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## ARTICLE VII.

## STUDIES IN CHRISTOLOGY.

BY PROFESSOR FRANK HUGH FOSTER, D. D.

## IV.

IN resuming, after so long a time, the "Studies in Christology" which he began in this Review in 1892, the writer will take the liberty of changing somewhat the purpose of the studies. Occupying at that time the chair of Church History, he was mainly concerned with the historical problems of the subject, and particularly with the subtle attack which Professor Harnack, of Berlin, is making upon historical Christianity by the introduction of rationalistic dogmatic principles among the canons of historical investigation. Transferred, as he now is, to the department of Systematic Theology, he wishes to consider the problem more in its dogmatic aspects. The purpose of these studies shall no longer be chiefly historical, though the basis afforded by a review of the historical origin of the Chalcedon doctrine will be essential to a proper understanding of the problem of our own day and of what is to be offered in solution of the same; but the questions raised by Harnack will be left to the professional historians for the most part,—to whom they are commended as constituting a large part of the historical *Aufgabe* of the day, and quite as important for history as the questions of biblical criticism are for exegesis. The refutation of Harnack's mistakes in instance after instance, by a thorough discussion of the original authorities, would seem to one observer, at least, to be the imperative duty of the times. *Monendo satisfeci officio meo.* These more technic-

ally historical disputations therefore aside, it will now be the writer's purpose to set forth what the problem in respect to christology really is, and to exhibit what the best modern thought has to offer by way of solution.<sup>1</sup>

## V.

## DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE BEFORE CHALCEDON.

The problem discussed in the church under the name of "christology" is, precisely defined, this: How is it that Jesus Christ is both God and man? What is the relation of the divine and human in Christ; that is, in the person of the incarnate, suffering, dying, risen, and living Christ?

Evidently before such a question could arise at all, there must have been considerable progress made in the church in dogmatic knowledge. The great discussions which resulted in the formulation of the doctrine of the trinity at Nice (325) and at Constantinople (381) precede chronologically, as they do logically, the Council of Chalcedon (451), for it is only when men are firmly convinced that Christ is God that the problem suggested by his human nature will press upon their minds and demand consideration. Yet, as the elements of the doctrine of the trinity were in the general feeling of the church long before careful thinking, brought out by particular exigencies, had led to precise formulation, so the elements of christology far antedated the discussions culminating at Chalcedon. In a sense the church always had a christology; and in a still larger sense, it was gaining a definite christology at the same time it was gaining the doctrine of the trinity. The study of our subject begins, therefore, in the ante-Nicene period.

<sup>1</sup> I shall drop also the elaborate citation of authorities which I began in the former article, since historical proof is not now my chief point of interest. That I have written with constant reference to the original authorities and that these essays spring out of original studies will, I hope, be sufficiently evident.

The fundamental thought of the church from the beginning was that deity and humanity were united in Christ. This is plain upon the most hasty reading of Justin, Ignatius, and Irenæus, but we find in such writers as they no trace of philosophical reflection upon the theme, no evidence of difficulty in connection with its problems. The contest with Gnosticism was, however, calculated to stir up thought, and it did this. Tertullian, particularly, has much to say about the cause of the incarnation, which he always views as the divine act of the Logos in taking flesh upon himself. Since Gnosticism put so great a chasm between the divine and human, making the body in consequence of its material nature essentially evil and so hostile to the divine, the Gnostics were driven to the denial of the reality of the human body of Christ. He could not have a body because he would thus have been defiled and essentially disqualified for the office of Saviour. But he seemed to have a body, and it must, therefore, be explained, which was done by making it mere "seeming" (*δόκησις*), a phantom without reality. This was the view called Docetism. Tertullian, therefore, and the other polemics, declared in reply that the body of Christ was a real body. By this was preëminently meant the material part, the flesh, not of course to the exclusion of the immaterial soul, the existence of which in Christ is implied by some of the expressions of these fathers, but without particular reference to it. And when the point was first raised, it was not entirely clear to all whether Christ had a human soul (*ψυχή*) or not. But Origen affirmed that he had. "The Son of God, then, desiring for the salvation of the human race to appear unto men and to sojourn among them, assumed not only a human body, as some suppose, but also a soul resembling our souls indeed in nature, but in will and power resembling himself." This idea, once fully received, was never relinquished by the church.

The movement which derives its name from Arius was

both a theological and a christological movement. Arius agreed entirely with the church that there was divinity in Christ, but, in order to make this divinity consistent with the unity of God, he explained it as constituted by the Logos, who was a creature, the first of all created things and the medium of all other creation, who was "advanced" to divinity as a reward for his perfect holiness. Thus the unity of God was preserved, as he thought. It remained still to protect the unity of Christ. Divinity was in him and humanity, and he was one. How could this be? Arius' answer was simple. • Let the Logos take the place in Christ of a human soul, and you have no divided personality, no double Christ, but a divine being capable through his human body of suffering as men do. Eudoxius later expressed it, "We believe in one Lord, incarnated but not made man (*σαρκωθέντα οὐκ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα*), for he did not receive a human soul but was made 'flesh.'" He adds "Instead of a soul you have God in flesh."

Thus Arius' solution of the problem involved the abridgment of the humanity, and this was a denial, as the church viewed it, of the fundamental facts of the case. Accordingly Athanasius, who voiced the general churchly doctrine of his day, maintained the full humanity of Christ. Thus only was the deity to be protected from the charge of having suffered. The divine and human are perfectly united by the incarnation, so that we are to say that Christ is the Logos become man. Through this union the sufferings of the humanity become the proper sufferings of the Logos. Thus the church rejects the positions of Arius, but she does little herself to bring the matter into a clearer light.

Apollinaris (d. about 390) is the next theologian who attempts a solution of the problem. With Arius and associated thinkers, he rejected the idea of two perfect beings in Christ, God and man, since such a combination would never give unity of person, and upon this he laid the greatest stress.

There would then be two sons of God, one a son by nature, and the other by adoption. On the other hand, Christ is no merely inspired man "having God in him as one being may have another," but the Son of God dwelt in him in a more intimate manner than that. Hence we see that the two thoughts which seemed to Apollinaris essential and impossible to relinquish, were divinity and unity of person. Now, said he, if you have the *νοῦς* in the human part of Christ, you have personality, and hence these impossible two persons in Christ, since the *νοῦς*, as conceived by him, was the center of volition. And further, he said, this *νοῦς*, if found in Christ, must partake of our sinfulness, and this would make Christ a sinner, and would destroy the possibility of our salvation. Therefore, to solve the whole problem, you have only to suppose that the Logos took, in the human nature of Christ, the place of the *νοῦς*.

This attempted solution was also rejected by the church, for it was seen not to do justice either to the plain words or to the general impression of the Scriptures and to the necessity of a true humanity in a true Redeemer. By the years 374 and 376 two Roman synods had got far enough to affirm that the "Son of God took the human body, soul, and mind ('sensus' for the Greek *νοῦν*)," and in 381 at Constantinople it was declared with special reference to these efforts that Jesus Christ was both "incarnate" and "made man" (*σαρκωθέντα . . . καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα*). But the church was not yet able herself to contribute anything of a positive nature to the solution of the great problem of two natures in one person.

One element in this solution had, however, received some attention from Athanasius and was to receive more from the two Gregories. This was the conception that the Logos was the personalizing principle in the God-man. We see it with Athanasius mainly in the emphasis which he laid upon the activity of the Logos in taking humanity upon

himself. He created the humanity, and he assumed it in creating it. The others brought the thought out more clearly, but it would be of little benefit to follow their forms of expression more closely. It is of greater importance that we attempt to understand the conception itself, and examine its promise for our own purposes.

If there were lying upon a table, scattered about in careless confusion, all the various elements of a watch, the wheels, screws, springs, hands, dial, case, etc., no one could rightly denominate this scattered and motionless accumulation of elements a watch. Let some skillful watchmaker now gather them together, and put part to part till they are all in their place, and the works are gathered into their case; while there is still no motion, there is yet no perfect and useful watch. There must be motion to be a watch. Not till the hands are moving and time is indicated does this collection of brass and steel and jewels deserve the name of watch. But, the instrument having been wound up, let the impact, that touch, be given it which causes it to spring into activity and to begin to move, and you have at last the watch.

In the light of this imperfect illustration we may, possibly, approach to a closer view of the incarnation. The elements of the humanity of Christ, if we may so speak, as they lay inchoate, in fact or in idea, ere the creating Logos assumed them as his own, were not a personality. If there were there body and soul, it was only a potential humanity till the Logos, in assuming it, gave it that touch which at the same time made it a humanity and made it his humanity. It came into being as a humanity in the moment of the incarnation, and when it gained the conception of its personality, that personality was the personality of him in whom centered all its experiences, its thoughts, feelings, purposes, and sensations, as his experiences. It had no personal experience apart from its union with that divine personality which was the personality of God in the Logos.

These fathers saw in this idea the meaning intended to be conveyed by the exact phrase which the apostle John employs, "The Word became flesh." That is, he so took flesh, or humanity, upon himself that all which it has and experiences is his possession and experience. Does it suffer? That suffering is not the suffering of a humanity, which leaves him impassive, but it is his suffering, for it only becomes the conscious suffering of the humanity in that it becomes his conscious suffering, for all the consciousness of the humanity is his consciousness. Thus it may be said of the man Jesus Christ, This man is God. There is no humanity there but such as is the humanity of the Logos, of God.

The Alexandrian school, under the lead of Cyril, developed this idea and carried it out to its consequences. The union of the two natures is an essential, but it must be admitted, a mysterious thing, beyond the conception or the utterance of man. That which is assumed becomes one with the Logos. Logically, there is still a distinction; God does not cease to be God, nor humanity to be humanity; but in reality, there are no longer two natures but one nature. One person, one being, one nature,—“one incarnated nature of the Logos.” The Logos is to be conceived of as assuming flesh, as being born a man, born flesh. Hence God was born of the Virgin, and Mary is rightly to be called the mother of God.

Now, here are extreme expressions which are likely to be misunderstood. It will serve to clarify our own thoughts as it did to clarify those of the church, if we follow the controversy between this school of thought and its rival, the school of Antioch.

The christology of the school of Antioch was determined by two fundamental ideas. The first was that the highest moral perfection is only to be gained by free personal development, and the second was its logical consequence, that the great work of the Redeemer was to present to man

in his own person an example to be imitated in attaining such perfection. The emphasis in Antiochian thought was therefore laid upon the life of Christ and upon his humanity, by which he is like us, and by which he affords us an example, and the relation between the divinity and humanity was conceived under the analogy of the indwelling of God in all holy persons. The incarnation is only a peculiar indwelling of God in humanity, so filling it that it partakes of the honor and perfection of deity.

Up to this point there is no necessary schism between Alexandria and Antioch. But the fully developed Antiochian thought begins to show an irreconcilable divergence. The incarnation, they taught, began in the womb of the Virgin. It is conditioned, on the one hand, by the Holy Spirit and on the other by the free will of the human nature. It grows more and more complete as time goes on, till at the resurrection all possibility of sin in the Redeemer is forever overcome, and the incarnation is perfect. Theodore of Mopsoestia refused to accept the Alexandrian phrase that the Logos became "flesh." This was to talk nonsense. The words of Scripture are to be taken in a loose sense. The incarnation is a "conjunction" of the two natures. The two natures are in all respects complete, and form two independent subjects. Consequently it was not the Son of God (the Logos) which was born of Mary, but only a man in whom God was; and hence she is not the "mother of God," but the mother of Christ. This term became the watchword of the school.

Into the wordy dispute between Nestorius and Cyril it is not necessary for us to enter. Nestorius was simply a faithful Antiochian, and Cyril was led by the natural tendency of controversy to emphasize excessively a tendency, already evident in the Gregories, to deify the human nature of Christ by teaching the mutual "communication of properties" between the two natures. But out of it all came

the clear and important result that unity of person in Christ is an indispensable element of the faith and that the personalizing element in Christ is the Logos,—a result which has entered into the substance of the Christian faith, and has been embodied, for example, in the Westminster Confession in the terms: "Christ, the Son of God, became man by taking to himself a true body and a reasonable soul [not a human personality], being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary and born of her, yet without sin."

But what in fact is the value of this idea? The problem of christology, as already stated, is to bring the three elements, perfect deity, perfect humanity, and unity of person into harmony. If there is to be unity of person, there can be but one center of consciousness, or in other words, one consciousness, for unity of person is unity of consciousness. But what consciousness shall that be? Evidently the consciousness of the being who speaks in the historical Christ in the first person, the Ego of the Christ, and that is he who was with the Father "before the world was," who "came down" from Heaven, who "humbled himself," who "became" flesh. It is the Ego of the active Logos. We affirm therefore, both as a result of the study of the Scriptures, and also as a necessity of thought, if the idea of a single personality in Christ is to be maintained, that to the Logos were referred, as the center of his consciousness, all the experiences of the God-man, that the Logos was thus the personalizing principle.

It may be said, by way of making the thought more intelligible, and at the same time of affording some additional proof of it from analogy, that our own dual nature gives us an example of personality resident strictly in one element of our being alone. Though the pain which I feel in my hand is the pain of my body, in the sense that it is a physical modification, yet it is my pain, the pain of my soul, because

it is known by that soul and first becomes mine by such knowledge. There is such a thing as feeling and reaction upon a pain-giving stimulus, without consciousness, as may be seen by the example of the sensitive plants. But an active spiritual personality is needed that there may be consciousness. Just so, if the human soul of Christ was so associated with the Logos that no feeling it might have, could exist without becoming immediately the feeling of the Logos from whom went forth the vitalizing principle of its existence, as our will goes forth from our souls and not our bodies, there would be no separate consciousness, and so no separate personality, in such a soul. The question whether there was a single or a divided consciousness in Christ, is the question whether the church rightly conceived its problem in the department of christology. This question we may be permitted to defer for the present, since it will be necessary to consider it fully when the more exclusively dogmatic part of the present discussion is reached.

## VI.

### THE RESULT OF THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON.

The remaining discussions prior to Chalcedon resulted merely in more exactly defining the elements of the christological problem. There was soon manifest a tendency to antithetic statement, whereby the humanity and divinity were set off over against each other and compared as to the things in which they agreed or differed. This tendency was very marked in Augustine's *Enchiridion*. His forms of statement modified those of Leo of Rome in his famous letter to Flavian, which in its turn became the great influential factor in the formation of the creed of Chalcedon.

Thus the council did little at bringing the problem to a solution. It affirms in strong and well balanced terms the unity of person, and the perfect humanity and perfect divin-

ity of our Lord. The antithetic statements of Augustine and Leo are imitated in such phrases as "consubstantial with the Father according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us according to the Manhood," "begotten before all ages of the Father according to the Godhead, and in these latter days, for us and for our salvation, born of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, according to the Manhood," etc. Both Leo and the council, by this antithetic balancing between the two natures, tend somewhat to hold the two apart, and lean, in spite of their statement that Christ "is not parted or divided into two persons," somewhat towards the Antiochian school of thought. We could not, of course, expect in a brief creed of this sort any reasoned and elaborate theory of the doctrine, and none is given. But not even the great facts which are to be maintained and which point towards a theory, are given. In a word, the creed is something to be believed, not something to assist belief or representing a stadium where the problems of the theme may be said to have been solved. It is a waymark of progress, not a goal.

## VII.

### LUTHER'S CHRISTOLOGY.

The christology of Luther is the next attempt to solve the problems of our theme which we need to consider. The Middle Ages devoted much attention to the theme, but they did not forward it; and they do not have that immediate connection with the thought of our day which would justify the study of their speculations as such in this place. We omit, therefore, all notice of John of Damascus, the great dogmatician of the Greek church, who did so much to give it a consistent and comprehensive system of thought, as well as the whole line of Roman theologians previous to Luther.

Luther's efforts for the advance of christology arose out

of his doctrine of the Lord's Supper. The important idea underlying the Roman system was that the means of grace and the distribution of grace to the individual soul were inseparably connected. Hence the mediation of the priest in the confessional and at the altar were essential to the forgiveness of sins and to the reception of the penitent to the favor of God. Luther retained this idea in its most important elements—“*Deus interna non dat nisi per externa.*” Thus the forgiveness of sins is communicated through the sacrament, and whenever the sacrament is received, grace is received.

It is a remarkable fact, and one not altogether intelligible to the modern, American mind, that, though Luther got far enough along to reject the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation,—the doctrine that the substance of the bread and wine are transformed in the sacrament into the substance of the body and blood of the Lord,—he retained the idea that in some mysterious way the real body and blood of Christ were communicated by the elements which represented them. Why should he, who emphasized the necessity of faith, and faith as the organ of spiritual union with God, have insisted upon this point? It is not common to find any explanation of this point in Lutherans, and, indeed, they seem often as unable to understand what the difficulty of members of other communions in comprehending Luther's meaning is, as the latter are to understand Luther. One must, therefore, offer any explanation which he may have arrived at with diffidence, but upon the whole, a careful and extensive reading of Luther has led the present writer to the conviction that Luther's mind followed something like the following line of thought:—

Spiritual gifts are the operation of Christ upon the Christian's heart. Where Christ operates, there he is; and where he is, he is entire. Christ, then, the whole Christ, body as well as soul and divinity, is in the Christian's heart as he receives the gifts of grace. Particularly, then, when the sym-

bols of the body of Christ are received by the Christian, and when grace is conferred, the veritable body of Christ, though in an inexplicable manner, is present in the heart of the believer. It can be thus present here in Wittenberg, or yonder in Jerusalem, because it is everywhere, and it is omnipresent because, by virtue of the communication to it in the incarnation of divine properties, it possesses the divine omnipresence.

Thus the necessity of the omnipresence of the body of Christ that Luther's doctrine of the Lord's Supper might be possible, led him immediately into the consideration of christological problems.

Luther thus solved his problem in respect to the Lord's Supper by taking up an ancient idea which was current at an early time in the Greek church, and finally became fixed in its theology under the influence of John of Damascus. It was employed by him for quite a different purpose, for the Greeks had sought to explain thereby the unity of person in Christ. That unity was more easily conceivable, they thought, if the natures to be united themselves became the same. Cyril finally expressed this in the phrase quoted above,—“one incarnated nature of the Logos.” Thus Luther started at a different point from the Greeks, but the inevitable gravitation of thought brought him after a time to the same problem and the same solution as they. He might have never given the subject this further consideration, had it not been for the Colloquy at Marburg, for Luther was essentially a practical and not a speculative theologian. But certain turns of thought there brought him face to face with the larger problem. His solution of it is believed by the standard Lutheran theologians to have substantially furthered the topic.

We shall not understand Luther unless we bear in mind from the beginning his starting point. This was not the incarnation, or the historic Christ as he appeared upon earth.

The contest brought to a conclusion at Marburg began by discussing the Lord's Supper, that is, by considering what was true of the body of the exalted and glorified Christ. Hence the glorified Christ was the point from which the dogmatic development proceeded, and the omnipresence of Christ was the particular attribute which was ascribed to Christ, and which the theory was elaborated to provide for. Hence it could hardly be expected that in Luther's hands it would account for the concrete facts of the historic life of Christ.

The more definite christological problem was thus apprehended by Luther. If there be a single subject in Christ, then all the phenomena of consciousness, whether they come from the human or the divine side, will be felt as the affections of this one subject. The one person, the God-man, must say, when the humanity suffers, "This is my suffering"; when he exerts his power to still the waves, "This is my power"; when he prophesies the future, "This is my knowledge"; and when he is ignorant of the "day and hour," "This is my ignorance." This one center of consciousness is the Logos. How, now, can the sufferings of the human nature become the sufferings of the Logos, who is the unchangeable God? And how can the body of Christ be everywhere present while it is yet a true human body?

In beginning his answer to these difficult questions, Luther states, first, in the strongest manner, the reality of the union of the two natures. He says: "'The Word became flesh' is as much as to say: The Son of God has become a human son; the Father's eternal Son has become a temporal son; he who was without a beginning has begun to be." "The infinite God has become a finite and comprehensible man." Divinity and humanity are in Christ "one thing, one being, so that one can rightly say, 'This man is God, God is this man.'" "He who murders Christ has murdered the Son of God, God, the Lord of Glory himself." Extreme statements these are and not to be justified except

as they are the struggles of language to express in vivid manner a thought which Luther proceeds to make more clear elsewhere.

The solution he has to offer of the difficulties involved in these contradictions is the rehabilitation of the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*. This is defined by him in the following terms: "The divine nature communicates its property to the human, and in turn the human also its property to the divine." His meaning seems to be this. Here are two different things to be united in one consciousness, that they may be perfectly united in all their work. Their qualities are contradictory, omniscience and ignorance, omnipresence and local limitation, etc. If they retain their distinctive properties in all this irreconcilable antithesis, they cannot be united. But if each receives the qualities of the other, while it still retains its own, there will be a perfect similarity between them. Then they can be united without clash or difference. Then, whatever the one nature does in its own original property, the other does of its acquired property, and the two work together in perfect harmony, so that to the perception of consciousness it is only the one working of the one subject. Hence, whatever the God-man does, he does in the unity of a single consciousness, and hence he has a single Ego, and there is a perfect union of the two natures. The one person works all things through both natures.

If I may be permitted to seek to make this thought clearer by means of an illustration which I have often used with my classes in the history of doctrine, I will illustrate thus. Here are two drops which it is desired to unite in one. But they are possessed of irreconcilable qualities, for one is water and the other oil. They cannot be united. If, however, they could mutually impart their peculiar properties, so that the drop of water should take upon it the properties of oil, and thus become oil-water, and the oil take upon it the

properties of water and become water-oil, then the two, being perfectly similar in nature could unite without difficulty. Placed at any point in such a drop, a conscious soul would have the same sensations as at any other, and thus would not experience division of consciousness between the contradictory properties of the originally differing substances.

Vigorous as this effort at a solution of the difficulty is, we must, I think, vote it a failure, for the following reasons:—

1. It seems to be mere speculation without foundation in fact. The theory is developed to explain the possibility of the ubiquity of the body of Christ in the sacrament. If the ubiquity of the body of Christ is a fact, then it needs explanation, and so far as this theory is calculated to explain it, it is to be regarded with favor. But is it a fact? I think, as I shall attempt to show, that it is not.

2. At best the difficulty is transferred, not met. If it be impossible to unite two differing natures in one *person*, how is it possible to unite two contradictory properties in one *nature*? How can the human *nature* possess both ignorance and omniscience with any greater ease than the unity of *person* can possess them when lodged in different natures?

3. The ground upon which Luther supported the ubiquity of Christ was fallacious. If the presence of the body of Christ in the believer is necessary to his sanctification, confusion is introduced into the doctrine of the trinity. It is the office work of the Holy Spirit to sanctify. Inasmuch as each hypostasis takes part in the work of each of the others, Christ is in the heart of the believer in the work of sanctification, but he is this according to his hypostatic union with the divine spirit, that is, in his divine nature. Inasmuch as the humanity is united, not with the Holy Spirit, but with the Logos, there seems to be no necessity for the presence of the humanity in this work. Indeed, it seems to be excluded by it.

4. The theory when applied, as Luther applied it, to the

God-man from the very moment of the incarnation, destroys the true humanity of Christ. This was Zwingli's argument, and it seems to be philosophically sound. For instance, take temptation. If the human nature of Christ possesses omnipotence, how can it be tempted through human weakness, or defect, such as hunger, which as weakness or defect is excluded by its possession of omnipotence? If it possesses omnipotence only as an acquired property, how can it be tempted in its original property of limitation, while it yet really possesses omnipotence? So of the suffering. What, now, does the doctrine lead us to, except to an *apparent* temptation, without reality, or to what is substantially the ancient and exploded system of Docetism?

5. Philosophically, it is impossible that the limited human body should receive the property of omnipresence. Take whatever theory of space you may, making it objectively valid or invalid, refine the matter to its greatest subtlety, and yet the body of a man is the exercise of the forces of God in a certain way, and God, while exercising those forces in *that* particular way, cannot, at the same time, exercise them in a *contrary* way. That is, a thing cannot both be and not be, both be limited and not be limited. The answer which Luther makes, that this is a mystery, is not a valid answer. A flat contradiction is not a mystery, it is an impossibility.

These objections are, possibly, somewhat modern in their tone. But Luther himself had difficulties, though other ones, with his theory. Since he had made the *communicatio idiomatum* to take place immediately upon the incarnation instead of at the exaltation of Christ, he had to explain the limitations of space under which the historical Christ was placed when upon earth. He could not give up the *communicatio idiomatum* for this period, since that would overthrow his explanation of the unity of Christ's person. He therefore resorted to a twofold mode of existence which he as-

cribed to Christ. As partaking of the property of divinity, the humanity of Christ partook of omnipresence. But this omnipresence was not an omnipresence everywhere in space—it was an illocal mode of existence, that is a mode of existence having no relation to space. But, so far as the humanity was concerned in and for itself, it had a relation to space, and in this relation was circumscribed and limited, like all other bodies. The difficulty here Luther did not care to explain.

### VIII.

#### CALVINISTIC CHRISTOLOGY.

On this topic there is little to say. Calvinists generally rejected Luther's speculations *in toto*, and fell back upon the results of the Council of Chalcedon as expressing their minds. There was always a tendency in Calvinistic theology of all the schools to a Nestorianizing form of statement, and the humanity and divinity were sometimes placed so far apart, in dividing up what Christ did between them, that all real unity of person was lost sight of. In general, it cannot be said that Calvinistic schools have done anything of note for this doctrine. It has been handed down with all its difficulties to the present day. We shall try to see, in our next article, whether anything can now be said to further its development.