ARTICLE VIII.

CRITICAL NOTES.

I.

THE NAME OF GOD AND THE CUNEIFORM INSCRIPTIONS.

Holy Scripture not only exalts God, but also gives special prominence to his name. The name of God occurs often where we would speak of God himself. Thus God says to Pharaoh (Ex. ix. 16), "I have raised thee up—that my name may be declared throughout the earth," i.e., that I may be known everywhere. So God speaks (Ex. xx. 24) of "places where I record my name." He also says of Solomon (2 Sam. vii. 13), "He shall build a house for my name." Compare 1 Chron. xxii. 8; 2 Chron. vi. 9; vii. 20. God speaks of his name being blasphemed (Isa. lii. 5); of its being great among the Gentiles (Mal. i. 11); of giving glory to his name (Mal. ii. 2); and of "you that fear my name" (Mal. iv. 2). The third commandment is, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain" (Ex. xx. 7). We are told to pray, not, "Be thou glorified," but "Hallowed be thy name" (Matt. vi. 9). And the glorified Redeemer commends one church because, to use his own words, "Thou holdest fast my name" (Rev. ii. 13), and another, "for thou hast not denied my name" (Rev. iii. 8).

All this constitutes a very marked usus loquendi; and without presuming either to account for it, or to call in question the common explanation of it, it is the object of this paper to inquire what light is thrown on this mode of speech by the cuneiform inscriptions.

It appears from them that just as the old realistic philosophy held that there is not only an idea in the mind when using words that denote genera and species, but also actual entities back of the words; so the old Babylonians held that names were things, not only representing objects, but themselves the equivalents of the things they represented. Thus the first line of an account of the creation reads, "When the heavens above had not yet announced, nor the earth beneath recorded a name," as though announcing or recording a name, and creating the things so named were equivalent acts. So it is written, lines 7-9 of the same tablet, "When the gods had not any of them come into being, were mentioned by no name,—then the great Gods were created," as if the gods came into being when names were assigned to them.

Their magical incantations also confounded together persons and their names. Many specimens of these have been found, and it only needed the name of a person to be inserted in the reading of a spell either to afflict him with disease or to heal him. The idea was that whatever was spoken concerning the name was done to the person that bore the name. The idea that incantations could injure by means of pictures, locks of hair, parings of nails, or even shreds of clothing seems to have originated in Babylonia, but the use of the name seems to have been the more common mode, because regarded as the more efficacious. The result was effected by means of spirits, who were supposed to have their abode in every created object. These spirits had power to confer good or inflict evil, mostly the last, though they were all under the control of "the great Gods," but both gods and spirits were under the dominion of fate, and the sorcerer had power to control this fate as he pleased. In other words, by using their names in his spells he could compel both gods and spirits to do his will,—so great potency lay in a name.

This identification of a name with its possessor made names the objects of supreme regard, and nowhere is this exhibited more forcibly than in the dreadful curses invoked by each Assyrian king on whomsoever should erase his name from his inscriptions. Two or three examples of these will suffice to show the extreme value attached to the record of the name, and even to the stone or clay on which it was recorded.

Tiglath Pileser I., in the original, Tugulti pal utsur, i.e., "The God in whom I trust (literally, my confidence) will protect my son," reigned B.C. 1131–1100, and writes as follows: 1 "In future days when the temple of the great Gods my Lords Anu and Rammanu, and these lofty ziggurat (towers) shall fall into decay, let whoever occupies the throne repair the falling edifice, anointed with oil, let him restore my written tablets to their places, and let him offer sacrifices. Let him also inscribe his own name along with mine on the renovated structure, and the great Gods Anu and Rammanu will keep him in gladness of heart and in the enjoyment of victory as they have kept me. But he who shall dash my inscriptions in pieces, cover them up, throw them in the waters, or burn them with fire, he who shall bury them in a grave (literally, the house of the pure god, i.e., Ia, the god of Hades), or put them in a place out of sight, and where no man goeth, he who shall erase the name which is written, substitute for it his own, and consign my records to an evil oblivion (literally, epoch of night), let the great Gods my Lords Anu and Asshur inflict on him terrible injury, and curse him with a dreadful curse. May they overthrow his kingdom, remove the very foundations of his throne, and swallow up the armies of his lordship. Besides causing the destruction of his soldiers, may they break his weapons and cause him ever to

1 See Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia, Vol. ii. p. 17, col. 1, l. 30; also Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, 330 and 442.

2 Inscriptions of Western Asia, Vol. i. p. 16, l. 50–88; also Professor Sayce's Elementary Grammar, pp. 111–113.
bow down in the presence of his enemies. May the God of storms (Rammanu) smite his land with destructive lightnings, fill it with famine, and strew it with corpses. Against his lordship may he utter his extremest curse, and cause his name and posterity to perish from the earth."

Over and above their estimation of names, these words remind us of that Scripture (Ps. cix. 17, 18), "Yea, he loved cursing, and it came unto him; he delighted not in blessing, and it was far from him; he clothed himself also with cursing as with his garment, and it came into his inward parts like water, and like oil into his bones."

Asshurbanipal (Asshur creates a son), who reigned B. C. 668–626, writes in gentler mood, "In the last days, let the ruler in whose reign this structure shall decay build up again its ruins. Let him write my name along with his own, my inscription may he see. Let him anoint with oil, sacrifices let him offer, and with his own inscription let him set it up, and the Sun God (Shamash) will hear his prayer. He who shall treacherously destroy my name, and the name of my beloved brother, he who will not inscribe my name along with his own, and with his inscription does not set it up, may the Sun God, who is Lord of all above and below, destroy him in anger, and may his name and posterity perish from the earth. Compare Ps. xli. 5, "When shall he die and his name perish?" also Ps. cix. 13, "Let his posterity be cut off and blotted out;" also Eccles. vi. 4, "His name shall be covered with darkness."

He also closes a long account of his rebuilding the palace where he was born in this unique manner: "When this Bitriduti (Harem) becomes old and ruinous, the name of whomsoever among the kings my sons, Asshur and Ishtar shall have then proclaimed ruler of the land and the people, let him repair its ruins. Let that remote descendant see the written record of my name, the name of my father, and my father's father. Let him anoint with oil and offer sacrifices, then place it along with the written record of his own name, and let all the great Gods named in this inscription confirm to him the power and glory they have bestowed on me. But whoever shall destroy the written record of my name, my father's name, and the name of the father of my father, and with his own inscription does not set it up, let Asshur (the god of Assyria), Sin (the moon god), Shamash (the sun god), Rammanu (the god of the atmosphere), Bil (Bel, the warrior of the gods), Nabu (Nebo, the god of intelligence), Ishtar of Nineveh (the Assyrian Aphrodite), the divine queen of Kidmuri (Is this a separate goddess?) Ishtar of Arbela (the Assyrian Bellona, goddess of war), Ninip (or Adar, or Uras the Assyrian war god), Nergal (the great lion, the god of Cutha, the death-dealing Lord of

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6 On this rendering see Professor Lyon's Manual, p. 75, top.

8 G. Smith's Assurbanipal, p. 314, 93, and p. 316, 111; also Inscriptions of Western Asia, Vol. v. p. 10, l. 108-120.
Hades), and Nusku (brilliance of the dawn, or Lord of the Zenith), judge him with a judgment worthy the naming of my name."

Could language set forth more forcibly the importance attached to a name than this entire extract from the inscriptions of Asshurbanipal in Bitriduti?

The risen Redeemer thus addresses the Church at Pergamos (Rev. ii. 17): "To him that overcometh, to him will I give of the hidden manna, and I will give him a white stone, and upon the stone a new name written." Here a gift is bestowed by way of reward, and on it is written a name. Asshurbanipal thus writes of Pharaoh Necho, "From among the rulers of Egypt I shewed favor to Nikuu and spared his life. I made with him a treaty more favorable than before. I clothed him with birmi (embroidered?) garments, and a chain of gold, the insignia of royalty I gave him, [Joseph was thus honored in Egypt (Gen. xli. 42), and Daniel had the promise of similar honor in Babylon (Dan. v. 6) rings of gold I bound upon his hands [compare Luke xv. 22], an iron girdle-dagger [so they are worn by Kurds and Arabs to-day] whose hilt was of gold, the naming of my name I wrote thereon and gave to him." No doubt that dagger was looked on by both the giver and receiver as the most precious of all the gifts, because of the royal name it bore, and who does not feel that all these things (from the records of a kindred race throw light on the Scripture usage respecting the name of God?

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7 Inscriptions of Western Asia, Vol. v. p. 2, l. 8-14; Professor Lyon's Manual, p. 48, l. 8-14; G. Smith's Assurbanipal, p. 27, l. 34-p. 28, l. 40.

II.

PARAPHRASE OF ROMANS V. 12-21.

Note.—I believe that the mind of the Spirit is in harmony with the highest reason, or, rather, that reason, if sufficiently enlightened, would ever be in accord with the mind of the Spirit. Consistently with this belief I must hold that if the interpretations of the divine word conflict with the declarations of reason, either there is a mistake in the interpretation or there is a fallacy in the reasoning or the premises of the reasoning are not stable.

This is suggested by the fact that some have taught that each of Adam's descendants is guilty of or for Adam's first transgression; and, if I mistake not, some have also affirmed this in very nearly the sense in which this language would now be understood. If the words of inspiration teach this doctrine anywhere, it is in Romans v. Of this passage I offer an interpretation, of the legitimacy of which careful students of the New Testament must judge.

ISAIAH DOLSE.

(12) Because of this (that solely by the redemption wrought by Christ we through faith attain to the favor of God and all the blessings of his love and grace), (there is presented the opportunity of illustrating the greatness of the work of Christ by instituting a comparison between its fruits and those of our first father's transgression, and it may be said) as through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death (or the penal suffering for sin); and thus

3 Death, the most dreaded and the last incident of penal suffering for sin that comes under observation here, by metonymy gives name to the full penalty.
death went throughout unto all men (penal suffering for sin reached men universally), upon which [ground it is evident] all men were chargeable with sin. For up to the time of law (as well as since) there was sin in the world. But (some one will perhaps say, this cannot be,) sin is not reckoned, if there is not law. On the contrary (there is full proof that all men are accounted sinners, even those who have not knowledge of law, since) death (or penal suffering for sin) reigned (or was dominant) from Adam to Moses over even those who had not sinned after the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is a type of him that was to come. But not as the offence, so also the act which procured the bestowment of the grace (this reached to results beyond comparison more stupendous); for if by the offence of the one the many died (if all those connected with Adam by natural generation all along the ages became subject to penal suffering), much more did the gracious kindness of God and his gift consequent upon the gracious kindness of the one man, Jesus Christ, come in superabundant measure to the many (to all those connected with Christ by regeneration). And not as that which ensued through one man's sin was the act which procured the conferring of the gift; for judgment became [to the many] condemnation from (or because of) one [offence]; but the act

It may be supposed that the apostle here pauses in his comparison, in order to set forth the tremendous consequences of Adam's transgression, that he may afterwards the more exalt Christ's work of redemption. This supposition accords with the apostle's manner of dictating his letters; and, if it helps to the only satisfactory interpretation, it may be regarded as required by the exigency of the thought. The preceding words suggested the inference immediately presented.

The infliction of penalty under a righteous government is demonstrative ground or proof that the sufferer was connected in some way with some transgression, so that he became in some sense chargeable with it.

For introduces an illustration of the statement that all men are chargeable with sin.

In the preceding sentence the apostle had personated an objector. Here he replies to the objection.

This fact shows that not only was he a sinner who, before the law came through Moses, violated some command, divinely communicated to him or handed down by tradition, or who offended his moral sense, or did that which he might have known to be wrong; but even those who had not consciously done evil, and could not have broken any command or sinned personally, infants and idiots, as being members of an organic whole, were constructively accounted sinners because of Adam's transgression. Considering the apostle's object, this argument need not be pressed to the logical outcome that Adam's posterity are guilty of and for his sin; but it does show that the whole race are sufferers through their progenitor's transgression (in which God cannot be unjust), and thus serves the apostle's purpose, enabling him to present Adam and Christ under analogous aspects, the one as mightily affecting all connected with him by natural descent, the other as still more affecting all connected with Him by spiritual birth.

The Greek noun in each case ends in μα, and etymologically may have an active meaning as interpreted above, as δικαιωμα certainly must.

The many in each case denotes all who are accounted as a posterity. The superabundant measure of the gift of grace is a measure, the lower limit of which is to be forthwith stated.

δι with the next word takes the place of a subject nominative.

eμυ, often understood, with εις and the accusative, is the formula for expressing transition to another condition or quality.
which procured the bestowment of the grace\(^5\) became [to the many] justification\(^5\) from many offences\(^7\) (reaching to satisfaction for all the offences of those who through faith become partakers of the benefits of the propitiatory sacrifice, as well as to their discharge at length from the penal suffering that befalls them in consequence of Adam's transgression.\(^1\) But beyond this, beyond a simple acquittal from one and all offences reaches the grace, the bestowment of which the act of Christ procured.\(^1\) For if by the offence\(^5\) of the one [man Adam] death reigned through (or by means of) that one, much more shall those who receive the abounding measure of the gracious gift of justification reign in life (be exalted as to royal state and life for ever) through the one [man] Jesus Christ.\(^1\) Now then, as that which ensued through one offence\(^5\) became condemnation\(^9\) to all men (to the many connected with Adam by natural descent), so that which ensued through one act of satisfaction\(^6\) to the requirements of justice\(^7\) became life-giving justification to all men (to the many connected with Christ by spiritual birth).\(^1\) For as through the disobedience of the one man [Adam] the many were constituted sinners, so also through the obedience of the one [man Jesus Christ] shall the many be constituted just\(^1\) (before the law).\(^1\) But (exceeding this is the overflowing fulness of all the blessings because of the act of satisfaction, for) law came along with [the state of sinfulness and condemnation through Adam's lapse] that\(^1\) offending\(^5\) might abound [beyond the first offending of Adam]. But where sin abounded (and this was in all who attained to any knowledge of good and evil), grace exceeded;\(^2\) that as sin was dominant in conjunction with [its attendant penalty] death, so also grace might reign through justification unto eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.

III.

NATURAL AND SPIRITUAL LAW.

Rev. James Scott, D. D., LL. D., of Aberdeen, Scotland, has published a clear and concise pamphlet in review of Professor Drummond's book following the line of the ablest criticism upon it. Dr. Robert Watts, Professor of Theology at Belfast, says of the thesis of the book, that it \"cannot be accepted either by scientists or theologians.\" Dr. Scott pronounces its ground \"sloping and slippery.\" After discriminating tersely forces, properties, and

\(^{1}\) The foregoing statement is some ground for the inference that Christ's act of satisfaction places those who depart this life without actual transgression in as good a condition at the least as that in which they would have been, had Adam not fallen; that, if being is continued to them, it cleanses them from the taint of an inherited sinful nature, and thus fits them to join in the worship of the redeemed.

\(^{2}\) The apostle here returns to the comparison which he began in verse 12, but in resuming conforms his words to what intervenes.

\(^{3}\) This verse no more proves the culpability of Adam's posterity for his sin than it proves merit in the redeemed for the redemption wrought by Christ.

\(^{4}\) This must be interpreted as a subordinate and incidental end, not as final cause.
laws, and showing that the nature of a law depends upon the nature of the substance in which it obtains, he shows how Professor Drummond mistates the question at issue. It is not whether science rests on facts, while religion does not; nor is it whether matter and spirit are one; nor whether scientific method can be used in theology; nor whether analogy is valid in religion; nor whether law, in some of its changing and confusing senses, is continuous. But it is simply whether known analogies between the two worlds of matter and mind establish an identity of law in both.

Dr. Scott maintains that the interchange of analogy and identity throughout the author's argument is "illicit and sophistical." "The laws of both worlds, like their forces and phenomena, are merely similar, and not the same." The assertion of their identity leads to materialism, or to idealism. It cannot consist with the separate dual existence of matter and mind. Monism is its goal. "If the law of both worlds be one, their substance, forces, and phenomena must also be one, or mere modes or modifications of one another. Mind would be merely a mode of matter, and the spiritual world but a form of the natural world." Freedom and responsibility would disappear. The moral tendencies of Professor Drummond's theory are "even worse" than the logical or theological. It "would reduce the whole realm of the spiritual world to the low level of natural religion, if not even of evolution."

But the principle asserted is an impracticable one. It cannot be applied to the incarnation or the atonement "as lying within the range of natural law." Nor to the resurrection as evidencing no greater power than plant-life, or regeneration as taking hold of souls literally dead, as mineral matter is. Continuity of physical uniformity does not here hold good. But this "nullifies the whole argument." Action and reaction may be said to be "opposite and equal to each other in matter and mind, but unless their forces be also the same," i.e., unless the words mean identically the same thing in mind, as in matter, "the laws" of action and reaction "cannot be identical." A "moral law of gravitation," so-called, as between man and man and man and Christ, "cannot be identical with the natural (law), which is directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance."

This is the ground taken in these pages (Bib. Sac., vol. xlii. pp. 270-290, April, 1885). Professor R. A. Lipsius (Jena), in the next succeeding issue of the Theologischer Jahresbericht (1885), supports the criticism here made, and treats the book as of very little account. He commends thoroughly the protest here made against the teaching of the book, and repeats his judgment in the Jahresbericht for 1886, referring a second time to the article in this Review. It is most desirable that analogy, as employed in science, religion, literature, be clearly discriminated from other things confounded with it. The books of logic, which ought to give definitions to critics, are here sadly deficient. Dr. Scott seems to use the word only in the sense in which scientific men employ it, as a means of classification, and in this sense it is doubtful whether identity of law can be denied as he denies it. Very properly throwing upon Professor Drummond the burden of proof as to uni-
formity of physical facts in the domain of spirit, and very justly suggesting that his remark that gravitation holds good in mind, if it be "in any sense material" (!), indicates "stress of weather," he seems to blend two sorts of analogy, that which brings objects under the same classification, and therefore, of course, under identical law, and that which does not. "Analogy was known and employed before true science began. Analogy, or a radical agreement between things or phenomena, has been more or less understood and acted on by the sages and saints of all ages." But can it be said that in one and the same unchanged sense it is alike "a first principle of all philosophy, the basis of inductive logic, the basis of all language, and specially of all poetry and parable"? or, that its value is "not only illustrative but evidential"? What evidence, in the proper logical sense, is there in poetry or parable? In loose popular and literary language an illustration is often said to be in itself a conclusive argument, but not by those who know well the difference between what is called analogical reasoning and logical. Some of Professor Drummond's asserted identities of law do not even amount to analogical reasoning, any more than does ordinary metaphor or simile. Dr. Scott well says: "We must be careful not to convert metaphors into literal or natural laws, and thereby travesty the language of all science, ethics, and religion." We are to "distinguish between analogy and identity on the one hand, and analogy and mere resemblance on the other." The organs of the ape are similar to the physical organs of the man, but they are not the same; [i. e., scientifically, by classification]. The frost-work on a window resembles the structure of a flower, but it is not analogous to it" [i. e., in the scientific sense of analogy, "radical agreement between things or phenomena."] There is something here which needs clearing up for the sake of truth—the analogy recognized in science, and that which is here called "mere resemblance"—and sound logic furnishes all that is needful for accomplishing it. And when it is done, writers like the author of this excellent little pamphlet will not assert that it is both "illustrative and evidential," "at once the language and the logic of thinkers and writers from the days of the prophecy of Jacob, the poetry of Moses and the prophecy of Solomon, down to the parables of Jesus, the philosophy of Bacon, the poetry of Shakespeare, and the analogy of Butler." It is very desirable that the critical judgment of experts on such questions should not be overridden by mere popular acceptance on other grounds than the true ones.