

ARTICLE IX.

NEW TESTAMENT NOTES.

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I. St. Matt. vi. 11, τὸν ἄρτον. . . τὸν ἐπιούσιον, and so St. Luke xi. 3. For the explanation of the difficult word ἐπιούσιον here, comp. Plato, *Crito*, § 2, οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ πλοῖον) ἤξειν ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. In this, since ἐτέρας must mean "next" or "other of two," the only possible sense of ἐπιούσης is "the present (day)." And this is confirmed by the context just above § 1. For, when Crito comes to Socrates at the prison, the time is noted as being "peep of day" (ὄρθρος βαθύς). They fall into conversation and Crito says, "The vessel is not come in, but I think she will arrive to-day (τῆμερον)." Socrates (§ 2) replies, "If the gods will, so be it; but I don't think she will come to-day (τῆμερον);" and proceeds with the sentence first quoted, using the phrase τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας. It is quite plain, then, that Socrates denies or doubts what Crito conjectures, and that τῆς ἐπ. ἡμ. must be=τῆμερον just as τῆς ἐτέρας is=αὔριον. Thus τὸν ἐπιούσ., applied to ἄρτον, adjectivally, is=ἄρτον τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας. This leaves open the question, what the true etymology of ἐπιούσιος may be, save that it plainly points to the partic. ἐπιούσα (whether ἐπιλοῦσα or ἐπιὸ οὔσα) as furnishing the clue. I incline to ἐπι-λὼν = "passing over," taking ἐπ in a static sense. This sense of ἐπιούσης in Plato is different from that which prevails in the use of that participle as applied to time in Greek classic writers. Thus ἡ ἐπιούσα λαμπάς. . . θεοῦ Eurip., *Med.*, 352, is the morrow. But in *Phæn.* 1651, where most editions follow Porson in reading τὴν ἰούσαν ἡμέραν, that scholar notes

that ἐπιούσαν is found in *codices plerique*, but objects to it on grounds which do not touch the meaning; which must be, “the day that then is,” or “is passing,” in short=σήμερον. And so Aristoph., *Thesmoph.*, 870, μὴ φεῦσον, ὦ Ζεῦ, τῆς ἐπιούσης ἐλπίδος, it seems certain that “the momentary hope” must be intended. Thus the sense of ἐπιούσα (of time) is not uniform. I have nowhere seen any of these passages adduced in the discussion of this much debated phrase of the Lord’s prayer. But I may compare the use of the word “presently” in English. It used to mean (*e.g.*, St. Matthew xxvi. 53, “He shall *presently* give me,” etc.) at once, on the instant. But now, if I say “I will do it presently,” I mean I will *not* do it at once, but at some later time:—a paulo post future, in short.

ON FORMULÆ OF CITATION and specially on ἡ γραφή λέγει, James iv. 5.

These formulæ are so different in our modern day of minute subdivision and precise reference, that we often overlook them in the more loose and general mode of reference current in olden times. An instance is probably Mark ii. 26, ἐπὶ Ἀβιάθαρ τοῦ ἀρχιερέως, where a difficulty arising from the fact that Abimelech not Abiathar (1 Samuel xxi. 1 ff.), was actually high priest at the time, is sometimes surmounted by an over-refined distinction between ἐπὶ ἀρχιερέως Ἀβιάθαρ (*cf.* Luke iii. 2, ἐπὶ ἀρχιερέως Ἀννὰ καὶ Καϊάφα) and the phrase as above—a preciseness in the use of the article which is foreign both to the New Testament and the LXX. If, however, we understand the reference to be to *the section* of the Old Testament, which introduces Abiathar as prominent (although he became more so further on), and is therefore designated by his name, the difficulty vanishes. The same is noticeable at Luke xx. 37, Μωσῆς ἐμήνυσεν ἐπὶ τῆς (al. leg. τοῦ) βάλτου, where “in the section of the Bush” is intended. It is probable that ἐν Ἠλίᾳ, Rom. xi. 2, is a formula of the same kind, not of course a precise one of authorship, but a general one of subject. Owing to accident of idiom, however, these references fall into the same form as those which

designate either date or authorship, and are liable to be confused with them. Thus *ἐπι* with the genitive is well known as a formula of date, *e. g.*, *ἐπι Κλαυδίου*, Acts xi. 28, while *ἐν τῷ Ὁσση*, Rom. ix. 25, and *ἐν Δαυίδ*, Heb. iv. 7, designate no doubt *authors* as such. We may suppose that these designations of sections were at first popular only, and, having grown into general acceptance, were not displaced when the Old Testament passed into the closer handling of the scribes. Thus the names "Genesis, Exodus, Numbers," attest the same principle to this day; compare also, "the Cow," etc., attached to various sections of the Quorān.

A very much disputed reference of citation is found in *ἡ γραφή λέγει*, James iv. 5. In order to make our exegesis well founded, we must review the previous context. St. James is rebuking the lustful heart, whose insatiate cravings lead to strife and bloodshed and whose prayers therefore fail of their effect; which review ends with a clause in which the words and punctuation, given by the best authorities, seem in conflict with A. V. and R. V.; as, . . . *ἵνα ἐν ταῖς ἡθοναῖς ὑμῶν δαπανήσητε, μοιχαλίδες*. Both versions make the clause end with the verb; and A. V. reads *μοιχοὶ καὶ μοιχαλίδες*, without due authority. (iv. 1-3). Whether, however, we construct *μοιχαλίδες* with verse 3, or verse 4, is of little moment. He passes on to dwell on a special lust, which not only wars within a man (verse 1), but wars against God and is his declared enemy (verse 4)—that of adultery. In no one sin are the world and the flesh so closely allied, perhaps, as in breaches of the seventh commandment.

Some commentators diverge here into the notion of spiritual adultery, *i. e.*, idolatry; but this seems unsuited to the simple directness of St. James, as well as to the very plain previous context. Then comes verse 5, *ἣ δοκεῖτε ὅτι κενῶς ἡ γραφή λέγει πρὸς φθόνον ἐπιποθεῖ τὸ Πνεῦμα ὃ κατῴκησεν (or κατῴκησεν) ἐν, ἡμῶν*. These last words which follow *λέγει* (or *λέγει πρὸς φθόνον*, if that is the connection) should certainly be a quotation, as is the clause which follows *διὸ λέγει* in verse 6. But no quotation to that effect or anything like it is to be found in our

LXX. or Hebrew. Nor have I been able to find an instance in which *ἐπιποθέω* is used in a bad sense, "lusteth" as A. V.¹ I think then a lacuna must be conceded here. Suppose, *e. g.*, such a quotation as the second commandment, the "Lord your God is a jealous God," to have dropped out, then the sense following is suitable, understanding *φθόνος* as in paraphrase=*ζῆλος*;—"the spirit which he has lodged within us, longs for us even to jealousy, but bestows a greater grace,"—*i. e.*, is more powerful to win than his jealousy to punish us. There is certainly an instance in which *ζηλώω* appears as=*φθονέω* in Num. xi. 29, *μή ζηλοῖς ἐμέ*, (an inexact rendering of the Heb.), where A. V. is "enviest thou for my sake?" and R. V., "art thou jealous for my sake?" I do not think *λέγει* can be taken absolutely, "speakest," *i. e.*, as=*λαλεῖ*. Nor is *λέγει πρὸς φθόνον*, as if=*πρὸς τὸν φθονερόν*, (abstract for concrete) suitable to the simplicity of St. James.

I will only add that *κατόπισεν* seems better supported than *κατόπησεν*, although the difference is in sense unimportant. If in the first copy made from the original, through homoioteleuton or otherwise, the quotation following the first *λέγει* dropped out, it may have influenced all now extant copies, since no chain is stronger than its weakest link. To such accidents transcription is liable from the very first stage throughout. The attempts to make sense where no connection really exists are foolish and fruitless. To recognize an actual loss is nearer the truth than to pretend that all is entire, which is what both the A. V. and the R. V. seem here to do.

¹ Of *ἐπιποθέω* in a good sense we have instances, Ps. xli. 1; lxxxiii. 2; cxviii. 131.