ARTICLE IV.

REMARKS ON BIBLICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

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The question "What is man?" remains, as it has ever been, the chief problem of philosophy; a problem which may be attacked by three different methods. The first is the method of experiment, which groups together the facts given in physiology, in the individual consciousness, and in the history of our race. The second is the method of intuition, which determines a priori the essential idea of the constitution of humanity, thence deducing what the facts must be. The third is the method of revelation, which gathers authoritative statements of the facts of human nature from the pages of Scripture. These three methods give rise respectively to empirical, rational, and biblical psychology. The first answers the question, What do we find man to be? the second, What do we prove man to be? the third, What does God declare man to be? This last science would transform the ancient maxim "Know thyself" into a humble prayer, "Lord, teach me to know myself."

The early Christian Fathers have left several attempts in the direction of biblical psychology; but science, in the modern sense, was unknown then, and it is an open question, even yet, whether the scattered materials found in the divine Word are capable of systematic arrangement. It must be granted, doubtless, that whoever would thus present them should have a single eye to the unforced

sense of the many terms and texts involved. He must not start, for example, with the avowed intention of discovering nothing contrary to the Lutheran creed, nor be constrained to apologize for many unproved theories. There is a place for ingenious human speculations, and their value should not be depreciated; but they should have no place in a professed system of biblical psychology. It is a light thing to incur the censure of Dr. Delitzsch against "the exact critics who have no taste for a gnosis exercised in biblical paths;" for we deny that gnosis plus exegesis is equal to scriptural synesis. Still, the work of this author (whose title is given above) remains the chief attempt at a system in the science before us, and it certainly deserves a careful review, a compliment it has not yet received, I think, on this side the Atlantic. The two other books mentioned are much slighter, Dr. Beck's in quantity, Mr. Heard's in quality also. With the latter it would be needless to detain ourselves, were it not that an honorable position has been sometimes accorded to it (for instance, in Blunt's Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theology).

Mr. Heard appears to have read many good books, but to have digested them poorly. He claims to have originated the thought that conscience is all that is left of the human Pneuma since the fall, whereas this view was so common in the Middle Ages, that Delitzsch (p. 164, n. 2) simply ascribes it to "the scholastics" (cf. p. 398 n.). The lapse of memory, if such it be, is a curious one, for Mr. Heard acknowledges great obligations to Delitzsch, yet the latter (p. 397) quotes from von Zezschwitz this very definition: "Conscience is the remains of spirit in the psychical man." Again, in the remarks on Gen. ii. 7 (pp. 41, 42) the four causes of the creation of man are taken,

1 Both these positions are taken by Delitzsch, Preface pp. ix and xi.

2 So far as I am aware, this remains true (1885), though the present article was written in 1878. Compare the editorial note on my Meaning of Nephesh, Bib. Sac., 1880, p. 202.
without credit, from Caspar Bartholinus (see Delitzsch p. 28). Mr. Heard almost ignores the Old Testament, with the dictum that its psychology must be expected to be imperfect. His fundamental misconceptions may be indicated by a single statement: "Ruach refers to what we should now call the soul, and Nephesh to what we should now call the body." The remark in the preface: "Thus the distinction between applied and pure mechanics exactly expresses the distinction between the present work and Delitzsch's Psychologie" is worthy only of a smile. A far different character belongs to Beck's "Outlines." This pamphlet, for it is nothing more in its original form, may be called both the earliest and the latest of recent studies in biblical psychology, the first edition having appeared in 1843, the third in 1877. A careful comparison of the first edition with the English translation of the third, reveals very little change in the body of the work, while the few additional notes, though interesting, are the part which could be most easily spared. The work owes its suggestion doubtless to the pioneer labors of Roos (1769), but has the great advantage over his treatise of a regular principle of classification, being as even Delitzsch tells us "the first attempt to reduce biblical psychology into a scientific form." The three parts of the book examine the life of the human soul as Nephesh, as affected by Ruach, and as centred in Lebh. The fullest and by far the most satisfactory of these divisions is the last, Nephesh being treated quite inadequately. Beck's results agree mainly with those of Delitzsch, when common ground is traversed. We shall make further references to the "Outlines" as we proceed.  

The immense and varied scholarship of Dr. Delitzsch has been often recognized in this country by favorable

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1 Many would welcome an American reprint of this little book, which might reduce its unreasonable expense, and bring it into contact (let us hope) with a large number of our thoughtful biblical students.
notices of his commentaries. We find the same recondite learning evidenced at every page of the Psychology, often intruding indeed (as we have hinted) upon the proper vocation of the interpreter. But due credit should be given to the admirable candor so manifest throughout the book and to the delightful Christian spirit which it everywhere breathes. Dr. Delitzsch has chosen the historical order for the development of his system, starting from God's eternal idea of humanity, proceeding to its partial realization in our first parents, with its partial frustration in their apostasy, depicting next the present condition of fallen man, then the way of salvation, then the changes experienced at and after death, and concluding with the resurrection state. A moment's thought will show that this may as well be called a logical as an historical order. The general question "What is man?" comprises the subordinate questions, What is his origin? What is his nature? What are his possibilities here and hereafter? or Whence is he? Where is he? Whither is he bound? We shall find that the seven divisions of the "Biblical Psychology" may be readily arranged under these seven interrogations.

But is there a biblical psychology? Can we claim for it the rank of a science? This question is examined at the outset. Harless, Hofmann, and others maintain that we are not to expect from Scripture a science of the soul, any more than a science of the universe. Its psychological statements are given only as connected with the history of redemption, and are entirely insufficient to be made into a system. Delitzsch replies that the fact that Scripture concerns itself solely with the history of redemption is the very differentia of biblical from empirical and rational psychology; but that the references of the Bible to the soul so vastly exceed its references to the universe as to form a store-house of divinely attested facts, which we have as good right to search and collate in the
interest of psychology, as to search and collate the Scriptures in the interest of dogmatics.

We shall now attempt to present the system of Dr. Delitzsch as concisely and fairly as possible, for the most part in our own words, putting all comments, for the sake of clearness, into the form of foot-notes. We shall follow our author's order in the main, grouping together, however, similar subjects treated in different parts of the book, and in such cases making it easy to verify our epitome by reference to pages.

I. WHENCE IS MAN?

From eternity; as is witnessed at once by Scripture and by consciousness. God hath set eternity in the innermost core of every human heart (Ecc. iii. 11). The time-world comes forth from eternity and returns into it again. Yet the doctrine of pre-existence, absurd in the form of metempsychosis, is unscriptural even as held by Kant and Müller; since the Bible refers the whole history of humanity to Adam, since it sets limits between class and class, since it makes death the end of each man's temporal history (cf. pp. 545-551). There is however an ideal pre-existence of man in the eternal counsel of God, which respected not only the genus man, but the entire life of each individual (Jer. i. 5; 1 Pet. i. 2; Rom. ix. 22, etc.). God from eternity knows himself as the ground of a world to be, which is not himself; man exists eternally in this Ideal-world, which Scripture calls ἡ πασχαλή and σοφία. Prov. viii. 22-31 refers not to the Logos but to the eternal archetype of creation, here personified.

God is no exception to the general law that every inner must have an outer; the Triune has eternally effected an impersonal, seven-fold, manifestation of Himself to Himself, namely, the doxa, or ideal world. This manifestation is not the personal God, but is variously termed in Scripture the glory of God, the (uncreated) heaven of his dwelling-place, the light which surrounds him, the rainbow round about the throne, etc. Identical with these also are
the seven spirits of Rev. i. 4 and of Isa. xi. 2 \(^1\) (cf. pp. 58-63 with 222-230). God is thus All in All. From his own Infinite Substance proceed the everlasting archetypes realized in the work of creation.

II. WHAT IS MAN’S ORIGIN?

1. His original formation.

Geologic discoveries powerfully confirm the doctrine of Scripture that man is the crown of creation. The Bible makes it clear that Nature has realized this triumph through no unconscious development, but through successive steps effected by creative words. The process of creation is to be interpreted in a literal, though not a crudely literal way. We are not to suppose “that God formed a clod of earth into a human form, and standing near it, breathed into it, from without, the breath of life” (p. 88). But yet the hand of God (his power) wrought creatively on the moist, red earth of Eden, penetrating it, and transforming it into an articulate organism before it became self-living by the breathing of the Divine breath (pp. 92, 93). This expiration from God was the created spirit of Adam, a conscious, individual existence, which instantly and rightfully lorded it over the entire bodily organism.\(^7\)

But the earth which constituted that organism had been already for unnumbered centuries cursed on account of sin, the whole creation groaning and travailing together (p. 74). Since man was not yet in existence this universal discord must have been the punishment of the sin of fallen angels. The brief hints of Scripture (1 John iii. 8; John viii. 44; Eph. vi. 12, [σκότος]; Luke x. 18, cf. Isa. xiv. 12) accord with the theory that the earth as first created was the home of angels, that these with Satan at their head revolted against God, in consequence of which they were

\(^1\) What can be meant by impersonal spirits? And who, unconstrained by a theory, would venture to call ἅπαξ impersonal? Delitzsch gives due credit here to Jacob Böhme and the Cabala.

\(^7\) The statement here (p. 96) with regard to the usage of the LXX is erroneous; see Ezek. xlvii. 9.
banished to the regions of darkness, and the earth was
overwhelmed with fire, the *débris* of that conflagration
being the *tohu wabohu* of Gen. i. 2. (Elsewhere, *tohu*
always denotes either a void, or a desolation by the judg­
ment of God, especially by fire.)

The conquest of primeval sin being complete, God
enthroned upon the newly-fashioned earth another ruler,
created in his own image. Man's likeness to God consists
not solely, though primarily, in his spirit; the entire man
is a created representation of the entire absolute life of
the Trinity. The world itself was created in the form of
God (p. 86), and it, and especially man, stands to the God­
head in a similar relation of likeness to that which the Son
of God bears to the Father.

2. Man's original constituent elements.

Is man twofold or threefold? body and spirit, or body,
soul, and spirit? Scripture seems to accord sometimes
with one view (Matt. vi. 25, Jas. ii. 26) sometimes with the
other (1 Thess. v. 23; Heb. iv. 12). Spirit and matter are
antitheses in the Bible (Gen. i. 2), and so even spirit and
flesh (Gen. vi. 3; Isa. xxxii. 3; John vi. 63). Man is the synthesis
of these two elements (Gen. ii. 7). But even here we meet
a third somewhat, נפש, related to פnings נפש (ם and פnings are
never coupled) as effect to cause; therefore spirit and
soul cannot absolutely coincide. 1 Thess. v. 23 analyzes
man into πνεῦμα, φυσική, and σώμα, three essential elements,
though not essentially distinct; and Heb. iv. 12 mentions
the dividing asunder of the soul and the spirit. These
are separable elements, but there is no gulf between them;
they are not distinct *natures*; the soul belongs to the side
of the spirit over against the body. Spirit and soul are
of one nature, but distinct *substances*; the latter is an emana­
tion from the former. According to Gen. ii. 7 the human

1 See however Deut. xxxii. 10; Job vi. 18; xii. 24; Ps. cvii. 40, where the meaning
is a desert, with no reference to divine judgment. *Tohu* occurs only
twenty times, and no better word could be found to express the common
conception of chaos. The occasion for the above theory vanishes, if we
accept the doctrine of anticipative consequences.
soul is related to the human spirit just as the brute soul is related to the Absolute Spirit. According to 1 Cor. ii.14; iii.3; xv.45; Jude 19, man who ought to be πνευματικός is in consequence of sin ψυχικός and σαρκικός (cf. p. 398); when he is delivered from sin, the spirit is renewed (Ps. li.10; Tit. iii.5) and it then concentrates its new life upon the soul. The relation of soul to spirit resembles that of the Divine doxa to the Trinity (Prov. xx. 27; 1 Cor. ii. 11; cf. Matt. vi.22; Gen. xliv.6; Ps. vii.6, etc., especially Ps. xxiv. 4 [K'ri]). Spirit is the inward being of soul, soul the outward nature of spirit. The life of man began in unconsciousness. His spirit was created holy, but it found the body not yet stamped with that holiness with which only the free choice of the spirit could permeate it; the problem of human life was to bring the entire man into captivity to God's will, thus sanctifying not only humanity but Nature, so that the universe might reflect the divine ideal (pp. 120 ff., 253, 262, 266). This transformation could be effected only through the soul, and when completed, man would be πνευματικός. That was not first which was spiritual, but that which was psychical; afterward the whole man was to be elevated from ψυχική ρωσια to πνεύμα ωσων. Herein we see the ethical design of the soul.

3. The origin of sex.

Human history has absolute unity of beginning. Since Eve was formed out of Adam, all that became distinctive in her must have been previously in him. As first created, man was externally sexless (so the glorified man will be, Luke xx.35; 1 Cor. vi. 13), but internally he was the synthesis of the male and female principles, which were sep-

1 Conceive of a winter harbor, frozen over near the shore. Let the shore represent body, the ice soul, the open water of the harbor finite spirit, the ocean infinite spirit. Here are two natures, two essences (earth and water), but three substances. Ice belongs to the side of water by nature, but differs in condition, forming the bridge to earth. The comparison can easily be extended. It occurred to the present writer, as he was endeavoring to make the theory of Delitzsch thinkable. The trichotomists are welcome to it, if it serves their purpose.
arated when Eve was formed. The male principle in man was the spirit; the female, the soul. In general, the distinction of woman from man coincides with that of soul from spirit. We admire a noble spirit in man, a beautiful soul in woman. Activity and receptivity, self-conscious energy and resigned passiveness, express the contrast between either pair. To Eve, as more sensual than Adam, the tempter first approaches. Man as such has his definite character from the prevalence of the spirit, woman from that of the soul.

4. The continuous origin of the human race.

Is it wholly explained by propagation, or is each spirit immediately created? This ancient problem has important bearings upon the history of redemption. We must decide for traducianism, for (a) When woman was created there was no new inbreathing of the breath of life; her spirit already existed in man's. (b) The work of creation was finished in six days. Since then God only governs. (c) Unless man's spirit were derived from Adam, he could not inherit his guilt. If creationism were true, "it could not continue to be an absolute necessity for the human spirit to subject itself slavishly to the sinful σάρξ of Adam." (d) Christ has his entire nature from Mary; only thus is he capable of redeeming humanity thoroughly.

To say that spirit cannot propagate itself is to deny the eternal generation of the Son of God, and the procession of the Holy Ghost, and also of the doxa. Heb. xii. 9 is indeed a classical proof-text for creationism, but it simply

If we grant the distinction of soul from spirit, yet when we regard the πνεῦμα as the organ of the new life, woman appears prevalingly spiritual, man prevalingly psychical. Apart from the numerical preponderance of Christian women, the nature of woman, when fully developed, seems more instinctively at harmony with the unseen world than man's. Her intuition of divine things attests the prevalence of the πνεῦμα τοῦ νόει (p. 217).

If creationism proves true, we shall not shed many tears over the loss of this absolute necessity. Cf. on this controversy the brief summary in Beck's "Outlines" p. 10 n. 2.
refers back the act of the human father to its ultimate cause in a divine creative impulse, continued from the first creation.

III. WHERE IS MAN?

Fallen, through sin, from the estate wherein he was created. Sin began in the spirit, which was led to suspect God's love, and is thenceforth by nature detached from that love, its normal element. Death was the penalty denounced against sin, but the spirit cannot die as the body dies; it is uncompounded. It might be punished with the loss of consciousness, but is not, for the evil spirits are conscious, and the spirits in Hades (see also Ecc. xii.7, 14). But spiritual death means discord of the spiritual powers, turba. Before sin entered, God's love ruled the spirit, the spirit ruled the soul, and through it the body; thenceforth the spirit lost the love of God and the dominion of the soul, while the body was doomed to return to its dust. But that the condition of man was not rendered hopeless by the fall appears from the shame and fear which seized our first parents, as also from the living testimony of conscience. Conscience is not the voice of God within us, but the active consciousness of a law which God has written on the heart; to which law it bears a similar relation to that which the Jewish prophets sustained to the law of Moses (Rom. ii. 15; ix. 1; Isa. xxiv. 5). Divine love did not leave the guilty pair to the sting of conscience; though life in God was lost, God from without approached them with the promise of redemption, to be realized by faith. When a reunion between God and man is thus effected, "the primitive condition of love renews itself, as in its budding commencement" (p. 175).

IV. WHAT IS MAN'S NATURE?

We begin from the centre of humanity and proceed outwards to the bodily life.

1 Delitzsch here agrees closely with Beck, (pp. 88-100) and, strange to say, without once naming him, though we find fifteen other authorities
1. The Ego. This is distinct from spirit, soul, and body, as in the scriptural phrases םירבד, י(photo, etc. On the other hand, the Ego sometimes includes the whole man, ירבד, etc. That which comprehends itself as Ego is a person. From man's personal life, which is free, is distinguished his natural life (the state into which he was born); this is conditioned without his knowledge and will. Spirit, soul, and body are naturally determined before man's personal conduct begins. But man may either apprehend himself as Ego within the natural life, or elevate himself above it into the likeness of God. Herein is the mystery of free-will. Man is free to choose since no outward will constrains him; but he is not free, since he has allowed sin to enslave him. He can never be absolutely indifferent to the contrasts of good and evil (1 Pet. ii.16).

2. The Spirit. Man being in the image of God, his spirit is threefold like God's. The eternal process of the Trinity we apprehend as Will, Thought, and Experience. The Father in begetting wills an infinite object of love; He knows Himself in the Only-begotten, the perfect image of his thought; the mutual love of these two gives rise to an experience of love, in the third hypostasis. The human spirit also is a trine of will, thought, and experience. These elements are partially distinguished even in the Old Testament by the terms פִּיו, יָוָה and יָה. But in the New Testament we find a clearer analogue; νοῦς, λόγος, πνεῦμα τοῦ νοῶς. That by which the spirit thinks and wills is νοῶς; the product of νοῶς is λόγος (not ratio, but oratio); the innermost life of the spirit is in intuition or experience, πνεῦμα τοῦ νοῶς (Eph. iv. 23, cf. Rom. xii. 2). This latter is sometimes expressed by the single term cited. It is but fair to add, on the other hand, that the note in the "Outlines" (pp. 96-99) is of later date than Delitzsch's work.

1 Despite our author's slighting reference to Beck (p. 207) I regard the latter's treatment of νοῶς as not only fuller and more scriptural, but even clearer, than that of Delitzsch. It should be well mastered (Beck, pp. 60-77).
By nature, this inmost experience is not directed to God's love; hence man must be renewed τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοῦ, and then God and the soul commune immediately in this sanctuary of the heart (Luke i. 47; John xiv. 23, Phil. iv. 7).

3. The Soul. Man being in the image of God, his soul is the likeness of the Divine doxa. As the latter is the link between the Creator and the creature, so the soul binds the spirit to the body. Like the doxa, the soul is the sevenfold reflection of the light of the spirit, while it is also the sevenfold organ whereby the spirit can transform the body. "The soul is the double-sided mid-nature which unites matter and spirit, as the seven-colored rainbow, originating from the effect of the sun on the dark cloud, symbolizes the willingness of the heavenly to permeate the earthly, and, according to the tradition, is the bridge (ἐπισ fr. εἰρέω) between heaven and earth" (p. 265). Scripture cannot be said, perhaps, to reveal this relation between the soul and the doxa; yet it accords with it. The process of the doxa from the Trinity is indeed in eternal free-will, and therein contrasted with the unconscious emanation of the human soul from the spirit; still, the seven spirits before the throne correspond to seven powers in the soul of man. In itself the soul (like the

1 Delitzsch remarks here: "What kind of a πνεῦμα this is, is to be gathered, although it has escaped the commentators, from 1 Cor. xiv." But was not his own view suggested, probably, by Bengel in loco, as quoted by Clemmens on p. 463 of this very Psychology? In the passage from Anastasius of Sinai (p. 220), readers of Longfellow will recognize the original of a stanza in the "Golden Legend." Decency, as well as reverence, might well protest against another quotation (p. 202) from an author happily anonymous, which draws out a fancied resemblance between the divine and human acts of begetting. Though Delitzsch cries sit venia, the production seems all but blasphemous. Our author says in this connection: "We are nothing but stammering children." But it is possible to be something worse.

2 I ignore the theosophic subtleties about the darkness, fire, and light of the Divine doxa; for they serve simply as ingenious points of attachment for certain texts, which after all prove nothing as to the sevenfold-ness that
doxa) is impersonal; in the spirit's struggles to reveal itself to itself, the soul has its origin. The first power of the soul is that of contraction into itself; the second, that of expansion toward the spirit; the third, that of rotation upon itself, as it were in birth-pangs; the fourth, that of genesis, in which the loving life of the spirit is separated from the self-life of the soul; the fifth, that of reception, in which the soul turns towards the spirit, and becomes impregnated with its thoughts; the sixth, that of expression, in which the soul carries over the conceptions of the spirit into (not yet spoken) words; the seventh, that of comprehension, which binds all the rest into an organic unity. "All these powers together are the substance of the soul itself." The first three powers correspond to the manifestation of the Father in the doxa; the fourth, to that of the Son; the fifth and sixth to that of the Spirit; the seventh, to the entire doxa. For these respective powers see Deut. xiii. 7; for the second, longing, Prov. xxiii. 2; for the third, life, Job ii. 6; for the fourth, the Ego, Isa. xxvi. 9; for the fifth, the disposition, Ex. xxiii. 9; for the sixth, the expressed will, Ps. cv. 22; for the seventh, the entire soul, Jer. xxxviii. 16. To the soul belong perception, memory, fancy, feeling, etc., Jer. iv. 19; Deut. iv. 9; Ecc. vi. 9; 1 Sam. i. 15, etc.

Desire belongs to the first power; impulse to the second; choice to the third; imagination to the fourth; perception to the fifth; understanding to the sixth; wisdom to the seventh. But all these are the spirit's own powers, and it produces the entire life of the soul. When it is objected that body and soul exist and develop before the self-conscious spirit, we reply that spirit exists before it our author is (literally) laboring to establish. When he mentions the momentous facts that the house of wisdom has seven pillars and that the wisdom from above has seven characteristics (p. 229), he out-Herods Herod; even Lange opposes him, in the very spirit of the common-sense philosophy.

1 How, pray, does this differ from self, the first power?
comes to definite self-consciousness. Scripture dates the life of the spirit even into the ante-natal period (Luke i. 15; Gal. i. 15, cf. Ps. xxii. 10 f.) and the advance of the spirit is at the same time the advance of the soul, Luke ii. 40, 52. Since the soul is brought forth that through the spirit may glorify the body, we must now examine the structure of the body considered as capable of transformation.

4. The body. Scripture calls the body the house of the inward man (Job iv. 19; 2 Cor. v. 1), the sheath of the spirit (Dan. vii. 15), the vesture of the soul (2 Cor. v. 2), etc. In Ecc. xii. 6 the soul is the silver cord, the body the golden one, not as made of gold (a golden bowl would not be shattered by falling) but as containing the golden cord of the spirit. Thus the soul is the bond which holds together spirit and body. At death the soul is loosed, the body becomes πτωμα (Matt. xiv. 12) the spirit escapes. The theology of the doxa will lead us to expect that as the soul is the image of the spirit it makes the body the image of itself. The seven powers of the soul correspond to seven forms of the bodily life, as follows: (1) The life of the embryo (βρως from βρως, as rolled in upon itself); (2) of breathing (πνευμα, so even Ἐνα Job xli. 13); (3) of the blood (γεν. ix. 4); “antiquity was aware that the blood flowed through the body, but did not know that it circulated;” (4) of the heart (Prov. iv. 23), the centre of the wheel of life. Is. iii. 6; three forms precede this, three also follow in inverse order, as is true of the corresponding powers of the soul: (5) of the nerves (πνευμα, including the marrow, the brain, the spinal cord.) Here should be placed the organs of sense (αισθήσεις, αἰσθητήρια Heb. v. 14); (6) of the muscles (πλευρας) especially the vocal chords (κοιλιας); (7) of temperament (στήρις Jud. viii. 18.) That which was a germ in the embryo here complete in the entire bodily habitus.

Certain prominent features of the body demand special notice.

a. The blood. Scripture attaches great importance
this. It is not to be eaten, because it is the soul (Gen. ix.4-6) under penalty of death, Lev. xvii.11-14. When one is mortally wounded, his soul flows forth in the blood, Lam. ii.12. The blood of Abel cries from the ground; an innocent person is ῥήσεως ἐν θλίψει Ps. xciv.21 cf. αἷμα δίκαιον Matt. xxiii.35. The blood is both the basis and the source of the physical life; hence the soul is pre-eminently in the blood.

b. The heart. This is not only a bodily organ, being (1) the centre of the entire organic life; but also (2) the centre of the pneumato-psychical life as volitive, intelligent, and emotional; also (3) of the moral life. The modern reference of the entire life of soul and spirit to the head rather than the heart is clearly one-sided. Scientific facts point at least to the conclusion that heart and head are corresponding poles of the bodily agency of soul and spirit, the heart being related to the head as the root of the tree to its crest. Whatever weight may be due to the statements of somnambulists must be thrown into the same scale.

c. The inward parts. Scripture assigns spiritual functions to the הרות and נפש. Zech. xii.1; Job xv. 35, etc. The intestines are the seat of lively sympathy, Is. lxiii.15. The liver seems to denote sensual desire in Prov. vii.23. The kidneys נזיב are pricked by suffering, cloven by affliction, consumed by longing, etc., Ps. lxxiii.21; Job xvi.13; xix.27. Scripture thus anticipates the most recent science in the prominence given to the vaso-motor nervous system. It is true, we now attach little psychologic importance to these organs. “Did antiquity feel in this respect otherwise than we do; namely, more profoundly, and more plainly?”

5. Abnormal conditions.

1 Delitzsch here follows Beck, giving him (as often) far too little credit. “To speak with Beck,” says he, proceeding to name, from the “Outlines,” the titles of the sections in point. But he had been speaking with Beck in the previous four pages.
a. Sleep. This is the periodic sinking back of the three higher forms of life into the four lower, the profoundest coma transferring man, as it were, into the life of the δύσ.

The biblical significance of sleep appears especially in the dream, a kind of birth-labor of the heart, Ecclus. xxxiv.5. The spirit of man, like that of God, neither slumbers nor sleeps. Dreams possess an intellectual, an ethical, and a spiritual significance. What a man is comes out, with no chance for self-deception, in his dreams. Moreover, God has often revealed his will thereby, making these phantoms and shadows the medium of his special intercourse with man. There are dreams designed to rouse the conscience, like that of Pilate's wife, and dreams depicting the future, like those of Jacob and of Daniel. Had man abode in his primal purity, all sleep would be a dreamless resting in God, as was the sleep of Jesus.

b. Sickness. The essential origin of sickness is God's wrath; its essential condition is confusion (turba); its essential process is dying or a tendency to death. Hence recovery is called life, being literally a re-viving. Man inherits sickness as well as sin from the first transgression; morte morieris is the burden of every disease. And as he is a sinner by practice as well as by nature, so his actual sins bear fruit in actual maladies. Both bodily and psychological or spiritual sicknesses may have ethical, sentimental, or physical causes.

c. Possession. All sickness goes back to Satan, as its ultimate cause within the range of created things, but there are certain forms which come so specially from his agency as to be rightly termed demoniacal. While the phenomena of demoniacal sickness are partly of the body, and partly of the border land between the soul and the body, the state of perfect possession is not reached till it announces itself in psychical, as well as physical symptoms. No doubt it is exceedingly difficult to comprehend the baleful power of one spirit over another, but the analogy of animal magnetism will help us conceive of it. The
specific character of possession is found in this, that demons intrude themselves between the nervous body and the soul of man, and forcibly fetter the soul and spirit, using at will the bodily organs of the demoniac to torment him. The soul, strictly speaking, is in the state of *obsessio*, not *possessio*. As divine influences are received through faith, demoniacal influences are received through superstition, which readily blends with magic, "the fearful opposite of the sacred miracle." The superstitious man is not he who believes in a supernatural world of spirits affecting this mundane world (for Scripture vouches for thus much) but he whose belief, in relation to that world, is not well attested. Of his own will he comes into such a reciprocal relation to the unseen world that evil spirits can entangle him in delusions. When such a one has become a serviceable instrument of the infernal powers, he is a votary of magic. He may not be consciously in league with demons; but he expects to work wonders, not through the prayer of faith, but through formulas and ceremonies. Hence magic is strictly forbidden in Scripture. We may not positively assert that modern clairvoyance and somnambulism are in themselves evil. The medium finds himself planted on the border land between the present and the future; the value of his statements depends largely on his personal attitude towards God and the Redeemer. Still, he is in an abnormal, a chronically morbid state, and is by no means to be regarded as a prophet, though it must be acknowledged that his declarations, when on the highest plane, confirm the Bible, and sound a loud call to repentance. On the lowest plane, they are akin to the biblically proscribed magic.

V. WHAT ARE MAN'S POSSIBILITIES IN THIS LIFE?

The one ground of hope to fallen man is revealed in the incarnation. As man was made in the image of God, so he can be restored only by being born again in the image of the God-man. To understand the new life of
the spirit we must apprehend the Divine-human Archetype. We maintain, in opposition to Dorner, that the Kenosis of Christ consists in a real surrender of his eternal doxa, his mode of being, and his attributes of omniscience, etc.; this surrender consisting in a withdrawal to the primary ground of his nature, that of Will; in which withdrawal the inner process of the Trinity was in no wise hindered, and indeed the Eternal Will of the Triune was thereby accomplished. The bearing of this controversy upon psychology is clear, since the renewed man must be the perfect image of the Redeemer. But how is this likeness effected? We bear the image of the first Adam, body, soul, and spirit, by physical begetting. The second birth is a creation from above by the power of Christ, the Eternal Word; its point of entrance is the conscience; its instrument is the word; its means, faith, which lays hold of Christ himself; its goal, the changing of man's separation from God into fellowship with God. Attracting love, on God's side, meets responsive faith, on man's side, and changes his conscience into a good one, bringing the subject out of the principle of wrath into the principle of love; this is the beginning of the work of grace. Thereafter believers become partakers of the spirit, soul, and body of Christ. Of his spirit; for this is one with the Holy Spirit, and by its power even babes in Christ become πνευματικοί. Of his soul; for they receive his blood, being thereby delivered from condemnation, and in part even from the actual power of sin. Of his body; for Christ's life-giving flesh, received by faith, is the pledge of their resurrection. A soul is born again by God's creative power, free and mysterious: the creature, as in all God's creative agencies, having no consciousness of what is occurring.¹ The growing new man comes up within the husk of the old man, and becomes conscious that the triune God pervades him with his love.

¹A misleading analogy, since in all other creative agencies, consciousness is out of the question.
The blessings conveyed in the sacraments we can only perceive after their operation; we partake of them by faith, but their nature is vailed from us. The validity of infant baptism depends on whether infants can believe; which is to be answered in the affirmative. They have direct but not reflex faith, the former being simple trust in Christ, the latter our own experience of this trust. Direct faith may be an operation of God prior to consciousness, even as the faith of every believer began with a secret, divine agency upon his will. The sacraments have a power from the immediate and sovereign working of God through them; so that he who has once received them needs only to open his eyes in conscious faith to find himself encompassed with divine grace. Corresponding to this action of God on the kither side of consciousness is his work of grace on the further side, bringing a man into the condition of ecstasy. We distinguish (1) the mystic ecstasy, when the divine love breaks out in the heart of the subject with such force as to hurry away his reflective powers and take full possession of the πνεύμα τοῦ νοὸς, (for example Paul in 2 Cor. xii.1-4.) (2) The prophetic, which is attended with a divine revelation, and which supernaturally subjects the outer man. Saul must strip off his clothes, so fierce is the inward burning (cf. Jer. xx.9.) See also the cases of Balaam, Ezekiel, Zechariah, Daniel, and John. (3) The charismatic, seen especially in the exalted but unintelligent speech of 1 Cor. xiv. 

We may profitably compare with this some aspects of modern clairvoyance. Different from the ecstatic state is the inspiration of the biblical writers (2 Tim. iii.16.) Here divine and human factors co-operate, and neither must be denied.

Throughout the new life of the spirit, these two factors are manifest, the human often displaying itself, even in the Christian, in opposition to the good work of grace. Hence the unabolished antinomy of which we read in Rom. vii., with its sequel in chap. viii. There is dire con-
flict in the regenerate between flesh and spirit, the old man and the new man. A careful survey of this entire classic passage (Rom. vii. 7-viii. 17) brings us to the conclusion that the Apostle is describing the antagonism between grace and nature in God's true children. The Christian is not privileged to experience the former state without at times also being drawn down into the latter; and he does not experience the latter, without being able to wait patiently for the former. If the question is asked how this subject comes under the head of psychology, we reply that grace works not only an ethical change in its subject, but a profound pneumatico-psychical change. Human nature differs to its inmost core, whether we compare its primal integrity with the ruin which followed on the entrance of sin, or either of these conditions with the regeneration.

VI. WHITHER IS MAN BOUND?

The theory that death enfranchises the spirit by delivering it from the clogging flesh is wholly unbiblical. Scripture contradicts moreover the view that man is by nature immortal. The whole man suffers the penalty of death; it is only through Christ that immortality is possible, though his redeeming grace has placed a limit to death even for those who reject it. The continued and endless existence of human souls is guaranteed by the universal instinct of immortality which Scripture sanctions (Ecc. iii. 11 as above). But mere continuance of being is no blessing; only they that are in Christ are truly immortal. Where are they after death overtakes them? We must distinguish between the state of the holy dead before and after the death of Christ. The saints of the Old Testament went to Sheol, the underworld, a literal region in the heart of the earth. They were locally restrained, though disembodied spirits; they waited for the redemption. Our Lord at his death descended into Sheol, set the captives

free, and ascended with them, drawing the whole multitude in a triumphant throng. They, and all who have since departed in the faith, are with Christ in a heaven above the earth, under God's altar. There is no purgatory, but their souls are freed from sin through the power of the spiritual life, which is begotten and nourished in them by word and sacrament. We know not whether this takes place in any by degrees, or suddenly in all. Possibly but not probably, some even who have died without hope in Christ may break through God's wrath to his love, before the final day of judgment; after that, the fate of the impenitent is sealed. Scripture indeed contains expressions which leave it to be dreaded that there is no probation after death, and contains absolutely nothing to favor that hypothesis.¹

In the view of Hofmann, the holy dead are not only with Christ but in Christ as their bodily home. The fullness of the Godhead dwelleth in him bodily, and the dying Christian is taken up without a body into the glorified nature of Christ. This (according to Hofmann) is the oikia of 2 Cor. v. 1 and the σκηνή of Heb. viii. 2; x.20, etc., cf. also John ii.21 with Eph. ii.19-22. But we point, on the contrary, to Heb. ix.11, where Christ is said to have entered into the holy of holies through the σκηνή. In Rev. xv.5 the ναός τῆς σκηνῆς is visible, as the place of heavenly worship. The holiest of all is the uncreated

¹I must leave to the reader, without analysis, the chapter of curious interest on "the phenomenal corporeity and investiture," hoping that he will have better success than I in comprehending that "spiritual form of the soul," which is "the embodied, blissful hope of the coming glorification," which is "immaterial" and yet "visible," and even "corporeal," being "the essence or extract of the material corporeity." This chapter and the two following are suggestive of Swedenborg.—Not to confute in particular the assertion of Delitzsch, that his doctrine of the intermediate state "in all its details depends upon irrefragable exegetic foundations" I only remark that many will regard as a failure the attempt to prove from 1 Pet. iii. 18 (pp. 482, 483, 488) Christ's preaching to departed spirits. Still, Delitzsch's general view of the intermediate life seems to be accordant with the scanty notices of Scripture, if not derived from them.
δόξα, inhabited only by the Triune. The στοιχεῖα is the heaven of glory which God's will continually produces, and where he reveals himself to the blessed. His train fills the temple (Is. vi. 1), but through this holy place Christ passed to his eternal δόξα, John xvii. 5.

The life of the blessed dead has some relation still to space and time. It is God alone who inhabith eternity; the believer is rooted in eternity, and becomes manifestly so in the future state; the foundation of his life is the absolute life of God. But the manifestation of this life is within the range of time and space, though absolutely penetrated by eternity. Believers are with Christ, (Phil. i. 23) and at home with him (2 Cor. v. 6–8), admitted, now that he is ascended, to the close, unchecked, intercourse which was denied to Mary, John xx. 17. There still subsists between the departed soul and the dead body a secret relation or rapport, during the whole intermediate state, 1 K. xvii. 21, 2 K. iv. 34, xiii. 21. Thus also the very term ἁλίς is applied to a dead body, since the corpse makes a vivid impression of soul.

As the body corrupts, its connection with the soul becomes less sensible, but is never wholly lost; thus the final reunion between soul and body is a union of elements which belong together, and attract each other.

VII. WHAT ARE MAN'S FINAL POSSIBILITIES IN THE FUTURE LIFE?

The life of man began with a miracle, in the creation of his earthly body; the new creation is consummated with a miracle, in the clothing upon of the glorified spirit with the house that is from heaven. Death is not the separation in man of an inner ethereal body from its gross encasement—thus death is not, as some teach, the only resurrection. Separated souls long for a reunion with their bodies, but are unable to effect it; this yearning is real-

1 It is far simpler to regard ἁλίς as applied sometimes to the entire man, sometimes to either of his main constituents, the body or the mind.
ized at the consummation of all things. The world with all it contains is then purified by fire; yet no atom is annihilated; God watches over the original elements of every human body and can gather them. The identity of the resurrection body with the present one does not depend on similarity of material; but on the other hand, it is not merely likeness of form, with entire distinction of substance. The true view is that the Almighty rescues from the world of nature which has been meanwhile purified by fire the elementary materials of our bodies, giving to each its own former elements in similar mingling, but (in the case of the righteous) deducting whatever has been the result of sin; this new body the soul takes possession of again, as a queen takes possession of her throne. The soul is not wholly passive in this restoration, although in the lightning flash of its accomplishment, she is necessarily unconscious. We adopt the language of Schöberlein, that God the triune "supplies to the soul, from the then glorified world of nature, materials for the new formation of its body, similar to those of which its earthly body was formed, and with which, when the soul impresses upon them the form of its inner spiritual body, its spiritual nature may attain to full manifestation even in the external body."

In eternal contrast to the resurrection doxa of the righteous is the turba of the ungodly. Doubtless their bodies, like themselves, are psychical and fleshly, the divine act of creation setting aside whatever might serve to conceal their true character; while their own souls act productively in the constitution of that which is positively sinful in the nature of their resurrection bodies. After the decisive day of judgment, they are banished into the darkness and fire of God's wrath, where they remain forever in conscious suffering. There is no crossing the gulf between the children of light and of darkness: the state of each, however, is no stagnant inaction, but a constant progress or regress respectively. "Human reason would
like in one way or another to abolish the dualism with which the history of the world closes. Let her do it upon her own responsibility, but let her not falsify the Scripture. This teaches an eternal, personal continuance of all personal beings, and indeed a continuance principally conditioned by what they have become in time" (p. 554).

At the close of this résumé of the work before us, the inquiry again arises: "Is there a biblical psychology?" It must be granted, we think, that such a science is possible. The points of contact between Scripture and human nature we have found so numerous, the light which revelation sheds upon man's origin, condition, and destiny so far excels all merely natural light, that it must be within the legitimate range of endeavor to construct from the Bible a Logos of the Psyche. But if the question be whether our author's attempt is likely to stand as a system of the science, the probabilities seem to be in the negative. Let us, in the few pages remaining for this article, discuss in the light of Scripture a cardinal position of Dr. Delitzsch, that man consists not simply of body and spirit, but of body, soul, and spirit. This position is so fundamental to the entire structure of Delitzsch's Psychology, that the system as a system must fall if it is made clear that Scripture favors dichotomy rather than trichotomy.

We return then to our fundamental question, "What is man?" and ask it now in a scientific sense. "What is his composition?" Man is one, say the materialists, and, at the opposite pole, the idealists. One would suppose the former class to have little sympathy with the word of God, and yet there is a growing school of biblical materialists. This is hardly the place for extended argument with either of these hostile camps; if the former really believe the Scripture to teach that matter can love God, or if the idealists really deny that there is a scriptural opposition between flesh and spirit, we must agree to disagree.
But most modern writers on biblical psychology admit that the categories of matter and mind exhaust the possibilities of the universe, and yet believe that human nature consists of three parts, spirit, soul, and body. Spirit belongs to the department of mind, body to that of matter, but what shall we do with soul? Here the psychologists are greatly puzzled, some, like Ströbel and Othner, considering the soul a distinct essence from the spirit, others, like Delitzsch and von Rudloff, considering it a distinct essence from the body. Beck does not face this question boldly; it is his view rather than that of Delitzsch, which is obnoxious to the criticism of Harless, (see Delitzsch, p. 263) of arranging the opposition between spirit and matter by an interpolated phantom which is neither fish nor flesh. A very common opinion is that the spirit in man lies dormant or dead (since the fall) till it is quickened in the new birth.

Obviously, the scriptural view should be sought, apart from all outside speculations, in a thorough, critical comparison of the numerous texts involved. Such a labor the present writer has attempted with מַעַל and מַעַל in the Old Testament and with ψυχή and πνεῦμα in the New; the process of which as to מַעַל appeared in the Bibliotheca Sacra January, 1880, and the result of which may be thus briefly stated: מַעַל means any thing with breath, especially a human person, the word being often limited to the mind, sometimes but rarely to the body, sometimes to the principle of life, sometimes to the condition of life. מַעַל means breath itself, but is transferred (as the most tenuous substance known) to conscious immaterial existences, God and the angels. Often it is applied to the immaterial principle in man; often it coincides with מַעַל; and when it differs, the latter frequently includes the former. Very often מַעַל is the whole man, composed of spirit and body; and thus man is twofold, not threefold.

In my judgment, a great deal of dust has been raised about a very plain subject, in the interpretation of Gen.
ii.7, which means simply that when spirit and body were united by the Creator, man (the whole man) became a living creature. It is not the second but the first chapter of Genesis which tells us what kind of a creature this was; namely, an exalted being in the image of God. Soul is a common term but not a tertium between spirit and body. The image of God in man is the spirit; hence the New Testament teaches that the πνεῦμα is quickened in regeneration. The unrenewed man is σαρκικός; the new man is πνευματικός. But the natural man as a whole, not yet quickened, is ψυχικός. Regeneration does not impart a new substance, but gives simply a new direction to the powers already existing.

In a few instances, spirit and soul are mentioned together; but so, for example, are καρδία, ψυχή, and δύναμις in Matt. xxii.37. No one thinks of a trichotomy there; it is for emphasis, not for distinction, that the terms are grouped. To what but to the spirit could that command be addressed “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God?” But as spirit is not named, it must be identical with heart, soul, and mind. As little need a substantial distinction be assumed in 1 Thess. v. 23: “your whole spirit and soul and body.” There is fervor rather than subtlety here; I take the meaning to be “your mind in its Godward aspect, your mind in its manward aspect, and your body.”

“But,” it may be objected, “we have the very process of the trichotomy, the cutting itself, in Heb. iv.12. The word of God divides asunder soul and spirit.” It divides, I reply, not by metaphysical separation. It cuts the whole man in two by its energy. The absurdity of reducing this pungent metaphor to fine-spun philosophy appears in the various comments of the psychologists upon the joints and marrow. In Rev. vi.9 and xx.4 the holy dead are called ψυχαί; in Heb. xii.23 πνεῦματα. Beck’s attempted distinction here is mere assertion. God himself says “my soul” as well as “my spirit”; Beck’s reply that the former phrase is used only of God’s dealings with man is
refuted by Matt. xii.18 "mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth," referring evidently to the eternal love of the Father for the Son. In this verse both ψυχή and πνεῦμα are applied to God, yet no one maintains a substantial distinction between them.

The proof of dichotomy, however, by no means depends on two or three "classical proof-texts." Let the careful student examine the following additional passages from the New Testament, and see if honesty permits him to maintain a substantial distinction between soul and spirit, the latter being the higher faculty, and the organ of the new life. (Space forbids enlarging upon these texts, but the reader should search in each case the original, since the force of a citation is often only thence apparent.)

Matt. xi. 28 (cf. 1 Cor. xvi.18, 2 Cor. vii.13. Soul is here the higher faculty.) Matt.xxvii.50(c.f. John x.17.) Mark viii.12 (cf. John xii.27; xiii.21.) Luke i.46 (cf. 47.) Acts xiv.2 (cf. Deut. ii.30; Ps. cvi.33; Dan. v.20.) Acts xiv.22 (cf. Eph. iii.16.) Acts xv.24 and 2 Pet. ii.14 (cf. 1 John iv.6.) Eph. vi.6 and Col. iii.23 (cf. Matt. xviii.35.) Phil. i.27; Heb. vi.19, Heb. x.38, 39 and Jas. i.21 and v.19, 20 (cf. 1 Cor. v.5.) Heb. xii.3 (cf. Is. lvii.16.) 1 Pet. i.9, 22 (cf. Jas. iv.8; 2 Cor. vii.1.) 1 Pet. ii.11 (cf. Gal. v.17. This parallel seems decisive.) 1 Pet. ii.25 and Heb. xiii.17; 1 Pet. iv.19 (cf. Luke xxiii.46.) 2 Pet. ii.8 (cf. John xi.33.) 3 John 2 (ψυχή here must equal πνεῦμα.)

Let us turn now finally to Delitzsch's defense of trichotomy. He holds stoutly, as we have seen, that the soul is immaterial, belonging to the side of the spirit, of the same

1 Dr. Hickok's distinction (Bib. Sac., Oct. 1875, see also Delitzsch p. 469) between ἐξήνωσεν, used of Christ, and ἐξηνωσεν, of Herod, Ananias, and Saphira, seems untenable. See the above parallel, also Luke viii.55, Acts vii.59. Cf. Gen. xxxv.18 and Ps.cxlvi.4; 1 Sam. xxx.12; 1 K. xvii.22. However, the exegesis of Dr. Hickok's article was a work of supererogation, since we find him asserting with characteristic positiveness (p. 610): "The conception is no abstract deduction from the facts, but an universal and a necessary prerequisite for the facts. The facts themselves could not have been, if precisely this constitution of humanity had not first been."
nature with it, of the same essence, but yet of a different substance. This, in view of his explicit definitions, is what we must suppose him to mean, but in truth it is hard to conceive of anything more confused and contradictory than his statements on this subject, when he feels pressed by difficulties from this or that quarter. For example, we are often told that spirit and soul are one in essence, but we read (p. 264) "Man consists of three essential elements" (body, soul, and spirit.) Per contra, soul and spirit, by definition, differ in substance, but (p. 15) "the substance of man's nature is dualistic." Again, (p. 263 n.) "soul is a phenomeon of the spirit." Below, in the same note, soul is degraded almost to the capacity of the so-called nerve-spirit (whose existence Delitzsch disbelieves.) Certainly freedom of choice is denied to it. But see the first great commandment. That Delitzsch sometimes conceives of soul as standing nearer to body than to spirit appears from the simile (p. 376) of the spirit as king, the soul as his royal robe, the body as his throne. On the other hand, the relation of a man to his house is used (p. 267) to express "the relation of the soul or of the spirit to the body." Does it not matter which? If there be a substantial difference between soul and spirit, will it not be manifest after death? Many trichotomists put the soul in the grave, the spirit in the heavens. Not so our author. After depicting the change of death, he proposes thenceforth to use the term "soul" more frequently than before, "in such a way as that the spirit is included in the idea." Why did not we find, in a biblical psychology, the honest admission that the author made no distinction between soul and spirit in the future life, because Scripture made none? Very like this admission is a remark on p. 501: "The souls, or, as Scripture expresses itself (without, like Ströbel, wrenching asunder soul and spirit), the spirits of departed men (Rev. vi.9; 1 Pet. iii.19; Heb. xii.23.)"

Is not this to fail at the experimentum crucis? The credit of trichotomy is hardly saved by the curious eva-
sion (p. 474) "the spirit, to which the soul has retreated." This distinction without a difference appears also on this side the grave. Page 457 n. makes Πνεῦμα Gal. v. 17 exactly equal ψυχή 1 Pet. ii.11. So ἰδρύτην pp. 468, 469. The Scriptures quoted prove too much for the theory advocated. Pages 293, 294 forsake trichotomy for the common division of mind (will, thought, and feeling.) On pp. 259-262 the great problem proposed is already solved, without need of the subsequent introduction of the soul as a deus ex machina. Page 246, "the seven powers of the soul are not the soul's own powers, but the psychical powers of the spirit itself." Has the soul self-consciousness then? Yes, but (p. 184) "the self-consciousness of the soul is just the self-consciousness of the spirit." Yet it would almost seem from p. 263 (apart from the note,) that the soul is the consciousness itself. Once more (p. 232), "the soul, made personal indeed by the spirit, is yet, in and for itself, impersonal." If the reader, in despair at these constant shifts, turns to the direct exposition in the section entitled "The false and the true trichotomy," he is by no means relieved of perplexity! On p. 110 soul and spirit are called relations (Bestandtheile),\(^1\) then essential elements (Wesensbestandtheile) but in no wise essentially distinct elements (wesensverschiedene). Just below it is stated, "Paul distinguishes three essential elements of

\(^1\) I omit one of the flattest contradictions, as it is probably a mistranslation; (p. 113) "the soul, as essentially distinct from the spirit, cannot possibly belong to the natural side of man." Thus it reads in my copy, which is dated on the title page 1875, but mentions no revision since 1866. I have seen a copy dated 1867, which gives an opposite sense; "the soul cannot possibly belong to the natural side of man, as essentially distinct from the spirit" — i. e., as though it were distinct, which it is not. This is doubtless the meaning of the original; "so kann die Seele unmöglich als wesensverschieden vom Geiste der Natursseite des Menschen angehören" u. s. w. The silent revision has been sometimes for the better, as on p. 64, last sentence but two, which is difficult enough in the later copy, but utter nonsense in the earlier.

\(^2\) This should have been rendered ingredients or elements.
man" (Wesensbestandtheile.) We turn the leaf (p. 112) and read that soul is not “an element essentially distinct from it” [spirit] (oder dass sie ein wesentlich von ihm Verschiedenes sei.) Page 114, “The essential difference (Wesensunterschied) between the soul and the spirit is an invention contrary to Scripture and to experience.” But if there be no essential difference between them, they cannot form two essential elements. On the whole, Delitzsch’s trichotomy can hardly maintain itself in the face of the abundant scriptural testimony above cited, and if this be so, his psychology, built as it is around this threefold-ness, is radically defective.

Have we, then, a system of biblical psychology? Not yet, or at least, not here. We still have need of a host of careful scholars to follow the path opened by Roos and Beck; to labor patiently, with no theories to support, at the eternal foundations of the science in the Word of God, which liveth and abideth.