

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.
THE COMING AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY.

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FOR some time past there has been an earnest cry in certain quarters for a new and distinctively American philosophy. This voice is indeed that of a John the Baptist in the wilderness, but nevertheless it is the voice of a herald who has power to discern the signs of the times. The chief crier may not perchance live to see the kingdom of this new philosophy ushered in, but unquestionably his soul is prophetic, and foresees truly that such a new American philosophy will be established. It cannot be much longer delayed. The signs point to an early arrival. Some of us believe that we are already in the twilight of its dawn, and that we shall live to see the full day break.

But patience is needed. The inquisitive intellectual eagerness of our time is bringing to light many new factors in these problems. New, perplexing, and uncatalogued facts are almost daily set in array before us. In truth, the fact-diggers are immensely industrious at the present time and are heaping up unclassified material in endless profusion. Physiological psychology has added a wealth of facts of which our fathers knew nothing. The

department of psychological logic has been explored again, and some new facts have been added to the general store. Evolution as a method has shown how to reach some valuable results and from a new direction. Some powerfully synthetic mind will yet arise to declare the place and significance of all this unorganized material, and set in order what is as yet undistributed chaos.

Many considerations unite to verify the conviction that we are to have such an American philosophy. It will be our task to indicate some of these considerations and then to point out some of the main lines along which this philosophy will, in all probability, be constructed, together with a brief statement of its bearings upon the questions of ethics, theism, and of revelation. It is an exceedingly significant fact that no system of philosophy, either ancient or modern, which has been matured and has held sway in Europe, has ever become so naturalized in America as to seem indigenous. Nearly all systems have been transplanted to this continent, at one time or another, but they have always remained exotic. They have never become acclimated. No one of them has received any general acceptance.

New England seemed at one time about to bow at the shrine of sensationalism, but good Bishop Berkeley arrived just in time to prevent her from quite getting on her knees; yet even he with all the charms of idealism about him could not keep her from starting something of a flirtation with transcendentalism. But still she did not really surrender her heart. She has in later times been giving coy glances at Hegelianism, but it will amount to nothing more than glances. It will never reach the marriage altar. It cannot. Inheritance, heredity, environment, the facts, are all against such a wedlock. Pennsylvania almost a century ago gave a few eager and frantic embraces to the theories of the French encyclopedists, only to find them airy nothings with no substance of eternal truth or fact in them. The attempt in recent years to make us be-

lieve that Scotland had given us the final thought upon this problem, and that Sir William Hamilton was henceforth to be our philosophical mentor, is ending like all the other attempts to put us in foreign leading-strings; we will have little or none of it.

No; America, assign whatever reason you will, will never be satisfied until she has produced a philosophy of her own. For this purpose we hold certain unusual advantages. We can study the philosophic systems of the past with the smallest possible bias growing out of inherited faiths. No people has a finer opportunity, in the way of heredity and environment, for the impartial study and investigation of the history of philosophies. Neither we nor our fathers have ever been in bondage to any philosophy. Moreover, the eminently practical quality of the American mind will prevent its losing itself in the merely speculative, or so thrusting its head into the clouds as to deny that it has a footing and a home on the material earth. The American mind is eminently cosmopolitan. It is not speculative nor dreamy like the German. It is not flippant nor leapingly vivacious like the French. It is not insular nor tradition-bound like the English. The diverse strains of blood in our national veins have given us a peculiar life, in which Saxon, Teutonic, Celtic, and Gallic qualities commingle. Our national environment has added an indefinable something beside all these. The business of conquering from nature this vast continent and the subtle influences of our political institutions, have given the American mind a severely practical cast. This will be a quality of supreme value in philosophical inquiry.

Furthermore, this new philosophy must be formulated by a mind which is native in America. Even so venerated and admirable a thinker as Dr. McCosh cannot forget that he is a foreigner. The flavor of Scottish thought and training is apparent. Try as he will to be an American of the Americans, you still taste in his writings the

barley-cake and the oat-porridge. He cannot resist the instinct of the foreigner to say things which will please the Americans. This is the distinct ear-mark of foreign heredity and training. These are, perhaps, small matters, but they are sufficient to keep any man out of perfect touch with American thought in its finer qualities. If the history of a century of American thinking teaches anything, it teaches that the philosophy which would attain general acceptance among us must be wrought out, not by a foreign mind, but by one which is wholly native and indigenous.

We believe, then, that America must produce and formulate a philosophy of her own, and that this philosophy will be more practical than speculative, more cosmopolitan than local, and more universal than continental. The history of past thought will aid in correcting the aberrations of present thinking, and the melancholy illustrations from some of the philosophies of the Old World will not lose their instructional value upon the New.

And now as to the lines along which this predestined new philosophy shall be constructed, every thinker in philosophy must confront and give decisive answer upon two great questions:—

I. THE METHOD OF PROCEDURE.

The new philosophy will include at least three methods of procedure: (1) the inductive, (2) the logical, (3) the intuitional. Each of these three methods will have its own peculiar evidential value. They will be mutually corroborative, and their aggregated conclusions will be irrefragable. Answering to these three methods or by means of these three methods, we should find at least three co-ordinated grounds for the validity of our knowledge. These grounds should be (1) results of induction, (2) the idea of law, (3) the personal intuition.

end. They are not ends in and of themselves, and even the rightness of them must be judged by the results which they produce. A history of methods in philosophical inquiry would have great instructional value to all thinkers. It would hold lessons of warning as well as of encouragement and wisdom. It is true that method is greatly in danger of making the mind procrustean in its habits of inquiry. If the facts do not conform, so much the worse for the facts, comes at length to be its dictum. Moreover, most thinkers confine themselves rigidly to a single method. All facts, whether material or psychical, must be interrogated by the same questions and be subjected to the same tests. Diversity in the nature of facts is no ground for allowing diversity in methods of inquiry. But, now, while the iron horse must keep to its parallel tracks, the real horse must have some liberty of action: the former gains in power and swiftness, but loses in range and freedom; the latter loses in power, but gains immensely in range of vision and breadth of freedom.

In the coming American philosophy we shall not be shut in to a single method of intellectual procedure. The inductive method within its sphere will investigate, and combine what facts belong legitimately to it; the logical method will have a range of facts all its own; while the intuitional method will traverse regions of fact and truth where either of the other methods could in the nature of the case have no vocation. The new philosophy may devise other methods, but it will certainly use these, both singly and in co-operation.

The history of philosophy abounds with illustrations of the use of a single method, and with the resulting narrowness of inquiry and meagreness of result. No one would deny that Locke did royal service to philosophy, nor would any one doubt the imperishable name which Kant has won for himself as one of the immortals among the world's thinkers. Their service consists not in the fact that each of them contributed a system of philosophy

which might be labelled sensationalism or subjective Idealism, and thereby outlined certain sentient and psychical activities. It consists rather in the fact that they asserted themselves emphatically as independent investigators in the primary and secondary facts of matter, of consciousness, and of being. Whatever facts they brought to light, will remain a permanent contribution to thought. Whatever results they reached by the application of their peculiar methods to the incomplete summary of psychological facts in the general progress of philosophy, have only a transient or transitional value. Each of them did sectional work. The result was not philosophy, but only a section of it. The method of each one narrowed him into a limited field.

In truth, any one who pursues studies in philosophy cannot but be impressed with the chaotic condition in which the whole subject at present lies. Sensationalism, materialism, idealism—objective, subjective, and absolute—transcendentalism, eclecticism, agnosticism, and each of these with innumerable subdivisions, are the sectional names under which philosophers have been masquerading. It has come to be an essential prerequisite, that thinkers should ally themselves with one or another of these standards. The historian of philosophy is not content unless he can arrange every one under his appropriate name and label, just as they do dead and dried specimens in a museum; and the lamentable fact is that he usually succeeds in his undertaking. This one is a materialist. This one is a sensationalist. This one is an idealist. This one is an intuitionist. Is it not possible that in the coming philosophy some true thinkers will find for us that all these are but phases of the one great subject, and that a full-orbed treatment from a full-orbed thinker will show us that these which purport to be comprehensive systems are only the multiform ways in which truths are presented to the mind, now exhibiting one side and now exhibiting another, but still remaining single yet many-sided

truths? The fact that thinkers must be thus classed and arranged is an involuntary testimony to the narrowness of human thinking, and yet each one of these in his own divergent way may be slowly gathering the facts, and setting forth the many-sidedness of truths, in such ways as shall be an immeasurable advantage to the mind which is yet to formulate the true and complete system. I do not refer to eclecticism. It is not a patchwork of thought which is needed, but a homogeneous whole of thought which shall give recognition to the fact that truths in matter and in spirit are not necessarily in antagonism because they are diverse, and that to discover the complexity of God's many-sided truths, no single method of procedure is sufficient. The coming philosophy will have many methods for many and diverse truths, and will show that the unity of these diverse truths is not mechanical, but organic. The fact that Berkeleyanism, Hume's agnosticism, and Kant's subjective idealism could have sprung from one paternity, viz. sensationalism as set forth by Locke, shows not a defective logic, but that philosophy, if it is to be complete, must recognize the many-sidedness of many truths. The coming philosophy must be so comprehensive, so far removed from narrowness, as to be too large to be covered by such titles as Scottish, synthetic, materialistic, intuitional, eclectic, positive, or by the titles of any one school. It must be willing and able to use all methods to discover and to adjust the facts, the truths, and the laws which lie imbedded in the one complex yet homogeneous mind-matter organism,—the sentient man. We believe that thoughtful men are growing weary of the method-of-procedure fetich, and that the days of the single and exclusive method are past. It seems, indeed, incredible that a method should ever have been thought to be a philosophy. A machine is not the products which it was constructed to produce. Neither are the motions of the machine, the products. You cannot identify the machine and that which the machine produces, and say that

they are one. So neither can you identify the mind which thinks, the method of thought, and the products of thinking. They are not identical, nor yet are any of these identical with matter.

Now to our thinking, the two most arrogant and self-assertive so-called philosophies of modern times, Hegelianism and positivism, are not philosophies at all. They are rather methods of procedure in philosophical thinking. They are at the antipodes of thought. The one, as absolute idealism, is purely a method of intellectualism, and is so manifestly unreal that the result is inevitable—a thorough-going scepticism. The other, as materialistic pantheism, is purely a method of the operation of the law, and is so manifestly narrow and false that it also leaves its devotees at the other and opposite pole of scepticism. *Positivism* is not a philosophy at all. It is, indeed, an admirable exhibition of the value and use of the method of *induction*. So also with *Hegelianism*. It is not a system of philosophy, but it is an almost flawless exhibition of the subtle use of the *logical* method.

And if I be not presuming too far, I should make a similar observation concerning *Kantian idealism*. It is not a system of philosophy, but is a singularly profound and lucid exhibition of the *intuitional* method, if one may be allowed to use the word "method" concerning the intuitions.

I would lay as much emphasis upon induction as the most ardent positivist could desire. I would lay as much emphasis upon the logical method as the Hegelian wished. I would emphasize the intuitional method as much as Kant himself.

Every method of procedure which has been elevated into a philosophy has, so far, inevitably eventuated in scepticism, and so we believe that it will be. When you believe things to be real which are unreal, then you are a sceptic. The coming philosophy will make just and sharp discriminations in the region here briefly outlined. It will

use any and all methods, examine all facts, prove all things, and hold fast that which is good. The discoveries which Bain and Helmholtz, Colton and Carpenter, Maudesley and Huxley, have made and are making in that domain where the sentient spirit flashes its light and life through the living bodily organism, will not be overlooked, but we shall need to make sharp discrimination between their discoveries and their theories. The discovered facts of physicists and physiologists are good, as a rule very good. The discovered theories of the same gentlemen are bad, as a rule very bad. Physicists, theorizing and experimenting and laying down *ipse dixit's* in the domain of pure psychology, are about as useful, graceful, and effective as a blacksmith mending the wing of an angel, or a trip-hammer mending the broken ends of a spider's thread. In a word, it is out of their line of business. A somewhat similar observation might be made concerning the value of the psychologist's work in physics. But the psychologist and physicist are coming to understand each other better, and to recognize that they are fellow-workers and brethren in the exploration and understanding of that wonderful being—man. The manifoldness of his life and the complexity of his relations are the overwhelming difficulty in any adequate thinking about him. As a recent writer has aptly said in substance, "After all, man is not merely a reasoning animal, he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal."

The coming philosophy will, then, use at least three methods: (1) the inductive, (2) the logical, (3) the intuitional, and others if it shall need them. It will not include merely a single department of man's life; it will not be a sect; but it will be all inclusive of truth and fact, and to reach these will use the appropriate instrument or method.

II. THE GENERAL VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE.

The coming philosophy must define and establish real grounds of certitude. Without this all inquiry and re-

sults are but vanity and vexation of spirit. These grounds of certitude must be so established as to afford a sense of moral and intellectual security. Such a result cannot be reached by any single method. Induction will not do it alone; neither will intuition. Every method of value must be pressed to its utmost in this service.

The coming philosophy will, we believe, be realistic, and therefore will recognize that no such thing as thought and its completed product—knowledge—is possible except upon the conceded basis of the twofold nature in man, mind and organized matter in organic unity, and the incessant interplay between these two distinct yet interwoven phases of his being. There is a basis in indisputable facts for the existence of matter. There is a basis in indisputable facts for the existence of mind. The close inter-relationship of these *substantiæ* and the almost endless range of facts which grow out of it, give large play for the *inductive* method. The primary and secondary qualities of matter, the investigation of sensation, of the physiological qualities of thought products, of sense perceptions, in a word of the whole outer world, and of that mysterious borderland where mind grapples with matter,—all these lie in a region where the inductive method must have large and free use toward the determination of the validity of knowledge.

The mistake which many thinkers make is to insist that all the facts of philosophy lie in the region indicated, and that the inductive is the only method of research. Induction has opened such secrets of nature, and has been so facile an instrument in the hands of modern science, that men may almost be pardoned for supposing that it is the one and only open sesame to all the secrets of philosophy. Nevertheless it is not so. It has, indeed, an invaluable use in its own proper sphere; but that sphere is limited by well-defined boundaries, and outside of these are some of the most subtle and certain facts of our being. These facts cannot be explored, nor their reality and value dis-

covered, by induction. They must be reached by a wholly different method. Induction will bring us to some elements of certitude in knowledge which must otherwise remain unknown, but it cannot reveal all of them.

A second method, viz. *the logical*, will bring us to some other elements of certitude, and elements which it alone can give us. Mind, in its thinking activities, is under laws, but laws which are peculiar and govern mental processes only. They have no necessary identity with physical laws, although there may be a likeness. They control entirely different activities and are adapted to give form solely to the intellectual forces. If thought were but the working out of physical forces under physical laws in the same way that electric currents are, then, of course, the causes would be fixed and determinate, and the results certain and invariable. There would be no freedom. There would be no psychical forces. All would be materialistic. But not so. The intellectual processes must pass under the mould of laws that are fixed. Now the mind intuitively recognizes this idea of law as applied to its own activities, and is already prepared to recognize the same idea outside of it. Hence the idea of law as applied to all the operations of forces in the broad realm of nature is one which has become thoroughly familiarized to the mind from its own operations. It accepts, therefore, at once, the authority and fixedness of physical law, not as giving any validity to the processes of knowledge, but only to the objects of knowledge in the external world. It gives instant and unvarying confidence to the unchangeable character of the physical and sense elements which are inwoven either directly or reflexively into almost all human knowledge. There is an absolute conviction that there is no variation in the nature of matter, of force, and of law, and that objects cognized in these domains are in and of themselves unchangeable in their essential characteristics. Where do we get this conviction? We answer, from the mind's own intuitive idea

of law and its changelessness. Experience guided by the inductive process may come in to verify this conviction, but to our thinking is not the original ground of it.

We believe that this idea of law is to occupy a very large place in the coming philosophy. It has had almost no place in what is past. We venture to assume that the mind's first and fundamental conception of law is received from the laws under which it is itself compelled to act, and thence gives a quick recognition to law as governing the physical world. Law is equally absolute whether in the one domain or in the other, and rests substantially on the same basis. It is therefore the inflexibility of law which gives an objective permanence and an objective character to the product called knowledge. The subtle correspondences between objectivities in mind and in matter; the subtle but common basis in the nature of law by which they both have their form and relations; all these through the logical method furnish another ground of certitude in regard to the objects of knowledge.

All knowledge which has matter as its objective, as well as all knowledge which has subjective states as its objective, will find the logical method invaluable in arriving at certitude. If the mind recognizes itself as having a real and not a relative existence, then must it also make similar recognition of the external world, for both are under similar conditions and environments of law, and what is under it in the one case is as real as what is under it in the other. This conviction in regard to the supremacy and absoluteness of law includes the forms of matter as well as its substance, and asserts that phenomena are as real as *substantiæ*. If the mind were competent, as it is not, to lay its subjective forms of thought upon matter, and so exhibit the external world as a relative but not an absolute existence, we should be so constituted that we should be always practising deceptions upon ourselves. In other words, we were created a lie. But idealism does not recognize the necessitated correspondences between

the mind which knows and the world which is known, and that both are natural correlates under law which in nature is a unit, but which in spheres of manifestations is diverse.

It is here, also, that the limitations of finiteness appear. Law compels mental activities to lie along certain fixed grooves. There is liberty within these bounds. If there were beings with larger liberty than we, they must still be under law, and though their knowledge would be larger, it would not be any more real. It would still be finite, however far along the line of an enlarging liberty under law they might go. Nor would the knowledge of an infinite being be any more real than ours. It would be only larger in extent. He would see infinitely farther than we do, and with absolute comprehension. The universality of law, therefore, binds mind and matter together in knowledge, and gives certainty and validity to knowledge, and the method of procedure to discover and use the facts rightly would be the logical method.

But the coming philosophy, if it is to be true, must use at least one other method, and will bring to light grounds of certitude in knowledge which are perhaps the most convincing of all. I refer to the *intuitions* and the *intuitional method*. By the intuitions certain qualities both of *matter* and of *thought* are cognized which could not be known in any other way. Here the intuitional method is the only possible one. The sensorium is known immediately. The natural forces and powers of the body are known immediately. The forces and powers in the external world are known in the same way. The infinite personality emits force, but is not necessarily himself present through all the line of its operation. He does just what we have conscious ability to do, only, in an infinite way. We transmit force to a stone, but we do not accompany it in its course. So also God is immanent in nature, in the forces which operate under law. These forces the mind immediately recognizes, and knows them to be the same

in kind, though not in manifestation, with those which lie inchoate within itself, but ready to be manifested upon matter. The kinship in nature between ourselves and our Creator makes such intuition possible.

It is at this point where one of our earliest theistic conceptions is gained. There is a conviction of the identity of the quality of the force emanating from us with that which is without us, and this intuitional knowledge is summated in a theistic conception. But upon this I must not dwell at the present time. The coming philosophy will admit the intuitive knowledge of forces in matter, and will verify this knowledge by the inductive process, in an experiential acquaintance with the qualities of matter. In other words, the intuitional and the inductive methods will be conjoined to establish the validity of all our knowledge of an outer world or of all that which is not ourselves. Forces will be known by intuition. Qualities will be known by induction.

The coming philosophy will give large use to the undeniable quality which the soul has of knowing its own acts and states. It will take for granted the absolute veracity of consciousness. Any other assumption would be absurd. I am, and I know that I am. I think and act, and I know that I think and act. Without question, the contents of consciousness must be veracious. No matter how they come, whether by sensation or representation or ratiocination or intuition. The residuum left in consciousness is veracious knowledge. The coming philosophy will not teach, with Sir William Hamilton, that consciousness is simply one of the co-ordinate powers of mind. It will not teach that consciousness is the sum of all the psychical powers. It is an entirely passive quality of the soul. It is the ultimate being cognizing itself as existing, itself as acting, itself as being acted upon. It has no activities. It has no processes. It cannot be false. It adds no element to knowledge. It performs no processes of elaboration. It knows by intuition both processes and products,

but has no share in producing the one or in completing the other.

If, then, the powers of mind are under limitations of law which is fixed, and consciousness is merely the absolutely accurate observer of these determinate processes and their results, there can be no question raised as to the validity of the processes or as to the reality of the products. Nor can any question be raised as to the veracity of the knowledge of all these by the soul in consciousness. To deny such veracity is at once to affirm that mental processes are deceptive; that the laws which determine mental activities are capricious and false; that our original substance and our original activities are wholly untrustworthy,—in a word, that we are so made as to exhibit forever in our natural constitution a most stupendous falsehood. There are no grounds for so absurd an assumption. It involves an impugning of the moral character of the Creator. We are not capable of doing this. If there were proofs of such moral perversity in the Creator, in the nature of the case, they would lie beyond our reach. This theory of untrustworthiness has nothing whatever to substantiate it.

But to return to our main inquiry,—the intuitions put us into immediate relations and acquaintance with the infinite personality and with those powers and forces which are the persistent and continuous outflow of his free will and psychical activity in nature and in man. The intellectual and elaborative functions of mind are employed upon the forms both of matter and of thought,—the phenomenal manifestations of the powers or forces which the intuitions cognize. The intellectual reason sits as the arbiter between these two elements of knowledge, adjusting the relations and collaborating the results. The knowledge from intuition is bodied forth and made luminous, is made determinate by these intellectual processes. The knowledge furnished by the intellectual powers, including the functions of sensation, of

sense perception, and of perception, are corrected and adjusted, as it were, to the eternal facts of truth and being by the intuitions. These two fruitful sources of knowledge by their steady intermingling, interaction, and interrelations leave the certified facts of knowledge in consciousness.

The application of these general criteria of certainty to the *moral* being would be similar. The soul recognizes limitations of law in the moral activities. Thence the logical method brings it to the moral activities of other beings, and observes similar limitations. It intuitively recognizes the free will and potential nature of the person, and empirically recognizes the forms, the phenomenal aspects of the results of moral activity. These two methods of knowledge are united actually in one indivisible act. They can be logically separated, but not in fact. There is the intuitional cognition of moral force,—the logical application of moral law, and the experimental recognition of moral phenomena; and the moral reason sits as arbiter for the adjustment of these interacting elements of moral knowledge. Moral limitations of law imply a moral being who limits. We intuitively cognize the power above us "which makes for righteousness," and experimentally cognize moral phenomena in providence and in government which are the clothing of this force. These the soul recognizes to be the potential nature and glorious garments of a being with powers like its own in kind, but infinite in degree.

Similarly as to *theism*. Intuitively we recognize limitations in general of our whole being; in other words, our finiteness. The direct knowledge of the infinite Being lies in this intuition—it is inevitable. The soul could not look for a God below itself or within its own limits: it must

activities and being, but its God must of necessity lie on the superior side. God is not only a logical necessity of all thought, but is also an actuality in our conscious knowledge. The coming philosophy will also recognize the fact, I believe, that the soul by intuition stands face to face with the essential nature of God. In that supreme moment of personal Christian history called *regeneration* the soul and God know each other intuitionally. Nothing intervenes. It is the unveiled vision of God. The philosopher may not understand the nature of this fact or the value of this testimony, but Christian men know what I mean, and the profound significance of these self-revelations of God and of the soul in the moment of regeneration.

This meeting of the soul and its God are not in sub-consciousness, as many have taught, and only the results, such as joy, love, peace, and reconciliation, in the proper consciousness. They are all in consciousness. The results, may, indeed, seem to obscure and confuse the true cause in some experiences, but a careful analysis and review will verify to any Christian man that he met God face to face. But here also, as in all other knowledge of the soul, the experiential part must not be lacking. In order to complete knowledge in consciousness, they must be organically conjoined. The empirical element will be furnished by an external revelation, by providential government, and by the soul's experiences.

It is true that under conditions of heathenism the intuitive gaze of the soul brought no certified or completed knowledge into consciousness, because the empirical elements of revelation upon which the elaborating processes of the intellectual faculty of the soul might act for purposes of corroboration, illustration, and embodiment, were

tude in regard to God. Physical force would furnish indeterminate, incomplete, and unembodied knowledge, unless it were also accompanied by phenomena. So also God without a phenomenal revelation of himself is practically unapprehended. This duplex source of knowledge is in harmony with the duplex nature of man. If either element is wanting, whether it be in regard to matter or spirit, whether subjective or objective, whether sensational or intuitional, whether moral or theistic, knowledge in consciousness is dim and indeterminate. When both elements are present and are rightly adjusted by the intellectual and the moral reason, certified knowledge in its completed form will be found.

The coming philosophy will, therefore, if it start from the premises of the physicists, accept the immutability and the absoluteness of law in the realm of nature, and will carry over the same conceptions into the domain of psychology, and thus exhibit its proofs of the validity of knowledge; or, if it start from the premises of the psychologist, will carry over its conceptions of spiritual law into the domain of physics, and thus exhibit its proofs of the validity of knowledge. The coming philosophy will, then, in no way whatsoever identify mind and matter, whether considering them as form or as force. It will confess them to be in substance wholly distinct and in form totally dissimilar. It will confess, however, that both have a real existence, and that they have a marvellous interweaving through all our thoughts and life. Moreover, if the new philosophy should acquire the spirit of prophecy, it will predict that neither in this life nor in the life to come will spirit and matter ever have divorcement, so far as we are concerned. As we were created and have lived, so shall we live forever. The new philosophy will not adopt the

diate every part and parcel, every root and every branch, of every theory of the relativity of human knowledge. No matter whether the theory is Scottish or German or French; no matter whether the theory masquerades under the name of Kant, of Hamilton, of Spencer, of Huxley, of Green, or of American Hegelianism; let it die the death, as it ought to die.

In conclusion, it is urged that many men deny that they have any clear intuitions of God or of truths which may come from him. A recent writer (let us hope ignorantly) in one of our denominational journals affected to make merry at the absurd belief in intuitional knowledge of God. No doubt his sin was committed ignorantly, but the whole difficulty lies where I have before indicated. Intuitional knowledge is never clear and determinate without the proper corroboration of phenomenal knowledge. Similarly, phenomenal knowledge is altogether uncertain without the basis of the intuitions, or, if you please, the framework of the intuitions. In regard to the being of God, these two methods must go hand in hand. They are, as it were, antiphonal. So also in regard to truths from him. Revelation is the phenomenal side of moral and spiritual knowledge. The spirit in man answers to the spirit of God. Revelation corroborates and embodies this relationship. The intuitions alone cannot reveal God to our knowledge. The whole sad history of heathendom attests this fact. The senses alone cannot reveal God to our knowledge. The sad, hopeless gropings of modern agnostic science attest this fact.

The duplex method alone will reveal the full-rounded facts of being. You will recall that pregnant passage of St. Paul in Romans i. 20 (I paraphrase it): For things, such, for example, as the eternal power and Godhead, which are not visible to the eyes of sense, ever since the creation of the cosmos, have nevertheless been spiritually or intuitively contemplated by the external manifestation of things which are made; i. e., power and Godhead are

seen intuitionally by the soul, but are clearly bodied forth only when they have an external manifestation which sensation and intellection can apprehend.

St. Paul's philosophy seems to me to teach with perfect clearness that our knowledge of *power* in whatever way exercised and of *Godhead* rest upon both intuition and empirical perception, acting in an indissoluble unity. This passage is a wonderfully condensed statement of St. Paul's natural theology, and to my thinking it anticipates and prophesies the true ground-work of the new and coming American philosophy, which will be through and through the handmaid and ally of the Christian faith.