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## ARTICLE VIII.

## GENERAL AND CRITICAL NOTES.

## THE ISAIAH CONTROVERSY.

IF we are permitted to strike out "Cyrus" as a proper name, and insert, in lieu thereof, "K'ur'ush" or "Koresh" as a general term like Pharaoh, Tzar, or König, it would seem that the main argument for the plural theory of the authorship of Isaiah is removed.

But so to treat the term "Cyrus" is only to do what has already been done with "Tartan" and "Rabshakeh." They are not proper names, but designations of offices. The Revised Version so treats these names, and lays the foundation for similar treatment of "Cyrus" by its marginal reading "Koresh." Of course this argument cuts both ways. It not only overturns a main pillar of the hypothesis of discrete origin, but it gives the *coup de main* to the old argument for inspiration from the fact (asserted) that an individual Cyrus was called by name, by the prophet Isaiah, generations before he was born. But that was an inherently unworthy argument, since it put inspiration in the attitude of playing a game of historic bo-peep. Cyrus was not such a providential man, either generally or specifically, so far as the Jews were concerned, that he should be singled out as the solitary, or even the leading, instance of this sort of vaticination. On the face of the case Darius was as worthy of premonition as Cyrus.

If chapter xxxix. of Isaiah is good for anything as history, then, in the lifetime of the first Isaiah, Merodach-baladan, king of Babylon, made an alliance with Hezekiah, king of Judah. Sayce is authority for saying that at that time Merodach-baladan was in alliance with powers beyond the Tigris—(Kurushes?). Grant that the first Isaiah knew anything about the political combinations of his time, and you have a foundation laid for all that is said about a "Koresh." In his exultation in God, Isaiah cries out: "He saith of the deep, Be dry!" "He saith of a Koresh, You are my shepherd." The philosophy is—"Man's extremity is God's opportunity"—a Koresh from beyond the Tigris can "perform all my pleasure." Out of general conditions special agencies will be found.

This treatment of the term "Cyrus" reduces the section xl.-lxxvi. to harmony with itself, for Cyrus is the solitary proper name in the whole section. Generalize this name, and you have taken away the force of the argument for a second Isaiah derived from the fact that the author seems personally acquainted with the historic Cyrus.

It is only necessary to suppose that Isaiah of Jerusalem, as Matthew Arnold calls him, knew what was going on about him to lay a foundation for this reference to a "Koresh," or for any other coloring in respect to time or event of seemingly later date. Is it not better to emphasize Isaiah's knowledge more, and his subjective psychosis or inspiration less? Isaiah ought to be regarded as the Edmund Burke, the Daniel Webster, or the James G. Blaine of his time—a man who knew the forces working in his own nation, and in the nations round about, and whereto they tended.

When the Turks had taken Adrianople and the adjacent territory in Europe, it would not have required extraordinary mental processes to come to the conclusion that Constantinople must also fall; though it was a hundred years before that event happened. The problem before Isaiah in respect to Jerusalem was substantially the same after the fall of Samaria as that of Constantinople after the fall of Adrianople. Jerusalem must go the same way Samaria had gone. The power is in the east; Jerusalem is foredoomed; it is only a question of time when the end will come.

As to the powers in Mesopotamia, or Babylonia, properly called, it is only a question of time, also, in regard to them, when their overthrow must come. East of the rivers was the coming power. The Persian stood to Nineveh and Babylon much as the Goth did to Greece and Rome when he was crowding on the Danube. The wild, strong men, in either case, stood facing the rivers, and it would scarcely take divine revelation, or even inspiration, to tell what would happen. The destiny was manifest. The strong son of the earth beyond the Tigris will bear sway over all. Jerusalem will fall, and Babylon will fall. Why not let Isaiah *know* something about these *prophetic conditions*, and let him speak out of his knowledge? So he may utter the decrees of God.

There are indications that Isaiah was a man of wide and close observation. "Ho, to the land rustling with wings, beyond the rivers of Ethiopia"—is a touch Isaiah could hardly have laid on his canvas had he not snared and speared fowl on the hills and in the lakes of Abyssinia, as they converge there for a winter home in their retreat from Europe and Armenia. If he had been to Abyssinia, there is no reason why he should not know about a Koresh beyond the Tigris, for probably he had ridden a camel in his retinue in Persia or Bactria. Widen out this man Isaiah—let him know something by observation and experience, and you have diminished the difficulty of interpreting the works that bear his name, and taken away the most of the force of the objections to their unity. We should make of him a greater man than we have hitherto allowed him to be. He was probably a cosmopolite in fact before he became such in theory. That is the natural order for development like his.

One objection raised by some of the higher critics to the assignment of the section xl.-lxxvi. to Isaiah of Jerusalem is so simple as to be

charming. The objection is that Isaiah in the time of Hezekiah could not have treated of a return when no captivity had taken place. It is even laid down as a canon that prophecy can speak only in the future tense, not in the future perfect.

But it seems a little strange that divine inspiration cannot do as much as the natural faculties of man can; a little strange that it could not run along the grooves of those faculties. We have a future perfect tense and we are all as voluble in it as we are in the future. We use not only the future tense, but a future perfect and a paulo-post future perfect in vista unlimited. There are few of us in the United States who have lived half a century that did not long before the war prophesy the destruction of slavery, and then try our powers on the problems which were sure subsequently to arise. There is a goodly number, I imagine, who have not been deprived of the comfort of saying, "I told you so," with reference to something on the line of these subsequent problems. Furthermore, the objection is not intelligent. "Salvation by the remnant" is a distinguishing element in the works of Isaiah of Jerusalem. To write the second section, xl.-lxxvi., he had only to elaborate a theme already burnt in upon his soul. The arguments for diversity of origin of the book of Isaiah from literary considerations, as style, etymology, are inconclusive. Three thousand years from this time it will probably be argued, from literary characteristics, that Tennyson could not have written "The Northern Farmer" and "In Memoriam."

But, no matter what the literary diversities may be, there is something that runs beneath them all and overcomes all their force. There is a *psychological* unity from i. to lxxvi. The essential ideas that underlie the works of the first Isaiah underlie the most of the second also. The scribes, if such there were, who put the works of these two men together and abolished one of them were certainly well witted. The essential ideas of the second Isaiah in the great Song of the Return are such as had been formulated over and over again by the first. The formula of the first Isaiah is,—captivity, return, consequences—universal righteousness. The formula of the second is,—captivity (assumed), return, consequences—universal righteousness. In both, the Messianic conception comes in as a means to the end involved in the universal ethical consequences. Suppose in one place the Messianic idea is of a king, in the other that of a servant—what of it? The two conceptions are not inherently inconsistent. It may be the function of a king sometimes to serve. "*Ich Dien*" is the motto of the Prince of Wales. A crown may be foredoomed to tragedy. There is no reason why the same mind might not have entertained even diverse ideas in different stages of its career, or developed now one function of a Messiah and now another. The conception of a king might suit "the fiery heart of youth"; something less forceful and strenuous, more spiritual, the pensiveness of mellow age. The two ideas are easily adjustable when viewed in the large indefinite

way in which they are treated by Isaiah. Why should not Isaiah of Jerusalem have sung the Song of the Return? He was so impenetrated with its idea that he named his son, "Shear-jashub," "Remnant shall return." Of all men of all time such a man was fittest to write this song. Section xl.-lxxvi. is merely "Shear-jashub" expanded. Why does not the rule here apply, that, when you have a sufficient cause for an effect, one more natural than any other, you can rest? The Song of the Return is wrought in miniature again and again in the first section.

It may safely be asserted that it would be a psychological impossibility for the Song of the Return to have been written at the time the captivity was verging to its close, without more marks of time, place, manner, and condition being left upon it. The total work is contemplative, indefinite, philosophical—such a work as one would write for an exigency conceived to lie in the future, not for one then pressing. So indefinite is this poem, that there is not a mark about it to tell where it was written, whether in Jerusalem, Babylon, or Damascus. It would be impossible for an old man even, writing at the time of the return or on the eve of its activity, not to have caught up some thrill from the pulse of the time, and to have made a call on the Jews for some specific acts that would tend to secure the success of the return.

Read this section to a camp of overland pioneers of '48 on the plains bound for California, or of '59 bound for Pike's Peak, and tell them it was a call upon a people to execute a journey under circumstances similar to their own, and you would get the reply, "Go to, now! There is nothing natural in all this; nothing that sounds of teamsters driving in the oxen. There is not even the primitive call in it to organize a company." And your critics would be right. From beginning to end there is not a thing about the section adapted to a living, pressing exigency.

Given a time when an "enterprise of great pith and moment" was crowding to the front, or was actually on the field, in view of its demands the very splendor of the section makes it profound and melancholy. Instead of hitting the exigency of the return, the Song of the Return always ricochets over the return to come down on the great universal ethical effects beyond. The work is such as a man would write who was contemplating a disaster to his nation, and yet could not give up the thought that there was something about that nation that would survive and ultimately bless all mankind. Isaiah had optimism enough about him to believe

"That good shall fall  
At last, far off, at last to all,  
And every winter change to spring."

But just what distinguishes Isaiah is the "far-offness" of his contemplated events. No man would be writing in this way in Jerusalem beleaguered, or in Babylon with the invincible Cyrus bearing down upon or in possession of it. But a man would write in Isaiah's way who was contem-

plating disaster and discipline as a necessity for Jerusalem in the retributive and righteous government of God, out from which must still come blessing to Zion and to men.

It would take comment on the whole section in minuteness to bring out the force of the foregoing suggestion. But read chapter liii.—“Who hath believed our report,” and chapter lv.—“Ho, every one that thirsteth,” and chapter lviii.—“Cry aloud, spare not,” and see how malapropos they are to a call to go up to Jerusalem and rebuild its walls. In such state of affairs, even the very first word in the section—“Comfort ye, my people,” is a false note. The people with whom Zerubbabel, Ezra, and Nehemiah wrought did not need comfort, they needed a gad.

The generations on the stage with them had been born in Babylonia. What was Jerusalem to them or they to Jerusalem? They were adjusted to Babylonia. They had thrived there. The Jew has always been realistic enough to adapt himself to circumstances. To sacrifice himself by going back to Jerusalem must have seemed to him unpractical idealism. It is unthinkable that a great man living in the time of the captivity should not have uttered a call for some specific acts adapted to the return, even that he should not have appealed to specific men to have ideals worthy of their fathers. There is nothing of all this in the Song of the Return. It is as oblivious of particulars respecting the return as it is of those pertaining to the captivity. On the theory of the higher critics the greatest man of the day sails in the air over this crisis and never once touches the earth to adapt himself to it. *Credat Judæus Apella!*

When you come to the matter of the further disintegration of Isaiah so as to make his work a collection from various writers at different times, I can only say that I am not impressed with the soundness of the philosophy or scholarship which attributes the great literary results which mark history to “the fortuitous concourse” of intellects. “Every house is builded by some man.” The masterpieces of literature are the outcome of the activity of the world’s great minds, not the collected dribbling of an infinity of small ones. The majestic harmony of Isaiah throughout never tumbled together out of a tendency; it was born of the travail of one great soul. Isaiah of Jerusalem *could* write what passes under his name. There is not only no evidence to show that any one else *did* write anything attributed to him, but that there was any one in being who *could* write it.

C. CAVERNO.

BOULDER, COLO.

#### DRUMMOND’S “ASCENT OF MAN.”

THIS latest work by Professor Drummond has already passed through several editions, and is being read by thousands of thoughtful youth.

Several combined causes account for his phenomenal success. He is bright, spicy, rhetorical, illustrative, clear, and a master in the art of put-

ting things. The subject-matter treats of the two most vital questions of the age—biological science and religion; not the religion of shibboleths and shibboleths, theories and Hebrew manuscripts, but a vital religion of every-day experience. He stands beside thinking young students who are debating between the two roads, the one leading to materialism, and the other to theistic philosophy. The earnest student fears to trust the mere scientist; he has been warned against the specialist as an unsafe guide, and yet this is a scientific age. He also knows that religion has power and value, and the tearing down of religion means the letting loose of nihilistic and anarchistic forces upon society. In such an hour Professor Drummond stands by the student's side and in words of consummate skill, in phraseology of the latest scientific theories, points him to the "*Everlasting Father and the Prince of peace.*" He assures him that he may run even in the advance ranks of the most progressive scientists, and yet need not join the cohorts of infidels in an anarchistic attack upon revealed religion. This is no small gain.

Some one asks, Is Professor Drummond's book a permanent contribution to human knowledge? It is too soon to answer, but Christians should hold him in grateful remembrance for his remarkable power in persuading young students to wait awhile ere they throw away personal faith in religion. His example of personal faith at the same time that he is an ardent believer in most advanced evolution theories is of great value in staying the tides. He in his own person is an illustration, that, despite the hue and cry of blatant infidels, the scientific doctrine of evolution does not read God out of his universe, but is a mere *modus operandi* of his marvellous workmanship.

In 1736 the thinking of the world had long been arrogated by infidels to themselves; religious foundations seemed to have sunk beneath authority and logic; intellect looked disdainfully upon piety as weak, ignorant, blind. What chance had a student in the universities of the world in those days? Bishop Butler in the above-mentioned year published a modest little volume which proved an epoch-making book. Men said, and still say, He proved nothing; analogy is no proof. But he turned the tide, and showed students how they could be men of thought and science, and yet earnest believers in God and active followers of Jesus of Nazareth. Drummond's book accomplishes a similar function in our own age. Readers by the thousands, not alone in colleges and universities but in homes, and shops, and factories, are held to faith by works of this class. These find comfort in Drummond's works—and more than comfort; for they turn with greater confidence to their Bible and their churches as fortresses over which the flag of faith is still waving unharmed. They are not driven to choose between their religion and the facts of science—there is no irreconcilable conflict between religion and science!

The most satisfactory part of the book is its introduction. He shows how the evolution of man has been studied,—

1. As to embryology, by His and Minot;
2. As to the animal body, by Darwin, Huxley, Hæckel, and Wallace;
3. As to the mind, by Romanes;
4. As to morals, by Herbert Spencer;
5. As to religion, by Edward Caird;
6. As to sociology, by Benjamin Kidd.

Professor Drummond seems perfectly in accord with Professor Henry Calderwood, who says: "Evolution *supposes* organic life; there was a lower form from which a higher had been evolved. . . . In natural history therefore life is taken as existing, a reality already present, given at some earlier stage in the world's history. Evolution cannot be a complete natural history; at most it is a scientific account of later stages in the history of the universe."<sup>1</sup>

Of the opening chapters of existence, of the first verse in Genesis, evolution ought not and cannot speak. In reading histories we must clearly distinguish between a historian's facts and his interpretations of those facts. Professor Drummond boldly says: "At present there is not a chapter of the record that is wholly finished. The manuscript is already worn with erasures, the writing is often blurred, the very language is uncouth and strange." He quotes Mr. Herbert Spencer's famous and much ridiculed definition of evolution, and says it "*throws no light, though it is often supposed to do so, upon ultimate causes.*"

The chief force of Professor Drummond's book is reached in the statement of what he calls "*the missing factor in current theories.*" He lays at Darwin's door the charge of misleading the world in scientific thought by the exclusive use of the principle of "the Struggle for Life."

This principle Drummond allows, but says of it: "The Struggle for Life is the 'Villain' of the piece, *no more*; and, like the 'Villain' in the play, its chief function is to react upon the other players for higher ends" (p. 13).

Drummond maintains most earnestly, that along with the principle "*the Struggle for Life*" must go the second factor, *the Struggle for the Life of Others.*

It is by the neglect of this second factor that interpreters of nature have told a history whose pages are full of woe, have drawn "a picture so dark as to be a challenge to its Maker, an unanswered problem to philosophy, an abiding offence to the moral nature of Man. The world has been held up to us as one great battle-field heaped with the slain, an Inferno of infinite suffering, a slaughter-house resounding with the cries of a ceaseless agony" (p. 19). Drummond maintains that a consideration of the second factor, the struggle for the life of others, relieves the picture of nature, and makes the world not a selfish one of battle, but an altruistic home of love.

In ten long and interesting chapters Drummond applies his theories

<sup>1</sup> Calderwood's *Evolution and Man's Place in Nature.*

of evolution to the Ascent of Man. In these chapters many will find much that is unsatisfactory and at times even repulsive. The introduction carries conviction, but the main part of the book offends in attempted descriptions of how nature accomplished everything, and thereby the book becomes visionary in the extreme.

For example, take the first assertion: "The earliest home of Primitive Man was a cave in the rocks—the simplest and most unevolved form of human habitation. One day, perhaps driven by the want within his hunting-grounds of the natural cave, he made himself a hut—an artificial cave" (p. 59). To call such a statement science is a misnomer: it is only a theory, an imaginary algebraic " $x$ " to test whether or not the equation can be made and solved.

He then proceeds to show how the one-roomed cave develops into the modern magnificent palace—the one-celled organism into the highly differentiated many-celled body. His rhetoric gets advantage over scientific facts, for biological "segmentation" must not be compared to the architect's "adding room to room." The process is antithetical to "*adding* room to room." Segmentation combines increase through division and subdivision and then growth. To call division addition is a strange figure of speech!

In his chapter on "The Ascent of the Body," our author vividly portrays from embryology the mysterious facts of man's relationships through the body to the lower creation. This is the most satisfactory of his chapters, and yet he admits: "In no case is the recapitulation of the past complete. Ancestral stages are constantly omitted, others are over-accentuated, condensed, distorted, or confused; while new and undecipherable characters occasionally appear" (p. 73). We might well adopt Goethe's words, as Hæckel has done:—

"Alle gestalten sind ähnlich doch keine gleichet der andern,  
Und so deutet der Chor auf ein geheimes Gesetz."

"All forms have a resemblance; none is the same as another,  
And their chorus complete points to a mystical law."

In his chapter on "The Scaffolding left in the Body," we meet with many interesting facts, the right interpretation of which is the question under discussion. The facts are unquestioned; the philosophy is quite another matter. Mention was especially made of the "gill-slits" found in the neck of the human embryo, slits which sometimes remain even at birth. Moreover the history of embryos shows that the ear is a development from one of those slits, and cases arise where the other slits develop into abnormal ears down the neck. In all vertebrate animals—man included—the most prominent features of the early embryo are the head, and then these gill-slits. In the early stages it is impossible to distinguish between the different embryos. Hæckel has a comparative set of figures showing this fact most convincingly. The fact of this likeness between

the embryos must be acknowledged. Does it necessarily follow that these appearances are mere stages of a development, "scaffoldings still remaining," "vestiges of former states"? The evolutionist demands credence in *his* philosophy of placing facts. He must not be impatient and contemptuous of others who have another philosophy of these same facts, a different grouping of them.

The difficulties are most seriously complicated because the champions on each side spend so much time and strength calling one another hard names—"atheist," "materialist," "infidel," "bigot," "religionist."

The most serious difficulty arises from the intense determination of so many evolutionists to rid the world of what they call the "teleological" purpose of nature, the doctrine of "final causes." They are determined to rule out of court any and all arguments which imply any supervising intelligence. Such a man as Hæckel disfigures his pages by contemptuous expressions against those who defend theories other than materialistic and mechanical. Such men not only leave God out of the account, but would drive him out of the account.

A scientific man's theories are his theories, and have value only in the ratio of truth in them. When he resents any teleological philosophy as unscientific, his assumptions must be repudiated and himself shown to be unscientific, because he refuses to consider all the possible working hypotheses in the case. If a teleological hypothesis can be made to answer the demands of the case, he is not scientific who refuses to accept it: he is ruled by a prejudice; he seeks not truth, but a predetermined theory.

Such an evolutionist is *not* Professor Drummond. He is a firm believer in God who accomplishes his purposes *via* evolutionary methods. No short review can give one any idea of his masterly presentation of the evolutionist's side of the argument. In Chapter I. he deals with the general evidences of man's ascent of body from the lower forms of life. Chapter II. shows how there still remain in our bodies traces of the forms through which they have been made to pass in previous ages—one of his most interesting and valuable chapters. In Chapter III. he treats of man as the finality, beyond which there can be no more physical development; reason, and not "natural selection," from here on takes the ruling hand. Evolution now changes its course from a physical to a psychical universe.

In Chapter IV. he deals with the evolution of mind, and acknowledges it as the great difficulty to be met. He starts with the given quantum of mental "elements," and then finds no further difficulty in developing present conditions.

The sources of information are the study of the child mind, brute mind, mind of man in early ages as evidenced in flints, potteries, weapons, etc.; study of savage races, and the study of primitive languages.

Some of the positions taken seem a strain upon science. He mentions twenty-three emotions manifested by animals, and asserts the definite

order in which they manifested themselves in the historic development—fear, surprise, affection, pugnacity, curiosity, jealousy, anger, play, sympathy, emulation, pride, resentment, love of the beautiful, hate, cruelty, benevolence, revenge, rage, shame, regret, deceitfulness, and the emotion of the ludicrous.

Most men will feel that this is a scientific refinement whose general lines may be accepted, but whose minutiae are far from being definitely ascertained. We feel ourselves on infirm postulates when we say a child at three weeks manifests fear followed at seven weeks by social affections, and at twelve weeks by jealousy and anger, and at five months by sympathy, and at eight months by pride, resentment, love of ornament; and at fifteen months by shame, remorse, and a sense of the ludicrous. His chief point, however, is emphasized, that these emotions are positively existent in the lower creation.

In Chapter V. he deals very interestingly with the growth of language, claiming that gesture and emphasis must be taken as factors, as well as enunciated speech.

Chapter VI. deals with objections drawn from the struggle for life against the very goodness of a divine originator and supporter of such a universe—an interesting chapter, but not a final and satisfactory explanation of agony and war.

From Chapter VII. onward, he endeavors to show how out of the principle of *the struggle for the life of others*, the altruistic principle, has grown love, maternity, and benevolence, these clustering around the feminine element, while around the masculine cling law, order, righteousness. The work done in these chapters is most painstaking and reveals the master hand, but one feels as when skating on thin ice, exhilarated, but rather doubtful as to the issue of the adventure. It may all be science—but can scarcely be an exact science.

The book seems to claim for itself special freshness and newness; but while Drummond has undoubtedly stated his principle, "*struggle for the life of others*," as with new emphasis, Darwin, Spencer, Hæckel, and others would be astounded to be told that they had left out the reproductive factor in the struggle for life. Darwin, for instance, explicitly states, "I use this term [struggle for existence] in a *large and metaphorical sense*, including dependence of one being on another, and including, which is more important, not only the life of the individual, but *success in leaving progeny*." The followers of Darwin will undoubtedly claim that Darwin's positions have been misapprehended and misstated. They, as well as Professor Drummond, will insist on both factors—nutrition and reproduction, and point to chapters by the hundred which treat on the reproductive element—the struggle for the life of others, "success in leaving progeny." It is not merely the individual life that is meant in the struggle for life, but the life of the species, and the struggle for life of the

individual at last resolves itself into species existence, and species implies constant reproduction.

In conclusion, we lay the book down, having been entranced by metaphors, dazzled with meteors of resplendent rhetoric, entertained by brilliant figures, instructed by the skilful statement of numerous biological facts, gladdened to find a thorough-going evolutionist who believes that He who made all things is God and in a special emphasis can repeat, "In the beginning *God* created,"—yet after all its learning, rhetoric, *belles-lettres*, and brilliant illustrations, one feels that there is much in it that, to say the least, bears the impress of special pleading.

Professor Drummond blames Darwin for using his principle of the struggle for life as if it were a ladder with only one upright, and urges the use of the other factor, the struggle for the life of others. It is a brilliant illustration, but the old illustration of a boat and the two oars would be better. The struggle for life would then be one oar, and the struggle for the life of others would be the other—yet there remains another factor; put the rudder to the boat, and all is well—the Rudder, "He who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will."

FRANCIS D. KELSEY.

OSBERLIN, OHIO.

### THE TRUE RENDERING OF ROMANS IX. 3.

Ἡθέλησεν γὰρ ἀνάθεμα εἶναι αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

THE right explanation of Rom. ix. 3 involves more than one important principle of exegesis. One is this: *Theological inferences are of no account against the simple obvious meaning of a passage.* The theological pressure on this passage is well expressed by Mr. Hutchings in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA for July, 1894: "The usual exegesis makes Paul willing to be excluded from all hope of salvation, including not only endless suffering, but also positive enmity toward Christ forever" (p. 512). This consideration is made to support the rendering, "For I myself did wish to be separated from Christ," the reference being to Paul's life before conversion.

Now against this pressure from without is the fact that the passage itself, if translated "I wished," etc., is not a natural reference to Paul's past life. He refers to that life more than once with a definiteness and warmth that leave no doubt as to his meaning. He could say, "I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth. . . . Being exceedingly mad against them, I persecuted them" (Acts xxvi. 9, 11). "Beyond measure I persecuted the church of God, and made havoc of it" (Gal. i. 13). He could humble himself to say "that am not meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God" (1 Cor. xv. 9). It is incredible that such a bare uncir-

cumstantial statement as is proposed, should be Paul's confession as a persecutor. The obvious impression is against it. No one would think of it except under outside doctrinal pressure. And for this obvious impression there are at least two distinct reasons: 1. The expression "anathema *from* Christ" is appropriate only in the mouth of a Christian, or one who considers himself a Christian. It implies renunciation of Christ and banishment from him. 2. There is no adverb of past time which would make it read thus, "I myself *once* [ἄρτι] wished." "But," one may say, "take heed to your grammar, and obey the imperfect tense, with or without ἄρτι. This leads me to give as a second rule of exegesis: *Avoid what may be called a mechanical use of grammar.* A sentence is not a piece of dead mechanism, grinding out its meaning by the levers and wheels of mood and tense; it participates in the life and flexibility and sensitiveness of the mind that produces it. Grammar is corrective, not creative; a good servant, but a bad master. Formal grammar is ultimately derived from the meaning, and not the meaning from grammar.

All that has now been said implies, or half implies, that the theological pressure on this passage is valid and weighty; but it is not. If it were, it would be one's duty to resist it, but there is really nothing to resist. By a cool analysis some of us have found dreadful things in the passage, but cool analysis is here out of place. The words are a hot outburst of devotion and love. "Let Paul go down—down to everlasting destruction, if only Israel may be lifted up to salvation." The apostle did not stop to measure his words, and we shall get his meaning not by picking away at the syllables, but by catching the spirit and feeling. "Was Paul then a Hopkinsian, 'willing to be damned'? Was he willing to be an enemy of Christ? Willing to sin forever?" No; if you speak of deliberate choice. But he was not expressing deliberate choice, but the most undeliberate passion of love. The language of logic failed him, and the language of pain and agony took its place. "Did he, then, mean what he said?" Rather he meant what he *felt*. He did not mean all that we can possibly find in his words. He uncovered his throbbing heart; that was all, that was enough—too much for modern cool-headed analysis. Let us, then, set down a third rule of exegesis, which may, perhaps, be expressed thus: *When a writer does not measure his words, the reader should not.*

L. S. POTWIN.

ADELBERT COLLEGE.