THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

ARTICLE I.

THE ADDENDA OF PSYCHOLOGY.

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Phenomena are our first terms of knowledge and must always remain its permanent center. The explanations we bring to these phenomena cannot be allowed to blur the phenomena themselves, or carry them off from their own basis. The facts of perception and the facts of consciousness, with which our thoughts are occupied, must, amid all theories, be allowed to retain their own independent revelation. This is essential to the coherence and accumulation of knowledge. In bold and speculative action we are liable to overlook this dependence, and the very data of thought are surrounded by an obscure halo of words, by images that lack firmness of definition, by alleged facts which are themselves without proof.

Empiricism is ready to carry over mental phenomena into the physical world, and, having given less than due weight to the facts of mind, to give more than due weight to the physical facts associated with them. Having missed the mind where the mind is most active, we rediscover it in remote and obscure places. We displace direct perceptions by ill-established implications. Thus consciousness, the exclusive form element in mental activity, is allowed to wander from its own
field, and to unite itself in an unintelligible way with physical processes. Whatever explanation is secured by the substitution of one kind of phenomena for another, by mingling phenomena in a way not justified by experience, serves only to confound the primitive data of knowledge. Monism and idealism and empiricism fall constantly into this error. They are not true to the problem they attempt to explain. They add and subtract in a way to suit their immediate purpose. Numerous and bright colors that lie distinct on the palette are rubbed together, and then the painting is rendered in grays and browns, as holding the constituents of the entire spectrum. The colors with which we started cannot be regained till our explanatory work is undone, and we stand again with the clear definition in perception of simple shades. Mind and matter explain each other by both being present. Our theories fail to satisfy the problem because they do not accept the problem as they find it, but put in its place confused terms which admit of an inadequate rendering. We need constantly to go back to our first forms of knowledge, to have our task reassigned us, and to see how far we have prospered in its accomplishment.

Mental phenomena, approached exclusively through consciousness, and the physical facts of the brain, subject to perceptive inquiry alone, together constitute the terms of intellectual life. Their interdependence is of a very subtile, obscure, and extended character, quite beyond any adequate explanation on our part. What we have to do is to study them, separately and reciprocally, in their sequences, and to preserve as best we can the true nature of each. We thus retain the facts and the order of the facts, see something of their dependence in its changeable character, and win some mastery over them. The success of the entire movement depends on our fidelity
to the facts, and our willingness to accept them in the relations which they establish among themselves.

Some years since, Dr. Carpenter, in aid of an explanation of the sometimes obscure and rapid development of intellectual processes, assumed that these processes were not always characterized by consciousness, but took place in a region designated as subconsciousness and came thence in an advanced stage of formation, as occasion offered. Thus a third term was introduced in intellectual activity which some thought very explanatory, and which was certainly very pliant. Herein was a first step taken in merging physical and mental phenomena in each other, and lessening the apparent difficulty of their union. The intermediate activity was neither strictly mental nor simply physical, but partook of a mingled character. We had thus gotten beyond the two disparate terms, mind and matter, and found a region, neither in space nor in consciousness, where they could be freely united. We were no longer bound down to two definite forms of activity, each of which had its own empirical limitations and laws, but could play off imaginary forces in a way wholly beyond any correction of observation. We had reached empty air-spaces and could do what we pleased. We were bound neither by a logical sequence nor by a physical dependence, but could vault at once over to undefined, intermediate terms. Our problem had become quite other than what it had been.

This region of reserved activities has been recently immensely enlarged, and we now have prolific automatisms which may quite submerge the plodding processes of reason. Says Professor James, "I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has occurred in psychology since I have been a student of the science is the discovery first made in 1886, that in certain subjects at least there is not only the
The consciousness of the ordinary field with its usual centre and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories, thoughts and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, and yet must be classified as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs.  

This method of reasoning, this region of novelties, this discovery in which not a phenomenon of any sort has been discovered, we must be allowed to question as quite beyond the range of knowledge. "Facts of some sort" is no sufficient description. The keel of our Columbus has not touched shore. A nebulous world, without form and void, whose misty outlines the eye cannot penetrate, is brought into the problem, and each man can expand it or contract it, or make what he will of it. There is no limit to the exposition it may offer, for there is no law to its being, to its actions or reactions. As a man thinketh so is he, and so is his philosophy. Binet, who has framed many experiments in confirmation of this region so constantly in the throes of creation, has given the theory definite expression. His earlier experiments had reference to movements of an automatic character which might be induced in a patient suffering from anesthesia. The paralyzed right arm, when hidden from the observation of the patient, would take up certain motions initiated by him, as those of writing, and repeat them several times as under a prolonged impulse. These movements were first referred by Binet to an organic interlock of nervous stimuli and muscular activity. The initiative stimuli supplied by him operated for a brief period when the occasion was removed. He saw nothing in this but an example of automatic response in the physical mechanism. His earlier experiments were directed to securing various re-

1 The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 233.
results which are ordinarily due to the will, but in which no conscious activity on the part of the patient was involved. Later some results impressed him as beyond those which could readily be referred to automatic dependencies, and to imply, in spite of the absence of all consciousness, something like intelligent connections. This conclusion he accepted with reluctance, but confirmed it, sufficiently as he thought, by repeated experiments. It is worthy of remark that automatic action in one suffering from paralysis, and with whom the normal connections between nervous stimuli and muscular activity are interrupted, might very well take on some unusual form. The habitual and serviceable use of organs being withdrawn, they would be left to play more idly under more remote and unregulated impulses.

A frequent experiment was that of placing a pen in the paralyzed hand, and guiding it in writing a few words. If the words so written were misspelled, the hand hesitated in repeating them and might correct the orthography. This Binet regarded as indicating a trace of overruling intelligence which must be referred to some unconscious source. If the first syllable of a word was indicated, later syllables were supplied. This result seemed to call for a similar explanation. That which finally satisfied Binet was that the patient could be incited to write sentences somewhat at length which could not be referred to the immediate activity of the mind, and yet showed coherent intellectual connections. Indeed, the matter so written might be only partially apprehensible when the attention of the patient was directed to it. These experiments, repeated in different forms, came to be regarded as complete proof of a guidance not found in the conscious activity of the writer. Thus Binet was led to accept two centers of supervision,—that of the mind proper, and that by
which certain phenomena took on a coherent form without any conscious oversight. These two centers are in interaction, the activities present in the one modifying those in the other.

While there is a certain coherence in this reasoning, it fails to attach sufficient importance to the automatic action of the nervous system, and is still more inadmissible in introducing a new center of control whose phenomena are in no way verifiable. Much, nay most, of the interaction of the several parts of the body on each other,—nerves, muscles, and organs,—passes without observation, and we can easily forget how extensive and exact this interplay is. The organic movements of the body in constant modification of each other proceed with little oversight of the mind or direction by the will. Stimuli that are able to secure such complex results are not to be hastily pronounced inadequate to explain other less familiar, but no more obscure sequences. The automatic activities of our physical mechanism are not easily exhausted, and may readily bear the appearance of direction from some overruling center. When we are dealing with dependencies which have been wrought into the system by the most protracted interaction, we cannot refer apparently intelligent activities to a second center of supervision with the same facility we would employ in ascribing thoughtful relations to persons. A certain suggestion of intelligence pervades the body everywhere. We must give these automatic movements full credit before we proceed to supplement them with hypotheses, involving unknown centers.

There are also the more variable forms of action which we refer to instinct and to habit. Here are connections, either constitutional or the result of repetition, which explain a great variety of effects as readily as does an immediately active in-
There has been a tendency, which it is not easy to justify, to make intelligent activity the basis of instinctive connections. The relation would appear to be the reverse of this. Instinctive, constitutional connections would seem to be the foundation of our voluntary action, and its constant support. While conscious effort reaches and modifies organic relations, the permanent lines of sustentation extend from below upward.

If we consider the two earlier stages of the experiment on which Binet relies, they present no special difficulty as explained by the ordinary dependence of physical and voluntary action on each other. The hand, moving automatically, hesitates as it repeats a word which has been purposely misspelled. This, in a slightly different form, is a familiar result. Spelling is peculiarly an automatic product, particularly if we spell correctly. He who hesitates in his spelling has fallen under a doubt raised by the mind. Words are spelt most correctly when they are spelt automatically, that is under connections established in the nervous system. We frequently resolve a doubt by writing a word, and seeing how it meets, to the hand and eye, familiar automatic relations. It is perfectly natural, therefore, that a form of orthography which had been just imposed should embarrass the physical mechanism when it came to repeat it in the presence of an established habit. In rapid writing, the mind, being occupied by the thought, gives little or no attention to the words. These follow each other under the stimuli of habit. If the hand cannot keep pace with the mind, words and clauses are dropped, and the fingers hasten forward. Our ideas, pen in hand, pursue the path of expression as readily and as forgetfully as do the feet the highway, when we are in animated conversation. Indeed, were not automatic movement becoming constantly
more complete, we should be but halting pilgrims in the crowded thoroughfares of thought.

Any sudden interjection of intelligence confuses the automatic processes, and is the prelude of failure. One accustomed to tie his cravat without a moment's thought, trying to do the same in a glass, in a more careful way, may find himself uncertain as to the movement which comes next in order. Or if one accustomed to work by direct vision, undertakes to guide the instrument he is using by reflected light, he may find himself quite at fault.

Neither does the completion of a word, the opening syllable being given, offer any particular difficulty. An endless number of dependencies have been established in this direction, and the one most allied to the occasion may thrust itself forward. Associations of this order are constantly being formed. When one wishes to evoke rhyming words, the automatic and thoughtful powers play into each other. The inquiry should be, How do the two tendencies sustain each other? and we are not to be guided in our conclusions by a rigid notion of the nature of the particular act. A reflective process may readily lapse into an automatic movement.

If we take the third consideration offered, the rendering without consciousness of consecutive and unfamiliar sentences, the case is somewhat more difficult and it is correspondingly rare. It is a result we should not anticipate prior to the facts, but it is not impossible of explanation. It is hardly more than an extension of the connections already recognized. An unusual verbal memory, with desultory reading, is sufficient to give a suggestion of the forces involved. The memory of words includes a ready articulation of them. The mental effort does not suffice unless it is at once sustained by the appropriate physical activity. This connection may be
flexible and rapid or it may be painful and slow. There are wide differences between persons in this regard. What seems impossible to one is readily performed by another. Words are most perfectly rendered when they are repeated by rote. In pronouncing the Lord's Prayer, if the automatic movement is broken up, the mind may become suddenly confused. Lines of poetry to which the attention has not been directed for a long period are frequently restored by running over the words still held in mind, till they link themselves again automatically with their fellows. The physical dependence outlasts the intellectual connection.

One may have changed the house in which he lives, closing a door here and replacing it by one at another point. For years an automatic tendency may occasionally return to find the familiar passage through the space now walled up. A man is flung from his horse; a shock is given to the nervous stimuli which confuses their action. Months may pass before the poise and assurance natural to him are recovered. Thought has no control over these impressions.

The surprising thing in the experiment referred to was that the words, automatically written, had escaped the recollection and even the comprehension of the patient. Yet this difficulty is not very grave when we recollect how many romancing and imaginative sentiments may become alien, in later life, to the mind that once entertained them; and how possible it is for the physical vestiges of these earlier impressions to linger long after they have ceased to play any part in the voluntary experience. Whether they ever did exist and how long they have endured are questions to be resolved by an inquiry into facts, and not questions to be readily set aside by a theory wholly of its own order.

If the case under consideration were such as to leave a
choice open between two sets of facts, each equally well established, we might incline in our opinion to the one or the other, but the problem is not of this nature. The proposed explanation is of a very unusual and unsatisfactory character. The immediate objection to the phenomena brought forward by Binet to account for the facts is their utterly unknown form. We not only assume them, we have no avenue of approach to them. Not even the imagination can assign them locality and a mode of being. The names we apply to them are inconsistent, and in no way guide us to the region of which we are in search. If we use the earlier word and term them subconscious facts, our language has no descriptive power. As consciousness has no locality, we cannot reach a locality by speaking of phenomena as above or below it. Facts are not defined as to their own nature and relations by being spoken of as not embraced in consciousness.

If we call them marginal or subliminal phenomena the confusion remains the same. The words still suggest space relations, and we have no areas which can entertain the facts proposed. Consciousness is an idea of its own order. The phenomena incident to it may be more or less rapid in movement, more or less distinct in impression, but when they disappear there is no known limbo into which they retire. They come and go in their own field, and are in no other way approachable. They cease to exist when withdrawn, as certainly as do shadows when the light is removed. Their provoking causes may be present in the brain, and through its action they may be restored, but they do not in the meantime exist. Our experiences combine the nervous and the intellectual activity in various ways, but we know nothing of any third phenomena which unite the two. Professor James speaks of
them as a discovery. Where have they been discovered? Jesus I know, and Paul I know, but who are you?

The word "automatism" gives us no aid. Automatism is a mere abstraction till we have some mechanism capable of automatic motion. We are assured that there is a nest with many vigorous fledglings, but when asked where it is, we are told that it is in the air.

What right have we to entertain phenomena of no known order? How, in fact, can we be said to entertain them, when we have no way of approach to them? When certain diseases were referred by the Jews to possession by devils, they had far more to proceed on than have we in subconscious facts. They had conceptions of devils, and pictures of devils; definite facts to refer to them, definite places to put them in. We have none of these, unless it be some not very intelligible facts which we insist on surrounding by mere words. This complete vagueness of our conception destroys its value.

Or look at automatism as an explanatory idea. There are certain phenomena we fail to understand. We create out of mere shreds of notions other phenomena which are to furnish their causes. When the healing water in our pool is to be moved, we imagine an angel who comes down out of Heaven and troubles it. Our angel is invisible, his methods are invisible, and all we really proceed on is the movement in the pool. That which we invoke is beyond all terms of knowledge. If this is explanation, we are at liberty to invoke any causes we please; no problem will prove too hard for us. Its conditions at once supply the fitting reasons. We thus leave open the cave of Æolus, and any vagrant and foolish wind that blows is at our service. Difficulties at once unravel themselves. They establish satisfactorily the needed automatisms.
But if this ready creation of causes is allowed, how can we get any explanation out of it? The perplexities are, to the mind in search of facts, as troublesome with the added reasons as without them. The imaginary phenomena do precisely what they are set to do, and no more. They begin where we begin, and leave off where we leave off. We have climbed a ladder, but we come down the same ladder with nothing more than we carried up. Our actual phenomena call out our imaginary ones, and then our imaginary ones expound our actual ones. Explanation can not proceed from the unknown to the known. All that remains to us as the fruit of our inquiry are the simple facts, physical and mental, with which we started. The waters of the pool are troubled, that is all. We may be diverted from proper forms of inquiry by these premature expositions, we can get no real instruction out of them. Our suppositions are so much rubbish, of which we can make no use. We know not when or by what law automatisms are to arise and convert themselves into thoughts. From the moment we leave the real till we return to it, we gain nothing. Naked we come into this world of nonentities and naked we go out of it. How phenomena that are neither physical nor mental can modify phenomena that are either physical or mental, we have no way of apprehending, and no experience pertinent to our want. The method is a mere simulacrum of knowledge.

There is no end to the variety of assumptions which this new freedom of psychology grants us. It has led some to assume two kinds of mind,—a subjective mind and an objective mind. All that they find difficult to explain under the daily objective mind is immediately referred, with perfect ease, to the subjective mind. The hypnotist is thought to reach these more hidden powers, by means of them to readily master fa-
miliar phenomena, and to secure unexpected lines of action. A tendency arises at once to exaggerate these hypnotic results, and to make them more alien than ever to the ordinary movements of mind.

One may impress his own thoughts strongly in reference to a future action, he may be affected in a similar way by something unusual in the address of another, or he may receive a "suggestion" from a hypnotist. The difference in these cases lies more in the circumstances under which the impression is made than it does in the impression itself. This may remain a normal intellectual fact. The hypnotist first induces an unusual condition in which the patient is withdrawn from ordinary influences and made especially subject to the operator. He then proceeds to enforce a certain line of action, and later it is found that this "suggestion" has gained a firm hold of the mind thus impressed by it. There is in this something unusual and extreme, but there is in it nothing which separates it finally from normal phenomena. The hypnotist starts in inducing a susceptible physical state, he proceeds by an enforcement of his own idea, and the patient, in obedience to this influence, receives the required action as a part of his own experience. The "suggestion" begins and ends with the normal phenomena of body and mind. What is there to call for occult causes, or what part is left for them to play? We should certainly exhaust all known interdependencies of physical sensibilities and mental states before introducing unknown data.

In the example of subconscious activity educed by Dr. Carpenter he neglects the readily forgotten, but frequent and real, activity which the mind directs toward the solution of a problem which has been presented to it; the increased insight of favorable moments; the accumulation of data as
time passes, and refers these gains to a decisive and unconscious effort. If the mind of a person entertaining a difficult question is not alert and attentive, it will not find any subconscious powers coming to its relief. Whatever is instructive to the mind must reach it in an intelligible, concurrent way. If it does not, it will make no impression, miss adoption and lie idly upon the surface. It must have a certain normal relation to the existing state of the waking faculties, or they cannot make use of it. If there were a deeper mind it would be compelled to play into and with the more superficial powers, coherent among themselves.

Binet seems to think that these subconscious phenomena offer an explanation of the rare fact of double personality. In double personality two series of experiences, diverse in kind, from time to time displace each other, with no obvious interplay or interdependence. These are very obscure facts, but they do not seem to be allied to a blind side and a perceptive side of the mind in constant interaction. The title of Binet's treatise "On Double Personality," seems to indicate that automatic mental states have for him a more detached, independent existence than is ordinarily ascribed to them; that they are not simply submerged incidents of normal mental processes, but a second form of such processes.

Subconsciousness, subliminal experiences, automatism, a subjective mind, bring no explanation to double personality. The normal man is thought to have two minds, a subjective and an objective one. The subjective mind makes itself felt through the objective mind. The subjective mind does not give us one experience in consciousness and the objective mind another. We have two minds, but not two personalities. The case of two personalities would call for four minds, and the relation of one couple to the other couple would be as obscure
as ever. Indeed cases have been affirmed of a half-dozen personalities, and thus we should have a dozen minds buzzing in the same hive to no intelligible purpose.

We are not wholly without suggestion as to how what has been termed double personality may arise. All sudden and profound changes of character may occasion a long struggle between conflicting tendencies, the rejected line of conduct recovering at times the mastery. A man like Gough may, under a sudden temptation, find the old ways of thinking and feeling returning on him like a flood. St. Paul affirms with much emphasis that there is a law in his members warring against the law of his mind.

Men in the process of starvation, as in the Greely polar expedition, may develop an entirely new character. In some diseases a complete erasure of memory takes place, and later experiences might thus be separated from earlier ones by a sharp line. If two such phases of life were to displace each other from time to time in memory, we should have the appearance of double personality. Certainly it is premature to accept any extreme theory of double personality, till we have given its phenomena more extended inquiry.

In any explanation the extension of familiar facts has great advantage over the introduction of unknown and unverifiable causes. It is surprising with what ease subconscious, automatic, and subliminal phenomena are accepted when they work confusion in the ethical world, and make men and women little more than jumping-jacks. There is no sense of the integrity of intellectual facts, allied to that of physical facts. It is as if in the presence of strange phenomena, like those of radium, the conclusion should at once be reached that there is no ground for the law of the conservation of forces.
The fact that so many of the phenomena from which this supersensuous state is referred are arrived at in connection with a disturbed nervous system goes to show that, in explaining the usual process of mind, we are allowing ourselves to be perplexed by some extreme interactions between the physical and mental terms of life. Our theory should rest on the ordinary, rather than on the extraordinary, dependence of the terms involved. Exceptional phenomena are pretty sure to approach habitual phenomena far more nearly than at first sight they seem to. The suggestions of hypnotism are an extreme manifestation of the action of one mind over another, incident to an impressionable nervous temperament; but they are quite in keeping with the impressions which we ourselves are constantly establishing through the processes of memory. A particular hour suggests a particular duty; we are frequently aware, in a vague way, of something which we have forgotten, a suggestion we have let slip.

Having indicated the defect in the reasoning process by which extended and complicated marginal mental phenomena are brought on the stage, we may properly speak of the mischief which attends on their presence. If they were established, we should be compelled to tolerate them, but if they simply provide an hypothesis of doubtful character, we are at liberty to point out the confusion they bring with them. They greatly add to the perplexity and obscurity of the most central and variable problem of human life,—the relation of its physical and spiritual constituents to each other. We still entertain a great variety of opinions on the nature of this dependence, and allow the initiative to pass in an arbitrary way from one to the other. A cautious study of data, a ready acceptance on either hand of the validity of the phenomena involved, a faith in the unity and integrity of our intellectual
constitution, a sense of the inexhaustible mystery of its ultimate terms, and of the safe and wholesome handling of its immediate activities which lies open to us, are the conditions of a successful management of life. We need at once a robust and resistful common sense, a ready entertainment of new phenomena, and a power to bring them into harmony with that whole of which at best they are but a small portion. To introduce between these two terms, physical and spiritual, each so potent and so changeable in expression, a third term in no well-defined relation to either, with no distinct functions, and to which so many results may be vaguely referred, is to greatly add to the confusion and obscurity of our spiritual life. It is to make a "sweet reasonableness" almost impossible. Of all forms of inquiry we need here most of all to maintain sanity of method, and one widely supported by a carefully collated experience. We need to be taught the deepest as well as the latest lessons of the world, and to reconcile all lessons in the growth of the race. Our ultimate certainty lies in a recognition and maintenance of the framework of things. A bold, speculative temper breaks down the first terms of knowledge. Forsaking beaten paths means leaving behind us the wisdom which men have learned by much wandering.

The use which Professor James is disposed to make of automatism is chiefly found in the religious world, to whose obscure experiences it so readily unites itself. Here are some of the resources of the subliminal region as he conceives them. "It contains, for example, such things as all our momentarily inactive memories, and it harbors the springs of all our obscurely motivated passions, impulses, likes, dislikes, and prejudices. Our intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, conventions, and in general all our non-
rational operations come from it. It is the source of our
dreams and apparently they may return to it. In it arise
whatever mystical experiences we may have and our auto­
matisms, sensory or motor; our life in hypnotic and hypnoid
conditions; our delusions, fixed ideas and hysterical acci-
dents, if we are hysteric subjects; our supra-normal cogni-
tions, if such there be and if we are telepathic subjects. It is
also the fountain-head of much that feeds our religion."¹ What
a chance medley have we here of things existent and non-
existent, normal and abnormal, and waiting one and all to be
abolished by deeper and better-established physical currents
sweeping us onward! If such a chaos exists anywhere, and
is liable to become pregnant with new terms of life, what
monstrous births are we exposed to! If our faith is fed from
these fountains none of its aberrations need disturb us. What
bars and locks sufficiently strong can be put upon this realm
of blind night; and when its progeny break forth how are we
to distinguish the offspring of hysteria from the sound chil-
dren of a sane birth?

The conscious, half-unconscious states of mind, the ex-
periences in which the physical and spiritual elements will
not allign themselves, but remain obstinately confused; visi-
tions that will not down; dreams that are perpetually re-
dreamed; impressions full of painful absurdities, forever turn-
ing as in insanity on their own axes; the self-repeating prog-
eny that swarm around a feverish pillow, are a few of these
maladjustments of mind and matter. The chief inquiry we
raise about them is how to escape them. It is the characteris-
tic of sound mental activity that it can and does wipe the
board clean of all its demonstrations when it has no longer
any occasion for them. To enthrone hysteria amid a swarm

¹The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 483–484.
of phenomena that are escaping all rule, is to lose the very center of intelligence, is to become the victim of spirits we have not raised and cannot lay.

Genius has been spoken of as if it were a form of insanity. The notion is radically untrue. Genius makes any want of harmony more conspicuous, but genius is preeminently self-centered. The distinction between the normal and the abnormal, between that which springs with wholesome activity from its own spiritual center, and that which is a half-formed product of ill-adjusted interactions, gains strength with every step in the spiritual world. What is normal, sound, and just? is the ever-returning inquiry. To cluster at random such phenomena as Professor James mentions and implies, and give them the freedom of the religious world, is to hand it over to endless folly and confusion. "In persons deep in religious life, as we have now abundantly seen,—and this is my conclusion,—the door of this region seems unusually wide open." "The B-region, then,"—the secondary marginal region,—"is obviously the large part of each of us, for it is the abode of everything that is latent and the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded and unobserved." "I do indeed believe that if the subject have no liability to such subconscious activity, or if the conscious fields have a hard rind of a margin that resents incursions from beyond it, his conversion must be gradual, if it occur, and must resemble any simple growth into new habit. His possession of a developed subliminal self, and of a leaky or previous margin is thus a conditio sine qua non of the subject's being converted in the instantaneous way." "Higher powers may get access to us through the subliminal door"—that is, I apprehend, the back door. The confused, mystical, and unintelligible have rarely been so installed in the high places of religion. Hard com-
mon sense, familiar ways of doing good, beliefs that have the suffrage of mankind, retire into the shadow of more visionary experiences. The hubbub of waking life closes the door which in the dreamy subliminal state remains ajar.

The fanciful, extravagant, and remote have often forced their way into faith, but here they are housed in a sumptuous manner, much to the disturbance of the homely, every-day occupants. If this properly represents the religious life, it is indeed a most evasive and erratic experience. It is not entering by the door into God's universe of wisdom and love, but climbing up "some other way," as occasion offers, over an ill-guarded margin of ever-shifting illusions. Our religious experience no longer lies in a territory of pure copious streams, bringing affluence and beauty to the landscape, but in one of subterranean streams, dropping out of sight, gliding in dark places, and leaving the surface parched and barren. What we have been wont to regard as the reproach of religion we now find to have been its native potency.

We shall escape all this confusion if, with a simpler and sounder philosophy of life, we believe that the apparent terms are the real terms of welfare, that the entanglements of matter and mind, working their way into each other and with each other, are entanglements; that the things which are to be are the things which truly are; that the failures of our mental processes vanish with the processes themselves, and that there is no rubbish of mind ready to stand in the way of its new creations. The center of what we do know is the best point from which to start our explorations of what we do not know. Our intelligence is not about to steal in upon us across a leaky margin, but is to slowly accumulate under processes of inquiry we have learned to use and trust. The familiar paths, paths the race has long traveled, trails that
have crossed continents since the dawn of time, are after all to remain our true thoroughfares.

These obscure ways of subconsciousness get no color from the fact that religion is so largely the expression of emotion. Religion is life, the fullness of life in the entire man, is the circumference of his consciousness held in one central illumination; but it is all the more for that reason profoundly rational. We need comprehensive, penetrative feeling, because, by means of it, and by means of it alone, is our life spread over its own field of spiritual phenomena; by means of it, and by means of it alone, we come to a knowledge of what we are, are to be, and have to do. One without abundant sensitivities is like one without wide-ranging perceptive organs; facts, both in their nature and in their scope, escape him. As many men are irreligious by virtue of obtuse sensibilities as are irreligious because of slow, dull thoughts. All ways of knowing the world in its several parts furnish the conditions of faith; but these impressions must be real, verifiable impressions, permeated with the light of reason. They must spring up in the day; parts of the permanent creative forces that are in progress about us; not colorless, feckless, fiberless, products of the night.

Mysticism has shown such unquenchable energy, and played so beneficent a part among men, because the systematizing processes of faith have often been so barren, and its formulæ so narrow, as to be incapable of fertilizing the mind. And yet we herein find no reason for the introduction of visionary data, which leave the thoughts searching obscure places with much eagerness but able to bring forth nothing which commends itself to universal, daylight experience. If religion cannot be completely worked out in terms of creed, rites, and observances, what remain to us as its proper expression
are the terms of life itself. We should not try to escape these in mystical phenomena. To submit ourselves to automatisms is to lose once more the plain paths. Our plea is for clinging to the knowledge we have as a condition of gaining more knowledge. The concurrent force of knowledge spreading outward from its own centers is its great characteristic. The myths and visions and hypotheses with which we surround the solid substance of truth must all be cleared away before the processes of growth can again set in. Things remote and detached are untrue; material for the fancy rather than the thoughts, meteors rather than planets in the true solar system. If empiricism would only be empirical it might come to something.

Professor James in his work on "Human Immortality" strives to lend probability to the doctrine of immortality by the theory that consciousness "does not have to be generated, de novo, in a vast number of places. It exists already behind the senses coeval with the world." There is required only a lowering of the threshold to allow of a free flow into the mind from this general ocean of consciousness. Our present experiences only express the form and movement of the gate by which these waters of intellectual life find admittance.

The doctrine of immortality is the assertion of our ethical nature—is that through which it completes itself. Physical difficulties do not enter into the problem. The promise is not a physical but a spiritual one. Speculations, like those offered by Professor James, in their own obscurity and improbability weaken rather than strengthen belief. In striving to reënforce the conviction with these evasive fragments of thought we envelop the whole subject afresh in mystery. There is hardly a better example of the need of finding our safety at those centers of faith where convictions, like liv-
ing things, have been perpetual, springing up and spreading abroad—new phases in the eternal evolution of being. If we could resolve immortality into the trickle of a preëxistent ocean of consciousness, what utter confusion and hopeless loss we should suffer in our spiritual individuality! The belief in immortality is the faithfulness of the soul to itself.