

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTES.

PROFESSOR PAINE'S REJOINER.

IN the course of an article in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* for April of the present year, the undersigned reviewed Professor L. L. Paine's book upon the "Evolution of Trinitarianism." Professor Paine has made a reply in the *Boston Transcript* of July 11th, a portion of which was reprinted in the *Congregationalist* of July 20th. With the merely personal part of that reply the public will not wish to be troubled. But the following points seem to demand notice from me:—

1. I am rebuked for "imputing the worst of motives," because I said that Professor Paine's criticism of the Fourth Gospel was *a priori*, having its origin in "rooted dislike" of the doctrines of the Gospel. I made the statement because Professor Paine had *expressed* his dislike in the most pointed terms, *which expressions I quoted*. If Professor Paine will now say (as he does not say in the *Transcript*) that he does *not* dislike the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel, and will *explain his expressions* in a way to make it plain that I was wrong, I will gladly retract what I said.

2. Professor Paine objects to my quoting Harnack against him in the matter of Athanasius. He says that I "seek to give the impression that Harnack is at irreconcilable odds with" him; whereas Harnack agrees with him in his general view of Greek Trinitarianism, and in his view of the whole trend of the history.

Professor Paine makes a very great mistake when he supposes that I was trying to oppose the naked authority of a great name to him. I gave Harnack's reasons for the disagreement with Professor Paine, and it is Professor Harnack's *argumentation*, not his person, that has not left our professor "an historical leg to stand upon." I expressly said that Harnack was the leader of the school of historical criticism to which Professor Paine belongs, by which I meant to say that there is general agreement between the two. But Professor Paine, I am now compelled to add, is not a very accurate student of Harnack. He errs in reference to him in the following points:—

(1) He says that Harnack and others "agree with him in holding that John the Apostle did not write the fourth gospel." That is true in form; but the general implication of the paragraph is false. Professor Paine holds that the Gospel was written about the *middle of the second century*, and that the author is *entirely unknown*. Professor Harnack holds that

it was written *before 110*, and perhaps as early as 80, and by an elder who wrote *in close dependence* upon the Apostle John. In other words, Harnack is a conservative critic, tending towards greater conservatism in his successive writings; and Professor Paine is one of the extreme radicals. To imply general agreement here is an injustice to Harnack. The same injustice is done to Professor B. W. Bacon, of Yale.

(2) He claims Harnack's general support for one of the most objectionable features of his book,—the identification of Augustinianism and later Trinitarianism with Sabellianism. I will not say that there are no passages in Harnack justifying this claim. I will only say I have not found them. The definitions of Sabellianism which Harnack gives¹ are not in favor of this idea, for he says expressly that Sabellius taught that "to the same essence three names are attached," and that "God is *not Father and Son at the same time*"; and no historian would claim that Augustine taught thus. His Son was an *eternal* Son. Augustine began at the unity of God, and made this the first thing; but so, according to Harnack, had Athanasius, so that Augustine must be viewed by Harnack at this point as taking up the old tradition. I find no passage in the "History" like that quoted from the smaller "Outlines" by Professor Paine, which speaks of Augustinianism being "modalism veiled." I suspect that to be a mistranslation, for in the "History" the corresponding passage² reads in the German: *Im Abendlande tilgte Augustin, einer alten abendländischen Tendenz folgend, den letzten Rest des Subordinationismus, näherte sich aber eben deshalb dem Modalismus*; and is to be translated: "In the Occident Augustine, following an old occidental tendency, obliterated the last remainder of subordinationism, but *for that reason* APPROACHED modalism." We have here Harnack's *interpretation* of Augustine, not an impersonal historical statement of his doctrine. Later (p. 296) he says that Augustine's "*investigations* . . . do not extend beyond modalism." I think it may be confidently maintained that he never charges Augustine with teaching modalism of any sort purposely. Of Harnack's value as a commentator I shall add a few words later. What Professor Paine says about Harnack's interpretation of the Cappadocians is correct. But I do not think that Harnack would approve, for an instant, the general line of Professor Paine's historical reduction of late Trinitarianism to Sabellianism. To call Stuart a Sabellian, is, in spite of Professor Paine's indignant objections, a case of "ambiguous middle" as well as an injury to a great name; for Stuart declared that the "distinctions" in the Godhead were eternal and co-existent, which is precisely the point which Sabellius denied. To identify these teachers on the word "*mode*" when one made it "*temporary mode*" and the other "*eternal mode*," cannot be designated by any other name than that of the fallacy of ambiguous middle, if one is to use logical language at all. Perhaps I erred in choosing to employ such

¹ Dogmengesch. i. 678, 679, second edit.

²ii. 294, first edit.

terms. I still think them adapted to prick the bubble of bad reasoning.

3. Professor Paine also misrepresents Calvin's position upon Sabellianism. Where he gained his idea of Calvin I do not know; but Calvin himself defines Sabellianism quite in accord with Thomasius and Harnack. "Sabellius," he said, "considered the names of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as little more than empty sounds; arguing that they were *not used on account of any real distinction*, but were different attributes of God, whose attributes of this kind are numerous."¹ And he defines the trinity in words which exactly express what Stuart contended for: "that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the one God: and that nevertheless the Son is not the Father, nor the Spirit the Son, but that they are *distinguished from each other by some peculiar property*."² Stuart was no Sabellian. His trinity was not exactly the trinity of the Greeks or of Augustine, but it was a faithful attempt to explain the essential elements of the New Testament doctrine, and whether fully successful or not, was enough to preserve the general evangelical doctrine which Professor Paine has abandoned.

I shall notice no further particulars in Professor Paine's article. But I wish to add one or two remarks, apropos of the little controversy, which I deem of great importance. The first pertains to the historical situation of the day. I have taken what pains I have to straighten out the relations of Professor Paine and Harnack principally for the sake of asking and answering the question, What are evangelical men to think of the considerable prevalence of this school of criticism at the present time?

My own estimate of Harnack's great work, the "Dogmengeschichte," was elaborately and fully expressed in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA in two articles, January and July, 1888. I trust that that review was both thorough and generous. But it was certainly plain in the estimate which a great deal of use of his work for the intervening thirteen years has continually confirmed. The book is excellent in parts and very bad in parts; but as a whole it is a failure as a description of the true progress and inner meaning of the Christian history. It fails fundamentally because it is out of sympathy with Christian theology. Harnack calls Athanasius' attempts to formulate the doctrine of the trinity "nonsense." He sees in what he calls the *Umschwung* (change, almost revolution), whereby the emphasis was laid by the Cappadocians upon the plurality in the Godhead, an entire inconsistency with the Athanasian position, which emphasized the unity. He does this because he thinks all trinitarian reasoning fallacious. But Professor Park used to remark that one might either emphasize the unity of God and lay the mystery in the threeness, or emphasize the threeness and lay the mystery in the unity. Either was scriptural and either orthodox. Professor Park had his own view, and for himself laid the emphasis upon the unity. But his capacious mind could hospitably entertain both views, as both possible, and

¹ Institutes, i. 13. 4. ²*Ibid.*, i. 13. 5.

each one expressing something which the other failed fully to express. Harnack can occupy no such position, and the reason is that he has never sought to get the point of view of the church theologians and sympathetically to understand them. He is so engaged in tripping them up that he does not fairly interpret them. He is a thoroughgoing Ritschlian. Whatever falls in with this school is welcome to him. Whatever else there is comes off with curt treatment. The result is that, where facts are plain and our sources are abundant, Harnack can be relied upon for his results. A good example of this is his presentation of Athanasius. There can be no doubt to the objective student of that teacher what his doctrine was. But where the sources are meager,—that is, in the most of the early historical period, and in many a one later, where it depends upon a *combination* of hints and brief items of actual information,—there Harnack is almost sure to go wrong.

If Professor Paine and Harnack are correct in their great underlying premise, the rejection of the supernatural as a fact in the providence of God and an element of Christianity, then their interpretation of these slight indications of the course of things, and of the ambiguous statements of many early writers, and of the whole course of the history, may be accepted as correct. It is, at least, as correct as men can arrive at who set out to explain everything by the categories of causation, the material categories of material science. But if they are wrong at this point, their whole edifice collapses. We affirm, and the church yet affirms,—and Congregationalism yet affirms,—the reality of the supernatural element in Christianity. Jesus Christ was truly God. The incarnation was a miraculous event. Miracles were performed by Jesus and his apostles. The Holy Spirit was in the church, and guided it to an ever fuller knowledge of the truth. Christian theology is, therefore, a divinely guided, consistently constructed, edifice of truth. This is our view of things; and when we come to interpret the history, this is the conception which finds the fullest confirmation from an objective study of the records as we have them. The other method finds them so full of error as to leave them without worth. The criticism necessary to maintain it is so subjective and arbitrary as to possess no convincing power to one to whom the conclusion is not a foregone one.

My second remark joins directly on at this point. Neither Professor Harnack nor Professor Paine has done anything to establish their denial of the supernatural, nor did Ritschl, the great dogmatic leader. Nothing has been done by anybody to invalidate the possibility of miracles, or to render incredible the gospel account of them. Evolution itself has left us with a personal God, and his personality is his superiority to his laws, and this is the possibility of miracles. Professor Paine will recognize no age of miracles. "The old traditional distinction between 'sacred and profane' history has been wiped out completely by scientific and historical criticism," he says. Nothing is more false. The person of Christ

still stands unique in history. Christianity is a unique force. These two things demand explanation. The biblical explanation is still the simplest, most reasonable, and the best. It is, that, in the great crisis of human affairs, when man had fallen into sin and was about to be lost, God interfered for his salvation. He sent his own Son. The Son came to men, wrought works which were natural and inevitable for him, since he was what he was. They were also necessary for man, that the revelation of God in Christ might be clear and the power of God brought into evident direct exercise. And that power, begun in miracle, has been continued in the supernatural work of the Spirit, which work is the secret of the efficiency and progress of Christianity. The so-called historical and scientific criticism is absolutely powerless to explain these things, and has nothing to say that is valid against the biblical explanation.

I believe that Congregationalists generally recognize the issue which is here at stake. But if any do not, let me urge them to a careful reëxamination of the matter. They will find that we are meeting the old Rationalism of several successive centuries before the present one, with hardly a new argument in its favor. The true force in the new historical criticism is not history but dogmatics. and very bad dogmatics too. Does a man reject the miraculous element of Christianity? Then he should go with Harnack and Paine. But he ought to go further, and eventually he will, viz., to the rejection of the personality of God upon which the miraculous is founded. Pantheism, black pantheism, which Professor Paine says is the goal of trinitarianism, will then be reached, but it will not be by evangelical believers in the Trinity.

The signs are numerous, and have increased since the April number was published, that Congregationalists intend to keep afloat that banner upon which Athanasius wrote the eternal and essential deity of the Son as the watchword of the church. Thus they will help preserve the faith in the personality of God; but—what is of greater importance yet—they will thus maintain the necessary condition of spiritual life in the church.

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ON THE VERDICT "GOOD."

"AND GOD SAW THAT IT WAS GOOD."¹

OF the many who have written on the Bible story of creation, none appear to have attached importance to the presence or absence of the verdict "good" after the divine acts. A very few have noticed its omission after the work of the second period. Some have said this was due to the fact that the devils were created on the second day; while others, like Professor Cheyne, think it was merely a copyist's error. But neither suppo-

¹ Condensed from *The Problem of the Ages*, a book in MS ready for the press, by Dr. Warring.

sition suffices to explain the remarkable circumstance, that, out of the eleven divine acts recorded, five, the most important ones of all, are not called good. If the reader will turn to his Bible, he will find four things done in the first period,—the creation, the “moving” of the Spirit, the production of light, and the division between light and darkness,—only one of which is pronounced good, viz. light. The second period has no such word. The third tells of two works, each separately pronounced good. The next two periods have each that verdict. The sixth relates the production of cattle, beasts, and creeping things, and pronounces them good; then comes the creation of man, but it is not said that he was good. Lastly, creation being now ended, and all handed over to Adam, God saw everything that he had made,—the five which had not been pronounced good, as well as the six which had been thus honored,—and “behold it was very good.”

What is the explanation of these remarkable peculiarities in the use of good? They cannot be accounted for by the requirements of Hebrew poetry, for they are so arranged as to do violence to the measured parallelism which is one of its chief characteristics. An error of a copyist might perhaps account for one omission, but not for five. Three such accidents in the first few verses would have been impossible without detection. Nor can we conceive it as a matter of mere caprice, certainly not if we regard the character and order of all else in the story.

Dropping then all that has been offered in the way of explanation, our only recourse is to the study of the account itself.

We find that good is there applied only to things without life and to animals; hence it has no reference to moral character, since they have none. Another common use of this word is in the sense of *advantageous*, or *beneficial*; as, when we say, meat is good for the laboring-man, oats are good for horses, exercise is good for one's health, and the like. This throws no light on the cause of the five omissions, since those creative acts were as necessary to the fitting-up of the world for its present inhabitants as the six which are pronounced good. The Septuagint translates the same word by *beautiful*, and undoubtedly it sometimes has that meaning, as, when it is said “the daughters of men were fair” (Gen. vi. 2). But this cannot be the sense intended here; else, why was it not applied to the firmament, and above all to our first parents?

There is another meaning of this word which is as common in Hebrew as now in English: I mean, *fit for its purpose*, and therefore *finished*, *completed*, *done*. A good knife, a good watch, a good piece of cloth, and the like are instances in point. If, in looking over a number of articles, the manufacturer should pronounce only a part good, the inference would be that the others needed to have something more done to them. This is why some things here are pronounced good; and others passed over without remark. The writer goes in this way through all the acts to the end of the series. And then, the others having in the meantime been com-

pleted, the whole was fit for the home of man, and accordingly it was all pronounced very good. This seems reasonable as a matter of exegesis. Moreover, it is a fact that each thing pronounced good was ready for the use of man, before, or in one case simultaneously with, the next thing in the story, which is not true of any of the five others.

The first divine act was the creation of the heaven and the earth. Not till long after the next two acts was there sun, moon, and planets. It could not be, and was not, pronounced good. The Creator next imparted motion; but, as this was only the first step in his formative work after creation, it was not finished till that had all been done; therefore it, too, is not pronounced good. The third work was the production of light. Coming from nebulous matter it was at first, according to the spectroscopists, poor indeed,—not merely feeble, but lacking in many of the important elements it now has. As condensation of the gas-like matter went on, the light which it emitted improved in quantity and quality until, when the nebulous mass's density equaled that of the sun, it became good for all purposes. This condition was reached before the earth became opaque, and thus divided the light from the darkness, or, in other words, before the next act mentioned in the account.

At that early period the earth's axis was perpendicular to the ecliptic. This I assume, because a globe developed mechanically from homogeneous nebulous matter, as our earth is said to have been, would necessarily take that position; and then, too, all geologists agree that, till long after the dry land appeared, there were no zones of climate, and lastly, the uniformity of plants irrespective of latitude, indicates uniformity of actinic influence, which could only be if the earth's axis was close to a perpendicular. The days and nights, therefore, were then of equal length, and seasons impossible. Evidently something remained to be done, the work was not completed, and Genesis withholds the verdict.

We next read of the expanse, and notice that it, too, is not called good. It ought not, because it needed much more done to it, for the atmosphere which filled it, was so charged with poisonous gases that none of the higher animals could breathe it. It was not fit for their or our use.

The sixth work was the gathering of the waters into one place and the appearing of the dry land. This was completed essentially a few, in the Pliocene contemporaneously with the appearance of the final species of vegetation, our present "grasses, herbs, and fruit-trees." The land and the plants being finished, ready for present life, each was therefore entitled to the verdict of completion, and each has it.¹

¹ As the reader perceives, I assume that the second work of this period was the production of the present flora. That "grass, herbs, and fruit-trees" refer to the first plants on our planet, is a survival from the traditional Genesis, which insisted that, if the Bible is true, the earth is only six thousand years old. The names which Moses gives to his plants apply easily and accurately to those of to-day, the only ones with which he

The work of the fourth period had to do with the natural measures of time,—“signs, seasons, days, and years.” Whatever it was, one thing is certain, nothing has been done in that direction since. Therefore it should have the verdict “good,” indicating completion, and it has it.

The thing actually done in the fourth period was, I think, the increasing of the earth's axial inclination to twenty-three and a half degrees. That would cause such days as we now have, and seasons, make the year an obvious measure of time, and offer a ready index to the times of the Jewish festivals. As such increase would in nowise affect the lunar movements, months would of necessity be omitted from the list of effects. And they are omitted.¹

The ninth act was the production of “living, moving, water creatures, and great whales,” and fowl to fly in the expanse of heaven. These brought animal life in their respective elements to present kinds, fit for all present purposes, therefore “good” in the sense the word is here employed, and the story calls them so.

Next we read of cattle, beasts, and creeping things. In them was the last development of land animals. No new types have since appeared. These were fit for all present conditions and needs. Genesis therefore pronounces this work “good.”

Man at his creation had before him, unlike the animals, an existence in which he was to rise higher and higher. Instead of setting out with no power of growth and improvement, he was gifted with capacities and powers which have as yet reached no limit, and, so far as we can conceive, never will. In this sense, therefore, “good” could not be applied to man. Withholding it implies far more.

By this time all that in their nature admitted of completion, had attained to it. The primal nebulous matter had been wrought into sun, moon and planets and stars; the divine “moving” first imparted had done its work; the earth's axis had become inclined as now, bringing with it all present effects; the poisonous atmosphere of the expanse had changed to the air we now breathe. All this was finished, and when Man was placed over it, everything was ready for the drama of human history

¹ For a full discussion, exegetical and scientific, see my *Genesis I. and Modern Science* (Hunt & Eaton, New York).

and his people were acquainted, and not at all to the protophytes of the Eozoic, or the seaweeds of the Silurian.

For similar reasons, I take it that the air and water creatures of the fifth period, as well as the land animals of the sixth, refer to the species at this end of creation. They are removed as far as possible from the microscopic forms in which animal life began. To-day's organisms arranged in order of seniority stand thus: its plants; its air and water vertebrates; its land vertebrates.

Understood in this way, all difficulties as to the order of plant and animal life vanish. There is, however, dispute in regard to man's place. But till scientists arrive at a consensus, it is useless to discuss the matter.

to open. Then surveying it all, the Great Architect pronounced it very good.

In the use of this word "good," I find a test of the historicity of the Genesis story of creation. It bears it well.

I have in this note worked on only one of the veins of precious ore which run through this chapter, invisible to the traditionalist, but glowing in the light of modern science. If some are stirred to look for themselves into the truth of this account, my present purpose will be accomplished. A conspiracy of silence may be a safe, but not a creditable, retreat for those who fear most of all a new idea.

POUGHKEEPSIE, NEW YORK.

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