it is forever and everywhere consistent with his "justice" that he should be the "justifier of him that believeth."

The next step in the development of the atonement is its analysis, which was conducted under three heads: 1. The facts which are involved in it; 2. The facts which constitute it what it is; 3. The essential relations of it.

1. We have seen how Park guarded against the idea that God was an angry and implacable God without the atonement. He now again emphasizes the truth by placing at the very head of facts involved in the atonement the fact (1) that the atonement has its origin in the grace of the Father. "God sent his Son," "God so loved the world," "I come to do thy will, O God," are the texts he cites. Christ is not more amiable than the Father, and it is infelicitous and injurious to give any such impression.

(2) The second of these involved facts is the divinity of Christ. In making the atonement he needs perfectly to represent the will of God; which is possible to God only. And then, all those expressions which represent the sacrifice of God in making the atonement, require the Godhead of him who was thus sacrificed. The reverse of this idea was also in Park's thought; for if the one great work of atonement which required the divinity of Christ were denied, there would remain no necessity for any such divinity. Like Henry B. Smith, he adopted the thought expressed by the phrase "incarnation unto redemption." Remove the redemption, and you have removed the occasion for the incarnation. In this view of the essential connection of ideas, both these men showed their greatness. It is not a chance phenomenon of earlier times that the denial of an objective atonement has led to the denial of the divinity of Christ: the two doctrines are

so connected by the internal necessities of thought that they stand in any system or fall together.

(3) The third involved fact is the humanity of Christ. He must be a man fully and genuinely to represent man. We see here the influence of Macleod Campbell upon Park's course of thought. His views were carefully and not unsympathetically reviewed in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* by Professor Park himself; but, long before, his great idea, that the atonement was the confession of humanity, had been fully incorporated in the theory. But while Campbell had rejected other elements in favor of his own newer light, Park, with his characteristic breadth, did not reject one truth because he had found another. The atonement makes forgiveness "consistent," and a profound confession of humanity's sin by the God-man adds another element to that consistency, but does not take away every other.

2. Passing, now, to the facts *constituting* the atonement, Park mentions (1) the sacrifice of the God-man. Sacrifice is so often conceived mechanically that Park's understanding of its meaning will have a permanent interest. "A sacrifice," he says, "is a confession of the guilt of the person for whom it is offered. It is an expressive gesture, a symbol. It is thus an acknowledgment of the rectitude of the being to whom it is offered. It is an acknowledgment that the sin may be deservedly punished by the being to whom it is offered. It is an acknowledgment that the sin must be followed by some pain of the person by whom the sacrifice is offered. Thus the sacrifice of the lamb without blemish by the ancient Hebrews was not merely the loss of so much property, but was a crossing of the affections. It is also a prayer for the person in whose behalf the sacrifice is offered. It is a public avowal of the offerer's intent to honor the being to whom the sacri-

fi ce is offered. And, finally, it is an avowal that the sufferings of one being are substituted for the punishment of another. The sufferings of the lamb are substituted for the punishment of the Jew: the sufferings of the Lamb of God are substituted for the punishment of the world."

(2) The second fact constituting the atonement was the death of Christ. Park conceived this in a large way. It was not the mere physical sufferings of the moment of death which constituted the atonement, but all Christ's sufferings, both physical and mental, culminating in Calvary. Park emphasized also the "public and judicial character of his sufferings"; and here he introduced, to the confusion of the argument, as it will seem to most, the attempt to connect the human government, cruel as it was upon the side of the Jews, weak and subservient upon the side of the Romans, with the divine government, so that the act of the one should be the act of the other. "He suffered at the hands of the rulers who are in this respect symbolical of the power of God." This element, it is true, plays no essential part in Park's theory, but it was introduced, apparently under the influence of the word "government" itself. It would much better have been omitted.

(3) "The atonement consisted in the sacrifice of the God-man substituted for the punishment of sinners." The proof of the substitution is derived from the use of the word *ἀντί* in Matt. xx. 28 and parallel, from the word *ὑπέρ*, which, while not so distinct, "in its connections denotes substitution," and from the other great cardinal passages of the New Testament, especially those which dwell upon the voluntary character of Christ's death. It is noticeable that Isaiah liii. is not employed in this argument.

3. Park now passes to another grand division of the theme,

to the essential relations of the atonement. These are relations to the created universe, to the sinner, and to God. He embraces them under the general word "appeal." The atonement is an appeal to the universe for God the Father. It expresses his love to his Son, to the universe, to the race of men; and it expresses his justice. It is an appeal for the God-man, who is an object of regard to angels, principalities, and powers. It is an appeal for the perfected race, since "the perfect representative man acknowledges by his sacrifice that God is right and man is wrong."

"Appeal" has therefore the meaning in this connection of a solemn setting forth of the elements of the case and the demand for a proper attitude in reference to it. Park accordingly goes on to say that this appeal to the created universe exhibits and honors the justice and holiness of God as much as these attributes could have been exhibited and honored by the punishment of sinners; it exposes also the vileness of sin as much as this would or could have been exposed by the unconditional punishment of sinners. We begin, therefore, already to see what Park has not yet stated, that the atonement is intended to accomplish in one way exactly what the punishment of the sinner would accomplish in another way.

But the atonement has relation to the sinner. It is an appeal to the sinner to repent and be saved. God appeals: "Behold, how I love thee"; the God-man appeals: "I have come to suffer for thee"; and the perfected race appeals, because that race will universally desire the conversion of every sinner. And then there is the relation of the atonement to God. It takes away the motive for punishing the sinner, since the end of punishment has been perfectly gained; and it presents a positive motive for forgiveness. Park is aware that this last

statement will meet with objection. God saves men to promote his own glory; but his greatest glory is the glory of his grace, and the atonement is the fundamental act of his grace. And then, the atonement is God in Christ; and to glorify the God-man expressing the desire of salvation is to glorify God himself.

With these many definitions and qualifications, suggesting repeatedly very broad conceptions of the atonement, Professor Park has now come to the "principle upon which the atonement operates." By this he means, of course, the theory of the atonement. We shall give the statement of this principle in his own words, but it is our purpose, in the further explanation of the theory, to depart now from the exact reproduction of the form in which he expresses his thought and to strip it of the governmental analogies by which it was enveloped and possibly obscured. It is possible that thereby the suspicion may be aroused that a departure is being made from Park's real theology. But in fact an explicit reference might be given for every statement that is to be made. If there is any difference from Park's own statements, it is one merely of form, and scarcely of that.

1. First, then, for the formal statement of the principle. It is this: "The atonement exhibits and honors the holiness, distributive justice, and law of God, and it promotes the holiness and happiness of the universe, so as to make the conduct of God in forgiving men consistent with the honor of his holiness, distributive justice, and law, and so as to satisfy his general justice in rescuing sinners from unconditional punishment, in adopting measures for inducing them to repent, and in eternally rewarding them if they do repent."

2. Second, for a running account of this theory:—

The theory of the atonement begins in the theory of man.

Park has given to men the attribute of freedom, and whether successfully or not, has labored to establish the principle that all influence over their action, whether on the part of their fellow-men or of God, must be exerted by means of motives. We may speak of the divine "government"; or we may call God "Father," and seek to find the principles upon which he exercises his fatherly office in seeking and saving men; but, however we put it, men are controlled or led through motives.

As to these motives, Park has a further idea which exercises a large influence at various points, the idea of "system," law, general methods,—the same idea, in fact, which appears in the scientific emphasis of "natural law." God is not restricted to these methods so that he cannot follow anything else, but he proceeds upon great general principles from which he does not depart (as, for example, to perform a miracle) except for grave reasons.

God has, therefore, established a system of moral influences designed to lead men to salvation. One element of this system is the law, involving threat of punishment, and summarily comprehended in the verse, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." This whole system, including the law, originates in the love of God. He is seeking the holiness of man, and he surrounds him with all appropriate influences which will tend to promote his holiness, exhibiting the attractiveness of holiness and the repulsiveness and danger of sin. All this is alike the outworking of the same love.

But if love originates such a system, then while love prevails in the councils of God, the system must be maintained. This is true of the law. It was fully understood, its meaning carefully weighed, the possible results which might flow from its promulgation clearly foreseen, before it was ever

proclaimed. When man has sinned, if he is to be saved, the penalty of the law must be waived, for to execute it would be to destroy the race; but, if it is waived, it must be so waived that the system of moral influences designed for man's good shall remain unimpaired. If man is not punished, then all that punishment would effect in the way of moral influence upon man must still be effected. His forgiveness must be made *consistent* with the maintenance of the moral system, with the undiminished total of moral influences tending to promote holiness and deter from vice, or else he cannot be forgiven: love forbids it.

It will be noted that this view of the case exalts the positive character of the law. God might have written his moral law in the nature of men as he has natural law upon the phenomena of nature, and left man to find it out in the same way. But that would have meant the destruction of men. He therefore adopted the method of revelation, of the communication of his law through chosen agents to men. He has declared his law and announced the penalty; and now he comes, and with equally distinct objective declaration, he sets forth his Son as the sacrifice for sin, saying explicitly that his sufferings are substituted for the punishment of all who will accept of his salvation by believing on him. Park did not suppose this declaration a matter of necessity in the nature of things. If his Son had come and quietly endured the sufferings which actually came to him without any explanation, the mere fact that God so hated sin, and had so involved all beings in its consequences that not even his own Son could come into the world, sinless though he was, without suffering, would declare his righteousness and the seriousness of the threat of the law, and thus maintain its honor. But this is not God's method, because we are under a system of

grace. God has declared what Christ does by his death. He takes the place of sinners before the law.

What, when thus viewed, does the suffering of Christ effect? Precisely that, all that, and even more than, the punishment of guilty but repentant men could effect.

To understand this reply, we need to ask what, in Park's thought, the punishment of men was designed to effect. It must be designed to effect something good, for else it could not be inflicted. Punishment, like every other act of God, must be performed under the influence of love, or else his act in this case is not holy. To ask what punishment effects is therefore to ask what good it effects. Does it do any good to the sinner? Park's answer is, No. He thus rejects the idea of the reformatory design of punishment. When man is finally adjudged guilty before the bar of God, the time for benefiting him through painful discipline is past. Such discipline is properly called chastisement, not punishment. Punishment, when it is inflicted, is to the sinner nothing but an unmitigated evil. Still it must do some good somewhere; and this must be among the innumerable intelligent spirits, men and angels, who may hear of this punishment. With them it will effect two principal things; it will vindicate the character of God as having no pleasure in sin, but as eternally opposed to it; and it will powerfully deter them from sin, since it exhibits sin's true nature in the awful consequences which ultimately follow upon its commission.

All this, and more, the sufferings of Christ upon Calvary effect. They (1) vindicate the holy character of God. Did he really express his holy attitude and the profound truth of things when he promulgated the terrible threat of the Law? Does he unspeakably hate sin? When he forgives it, is there no trace of carelessness in him, no complicity of heart with

it, no relaxation of his moral earnestness, no giving of the lie to the solemn implications of the threat of death to the sinner? All these questions might be raised, if God forgave sin without an atonement.

What would it be to have such questions raised? Take the repentant sinner himself, what would it be to him? It would destroy his repentance, for why should he repent of that about which God cared so little? It would destroy his God, for he would find himself upon a higher level in repenting than that occupied by God in forgiving and thus reversing his law without a given reason, since he would exhibit a greater sense of the meaning of sin. What would it be to angels but to teach them that they might indulge in the pleasures of sin, if they seemed attractive, without much hesitation, since God thought far less of it than his law seemed to indicate, and the danger of transgression was small.

But the atonement forever shuts off such questions. God waives the punishment of the repentent sinner, but he does it for a great reason. His own dearly beloved Son comes and takes upon himself the suffering of the cross. This is the suffering of God. Man was to suffer to express the infinite ill-desert of sin, but now God suffers to bear testimony to the same thing. If man suffered, the suspicion might possibly arise in some mind that the suffering was inflicted in a mechanical manner or a routine spirit, and did not mean so much after all. But when God suffers, no such suspicion can arise. God is intensely opposed to sin, his law expresses the ultimate relations of things and his own most unchangeable attitude towards all sin, if, in order to waive the punishment of the law and relieve man from eternal suffering, God himself must first suffer. Such is the unavoidable impression of the beholder, be he angel or man.

But (2) the sufferings of Christ deter all intelligent beholders from the commission of sin as effectually as, and even more effectually than, the punishment of guilty men could. One might suspect that God had grown indifferent to men, and punished them without deep feeling; but no one can suspect this when he "sends his only-begotten Son." The threat of the law remains in all its terror. If God makes exception to its execution in the case of those who repent, what will he do to those who rush forward consciously into sin, are thus from the beginning unrepentant, and have no sort of warrant in themselves that they ever will repent? And to those souls to whom the thought of the vileness of sin is a greater deterrent than the thought of the danger involved, how much clearer is its essential odiousness in the sight of God, and of all holy beings like the Son, when God will not pass it over without so great a reason as the sacrifice of his Son, and that Son voluntarily takes the cross that sin may be condemned in the act of its forgiveness!

Thus, when Christ has suffered, the object of punishment in the case of the repentant man has been secured, and it is now consistent with God's honor and the honor of his law, and with the interests of all holy beings everywhere, that he should be forgiven. And, since he is now, by repentance and faith, brought into harmony with God, the love of God positively prompts him to receive into his fellowship one who is now fit for it. Thus love in all its aspects is fulfilled by the forgiveness of the sinner.

This is the form of the theory resulting from the introduction of positive law into the universe. Dropping this fact now from view, the atonement may be considered, in conformity to that ultimate principle already enunciated, as the means by which, when sin has once entered the world, man

may be saved and still the "system of moral influences" originally inaugurated be preserved. Those moral influences are exerted substantially through the combined faculties of the intellect and the conscience. In the voice of conscience and in the teachings of history as interpreted by the faculty of the reason lie the great natural influences which are designed to restrain men from sin and lead them to holiness. If man repents of his sin, however blindly he may grope for the truth, and however little he may know of himself or of God, he is received by the forgiving act of God into the divine fellowship. It might be that, in a limited sense and for a time, a man ignorant of the atonement might find holy influences impaired by the very freeness of the divine approach to his soul. But the ultimate revelation of the atoning death which Heaven will make, the fact of the cost of sin, and hence the cost of forgiveness, to God, as shown in the sufferings of the Son of God, would so reënforce the voice of conscience and the lessons of history that the soul would ultimately rest in the eternal meaning and validity of its earliest impressions of righteousness. And thus God's intent in surrounding it and filling it with such moral influences in favor of righteousness would be both justified and maintained.

Into the remaining portions of Park's treatment of the atonement it is not necessary for us to enter. Enough to say that he thoroughly discussed, along lines which will be easily surmised by the trained reader, the old theories which the New England speculations were intended to replace. He then passed to the "fact" of the atonement, which he elaborately proved from the Scriptures. He derived its "relative necessity" from the principles we have already passed in review. And he taught that it was "general," that is, made the salvation of all men possible. It is easy to see that if the

atonement makes it "consistent" for God to forgive one sinner, it, makes it equally consistent for him to forgive all. In these discussions Park displays all his characteristic acuteness and profundity.

For a time the theory of the New England theologians which Park presented received a very large acceptance among Congregationalists. It became the working theory of the great majority of practical ministers. But the original minds which were pressing on to new views of truth and felt most fully the influences of the new forms of thought which from time to time appeared, did not accept it. They did not even become acquainted with it. This was undoubtedly the effect of Park's error in following too loyally the modes of presentation of his great predecessors, as has already been suggested. It is to be expected that more attention will be paid to him in the near future, and that the main results of his studies will, under the interpretation of some appreciative student who possesses the necessary familiarity and sympathy with later speculations, supply the necessary corrective to the too exclusively subjective theories of the present hour. Almost all those who have gained the ear of the theological public have, more or less clearly, explicitly acknowledged the necessity of just that element which Park placed at the center of his theory, that men "must be made to feel, in the very article of forgiveness, when it is offered, the essential and eternal sanctity of God's law." These are the words not of Park, but of Bushnell, who was prevented from giving his adhesion to the New England theory by confounding it with the older Calvinism, as I have elsewhere shown.¹ William N. Clarke, who has removed most of the objective elements from Christian theology in favor of the subjective, lays great stress upon the manifesta-

¹ *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. lix. (1902) p. 617 ff.

tion of God's righteousness in connection with forgiveness. He says that Christ does not satisfy law or punitive justice, but he has in mind here the elder ideas of satisfaction which Park also rejects. He speaks of the "gladly endured pain of saving love," and adds that it "is a substitute for punishment which God is offering." Again: "Whatever exhibits God's righteousness, or rightness of character and conduct respecting sin, has the character of a propitiation." Clarke thus approaches very near to Park. Like him, he has emphasized the ethical, and has laid the greatest stress upon the holy character of God. But he is conspicuously defective in his exegesis of the Scriptures, giving them, when he considers them at all, little chance to express their true mind, and generally neglecting to refer to them either as the source or the proof of his theories. He thus denies what ever has been and ever must remain the received interpretation of the Bible, that the sufferings of Christ are accepted by God in place of the punishment of sinners. To complete his theory, to gain the full benefit of his most powerful setting forth of the truth which he does present, he needs objective faithfulness to the Scriptures. He needs, therefore, correcter ideas of the office of punishment. He needs just those considerations which abound so richly in the discussions of Professor Park.

In a sense, all the defects of the purely subjective theories of the atonement may be traced to a defective understanding of the principle of the divine love. Love conceived as an emotion, and directed to the conferment of happiness as the supreme good, can never serve as the principle of a theology, because it is but a half truth. Love is an emotion, but not fundamentally. Fundamentally it is a choice. Happiness is an end of God's efforts for men, and it is even the ultimate end; but it is never the supreme end. The highest thing

which God seeks is man's holiness, from which happiness is to result. This conception of love is the Edwardean, and needs to be better understood by those who wish to make love the principle of their theology. And when it is understood, it will be seen not only to admit of, but to require, that objective view of atonement upon which both Edwards and Park insisted, and which alone will ever be thought by the mass of readers to agree with the plain utterances of the New Testament.

We think that these elements of the case are yet to receive a more full and hospitable treatment than they have in recent times. Let some theologian arise to go deeper into the idea of love than even Edwards did, and let him deduce his theory directly from the facts of the Scriptures gained by an objective exegesis, and formulate it in the light of his correcter and deeper analysis of the fundamental ethical principle, and he will be hailed as the restorer of theology to objective truth.

An indication of this may be found, perhaps, in the fact that Kaftan, who represents the outcome of Ritschlianism in the more orthodox direction, insists upon such an ethical view of the atonement as shall not evacuate the juridical of all its meaning. He says, in closing his discussion upon this theme in his "Dogmatik":—

"If the juridical conception of the doctrine of the atonement is to be replaced by an ethical conception, it is necessary to found the understanding of the death of Christ upon the moral order of education instead of the legal order of the state. The death of Christ was not necessary as punishment [considered merely as punishment] but as a means of education, this word being taken in its widest meaning as it is unfolded in the historical conduct of the race through the world by God. We must only add that the death of the Saviour was

the only sufficient means for the purpose of education, and that this purpose is founded in the nature of God himself; for then the suggestion of the arbitrary and of something like a selection among various means, which seems at first to attach to the notion of a means of education, disappears, and it becomes evident that we have here to do with a necessity for God. Every effort at amending the old theory which is less thoroughgoing runs the danger, so far as it holds to the legal presuppositions, instead of effecting an ethical deepening of the doctrine, of failing to maintain the moral earnestness of the old theory. For this is the end of the matter, that the thought of propitiation ethically understood is that of punishment through which satisfaction is rendered to the broken law."

I have said that the lectures upon the atonement were the most impressive part of Park's work and the scene of his greatest service to theology. Whether this statement be accepted as correct with reference to the theological world outside or not, there can be no doubt that it was correct so far as those of his pupils were concerned who followed him with intelligent comprehension and were naturally led to the acceptance of his positions. For them he satisfied all those difficulties which arbitrary and forensic theologies had accumulated about the theme. He rendered the ultimate conception of the atonement ethical. He liberated the enjoyment of all its benefits from any arbitrary conditions of such a nature that some (like Socrates) never could meet them. He preserved, at the same time, the real relation of the transaction upon Calvary to the divine law. There was an objective substitution, a propitiation. The old hymns of the church could still be sung, the results of the universal experience of the Christian heart still be accepted. And he made real that without which no the-

ology can be biblical or (in the historic sense) Christian, viz., the essential relation of the person of Christ to our salvation. It is not Christ's doctrine that saves, it is himself. We are not called upon to *believe him*, but to *believe in him*. Thus the heart's loyalty could still go out to the divine Redeemer, and with even augmented intensity. And the preaching could still remain what it had been to Paul, the "preaching of the cross."

But these services were not completed with the topic of the atonement; and in the next and concluding article it will be necessary to review the discussions of regeneration, sanctification, and eschatology, in which the further outworkings of Park's thought will be seen.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]