

ARTICLE V.

FAIRCHILD'S "ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY."¹

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THE theological thought of the Calvinistic world has long been divided between two systems of doctrine, known respectively as Old School and New School,—the former emphasizing the doctrines naturally associated with foreordination; the latter, those associated with free will.

While the preponderance of opinion is largely and growingly on the side of the latter, the theological literature of our times, by some fatality, is largely committed to the former. For the last half-century the American press has been prolific of Calvinistic publications while very few have appeared setting forth New School views. Previous to the publication of the "Elements of Theology," complaints were heard of the impossibility of finding a text-book of the New School type suited to the need of our theological schools; and a want was felt, by some minds deeply, of a treatise on systematic theology in better accord with the present condition of theological thought. In consequence many eyes were turned to Rev. J. H. Fairchild, D. D., late President of Oberlin College, as the fitting man to supply the need.

Dr. Fairchild, no one knowing him doubts, possesses a mind marvellously equipped for such an undertaking. He is admittedly one of the ripest of American scholars, and the ablest living exponent of the free-will system of theology. The announcement, therefore, that he had consented to give the

¹ *Elements of Theology, Natural and Revealed.* By James H. Fairchild, Professor of Theology in Oberlin College. Oberlin, O.: Edward J. Goodrich. 1892. (Pp. xv, 358. 6½x3¾.)

world the result of his half-century of patient study was hailed, especially by the large numbers who had enjoyed his instruction, with marked satisfaction. Great expectations were raised which the writer is safe in saying have been fully realized. I question whether any author of our age has made a more valuable contribution to theological science.

In this moderate sized volume, so creditable to its publisher, the author condenses a pretty complete outline of what is termed systematic theology. In no spirit of controversy, resorting in no instance to the *argumentum ad invidiam*, making but a sparing use of the opinions of others, in language clear, simple, but wonderfully compact and comprehensive, the author sets forth with characteristic modesty what seems to him the teachings of reason and the Word of God. The result is an invaluable repository of great thought, on the greatest themes which can engage human attention.

The design of this article is to present to readers who may not find it in their way to peruse the volume, some of the more important conclusions reached through so many years of patient thought by a mind so thoroughly qualified to deal with the great problems of the moral world.

It may aid the reader, to premise that the author fully accepts the doctrine of *human freedom*, in the sense that moral beings, in any circumstances, under any pressure of motive, human or divine, in which they can choose at all, can choose in either of two ways—that every choice, by virtue of its own nature, is made in the possession of full conscious ability to choose otherwise. Hence he utterly discards, not all that Calvin or Calvinists believe, but that system of faith set forth in the Westminster Confession, which holds the dogma of a necessitated will, and reduces the several doctrines of the Christian religion into conformity to that fatal assumption.

On the other hand, our author does not regard himself as an Arminian. He holds rigidly to the underlying facts of the New School System; such as, that the will is free; that

ability and obligation are always commensurate; that the moral element resides exclusively in voluntary phenomena, primarily in ultimate choice; that willing good to sentient being is the *love* which fulfils law, and covers the total of obligation. As will appear, these great elemental truths permeate and to a wonderful extent shape his whole system of metaphysical theology. President Fairchild certainly ranks as a New School theologian, yet it is not to be concealed that he introduces into his system some views not in good and regular standing in the great Christian world, or even with most of his New School brethren—views which, while not fundamental, are of sufficient importance, probably, to justify the name "Oberlin Theology." These peculiarities seem to me but logical necessities of the basal truths to which I have referred, so that his whole offending consists merely in being more rigidly logical than his brethren. Long a pupil and associate of President Finney, that incarnation of logic, he finds it difficult to embrace a truth and reject its logical sequences.

The work very properly commences with

THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

The author holds to the universality of the idea of God as indicated by the universality of the idea of *accountability*. The idea of accountability evidently carries the idea of a superior intelligence to whom we are accountable, or of God. Then, if the idea of accountability is intuitive and universal, as it doubtless is, the idea of God is equally so, and atheism is not possible. This view seems to me inferable from the whole trend of the Sacred Scriptures, and I am a little surprised that, like most other theologians, our author should place chief reliance upon *a posteriori* considerations in proof of the divine existence. As his views on this whole subject are those generally accepted, it is not necessary to indicate them.

MAN

is a spirit, in possession of three, and so far as we know but

three, generic faculties—intellect, sensibility, and will. The exercises of the two former, intellect and sensibility, he deems necessary, and consequently devoid of moral character. Such exercises as compassion, gratitude, avarice, pride, vanity, etc., he believes involve a voluntary element to which their moral character exclusively attaches. The *reason*, our author defines as the *intuitive* faculty belonging to man's intellectual nature. As its revelations are absolute, necessary, self-evident truths, he claims for it, and for all its exercises, absolute infallibility. The *conscience* he defines as a function of the reason, or as the reason in the sphere of obligation; and consequently regards its behests as in perfect and changeless accord with the divine law. A conscientious sin he rightly deems an absurdity.

THE SACRED SCRIPTURES.

To this subject the author devotes three valuable chapters. In the last he discusses the burning question of inspiration and inerrancy. These he considers important themes, but not vital to the authority and claims of the sacred Word, or of special interest to the unbeliever, as his duties are the same, whether the Bible is or is not inspired. If it can be shown that the Gospels were written by honest, capable men, of well-balanced minds, who were personally cognizant of the events they narrate, and that their histories are true as other history is true, the Bible is true, its claims are established by such historic proof as governs men in the ordinary affairs of life.

There are two theories of inspiration. The first involves the absolute truth of every statement made by the writers, whether more or less important. For this the author suggests the name *absolute inspiration*. The second accounts the Scriptures inspired to such an extent as to present with all required fulness the great truths it is their intent to convey; so that should errors appear in some minute matters, it would not disprove inspiration, or deduct from the value of the sa-

cred writings. For this theory the author suggests the name *essential inspiration*.

While the author finds the Bible not only marvellously free from errors, but pervaded by marvellous wisdom in reference to all matters of science, securing the use of popular expressions which are always appropriate, and the avoidance of all technical terms which imply a scientific theory, he does not regard the harmony of its statements with truth, or with each other, on unimportant subjects, a thing the best scholarship would attempt to prove.

The Bible having been exposed for centuries to the carelessness of copyists and translators, multitudes of variations have crept into it. Certainly absolute inerrancy can be claimed only for the original text; and even there it cannot be proved, and would be a matter of trivial importance if it could, inasmuch as the original text has been irrevocably lost. There is then a substantial agreement between the advocates of the two theories. Both admit there are discrepancies and inaccuracies in the copies we now have, and it is a matter of small importance whether these inaccuracies are due to the original text, or to the inadvertence of editors, copyists, and translators. Certainly he who adopts a theory which makes no provision for such inaccuracies puts himself, and the Bible too, at a needless disadvantage.

DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

The divine power throughout nature, also throughout the realm of mind, so far as its existence and movements come under natural law, is *causal and absolute*. But when we come to the *conduct of moral beings*, the relation is entirely changed. Here the divine power is no longer causal or coercive; it is simply moral or persuasive. The prerogative of sovereignty has been so transferred from the Creator to the creature that the responsibility of the creature's conduct rests upon himself, not upon his Creator. Hence the existence of sin, which God

deprecates, and which if he consistently could he would prevent. We may call this a divine limitation, but it is a limitation self-imposed, provided for, and accepted as the best system possible to devise.

Notwithstanding this limitation, a *divine plan* pervades the moral world. Hence without violence to their freedom, or affecting their moral character, and often without their knowledge, God is largely securing the co-operation of men, good and bad, in the promotion of his ends. The wrath of men praises him.

To the question, Does not the existence of sin, on the whole, secure the greater good, and on this account the divine approval? our author answers decidedly, *No*. Were it so, and moral beings apprised of the fact, sin would not be sin. Sin is an evil which God abhors; and which has proved infinitely disastrous to his interests, though he has by his infinite wisdom and love largely parried and averted its awful mischief. At the same time a world in which sin is possible is the best world, because this possibility is essential to the existence of moral beings.

The two facts divine sovereignty and free-agency exist, and cannot be in conflict. Any theory placing them so is false. The difficulty of reconciling them is not in the facts themselves, but in our inadequate apprehension of them. The Calvinistic and Arminian theologies diverge at this point. Calvinists so explain divine sovereignty as to set aside freedom. Arminians so explain freedom as to trench upon divine sovereignty, even sometimes to the denial of the foreknowledge of voluntary actions. The great thought in each system is true, and a satisfactory theology must embrace both.

OBLIGATION

is an intuitive, necessary idea; one which can neither be analyzed, defined, or communicated to a mind not already in possession of it, though the most important, ever present, un-

changing idea in the realm of thought. What is the *ground* or *ultimate reason* of obligation is one of the most profound and widely controverted questions of Ethics.

Various answers are given. The *will of God* is sometimes assigned as the ultimate reason why we should, for illustration, do good. For obvious reasons our author rejects this theory. He also rejects the more plausible and popular theory that *right* is the foundation of obligation; for the sufficient reason that right and obligation are synonyms, or nearly so, and making right the ground of obligation is simply making obligation the ground of obligation.

Obligation relates exclusively to sentient beings. We can owe no duty to inanimate things. All the claims of any being for regard, and all the obligations owed any being, grow out of the value of his well-being. The *value of well-being*, then, is the ultimate reason of obligation. Were well-being not valuable, obligations to promote it would be unthinkable.

VIRTUE

is conformity to obligation—to all obligation—or obedience to the law of benevolence. It is supreme devotion to the welfare of being. As this law requires the love of *all* the heart, it is not possible to exceed its demands, or do more than duty. Works of supererogation and the accumulation of merits are mere figments.

All virtue, and all the special virtues, such as justice, veracity, temperance, faith, etc., are included in benevolence, and are but the varied applications of the generic principle of love. This, I am aware, is not universally conceded. It is claimed that there are independent co-ordinate virtues which differ from benevolence as veracity differs from temperance. *Justice* is instanced as an example. But justice, unless a mere impulse, takes within its scope the interests of him to whom it is accorded, or the interests of the public, or of both. If not, it accords with no obligation, and falls outside the cate-

gory of virtues. *Truth* is also instanced as a co-ordinate virtue which cannot be reduced to benevolence. "Truth for its own sake" is an old maxim. But truth is only a relative good; sacred, valuable, obligatory, only because of its contributions to well-being.

If justice, truth, etc., are separate, independent, co-ordinate virtues, valuable as ends or for their own sake, the law of love which Christ enunciated is not "the whole law and the prophets." There are obligations other than love. Love is not the fulfilling of law.

SIN

is a violation of obligation,—a transgression of the law of benevolence. It is a voluntary preference of self-gratification to the welfare of the great family of God. It is not selfishness in the sense of making one's highest good supreme. This all sinners refuse to do. It is selfishness in the sense of sacrificing one's own interests, and measurably the interests of others, to the demands of impulse and appetite, in disregard of the laws of God, and his own better nature.

Our author rejects the idea that sin or holiness is a thing that can be created, transmitted, inherited, or justly imputed to other than the subject of it, or that it in the slightest degree consists in any corruption or taint inherited from our first parents. We doubtless inherited from them weak and tempting natures, such as they themselves had prior to the fall; but to account such natures ill-deserving is abhorrent to both reason and the Word of God. Into the same category of absurdities, the author rules the theory that men are under obligation to love God with the strength they would possess had their powers never been impaired by their own sin, or that of their first parents; and in so far as they fall short of the standard set up for unfallen beings, they come short of obligation. Evidently obligation and ability are conterminous, and present power is the measure of present duty. Nothing is sin that is not voluntary in the sense that it is freely en-

tered into and maintained, and can at any moment be abandoned.

CO-EXISTENCE OF SIN AND HOLINESS.

Holiness is the devotion of one's self to the interests of the kingdom of God. Sin is the devotion of one's self to personal gratification. These two contradictory attitudes necessarily displace each other, and cannot co-exist. It is not possible at the same time to make both the general welfare and self-indulgence the supreme law of life. A mixed action—fealty to both God and mammon—is an absurdity.

To this view it is objected:—

1. Motives are a mixture of both good and bad. Why, then, it is asked, may not the resultant action be a mixture of good and bad? For the sufficient reason, it is answered, that the good and bad impel in different and opposite directions, and it is not apparent how the mind, in the same act, can yield to both.

2. A choice, right so far as it goes, may embrace but *part* of the good perceived. One may be truly benevolent toward his friends and not toward his enemies. This the author denies. True benevolence is the impartial choice of good as good, good for its own sake, and necessarily embraces all good. The Master approves of no other. "If ye do good to them that do good to you, what thanks have ye?"

3. Benevolence may be defective in *intensity*. There may be a sinful deficiency in true love to God. This the author also denies. Love is primarily a *choice*, and a choice, certainly an ultimate choice, admits no degrees. If one intends to pay a debt when due, what more is of the slightest value, or even possible? Intensity pertains only to the emotions, or clearness of perception accompanying a choice.

4. Voluntary acts inconsistent with a right prevailing choice are possible. This the author also denies, and I think a moment's reflection will satisfy any one that he is right. One, we will suppose, intends to reach a distant city in the

shortest possible time; can he, knowingly, unnecessarily turn aside without a temporary or permanent suspension of his purpose? The objection also assumes that one may disobey God while intending to obey him. This evidently is not possible.

This view of the completeness of moral actions is the chief characteristic of the Oberlin Theology; and the basis of that "*perfectionism*" which, half a century ago, excited so much prejudice against President Finney. That great thinker was compelled to believe, that "no man can serve two masters;" and that to purposely gather with Christ, and at the same time purposely scatter, is not possible. He could not believe anything less than that the devotion of the *whole* heart to God, and the purpose of *entire* conformity to his will, is acceptable holiness.

GOVERNMENT, HUMAN AND DIVINE.

Government is a necessity for finite beings, and probably ever will be. The right to govern is not a privilege conferred by the people, nor does it rest upon the consent of the governed. It is rather a *duty* enjoined by the moral law upon him who can govern best, or upon him whose services, as ruler, the highest good demands. The best indication of this duty is usually the consent and approval of the people.

Penalty is suffering inflicted upon the transgressor. Its object is to restrain from transgression, not the offender only, or chiefly, but all the subjects of law. Ill-desert is a condition of punishment, but in no case a *sufficient reason*. The claims of benevolence alone can justify it. Its utility is the only warrant. If simple ill-desert requires God to punish, it is because he is amenable to some law other than love—a law, too, which must forever stand in the way of pardon, inasmuch as ill-desert once incurred can never be canceled.

THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

Our author believes the Eternal Logos was in the be-

ginning "with God, and was God," "and became flesh and dwelt among us."

The *Sabellian* theory he rejects, believing there is in the eternal nature of God the foundation of the threefold manifestation; the mystery of which, he makes no attempt to comprehend or explain.

In his view the same mystery hangs over the *person* of Christ. The time-honored formula, "two natures and one person," involving the self-contradiction, as the terms are used, of "two souls, yet only one;" and also the theory that Christ was simply the eternal Logos incarnate, made man by the limitations necessarily resulting from acting through a material organization—God manifest in the flesh so far as it is possible for the infinite to manifest itself through the finite—termed the *Kenotic* theory, involve difficulties so formidable that he prefers to rest upon the clearly revealed fact that Christ exhibited traits both human and divine, without formulating any theory, or attempting any explanation.

THE ATONEMENT.

Salvation through the sufferings and death of Christ is the supreme fact of the New Testament. How the great sacrifice availed to render sin pardonable, and God just and the justifier of the believer, is a problem of surpassing interest.

Three theories are suggested. The first is termed the *Moral Influence* theory, of which Dr. Bushnell's "Vicarious Sacrifice" is probably the ablest exponent. According to it, nothing is necessary to justify the pardon of sin but its abandonment. The sufferings of Christ are an atonement in that they are God's chief instrumentality in subduing the opposition of sinners, and making them at one with himself. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself," is the comprehensive fact of the New Testament. This theory, our author, for obvious reasons, rejects; and even Dr. Bushnell himself, in a later work, "Forgiveness and Law," materially modifies, if he does not entirely abandon it.

The second theory, more popular but not less objectionable, is termed the *Penal or Satisfaction* theory. It finds, not the sinner's impenitence, but divine justice, or God's righteous indignation toward sin, the real obstacle in the way of pardon. This obstacle Christ removed by taking the place of sinners himself and suffering in their stead the penalty due to sin. Thus he satisfies divine justice and provides lost men a way of escape.

This theory lies open to some very serious objections:—

1. Why indignation should be more obligatory and influential than *compassion* is not apparent. "God delights in mercy, and judgment is his strange work." That his compassion should in every case be outweighed and set aside by his indignation is, to say the least, antecedently very improbable.

2. Sin cannot justly *twice* be punished; once adequately on the person of Christ, then again on the person of the sinner. All those whose punishment Christ has borne evidently must be saved. If any are not saved, Christ did not taste death for every man. The penal theory involves either limited atonement or universal salvation.

3. The idea that the divine anger toward sinners was pacified by inflicting suffering upon One "who knew no sin" strikes us as preposterous, and even as *monstrous* when we reflect who the sinless sufferer was.

4. Worse than all is the dishonor which the theory casts upon the divine character. If the object of Christ's sufferings was to pacify divine indignation, precisely this is the object of the punishment of lost men, as one is the substitute for the other. This theory then represents God as punishing wretched lost souls forever, not to promote the general good, but to satisfy personal vindictiveness. Such a theory needs no refutation.

These colossal difficulties are met by assuring us that the justice Christ satisfied was not a mere impulse, or, if so,

it was an impulse that carried with it *obligation* to punish sin, all sin, either in the person of the sinner, or some one taking his place, up to its full deserts—a justice so stern and imperious that God could not disregard it and be true to his own nature.

It will occur to the reader that this is meeting the difficulties of the penal theory by utterly abandoning it. It could not have been any *abstract justice* which Christ died to satisfy, for the sufficient reason that there is no such thing. If it was *obligation* Christ died to fulfil—it could have been nothing else—it was obligation to promote the general welfare, or to contribute to the great total, the infinite sea of bliss; for no other obligation ever did, or ever can, rest upon God, or upon any other moral being. Nothing is valuable but *good*. Then if anything is obligatory but doing good, it is something which has no value, and is of no use. Was it for such as this, the Saviour of sinners laid down his life?

The third theory of the atonement, the last noticed by our author, is called the *Governmental* or *Benevolence* theory.

It holds *not* that God so *hated* the world that he gave his only begotten Son to pacify his anger; but that he "so *loved* the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believed in him should not perish." It was to satisfy public justice, to meet the claims of a benevolence which embraced the universe, that Christ died. To make pardon safe, there was needful such an expression of the divine character, of God's hatred of sin, and of his regard for the welfare of his creatures, as would shame every sinner, and establish such confidence in himself, that he could, at his own discretion, forgive sin without compromising his honor or laying a stumbling-block in the way of the weakest of his saints. Sin had created an awful exigency. It was either the execution of law in all its rigor, or something to take its place just as efficacious in sustaining divine authority and repressing sin. It was just this exigency which Christ met. "He was set forth to

declare the righteousness of God, for the remission of sins . . . that God might be just and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus."

REGENERATION AND CONVERSION.

These terms, used in substantially the same sense in the Bible, denote a change of moral character, or the change which makes a bad man a good man; an ill-deserving man meritorious, and worthy the approbation and complacency of God, and of other moral beings. It consists in the abandonment of self-gratification and in the acceptance of the interests of the kingdom of God as the end of pursuit. As it is primarily a change of the *ultimate choice*—the exclusive seat of moral character—though always secured by the enlightening and persuasive influence of the Holy Spirit, it is always and necessarily the act of the *subject* himself. The idea that the act of one being can make another meritorious, or that anything but one's self can change his own choice, is simply unthinkable.

In this change there is nothing organic, miraculous, mysterious, or beyond the ability of any sinner at any time, here or hereafter. The only thing mysterious about regeneration is the divine influence which secures it, and the great results which follow. Should any prefer to call the *choice*, which is the supreme thing, *conversion*, and the entire work, including that of the subject and that of the Holy Spirit, *regeneration*, he would violate no canon of propriety.

HUMAN ABILITY.

The assertions, says our author, "that whatever is to any person, at any time, under any conditions, *obligatory*, is to that person, at that time, and under those conditions, *possible*; and wherever any being can do wrong he has plenary ability to do right; are necessary truths, too obvious to be proved or doubted." The question, Can a fallen sinner do right without divine help, he answers, "If a fallen sinner can-

not do right without divine help, he is under no obligation to do it." If the sinner has not, he asserts, every ability and equipment requisite to doing right, God's commands, warnings, exhortations, and entreaties are inexplicable.

SANCTIFICATION.

The author's views of this important theme are in harmony with those of the Christian world, except as possibly modified by his adherence to the doctrine of the simplicity of moral action. All Christians are, in the language of the Bible, sanctified. The choice which constitutes conversion is entire conformity to the claims of the divine law. Nothing less than doing, or, what is the same thing, intending to do, *all* God requires, is acceptable to God, and nothing more is either obligatory or possible. In harmony with this view, the people of God are called, in both the Old and New Testaments, *saints*, or sanctified ones.

But the choice which constitutes conversion, though in itself faultless and complete, is susceptible of growth, confirmation, and expansion infinite. The convert's knowledge is exceedingly limited and defective; his sensibility, cold, stunted, and measurably soured. There is not a faculty of his being which is not capable of immeasurable perfecting. He stands at the base of a mountain whose summit no angel's eye has ever reached; and the law of his life is "Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forward to things that are before."

But the word *sanctification* is now used to designate a certain, or rather an uncertain, maturity in the divine life. The author questions whether there is any particular spot, or any designated attainment in the divine life, which *par excellence* deserves the name, or whether any two Christians are led over precisely the same path, or whether there is in this life any place where the Christian may lay his armor down in the assurance that the last foe is conquered. While he should

earnestly seek richer manifestations of Christ, and fresh baptisms of the Holy Spirit, he should never make personal attainments the end of pursuit, or for an hour forget that the promotion of the kingdom of God is the work to which he is called, and that the highest summits possible to him are reached by "patient continuance in well-doing."

ELECTION.

The character of all men is, says our author, foreknown to God, and their destinies are predetermined in view of this foreknowledge. Some he will save, others reject, and what he will do at last already lies in his purpose. Hence the salvation of some, and the reprobation of others, are already settled in his eternal purpose. Thus far there can be no difference of opinion. But whether moral character is *pre-determined*, and the ultimate reason it is what it is, lies in the divine will—whether the conduct of men and the motion of stars are controlled by the same infinite power, is a question from which two great schools of theology take their divergence.

On which side of this question our author stands has been already clearly intimated. His language is: "Since the voluntary acceptance of the gospel is the condition of man's salvation, it is also the condition of his election to salvation. This condition each one supplies or refuses to supply for himself. Hence, each one makes or refuses to make his own 'calling and election sure.' As one can make his conduct to-morrow different from what it will be, he can make his destiny forever different from what it will be."

ESCHATOLOGY.

Our author believes in the resurrection of the dead at some period still in the future. While he does not believe that we sow "that body that shall be," or that "flesh and blood can inherit the kingdom of God," he thinks the Bible warrants the belief that there is some relation between the

bodies we put off, and those with which we shall be "clothed upon." What that relation is no one knows. Still he sees no more mystery in it than in the relation between the bodies we now occupy and those we occupied twenty years ago. They seem the same, yet, so far as appears, there is not a particle of matter common to both.

This view involves an *intermediate state*, where this long period will be spent. What will be the condition and employments of what he deems disembodied spirits, we have little data for judging. The theory that it will be a continued probation, he thinks, lacks both proof and plausibility.

The resurrection is immediately preceded by the second coming of Christ, and followed by a judgment-day in which all the dead will stand before God and hear the final sentence. This time-honored and widely received view is attended, the author is aware, with difficulties so serious as to stagger the faith of many, and he admits that much of the scriptural language by which this view of the last things is supported is highly figurative; and I think he will admit that probably the last words in reference to these great themes are yet to be spoken.

His views of the future of good and bad men are in harmony with the generally accepted faith. Heaven, in his opinion, is a *place*, not of rest and reward simply, but of activity and responsibility. The idea that it will be our earth, purged by fire and rejuvenated, is not sustained, he thinks, by the Word of God. Whether its inhabitants will be limited to the redeemed of Adam's race, or it will be the general gathering-place of the holy from all worlds, he thinks there are not sufficient data to warrant an opinion upon.

He discards the doctrine of the *annihilation* of the wicked. If the Scriptures teach it they have done it, he thinks, in language uniformly misunderstood. His great work closes with the assertion: "Nothing appears in reason or the Scriptures which warrants a departure from the commonly received

doctrine of the church, that those who pass into the other world as sinners will continue to sin, and abide forever under the righteous displeasure of God."

The reviewer of this able theological treatise ventures the assertion, that it will need revision and modifications, more or less important, as the world progresses in knowledge, but that the *system* of theology it embodies is so self-consistent, so beautifully symmetrical, and accordant with the scriptures of truth, and the deepest trend of human thought, that it will be the system taught in the schools of this world when "its kingdoms are become the kingdoms of our Lord and his Christ."