

ARTICLE VI.

THE DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION FROM
AUGUSTINE TO PETER LOMBARD (430-1160).

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[NOTE.—The following paper constituted a portion of the work of the Historical Seminary at Oberlin for the Winter Term of 1889. Martin Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin all teach a very strong doctrine of predestination, and it became a matter of importance in the studies of that Winter to know whether they had simply followed Augustine blindly, without the light of modifying ideas, or whether their view was founded upon personal thought, and thus in their minds held a closer relation to the system of evangelical truth which it was their office to present to the world. Hence the question arose whether there had been any thought upon the subject since the time of Augustine by which they might have profited,—which question the writer sought to answer in the paper here given. It is now published in the hope that, though perhaps bearing traces of an immaturity which is generally characteristic of the first fruits of independent research, it may be not without interest to a wider public. For Hinemar's doctrine, the opportune publication of two short treatises of his against Gottschalk in the *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* for 1888, afforded indispensable material.]

THE doctrine of predestination was first formally set forth in the writings of Augustine during the Pelagian controversy. It was somewhat modified by the so-called semi-pelagian discussions. If we hope to understand the course of its development, we must have a definite knowledge of the doctrine in its original shape and the character of its first modifications. The first questions before us, then, are these: What was Augustine's statement and understanding of the doctrine? To what extent did he carry with him the church of his time? What changes of statement and theory were introduced by the Semi-Pelagians? and what was the common doctrine of the church at the close of that period?

According to Augustine's doctrine of original sin, the will of man after the fall had no power to choose the good, except by the help of divine grace. All men, therefore, were not only under condemnation for their original sin in the fall, but had added to this the guilt of actual personal sin. Being thus corrupt and guilty in the most extreme degree, the whole race were justly condemned to the pains of eternal punishment. But divine grace, through Christ, interferes in behalf of some. God, by his own decree and from the secret purposes of his own will, has from eternity chosen certain definite persons out of this corrupt mass of mankind to whom he would grant his grace, enabling them to repent and exercise faith in Jesus Christ; and upon repentance and faith, these were to be the heirs of eternal life. The rest of mankind, left without grace, were powerless to repent or exercise faith, and hence must suffer that eternal punishment to which they were justly condemned. Such election comprises the conferring of grace, which enables to repent and exercise faith, and also salvation. While salvation is conditioned upon repentance and faith, Augustine is careful to guard against the idea that the election is based upon merit. The salvation is not for foreseen merit, but this merit is the fruit of election. God has elected some from eternity. These repent and believe. God foreknew their faith because he foreordained it, and in view of this foreordained faith they are saved. But why grace is given to some to believe and withheld from others, he does not attempt to decide, but dismisses as a great mystery. He seeks no further explanation than that such is the inscrutable purpose of God, and therefore

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prevailed, though not universally accepted. Especially in Gaul there was a tendency to shrink from the fully developed doctrine. John Cassian introduced the so-called semi-pelagian doctrine, which was an attempt to sail between the two extremes. This doctrine gained a victory at the Synod of Arles in 472. But Augustinianism, under the leadership of Prosper of Aquitania and Fulgentius of Ruspe and others, finally triumphed, even in Gaul, through the synods of Orange and Valence in 529. Boniface II., Bishop of Rome, confirmed these decisions, and thus Augustinianism became formally the accepted system of the Western church.¹ But the harsher side of the doctrine had already received some modifications. The confirmation of Boniface closed with these words: "But that any are predestined to evil by divine power, we not only do not believe, but if there are any who are willing to believe so great an evil, with all detestation we say to them, Anathema." The system thus toned down, affirmed by synods and by Pope, was secure in its position. But, as sometimes happens, security bred oblivion. Augustinianism was born and nourished in the midst of conflict; and when the need for struggle and effort in its defence ceased, men's minds were turned into other channels. Doctrinal points were thought to be settled and were left to take care of themselves, while so-called practical religion absorbed the energies of the church.

Gregory the Great, who began his activity at the close of the sixth century, though one of the wisest and best of the popes, though he was a voluminous writer, and though he held the doctrine of predestination, scarcely alludes to it in all his writings, and then only casually. We find enough to know that he held the predestination of both elect to life and of reprobate to death. But whether the reprobate were predestined to their sins or only to the consequent death, he does not say. He does not seek to know the grounds of

¹ Hagenbach's *History of Doctrines*, Vol. i. sect. 110-114.

predestination. "The reasons of the judgments and predestination of God, no one knows; let no one seek them out,"¹ he says, and hastens on to consider some matters of external duty which he seems to regard as the proper sphere of investigation for feeble man.

Thus, for two hundred and fifty years more, the doctrine of predestination lay packed away in fancied security in the decrees of synods and popes, secure enough there so long as undisturbed, but, as events proved, fading more and more out of the life and soul of the church. For when it next appears, the man who dared to stand bravely by the doctrine and push it through to its logical consequences, was styled, "this modern predestinationist," "this heretic," and for twenty years lived in a dungeon, because he would not give up his convictions.

Gottschalk (*Gotteschalcs*), the man who brought the question of predestination to the front again, was a monk of Saxon origin. In his childhood he was given by his parents to the monastery of Fulda to be trained for a monastic life. Here he spent his youth in study and in other duties. After reaching manhood, he sought to free himself from the monastic bondage; and in 829 a church assembly at Mentz released him from his vow. But Rabanus Maurus, Abbot of Fulda, appealed to the emperor, and the release was annulled. Gottschalk removed to France, and entered the monastery of Orbais, and here he devoted himself to the study of the church Fathers, especially Augustine. During his life here he formulated and promulgated his particular doctrine of predestination. This soon brought him into trouble. Rabanus Maurus, his old enemy, now Archbishop of Mentz, was the instigator of the persecution to which he

Rheims, who was his ecclesiastical superior. Here he was brought before a synod at Cressy, and convicted not only of heresy, but of contempt of his superiors, and condemned to be scourged and imprisoned. He was scourged most severely and cast into prison in a monastery. After a time, the cruelty of his treatment excited some stir in his behalf, and Hincmar granted some alleviation of his condition. But, again, at the instigation of his evil genius, Rabanus Maurus, he was made to feel all the severity of a mediæval imprisonment. His appeal to Pope Nicholas only served to stir Hincmar up to induce others to write in opposition to his doctrines. So his imprisonment dragged on till some time about the year 870, when death came to his release.

Thus cruelly oppressed and even crushed by the dominant party in the church, Gottschalk yet produced a great disturbance in it. Hincmar of Rheims had numerous enemies, and they were not slow to take advantage of his treatment of Gottschalk. He himself wrote two treatises which were really in self-defence. His appeals led other eminent churchmen to write in his behalf. King Charles the Bald also commissioned several to set forth the true doctrine of predestination, so that he might know what he ought to do in reference to Gottschalk and Hincmar.

Thus, in a short time, there sprang into existence quite an extensive literature on the subject of predestination. A great variety of theories were set forth. To classify and arrange them is no slight task; yet plainly the doctrine of Gottschalk is the first one to be studied. It was the first in time and the occasion of the others. It marks the extreme predestination view; even those who opposed the treatment he received, could not go with him to the full conclusions which he derived from the doctrine. Then, too, all those who discussed the question were either for or against Gottschalk. Their writings were written with reference to his doctrine. To find, then, in what points and, so far as pos-

sible, why the various writers agree with, differ from, and oppose his teachings, is the readiest way to understand and compare them.

Our next task, then, is to get the doctrine held by Gottschalk. Unfortunately our sources of knowledge are quite limited. Two confessions and a few quotations made by his opponents, in all much less than the shortest treatise against him, are all that we have of his writings. This disadvantage is in part made good by the condensed nature of his two confessions, and by the fact that the quotations by his opponents are naturally such as set forth the extremes of his belief. Thus we can get a fuller and better knowledge of his teachings than might be expected from the amount of his writings that has come down to us.

The historical sources of his doctrine are to be found in the old Pelagian controversy. His confessions are full of quotations from writers of that period, especially Augustine, Prosper, and Fulgentius, and he himself was nicknamed Fulgentius, on account of his frequent appeals to that Father and the similarity of their teachings. He had formed his own doctrine in strict accordance, as he believed, with their teachings and the decisions of the church of their time. It seemed evident to him that the church of his own time had abandoned the old position, and the question he deemed one of vital importance. Hence he sought to bring the church back to the truth. He even courted controversy, and had such faith in his own convictions that he challenged trial by ordeal, and offered to walk through boiling caldrons of water, oil, and pitch, and let his doctrine stand or fall according to the result. Such a spirit as that could

logical consequences they sought in every way to evade. Gottschalk accepted them, built upon them, and shrank from nothing which could follow from them. These facts were: (1) the final causality or omnipotence of God; and (2) the fact that some men are saved and some are lost. These two facts he proves directly from the Bible. By simply putting them together, he gets the first point of his doctrine; it is the will of God that some be saved and some lost. He says: "All whom God wills to be saved, without doubt are saved, nor can any be saved except whom God wills to be saved, nor is there any whom God wills to be saved and he is not saved, since our God has done all things whatsoever he willed."¹

Taking the immutability of God as another fact, he advances still farther. Immutability he proves directly from the statement of it in the Bible; but he also proves it by a course of argument built upon his first fact of final causality. We learn from the Bible that God is omniscient, and that this omniscience embraces not only past and present, but also future events. This foreknowledge can only be through foreordination. God foreknows all things because he it is who does all things. Foreseeing thus all things from the beginning, the will of God is necessarily immutable; for, how could he foresee what he was to do, if there were mutability in his will? Putting this immutability of will with his first step, that it is the will of God that some be saved and some lost, we get this conclusion: From eternity it has been the will of God that some be saved and some lost; that is, God has from eternity foreknown and predetermined the fate of every individual man, and that fate is as immutable as the will of God.

It cannot be said, however, that Gottschalk was distinctly supralapsarian. The question of the order of the decrees was evidently not presented clearly to his mind. He holds

¹ Migne, Pat. Lat., Vol. cxxi. p. 366.

the election to be eternal, and the sole reason of it is in the will of God; yet, with reference to the reprobate, he says that God foreknew *and* predestined them to eternal punishment, as if the punishment were for their foreknown sin. This he modifies further by maintaining that there is no interval, even of a moment, between foreknowing and predestining.

To render these ideas consistent with each other and with the idea of foreknowledge based on decree, I think we must state his full theory something as follows: God from eternity willed and decreed the sinfulness of the entire human race. He also from eternity willed and decreed that some should repent and exercise faith and that others should continue in sin. Again, from eternity he willed and decreed that for their foreseen faith these should receive eternal life, and that those for their foreseen continuance in sin should receive the eternal punishment which their sins justly merited.

Here are three distinct decrees, and one of them at least is conditioned on foreknowledge. Yet so exalted is Gottschalk's idea of the nature of God, that we may readily believe that he could conceive of these three decrees, together with the foreknowledge upon which one is conditioned, as being comprised in a single act of the infinite mind, and that to say that this is impossible, were to subject God to the limitations of the human mind.

That Gottschalk would accept this statement of his doctrine, no one can prove. He nowhere distinctly says that God decreed sin or predestined men to sin. In speaking of the predestination of the reprobate, he always, in what we have of his writings, represents them as predestined to punishment for sin, and never to sin itself. Yet his opponents charge him repeatedly with teaching that men were predestined to sin unavoidably by the will and decree of God. They of course had his full writings, and were familiar with his oral teaching; and, though they give no quotations

which clearly state the doctrine, their understanding must have some weight when we consider how naturally the doctrine follows upon his view of the sovereignty of God's will. As he stated the omnipotence of God, it is but a single step, if he acknowledged the existence of sin in the world, to say that it existed by the active will of God. Did Gottschalk himself take this step, or did his opponents see it and take it for him? No one can know; but, if he saw it, I find nothing in his character that would cause him to hesitate for a moment, but much that would lead him to take it boldly.

The prevailing ideas of his time, and especially the grounds taken by his opponents, led him to lay special emphasis upon two points involved in his doctrine. These were: (1) a double predestination, i. e. of elect and reprobate; and (2) a limited atonement. For reasons which will be set forth more at length when we come to the consideration of their writings, his opponents held that election or predestination affected only those who were saved. Gottschalk therefore, again and again, affirms that the good and bad are alike predestined to their fate. He says: "Who, as the pages of the Old and New Testaments offer manifest proof to those considering them wisely and soberly, just as he predestined all the elect to life through the free kindness of his grace alone, so precisely also predestined all the reprobate to the punishment of eternal death through the just judgment of his unchangeable justice." And, again, he says: "Predestination, whether of the elect to life or of the reprobate to death, is twin; since, just as God in his unchangeableness before the foundation of the world predestined all the elect immutably through his own free grace to life eternal, in the same way precisely, through his just judgment, the same unchangeable God himself immutably predestined to a death deservedly eternal all the reprobate who in the day of judgment shall be condemned on account of their own evil deserts."¹ Again, in his longer

¹ Migne, Pat. Lat., Vol. cxxi. p. 366.

confession, he says: "Thou didst freely predestine to all thine elect eternal life and them no less to eternal glory. So also, in the same way, thou didst predestine deservedly eternal punishment to the Devil and his angels and to reprobate men, and similarly thou didst predestine them to it."¹ Thus strongly does he assert the double predestination, emphasizing particularly the idea that the *manner* of predestination is precisely the same both of the evil and the good. He retains the terms elect and reprobate, saying that life is predestined to the elect, and death to the reprobate. But in his mind these facts are logically in consequence of the predestination. The elect are the elect because they are predestined to life, and the reprobate are reprobate because they are predestined to death, not merely because they are left in that universal sin from which some are rescued by grace.

The other point upon which he lays special emphasis is that of a limited atonement. It develops logically enough from his premises. All admit that some are lost. Whatever God wills, he has willed from eternity. Whatever comes to pass, comes to pass through the will of God. Therefore it is through the eternal will of God that some are lost. Then, if Christ died for all, it must be the will of God that all should be saved. But it is the will of God that some be lost. That there should be such a contradiction in the immutable will of God is impossible. Hence plainly Christ died only for the elect. Gottschalk himself states it as strongly as possible. "All those impious and sinful men," he says, "whom the Son of God came to redeem through his shed blood, these, predestined to life, the omnipotent goodness of God wills to be saved irrevocably."

whom, indeed, he foreknew would be most evil, whom, also, he justly assigned to be cast into eternal torments, these he within himself forever willed not to be saved." Again he says: "Our omnipotent God, the founder and maker of all created things, deigned to be the restorer and healer of all the elect; but of none of the reprobate did he even will to be the saviour, of none the redeemer, of none the crowner."¹

Thus the doctrine of Gottschalk stands forth, rugged and strong. It is built upon the one thought: God is supreme, and man in comparison is nothing. The thought is pushed to its full consequences, and thus in many respects becomes harsh and repellent. Many facts of man's nature and life are lost sight of. And yet, if they are hidden, it is because the ideas that hide them are *great*. Harsh, repellent, one-sided in its development though the doctrine may be, it possesses a real grandeur. The humble monk, wearing his life out in his gloomy cell, had yet a soul greater than the highest of his judges. To him, accepting his doctrines to their fullest meaning, God was yet a loving Father. He sought communion with God, not by smoothing over or making meaningless the teachings of his Bible as he understood it, or the teachings of his own intellect; but, with a faith as strong as his logic was relentless, he trusted. Mysteries there are, and ever must be, to the imperfect mind of man, for "His ways are past finding out." There is no solution of them all, and yet, "shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" This is the final step which the mind of man can take until "we shall know even as we are known."

As has been said above, this controversy aroused by Gottschalk brought out many writers on the subject of predestination. The motives for writing were largely personal or political, and hence the opponents of Gottschalk were rather advocates, than seekers after truth. The question was not taken up to be investigated and a theory of the

¹ Migne, Pat. Lat., Vol. cxxi. p. 366 f.

doctrine propounded: Gottschalk was to be opposed, and that was all. From this fact follow several others which determine the character of the writings. They are all produced within a brief period, and no more is heard on the question till two centuries later. The writers being contemporary and independent of each other, there is no progress or development of doctrine. The exigency of the occasion being deemed urgent, there is rapid work, but no thorough mastery of the subject by any writer. Some oppose the doctrines of Gottschalk upon one principle, some upon another; some emphasize one point of difference, and some another. I see no trace of anything by which a logical classification can be made. In whatever order the writers are presented, the order must be determined by something wholly external to the doctrines presented by them.

We will begin, then, with Hincmar of Rheims, the most prominent man who took part in the controversy.

The most fundamental difference between his view and that of Gottschalk is that he reverses the logical position of foreknowledge and predestination. Foreknowledge is the independent attribute upon which predestination is founded. He offers no proof or even explanation of how this can be. The nearest attempt at proof is an illustration or comparison with our memory. "Just as man remembers all he has done, yet has not done all that he remembers, so God foreknows all things of which he is the author, yet is not the author of all he foreknows."¹ Thus his philosophical position at this point is weak.

This, however, is not his starting-point. The final fact upon which he bases all the scanty arguments in his treatises is this: God is just. This he asserts, yet not more strongly than does Gottschalk. Each accepted the fact,

“ways are past finding out.” The justice was accepted with a full acknowledgment of the mystery involved. Hincmar, on the other hand, says God is just in all his ways; therefore his ways must conform to our ideas of justice. Coming at the question from this point of view, we cannot expect from him profound philosophy. Predestination, grace, foreknowledge, and the punishment of the wicked are all made harmonious with this idea. These points being illuminated, he seems not to see the darker shadows of mystery left in other places, and wholly fails to realize that the fact of the existence of evil in the universe involves the justice of God in as dark a mystery as does predestination.

Hincmar does not deny predestination, but limits it. The elect of God are predestined to life through God's free grace. Eternal death is predestined to the reprobate even, but further than this he cannot go. The reprobate are not predestined to eternal death. To deny this after granting the other points is no easy task, and it is no great wonder that Hincmar had to call in the scourge and the dungeon to the aid of logic.

The argument of Gottschalk from God's omnipotence and immutability is not even touched, much less answered. Hincmar's argument is this: Predestination to punishment involves the necessity of sin. Punishment for unavoidable sin is unjust. Since God is just, there can therefore be no predestination to punishment.—But does predestination of a man to punishment involve the necessity of sin any more than predestination of the punishment to the man? And the latter, Hincmar grants.

There is a possible distinction between the ideas. Man has the power of voluntary choice, while the punishment is without personality; so that predestination can be applied to one as not to the other, if taken independent of each other; but if one is predestined to the other, there can be no practical difference as to which is the direct and which

the indirect object,—as Gottschalk pertinently remarks, “Since it were too much without reason that thou shouldst predestine the penalty of eternal death to them unless thou didst also predestine them to it.”¹ However, to the mind of Hincmar there is a difference, and he sets about making it clear that the predestination of the punishment is not unjust. Punishment, of course, is for sin, and is predestined not for necessary, but for foreseen, sin. Here comes the necessity of holding foreknowledge as an independent attribute.

But if this predestination be for foreknown guilt, must not election be for foreknown repentance, and how, in that case, can there be a predestination to life by direct will of God? Hincmar is beyond his depth, and flounders hopelessly. His argument is buried almost beyond discovery in page after page of quotations. That he was in a desperate strait is evident from a theory he presents as an explanation of how predestination of the punishment is possible with only foreknowledge of the man. The eternal fires of hell, he says, were prepared for the Devil and his angels. Then God, in view of the fact that sinners cling to the Devil, determined to use this same eternal fire in their punishment.

It is something of a relief to turn to other points of difference from Gottschalk which Hincmar holds, not as logical, but as biblical positions. He affirms, that it is the will of God that all should be saved; that Christ died for all; that the atonement through Christ's death was sufficient for the salvation of all; and that those who are lost, are lost not from any lack of virtue in the atonement, but by the act of their own free wills. These points he does not attempt to uphold by a philosophical argument. Considering the success he had in the other point, we may be glad he did not. The foundation of his proof here is the Bible; yet, according to the fashion of his time, he made no pretence to inter-

¹ Migne, Pat. Lat., Vol. cxxi. p. 350.

preting the Bible for himself. Every text is backed by a host of expositions by the writers of past centuries, and some of the church Fathers seem to be given as much weight as the Scriptures themselves.

What of honor, then, shall we give to Hincmar in this contest? In general, he opposed Gottschalk at the most repulsive points of his doctrine. He held some great truths which his opponent had either denied or overlooked. The universality of the atonement, the will of God to save all men, the responsibility of man for his own fate, the injustice of punishing acts of necessity, are all great truths which had no place in Gottschalk's system, yet they stand far stronger by their own intrinsic worth than by the cogency of Hincmar's argument. There is a lack of logical power, an inability to see the consequences of the positions which he took, that led him into inextricable confusion. There is, too, running through his treatises, a spirit of bitterness and personal hostility that renders our sympathy impossible, even when he is upholding a truth. The close of his treatise, in which he adds the decree of the synod which condemned Gottschalk, and a fervid peroration based upon it, breathes a triumph won by power of arm, not of brain; and such his triumph was.

As has been stated, many writers were drawn into the controversy. Among those who may be classed as on the side of Gottschalk on account of their opposition to the treatment he had received and a general sympathy with his principles, the most eminent were Servatus Lupus, Prudentius, and Remigius. Yet all these modified in some degree the most extreme views ascribed to Gottschalk. Upon the other side were Rabanus Maurus, Ratramnus, and, most interesting of all, Scotus Erigena, the witty courtier of King Charles the Bald.

Scotus opposed double predestination, on the ground that

predestination to evil made God the author of evil, and he assailed Gottschalk with such vigor of abuse that at first he was eagerly welcomed as a defender of Hincmar's cause. But his wild speculations in regard to the nature of sin, of evil, and of God, soon brought universal condemnation. Hincmar was forced to deny all implication in his theories, and his influence in the controversy was wholly destroyed. He declared sin and evil to be absolutely nothing, and hence incapable of being predestined, or foreknown, or of having any place in the knowledge of God. We speak of God's foreknowledge and predestination, but only as adapting our language to the limitations of our own mind. In reality, God exists without relation to time, and there can be no such thing as foreknowing or predestining on his part.

On the whole, the controversy remained as it was left by Gottschalk and Hincmar. Much sympathy was given to Gottschalk, but it did not avail to save him. The repulsive features of his doctrine were toned down. The principal features of Hincmar's teachings prevailed, but his spirit was very generally condemned. Indeed, the contest was largely in regard to terms, for if predestination of the elect, which both parties maintained, be once granted, there can be little practical difference in regard to the condition of the reprobate. Gottschalk preferred to say that they were predestined; his opponents preferred to use other terms. Actually, the one considered the reprobate as hopelessly lost as the other did. On the questions as to the will of God in the matter and as to the extent of the atonement, whether universal or limited, there was real difference; but both parties regarded these as subordinate matters, related to the main question indeed, but not vital.

We may pass on then to a fresh discussion of the ques-

here, in the very dawn of scholasticism, the question was taken up in the true scholastic spirit, discussed and speculated upon for the mere sake of discussion and speculation.

St. Anselm begins this discussion of predestination which took place during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. He does not discuss the question of predestination or no predestination, nor does he discuss predestination as standing by itself. But, taking the allied questions of foreknowledge, predestination, and grace, he inquires into their relations to human free-will. He does not question the fact of any of the four things, nor yet does he attempt to prove any of them. He assumes all of them as facts; and, recognizing an apparent contradiction between the first three and the last, he purposes to show that they are not contradictory and may be harmonized.

In his dogmatics¹ he gives the question of election a short paragraph, affirming the justice of God in election, but acknowledging its deep mystery. He says: "Whom thou dost will to punish, it is not just to save; and whom thou dost will to spare, it is not just to condemn; for that only is just which thou willest, and not just which thou dost not will." And again: "But if ever it can be understood how thou art able to will to save the wicked, surely this can in no way be comprehended, why from like wicked ones thou dost save these rather than those through thy most high goodness, and dost condemn those rather than these through thy most high justice."

He takes up his real discussion of the question in his "*Tractatus de concordia praescientiae et predestinationis nec non gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio.*"² The three parts of the tract take up the three acts ascribed to God, and

Scotus had argued against Gottschalk's double predestination, that it destroyed free-will; but he either failed to see that predestination to good interfered with free-will just as effectually as did predestination to evil, or else he wilfully overlooked that side of the question. At any rate, he made no philosophical or logical objection to predestination on this ground. There is, of course, an apparent contradiction in saying that a thing which takes place through free-will, is predestined. Anselm first sets forth this contradiction as strongly and as clearly as he can. He proposes, too, to grapple with the question in its extremest form; for he next declares, that "predestination can be affirmed not only of the good, but also of the evil." There is a difference, however. While God brings about all things which he predestines, he must not be regarded as the responsible author of evil or sin. Anselm says: "But he is said more especially to foreknow and predestine the good, since in reference to them he brings it to pass both that they are and that they are good, but in reference to the evils only that they are in being, not that they are evil." To harmonize this idea with the statement that God predestines evils, Anselm introduces the thought of a permissive decree as distinguished from a positive decree. He says: "God in a sense may be said to do what he does not, when he permits it." "It is not out of place, therefore, to say in this way that God predestines the wicked and their evil works, since he corrects neither them nor their evil works." Thus he would preserve the sovereignty of God's will as Gottschalk did, and yet avoid saying baldly that sin and evil are caused by the direct act of the divine will.

The great problem before his mind, however, is to show how God can foreknow and predestine acts of the human will without overthrowing its freedom. He comes very close to the modern solution. There is a near approach to the idea of controlling the acts of a free-will, yet he stops short

of control by motives. He says: "Similarly some things are predestined to come to pass through free-will." He shows that this is involved in the fact that some are predestined to righteousness, thus: "For God neither foreknows nor predestines any one to be righteous of necessity; for he does not have righteousness who does not keep it by free-will." Why did he not also say that he does not have sin who does not have it by free-will? It is certainly implied, but I doubt if he could cast aside the prevailing ideas of original sin enough to affirm or even admit it.

Again, he tries to harmonize predestination and freedom by drawing an analogy between predestination and foreknowledge. "However necessary it may be, therefore," he says, "that these things which are foreknown and predestined shall come to pass, yet some foreknown and predestined things come to pass not by that necessity which precedes the fact and causes it, but by that which follows it." This is clear and valid reasoning so far as foreknowledge is concerned. To be foreknown, an event must of necessity come to pass. But the necessity is for the sake of the foreknowing merely, that is, there is a necessity that there should be certainty of an event, or there can be no foreknowledge; yet the foreknowledge in itself may have nothing whatever to do with the causation of the event. Just here the analogy drawn by Anselm fails. Predestination of an event involves causation of it. A predestined event must come to pass through that necessity which precedes and causes the fact. Yet in this self-same paragraph he seems almost to grasp again the thought which would make his false analogy unnecessary. He says: "For whatever God predestines, he brings to pass not by compelling the will or resisting the will, but by turning it over to its own control." To us, when we once say that God brings about an act of the will not by compelling the will, it seems the only possible conclusion to say that he then must control it

by means of motives applied to produce the act freely. Anselm, however, turns to a different solution. God turns the will over to its own control. This is in harmony with his idea of permissive decrees. By thus permitting the will to take its own course, God predestines the act. He states this thought thus: "Yet although the will uses its own power, still it does nothing which God does not do, with reference to the good, of his grace, with reference to the evil, not of his own fault,—but of the fault of the will." If by simply turning the will over to its own control, God predestines the act which follows, then he must foreknow just how that will will act of itself. This can be done in two ways. God may know just what motives he will bring to bear, and just what effect they will produce. In this case the foreknowledge of God will depend upon his own decree. On the other hand, God's foreknowledge may be an independent attribute, and he may know what a man's will will do in any given case, just as we may know what any man before us is doing. Which of these views did Anselm hold? He does not state positively, at least not in this connection. Evidently, however, he held to the latter, the idea of an independent attribute; for, in explaining the possibility of foreknowledge and predestination, he drifts into the misty vagary of the "eternal now." He says: "It must also be understood that just as foreknowledge is not properly spoken of in reference to God, so also neither is predestination, since to him nothing is neither before nor after, but all things are at the same time present."

Anselm was a man of powerful mind. He perceived distinctions and saw logical consequences which had been un-

constant feeling that one is with a man who is opening up to his fellow-men wide fields of knowledge which have been unknown to his predecessors and which shall be fully explored only by those who shall come long after him.

We pass over Honorius of Autun,¹ who wrote a dialogue between master and pupil upon the question of predestination and free-will. He wrote somewhat later than Anselm and holds about the same opinions. His work, however, is very inferior. The questions asked by the pupil are marvellously well put,—to be answered. Questions and answers are so neatly dovetailed together that it is hard to say which was prepared first. Neither are profound, neither give the impression of original thinking. The dialogue was perhaps written with the purpose of instruction only, and for the use of pupils.

We may pass on, then, in search of a writer of independence of thought, and of sufficient vigor and force to leave an impress on the thought of his time upon this question of predestination. Such a man we find in Peter Lombard, who, though he wrote no special treatise on the subject, yet in his commentaries on the Epistles of Paul set forth in forms of definition and statement, rather than argument or proof, some new and vigorous ideas, which show that he entered earnestly into the subject, and sought to find truth upon which he, for himself, could stand. He argues with Anselm in basing predestination upon foreknowledge. He says:² "Properly speaking, predestination is foreknowledge and preparation of grace by which most surely those are freed who are freed. Predestination is therefore preparation of grace which cannot be without foreknowledge, but fore-

God also foreknew things which he himself was not to do." He differs from Anselm, and goes back to Hincmar and his school, in holding that, while God foreknows both good and evil, the elect only are predestined. To this position he is compelled by the thought that predestination of the reprobate would render God the author of sin. He says:¹ "For God prepared what divine equity would restore, not what human iniquity would lose." "For not, as he prepared the saints for receiving justification, did he prepare the wicked for losing it, since he was never the preparer of wickedness. This rule must therefore be held unshaken, that the wicked were foreknown in their sins, not prepared, but the penalty was prepared according as they (the wicked) were foreknown."

His meaning in this will be more clear when we have considered the method of election which he presents, and in which he takes new ground, or perhaps more truly goes back to Augustinianism. His theory, in brief, is this: Men were created for eternal life. But for the fall, all men would have secured it. By the fall, or through original sin, all men lost eternal life and came under eternal condemnation. Through the atonement of Christ, God provided salvation which should be granted to all who should repent, and exercise faith. Repentance and faith come only through the operation of the Spirit of God, and this operation of the Spirit constitutes election. God is in no sense responsible for the fact that all men have fallen under condemnation. "For," he says, "God prepared what divine goodness would restore, not what human iniquity would lose." The resto-

an acceptance of faith, or to urge on (*compungere*) him whom he knows, to hear; and this call, as I have said, is to the elect only. In this call, predestination is fulfilled." The implication is plain that the reprobate are so, simply because this call is not given to them, and hence they are left in their sins and to the consequent punishment; but since God is in no sense responsible for the sin, Peter Lombard would say that he did not predestine them to the punishment. Why some are called and some omitted, he, like Augustine and like Anselm, leaves among the inscrutable mysteries of God's will.

We have thus traced the course of the doctrine of predestination through seven centuries. We leave it essentially the same as we found it. Three great ideas have at times stood opposed to it, yet only to one-half of it, the predestination of the reprobate. This has been said to conflict with the justice of God, to overthrow the freedom of the human will, and to involve God's authorship of evil: Through all the controversies, the whole doctrine has stood. Peter Lombard stands in reality where Augustine did, though he rejects the term "predestination" as applied to the reprobate. What difference does it make what we call it, if the fact remains that men are lost because they cannot be saved except by the call of God, and God refuses the call? I do not escape action or the responsibility of action by performing the exceedingly significant though negative act of refusing to perform any positive act. All these writers recognized a great mystery in predestination. To some a single, as opposed to a double, predestination seemed, if not a solution, at least an advance toward the light. Augustine, Gottschalk, and Anselm stand out distinct from the rest, in that they looked deeper, and detected the fallacy of such an attempted solution. To them, who recognized and acknowledged the great mystery of the doctrine, is due its

preservation as a reality in the faith of the church, rather than to those who would solve its mystery by stripping it of its meaning. A meaningless doctrine, though clear as noon-day, was not what Calvin and Luther needed upon which to build the strong and efficient theology of the Reformation. Hence they went, we find, to Augustine and Anselm, not to Hincmar or Scotus.