ARTICLE VIII.

THE FIRST SIN, ITS CONSEQUENCES, AND THE REMEDY.

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We speak of the sin of the first man. Rabbinical Theology, more that of literalism, speaks of it as that of the first woman. And the Apostle himself, who elsewhere runs the parallel between the sin and death of the first man and the grace and life of the second, speaks of the woman as first in the transgression. It is, therefore, as man the head of the woman, identified in this, his headship, with the destinies of the race springing from them, that he is contemplated as the first transgressor. “By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men”; “In Adam all men die.” But, in reference to each of these we ask, How? How did the first man sin? In what way did he die; and, in so doing, communicate sin and death to his posterity?

In looking at this transgression and the questions involved, we are approaching what, since the fifth century, has been one of the chosen battle-grounds of theological controversy; the most positive assertions often being made where there was barely ground for a hesitating conjecture. The subject, however regarded, has its difficulties; and in no respect more so than in the ambiguity of the terms as they have been employed. The three main terms, for instance,—sin, guilt, punishment,—are, alike and each of them, used in at least two, if not more, senses. The first, “sin,” sometimes means an act, sometimes a state the result or effect of an act, and sometimes it has been made
to mean a state or condition prior to action, or even the capacity of action. The second, "guilt," sometimes means the criminality, reatus culpae, of an evil-doer; sometimes the effect, reatus poenae, a state or condition of those in themselves innocent, but affected by the criminality of others; and the other, and last of these words, "punishment," sometimes means the moral or legal consequences of evil-doing to the wrong-doer himself; sometimes similar consequences, so far as they can be similar, in the experience of others, who took no part whatever in the act producing them. It behooves us, therefore, at the very outset, to be on our guard, as to the sense in which any such term is taken; as also the importance, in our usage, of adhering to one that is throughout consistently the same. Otherwise we are in hopeless confusion.

In looking, then, at this first sin or wrong act of our first parents, we are met by three questions, under which may be ranged most of the discussions with which it is connected. The first of these is as to the nature of the act or sin itself in those by whom it was perpetrated. The second is that of its effect, whether as punishment or otherwise, immediately or remotely, to the offenders, those by whom the sin was committed. And the third is as to the participation of their posterity in this sin, whether in its criminality or in its consequences. If we are able to answer these questions, we shall have surmounted the greatest difficulties of this subject.

As to the first, it may be unhesitatingly answered, When we speak of the sin of the first man in himself, if we follow the light of Scripture, we say it was an act of disobedience to known Divine law,—one of moral dereliction. The temptation, the enticement, was from without inward; the sin, the moral act, was from within outward. This enticement was not only to the appetite, but through appetite to distrust, the opposite of faith, and to pride, the opposite of
dependence; and, through these, to voluntary disobedience: the pleasantness of the fruit, the assurance of its enjoyment with impunity, the suggestion that in such enjoyment would come self-exaltation. God, in the act of offense, was disbelieved, distrusted, disobeyed. The Tempter was believed, trusted, and followed. Whether that Tempter was only a serpent, or Satan in the form of a serpent, or Satan making use of the agency of a serpent, makes no difference whatever as to the human part of the transaction. Whether the Devil was there in person, or only in manifestation of agency, or through mediate instrument, the Devil's work was done, sin was committed. Known law of supreme rightful authority, enforced by specific warning in one direction, and implied promise in the other,—the explicit threat of death and the implied promise of life,—supreme Divine law, thus exhibited and enforced, was violated. There might be, as there actually was by one of the guilty parties, the plea of temptation coming from the other. There might be, again, and there was, the plea of the latter, that enticement had been presented from an outward source. But all these imply that violation of law had taken place. With every such possible excuse and alleviation, there could be no doubt of the fact, or as to its character. As criminals in act under Divine law, they have incurred its penalty.

What was that penalty, the punishment legally and morally due,—for under the Divine administration, these terms "legal" and "moral" are synonyms,—to the guilty perpetrators? That, of course, to which the Divine sovereign, true and righteous, as well as wise and loving, was pledged and committed in his own previous declarations,—death. What death was, the full significance of this word, to those first told of it; how far, in their condition, their thoughts went, or were capable of going, into this mystery, it is now impossible to decide. That it
meant, in man, what probably he had seen in the animal creation, would be intelligible; and this, so far as sight and sense were concerned, seemed the end,—annihilation. So far as the record goes, there were no intimations of any other form of continued existence. The possibility of endless life was implied in obedience. Disobedience brought them under the law of its positive opposite,—the death, the destruction, for perhaps that word best expresses what was understood, involved in the act of transgression. The result made manifest, that in this death or destruction, at the very least, was included physical death, the dissolution of the bodily organism. How it might have been with man and his posterity, had the first trial been passed through successfully; what would have been the form or forms of probation to each one of that posterity of succeeding generations; what the result, if, in any such future case, failure, whether bodily death or some other penalty,—these are questions of speculation, for which in nature we are without reply, and to which no such reply has been given in Scripture. But the actual result, in the actual trial, in the sentence as pronounced, is clear and unmistakeable: "Thou shalt return to the ground from whence thou wert taken." "Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return."

Even here, however, in the execution of penalty, there are exhibitions and intimations of forbearance, of clemency, the forbearance of Divine law's long delay, in the actual infliction of the Divine sentence. The threat had been, "Dying, thou shalt die"; "In the day that thou eatest thereof"; and the bodily dying, whether by physical or moral agencies, would seem to have begun from the time of the transgression. But the fullness of the sentence was long delayed. It was nearly a thousand years, only seventy short of it, before the final result, physical death, in the experience of the first transgressor, was fully consummated.
All the days that Adam lived were nine hundred and thirty years, and he died. He probably saw this fact of death in many others prior to his own actual experience of it. In this way it was not by previous specific declaration, of which we have knowledge, that he or they were made cognizant of their participation in the effects of his transgression; unless, indeed, their personal participation in evil and sin justified the anticipation of like participation in its consequences. As to the first offenders, however, all is clear and indisputable, as to the two points already exhibited: actual violation of Divine law,—personal criminality, and its forerevealed consequences and penalty,—bodily death.

These, however, were not the only effects of this first transgression, with the actual first perpetrators. A moral effect was also involved. In the very act of transgression, and manifesting itself before the sentence of bodily death was pronounced, is this moral effect to be distinctly recognized. So far as we can see, the moral convulsion and derangement, in the domain of spirit, through an act of wrong, of spiritual dereliction, is not only irremediable, but incalculable. The chords of that mysterious instrument, the human soul, once swept by a voluntary action, may vibrate responsively forever. Forces are generated, agencies affected, and processes set in operation, which far transcend our capacity of calculation, or indeed of comprehension. The act itself is seminal to principles and habits, to a character; unless arrested as to its results, is the initiative to such character. "I was afraid, and hid myself." The fear of conscious wrong, the dread of guilt, its consequent alienation and suspicion, is the beginning of opposition and of enmity. "We never forgive," is the language of a Spanish proverb, "those whom we have wronged or injured." The unsuccessful effort, in the way of self-excuse, is productive of such enmity. Just as in
the body there was the beginning of bodily death, so in
the spirit was there a beginning of spiritual and moral
death: negatively, in diminution, if not departure, of filial
affection, and dependence as to God; positively, in the en-
trance of their opposites, estrangement, alienation, en-
mity, and opposition.

Full and complete development, in these respects, in the
first transgressors, does not seem to have been left to go on
and perfect its course. Graciously arresting influences
came in. Divine agencies were exerted, by which it was
delayed, if not indeed neutralized. We have, indeed, no
specific authority for the assertion of such penitence as in-
volved the restoration of Divine favor; nor have we one
for its opposite. But, whatever the final result, there was
this element of delay and gracious interposition. As the
bodily death was not immediately inflicted, so with that
which was moral and spiritual. Mediating agencies came
in, or might come in, by which these two forms of death
might be accomplished, or by which they might be ar-
rested and modified. As already intimated, we are not
distinctly told as to what was the final result, with our
first parents, in this matter. We are told, however, of
Divine dealings with them which clearly indicate that
they were not, as once, cast off hopelessly; rather that
agencies were set in operation, and influences exerted, to
call forth penitence, and the loyalty of gratitude, towards
a Heavenly Sovereign and Benefactor. They are driven
out of Paradise. But an intimation is afforded, that, while
a penalty, it was not all penalty; that it would not be to
their advantage to remain there. Provision is made for
them, in the exposure and circumstances of their new con-
dition. They enter, indeed, upon that condition, with the
inheritance of labor and bodily death and suffering; but
with the Divine promise and assurance, that, through one
of these forms of suffering, would come overthrow to their
tempter and enemy,—the power which has brought them to their condition. Man "must labor in the sweat of his brow"; but in such labor are restraining and protective influences of a beneficial character. The woman, in childbirth, would have pain and suffering; but she would live through it, and bring forth the deliverer.

If, as we may hope, these Divine arrangements and efforts were not fruitless, and these first offenders, seeing their offense in its real nature, repented of it, the full development of moral and spiritual death with them did not take place,—never did take place,—and its full penalty, eternal death, was not incurred. And, if it be said that such death was justly due to the first offense, though it stood alone, and was followed by a life of penitence and holy obedience, the reply might well be made, What the authority for such assertion? Still further, supposing it to be warranted, the work of Him who came to "save to the uttermost" (ἐπὶ τὸ παντελές), "completely," for all the times and ages of man's earthly existence, could meet such necessity. Eternal death, it is to be remembered, is only possible to character; where moral and spiritual death precede, as its preparation and necessary moral condition.

Thus far we have looked at this matter purely with reference to the actual offenders. We thus have found an actual sin, criminality, involved, personal guilt and delinquency. The punitive consequences of this criminality are, first, morally the deranging effect of the act in the moral and spiritual constitution of the offenders; depravation, to a greater or less degree, of the character and moral capacity. With this, whether immediately and purely, in the action and reaction of spirit and its bodily organism, or mediately, through some physical agency, in the act of offense, or purely as the Divine fiat, is the further effect, bodily mortality, death of the body, in due time, to be
experienced; and, as a possible consequence, eternal death in the carrying out of the depraved tendencies, originated by the act of sin, and lodged in the moral and spiritual system of the offenders. We thus have the sin, its guilt, its present punishment bodily and spiritual, its possible future of reprobation, and its final results and consequences.

We come, now, to the more difficult question How with their posterity? Of these, as yet unborn, and unrecognized as existences, nothing is said in the original threat of penalty; and the only allusion in the sentence, when penalty is inflicted, is to the fact that they come into the world by suffering; and that, through the agency of one of this posterity, the Tempter and Author of the evil will be overcome. In one respect, it is to be said, that, in strictness of Divine sentence, they died before they lived, as did the actual offenders die in the moment of the transgression. In the terms of that sentence, and in strictness of law, these offenders died in the act of offense, their lives were forfeited, ideally they were dead. The lives of their posterity, dependent upon the continuance of theirs, only indeed naturally possible through such continuance, were thus, of course, forfeited also. They all, in the death of their progenitor, were thus ideally dead,—shared in the effects of his sentence. That sentence, however, as we have seen and in whatever manner construed, was not actually, and immediately, with the original offenders, carried out in execution. For sufficient reasons, in the Divine administration, at the time, and made clear to men by subsequent revelation, there was a mediating influence, an exercise of Divine clemency, by which the actual offenders were spared, and put on a new probation; by which, also, their offspring could come into existence,—an existence, like that of their progenitor, of a probationary character. The great principle of mediation, the old
theologians called it representation, which Butler, in his Analogy, so strikingly exhibits, as running through all the arrangements of man's natural condition, thus shows itself in this first chapter of his early history. As the first man by his own act, in contravention of the Divine will, and yet under Divine control, had become a mediator communicative of evil and disaster to his offspring; so immediately, in the Divine arrangement, was there another Mediator, communicative of good, and rendering possible the exercise of Divine forbearance and clemency, to the results already mentioned: by which the first offenders continued to live; by which their offspring could have life at all; and by which both, in their new state of probation, and with the promise of final victory over the enemy, were given another opportunity. As in the mediation of the first Adam they all died, so in the mediation of the second Adam, Christ, they all lived.

But not entirely unscathed, as to the effect of the first transgression. Included in the fact of their living at all; in that of their coming into existence, under the circumstances of the new probation, was that of their sharing in all the conditions of that probation. One of these conditions, not specifically mentioned, as to the posterity, but showing itself in their actual experience, was the fact of mortality, death of the body. We are not told of that first death. It may possibly have been that of righteous Abel. But as he was at years of manhood, and he and his elder brother seem to have been mentioned mainly with reference to the circumstances of his death, there may have been many others, births and deaths, prior to that event. The first that came, whenever it was,—and it may have been that of an infant of days, without sin in act, or knowledge of good or evil,—that first death made manifest the fact that the sentence in this respect was one, not only for the first offenders, but for their offspring. Death reigned from
Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression; of those who, not partakers of that sin by personal act, in their subjection to bodily death, were partakers of its effects and consequences.

So too, and as, in the matter of mortality, manifested in the actualities of existence, and one of the conditions of the new form of trial upon which the race had entered, was there the participation of the offspring with the parent, not only of the bodily, but of the mental and moral, consequences of the transgression. That transgression affected the whole nature, the whole constitution, physical and moral, of the transgressor. As that nature was perpetuated, through and from the parent, to the offspring; so were perpetuated the moral as well as physical results of the great convulsion to which it had been subjected.

That moral result could not, of course, be to make the personal act of one moral agent the personal, moral act of another. With reverence, be it said, this is not a possibility within the resources of infinitude, whether that infinitude be contemplated as justice, omnipotence, or sovereignty, or the comprehension of all perfection in a Divine Personality. "The idea of strict imputation, so that one becomes personally guilty of the sin or action of another, is at the foundation of all moral science." This assertion was made during the controversy separating the Old and New School Presbyterians some sixty or seventy years ago. To many it rather seems as destructive of all morality and personal accountability. The first man could not transmit the guilt, the criminality, of this his individual act to his descendants. He could, however, transmit its consequences. And, as the result shows, and as, in accordance with the mediatorial principles of the Divine administration elsewhere exhibited, such transmission in its consequences may extend to, and affect, the intellectual and moral as well as the bodily constitution. Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive how one of these parts of human nature can be seriously affected, without its extension to others. If, moreover, the movement begin in the higher, the moral and spiritual, part of such nature, the inference, as to participation in results, is greatly strengthened.

And, thus, we have this further consequence, a depraved nature, that which, if unarrested by mediatorial Divine agencies and influences, works into depraved action, and through this to moral and spiritual death. The child of a depraved and fallen parent, born in the image of that parent, is mortal as to his body, is liable to spiritual death as to his soul. There is no absolute necessity that he shall actually die in either of these respects. Two of the race have not thus died, as to the body; and, of the last generation of that race, there will be millions who will not. So, too, many have not actually died the moral and spiritual death of hopeless impenitence. In all, however, there was, and is, the bodily and spiritual mortality, which comes from a bodily and spiritual mortal progenitor. In both of these respects, the children of the first man are begotten in his image. "The father has eaten sour grapes, the children's teeth are set on edge"; "The iniquity of that father is thus visited upon his offspring."

But not, in such a manner, as necessarily to make them worse than he is himself, or to put them in a worse condition, bodily or spiritually, prior to their own actual transgression. Whatever the moral effect wrought in the first man, that is, whatever was his depravity, the effect of his own sin, it manifestly was not the total destruction of all spiritual susceptibility, of all capacity of response to Divine truth and influences. He is immediately dealt with as receptive of these; and Divine means are used to arrest and restrain the development of that depravity. The mode of the Divine sentence, the alleviations in that sentence, the promise given in connection with it, the
merciful provision for bodily comfort, the twofold significance of the cherubic symbols of the Divine presence (the guard of Paradise, and the point of access thus indicated, to Him with whom they had first communed in Paradise),—all these particulars are to be taken into account, in our estimate of the condition of the first man, a guilty, fallen, depraved, and dying, but not a God-forsaken being. Lost, but, in the resources of Divine love, not hopelessly so; depraved, but not thoroughly and completely so; fallen, but not beyond recovery; mortal and dying, but not beyond the prospect of restoration. Total depravity in theological discussion, always under protest, however, as liable to be misunderstood, sometimes means depravity which affects man's whole nature. In the pulpit, or rather in the pews, it means utter destruction of all spiritual capacity and susceptibility; that is, that all men are alike, and alike are equally demons. The order of the Apostle is thus reversed: "devilish, sensual, earthly," not, as he puts it, "earthly, sensual, devilish." That depravity might, indeed, work itself out to its extremest and most awful result with the first man, the original offender, as it has since undoubtedly with some of his offspring. But it is under probation, in the perversion of Divine truth, and of the circumstances of such probation, that such result is reached. Human depravity is an awful, humbling truth. Minimize it as we may, it remains still, in itself, as in its results, everywhere and in all ages, to proclaim its character. But such depravity, and its possible or actual developments, in human experience, must be carefully distinguished. The new-born infant cannot be described in terms applicable to a Catiline or a Borgia. And it is manifestly an exaggeration, when such depravity, prior to any of its developments, is made out to be worse and more malignant in its posterity, the participants, than it was in the first parents, the actual offenders; such exaggeration, too, ex-
tended, as has sometimes been the case, to those with whom no positive exercise of it was possible; with those who, in the language of Scripture, have no knowledge of good or evil. "Precious little angel," was the fond language of a loving mother, as she looked on her darling, in the sweet sleep of infancy. "Malignant little devil, would come nearer the truth," was the suggestion of what claimed to be a sounder theology. Both, it may be, exaggerations; but which nearer the language of the Master, "Of such is the kingdom of heaven"? It may be said, that these exaggerated opinions, as to the malignity of inherited depravity, are the full inheritance of the Pelagian controversy. Pelagius found the effect of the first sin, only in the example of the parent; Augustine, in the transmitted tendency. But that tendency soon became the equivalent of personal guilt, and its result condemnation. Heightening and intensifying this, were the accepted views of infant baptism, as a necessity of salvation. The inference seems to have been, if baptism is thus necessary for salvation, there must be something in this inherited nature, so malignant that it deserves condemnation. At an earlier period Origen speculated as to the transference of moral character, from previous conditions of existence. Tertullian, on the other hand, objects to this baptism of infants, as useless, on the ground of their innocence. Cyprian, his admiring disciple, argues in its favor, in view of this fact of depravity; not that baptism takes away infant criminality, but this foreign element the guilt of Adam, imputed to him. In both the personal innocence of the infant is implied. Our readers will recognize the connection of this question with the proposed revision of the Westminster Confession. "Elect infants" as a class are recognized. How as to the non-elect? Theological hardihood has not, as yet, formulated the expression "reprobate infants." Are there any such? If so, do they
never die in infancy? If it can be proved that only elect infants die, the difficulty will be alleviated.

These beautiful lines of Coleridge, the epitaph of an unbaptized infant, are not here out of place:

"Be, rather than be called, a child of God,
Death whispered. With assenting nod
The baby bowed his head upon his mother's breast,
Without demur.
Possessor of the kingdom of the blest,
Not an inheritor."

There are two other effects, to be contemplated, in this connection, of the first offender with his posterity:—that of their actual sin and its final penalty, the spiritual death of actual sin and its consequences, eternal death. From the first man, as we have seen, is mortality, the seminal principle of bodily death, to his posterity. From him, also, is depravity, the seminal principle of moral death, of total estrangement and alienation from God. Must actual sin and eternal death following, be recognized as traceable to the same source? In certain respects they may be thus traced, and are so in Scripture. As constituting the ordinary condition to the commission of such sin, and its consequences, there is such connection. In posse, not in esse all sinned, in the first man; as in that first offense was opened the course of antecedents and consequences, of agencies and conditions, under which actual sin since then, and now, takes place. To this actual result, however, is another element, and that which gives more character to all human action; that is, the personality, the voluntary agency, of the actor comes in, and is needed. "Take away the will," says the judicious Hooker, "and all acts are equal": equally good and equally bad, that is have no moral character at all. Whatever the antecedent conditions in the sin of the first man, or the depravity thereby evolved in himself, and transmitted to his posterity, they
are not the efficient, accountable cause, with these latter, of an outgoing of actual sin.

That efficient accountable cause of the actual, or of any moral act of any kind, is the personal agency, the choice and will of him who finds himself under these conditions, and decides as to his own action. Such an one, if he dies eternally, dies for his own sins. He is a fallen, but a redeemed creature. "Where sin abounds, grace superabounds." Whatever, irrespective of his own agency, comes to him from Adam, is also, and irrespective of his own agency, provided for him in Christ. If, under such circumstances, he sins and dies, he dies for his own sins, not for those of his progenitor. For these his own sins, also, there is indeed provision of pardon and remission; but under another principle. The pardon, in this latter case, comes through a free moral act, as did the offense and its condemnation. As by personal acts of sin he comes under condemnation; so, by a personal act of faith in Divine Redeemer, he receives pardon. "As the wages of sin," in this last and most terrific aspect of it, "is death"; "so the gift of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, is eternal life."

We thus sum up the teaching of Scripture, as of the earlier Christian theology of the first three centuries. We do there find the fact of race connection with its progenitor, a participation of nature, of physical and moral constitution, as of consequences in some form or other, of his sin and fall. What seems to be the nature of that connection? What are its consequences?

In dealing with the material of Scripture bearing upon this subject, there are two general classes of passages to be considered: 1st. Those which bear strictly upon the question of the effect of the first sin upon and in man, prior to actual transgression; the condition of the race, affected by this, as at birth, and prior to the outgoing of personal agency. 2d. Those which bear upon this sub-
ject, as they refer to the effect of this in some of its results,—in the actual sin of the hardened offender, as in those of all offenders against Divine law. Nero, for instance, in the outgoings of this depraved nature, was a monster of iniquity. But this does not prove that he was actually wicked, or criminally guilty, in his birth. Such capacity of monstrosity may find its only explanation in this fact of a depraved nature. But that nature, in its existence, in its development and actual exercise and expression, must be distinguished. The larger number of scriptural allusions to the evil of human nature, are of the latter class. And their importance, especially in connection with their universality, as to the outward developments of depravity, is, to indicate its presence, and its moral danger. They cannot, however, indicate personal character, innocence or criminality, prior to the exercise of personal agency. We must, therefore, confine our examination to the first of these classes of passages,—those which describe the race, all men alike, as affected by Adam's sin, and this, irrespective of their own actual transgression. In regard to these latter, they are unlike; how, in the former, are they alike?

"In Adam," says the Apostle, "all die." "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all, for that all have sinned": this followed by the parallel of the two great heads of the race, as to the evil and the remedy. Taking these passages and their contents, it may be said that the race connection contemplates or implies a threefold death, as the consequence of the first transgression,—physically, that is, of the body; morally, that of the character; legally, that of the condemning sentence of the Divine law. But how? Actually? Take the first, that of the body. There is thus the fact of mortality. But actual death, under certain conditions, may not take place; as, with Enoch and Elijah, and with the millions who will be found alive at the final resurrec-
The body is mortal; but this is not death. There is in it the potentiality of death. But that potentiality may not be exerted to its extreme result. So, too, as to moral death. Is that actual? Men are said to be "dead in trespasses and sins," to have become "past feeling," "to having their conscience seared." That is actual, moral death. But that is not the condition of the newborn infant. He has inherited a depraved and disordered nature; and, in the workings of that nature, unarrested, and uninfluenced by higher and gracious influences, his moral possible death becomes actual. Just as there is, in such case, the potentiality, so to speak, of bodily death, which may not be actualized; so with that of the spirit. The actual moral death may never take place. In numberless instances it has not taken place. Gracious agencies and influences meet such spirit at its birth. The thanksgiving of maternal gratitude that the child is born, may, and doubtless has often passed into, the prayer, that God will take him, and make him his own. Parental consecration and faithfulness and love, prayer and the gracious breathings of God's Spirit, may thus meet the inheritor of a depraved nature at his birth, hover over his cradle, go with him in all his infantile movements and childish steps, and, in the language of Scripture, "sanctify him from his mother's womb." Here, again, we have not an actuality, but a potentiality. What is actual is the inherited depraved nature; what is potential is the moral death of trespasses and sin,—a potentiality in many cases not reaching its ultimate exercise.

And, as it is with these two forms of death, so with another, to which they are the natural introduction,—the death of a Divinely condemning sentence, legal death upon actual transgression. In all actual sin is involved this condemning sentence, the sentence, the potentiality which finds its exercise, in the actual death, of Divine infliction
of penalty. But many who are guilty of actual sin, and have in them this potential death, will not die actually. Divinely remedial agencies and influences come in, produce repentance, and the actual death does not take place. As, in each of these respects, there is a potency of death in Adam; so, over against each of them, and superabounding, is there a potency of life in Christ. As man, irrespective of his own agency, inherits bodily death from Adam; so, irrespective of such agency, he inherits from Christ bodily resurrection. As, moreover, irrespective of his personal agency, he inherits from Adam a depraved nature; so, in and through Christ, and irrespective of his personal agency, comes to him a quickening and sanctifying Spirit, through which that depraved nature may be renewed. As further, in the exercise of his personal agency, he follows Adam and becomes by actual sin the inheritor of a sentence of death; so, in the exercise of that same personal agency, trusting in Christ, that sentence is taken away, he is forgiven, he lives; his sentence of death is not executed. As in each of these respects "all die," come within the potency of death, from Adam; so, all come within the potency of life, from Christ. Whether that potency, in either case, shall become actuality, is the problem of the earthly probation. As, in the exercise of such personal accountability, each one sows, for life or for death; so shall he reap.

We thus have the result. By nature, mortality, depravity, actual sin; by grace, life, renewal, pardon, restoration. The child of Adam, therefore, has no responsibility for his mortality, for his depraved nature. But he is responsible for the manner in which he deals with them and bears himself toward them; for neglect or reception of the Divine grace and life, which may overcome his depravity, which may overcome the evil of his mortality. He is also responsible, as to whether he will voluntarily follow Adam
in his actual sin, or whether he will take Christ, in his offers of life and salvation. Here we have passed into the region of personal action, of personal accountability, and consequently of guilt and blame, or of moral rectitude and approval. Here, as elsewhere, the Judge of all the earth manifests himself as doing right; as, even in that righteousness, making known also his boundless love and compassion.