ARTICLE II.

THE IDEA OF LAW IN CHRISTOLOGY.

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Advance can be made in the doctrine of the person of Christ, providing new facts with regard to him are brought to view, or old facts interpreted by a better method. For new facts, we have the light which modern physiology throws on the workings of the human mind; since it will be admitted that a more exact knowledge of man leads to a fuller understanding of Christ. As to method, the modern conscientiousness in subjecting theories to the test of fact, of all pertinent fact, is abundantly exhibited in the recent biographies of Jesus, and cannot be withheld from reinvestigating his nature and person. Some modification of view will almost inevitably follow the strict employment of the inductive method, because the venerable theories of the church were not framed in this way; and Protestants, notwithstanding their boasted deference to the facts of the Bible, have accepted without question not a little of ancient dogma. The ancient procedure was by deduction from accepted beliefs, even as to matters too large for human logic to handle. For example, it was first agreed that Christ is divine, and then so and so was inferred concerning him. But so and so was sometimes an inference that the facts would never suggest, and only by force can be made to fit.

Of all facts which an inductive study concerning the nature and person of our Lord must now take into account, the most significant is the fact of law. No ques-
tionable idea as to law need be advanced. It is enough for the present purpose if we agree that law is an order of facts, and that this order is part of the nature of the facts. In giving things their natures God gave them their laws. It is plain, therefore, that any statement as to any department of the being of Christ which proves contrary to the known law of that department, is contrary to his nature, and cannot possibly be true. We may mistake the law, but in that case we must mistake our Lord. So potent for good or ill is the idea of law.

In applying this idea to the person of Christ we will, first, test by it some of the more noteworthy theories; secondly, ascertain what are the main facts concerning him; and, thirdly, make use of certain little considered laws to construe those facts into a provisional theory of his nature and person.

I. Will the more important theories concerning our Lord bear the test of an appeal to facts, especially to the fact of known law?

The docetic fancy, that Christ had only the appearance of human nature, was in so plain defiance of reality that an early Father said, "Whoever teaches that Christ is only an apparent man, is himself only an apparent Christian." And this denunciation but paraphrases that of John, "Every spirit which confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God: and every spirit which confesseth not Jesus is not of God" (1 John iv. 2, 3). It is a matter of course that Christ was human.

But the facts show with hardly less distinctness that he was more than human. Whoever finds the New Testament representing Christ as merely a man, finds the facts so different from what they seem to the average mind as to afford scant common ground for a basis of discussion. Christ was a man, and also more than man.

Was he, then, that one personal God whom both Testaments alike set forth? Was the divine in Christ simply
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a phase of the economic appearances of God? Was the Logos only the semblance of a distinct person in the Godhead? It is an eminently respectable theory, and lends itself, as a pantheistic denial that God is at all a person lends itself, to the service of poetry; but it is essentially a docetic disregard of facts, and serious embarrassment attends the attempt to state the facts in terms of Modalism. For example, Jesus spoke of the Comforter whom he would send from the Father (John xv. 26). Construed according to Modalism, this promise runs: The one personal God in his aspect as Son will send himself in his aspect as Spirit from himself in his aspect of Father. This is not a plain statement of facts; and if this were what the promise meant, it would not be even a candid statement of facts. Or if we seek light upon Paul's classic statement to the Philippians about the humiliation and the exaltation of our Lord (Phil. ii. 6–10), does the Modalist bring the facts forth for us into sunlight when he thus construes them: The one personal God, existing after a manner suitable to himself as God, would not insist like a robber on being equal to himself, but emptied himself of that manner of existence, and took on a servant's way of living, by becoming man, and so on and so on; until, at length, having reached the lowest depth of renunciation of self, that is of obedience to himself, he now, that one personal God, being at the same moment in full possession of the divine glory and stripped of all things, did lift himself from a human grave into heaven where he already was, and in his phase as Father did give himself in his phase as Son a name which is above every name? Can anyone imagine these to be the facts as they lay in the mind of Paul? Modalism has everything in its favor except that it does not state the facts. Christ, then, was a man and more than man, but he was not that unipersonal God whom the Bible consistently declares.

Was he, then, created yet above all other creatures, divine but not Deity? Every student of the New Testa-
ment has lit upon passages which could readily be so understood; nevertheless, subordinationism is confronted with the whole force of the Bible's protest against polytheism. If any scriptural fact is plainest of all, it is that God is one, and beside him is no other. Jehovah is not a Jupiter presiding over an Olympus of lesser divinities. Although more than man, Christ is not a minor god.

The Council of Nicæa was shut up to declaring the personality and consubstantiality of the Son; to which the council held about half a century later in Constantinople added the same doctrine about the Holy Spirit. It was a necessary effort of the human mind to embrace in one view all the facts concerning the personality of the Godhead which had been revealed in the economy of redemption. So far as these councils declared the summary of facts, their decrees have not been successfully controverted. The Scriptures teach that, in the ordinary sense of the word "person," viz., a being possessed of self-consciousness and of substance distinct from that of other beings, God is one person. In presenting God as one, the Old Testament also presents him as one person, and the New Testament throws no shadow over the teaching of the Old. It is ever he who spake through the prophets that speaks by his Son. The most conspicuous doctrine of Scripture is that there is but one God, and that he is but one person, in the ordinary meaning of the term. But the New Testament presents facts from which it must be inferred that in the one personal Godhead there exist three personal distinctions. Personality in this case is quasi personality. It means self-consciousness without numerical distinction of substance. I take it to be one of the commonplaces of orthodox theology, that we do not use the word "person" in the ordinary sense when we say, that there are three persons in one God. It is only to avoid using a term in two senses that we need hesitate to say, In the unipersonal God are three persons.

Now if the Council of Nicæa had been content to state
The facts without attempting to explain them, its positions would still be impregnable. But it undertook to give a rationale of the relations between the persons of the Deity, to construct an ontology of the Trinity and explain how three persons could be one God. It did more; it decreed that the acceptance of its explanation was essential to orthodoxy; and although the Council of Constantinople would not reaffirm the anathema, multitudes of Protestants still feel bound by these ancient decrees of speculative theology. To conjecture what the ontological relations within the Godhead are, is to attempt an impossible metaphysics; but to impose such a conjecture upon faith was an act of usurpation and sacrilege. The theory of Nicaea, as to the relations of the Father and the Son, is that the one eternally generates the other, yet without conferring upon him distinctness of substance. Now, if the inductive method is the scientific and the reverent method of dealing with themes like this, then the theory of eternal generation is open to the objections:—

1. The facts do not lead up to it. The facts lead up to belief in the proper divinity, the personality, and the consubstantiality of the Logos; eternal generation is at best but a deduction from this belief. It is the first, but not the last, notable application of the a priori method to matters about which our knowledge is too small to justify an abandonment of the direct teaching of facts, and a venture into the inner reality of the divine essence, with no other guide than inference.

2. The doctrine of eternal generation is sheer Neo-Platonic emanationism, a discredited metaphysics.

3. An explanation is bound to explain; but the doctrine of eternal generation is essentially incomprehensible and incongruous. If the Son continually streams forth from the Father, how does his substance remain identical with the Father's? If it returns, as some have taught, does not the Father in that case derive substance from the Son? The perplexity increases when we reflect that, in
representing the Son as eternally becoming, it represents him as never effectually being, and therefore, as a mere process, affords no basis for his personality. So far then from affording an explanation of the Trinity, the notion of eternal generation actually defies all known laws of being, and is altogether, if I may say so, a bewildered dream of speculative fancy. Now this objection would hold if it were an attempt to synthetize and to picture indisputable facts; but—

4. An item essential to the theory is missing when we search the Scriptures for data; to wit, the New Testament does not unmistakably teach that the Logos is a derived being. It teaches that Jesus was such a being. The angel of the annunciation gave him the title "Son of God" expressly because God was to be his Father (Luke i. 35). Paul's earliest recorded address applied the same name to Christ, on the ground that God had raised him from the dead (Acts xiii. 33). Once historically fixed, the title was as naturally carried back to the pre-incarnate Logos as the title "Christ" is carried back by us. Thus Paul exalted our Lord to the Colossians by calling him "the first-born of all creation" (Col. i. 15), "the first-born from the dead" (i. 18). But to be born first does not mean to be eternally begotten. We come to that meaning, if at all, by the deductions of systematic theology; it would not occur to an exegete. Surely there is no proof that Paul had the notion of eternal generation in mind, or that he meant by "first-born" anything else than precedence in time and pre-eminence in dignity,—which, in fact, is the explanation given at once by himself: "that in all things he might have the pre-eminence" (i. 18).

We know that the Arians were not convinced by the decrees of the Council of Nicæa. How could they be? Argument might be off-set still by argument, and decrees supplanted by the decrees of another council and another semi-pagan emperor; while nothing could be simpler than that anathemas should be met in mid-air by counter-
anathemas launched from the rebel intrenchments. In such a state of affairs it was a kind thought of the excellent Apollinaris to win a peace through compromise. He supposed he was orthodox, and until now that was the general opinion. The opportunity was obvious. The Arians had urged that the Logos took the place in Christ of a rational human soul, and the Council of Nicæa had said not a word against this opinion. Indeed, up to this time Origen alone had laid much stress upon the assumption by the Logos of a full human nature, and Origen was so notorious a heretic that the council had taken as much as they decently could from him in adopting his notion of eternal generation. Apollinaris therefore proposed this adjustment of differences: the Athanasians should admit that the Logos assumed only the animal psyche and body of a man, while the Arians should concede that the Athanasians were right in their opinion about who and what the Logos was. The proposal was not without its merits. Its peculiarities touched the human side of our Lord's nature, and therefore were not hopelessly beyond testing. Besides, Apollinarianism would greatly simplify the nature of Christ. Instead of making one body the home of two spirits, it made it the home of one, and that one the archetypal Logos, at once divine and human.

The theory was, however, too simple to be true. Easy answers to hard questions are almost always wrong answers. Something, we may be sure, has been overlooked. And so it was with the venerable and excellent Apollinaris. Athanasius and his party had a remarkable intuition, so to speak, of what the church in all ages would hold for truth. They saw that Apollinaris had provided for an incarnation, but not for an assumption of our nature. The modern idea of law curiously reinforces this objection. We are now able to say with absolute confidence that the laws which prevail in the propagation of the human species forbid the theory of Apollinaris. It could be true only on the supposition that the rational element is de-
rived solely from fathers, and the animal element solely from mothers. But, according to all signs, children owe as much of the higher as of the lower elements of their nature to their mothers, and as much of the lower as of the higher to their fathers. Whatever else the male function in the mystery of propagation may be, it is unquestionably, and contrary to Apollinaris, physical and vital, somatic and psychic.

But now, in sharp rebound from the human deficiencies of Jesus as argued by Apollinaris, the Nestorians, with another aim, proposed a view which, in the intention of Nestorius himself, was probably not very different from the one taught in our Sunday-schools, when some well-reputed brother or winsome young sister is called upon to solve the puzzles of christology; to wit, that the human and the divine in Christ were so complete and so far independent that it was now the divine, and now it was the human, that spoke or acted, grew or slept, suffered or prayed. The Orthodox insisted that this as good as made Jesus consist of two persons, and the Nestorians were by and by logical enough to accept that conclusion.

Once more the dispute was really about the human side of Christ. The Orthodox would not deny the completeness and personality of the divine in Christ; the sole question was about the personality of his human nature. And the Nestorian answer never had a chance of acceptance by the church. Christ was visibly as compact, coherent, single-minded, and totally engaged a being in all he did as any the earth has seen. Once more physiology offers corroboration from the point of view of modern science. That one brain should serve two persons is so defiant of all that is known about the functions and capabilities of that organ as to be next to unthinkable. One wonders what the phenomena would be in kind and in amount which could satisfy the most devout physiologist that two sane souls had made one bodily organism serve the purposes of them both.
The name of Eutyches, a simple abbot, was given to the Monophysite theory, which, germinating in the mind of sturdy Cyril of Alexandria, was forced into bloom by the heat of the Nestorian controversy. It was an opinion bound sooner or later to spring up. It taught that the divine in Christ immediately absorbed the human, as a drop of honey is absorbed by the sea, so that even his body, though real, was divine.

Eutychianism would save the unity by sacrificing the humanity of our Lord; but this was to defy facts so obtrusively as to afford one of history's warnings against the vicious method of deductions in theology, from ill-understood postulates. And yet Eutychianism has had its charm for sober theologians of the a priori sort. Our admirable Anselm was wont to say that Jesus did not actually grow in wisdom, but only seemed to; while even among Protestants there have not been wanting some who leaned so heavily on inference that all support for that inference on the human side of Christ has given way, and the communicatio idiomatum has turned out to be a Eutychian, that is a docetic, collapse of the human into the divine.

In 451 the Council of Chalcedon undertook to clear up the prevailing confusion. It decreed in general that Christ is "perfect in deity....perfect in humanity;" as against the Apollinarians, that he is "of reasonable soul and body;" against the Eutychians, that "the distinction of natures" is "by no means abolished by the union, but rather the property of each preserved;" as against the Nestorians, that "the property of each is....combined into one person; not severed or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, viz., God, Logos, and the Lord Jesus Christ." In brief, the decision of Chalcedon is that the one person of Christ was formed by the union of two complete and distinct natures, the divine and the human.

This council has ever been regarded with a deference
second only to that felt for the Council of Nicæa. Its decisions are held to be a model alike of precision and of moderation. Even up to our own day, the startling theories of orthodox Germans have claimed to be but a reconciliation of differences among the modern followers of Chalcedon. But when it began to appear that these novelties could be fitted to the New Testament more easily than to the Chalcedonian formula, deference to that venerable instrument began to relax; until now there are not a few who without a tremor can hear it said that the decrees of Chalcedon show some bad effects of the false method of deduction by which in large part they were reached. It may be that our Lord was not only complete in divinity and complete in humanity, but that these natures were distinct. The difficulty is to find any facts which show it. That conclusion was reached a priori, and the facts look quite the other way.

Evidence is abundant that the human nature and the divine nature of Christ were each perfect and entire; but to add that each was distinct from the other, is virtually to attribute to him two souls, and the evidence against two souls is precisely the same as the evidence against the Nestorian theory of two persons; viz., (1) His entire life was that of one soul, at once and equally divine and human; (2) All experience testifies that one body cannot serve two souls.

The decrees of Chalcedon forced the issue with the Monophysites. These became organized into a sect, and in the course of two hundred years the turmoil in the East had so sapped the strength of Christian peoples as to offer them an easy prey to the Mohammedan Arabs. In the hope of ending the quarrel, the Emperor Heraclius, abetted by Pope Honorius, proposed, as an irenicon, that two complete natures with only one will should be confessed. The peace lasted about forty years, when a sixth general council held in Constantinople decided that Christ had two natures and two wills, the human will being in con-
stant subjection to the divine. And this decree is orthodox to date.

Certainly it is a logical rounding out of the decision at Chalcedon. If Christ had two full natures, how could either of them lack a will? And if those natures were distinct, must he not have had two wills? But if he had two wills, in what respect did he differ from two persons? To modern psychology the will is the nucleating centre of personality; and, consequently, to the modern mind, to affirm two wills while denying two personalities is to sink the deductive exposition of Christ’s nature into a contradiction in terms. Such is all-knowing, a priori, orthodox christology.

To the doctrine of two wills a certain division of the early Protestants added the doctrine of a double consciousness in the Logos. He was totus in Jesu, and totus extra Jesum. The whole of him was shut up for thirty years in the body of Jesus, without any energy or any knowledge beyond that of man, save as the Father gave it to him; and yet, during all those years, the whole Logos was everywhere, knowing everything, and doing everything which before the incarnation it fell to him to do. Consistency could require no further inferences, even from a Calvinist. The deductive method had gone all lengths, and the theological world waited for two centuries until new methods should attain new conclusions.

Our own generation, with its unflinching exegesis, challenges our attention to scriptural facts, and with its scientific conceptions of law teaches us how to synthetize facts. Can any one wonder that this generation should be prolific of new theories touching our Lord? While none of them has found general acceptance, the problem has been fairly reopened, and he would be a sturdy conservative, indeed, who would say that no progress has been made.

The most modest of modern views, if it can even be regarded as modern, is based on a realistic conception of
human nature, and affirms that, while Christ had two complete and distinct natures, his human nature was generic and impersonal, his person divino-human, and his will single.

But how could his human nature be complete and yet lack every faculty of intellect, sensibility, and will, i.e. how can it be called complete while it lacks every power of a human soul? We are admonished not to confound nature and person, and the distinction is not only possible in thought, but often convenient. But when were nature and person actually separated in the case of a human being? Is it not as unthinkable that a human nature should be complete apart from a human personality as that a human personality should exist apart from a human nature? I think I may safely affirm that, if we are at liberty to allege anything about the human nature of Christ contrary to the known laws of that nature, we gain such a liberty only at the price of denying that he was in reality man. And so the proposed application of realism to the theory of the person of Christ seems to be self-destructive.

I may pass by the teaching of Schleiermacher and others, that Jesus, although essentially and in consciousness divine, was in point of fact begotten by Joseph; for what reason is there for believing that the church will ever be satisfied with a doctrine expressly contradicted by the Scriptures? The most important change proposed in our christology is the modern Kenotic view. I select as a typical Kenotist Dr. W. F. Gess, whose views have been familiarized in America through a work avowedly based upon them, and who, more consistently and unflinchingly than any one else, follows the Kenotic idea whithersoever it will lead. According to Dr. Gess, the kenosis of the Logos consisted in laying aside the divine attributes; the depotentiated Logos thus became human, and in the incarnation took the place of a human soul.

I do not feel the force of the usual objection to this extreme form of Kenotism. That objection is of an a priori
sort, and, although it may possibly be valid, cannot be proved so. Namely, it is urged that for the Logos to lay aside infinity of attributes would be to lay aside divinity. Now, I do not think the New Testament warrants the statement that the attributes were laid aside or put to sleep. All that it assures us is that the exercise of the attributes was put under limitations; and that this was compatible with Deity is plainly enough made known by the fact that the Most High himself accepted such limitations upon his own activity. When he bestowed free will on man, he accepted limitations upon the exercise of his own will, for not even God can make man free and not free at the same time. What the utmost limitation compatible with divinity is, I, for one, dare not say, for I have not been told. Dr. Gess's theory is, however, exposed to objections on the score of facts; to wit,—

(1) As already intimated, while it may be intrinsically possible for the Logos to accept a dormancy or a relinquishment of divine powers, the Scriptures do not warrant any further statement than that he accepted limitations upon the exercise of those powers.

(2) If Jesus derived the immaterial elements of his nature from the Logos alone, what became of that immaterial element which mothers, according to all signs, bestow upon their offspring? Was it annihilated as it began to be? Or was Mary miraculously withheld from connecting Christ in the usual way with the race from which on her side he was sprung? Aside from the antecedent improbability of such a miracle, may be pleaded the uniform rule of interpretation, that we are not to allege a miracle unless the record plainly indicates one. I think none will pretend that the maternal functions in the case of Jesus were in the least different from what they are in all other cases; and this of course would of itself refute the theory of Dr. Gess, unless we allow an extreme of creationism repudiated by all modern thought, both theological and scientific. In other words, Dr. Gess's theory is open to pre-
closely the same objection on the side of known law as lies against the thoroughly antiquated notion of Apollinaris; it does not provide a place for the mother's share in Christ.

We pass to the doctrine of the learned christologist, Dr. J. A. Dorner, who shares with Tholuck the peculiar love of American students. Dr. Schaff regards his theory as the most promising now under consideration, although he judiciously adds that it "has not yet been sufficiently matured." It is the theory of a progressive incarnation. This view is based on the assumptions, as against the Kenotists, that it is impossible for the Logos either to be depotentiated or to grow in power, and that during the incarnation there was no interruption of his cosmic offices. It teaches that through the incarnation the Logos was hypostatically united to a human nature which was personal, yet not a person, and that, as the human in Christ developed, the Logos imparted himself in the same proportion, until at the resurrection the human threw off all limitations and became capable of a complete union with the divine.

Concerning this representation of the nature and person of our Lord, nothing can be so pertinently said as that it fits with amazing ingenuity the conditions of the problem which it has in view. But this very fact exposes its defects. Ingenuity and adaptation to a priori demands are quite too conspicuous in the theory to allow the feeling that it was suggested by the facts in the career of our Lord. More specifically, we note—

(1) We do not know that the Logos laid his attributes aside or put them to sleep; and yet it is overbold to assume that he could not do this.

(2) Of course, if it be possible for the Logos to lay aside his attributes, it is not impossible for him to grow in respect of the powers which he supposably laid aside.

(3) The New Testament does not by so much as one word tell us whether the cosmic offices of the Logos were
interrupted during the incarnation or not. Presupposition is quite too fragile a basis for so weighty a doctrine as the doctrine of the person of Christ.

(4) We do not know that the Logos grew, but we know that the theanthropos grew. Every intimation is that Jesus acted as a unit, and not as a fraction. The theory of a progressive incarnation does not in the least relieve us from the consequences of this unmistakable fact. Even according to Dorner's theory, so much of the Logos as had been united with the human was subject to the human limitations which existed up to the resurrection.

(5) What is a human nature "personal but not a person"? Does it gain its personality from the Logos? Was then Jesus, as the incarnation progressed, more a person one day than the day before? We look in vain for facts on which, or laws according to which, this conjectured personality could be erected. Or, to urge precisely the reverse objection,—

(6) What sort of a union could be more complete than the hypostatic union formed between the Logos and the human in Christ at the conception? We know not but that Dr. Dorner rightly conjectured that the human element in Christ became a more and more facile instrument of his divinity; but this, if true, no more implies a progressive incarnation of the divine than the training of the human body to answer more perfectly the demands of the human mind implies a progressive incarnation of that mind.

In brief, the doctrine of a progressive incarnation of the Logos deepens, upon the whole, the mysteries which it professes to solve. At the most, we can say that the incarnation might have come about in that way, but there is no sufficient evidence that it did. In this respect the theory is more like a clever guess than like an account of what actually took place.

It is not impossible that, in the course of my attempt to apply to christological theories the touchstone of fact,
particularly the fact of law, well-nigh every reader of this article has found some objection raised against an idea which he cherishes as truth. I in turn must look for as general hesitation to accept what I am about to allege for facts, and must expect copious objections to the tentative theory into which I shall synthetize those alleged facts. But, at all events, I trust that it may not be my extreme misfortune to be understood as adopting either of the theories which this study has already rejected.

II. What foundation facts does the New Testament reveal concerning the nature and the person of our Lord?

1. That he was a man is as certain as that any historical personage was a man.

2. It is needless to argue that he was very God; but it may not be inappropriate to show that the method followed in this inquiry is as applicable to the present branch of it as to any other. Proof-texts of course throng every memory; but reliance upon proof-texts alone is open to the vexatious difficulty that each one of them can be made by hook or by crook to mean something else than the proper deity of Christ; in fact, the more express the text seems to be, the more insistent and ingenious the warning against getting out of it so prodigious a meaning. But we may adopt the method by which the followers of Christ in his own and every subsequent age have reached their persuasion that he is very God. It is the method of becoming acquainted with him, the critico-historical method, upon which all recent stories of his life have been framed and all recent estimates of his character formed. This method places us amongst his immediate followers, and opens our minds to the impressions which they received. It is not a hard method to apply. Any attentive reader may readily share the daily wonderment of the disciples, their efforts at insight, their consultations, their sometimes rapidly crystallizing convictions as they witnessed the varied manifestations of divine re-
sources, used indeed according to the will of the Father, but plainly native to himself. With them we learn to interpret aright the significance of his holiness without flaw in quality, without limit in energy, of his transfiguration, his resurrection, and his ascension. We eagerly welcome what he says about himself, confirming perhaps what we have already surmised, or opening at a glance the secret of what he was and of what he did. Still deeper the insight, still loftier the adoring faith, when the gifts of Pentecost prove that Christ is on the throne of his Father, and the inward witness of the Spirit testifies both that he is the Son of God and they and we the children of God. The offices of redemption, when the Spirit recalls what the Master had said they should be, and the offices of the Logos to the universe, when at length, we know not how, these come to the knowledge of the apostles, these redouble to the heart and to the intellect the teaching of the facts thus far witnessed. Now the Old Testament yields its hidden meanings, and the mystery of godliness is revealed to men and angels. And when at last we find the disciples calling Jesus God and Lord, and Alpha and Omega, we cannot any longer refine such names into emptiness, but are fully assured that, for those who first applied them, as to us when we use them, these titles of Deity are meant to honor the Son, even as they honor the Father that sent him.

It ought to be added that, as the church has ever received from Christ the same offices that the apostolic church received, so it has ever felt itself bound to offer him the same adoring faith, love, and obedience. Indisputably, the Christian consciousness deifies Christ.

Even secular history adds its corroborations. Since from beginnings so obscure and with a life so brief Christ introduced a new era in the history of mankind, it would be unhistorical, and therefore unreasonable, to ascribe to delusion those benefits which Christendom has so long enjoyed, and now sees daily increase, in proportion as our
Lord is exalted and obeyed.

When we form our idea of Christ from an induction of facts, that idea has the same reality and solidity which belong to our conception of the best known figures in history. Most wonderful of all, while the finest romancers are fated to rob their heroes of reality in proportion as they exalt them, and while high laudation of historical characters provokes doubt, the perfections of Jesus give us a notion of him, and make his image seem as substantial as it is unique.

3. The personality of the pre-incarnate Logos was quasi personality, that is, it included self-consciousness, but not substance numerically distinct from that of the Father; Christ, however, the incarnated Logos, was a person in the full sense of the word, and the Logos-consciousness added to itself a human consciousness. The Logos knew himself as Jesus. Conversely,—

4. Inasmuch as the quasi personality of the Logos had existed from eternity, it formed the basis of the personality of Christ, and Christ repeatedly testified that his consciousness reached back into the purely divine consciousness of a pre-incarnate self. Jesus knew himself as the Logos.

5. As to the qualitative relationship of the two natures, certain facts may be declared with some degree of confidence: (1) The divine and the human were similar in kind, for man was created in the image and likeness of God; (2) Similarity brought them into the same class of beings, for God and man, together with the angels, are distinguished as personal beings from all other orders of living things; (3) In the class of personal beings God and man were akin, for the divine and the human could be united as the father element and the mother element are united in men; and (4) This kinship was so close as to be indistinguishable from identity in species. The specific oneness of the natures may be made out from what the Scriptures say on this very matter, and also from what
appears in the life of Christ.

The precise purport of the book of Genesis, in connecting the statements that God created man in his own likeness and Adam begat Seth in his own likeness (v. 1-3), seems to be that, as the image of Adam was reproduced by propagating his nature, so the nature of God was reproduced by creating his image. We may feel entirely assured that there was nothing in this idea repugnant to primitive anthropomorphism, while at the same time the record is carefully guarded from a pantheistic identification of the substance of God and Adam. Similarly Luke, in tracing the genealogy of Jesus back to the first man, uses the same formula to state the relation of Adam to his Creator which he uses to state the relation of every mentioned descendant of Adam to his predecessor in the list. We must not infer from this, contrary to the whole tenor of Scripture, that Adam was actually the son of God, but we may infer that Luke did not consider Adam as of an alien species from his Creator.

The testimony from the life of Christ is perhaps as explicit as facts could make it. Jesus was not a hybrid; that is, he was not a monstrous offspring of distinct species. The divine could normally accept the human, the human was capable of an hypostatic union with the divine. Christ never seemed the less divine for being the son of Mary, nor the less human because he was the Son of God. The difference between the soul of man and the spirit of God is apparently quantitative, not qualitative. If the powers of a human soul were extended out to infinity, that soul would become divine; and so far as the infinite powers of God were put under human limitations, so far the Logos displayed his specific identity with man. It may be prudent for me to guard at this point against misconception by adding that to be of the same species is not to be numerically of the same substance. No one is less inclined than I to a pantheistic identification of the human race with God.
6. Quantitative effects of the incarnation were constantly indicated. The powers exhibited by our Lord were strictly theanthropic, that is, larger than the human, but in exercise less than the divine. Contrary to what Unitarians allege, it was because the divine enlarged the human that Jesus had an insight into men's hearts and a sympathy with their lot impossible to a mere man. On the other hand, he did not know all that God knows, nor speak aught than what the Father gave him to speak, nor do anything except what God directed, nor, although one with the Father, did he claim as the God-man to be equal with God. That the human laid its restraints upon the activity of the divine we are thus as good as told; while to say that the divine attributes were laid aside or dormant is to travel beyond the record.

To recapitulate the facts already stated concerning Christ: He was human; he was divine; the Logos was a quasi person in the Godhead; through the incarnation the quasi personal Logos became the fully personal Christ; the Logos thus formed the basis of the person of Christ; the divine and human elements in the nature of Christ were not specifically alien, but probably specifically the same; the quantitative effect of the incarnation was the exhibition of powers greater than human, in exercise less than divine.

One fact remains by which to construe all those which I have mentioned into a consistent and at least provisional theory of the nature and person of Christ; that fact is the physiological law of propagation.

III. It is now almost twenty years since a masterly teacher, Dr. E. G. Robinson, then president of the Rochester Theological Seminary, suggested to one of his classes that physiology might hereafter have something to say about the person of our Lord. What he anticipated I never knew; but it was a hint to be followed, and what it has led to may here be stated.
The questions on which physiology has a right to speak concern the human side of our Lord's nature. As to these it is entitled to say all it can, save only when the New Testament assures us that the ordinary course of nature is interrupted by a miracle. Now, while the record plainly teaches that the father's office in generation was performed by "the power of the Highest," and therefore was miraculous, it nowhere in the least degree intimates that Mary's functions were not those of other mothers. Physiology may therefore speak to the question, Whence the human nature of Christ? What is the answer from Chalcedon? "Born of the virgin Mary... according to his humanity." What is the answer of physiology? Precisely the same; the mother of our Lord was the only source it knows for the humanity of Christ. But creationism has considered further of this matter than the fathers of Chalcedon, and, accepting the Chalcedonian decision that his human nature was both complete and distinct, it adds that Christ obtained his body in part from Mary, in part from miracle, but that his human soul, like all other human souls, was specially created. What has traducianism to say? Assuming the completeness and also the distinctness of the human nature, traducianism alleges that, in respect both of body and of soul, the human nature of Christ was derived in part from Mary, but was completed by miracle.

Now let us question physiology a little more closely. Physiology accounts for so much of the humanity of Christ as mothers give. But is that all of our nature which Christ possessed? Manifestly not; for the body is not derived from mothers alone, and yet Christ had a body at once complete and exclusively human. It is evident that the paternal contribution to the body of Christ must have been created. Here, then, we face the crucial issue. It arises thus: fathers do not impart to their offspring a bodily factor devoid of life. But it is the soul that animates the body. Physiology is traducianist.
This may not be denied; but it is charged up against traducianism as a sign of its materialistic character. How then will the creationist get on with this: the principle of life in beasts and in plants is immaterial? Is it therefore not propagated? Does God specially create a soul, so to speak, for every several animal and plant? At all events, since the principle of life resides in the souls of men, fathers in begetting, and mothers in conceiving, a living body, must necessarily propagate with it the vitalizing soul. This, then, is the query with which physiology, to which this article appeals, threatens to rebut my objections to the Chalcedonian theory: Since a miracle created the paternal factor in the body of Jesus, did not the same miracle create the paternal factor in the human soul of Jesus? If so, then Christ had a human nature complete and also distinct from the divine both in body and in soul.

In considering this matter let us note what physiology teaches upon each point involved. As to the mother's contribution to both the material and the spiritual elements in the nature of Christ, the testimony of physiology is entirely unequivocal and unmistakable: Mary conferred upon Christ just so much of body and of soul as other mothers confer. Even as to the miraculous paternal element in the body of Jesus, physiology is not wholly silent. A devout physiologist may lawfully call attention to the fact that the explanation which the physician Luke says was given by the angel of the annunciation to the virgin mother of our Lord, is a strictly physiological explanation (Luke i. 35): and therefore physiology itself suggests that, since we take the account to be true, a miracle provided the paternal factor in the body of Jesus. But what reason is there for supposing that God created also the paternal factor in the human soul of Jesus, thus rounding out a human nature for him in addition to his divine nature? Does the record say so? No. Does it so imply? No: the record does not even imply the creation of a paternal factor in a human soul and the rounding
out in this way of the human nature of Christ. The record, as interpreted by physiology, tells us that the Logos was united to the factor of a human soul which Mary furnished. Nothing further is even implied; for, since the Logos was so near akin to a human soul as to enter into hypostatic union with so much of a human soul as is derived from a mother, surely the Logos was near enough akin to vitalize the paternal bodily factor which was miraculously produced at the same time.

Physiology thus gives the record its natural meaning; namely, that a divine and spiritual was substituted for a human and carnal paternal act, and that this substitution joined the Logos to the mother's contribution toward the soul of her son. Physiology does not, then, confirm the theory of Chalcedon, but, fully stated, is to the effect that the Logos and a created bodily element vitalized by the Logos were united to so much of human nature, both bodily and spiritual, as mothers in all other cases bestow. The nature of Christ was therefore, like ours, a father-mother nature, a divine-human nature, comprising one body and one soul. Reasons must be given if the plain testimony of the narrative, as understood by physiology, is set aside.

Thus far physiology teaches that Christ was theanthropic, that is, of a nature not precisely man's; but we may now make use of what has been shown above, that the divine and the human elements in the soul of Christ were not of different species. If this be true, then the theanthropic Christ had a soul at once completely divine and completely human. It was completely divine in the same sense and for the same reasons that all orthodox Christians accept; and it was completely human, because the Logos was not of a nature alien from man's, but could himself be "made flesh" (John i. 14), that is a man, and in the incarnation simply took the place of a father's contribution to the soul of his offspring. According to this view Christ had two complete but not two distinct natures.

I set out to synthetize the alleged facts by aid of physi-
The idea of Law in Christology.

1. I have just shown how the physiological view embraces the perfect humanity and divinity of Christ.

2. It also shows how the quasi personality of the Logos became the full personality of Christ—it was by taking on the maternal complement of soul.

3. Let it be noted that, in so doing, the physiological theory escapes the burden which christology has borne too long, the psychological anomaly of two complete and distinct natures without two wills; or, if with two wills, then the greater anomaly of two wills without two persons. In other words, the testimony of physiology is also the testimony of psychology.

4. The quantitative effects of the incarnation are thus precisely provided for. As in all other cases, so in this case, the father and the mother determine in some way the powers of the soul which is sprung from their souls. Unless the laws of human propagation were to be broken, the union of elements which went to constitute the one soul of Christ could not but equip him with powers greater than those of a mere man, and in exercise, at least, less than divine.

5. That the father and mother elements in the nature of Christ, instead of being distinct, were complementary, strictly corresponds to the fact that his one soul was served by one brain, and avoids the anomaly, intolerable to physiology, that two distinct natures were constantly active, yet had but one organism to act through. The physiological theory is at least a coherent theory.

6. A large and momentous class of facts thus secures a provision not otherwise afforded: the evidence from the career of our Lord upon earth is all to the effect that his entire personality, and hence both of the natures which entered into it, shared in all he was and did and bore. Neither could act apart from the other, because neither existed in him apart from the other. He might, to be sure, refer to one or to the other side of his nature, as we
do when we say of a friend, “then the father acted,” or “then the mother spoke,” not at all imagining anything further than that the one factor or the other in our friend was for the moment the more noticeable. Since his natures did not act singly, it came about that, although “God cannot be tempted with evil” (Jas. i. 13), the divine in Christ shared the temptations of the human. “If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread . . . . and cast thyself down.” And because the two natures were not distinct and, could not act apart, Jesus replied as men should reply, “Man shall not live by bread alone, . . . . thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.” Even the temptation to accept his kingdom from Satan, like the diabolical offer to acknowledge him if he would descend from the cross, was addressed to that Messianic consciousness which had its ground in his consciousness of divinity. How distinctly the writer to the Hebrews intimates the same fact when he tells us that “Jesus, the Son of God, . . . . was in all points tempted like as we are” (Heb. iv.14, 15), and that he who “taketh hold of the seed of Abraham . . . . suffered, being tempted ” (ii.16-18)! The divine in Christ could suffer, because the human could not even suffer alone. It is not quite certain that the Most High is exempt from all unpleasant feeling. Is he without sensibility? Can sin give him pleasure? Was he not “grieved forty years long” with one generation (Ps. xcv. 10)? Or, if it be impossible for the Deity to experience any but pleasing emotions, if, in fact, he is incapable of all emotion, do we not plainly enough see that, by the limitations which the Logos accepted together with the human element, the theanthropos became susceptible of feeling even pain?

Finally, I may be permitted to suggest, by way of corroboration, an argument derived from the analogy of faith. If the Logos remained distinct from the human in Christ, how imperfect his union with the race which he came to redeem! To the creationist it was a union on the side of
his body alone, for that is the only union that subsists among ourselves. To the traducianist the soul of Christ was not only twofold, but threefold: one element was the Logos, a second element of his soul was the factor provided by Mary, a third was the created factor necessary to secure to Christ a human nature supposed to be wholly distinct from the divine in him. Physiology, on the contrary, permits us to believe that the person of Christ owed the completeness of its humanity to the Logos, and thus the closest union was formed between our race and the Creator of it; "the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us." The views as to the atonement which the readers of this Review find satisfactory may not require so organic a connection as this between the Logos and our fallen race; but no one, I think, would find it unwelcome; and surely He would not refuse to be regarded as one with us, whom "in all things it behooved to be made like unto his brethren that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining unto God," to make propitiation for the sins of the people" (Heb. 2. 17).

Now the sum of what I have written is this: For the usual reasons I regard the nature of Christ as perfect in divinity; in addition to this, the facts of the New Testament as interpreted by their laws, especially by the laws of physiology and psychology, afford the following conclusions: that the Logos was united to elements of a nature so closely akin to his own that Christ was in no respect the monstrous offspring of different species, and therefore his nature, although the Logos formed a part of it, was perfectly human; that, accordingly, the person of Christ comprised two complete but not two numerically distinct natures; that therefore the soul of Christ was precisely like ours in being referable to two parents, and in not containing any additional created elements; that, as with us, his one theanthropic spirit was coordinated to one bodily organism, and throughout the earthly career of Jesus fulfilled for that body the usual offices of a hu-
man soul; that, since his two natures were qualitatively the same, there is no question about a confusion of qualities; that the quantity of his powers was precisely characteristic of his origin and nature,—they were seen upon occasion to be boundless, yet in use were always subject to limitations of the human and to the will of God; that the Logos was the basis of the personality of Christ, yet Christ was fully personal only through the incarnation; that, having but one soul, Christ had but one will; that inasmuch as the personal Christ did not even exist apart from either one of his natures, both necessarily had part in all he did or bore; finally, that, since the Logos himself was the father element in the human soul of Christ, a union with our nature by which the Maker, the Upholder, the Ruler, the Final Cause of all became one with us, justifies the saying attributed to Athanasius, "He who created all men from nothing could suffer for all and be their substitute."