ARTICLE II.

SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

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In Part I. of the "First Principles," Spencer applies himself to the task of reconciling science and religion. He begins his discussion by reminding us there is a "soul of truth in things erroneous"; and he will seek the soul of truth in religion. The phenomena of religion, practically universal, raise the question as to whether religion is of divine origin, or the result of natural evolution.

"Considering all faculties to result from accumulated modifications caused by the intercourse of the organism with its environment, we are obliged to admit that there exist in the environment certain conditions which have determined the growth of the feeling in question; and so are obliged to admit that it is as normal as any other faculty. . . . We must conclude that the religious sentiment is either directly created, or is created by the slow action of natural causes; and whichever of these conclusions we adopt, requires us to treat the religious sentiment with respect."

". . . Regarding science as a gradually increasing sphere, we may see that every addition to its surface does but bring it into wider contact with surrounding nescience. . . . Hence it must always continue possible for the mind to dwell upon that which transcends knowledge; then there can never cease to be a place for something of the nature of religion; since religion under all its forms is distinguished from everything else in this, that its subject-matter is that which passes the sphere of experience."¹

The reconciliation is to be found in the most abstract truth contained in science and religion.

"If there be a fact which science recognizes in common with religion, it must be that fact from which the several branches of science diverge, as from their common root.

"Assuming, then, that these two realities are constituents of the same mind, and respond to different aspects of the same universe, there must

¹ First Principles, pp. 16, 17.
be a fundamental harmony between them; we see good reason to conclude that the most abstract truth contained in religion and the most abstract truth contained in science must be the one in which the two coalesce.'"  

This most abstract truth is found in the second and third chapters, on the ultimate religious and scientific ideas. The old antinomies as to creation, first cause, etc., are made to do service in showing that the religious sphere, transcending experience, is a region of absolute and eternal mystery.

"The analysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus the mystery which all religions recognize, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect—not a relative, but an absolute mystery.

"... If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, most certain of all facts,—that the Power which the universe manifests is to us utterly inscrutable.'"

Spencer had at his disposal the dialectical puzzles of universal history, from Zeno down to date, which Hamilton's immense erudition had gathered—as to space and time, the divisibility of matter, rest and motion, etc. It was not difficult, therefore, to show that

"Ultimate scientific ideas are all representative of realities which cannot be comprehended. ... In all directions his [the scientist's] investigations eventually bring him face to face with an insoluble enigma. ... He, more than any other, truly knows that in its ultimate essence nothing can be known.'"

The concluding chapter is on The Reconciliation. The "ceaseless conflicts" of science and religion

"have been due to the imperfect separation of their spheres and functions. Religion has, from the first, struggled to unite more or less science with its nescience; science has, from the first, kept hold of more or less nescience as though it were a part of science. ... Religion, though at the outset it asserted a mystery, also made numerous definite assertions about this mystery—professed to know its nature in the minutest detail; and in so far as it claimed positive knowledge, it trespassed upon the province of science. ... In the meantime, science substituted

1 First Principles, pp. 23, 24. 2 Ibid., p. 46. 3 Ibid., pp. 66, 67.
for the personalities to which religion ascribed phenomena, certain metaphysical entities, and in doing this, it trespassed on the province of religion. . . . Gradually as the limits of possible cognition are established, the causes of conflict will diminish. And permanent peace will be reached when science becomes fully convinced that its explanations are proximate and relative, while religion becomes fully convinced that the mystery it contemplates is ultimate and absolute. "Thus the consciousness of an Inscrutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena, has been growing ever clearer; and must be eventually freed from its imperfections. The certainty that on the one hand such a Power exists, while on the other hand its nature transcends intuition and is beyond imagination, is the certainty towards which intelligence has been from the first progressing. . . . And this conclusion, satisfying as it does the demands of the most rigorous logic at the same time that it gives the religious sentiment the widest possible sphere of action, is the conclusion we are bound to accept without reserve or qualification." 1

Spencer’s principle of reconciliation is in essence the specious one, appearing so often in religious history, that we know so little about the supernatural background of the universe, that reason cannot deny to faith the privilege of believing what it will, so long as it confines itself to the regions of the transcendental. The new element Spencer introduces is the strong insistence that the ultimate scientific principles are as mysterious and contradictory as those of religion; so that in the dark region of the unknown which lies, both for science and religion, beyond the limits of experience, the clashing antagonisms of the two spheres of thought may disappear.

The unsatisfactory nature of this general argument, as a defense of the objects of faith, is well enough known by all students of philosophical opinion. It was made especially clear by Kant, who assigned to the theologian an intelligible world beyond the bounds of experience, where he could amuse himself by constructing speculative air-castles, while the intelligent of mankind looked on with a smile of pity or contempt. This type of thought was given a temporary prominence in Great Britain through Hamilton

1 First Principles, pp. 106-108.
and Mansel; and Spencer, unfortunately for his fame, was seized by the idea that here was the golden opportunity to bring the conflict of the ages to an end. He accordingly abandoned temporarily the task for which his talents undoubtedly fit him,—the collection and systemization of scraps and clippings about the Aztecs and the Zulus,—and betook himself to the misty regions of the transcendental, where his most ardent admirers will hesitate to assert that he is peculiarly at home. Spencer's discussion of the ultimate metaphysical principles is for the most part a feeble echo or a direct quotation from Hamilton and Mansel; what little he adds being largely erroneous, and serving only to reveal his inability to deal with philosophical questions. Hamilton's philosophy of the unconditioned died early and childless,—is already an historical reminiscence; so that Spencer has lived to repent the mistake of assuming that any theory can remain an exception to the law of evolution long enough for us to derive from it any substantial knowledge of the ultimate verities.

As for Spencer's method of reconciliation in general, it would be difficult to find a more perfect example of the logical non sequitur. Science and religion both run up into the unknown, and therefore they have a common root! It is surely apparent, that the denial of any knowledge of two objects gives no ground for their positive identification. I know nothing about Smith and Jones, therefore Smith and Jones are the same man; a dog is the same as a cat, because one can see no difference in the dark! If Mr. Spencer knows nothing about the ultimate facts of science and religion, he cannot assert that they have a common root or any root at all. Of course, among the infinity of suppositions possible on this line of argument, it may be that science and religion have a common basis; and no one can deny this, for neither affirmation nor denial has any place in the vacuum of the unknown, where the
laws of human thought, causality, the law of contradiction, etc., do not hold. Spencer's argument then brings us one chance against infinity, that religion and science may have a common root. We need not be surprised, therefore, that the waters of controversy have not yet become still, though this valuable "reconciliation" has been before the world for many years. Mr. Spencer has been more and more driven by his critics to realize that pure negation can never furnish a basis for positive reconciliation. This appears strikingly in his discussion with Frederic Harrison. Harrison makes it so plain that a blank unknown can serve no useful purpose in religion or any other sphere, that Spencer ascribes to the unknown one after the other of the divine attributes; but when Harrison accuses him of playing into the hands of the theologians, and declares there is joy among the orthodox over one philosopher that repenteth, maddened by the keen thrusts of his adversary, Spencer throws consistency to the winds, and declares he does not claim that his doctrine of the Unknowable furnishes any ground for a religion!

It will be objected that this is an extremely unfair treatment of Mr. Spencer's theory. I submit, however, that I have done Spencer only the injustice of taking his doctrine of the Unknowable Absolute, and carrying this doctrine through to its logical conclusion. If Mr. Spencer's result does not agree with mine, it is because he has not dealt with the problem in rigid consistency. The fundamental difficulty with Spencer's position, which involves him and is likely also to involve his critics in inextricable confusion, is that he never deals with the notion, the Unknown Absolute, in logical strictness. The supernatural basis of phenomena is the unknown, and yet Spencer speaks of it in the same breath as the Infinite Power, the Eternal Energy, the Ultimate Cause, etc. Here is a plain contradiction in terms, for if it is unknown it cannot be Power, Cause, etc.
Spencer is ready enough to accept the conclusion of Hamilton and Mansel, that thought runs out into mystery and contradiction on every hand, for this conclusion is useful in destroying the assumptions of the theologians; but he denies Mansel's assertion that we are necessitated to believe that God is infinite and personal. We are necessitated to believe no more than we know. Spencer holds, against Hamilton, that we have a positive though indefinite consciousness of the Absolute,—the undefined, "raw material" of the notion.

""Clearly, the very demonstration that a definite consciousness of the Absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite consciousness of it.""  
""... We have seen how impossible it is to get rid of a consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances, and how, from this possibility, results our indestructible belief in that actuality.""  

Spencer, therefore, feels justified in assuming that there is a supernatural basis of phenomena,—a power, first cause, etc.; it is a "sort of a something," but we know nothing of it except that it exists. This position appeals to him as satisfactory, because it curbs the pride of the theologians, and yet preserves enough metaphysical principles, power cause, etc., to keep the scientific world in motion.

This fundamental ambiguity of Spencer's metaphysical work renders it worthless or worse. If the infinite is Unknown, it is not a power or cause; if it is a power or cause, we know, on rational grounds, much more than that it is a cause. Spencer nowhere treats, in logical strictness, these two mutually exclusive notions, and this ambiguity vitiates his conclusions. Take the concept, the Unknowable Absolute. This is assumed to be unknown and unknowable to man, which must mean in strictness that it is in no causal relation to the world, that personality, unity, the law of contradiction, no categories of thought apply to it. It is evident, then, that nothing whatever can be said or

1 First Principles, p. 88.  2 Ibid., p. 97.
thought about it, it amounts logically to nothing at all, and should be treated as such. It is in this strict sense of the term I have discussed the question above, and of course the outcome can be only absurdity or vacuity.

Spencer's ambiguous use of terms, however, furnishes him an easy method of defense against criticism; for when attacked for preaching the unknowable, he can assert that the unknowable is a cause or power, and *vice versa*. This is the course of his defense against Harrison. When Harrison ridicules the unknowable as an $x$th power which gives no ground for religion, Spencer declares it is the Ultimate Cause, the All-Being, the Creative Power, etc.; when Harrison rejoins that, in this case, Spencer is preaching the Christian God, Spencer says no, for he holds to the unknowable, and does not claim to furnish any basis for religion whatever.

It is not necessary, of course, to suppose that Spencer was consciously disingenuous in his treatment of these questions; for he was in the fog of a relativistic theory of knowledge, where many stronger metaphysical heads than his have lost their bearings. The vicious subjectivity of modern philosophy has resulted in idealistic or relative theories of knowledge, so that the notion is as widespread as it is erroneous that knowledge is merely phenomenal, never bringing us to ultimate external realities. If this be true, the conclusion is absolutely unavoidable that we know and can assert nothing of ultimate verities; this is as clear as daylight, and a man need not take a course of philosophical study to understand it. The idealistic and relativistic thinkers, however, recoil from the gulf of absolute skepticism, that *reductio ad absurdum* of all false philosophy, and resort to various expedients, unwarranted on their premises, to retain some sort of Absolute Being and give it a content comprehensible to the human mind. An interesting example of such an attempt, where the wide erudition
Spencer's Philosophy of Religion.

and the philosophical acumen of the author make the resulting failure the more conclusive and instructive, is Professor Royce's "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy." Here appears the fundamental and fatal inconsistency of assuming an Absolute Thought which is not personal and thinks and acts in no way as our thought; and which is not in a causal relation to the world, though its realized thoughts are the beings and things of the world. This type of philosophy, when presented by a pleasing writer and a skillful dialectician, may seem profound and perhaps satisfactory; but a little careful reflection shows that the result must be a state of mental confusion where all landmarks of substantial truth vanish, and the outcome is the suicide of philosophy as well as the vanishing-point of religion.

It is unnecessary, even if the limits of this article would permit, to dwell at any length on Spencer's use of the philosophy of the unconditioned. This element in Hamilton's system has served its purpose as an evidence of the injurious effects of the falsely subjective attitude of modern speculation, and has passed into neglect and insignificance. It is true, of course, that speculative reflection brings one upon difficulties and apparent contradictions in the fundamental laws of thought, undreamed of by the unphilosophical thinker; but the dialectical puzzles of Zeno, as well as Kant's antinomies, have been satisfactorily solved again and again, and no respectable thinker now accepts the "imbecility" of the understanding because he cannot form a satisfactory mental picture of the creation of the world out of nothing. Spencer's second-hand dialectic, therefore, about the inscrutable and contradictory nature of the ultimate religious and scientific ideas may be simply dropped out of the discussion. The question then arises, Does anything remain, of solid and permanent value, in Spencer's reconciliation of science and religion?
Religion is primarily concerned with the First Cause, the supernatural background of knowable phenomena; science is primarily concerned with the natural sphere of the knowable, with second causes so far as they are knowable by man. If the limits of these two spheres can be distinctly drawn, and then each party can be persuaded to keep on his own side of the fence, the conflict will plainly cease. Are these conditions possible? and, first, Can the limits of the spheres of the natural and supernatural be distinctly drawn? Not certainly in a way that is likely to be permanently satisfactory. The progress of science has been simply the enlargement of the sphere of the natural, at the expense of what had been considered the sphere of the supernatural. A hundred years ago the opinion was practically universal in Christendom that the first members of the human race were divinely created. The limit of the natural and the supernatural, in the history of the human race, was then set at the appearance of the first man. It is now carried back by many in the scientific world to the appearance of the first bit of protoplasm, or farther. As science promises to enlarge the boundaries of natural knowledge indefinitely, and every advance is attended by uncertainty and weighing of doubtful evidence, the prospect of a speedy and permanent demarcation of the spheres of the natural and the supernatural is far from encouraging.

As to the second condition, Can each party be persuaded to keep his own side of the fence, supposing a fence, of a reasonably permanent nature, to be erected? The most encouraging feature of the situation is the fact that each party is becoming more disposed to recognize its limitations, instead of claiming the whole field. The scientists have asserted, often enough, that the universe can be easily explained by material laws, without assuming God or anything mysterious; and the theologians have offset this dogmatism by asserting that in the Bible is the one reliable
account of creation and scheme of ancient history. The growing moderation of both parties, which is undeniable, is a hopeful sign of peace.

The above statement and solution of the difficulty is suggested, in the main, by Spencer on page 107: "Gradually as the limits of possible cognition are established, the causes of conflict will diminish." But when will the "limits of possible cognition be established"? Evidently not till the death of the last member of the human race makes it certain that no other mystery is to be brought into the light of reason, and under the sway of natural law.

Spencer endeavors to give an air of satisfactory definiteness to his reconciliation, by limiting science rigidly to the "proximate and relative," and religion to the ultimate mystery. It is doubtful whether scientists in general would agree to this limitation. It is certain that no intelligent adherent of religion would do so, for his religion must ultimately become a pale abstraction, and vanish from the real life of the world. I have said above that religion is concerned primarily with the first cause, and science is concerned primarily with the sphere of the natural; but science would doubtless object to being thus summarily excluded from the fascinating problems of ultimate reality, and any religion which is alive and expects to continue so would claim a present power and influence in the present world. Spencer was encouraged to think that the religious world would accept his "ghost of religion," because of the folly of certain Christian apologists who have sought to defend the divine Being from attack by making him invisible, powerless, and useless in the world,—"defeated to a pure transparency"; but this is not the common or the sound view of Christian theism. Religion is not a thing "only to stare at," an nth power of mystery of which we can know nothing and with which we can come into no relation; but it is the revelation of a real divine power
which is operative in the real life of the world. Especially is this true for a religion which recognizes miracle and prayer.

It is therefore evident that neither science nor religion is likely to remain content with the limits established by Mr. Spencer; and there is thus introduced a new complication into the problem, which is not encouraging to those who look for a speedy suppression of the conflict. Spencer suggests the proper point of view for understanding the contending forces; but he does not recognize sufficiently that the conflict is unavoidable and endless for finite humanity, and therefore the problem is not to suppress it, but to carry it on with mutual courtesy, candor, and good feeling.

Space will not permit even a reference to the many valuable criticisms on Spencer's philosophy of religion, except those of Edward Caird and Frederic Harrison. The former, presented in his "Evolution of Religion," is important as treating Spencer from the Hegelian standpoint; and the controversy of Spencer and Harrison is not only extremely entertaining in itself, but is an instructive illustration of the fact that when free-thinkers fall out, the orthodox may gain many valuable suggestions.¹

Caird's philosophical position is that of the modified Hegelianism of the late Professor T. H. Green. From Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception" has been developed an all-embracing world-consciousness, in which the finite mind knows the external object, and the knowledge of which is religion. The "transcendental unity of apperception" has thus been made the source of all truth and life,—it is the Hegelian God, deified and enthroned, and universal.

¹See the Nineteenth Century for January, March, July, September, November, 1884. These Essays, published in March, 1885, by D. Appleton & Co., under the title of "The Nature and Reality of Religion; a Controversy between Herbert Spencer and Frederic Harrison," were, after a public correspondence in the London Times, suppressed by order of Mr. Spencer (see Popular Science Monthly, August, 1885).
sal humanity is summoned to bow and worship. What is Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception"? It is simply the unity, or the unifying power, of the finite consciousness,—the sense of oneness, selfhood, which abides through all changing mental states, and makes possible the union of subject and object in the act of knowledge. One of the most extraordinary achievements of Kant's idealistic successors was to take this unpretentious principle of our inner life, disguise it in the garb of an unintelligible terminology, quote Scripture about it, and so metamorphose it into the divine Being. The result is that we "see all things in God." "In the transcendental unity of apperception we live and move and have our being." This theory has manifest advantages in dealing with ultimate philosophical and religious questions. God here has two or three distinct meanings, and the philosopher can use the one which suits his convenience, so that there is little difficulty in refuting the common-sense objector, or reducing him to speechless astonishment. God may mean (1) the unity of the finite consciousness; (2) the general principle of unity in the universe [(1) and (2) may fall together for the pantheistic idealist]; (3) the popular notion of Christian theism. It is very easy on this theory to prove the existence of God. Do you know the book or table before you [in the unity of your inner consciousness (1)]? Then you know God [which means (3) to the hearer], for he is the principle of unity in this knowledge.

This is the principle of Caird's criticism of Spencer. He quotes Spencer's "Principles of Psychology" (p. 120):—

"When the two modes of being which we distinguish as subjective and objective have been severally reduced to the lowest terms, any further comprehension must be an assimilation of these lowest terms to one another; and as we have already seen, this assimilation is negated by the very distinction of subject and object, which is itself the consciousness of

1 Seth's Hegelianism and Personality.
a difference transcending all other differences. That a unit of feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion, becomes more and more man­ifeﬆ when we bring the two into juxtaposition.''

Caird continues that for Spencer,

"the unity is found only in that unknowable, of which, although we cannot know it, we are still conscious, as the absolute reality of which both subject and object may be regarded as modes."

Caird’s reply to Spencer’s agnosticism as to the absolute may be anticipated from what I have said above. Spencer’s problem here is the old one of how mind and matter can be united in knowledge or action; and his solution is the true one, that they are to us ultimate and inexplicable modes of the manifestation of the divine,—though he is wrong in asserting that the divine is unknown. Caird proceeds to overthrow materialism,—the common-sense assumption of external reality,—and also subjective idealism. We have then the Hegelian idealism of knowledge as the unity of the subjective and the objective, of the self and the not-self. Caird is now in position to assert against Spencer that the fundamental principle of unity cannot be unknown.

"It is obvious that when we thus break down the supposed wall of division between the consciousness of the self and that of the not-self, we must also break down the wall of division between both and the consciousness of God. And instead of thinking of ourselves as confined to the finite to the exclusion of the infinite, we must rather recognize that everything we can learn of the former is also a step in the knowledge of the latter. The consciousness of the finite is based on the idea of the infinite as its first presupposition; nor can it become knowledge in the highest sense till it understands this presupposition; till, in other words, it recognizes the consciousness of the finite subject and the consciousness of the finite object as elements in the consciousness of God." ¹

The infinite is therefore the presupposition and the first real object of all knowledge.

"Our ignorance of God is then, in one aspect of it, the effect of too much knowledge. For it is simply the incapacity of rising to the idea of a unity, which yet is implied in all our knowledge." ²

Caird's unsatisfactory deduction of the knowledge of the infinite should not blind us to the fact that he brings a correction for Spencer's fundamental error. Spencer studies matter, mind, the religious nature of man, etc., and finds everywhere lines which run up and converge in an infinite principle of unity; and yet he asserts of this principle we can only know that it is. It is manifest that if our reason is trustworthy, this principle must be adequate to account for the world, and so we know much more about it than its bare existence. The Hegelian contention, and in general it is a noble and true one, is that the laws of our thought are reliable, and therefore we are justified in assuming what logically holds good of this infinite as invincibly true. The unwarranted and misleading element in the Hegelian exposition is, that the remote logical inference that there is an infinite principle of unity is treated as though it were immediately known in the simplest act of knowledge,—the "God-consciousness" so mysterious to the plain man. This has come about for the Hegelian because he has unwarrantably destroyed the self-subsistence of the world and of the finite personality, and therefore the unity of consciousness, the "transcendental unity of apperception," is only possible in God.

The Spencer-Harrison discussion has brought out some valuable results, in so far as each has shown conclusively that the other has no religion; and in the end each frankly admits this fact. At the start, however, each plainly gives the impression that he is prepared to furnish the world with the genuine religion. Harrison appears first as a Comtist, full of enthusiasm for the religion of humanity.

"Humanity is the grandest object of reverence within the region of the real and the known, Humanity with the world on which it rests as its base and environment. Religion, having failed in the supernatural world, returns to the human world."

The lyric strains which immediately follow as to the glor-
ies of the religion of Humanity, are in very striking contrast to Harrison's sobriety of utterance after Spencer's criticism.

"In plain words, the religion of Humanity means recognizing your duty to your fellow-men on human grounds. I have no wish to 'worship' humanity in any other sense than as a man may worship his own father and mother."

In short, Harrison does not claim for his religion of Humanity in the upshot of the debate, any more than that it is what mankind has always designated as morality, as Spencer does not claim that his religion of the Unknowable is any more than the "ghost of religion," and is willing to admit it is not even that.

Spencer has gravely announced to the world his purpose to reconcile science and religion, and does so by showing that science and religion agree in recognizing an absolute power or being as the basis of the universe. Beginning with the principle that there is a "soul of truth in things erroneous," the plain implication is that Spencer holds the true and permanent core of religion to consist in the feeling of awe and veneration before this mysterious supernatural power. This is the natural inference from the closing paragraphs of the essay on Religion.

"Science under its concrete forms enlarges the sphere for the religious sentiment. From the very beginning the progress of knowledge has been accompanied by an increasing capacity for wonder."

"And this feeling is likely to be increased by that analysis of knowledge, which, while forcing man to agnosticism, yet continually prompts him to imagine some solution of the Great Enigma which he knows cannot be solved." 1

All the world has supposed that religion to Spencer was wonder and awe before the Unknown Infinite; and so Mr. Harrison took it, in the "Ghost of Religion." Harrison says,

"In any reasonable use of language religion implies some kind of a belief in a Power outside ourselves, some kind of awe and gratitude felt

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1 Essay on Religion, pp. 33, 35.
for that Power, some kind of influence exerted by it over our lives. A religion which gives us nothing in particular to believe, nothing as an object of awe and gratitude, which has no special relation to human duty, is not a religion at all."

And now in Spencer's "Last Words" he asserts that he never meant to advocate a religion of the Unknowable at all.

"I have nowhere 'proposed' any 'object of religion.' I have nowhere suggested that anyone should 'worship this Unknowable.' . . . I have simply affirmed the permanence of certain components in the consciousness which is 'concerned with that which lies beyond the sphere of sense.' I have said nothing about the adequacy or inadequacy of this surviving sentiment, as a religion."

Mr. Spencer then comes out at the end with a "surviving sentiment," which he is ready to admit is not religion. What becomes, then, of his reconciliation of science and religion? It is apparent that the reconciliation has been effected, or is in Spencer's opinion to be effected, by the simple elimination of the religious factor,—religion is to vanish entirely so far as any real significance can be attached to the term, and leave science in complete possession of the field. This is not the conclusion one finds suggested in Part I. of the "First Principles." The sentiment in relation to the Unknowable was there discussed in such a fashion as to give the impression that a satisfactory religious content was being considered; and the whole force of Spencer's reconciliation depended on giving the reader this impression. When, therefore, after a lapse of twenty years, Spencer coolly announces that he is perfectly willing to admit that this "surviving sentiment" is not a religion at all, that after all he does not claim that there is any permanent "soul of truth" in religion, the reconciliation of science and religion must appear as a most transparent humbug. And we can well understand Harrison's evident astonishment at this extraordinary position, where Spencer wins a trifling argumentative victory at the price of a fundamental inconsistency, and even of apparent dishonesty.
"On one point I certainly did misunderstand Mr. Spencer, and that in all good faith. When he said, 'if veneration and gratitude are due at all,' I confess that I took him to admit that they are due. He now says that is not his meaning. Be it so. But if his view of religion is, that veneration and gratitude have no part in it, that it has no object and is 'altogether unconcerned' with devotion, hope, worship and consolation, the pertinent question occurs, Why all these chapters and articles about religion at all?"

And, we may add, why the labored attempt at a permanent reconciliation of science and religion, if the religious factor is to disappear?