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ARTICLE VIII.

REACTION BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCE AND
RELIGION.

BY FREDERICK W. SARDESON, PH.D.

NOT infrequently, nowadays, one may hear some thoughtful religious person questioning some natural scientist with evident intent to learn what new idea the scientist may have on that great question—religion. As a natural scientist, I have had my little share of questions to answer, and to the more pertinent ones, serious reply has been essayed. Or, now and then, feeling a little bolder, I may have suggested both the question and the answer. In doing this I am not soliciting. A natural scientist need not seek to proselyte, for his advantage is in natural science, not in theology, and I do not wish to be misunderstood as claiming that proselyting is ever permissible to me as a natural scientist.

But a scientist properly cultivates the truth in the field of natural science; and he claims this as his right, even though he must hear the accusation that in his field he is cultivating seed which scatters and grows destructively as weeds in other fields. Science is accused of producing, even inadvertently, a tendency to a loss of faith within the church. And it may be admitted, I think, that there is such a tendency, and that it is now largely due to the teachings of science.

This tendency is not alone due to the interference of scientific fact with literal interpretation of biblical language. There were different understandings of the Scriptures before there were any appreciable natural scientists;

and because the Bible had been misunderstood does not appear to have then invalidated it. I do not understand now that scientific thought would approve the rejecting of the Bible because parts of it had been partly misunderstood.

But the science method of weighing evidence before fixing conclusion or belief does tend to build the idea of theory, instead of the idea of fact, in all theology. The belief in God, when based upon scientific evidence, or when scientifically considered, does not stand as an unquestionable fact, but is rather a theory or hypothesis, because resting on insufficient scientific evidence; and is not a fact defended by complete and concordant scientific evidence. I mean, of course, that it is a true theory, or true hypothesis, that belief in God is not false idea as a theory more than it is as an assumed fact. It is a theory with the privileges of a fact—a *true* theory; not a preliminary "working hypothesis," but a consequent, true one, yet not a scientific fact.

It may be fairly admitted that the theologian rightly blames natural-science study for the dissolution of the cocksure faith of past generations, although there may be also a larger prior cause for it; such as is suggested by the idea that the church never has remained quite static; that it changes retrogressively and progressively, or evolves as we say. It is not possible here to explain why it changes, except that it does as all else appears to do,—evolve,—change. And since change inevitably comes, what is more to be expected in this age than that theology should come to be represented to scientific minds in scientific figure of speech?

If the natural scientist, failing to prove to the point of fact that there is a ruling God, still holds to the theory that he exists, not being able to dismiss this true theory,—is that faith? That is now the question. And if he believes in Christ, realizing, however, that we may be misin-

formed upon, or have misunderstood in part, his words and deeds,—is that faith? The effect of the natural scientist's habit of thought upon faith may well be to more or less prevent absolute "faith" in theology. But I am inclined to inquire whether it is not doing this chiefly by substituting a faith on theory; also, whether belief is, after all, waning. May it not rather be that it is distributing?

Necessarily minds are different,—apparently no two are exactly alike,—and they have different forms of belief. There are many creeds, not all of which can be all true. And the idea of theory in belief merely admits the varied color of belief which the idea of fact, or absolute belief, has not prevented. Instead of, as formerly, many men believing absolutely and few men disbelieving absolutely, men are coming to believe more equally—all with a margin of doubt—though their faith be no larger than a mustard seed! And, if scientific thought renders absolute belief impracticable, it makes disbelief arbitrary, and absolute unbelief therefore impossible. The reactionary outcome may even well be a waxing of faith among men; if only the true theory upon the scientific mind and heart weigh as heavily as the absolute belief of the dogmatist.

The ideal of the scientific man (in the right sense of the word) is the motto "I mean to know," while the ideal of the dogmatic man (in the right sense of the word) is the motto "I believe"; and it may be well claimed that the tendency of the age is to prefer the former motto. The one is in its tone discordant to the other, inasmuch as the former uses skepticism and criticism, which the latter rejects. A scientist cannot remain in a dogmatic state of mind and be a scientist, and for him to make an absolute exception in case of theology does injury to his ideal, "I mean to know." But he does not necessarily adopt a negative motto, "I do not believe."

For that which one knows scientifically to be a fact, is

worth believing. And, moreover, the scientist has belief beyond actual knowledge. He calls it hypothesis or theory. Though his belief is not unalterable, and must change in deference to evidence possessed by him, yet he may have many beliefs which he will never need to change. He may have more belief than knowledge of fact (and truly many pretentious scientists are very superstitious in their way, if you know them). He may early discover that the scientific ideal cannot be driven everywhere; and, moreover, that not every one can find a way to follow the scientific ideal. Hence a well-selected creed becomes a necessity! The motto "I believe" leads temptingly where the "I mean to know" fails. The people and the scientist may touch by belief that which is not within scientific grasp. And, further, what is the "business man" to do? For the "I mean to know" promises as little tolerance to apathy and agnosticism as the "I believe" has done.

It seems to me that the so-called loss of faith is in some cases a translation of idea, not loss of faith—a change from absolute belief to belief on theory; in others it may be unbelief sheltered under a scientific pretense. (In passing, it may be well to mention with special disfavor the hypocrisy of unscientific minds pretending to be scientific—an evil like that of pretended absolute belief.) Yet, when there is directness of purpose, the scientific mind cannot well shake off the consciousness that God is not completely grasped in human understanding. The scientific minded who realizes the imperfection of human understanding, knowledge, and language, but who sees truth in theology and Christ's teachings, appears to himself as a true believer. Seemingly only the dogmatic state of mind to which all is either all true or all false requires an absolute belief. Probably the majority of minds still require an absolute belief.

But those two states of belief are related, i.e. the theoretical belief of the scientific mind tends also to become

absolute, just as our students of science tend to look upon its theories as if they were fact; for example, the atomic theory of chemistry and physics. Chemical activity or reactions take place only when substances are imperceptibly close together. All matter is assumed to be separable into invisibly small units or atoms. Atoms act upon other atoms infallibly the same under the same conditions. Atoms combine to form molecules. Now the atomic theory is theory; but, assuming this theory, the chemical affinities can nearly all be explained. The theory has the force of fact. All knowledge of chemistry is written in terms of this theory, and the student accepts it, and becomes a practical chemist. He may forget that atoms are theory, and might be hollow instead of solid, or may not be at all. He knows that the truth as far as known to him is expressed in the theory. He pursues new facts in light of the true theory.

The teachings of Christianity are founded on fact; it is the truth, whether or not it is the whole truth, whether or not it is unalloyed. Belief in Christianity on the basis of scientific true theory could then be valid.

Creed is necessary too. Whoever makes a practice of religion must begin with a belief, be it theory or fact in his mind, that there is a God, a Father, great, good, powerful, omnipresent, out of contact with whom he cannot get, though out of accord he may,—this is his belief, or part of it. Then the field of religion is open to him, or begins to open to him.

Some are trying to practice religion under the name "Evolution." They say, "Everything has evolved, and everything will evolve; man has refined from an ape, and must become an angel *de facto*." Now, evolution and organic evolution mean no such thing to the evolutionist in proper sense. Evolution is change. Organic evolution is change in adaptation to changing environment,—now re-

trogressive, now progressive, from any point of view. But people must have a god for religious purposes, even those who say, "There is no God; it is evolution that did it." Yet the theory of evolution is not a god, and must not be made an idol. Religious people should use the word God when they mean God.

Of course faith in creed is a shield, and is useful in that way, if not absolutely necessary. It is not comfortable, it is not religiously healthful, for the weaker theologially to be driven here and there by meandering pedagogues. A well-chosen creed is a shield. It gives the right protection to religion. Similarly, beliefs or theories dominate all stages of natural-science learning,—such as, the theories of evolution, the atomic theory, and the like,—and they protect and guide the scientist.

If you do not think that a true theory can be an impenetrable shield, just attack the theory of organic evolution. Or, I might say, that there has been a battle over that theory, and that there is more or less of the bewilderment of a defeat in the ranks of the attacking party.

A true theory is valid. Christianity is undeniable true theory at least. That love makes for good and hate for evil, is the truth. I do not mean to place Christianity on a level with natural-science theories, but rather to argue that it would stand if it were. And as to religion, the right attitude toward the great and hence little known God and the mysteriously constructed brother-man need not be less imperative than toward the king God and the fellow-pensioner of old. That we are all brothers, and are all children, is, in natural science, true theory as in the best theology.

There is a religious nature in man, and it is fed by religious belief. If a man believes in God, it is just as if there was a God on earth for him. If he believes in heaven, there is heaven before him. If in immortality of the soul

he believes, it is so for earthly life, at least. If he believes in Christ, this is also a manifestation of the godlike which man may be if he will. If he believes in the supernatural, he will feel it. If he looks for inspiration, he will find it. And the Bible is a revelation to him of his own self and condition.

But what about miracles? Of course the whole of nature is a miracle to us if we stop to think and ask why it is as it is. How nature acts we can know, but why it does is mysterious and miraculous. If the natural scientist does not wonder, it is not because he has nothing to wonder at. Possibly the "age" in which we live has dazzled him;—like the Patagonian who has seen the ships and guns of the white man, and would no longer wonder if a man put his head on the ground and walked away without it. Anything which is not explicable is miraculous, unless we refuse to wonder.

And since as yet we do not know the limits of, and cannot claim to know all the laws of, nature, it is not possible for me to determine whether for Christ to raise the dead was unknown natural law in operation, or supernatural. We are in science now trying to find out whether life can be made out of inanimate matter by imposed conditions; and it is not fair for us to say that the dead could not be raised under right conditions. But if I were to bring the dead to life to-day, scientists would proceed to inquire how it was done, without assuming that it was supernatural. As to the supernatural, not knowing the limits of the natural, I do not suppose that I should be able to identify it. There was a man present when his eyesight was restored, and all he knew was, "Whereas I was blind, now I can see." Miracles and revelation come to us who read, in the guise of human language and with the limitations of human mind.

Without special miracles in science (for there are enough

general miracles), how are we to believe that there is a God, a Creator? On this subject, any account of creation contains the same ideas: it assumes or proves a creator; it assumes or proves a creation—man is a creature; it assumes or proves a period of creation. In geology the exact length of time is not determinable, but is assumed to have been so. In Genesis an exact length is stated, bringing the whole story within human comprehension. We see the earth and its surroundings scientifically, and assume that there is a universe. And likewise you live in a sense of right and wrong, of strength and weakness, and readily believe that this correlates to a universal life,—a living God. God is scientifically a true theory, as true as the theory that there is a universe, anyway. Conscience and reason did not come from nowhere, any more than the solar system came from nowhere.

Though natural science will not laud the understanding of a South American native who could hear a story of creation on a two-day basis,—since he can count but two,—nor subserve the seven-day figure of speech, yet it cannot deny that truth is in the story. It does not deny it.

It is not logical for us to refuse to believe the only theory, that is, God, to account for our existence. They do not escape this theory who call God Evolution, or Chance, or Mathematical Necessity, or Nature. They only weaken those words for scientific use by putting too much meaning upon them.

Natural science enlarges our sense of the universe, by a systematic method of discovery and record, but it does this in one way only, discovering always more of the same kind, that is, matter in motion. It discovers the material of the universe. For example, the moon is another planet of matter in motion. Between us and the moon there is ether (whatever that may be), and what else, we do not know. The universe is to us matter in motion, since we

see nothing else. Is there nothing else? We do not know, in natural science, whatever our theory.

At present, it is known that light, heat, and motion are forms of one energy. Some effort is also being made to trace gold, silver, and all matter as forms of one real element. The biologist, too, is trying to solve the problem of life and mind: what man is in terms of matter and energy. It is of course evident that the natural scientist is trying to comprehend everything in terms of matter and energy of matter. And he is able to comprehend what God is, in those terms, about as easily as a child could put the universe into its mouth. He cannot define exactly what man is; and certainly not what he is after death, as to his "soul."

There is an effort¹ to trace life processes to chemism, to prove that assimilation is chemical activity only. But when that is done, there will be no analysis of life and mind yet.

If we could make a dead thing live by producing some chemical conditions, we should suppose then that life is a condition of matter,—not non-material. There is, indeed, an old superstition of spontaneous generation of living from dead matter. Some Greeks (B.C.) taught philosophically that lower life arose spontaneously, and from this animals and man descended (Anaximander), that is, spontaneous generation and organic evolution. Scientists now hold, for reasons, that the animal man has evolved from lower animals, but spontaneous generation was disproved utterly by the late Pasteur. Yet some speculate as to whether the first "spark of life" may have arisen spontaneously. It is mere superstition. We do not know how life arose. Science of a hundred years only results in sharpening the demarcation between the inanimate and the truly living. Once we think we have filled the chasm, we

¹ See *Science*, August, 1901.

find we were deceived. For example, in the case of ferments in chemistry; two substances are put together which do not react on each other. A certain third substance is added. In the presence of this one the first two attack each other, they work; but to all appearances the third, the ferment, is unchanged. Thus the life germ is simulated by the ferment. But again we are discovering, that, however dead ferments appear to be, they are of protoplasmic origin; i.e. the ferment is not the non-living matter simulating the life process, but it is the life process not yet dead. Evolution, also, is not creation of life, but adaptation of life to changing environment, evidently. What created life we do not know in terms of matter. That man evolved only as other animals evolve, we do not know; evidently not, unless there is to us invisible mind in matter. In terms of matter and energy of matter we cannot express, quite yet, the whole difference between a live man and a dead man. This soul, or whatever is in us, comes we know not whence or how, goes we know not whither, in science.

Yet that man is immortal is true theory. If life is supposed to be only matter in motion, by the law of indestructibility of matter, and the law of conservation of energy, man is of immortal stuff. Then why not indestructible as to the soul, whatever the soul may be? The living body may well be a condition of matter merely; there is reason to think so; and the soul of man may be a condition of soul or "oversoul," preservable or destructible as to the individuality. And the human body may acquire, at birth, a soul from a source extraneous to it, for all we know, which soul may be preservable after death. Again, we cannot deny that man has been created, whatever we think of man and of God; and a power that created man could create a heaven, and, if He has not, I prefer to feel that it is a mistake,—if mistake could be.

How man passes from this life to another is manifest in natural science only in that he is gone. Is it another survival of the fittest? That might be.

Theories of evolution have become deep-set in the thought of the age. Even people who denounce the theories are apt to do so in terms of the same theories, saying that it is a growing tendency, instead of that it is added mischief. All theories of evolution begin in the correlation of observed phenomena, extend toward mythical explanation of the origin of the same, and then end abruptly. It is not definitely hypothecated that the laws of nature evolve, such as the law of gravitation; rather, the universe does not evolve, but its parts: correspondingly, God does not change, but his domain is changing.

The nebular hypothesis, which is based upon the phenomena of suns and planets, tries to explain then how these originated. The solar system is imagined to have arisen from a rotating nebula, which, as it cooled and contracted, left parts or planets to one side. This theory is not reducible to a law, inasmuch as an unexplained inequality of motion or non-homogeneity of mass must be assumed to account for the planets. The hypothesis expresses a law with an unexplained exception; not, therefore, an exact law. It correlates many undeniable facts, but yet is not necessarily true. One cannot deduce from it the cause for the continents of the earth, and not for the origin of life and man. The nebular hypothesis is a very incomplete explanation of the earth's origin and history, at best.

There is a break between the nebular hypothesis and the geologic evolution theory, and this is usually bridged by a clever myth. As the planet cooled, an exterior crust formed, which, being heavier in some places, depressed, forming the ocean basins. But why heavier in some places? There is better reason now to suppose that the earth would have, in cooling, solidified first at the center.

It is at least not tenable to suppose the earth to be molten inside now.

This now requires a different hypothesis. The lithosphere, or solid spheroid, as it cooled has tended to crystallize into a tetrahedron, a solid body with four plane faces, six edges, and four projecting corners; these corners being the land piercing the hydrosphere and into the atmosphere. Did life originate on one of these corners, or on four of them? The fact is that the land elevations are now unsymmetrical, and seem always to have been so. We do not know how they began. Only, the idea that life arose with the rising of land from beneath the hydrosphere is apparently an unavoidable scientific hypothesis; as it also appears to be a theological one.

Since animals and plants can build islands by taking salts from the sea-water, that is, by accumulation of their skeletons, whence coral islands and the like; and the unsymmetrical development of the continents might be ascribed to local origin of life, the land would have been mathematically lawful if it were not for this interference. But to ascribe the origin of life to a mathematically exact natural law, and then use it as the cause for an exception to the same law, would not do.

In spite of the abundance of fact showing that continents evolve; in spite of great knowledge of cause and effect in the building and unbuilding of the land, this evolution is reducible at present to only a law with an exception. While erosion of the land and loading into the sea causes elevation and subsidence, yet organisms—life—interfere in this process, aiding here and preventing there, composing one of the great factors in geologic evolution. But in all this we have nothing to show that life arose as a necessity or otherwise than as an exception to the geologic forces with which it is interlocked. Why not spontaneous generation of first life? That is a clever myth; failing, how-

ever, to explain the origin of life as the consequent of a geologic law.

The theory of organic evolution is based upon abundant evidence which it fully correlates—the succession of organic types in geologic time, the graduated interrelationship of organic structure, the adaptation and adaptability of organisms to environment, the vagaries of geographic distribution, the interbreeding of species, and the connecting links between successive species and the biogenetic “law,” so-called—all argue that species of organisms change, and have descended probably from an ancestral one species. We may speak of this as the fact of descent. The evolution theory tries to explain that descent. The cause is traced quickly to heredity and environment. The environmental factor being eliminated, what is heredity? What is the law of heredity? Biologists have not yet decided on the law or laws of heredity. But, as a fact, heredity operates as a law with an exception. Like begets like, but not exactly like. Individuals are apparently never exactly alike, whatever their relationship. Further, children are also children of their ancestors, of whom the parents are but two. We are all brothers.

Darwin maintains that natural selection produces evolution; that is, heredity varies, and environment eliminates. Further explanation has been entered into to account for the variability in heredity, without, as yet, definite result.

Further, it may be stated that we have no unit in organic evolution. Organic evolution is evolution of species; but we have discovered no unit of size or strength of species, no unit of change for number of generations, or years, or number of experiences. We are dealing with generalities yet, and cannot mathematically calculate that which we can trace, nor prophesy the future except as to possibilities and probabilities. A species divided by intervention of environment is two virtual species, and of these the

one may change one way, the other another way; one rapidly, the other slowly. These facts eliminate the idea of certainty or predestination, and even mathematical necessity from our calculations on organic evolution, as far as to the deduction of particular from the generality.

What is to become or evolve in the human race in the future we can only guess. The idea that humanity is going to evolve on to perfection is mere myth. That the human body has reached the apex of its perfection is another myth. The statement by Williams that "there can be no two kinds of evolution" is not necessarily true. There may be or may not be, for all that we know now; and the statement has no force either way, until we know better what one kind of evolution is as to its causes, and what would be called kinds of evolution. Man has not evolved just like other organisms, whence his difference from them.

Of course the theory that the animal man has changed from ancestral mammals is not well deniable, even if one wished to deny it, since now the fossil *Pithecanthropus* "link" has been discovered. But there is yet required some hypothesis. Fiske's theory that the perennial care of the young and the mother's sacrifice have been the great means for the ennoblement of man, is good theory. *Æsop* tells us how to make stone broth. Both the earth and the seasoning must be accounted for in man's make-up. To dip up the stone does not account for the broth. Fiske's theory explains how the seasoning was gradually stirred in, judged from the present taste of the broth.

Yet, for life to arise even spontaneously in matter; to develop into the form of an ape and then convert to man, requires the same great Creator as to make dust into the man Adam, and let him descend to the human race. And, likewise, the future increase in the knowledge of man and his origin will probably afford amplification only of that which is already known.

For example, it is said that man is fallen. Of course he is. Man has descended; or, if we abandon that figure of speech—since there is really no up or down in the universe, except as we assume such a direction—man has come along. Evil in man's nature has come the direction he has come. The whole history of the species man, from the first dawn of the sense of right and wrong, from the first sense of love, and consciousness that another man is his brother,—the whole course has been a conversion to better, with constant temptation to backslide. The survival of the fittest means that in his case, as the result shows. He has been progressing; that is, he has come from what he was to what he is, and brings by heredity the mingled instincts of lower orders with those of a newer, higher sanity. And the question is whether he is going back or going on. This is a very important truth scientifically, and, is it new theologically?

The church is more concerned with the future life of the individuals, while the devotees of natural science find their noblest aim in the betterment of the future of the species. But this is all one question, probably; as, in biology, there is found to be a mutual relation between the species and the individual,—the betterment of the species benefiting the individual, and betterment of the individual benefiting the species.

The illustration as to man's fallen condition is sufficient, and expresses truth for individual conversion. But to prove the reasons for punishing a member of the race as a traitor who contracts and harbors a diseased habit of body or mind, the elucidation of the facts of heredity argues on the basis of worldly profit, I think, without denying the theologic doctrine as to reward in the next world.

The ten commandments seem to me, as a natural scientist, to be laws which must be obeyed to escape degeneration or apehood,—to you they are laws of God. A person

who willfully violates the commandments is to me an enemy, a traitor to his race,—to you a sinner, a traitor to his God. He may well be both. Again, both the evil and the good are natural, and there appears to be at least a downright practicability, therefore, in living toward an ideal, or under inspiration, since the ideal or inspiration operates as an environmental factor, both in the man and in the species, and must tend to eliminate the evil.

Regarding the nature and effect of inspiration, the theory of organic evolution could have to do with that only in so far as it may be proved that mental inspiration influences heredity,—is an environmental element in heredity. One who goes about thinking murder, may commit murder almost involuntarily; and his descendants are the more murderous, apparently, for his thinking. The converse is also true. Inspiration could then work similarly. If I define as inspiration that which in any one's habit impels another to a higher sanity, such could well be a factor in the advance of the species in education and instinct toward a higher sanity. That which would be inspiration to one may reach all of course. One inspiration follows another. An inspiration to a simple mind might not be such longer to one of higher standard, which had already risen upon that inspiration. But since there is no man so high that Christ is not an inspiration over him;—then, who inspired Christ? (Well, who made the universe, anyway?) If we place Christ upon the plane of a scientist, he has discovered the highest law of life; more than that, he exemplifies the same. He is godlike.

Now, whether inspiration has worked much or little in the descent of man would be best demonstrated in the living man, rather than in his fossil bones. There is nothing determined in natural science to-day, apparently, which precludes the practicability of divine inspiration.

Haeckel is quoted as asserting that "matter and ether

are not dead, and only moved by extrinsic force; but they are endowed with sensation and will; they experience an inclination for condensation, a dislike for strain; they strive after the one and struggle against the other." A matter of definition, of course. If we call all those things living, we shall need a new word for that which we now call life, I think.

With equal license from the side of natural science, one can say that there came a time in the development of the ape when he fell under inspiration, and hence man descended. Further, that divine inspiration is one of the environmental factors in man's evolution—that God has time and again stirred men toward a higher sanity, through worship of the winds, of idols shaped after dreams, and finally of superhuman virtue. Now that we have arisen over the first, we are past or passing the second, shall we, the species *Homosapiens*, reach the third, and then see another Christ?

As to the individual who soon wears out his mortal restraint, what of him? Does he pass by law of survival of the fittest into heaven as he did into this world—born again—his status there being determined by his inheritance, that is, by heredity and his new environment?

Such an hypothesis can be made to bridge from the theory of evolution of life to doctrine of salvation of men, and to express the truth, though in a very general way. To the scientific minded, such hypothesis is, to say the least, harmless. And, on the other hand, it is not necessary to the religious scientific sense. Theories of evolution, based firmly upon fact, are themselves each yet a little apart the one from the other, or are bridged together by fanciful hypothesis; and theology, also, does not need scientifically to arise direct from more than its own basis of recognized truth. There need be little wonder that the Bible proceeds to the exposition of religious law with authority, and di-

rectly, that is, without going around the meandering line of the bounds of natural-science knowledge.

Speaking as a natural scientist, one need not try to define what theology should be. But I have asserted that religion in general could stand upon a scientific basis, and I may say, also, that it does not require such a basis. We have a sense of right and wrong which works for good. Fellowship, patriotism, and religion,—and by the last name I mean a confidence in, and regard for, a consequent to this life,—these things do not yet depend for their value upon our ability to express them in terms of natural science; but they do depend for their value upon our confidence in them.

Since you have hunger, eat what is wholesome as best you know, and, if science can later improve the appetite as well as the food, meanwhile, why starve? It requires little science knowledge to disprove the assumed virtues of starvation, physical, mental, or spiritual.

Finally, it seems to me that science has a disquieting effect on any dogma, whether this be religious or irreligious, and yet is quite impartial. For, if you say, God has spoken to you, it may ask, How do you recognize infallibly the voice? Or, if you say men have only imagined that God has spoken to them, it may ask, whether the direct way from God to the human mind is not along that line; for see what those imaginations have revealed!

The impartial natural scientist may appear to the theologian as some kind of a bugaboo, or atheist, but to the real atheist he may appear to be just another one of those Christians. For the weighing of evidence pleases neither, since it shows to the one that neither scale is full, and to the other that the weight of evidence is on the same side as before.