

ARTICLE X.

CRITICAL NOTES.

"IS THE BOOK OF AMOS POST-EXILIC?"

THIS is the title of the leading article in the January number of the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*. The joint authors of the article, Edward Day and Walter Chapin, of Springfield, Mass., answer the question in the affirmative. At the outset, one is tempted to say, that, if this be correct, there can be no certainty as to the date of any Old Testament book. There has been a great unanimity of opinion among scholars in placing Amos at the very beginning of the literary prophets. A second temptation is to add that such a theory must not only revolutionize our whole view of the development of the Old Testament religion, but also cause us to abandon many conclusions that we have regarded fundamental. But perhaps neither of these inferences is warranted. Critical investigation has before transferred literature from an early to a late date, and in so doing has done no great violence to our important religious beliefs—nay, may even have added something of value to these. Is this to be another case of this kind? At any rate, whatever the truth may seem to be, it must be faced, regardless of results. The question is considered here, largely because it has an important bearing on the present writer's discussion of Amos in the January issue of the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA*. In that discussion it was stated, that the position there taken (for the first time as it is believed) as to Amos's reason for predicting the captivity might be made clearer by reviewing the course of the prophet's argument in the different sections of his book. But, as preliminary to this, it seems necessary to glance at the contention that the book properly belongs to a period after the exile.

The article under consideration begins with a set of statements which it would seem may be properly viewed as chiefly introductory to the main arguments of the writers, rather than as themselves constituting an important part of the argument. These statements may be conveniently grouped under four heads:—

- I. There is, first, a reference to the wonderful attainment of the prophet Amos if he lived in the eighth century B.C. and amid the surroundings usually attributed to him. Cornill is quoted as calling Amos "one of the most marvelous and incomprehensible figures in the history of the human mind"; Cheyne, as characterizing the prophet "a surprising phenomenon," and his book "a literary as well as prophetic phenome-

non"; George Adam Smith, as asserting that "the book of Amos opens one of the greatest stages in the religious development of mankind." In the opinion of Day and Chapin, this is all to be explained by the fact that the prophet lived at a very much later period than has generally been supposed.

2. The title of the book "simply records a tradition of the post-exilic period," and is of no value in determining the date of the book.

3. There is no mention of this prophet in the historical books of the time. Jonah of Amittai is spoken of, but not Amos. "The first mention of Amos outside his book is in the Apocrypha."

4. The biographical passage vii. 10-17 "is wanting in vividness and reality"; it is "brief and unsatisfactory," it is "strangely inserted." There is no other information about Amaziah, "who is probably a purely imaginary personage." "Such as he are not wont to reason thus, if at all, with a poor shepherd." In other respects the reported interview between these two men is claimed to be very unnatural, and "we must conclude that this biographical section is untrustworthy as furnishing data concerning this supposititious man, Amos."

Coming now to the positive part of the argument, it is reasoned at considerable length, that some thirty verses, or fully one-fifth of the whole book, are certainly post-exilic. These are largely the passages which are regarded by several critics as later insertions in the book.

Finally, the remainder of the book is considered, and an attempt made to prove it also to be post-exilic.

Now in regard to the first set of statements, which are mainly introductory, almost negative (part of them fully so),—at the best these can only be regarded from their very nature as possibly harmonizing with the theory of a later date, and thus confirming reasons that may be otherwise adduced, but not in themselves constituting any direct proof. But, more than this, the statements themselves are of very doubtful force.

1. That Amos, an unlettered man, from the desert, should have such an insight into truth, and be able to state this with so much artistic ability, is only a "surprising phenomenon" parallel to that which has been frequently witnessed, as untutored men from the most barren regions and the most unpromising surroundings have attained a surprising conception of truth and a phenomenal power in declaring it.

2. The contention regarding the title may be admitted, for scholars have not determined the date of this book mainly from its title.

3. That Amos should not be mentioned in the historical books seems to have some significance. Yet, in view of our lack of data to enable us to reason in regard to this, e.g. the literature that may have failed to come down to us, the unknown reasons for the failure to mention other great men, etc., the suggestion may not have much force.

4. Regarding the reported interview between Amos and Amaziah, it surely is a most difficult undertaking to pretend to assert what is likely

to have transpired between two such men at so remote a period. A man with so much force of character as Amos had could not be so easily ignored, even if he had no official standing.

But, even allowing all these statements to have the force intended, they are still only introductory, and do little more than prepare the way for something in the nature of proof.

The next step in the article is to establish the claim that certain passages, about thirty verses in all, are late. As has been said, several critics have already catalogued most of these verses in the same way. For the purpose the writers had in view, then, this might have been assumed. But considerably more than one-third of the article is taken up with this point. As the reasons for rejecting these passages are fully given in the recent commentaries and encyclopedias, it would seem that a sentence or two would have been sufficient to indicate this fact in passing; whereas no less than ten pages are here consumed.

We have looked for some other justification of the lengthy treatment at this point. The clearest that can be noticed, is, that, in connection with the rejection of the doxologies (iv. 13, etc.), it is added: "We feel with Kuenen the force of W. R. Smith's argument for their retention as a part of Amos; with him also we recognize the fact of their frequency in the later literature." From the very nature of the case, it would be a well-nigh impossible undertaking to prove that these passages were *necessarily* a part of the original book. Perhaps this is the reason why there is nothing more on this point, except a negative statement two or three times something like this: "We fail to discover sufficient reason for tearing this oracle out of its place."

In the first two-thirds of the article, then, there does not appear to be any great advance toward the establishment of the proposition. Indeed, up to this point there is very little more than a reiteration of points that have been emphasized by several critics who hold the earlier date of Amos. According to the showing of the article itself, the main contention should come in connection with the next step, viz., an examination of the remaining four-fifths of the book. But when we consider that there are only seven pages left (omitting the concluding reflections), in which to dispose of a portion four times as great as that treated in the ten preceding pages; that, moreover, this is a part not generally admitted to be late, while the other is; and that therefore this will naturally demand a more abundant massing of proof,—it must be confessed, that, at the outset, the hope of the authors' being able to prove their case is not very bright. Nor does an examination of the arguments seem to lead to a different conclusion.

The five oracles of chapters i. and ii., not before rejected, are thrown out largely on linguistic grounds. The phrase "thus saith Yahweh" is brought timidly forward as a mark of lateness, as being "characteristic of the literary Israëlitish oracular prophecy." The phrase "for three transgressions,"

etc., is said to have its nearest equivalent in a late book (Prov. xxx. 15, 18). The word for palace (מַרְכָּסִי) is regarded late, though the same word is found in Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah. Other terminology is regarded as pointing in the same direction,—“righteous,” “poor,” “to profane the name of my holiness.” The last point here is, that Jer. xlix. 23-27 contains the original of the first of Amos's eight oracles. But it is difficult to see how any one could regard these passages as necessarily dependent on one another, except in one verse, and it seems gratuitous to assume that Jeremiah has the original of this.

Chaps. vii. to ix. are next examined. The visions are considered “written pieces which were never spoken.” Jacob being mentioned in two of the visions as small, the authors say, “Incomparably great as was Assyria at the time of the supposed date of Amos, it is doubtful if a prophet of that day would have pleaded the smallness of Jacob.” This seems fanciful. The evidence of language is again adduced in a manner similar to the above.

Finally, chaps. iii. to vi. are briefly considered. As this section is an expansion of the oracle against Israel in ii. 6-16, it is claimed that “in the main, what was said of that oracle as evidencing its post-exilic character must hold good of this.” The disorganized state of society, the lack of a strong central government, and the excessive religiousness implied, are all thought to point to a later period.

Altogether there is the slightest ground imaginable on the basis of which to suggest so thoroughgoing a change in the position of Amos. It is especially noteworthy that, in the positive part of the article, a large part of the argument turns on the language. Yet even this seems to be to some extent surrendered, when it is said, “We are aware of the fact that many of the words and phrases we have mentioned as late may have been used in the earlier time, though they did not find their way into the literature which has come down to us”; and again, “we would not attempt to make too much of the linguistic part of the argument.” Indeed the precariousness of the linguistic argument in general is well illustrated in an elaborate footnote, showing the unity of ix. 8-15 with the rest of the book from the similarity of the language; whereas the dissimilarity of the language is sometimes adduced as one indication that this section could not have been written by the author of the rest of Amos.

To the above, other considerations of a more general nature may be added.

For example, the strange absence of the mention of Assyria may not be without significance. Scholars are interpreting this as indicating some uncertainty in the prophet's mind as to Assyria. Cornill calls attention to Assyria's weakness at the time usually assigned to Amos. Dr. Taylor, in Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible, says, “Perhaps he was aware of the weakness under which the Eastern colossus then labored.” At any rate, if the book were written late, and for some reason referred back to a pre-

exilic writer, there would have been no necessity of hesitating to mention Assyria by name, especially as the prophet does not fail to be specific in the oracles against other nations.

Again, there was evidently not yet simply one sanctuary, but there were numerous high places—Bethel, Gilgal, etc. True, the Deuteronomic ideal may not have been fully realized for a long time after the legislation was published. But here it is not only the people falling below that ideal. The prophet himself has nothing to say against the high places, for that does not seem to be at all the point of such passages as iv. 4; v. 5.

Many would also consider the joyous character of the feasts as favoring an early date. Possibly, too, the pure Hebrew style which is often attributed to Amos might be considered indicative of the earlier period as far as it could be considered to have any indication at all.

But not to insist upon these points, more important than all else is the consideration of the object of the book. What can be its purpose according to this new interpretation? This is what is said: "Viewed as we regard it, Amos is, like Jonah, a late prophetic book written with a motive that is easily discernible in its main outlines. After the return from the exile, partial as that return was, there was for a long time a disposition on the part of the reformers in Jerusalem to look upon North Israel, or Ephraim, with disfavor, because of the state of affairs there, both civically and religiously. The Assyrian captivity, or dispersion, had been but partial. Against North Israel, then, this post-exilic writer thundered, albeit not to the total neglect of Judah and neighboring peoples by any means; but he did, for reasons known only to himself, put his words in the mouth of one whom he supposed to have lived in the days of Jeroboam II. In an imperfect way only does he reproduce the past; the coloring is largely that of his own day; in little more than the osseous structure of his work does he give us a pre-exilic book. The only wonder is that his fiction should have so long misled us."

Such a statement seems intensely disappointing, and surely makes a splendid literary production lead to a very decided anti-climax. One prominent object of the prophet manifestly is to antagonize the idea among the people that Jehovah would defend them simply because they were his people. But what need would there be for proclaiming such a doctrine after they had been carried into exile? They would know it themselves quite well enough then.

This leads to the thought made prominent in the article in the last issue of this quarterly. Amos was combating the idea of Jehovah as the God of one nation alone,—a notion so characteristic of the people of antiquity. Because every sort of discipline has been used in vain, and it is evident that they cannot be led to any sort of spiritual conception of Jehovah unless they are divorced for a season from their altars, the conclusion of the prophet is that they must be exiled to an "unclean" land,

where they will be entirely out of reach of their high places. In time they will then be led to see that Jehovah can be worshiped independently of these, and that he is better pleased with a right attitude towards him, and righteous conduct towards others, than by the utmost zeal at the altars without this. Amos is not a theologian, and does not bring this forward as a theological dogma or for doctrinal purposes; but, having a practical end in view, this conception, so different from that of the people, is present everywhere. It is to be seen in the arrangement of the book as a whole. It is conspicuous in every subdivision of the book. It manifestly underlies the whole development of the prophet's thought.

A brief examination of the various sections of this prophecy will show the force of the statements just made.

Chapters i. and ii.—These contain oracles against various nations. But what place have they in a book concerned almost wholly with Israel? If nothing more, these oracles form at least a very skillful and ingenious rhetorical introduction to the rest of the book. It is a question of dispute whether the judgments against the nations are for moral shortcomings or for national transgressions. Perhaps the author had his reasons for making this doubtful. In almost every case there is ground for counting that the nations are to be condemned because they have committed some crime against Israel. This would be very acceptable to the Israelite of that day, and in keeping with his conception of a national deity. But there is also carefully interwoven in the guilt, more or less of the moral element. This would not be so noticeable to one considering the charge from the national standpoint, but it gave a splendid opportunity for uprooting that point of view, and implanting a higher when the prophet continued the thought by asserting that Israel itself must expect similar punishment, and because of transgressions more or less similar to those of which the other nations were guilty; these being in its case, of course, necessarily, of a moral nature. Jehovah, then, is not simply the God of Israel, bound to support her against all others under all circumstances, but he is a God of justice. His sway is everywhere, and he will uphold Israel only on condition that she maintains a righteous standard.

Chap. iii. 1-8.—Even in this introduction to the main subject, it may be that the prophet's fundamental thought is present.

Why will Jehovah deal so severely with his own people? For the very reason that he occupies so tender a relation to them as to distinguish them from all others (ver. 2). And how does the prophet know he is rightly guided in declaring Jehovah's word? The indications are plain. In the natural world the working of the law of cause and effect is to be seen everywhere. The roaring of a lion, the falling of a bird in a snare, etc., plainly suggest it. In the spiritual world the presence of this law is just as manifest to one who has the prophetic instinct to discern it. On the one side is justice; on the other, iniquity. Evidently the ini-

quity must be abandoned, or there must be sufficient discipline to bring about a reformation. But almost every method has been tried without avail. The worst feature is that the people are quite indifferent, imagining that zealous devotion at the altar will palliate everything. Taking into consideration, then, the ever-present law of cause and effect, there is evidently only one course open; and thus the prophet arrives at his conclusion of the need of an exile, which is developed later. There is less certainty that this is the writer's thought here than in any other part of the book. Yet this seems to be fully as probable as that which makes him allude directly to Assyria, especially in view of the comparative weakness of that power at that time.

Chaps. iii. 9-iv. 3.—The first count of the prophet is against the prevailing injustice and oppression. He does not yet get very fully into the details of his subject. Perhaps the result which he pictures in other places as a decided climax, viz. an exile, may be hinted in such a passage as iv. 3. However, it is not made emphatic, just as the chief consideration which drives him to this conclusion, the prevalence of ritual observance along with great iniquity, has not yet been conspicuously mentioned.

Chaps. iv. 4-v.—The prophet now plunges into his subject in the most thoroughgoing manner possible. The ritual observances keep the people from seeing the evils as they really are. They are blinded by the altars. Therefore to come to Bethel, is simply to transgress, and to Gilgal is to multiply transgression. The case is truly desperate. Oh, that some change could be effected. But what hope is there? Almost everything has been tried, but in vain. Pestilence, famine, drought—all these have availed nothing. There seems to be nothing left but to mourn in bitterest terms the condition that prevails, and the well-known form of the funeral dirge is introduced. Right in the midst, then, of the merry-making and joyousness of one of their mirthful feasts, hark, the most gloomy refrain:—

“ Fallen, to rise no more,
Virgin of Israel:
Prostrate, she lies on her soil;
There is none to upraise her.”

But no prophet is entirely without hope for the people. It is less conspicuous with this prophet than with most, yet a slight gleam of hope now appears. A ground of hope for them indeed! Did they need this? Are they without such hope? On the contrary, there are two things which give them the greatest possible confidence:—

The Day of Jehovah.—To them a day of light and triumph when Jehovah would give his own people complete victory over their enemies. But the very opposite shall it be, declares Amos—a day of darkness and death, when Jehovah shall bring his judgment upon them, rather than upon their enemies (v. 18-20).

Their Rites and Ceremonies.—These were their chief resort, and the center of their hopes. But these, Amos asserts, are abominations unto

God; the more so because there is pretense of honoring and worshiping him who is the embodiment of all righteousness, while they themselves are mixed up with all manner of unrighteousness. Therefore no language is too strong to represent the attitude of Jehovah towards those who claim to be his worshipers. "I hate, I despise, your feasts, and I will take no delight in your solemn assemblies," etc. (v. 21-27).

No longer, then, can the plainest possible announcement of exile be withheld. "Therefore, will I cause you to go into captivity beyond Damascus, saith Jehovah, whose name is the God of hosts."

Chap. vi. pursues the same thought in its application to the rich. Such is the luxury of the ruling classes, such the self-confidence, which their ritualism has begotten in them, such their national pride and blindness to the signs of the times, that there is absolutely no hope of effecting any cure, unless it be by the reserve method which the prophet has come more and more clearly to regard as necessary from the very condition of things. Therefore "I will raise up against you a nation, O house of Israel, saith Jehovah, the God of hosts."

Chaps. vii.-ix.—Amos tries one further expedient. There is no new thought. It is only a repetition of the one idea of the rest of the book, the only idea Amos had in reference to Israel. But the manner of presenting the idea is quite new.

The prophet is intensely in earnest. He has used almost every available means to have heed paid to his unwelcome but most important message. He has called the roll of the nations. He has interpreted the relationship of Jehovah to each. He has summarized their misdeeds. He has declared their downfall. He has placed Israel alongside of these. He has held Jehovah's sway to be universal. He has insisted that there is a higher principle than the welfare of any single nation by which Jehovah from his very nature must be governed, viz., the principle of righteousness.

What more can he do? All his resources seem exhausted. But his message burdens him. It is his dream by day and night. In the intensity of his soul he is carried outside of himself. Unconsciously there is thus opened up to the prophet another avenue of approach unto the people. It is the vision. He is in a state of ecstasy. His senses are closed to all things except one. It is still his message which is the important thing. Dwelling upon this, it is presented to him in a more forcible way than ever before, and now it is truly "the words of Amos . . . which he saw" (i. 1). First it is the dreaded locusts (vii. 1-3). Then it is the terrible drought (vii. 4-6). Next it is the exacting plumb-line (vii. 7-9). Following these, it is a basket of $\gamma\eta$, signifying $\gamma\eta$, or the end has come (viii. 1-3). Finally, and most significant of all, there is a vision in connection with the ritual (ix. 1-4). The particular character of the calamity, too, is significant. The altar is to be broken down, and at Jehovah's own command. Thus, the very thing upon which the people built their

assurances of safety more than anything else is reserved for the climax of the prophet's message; and the climax of calamity comes again in the same connection—the *captivity*.

Even in the Amaziah episode interjected among the visions (vii. 10-17), the same all-controlling thought is present. Inasmuch as a totally unknown man has come even to the sanctuary of Bethel to make such bold assertions against Israel, and even in the name of Jehovah, who at this very altar has virtually pledged himself to support his people against all foes that may come up against them, it is not surprising that Bethel's priest was thoroughly aroused. But the outcome of the interview is seen in the prophet's words, "Thou thyself shalt die in a land that is unclean, and Israel shall surely be led away captive out of his land." The significance of this would be not merely that the people would be carried away and treated harshly, but *they could not worship Jehovah in the strange land*, according to their conception. To people who set so much store by their ritual, this would seem to be a great calamity. But to one who had a much more exalted conception of God, a glimpse at least of the benefits of such an experience would surely be given, as he contemplated the gradual opening of the minds of the people to the truth that Jehovah could be worshiped even in the "unclean" land.

We are not concerned to discuss here at any length the question whether Amos could have written the closing section of the book. But if not by Amos it was written by one who in this respect at least was true to the spirit of Amos. Here again the thought of the captivity is the prominent one, but in this case the restoration from captivity. It is objected that Amos could not have written this because the predicted blessings are pictured in material terms. But this is the case also with the calamities in the book. And just as these would naturally point such a people to their religious significance, so it would be in the case of promised restoration.

Thus always and everywhere is there but one thought in this book. Amos was emphatically a man of one idea, but it was a very comprehensive idea. It looked chiefly to the sterner aspect of things, but he seems to have regarded the stern judgment that he foresaw as a necessary antecedent to a better future. He had but one conception of Jehovah, but it was a very important conception. Limited in its scope, yet none was more needed for his time.

The work of Amos had great need to be supplemented, as it was, by other prophets who regarded Jehovah from very different standpoints. But to him it was given chiefly to lay emphasis upon the coming doom. Clearly he grasped his message, bravely he declared it. That message would have been entirely out of place at any time except before the exile. First in the succession of great men of that period of Israel's history, none had a more unwelcome mission than he; none fulfilled his mission with greater faithfulness or truer success.

EDWARD E. BRAITHWAITE.

PRESIDENT JAMES H. FAIRCHILD.

THE death, on the 19th of March, of President James Harris Fairchild removes from Oberlin its most commanding figure, and from the world one whom President McCosh once pronounced to be among the profoundest philosophers and theologians of the present generation.

President Fairchild was born in Stockbridge, Mass., on the 25th of November, 1817. When he was one year old, his parents removed, with the great tide of emigrants that was then setting from New England to Northern Ohio, and settled in the wilderness on an uncleared farm in the township of Brownhelm. But it is significant of the character of the emigration, that, when the boy was twelve years old, a classical school was opened in the neighborhood, where he could begin the study of Latin and Greek; while, a few miles away, a high school was within his reach, with an accomplished scholar at its head who was amply prepared to fit pupils for college.

Just as young Fairchild was ready to enter college, Oberlin was founded in the wilderness seven miles away. Thither he repaired, and became a member of the first Freshman class in 1834, and in Oberlin he remained in continuous connection with the college until the day of his death, a period of sixty-eight years. Graduating from the college course in 1838, and from the Theological Seminary in 1841, he became first a tutor in languages, teaching Hebrew, in which he was specially proficient, having had as an instructor a highly educated Jew. For five years he was professor of classical languages, teaching Latin and Greek; in 1847 he was transferred to the chair of mathematics, in which he attained equal success. Meanwhile increasing responsibilities relating to the administrative details were thrown upon him from year to year. In 1858 he was elected to the chair of associate professor of theology and moral philosophy, President Finney still holding the first place in this department. In 1865 he was elected president, and continued to fill that office until 1889, when he resigned his administrative work, but still taught theology and moral philosophy,—a work from which he did not wholly retire until shortly before his death.

Those who enjoyed the privileges of his personal instruction,—and they include almost the entire body of Oberlin students for a period of sixty years,—felt for him a degree of personal love and admiration such as few teachers have ever been able to win from their pupils. But of his personal characteristics this is not the proper place to speak, and we have space at present to say but a few things concerning his system of philosophy and theology.

President Fairchild's publications are not conspicuous for their number or their size, and they are peculiarly devoid of rhetoric; but they are preëminent for that exactness of statement induced by mathematical training, and that profound respect for the Bible obtained through repeated teaching of it in the original languages, and long experience in

dealing not only with the individual wants of sixty generations of students, but by active participation in the great political, religious, and social movement which characterized the United States during the latter part of the nineteenth century.

His "Elements of Theology, Natural and Revealed," covers the whole field, but contains only three hundred and fifty-eight pages;¹ while his volume on "Moral Philosophy; or, The Science of Obligation," first published in 1869, was condensed into three hundred and twenty-six pages of smaller size, and in the revised edition, which was called "Moral Science; or, The Philosophy of Obligation," issued in 1892, was reduced to three hundred and twenty-four pages.² Aside from these two volumes, he contributed upon this class of subjects a few articles to the periodical press, the chief ones being those found in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA*, which are as follows:—

The Nature of Sin, Vol. xxv. (Jan., 1868) pp. 30-48.

The Decline of the Religious Sentiment, Vol. xxviii. (Jan., 1871) pp. 98-122.

The Divine Personality, Vol. xli. (April, 1884) pp. 127-233.

The True Principle of Theological Progress, Vol. xli. (July, 1884) pp. 573-585.

Mormonism and the Spaulding Manuscript, Vol. xliii. (Jan., 1886) pp. 167-174.

Probation—Its Conditions and Limitation, Vol. xliii. (July, 1886) pp. 423-442.

Co-education at Oberlin, Vol. xlvi. (July, 1889) pp. 443-454.

Authenticity and Inspiration of the Scriptures, Vol. xlix. (Jan., 1892) pp. 1-29.

Progress of Religious Thought, Vol. xlix. (July, 1892) pp. 412-430.

The Religious Life: Its Nature and Claims, Vol. liv. (Jan., 1897) pp. 21-37.

To these should be added the very important one entitled "The Doctrine of Sanctification at Oberlin," *Congregational Quarterly*, Vol. xviii. (April, 1876) pp. 237-259.

President Fairchild's theology would be classed as Calvinistic somewhat after the pattern that had been wrought out in New England under the influence of Jonathan Edwards and his successors, more especially Hopkins; but it was a system thought out by himself in independent study of the Scriptures, and differed in many points both from the general system and from that of any individual writer. He received the Scriptures as authoritative, but not as minutely inerrant, maintaining that absolute inerrancy could not belong to human language, but still that the orbit of error was so small that, to use a mathematical expression, it might be treated as an infinitesimal, and disregarded in a large

¹ Oberlin, O.: E. J. Goodrich, 1892.

² New York: Sheldon & Co.

survey, so that his volume on *Theology* contains scarcely a quotation except from the Bible, to which it everywhere appeals with the unqualified confidence which marks an advocate of the strict theory of inerrancy.

In his opinion, "theology touches upon all branches of study and of thought," involving a knowledge of natural science, of metaphysical and ethical philosophy, and the historical development of doctrines as well as of the Holy Scriptures in their original languages. "Thus philology, archæology, and history become aids in the study of theology."¹ In light of his study upon all these subjects, he held firmly to the personality of God; to the freedom of the human will; to the immortality of the soul; to the authenticity, credibility, and inspiration of the Scriptures; to the doctrines of divine sovereignty; of the hopeless entanglement of the human race in sin apart from the work of Christ; of the true divinity of Christ's preëxistent nature; of Christ's atoning work for sin (which he formulated under the theory known as the governmental, believing that Christ's death removed obstacles in the way of the divine action, as well as furnished motives to induce a change in man); and of the necessity of the work of the Holy Spirit as preliminary to repentance, conversion, and regeneration, while maintaining at the same time the natural ability of man to do all that is required to win a virtuous character. He distinguished properly between justification and sanctification; held to the absolute foreknowledge of God; to the doctrines of election, perseverance of the saints, the final character of the probation extended to men in this life; and of eternal punishment for those who leave this world unreconciled to God.

It has been difficult for many to see how he adjusted all these doctrines to some of the fundamental principles of his philosophy; for he argued most strenuously for the absolute freedom of the human will, and the natural ability of every person to resist all the motives which are brought to bear upon him, and to make a choice contrary to them;—rejecting the Edwardean phrase that the choice of the will is always as the highest motive. A distinguishing feature of his philosophy, like that of President Finney's, was that the will is capable of acting in only one direction at the same time; every choice is, therefore, either virtuous or sinful, and wholly one or the other. This, which is known as the "simplicity of moral action," would seem to render it impossible for him to believe that probation closed in this life; in the doctrine of sanctification, either in this world or the next; or, indeed, in any establishment of the will either in virtue or in vice.

But he was not so foolish as to regard his logic as iron-clad; for he recognized to their full extent the mysteries which are involved in any doctrine, either of nature or of grace. Notwithstanding his rejection of the theory that the will acts according to the highest motive, he believed that infinite intelligence foreknew what the action of all free wills would

¹ *Elements of Theology*, p. 5.

be. His theoretical belief in the ability of the will to put forth choices contrary to the whole tendency of present motives, did not interfere with his holding firmly to the permanency of established character. He did not believe that there was any danger that God would commit a sinful act, though theoretically he held that that was possible; nor that the saints in heaven would fall from grace, though theoretically that, too, was possible.

But President Fairchild did differ from President Finney in the emphasis which he laid upon the hope of obtaining a state of entire sanctification in this life, though it is difficult to see why President Finney's theory with regard to sanctification in this life was not as logical as that of President Fairchild's belief that the saints would never fall from grace in heaven; for both of these opinions are held upon the ground of a revelation upon the subject in the Bible which ignores all fine-spun theories concerning the natural powers of the human will. If the manifestation of Christ to believers in heaven is such that they are practically assured against falling away, there is no theoretical reason why such a manifestation might not be made in this life, which was what President Finney maintained. Both of them, however, held to the simplicity of moral action, and that sanctification was merely a state of stability in which the successive acts of the human will would be continually virtuous, but not at one time more completely virtuous than at another.

Another central position of President Fairchild's philosophy was that love or benevolence is the sum of virtue, defining love as "the choice of the good of being." All the moral attributes of God are but manifestations of love in its various aspects. If the moral universe is so created that the punishment of the evil-doer is necessary to the establishment of others in well-doing, and so to the promotion of the good of being, then love for the many requires the punishment of the offender. What God shall do, therefore, with reference to the punishment of sin, depends upon the moral constitution which he has given to the universe, which can be learned only by studying the facts found both in nature and in revelation.

The sublimest of all thoughts revealed by such study is, that, in a moral constitution where the punishment of sin seems necessary for the preservation of righteousness, an atoning self-sacrifice on the part of God has been enacted in the person of Christ, which enables the Supreme Ruler to be "just, and yet the justifier" of the repentant sinner who casts himself upon his mercy. Justice and mercy are not fictions in God's government, but realities of the most impressive nature.

It is sincerely to be hoped that President Fairchild's death will be the occasion of calling renewed attention to his clear-cut, comprehensive, yet at the same time most profound and affecting, presentation of the system of religious truth revealed in the Bible and based upon the eternal realities of the universe.

THE CASE OF PROFESSOR PEARSON.

THE resignation of Professor Charles W. Pearson from the chair of English Literature in Northwestern University (Methodist Episcopal), at Evanston, Ill., is worthy of more than a passing notice. Professor Pearson had been brought up in the faith of the church which he was serving, and it had not been known that his faith was being undermined, until the publication of an extended communication, announcing the fact, in the *Evanston Index* of January 18, 1902. In this he states, that, while the Bible is to him still the "most precious of all books," he has been led, with Hume and Strauss, "to recognize the mythical character of the biblical miracles," and to regard the present preaching of his ministerial brethren as "evasive," and present Sunday-school teaching as "inadequate and almost farcical."

The apparent honesty and sincerity of Professor Pearson at once attracts attention and arouses sympathy, while the weakness of his position illustrates the danger which besets multitudes of sincere believers who have far less intellectual training than he. The network of errors and misconceptions in which he has become entangled can best be unraveled by starting from the opposite end of the problem from that at which he begins.

According to a most common error, Professor Pearson begins his consideration of the credibility of miracles with those which are least capable of direct proof, and which in themselves receive least support from the general presumptions of the case. The few examples of "tares among the Bible wheat" which he adduces begin with Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, and include the story of Elijah's being fed by ravens, of Elisha's making the ax to swim, and his multiplying the widow's pot of oil and barrel of meal, of Peter's deliverance from prison, of Jesus' walking on the water, and his raising the son of the widow of Nain. All the Old Testament miracles he declares to be legendary and not historic, and reaches the conclusion that "it is impossible to draw any dividing line between the alleged miracles in the Old Testament and similar accounts in the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles." He does not expressly deny the resurrection of Christ, but that miracle would logically be included in his general statements of denial.

It is easy to see that this method of approach is the reverse of the logical and natural order, and is calculated to obscure the force of the weightiest and most convincing arguments. The point at which Christian faith almost universally begins is at the resurrection of Christ, which is both the most stupendous and the most fully proved of all the miracles. It is proved, not only by the superabundant documentary evidence, but by its correlation to the deepest wants of the human soul. Professor Pearson pays high tribute to the witness which his church has all along borne to the importance of "'the inner light' and obedience to the direction of the Holy Spirit," and the "personal consciousness of pardon and

salvation" which "gave joy and power to the early Methodists." But he overlooks the fact that this "witness of the Spirit" has never been disconnected from the miraculous resurrection of Christ. The truth which has ever been witnessed to by the Spirit is the preaching of the supernatural redemption wrought by the Incarnate Deity in the person of Jesus Christ, who was "the Word become flesh," and who was "in the beginning with God," "by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made that was made."

It is from this sublime eminence of the incarnation that we should approach the subject of the biblical miracles. With the "incarnate deity" in the world, whose glory shone out on the cross and in the resurrection, there is not only no presumption against the miracles of the New Testament connected with the establishment of his mission in the world, but the strongest presumption in favor of them. To compare great things with small, when the miracle of Christ's person is once conceded, it becomes as easy to believe in the lesser miracles of the Christian system as it does to credit the lesser victories of Napoleon when once his military genius has been demonstrated; or, when Shakespeare has written one immortal play, and Milton one *Paradise Lost*, to believe that they have written other works of a similar character.

The miracle of the resurrection of Christ is the most stupendous of all, and it is central in its relation to the witness of the Spirit and the Christian experience. Any one who endeavors to root out that miracle from the creed and faith of the church uproots Christianity. Any one who has accepted that miracle and found peace in believing in the redemptive work of Jesus Christ needs not be troubled with any of the other miracles of the Bible. After having swallowed the camel, it would be absurd to strain at the guats.

It certainly is not unreasonable to suppose that a religious system whose central figure is miraculous should incorporate into it a limited number of lesser miracles. The surprise all along has been, and still is, that the reported miracles in the supernatural system preparatory to, and succeeding, the advent of Christ, are not more numerous than they are. This economy in the use of the miraculous has, from the time of Origen down, been a standing argument in favor of the genuineness of the limited number of miracles recorded for our belief.

Professor Pearson, like most others who have stumbled into his logical pitfalls, has much to say about the supreme importance of discarding "all error as soon as we discover it to be error," and accepting "all truth as soon as we become convinced that it is truth"; which is all very well, only the questions remain, What is error? and What is truth? Apparently he would have us believe in Darwin, and Huxley, and the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, and the indefinite entity which he calls "the science of criticism"; being seemingly under the impression that there is a great body of conclusions adverse to the miraculous portions of the Bible

which "the whole scientific world and its best scholars" are agreed upon. But in this he is laboring under a great delusion. A fair share of our greatest scientific authorities and best scholars believe in the miracles of the Bible and humbly recognize their own incompetence to solve the great mysteries of existence relating either to the origin of things or to the end of things, or to the manner in which the world of thought enters and operates upon, and coöperates with, the material forces of the universe. Huxley, indeed, tried to believe in spontaneous generation, but he did it by a supreme act of faith in the unlimited power of eternally fomenting gases to produce something of an entirely different nature from the properties which they are known to possess. Huxley could not believe in the free-will of man, but maintained that all actions were automatic; and yet he was the most pugnacious disputant that ever lived, and so the most illustrious example of the self-determining power of the will. Darwin never solved, and never pretended to solve, the cause of variations in plants and animals; while his theory of evolution by infinitesimal steps, without any leaps and bounds, has been discredited on every hand, even by Huxley and Hæckel. The exact science of which Professor Pearson dreams does not exist outside of pure mathematics; and that relates merely to suppositions, and not at all to realities.

A single example of Professor Pearson's efforts to shed light on unsolvable problems must suffice. He asks, "How did God communicate the contents of the Book to man?" "Did he speak the words aloud so that they came to the outward ear like a telephone message? . . . No book, no chapter, no verse, no word in the Bible was ever so communicated. God is a spirit, and speaks to men as a spirit and through the spirit."

This sounds like the word of a prophet, and we well may wonder how it is that without divine inspiration he can be so confident in his answers to such profound questions. But in the very next sentence he drops down from his high spiritual outlook, and talks in material figures which are as gross as those which he has just before emphatically discarded. He says, "All spiritual truth comes to man through his *brain and conscience*." But what similarity is there between brain and conscience? How is it any easier for spirit to move brain than it is for the Lord to produce a sound in the air? Is not the brain material? How then can God move it without a miracle?

But the remaining phrases in the sentence are even more paradoxical. He says that one man receives more, and another man less, of this spiritual truth, "because of the differences in the minds and hearts and wills of men." We have no difficulty in understanding what is meant by these words, because we are accustomed to the figurative use of language; but we are left in some uncertainty as to where in the body Professor Pearson believes the mind to be located,—whether in the brain or in the heart. The conscience he seems to connect with the brain, and the

mind and will with the heart,—a grossness of conception which is hardly equaled in any of the sacred literature of the Jews.

To be serious, the relations of mind to matter, of thought to material forces, are so mysterious, and so beyond the comprehension of the highest flights of modern science, that it is folly for anybody in the name of science to reject miracles. It is easier to think of God's performing miracles than it is of man's performing the simplest act of volition in which he sets material forces in motion; while the miracles of the Bible which cluster around the person of Jesus Christ, and around the preparatory stages of the system of truth of which he is the consummation, are as congruous as are the simplest acts put forth by the human will to accomplish even the most elementary human designs.