probation is confined to this life, and rested entirely upon the statements of the Scriptures (iii. 712, 714; comp. xlvi. 118).

8. Theories as to the nature, object, and justice of punishment; disciplinary (iii. 26; xlv. 685; comp. iii. 12, 287); unjust (iii. 8, 288, 302; comp. iii. 18, 20, 293, 719). The great reply to the latter error was always from the nature of virtue.

9. Annihilation (iii. 11, 713).

ARTICLE VI.

FUTURE PUNISHMENT AND RECENT EXEGESIS.

BY WILLIAM ARNOLD STEVENS, PROFESSOR IN ROCHESTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

The problem of human probation involves two questions which are now widely engaging the attention of thoughtful men in the Christian church. The first: Are the issues of human probation eternal? The second: When does that probation end? or rather, Does man's present life determine his eternal future? The latter of the two can be approached only through the former. It is the former which I propose to consider in the present paper, to state and on certain points briefly to vindicate the testimony of modern New Testament exegesis concerning it.

Do the New Testament Scriptures teach the eternity of future punishment?

The science of biblical interpretation, I maintain, has answered this inquiry in all but unanimous affirmative. That this to-day is the dictum of scientific research into the New Testament, the general consensus of the leading modern exegesis, will be evident to any one familiar with the recent literature on the subject, who considers the form which the
controversy has taken. Those who deny that this is the doctrine of the New Testament take the attitude of protest. They practically admit that the authority of the great body of scholars is against them. Their discussions recognize the fact that the *onus probandi* is thrown upon themselves.

It will perhaps be the clearest and fairest mode of presentation to formulate the leading objections or arguments advanced by those who deny that the New Testament Scriptures teach the eternity of future punishment, and to consider the validity of them from the exegetical standpoint.

One premise, however, requires emphatic enunciation at the outset. The question before us is one of interpretation, and not of theology in the ordinary sense of the word. Interpretation is a science, in its own right. It is a science inductive in its method, with certain defined principles of procedure, in the use of which it is on the line of progress and discovery, advancing step by step to the ascertainment and verification of Christian truth. The question whether the New Testament does or does not teach a given proposition is one to be ascertained through the scientific methods proper to the domain of biblical interpretation, and in no other way. On a given proposition it is one thing to ask whether the church holds it as an article of faith, or whether philosophical theologians hold it as a necessary postulate or deduction—it is another to ask what testimony concerning it is elicited by scientific interpretation from the Holy Scriptures. The problem is a simple one in statement, difficult as it may be in solution. A group of Greek documents lies before us,—all written, say, within a given half-century; what did the writers of these documents believe and teach on this point? Are they silent regarding it? Or do they speak in obscure or ambiguous terms? Or, again, are their teachings inharmonious and even contradictory? Or finally, do they speak without reserve, in terms accordant, explicit and unequivocal? It is the function of interpretation, and of interpretation only, to pronounce; furthermore, if it be a science at all, it will be able, in time, to pronounce a final and decisive
opinion; and still further, if it be true to itself, no prejudice
and no tradition can fetter it, or control its deliverances. The
exegete finds it constantly necessary to counterwork
two popular impressions or prejudices. First, that the Bible
is a book written on the level of the average reader, and
designed to be within his uninstructed comprehension—that the
wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err therein. Second,
that exegesis is not a science at all, in any proper sense of
the word, but is essentially empirical, has no established
principles of procedure, and that its history is little else than
a register and classification of the shifting arbitrary opinions
of successive generations of Christian scholars. I cannot
pause here to verify or vindicate the premise,—a premise so
often silently ignored, notably in Canon Row’s “Future Retri-
bution,”—but only to repeat it. Biblical interpretation is
a science, based on established principles, inductive in its
method, and slowly but surely progressive in its achievement.

I. It is averred, in the first place, by way of protest
against the received interpretations, that biblical exegesis has
been unduly influenced by dogmatic theology—in other
words, that it has not kept itself on a strictly scientific basis.

This charge, or assumption, underlies the whole of Canon
Row’s recent work on “Future Retribution.” He assails
not the current exegesis, but “the current theology” which
teaches such and such interpretations. Farrar takes similar
ground. Taking the history of exegesis as a whole, the
charge is not altogether ungrounded; but that the exegesis
of the present century has been greatly influenced by dog-
matic prepossessions in its research into this particular ques-
tion is more than doubtful. At all events the critics of
orthodox interpreters are not assisting by their example to
correct the evil; they have none of them shown us a more
excellent way. Canon Row devotes the latter half of his
work to a professedly exegetical investigation of the New
Testament writings, but much of it is dogmatic exegesis of
the worst sort, not only dogmatic in tone, but dogmatic in
method. I quote a single sentence by way of specimen.
The apostle John, in writing of eternal life, he says, "identifies it with love, which he shortly afterwards pronounces to be the essence of the character of God." Again (p. 243) we have this assertion: "The word Gehenna here translated 'hell' is neither more nor less than the name of a valley situated a short distance from Jerusalem," —an assertion in blind defiance of all recent lexicography.

Furthermore, if "the current theology" is open to the charge of sometimes wrestling texts, and of building entire dogmas on single isolated passages, what shall be said of writers who cite in support of the wider hope a single sentence from John's report of the discourse with Nicodemus: "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand" (iii. 35), and omit any reference to the very next verse, which reads: "He that believeth on the Son hath eternal life; but he that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him"? In fact, I know of no more effective reply to the above cavil, nor indeed any more convincing exhibition of the weakness of (for example) Farrar's position, than could be made by taking the list of Scripture passages cited at the close of his "Eternal Hope," arranging them according to authorship, and reading them in their connection.

I may add, before passing to the next point, a suggestion from Dr. E. D. Morris's "Is there Salvation after Death?" that the charge of wrestling proof-texts in the interests of dogma comes with an ill grace from writers who use the phrase of Zechariah, "prisoners of hope," as if it furnished any possible support to the theory of ultimate restoration.

2. The next objection concerns the word αἰώνιος. The remonstrant interpreters unite in maintaining that this word has been misunderstood, or perverted from its proper signification.

In King James's version it is usually rendered by "eternal," in a few instances by "everlasting." The Revisers have uniformly translated it "eternal." This Greek adjective is considered by many to be the hinge of the controversy,
and reams of print have been published to demonstrate that it does not in all cases denote absolute endlessness—quite unnecessarily, inasmuch as no lexicographer ever maintained that it did. In discussing Matthew xxv. 46, "These shall go away into eternal punishment," Farrar maintains that "eternal" means "above and beyond time;" time, he says, "being simply a mode of thought necessary to our finite condition." No other scholar that I know of, has ventured so confidently, so dogmatically I might say, these precise definitions of the two terms "time" and "eternal"—terms familiar in all languages, but which have cost metaphysicians not a little study. Archdeacon Farrar is forbearing enough to add: "The utter dearth of metaphysical knowledge renders most people incapable of realizing a condition which is independent of time—a condition which crushes eternity into an hour, and extends an hour into eternity. But the philosophic Jews and the greatest Christian Fathers were quite familiar with it." Dr. J. M. Whiton has given currency to the protest of the New School of interpretation, more widely, perhaps, than any other American scholar. His definition of αἰώνος, however, differs from the above. He says: "We speak scripturally of eternal punishment only when we drop from the phrase the idea of duration, and mean simply the punishment taking place in eternity."¹

Canon Row denies that the word means eternal in any proper sense whatever, and demands that it be rendered "age-long." He recommends to translate in Romans xvi. 26, ὁ αἰώνος θεός, "the age-long God" (p. 214). He undertakes to show that αἰών "was used to denote a short period of time," etc. But this paper is not designed to criticise in detail any single writer, least of all to follow up the (as we are compelled to deem it) unscientific and inconclusive reasoning of Canon Row on the terms of the New Testament.

The ablest Greek scholar among all the advocates of the

recent eschatology—I am speaking particularly of English and American scholars—does not rest his case upon the terms \( \text{aiw} \) and \( \text{aiwno} \). Professor Plumptre distinctly admits that they denote indefinite duration—in some instances raised to the idea of perpetuity. He admits also, perhaps by way of kindly hint to his friend Archdeacon Farrar, an inability to conceive of life apart from the idea of time. "This," he says, "may be a personal infirmity of brain power . . . . but I apprehend the infirmity is common to many minds besides my own."

In questions of definition the appeal is to lexicography, a distinct branch of philological science. Not the ultimate appeal, it is true. Lexicons also are subject to challenge, and a scientific exegesis only appeals to them as a comprehensive induction based upon its own decisions. It will hardly be denied, however, that biblical lexicography is at present quite abreast of biblical interpretation, and has impartially registered its results. The objectors above named appeal from the orthodox definitions, but to whom shall they make their appeal if not to recognized specialists in the department of lexicography? What their verdict in the case is may be found briefly stated in Thayer's Grimm. The definition of \( \text{aiwno} \) there given is threefold: (1) "Without beginning or end—that which always has been and always will be;" (2) "Without beginning;" (3) "Without end, never to cease, everlasting." It is to be remembered, moreover, that Professor Wilibald Grimm, the later author of the original work, is himself understood not to be a believer in the doctrine of endless punishment. But he is too thoroughly scientific in his method to manipulate his definition in favor of his own theological position.

My impression, however, is, that disputants on both sides have too generally assumed that this phase of the controversy turns on the precise definition, in classical or biblical Greek, of the noun \( \text{aiw} \), and with it, of the adjective \( \text{aiwno} \). Whether either of these terms conveys the idea of absolute endlessness, whether it is essentially based upon the met-
aphysical conception of eternity, whether or not the New Testament writers who use it look beyond the terminal event predicted by Paul, "when the Son shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father,"—these are questions liable to "æonian" discussion, and on which many minds will find it difficult to reach a decision. But there is another term belonging to the aiōn group, on which any competent scholar may without great difficulty fully convince himself as to its true meaning. It is the phrase eis toûs aiōnas joined with a preceding negative ou or µη—a phrase of frequent occurrence in biblical and Jewish Greek. However plausibly it may be urged that aiōnios does not, in the Scripture references to a future life, mean "everlasting," and that eis toûs aiōnas does not really mean "forever," no scholar will undertake to deny that ou—eis toûs aiōnas is biblical Greek for an English emphatic, unqualified never. The phrase has various forms (eis toûn aiōna, eis toûs aiōnas, eis aiōnos, etc.), but they are all combinations of the noun aiōn with some preposition and with a foregoing negative. It always, so far as I have noted, both in the Septuagint and in the New Testament, answers either to the English "not—forever," or to "never." In the former case it denies permanence or future perpetuity to that which already exists or is conceived as existing; for example, Job vii. 16, ou γαρ eis toûn aiōna ζήσομαι, "for I shall not live forever;" Ps. ciii. 9, oux eis telos ὄργισθησαι, oude eis toûn aiōna μνει, "He will not be always angry, neither will he be wrathful forever." But in the majority of instances in biblical Greek it is equivalent to never, when used not with reference to the past (for example, John vii. 46, ουδέποτε ἔλαβεν οὗτος ἀνθρωπος, "Never man so spake"), nor to the present (for example, 1 Cor. xiii. 8, ἡ αγάπη οὐδέποτε πίπτε, "Love never faileth"), but to the future, as in John iv. 14, "But whosoever drinketh, etc., shall never thirst (ou µὴ δεψησαι eis toûn aiōna); 1 Cor. viii. 13, "Wherefore if meat maketh my brother to stumble, I will never eat flesh" (R. V., "eat no flesh for evermore;" A. V., "eat no flesh while the world standeth"). It is further to be ob-
served that while there are various other Greek words and phrases which answer to our emphatic future *never* this, of which we are speaking, is one of the most frequent in the New Testament. In order to ascertain its meaning in Hellenistic Greek it is not necessary to fix the various significations of the term *aiṓn*, considered simply as a substantive; the phrase is one concerning which no doubt, at least in the majority of passages, can be raised. Now this is the term which we find in that impressive warning of our Saviour to his antagonists recorded in Mark iii. 29, "but whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin," ὁ δὲ ἐχει ἀφεσιν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ἀλλὰ ἐνοχὸς ἐστιν αἰωνίου ἀμαρτήματος. In this one passage, at least, we are compelled to recognize an unequivocal, emphatic, absolute *never*. We may add that it unmistakably defines the following *aiṓnoc*. Let us not forget that our Lord sought to bar the pathway of the sinners to whom he spoke with the warning of an eternal *never*, and to at least one class of transgressors closed the door of the wider hope. It is well remarked by Professor Plumptre: "They cannot be altogether wrong who speak now as he spake of old."

3. A third argument is based upon the words *death, destruction, Hades*. It is made more plausible by confining it chiefly to the interpretation of the Pauline Epistles. It is claimed that a theological sense has been imposed upon these words as used by Paul,—a sense which they did not originally bear, and at variance with the *usu loquendi* of the communities to which his letters were sent; that they have received meanings which his readers could not possibly have attached to them, and hence were not intended by the writer. "It is always to be presumed," says Canon Row, "that the writer of a letter uses words in a sense which he knows will be attached to them by his correspondents, namely, in the ordinary meaning of the words, and not in a sense peculiar to himself." On another page he remarks: "The Thessa-
lonians must have understood his Greek in the sense which it bore in the vernacular."

Now assertions such as these are directly in the face of all sound criticism. When Christianity entered a pagan community did it not bring a Christian vocabulary with it—either new words, or old words with new and deeper meanings? Has any Greek lexicon ever been made which was not based on the fact that Judaism and Christianity, as well as the conquests of Alexander, created a new Greek diction? The fact is, that even single minds of a high creative power, in dealing with moral or philosophical truth, mould language anew, and stride far in advance of their readers, both in their conceptions, and in the terms that express them. Thus Aristotle and Leibnitz, as well as Paul, create their own speech. There is an element in the Pauline writing hard to be understood. Even Peter found it so, and he reminds us that there are "ignorant and unsteadfast persons who wrest it to their own destruction." As to the Thessalonians, Canon Row seems to have forgotten that the two letters written to them were written shortly after Paul's departure from their city, where he had been giving them weeks, if not months, of oral instruction; that they are simply a supplement to that oral instruction, dealing with precisely the same topics. Thus his Thessalonian readers had the best possible preparation for understanding his new or peculiar religious diction.

But Canon Row declares that New Testament Greek "contains no scientific or technical terms." A singular assertion, certainly. Take Luke for instance, one of the most precise of writers,—his accuracy of observation and of thought shown by the frequent use of exact technical phraseology. Witness his use of medical terms, of nautical language in the account of the voyage to Rome, his technically accurate designation of Roman officials in different cities and provinces. No technical language indeed! As for Paul, it is the very height of absurdity to conceive of the most highly educated rabbinist of his time teaching Christian theology year after year for a whole generation and yet not
employing the terms of Christian theology—terms unfamiliar to a church of converted pagans and to a pagan community until he made them familiar, but absolutely indispensable to his mission as an apostle. Has the objector paused to think how extensively interpreters, from the older Lightfoot down, have been resorting to the dialect of the synagogue and the schools of Jewish theology in order to interpret the apostolic writings? It needs little argument to prove that διαθήκη, δικαιοσύνη, δίκαιος, ἐπόλεμον, and the like, were words that in their scriptural meaning were unfamiliar to Paul's pagan readers.

From this point of view we may estimate at its proper value one of the deliberate conclusions arrived at by the writer of "this well-reasoned book"—as we are told it is by the Andover Review. He says: "The Greek words for future retribution convey to the reader the firm persuasion that God will execute a righteous judgment in the world beyond the grave. . . . that sin wilfully persisted in will be attended with suffering which will end in the ultimate destruction of the sinner; [yet] that none of the terms employed in their ordinary or natural meaning convey even a hint that the suffering will be of endless duration." Works of this character may be in some sense "well reasoned," but it is a significant fact that no lexicon, no grammar, no commentary of any note (whether rationalistic or evangelical), no biblical theology, has yet appeared to appropriate or endorse these discoveries in exegesis, made by the advocates of the wider hope.

4. The next objection deserves our careful and candid attention; I shall endeavor to formulate it fairly, and to allow its full weight. It says: The orthodox interpretation of our Lord's teaching (as stated in the Gospels) springs either from ignorance or from disregard of its true historical setting. Christ's discourses are to be read in the light of their time, and the whole drift of his teaching is to be considered in its relation to the Jewish theology of the age, which he accepted in part, and in part modified or cor-
rected. Single startling expressions concerning the future of the wicked, language of oriental imagery and hyperbole, phrases that were simply expressive of deep moral feeling,—are not to be expanded into declarations of absolute truth, but to be understood as his Jewish hearers must have understood them. The Jewish teachers of that day, we are told, believed in the recovery to salvation of the vast majority of men and that the irrecoverably wicked were to be finally annihilated; they did not hold or teach the doctrine of endless torment. Further, and this point is strenuously emphasized, Christ's language, being addressed to those who had been trained in the popular beliefs of Judaism, was likely, so far as it did not protest against them, to be interpreted by those beliefs. The remonstrants claim, in other words, that the scientific application of the historical principle will elicit the true drift and import of Christ's personal teaching far better than any scrutiny of single words and isolated texts; that if there had been one decisive answer on a question of such momentous import to the world he came to save, our Lord would surely have condemned in explicit terms the current Jewish theology, and put the whole question forever beyond the reach of doubt.

The requisition is a just one. In the interpretation of the Gospels two inquiries are of pressing importance: What was the Jewish theology of our Lord's time? To what extent did it influence the substance and form of his teaching? Biblical interpreters on every hand are industriously prosecuting these very inquiries.

We have to ask them, What was Jewish theology and Jewish popular belief concerning future punishment? This is a question for specialists to answer. There are authorities of admitted eminence, whose testimony will be recognized as decisive; brief mention of several of these must here suffice.

Edersheim, in Appendix XIX to his 'Life of Jesus the

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3 Eternal Hope, p. 211.  
4 Plumptre, Spirits in Prison, p. 127.
Messiah," treats of "Eternal Punishment according to the Rabbis." The eternity of punishment, he decides, at least in the case of some of the wicked, is known to have been held in the century before the Christian era. In our Lord's day it was held by both the leading rabbinic schools, that of Shammai and that of Hillel. This is testimony, not from a Calvinistic theologian, but a writer himself strongly inclined (chiefly on speculative grounds) in favor of an ultimate restoration for the great mass of the wicked.

Professor Schürer, of Giessen, has made Jewish history and doctrine a life-long study. Moreover he will be charged by no one with orthodox prepossessions. In his summary of Jewish doctrine on this subject, he says that an eternal heavenly happiness was expected for the righteous, "an absolutely glorious state in heaven; as on the other hand for the wicked not merely an exclusion from the Messianic kingdom, but eternal torment and punishment in hell." 5

Again, he describes the Judaistic theology as follows: "The deeds of men are during their lifetime written in heavenly books, and sentence is passed according to the contents of those books. The ungodly are cast into the fire of Gehenna. This condemnation is, as a rule, regarded as everlasting. But the view is also met with of a temporal duration in the punishments of hell, giving them only the signification of a purgatory." 6

But by far the most important contribution of recent years to our knowledge of this subject is the treatise of Ferdinand Weber on the "Palestinian Theology of the Ancient Synagogue," 7 a work whose value has been recognized by all New Testament scholars from the first. Schürer (in his later edition) has used and cites Weber's treatise. Sections 74 and 88 summarize the results of his investigation, particularly pages 374, 375. He allows a wider prevalence than does Schürer for the theory of annihilation. The prevailing view

7 System der altsynagogalen Palästinischen Theologie. Leipzig, 1880.
among the rabbins, he states, was that the souls of the wicked—or at least many of them—would be annihilated in the fires of Gehenna; but that there are not wanting passages which speak of the punishment of the godless in hell as enduring forever.

In verification of the above testimony a single extract from the Mishna deserves reading entire. It is given by Dr. J. Lightfoot from the tractate Beracoth, and is of unchallenged antiquity; it relates the dying words of the Rabbi Johanan, a president of the Sanhedrim at Jamnia. He died in the latter part of the first century, probably before John's Gospel was written.

“'When Rabban Johanan ben Zaccai now lay languishing, his scholars came to visit him; whom he seeing, began to weep. To whom they said: O thou light of Israel, thou right hand pillar, thou strong hammer, whence are these tears? To whom he replied: If men were about to carry me before a king of flesh and blood, who to-day is here, and to-morrow in his grave—if he were angry with me, his anger is not everlasting; if he should cast me into bonds, his bonds are not eternal; if he should kill me, his killing would not be eternal; and I might perhaps pacify him with words, or soften him with a gift. But they are ready to lead me before the King of kings, the Lord holy and blessed, who lives and lasts for ever, and for ever and ever, who if he be angry with me, his anger is eternal; if he bind me, his bond is eternal; if he kill me, his killing is eternal; and whom I cannot either appease with words or soften with a gift. And moreover there are two ways before me, one to paradise, another to hell, and I know not which way they will lead me. Should I not therefore weep?'”

It is therefore an utterly groundless assertion that the Jews have never held or taught the doctrine of endless torment as a part of their religion. But observe one fact that is coming to stand out more clearly on the page of history. This very doctrine was then in dispute. Consider how the

case stands. When our Lord discoursed on the future life, he had before him Jewish hearers and Jewish teachers, part of whom held to the doctrine of an endless punishment, part of whom denied it. It was a living question, on which men's minds were awake. They pondered, debated, doubted, believed, denied.

What course did our Lord adopt? Did he decline to answer? Did he teach first one, and then another view? Did he use language of doubtful import to his auditors, and palter with them in a double sense? Had the question been one remote from ordinary thought, or one that merely concerned the general future of the church, not one of eager, pressing individual moment, he might have spoken with a certain reserve, or have had reason for oracular obscurity. But read, with the blaze of historic light that is now thrown on the Gospel page, his warning on one occasion to these very rabbis, that they were then and there deciding their eternal destiny: "Whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin; because they said, He hath an unclean spirit" (Mark iii. 29, 30). In this view, also, how doubly explicit, as well as how unutterably significant, that declaration to the disciples on the Mount of Olives shortly before his crucifixion, excluding forever from Christian thought all dreams of an ultimate restoration, and pointing forward to an endless dualism in the destiny of our race: "These shall go away into eternal punishment; but the righteous into life eternal"! Matt. xxv. 46.

5. One other view remains to be considered. It is that the teachings of the New Testament on the subject are either inconsistent, or irreconcilable to our human understanding. Admitting that many Scriptures plainly teach the endlessness of punishment, it holds that others with equal plainness imply the contrary. Orthodox interpreters, it maintains, have forced these into a harmony that they will not bear; that the New Testament enunciates no coherent doctrine upon the subject, and that as far as the science of interpretation is con-
cerned it can only hand over to the church the whole question as an insoluble antithesis—one of the antinomies of faith.

This view is widely prevalent, either as a dogma or as a doubt. As a doubt it is "the wider hope;" as a dogma it is restorationism. Logically it is the latter. Restorationism is the undercurrent of eschatological thought that is profoundly influencing our evangelical theology and evangelical pulpit. As a doctrine it is affirmed by few; as a query or a hope it is the mental outlook of a considerable body of thinkers. I need but name De Wette and Nitzsch; Neander and Olshausen, it being with these two, however, scarcely more than an hypothesis; writers on biblical theology such as Immer, Biedermann, Otto Pfeiderer, and Delitzsch; Naville, Sabatier, and others, in France. In England the views of Maurice Dale, Farrar, Plumptre, Russell, and many others of the liberal school, are well known. Bengel is claimed as favoring restorationism, but I have found no evidence of it. That Bishop Butler ever gave the least encouragement to it, even as an hypothesis, I do not believe. Martensen will be quoted in a moment; Dorner, as respects the exegetical portion of his argument,9 like Martensen, lends encouragement to the theory.

Let me quote Professor Plumptre, stating the conclusion of the exegetical inquiry contained in Chapter II. of his Short "Studies:" "I do not attempt to formulate a reconciliation of the two contrasted views . . . . . . each of them finding an adequate, or at least an apparent support in the teaching of the New Testament. We seem landed, as in other questions, God's foreknowledge and man's free will, God's predestination and man's responsibility, in the paradox of seemingly contradictory conclusions."

From Bishop Martensen I quote the following: "It must, however, be allowed that the opposite doctrine of universal restoration has been espoused at various periods in the history of the church, and, moreover, that it too finds some

foundation and sanction in the language of Holy Scripture; that it has not always sprung merely from levity, as has often been the case, but from a deep conviction of humanity, a conviction growing out of the very essence of Christianity. We have full warrant, therefore, for saying that the more deeply Christian thought searches into this question, the more does it discover an antinomy,—i.e., an apparent contradiction between two laws equally divine—which it seems cannot find a perfectly conclusive and satisfactory solution in the present stage, the earthly limits of human knowledge.

"This antinomy meets us if we turn to Holy Scripture; and no definite solution is given of it there. There are texts which if they be taken in their full and literal import most distinctly refer to eternal damnation . . . . But on the other hand there are contrasted expressions of Scripture which have an equal claim to be taken in their full sense."

The scriptural citadel of this position is the passage in 1 Cor. xv. 22-28, "For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. But each in his own order: Christ the first-fruits; then they that are Christ's, at his coming. Then cometh the end, when he shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have abolished all rule and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all his enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be abolished is death. For he put all things in subjection under his feet. But when he saith, All things are put in subjection, it is evident that he is excepted who did subject all things unto him. And when all things have been subjected unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subjected unto him that did subject all things unto him, that God may be all in all."

Also Rom. v. 12-21, and the single expression in Rom. xi. 32; Eph. i. 10; and Col. i. 19-20.

These, it will be observed, are all from Paul's writings. John, it is well understood by the ablest interpreters of all schools, "never for a moment wavers as to the final and

*Dogmatics, English translation, p. 475.
irreconcilable hostility between the sinful world and the kingdom of God." But Paul, it is claimed, allows and encourages a wider hope, when that dualism will have disappeared, and every intelligent being will either be destroyed or be won to holy love. Thus much for the statement of this form of denial or doubt now so widely prevalent concerning the doctrine under discussion. Let me very briefly voice the reply of scientific interpretation:

In the first place as to the alleged antinomy, there is a sophism in the very word. In a pure question of fact the term "antinomy" is not applicable. It can properly apply only to the relation existing between two laws or principles (principles either of procedure, or of thought) which are each conceived as valid and imperative, but which issue in contradictory propositions. Now of course, it is allowable to argue the purely a priori question: Do our conceptions of God, or of the moral nature of man, necessitate a belief that the punishment of human sin will be endless? Such an argument may issue in a so-called "antinomy of faith." But the question in hand is one of fact. The mind may remain at rest in an antinomy; it does not, at least, annul organic thought. It is compatible with reason and science. The instance given above is familiar; divine foreknowledge on the one hand, human responsibility on the other. It is otherwise with a question of fact—the existence and non-existence at the same time of a given thing, the taking place and the not taking place of a given event. The present question is one of the latter kind—one on which the Scriptures do not reason with men, but announce to men.

The question is: Did our Lord and the apostles announce a given future fact? An antinomy here is out of question. Either they were silent, or else they spoke obscurely, or in terms inconsistent and contradictory (in this case, their testimony, being on a point of fact, must be thrown out entirely); or, finally, they spoke in terms accordant and unequivocal.

We inquire, therefore, whether it is indeed the case, as so many writers assume, that the New Testament delivers con-
tradictory announcements concerning the future fact—statements irreconcilable to the understanding. The answer of modern scientific interpretation is in the negative. The alleged contradictions are to be found, if anywhere, in the Epistles of Paul. Now one hazards nothing in asserting that the ablest exegesis of recent years is disinclined to admit the existence of such contradictions. Since the year 1836 (the year of Baur's Essay, "Die Christuspartei in Corinth)," the Pauline Epistles have been subjected to a laborious scientific research that is phenomenal in the history of thought. It is bearing fruit—witness the works of Lightfoot, Reuss, Beyschlag, Weizäcker, and Weiss; the commentaries on Corinthians of Ellicott, Edwards, Heinrici, and Godet. I do not deny great divergence of opinion on the point just named; I have referred above to distinguished authorities who either positively or doubtfully attribute inconsistency or contradiction to the Pauline theology in dealing with the subject. But the ablest of those who assume this inconsistency argue the point as a speculative one; others, like Otto Pfeiderer of Berlin, ignore the element of revelation and prophecy. In proof that I do not misrepresent the trend of hermeneutical science, I quote from Reuss, whom no one will accuse of orthodox leanings. "This unquestionable fact, this tendency, namely, of the apostle to dwell with complacency on the consoling aspect of the future, and to pass by the other side of the picture, has perhaps contributed to foster in the minds of some theologians the belief in an ultimate restoration even of the condemned, and in a finally happy end for all creatures endowed with reason.... We can discover no trace of this doctrine in the writings of Paul. The only passage which might be construed to contain it elementarily is that in which it is said that after the appearing of Jesus Christ, and the resurrection of the dead, will come the end; that Christ having reigned till he has put all enemies, even the last enemy death, under his feet, will then deliver up the kingdom to the Father who gave it him, and thus God will at last be
all in all. To these last words the idea of universal restoration has been attached, but taking the wider passage we do not see that it contains anything more than has been set forth in the previous pages. Exegesis can find no more in these words. Nevertheless we admit that they may have a wider significance, if they are logically carried out to consequences not intended by the apostles. . . . But here commences the province of speculation; the duty of religious exegesis is simply to ascertain with scrupulous impartiality what are the statements really made by such writer."

In bringing this brief review to a conclusion I am well aware that there are many aspects of the great question of future retribution which the foregoing pages have not touched upon. But I feel confident that the grounds on which liberal theology chiefly bases its protest against the current interpretation of the New Testament teaching have been candidly set forth. Its demurrer—to recapitulate—embraces the following principal points:

1. Biblical interpretation has been unduly influenced by dogmatic theology.
2. The word αἰώνιος and its cognates have been erroneously defined.
3. The scriptural terms death, destruction, hell, and others have had a modern theological sense imposed upon them, which they did not originally bear.
4. Our Lord's discourses, studied in situ and historically interpreted, do not, as is generally supposed, teach the everlasting punishment of the wicked.
5. The teachings of the New Testament, as a whole, upon the subject, are wavering, inconsistent, or irreconcilable.

Without attempting to cover the ground of inquiry on each of these points, I have shown sufficient reason for suspecting the fundamental weakness of each objection, and sufficient to vindicate the deliverance of scientific exegesis. That deliverance, it may be affirmed without hesitation is this: *The New Testament documents teach the eternity of punishment*

not in single words merely, not in single sections or books, but in-wrought into the very tissue of their historically unfolded doctrine. The gospel as taught by our incarnate Lord proclaimed it; the gospel as taught by Paul proclaimed it; the gospel as taught by John proclaimed it. The three agree in one.

ARTICLE VII.

MUSIC AND CHRISTIAN EDUCATION.

BY EDWARD S. STEELE, OBERLIN, OHIO.

[Concluded from Vol. xiv. p. 723.]

In the former article conclusions were reached favorable to the Christian cultivation of music, both for specifically religious uses, and as an element in general culture. The inquiry now assumes the educational point of view, considering what the claims of music are relatively to those of other studies, and what the aims and instrumentalities of musical education in our time and country should be.

First, then, attention must be called to the large community of spirit and interest which subsists between the fine arts and the branches of an ordinary liberal education. Their sympathy becomes apparent when we consider that even the pursuit of the sciences, not excepting the physical, is largely prompted by an impulse which is at the bottom aesthetic. It is a quite mistaken assumption that the sole, or even the main, inspiration of the vast scientific investigations of modern times has been a regard for utility. This investigation, on the contrary, has been more an enthusiasm than a calculation; and even when use has been the avowed end the real moving power has been the unquenchable aspiration of man toward an orderly view of the world, an insight into its idea or plan, as an attainment on its own account valuable. Francis Bacon, indeed, places the true end of