

ARTICLE V.

THE THEOLOGY OF CANON MOZLEY.¹

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It is my purpose to give an account of the theology of Canon Mozley. Before entering upon this task, it is fitting to present the principal facts of his life.

James Bowling Mozley was born the fifteenth of September, 1813, in Gainsborough, Lincolnshire. Early he was sent to Grantham—a school which had graduated, among other great men, Sir Isaac Newton. His preparation for the university, thus begun, was completed under private tuition. In October 1830 he entered Oriel College, Oxford. For the following twenty-six years he resided at the university. In 1840 he was elected a Fellow of Magdalen. In 1856, on his marriage, he accepted the living of Old Shoreham. By Mr. Gladstone's recommendation, which was also the premier's first act of patronage, he was in 1869 presented to the canonry of Worcester. Two years later he was made Regius

¹ The following Articles and other Works by Dr. Mozley, appeared in the order here given. (It would not be safe to infer that the list includes all his published writings.) Truths and Fictions of the Middle Ages (British Critic), Oct. 1838; The Lollards (British Critic), Jan. 1839; De Clifford (British Critic), Jan. 1842; Bishop Andrewes's Sermon (British Critic), Jan. 1842; Palmer on Protestantism (British Critic), April 1842; Development of the Church of the Seventeenth Century (British Critic), Oct. 1842; Strafford (British Critic), April 1843; Bishopric of Jerusalem (British Critic), July 1843; Plea of the Six Doctors (Pamphlet), 1843; Dr. Arnold (Christian Remembrancer), Oct. 1844; Laud (Christian Remembrancer), Jan. 1845; I promessi Sposi (Christian Remembrancer), April 1845; Recent Proceedings at Oxford (Christian Remembrancer), April 1845; English Churchwomen, 17th Century (Christian Remembrancer), July 1845; Blanco White (Christian Remembrancer), July 1845; History of the Church of Russia (Christian Remembrancer), Oct. 1845; The Recent Schism (Christian Remembrancer), Jan. 1846; Dr. Pusey's Sermon (Christian Remembrancer), April 1846; Carlyle's Cromwell (Christian Remembrancer), April 1846; Newman on Development (Christian Remembrancer), Jan. 1847; Luther (Christian Remembrancer), Jan. 1848; The Book of Job

Professor of Divinity at Oxford. After an illness of somewhat more than two years, he died at Old Shoreham, on the fourth of January, 1878.

It was not till perhaps after his death that the church in the United States, or even in England, came to realize the loss which the cause of theology and of literature thus sustained. His mind was of slow growth. In that brilliancy to which John Henry Newman, Keble, Pusey, and Hurrell Froude contributed the fire of their genius the light of his intellect shone but dimly. Nature had endowed him with certain intellectual treasures as rich as those that any Oxford contemporary possessed; but time was needed for their development. Nature also gave him the qualities necessary for the training of his powers. Diligence, conscientiousness in the use of opportunities, constant discipline and self-correction continued through more than fifty years, served to develop his intellect into an instrument of thought strong, vigorous, and incisive. He was pre-eminently a thinker. His scholarship was noble, his knowledge broad and exact; but in thought, abstract and profound, he specially delighted. "Thinking was part of his diversion" even from boyhood. His powers of thought were to a large degree devoted to religious doctrine. He entertained profound views of doctrine, and supported these views with arguments equally profound. His style is precise,

(*Christian Remembrancer*), Jan. 1849; *Recent Arguments on Baptismal Regeneration* (*Christian Remembrancer*), 1850; *The Oxford Commission* (*Quarterly Review*), June 1853; *Maurice's Theological Essays* (*Christian Remembrancer*), Jan. 1854; *A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination* (Murray), 1855; *The Primitive Doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration* (Murray), 1856; *Indian Conversion* (*Bentley's Quarterly*), Jan. 1859; *A Review of the Baptismal Controversy* (Rivingtons), 1862; *Subscription to the Articles, a letter to Rev. Professor Stanley*, 1863; *Bampton Lectures on Miracles* (Rivingtons), 1865; *Observations on the Colonial Church Question* (Pamphlet, Rivingtons), 1867; *Of Christ alone without Sin* (*Contemporary Review*), April 1868; *Argument of Design* (*Quarterly Review*), July 1869; *Education of the People* (*Quarterly Review*), April 1870; *Newman's Grammar of Assent* (*Quarterly Review*), July 1870; *The Principle of Causation; a Lecture written for the Christian Evidence Society*, 1872; *University Sermons* (Rivingtons), 1876; *Ruling Ideas in Early Ages* (Rivingtons), 1877; *Essays Historical and Theological*. 2 vols. (including several of the above-named papers), Rivingtons, 1878; *Sermons, Parochial and Occasional*.

concise, powerful, and at times of great beauty. He was a controversialist, but, unlike many controversialists, he believed in and did "underground work." Whatever he undertook he accomplished, and whatever he accomplished was accomplished with honor to himself and to the cause he served. An editor, interested in the *British Critic*, the *Christian Remembrancer*, and the *Guardian*, his papers, many and diverse in their topics, are elaborate studies which deserve a permanent place in literature. A preacher, his sermons rank among the great sermons of the nineteenth century for their profundity and comprehensiveness of thought. A professor, he was a teacher rather of teachers than of the ordinary Oxford students. The theology of such a man merits attention.

As exhibited in his works the theology of Canon Mozley is fragmentary. It is not seen as a system well proportioned, each part fitly adjusted to every other. This characteristic is due, however, simply to the fact that his published writings relate in the main to a few particular doctrines. His views in reference to doctrines not thus considered can be gathered only crumb by crumb, by inference and suggestion. In this paper his views are presented respecting these doctrines: § I. The Being of a God; § II. Predestination; § III. Miracles; § IV. The Atonement; § V. Regeneration and Baptism; § VI. Eschatology.

§ I. THE BEING OF A GOD.

The views of Canon Mozley regarding the evidence for the existence of God are chiefly contained in the lecture "delivered in connection with the Christian Evidence Society" in 1872. The discourse bears the title, *The Principle of Causation considered in opposition to Atheistic Theories*. It presents little or nothing that is new to the philosophical student; but it points out with rare skill and directness the bearing of the principle of causality upon the proof for the being of God. The idea of a cause, Canon Mozley holds, belongs to that class of fundamental conceptions which lie

beyond all experience. Although experience may bring the idea into the light of consciousness, it cannot originate the idea, any more than the photographer's iodine can originate the image on the sensitive plate, which it only makes visible, and which the sun has imprinted. Possessing this axiom, that every event must have a cause, the problem which we have set is this: To derive from this principle the proof for the existence of a Supreme Being. In the attempt at a solution the important consideration is, whether this idea of a cause demands a finality, — a cause which is itself uncaused, — or whether it is satisfied with an infinite series of causes. Reflection appears to prove that this idea does demand finality, and is not satisfied with an infinite series. As the first part of our idea of cause is motion, — a progress from one event to another in sequence, — so the last part is rest. That necessity of thought which compels me, on the one side, to think of an event as a cause, also compels me to think of that same event, on the other side, as uncaused. The cause of its own effect, it is itself the effect of nothing. This is a necessity of thought; a law of being which every man reads in his own consciousness. When this idea of cause is applied to the universe, it furnishes the proof for the existence of a Supreme Being. For this existence, which is itself uncaused, but which is a genuine cause, must be, and must so be denominated, the First Cause; and a First Cause is necessarily eternal and self-existent. Although in Clarke's famous work, the *Demonstration of the Being of a God*, there is much unworthy of so lucid and profound a thinker as its author, yet he has well expressed the necessary character of the belief in the existence of a First Cause. "How much thought soever," he says, "it may require to demonstrate the other attributes of such a Being, . . . yet as to its existence, — that there is somewhat eternal, infinite, and self-existing, which must be the cause and original of all other things, — this is one of the first and most natural conclusions that any man who thinks at all can form in his mind. . . . All things cannot possibly have arisen out of nothing, nor

can they have depended on one another in an endless succession. We are certain, therefore, of the being of a Supreme, Independent Cause, that there is something in the universe, actually existing without, the supposition of whose non-existing plainly implies a contradiction."

Kant both agrees and differs with Clarke. He agrees with him in the necessity of the being of an ultimate, original First Cause. He differs from him in believing that the existence of an "objective reality" can be proved from any course of reasoning which is not founded upon the "very conception of the being itself." From an idea cannot be proved a fact. With the German philosopher, therefore, this method of reasoning is not a demonstration of the being of a God. But Clarke, in common with most English metaphysicians, was satisfied with resting the course of reasoning to prove the existence of God upon the existence of this visible world. So also Dr. Mozley. And, although this method cannot have the strength of mathematical reasoning, it is ever to be remembered — a fact which the great German forgot — that the strength of mathematical reasoning is not needed to prove conclusions which are not mathematical, but which are simply moral in their origin and character.

But the argument is by no means complete when the existence of a First Cause is proved. It is quite as, if not more, difficult to prove from causation that this First Cause is God — that this self-existent Being is a moral Being. Yet the method of reasoning is simple, and similar to that just employed. Every cause must be a cause sufficient to produce its effect. An adequate or a sufficient cause is only the carrying out of the theory of causation. Moral and spiritual beings exist. Personality, intelligence, feeling, volition are qualities of man. These existences are effects which require a cause sufficient for their production. If pursued through a series of causes they must finally be thrown back upon the First Cause itself. But from any being cannot issue that which is not contained in it. Therefore, as these qualities have their origin in this First Cause, this First Cause must

be personal, intelligent, possessed of feeling and of will. At this point the argument from design touches the argument from causation. The adaptations and contrivances of nature and of the human system demand a cause, and an adequate cause. This cause cannot be found in nature itself; for nature presents to our view a series of causes which leads us back to the First Cause. This First Cause, being the origin of adaptations and contrivances, must itself be an intelligent Being—a Being who thus, so far forth, may be denominated God. Intelligence proves intelligence; personality, personality; volition, volition; and mind, mind. The great difficulty in this argument Kant finds in identifying the moral, Self-existent Being and God. He confesses his perplexity in erecting a proof of the ideal upon the ground of experience. "The transcendental idea of a necessary, all-sufficient, original Being is so immensely great, so raised above all that is empirical, which is always conditional, that we can never collect matter enough or experience in order to fill such a conception." This chasm, however, he holds is bridged over by an "intuitive impulse, which springs from the whole view of creation, and carries the mind, by a quick movement of thought which it cannot resist, to the transcendental conclusion of an Infinite, Perfect Being." But it is still further to be asked if the existence of this ideal in the mind of man does not itself prove the existence of a power outside of that mind sufficient there to implant this ideal? Is not this conclusion necessitated on the theory of sufficient cause or reason? And can the Being who implanted this ideal be other than himself its fulfilment?

§ II. PREDESTINATION.

The theories of our author respecting the relation existing between God as a moral governor and man are mainly contained in a volume entitled, *A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*, and published in 1855. This relation is made to centre in the principle of predestination. In the treatment of this subject a distinction is, in the

first place, to be drawn between the predestinarian and the fatalist, or the necessitarian. The two agree in representing man rather as acting necessarily for either good or evil, than as acting by an original impulse of the will. But for the reasons of this state of slavery the predestinarian goes to the Bible, and the fatalist to philosophy; the former argues from a particular fact of which he is informed on good authority, the latter from the nature of things. The fatalist thus believes free-will to be not only false, but impossible. The predestinarian cannot grant that free-will is impossible, for he admits, on the authority of the Bible, that Adam possessed it at his creation. Only since the fall has man been devoid of it, and the fact of free-will is merely historic. "It is confessed by all that whatever God does, he determines or decrees to do from all eternity; for no one who believes properly in a God at all can suppose that he does anything on a sudden, and which he has not thought of before. There is, therefore, a divine decree from all eternity to confer this certain salvation upon them on whom it is conferred. And, again, it is universally admitted that only a portion of mankind are saved. But these two admissions complete the doctrine of predestination, which is, that God has decreed from all eternity to save by his absolute and sovereign power a select portion of mankind, leaving the rest in their previous state of ruin." The defence of this doctrine is contained in the doctrine of original sin. This doctrine of original sin teaches that all men deserve eternal punishment. Election, therefore, confers undeserved happiness upon a portion of the human family. To this favor no objection can be offered. Are we to complain of the divine mercy? Outside of Scripture the argument for predestination rests upon two grounds: first, the law of causality, that every event must have a cause; and, second, the idea of the divine power. If every event must have a cause, the conclusion that a necessity controls human actions is inevitable. But by the side of this principle of causality is to be placed another principle, viz. the self-determination of the will. According to this, we are our-

selves the original causes of action. "Here, then, are two contradictory instincts or perceptions of our reason which we must make the best of, and arrive at what measure of truth a mixed conclusion gives. We certainly have both these perceptions, and one must not be made to give way to the other. However reason may declare for the originality of our acts, it says also that every event must have a cause; again, however it may declare for a cause of every event, it says that our acts are original." The second ground of predestination, the idea of the divine power, is allied to the first, the principle of causality. For this divine power is the first cause of all things; and as such it is directly or indirectly the controlling power in human conduct. It thus leads to predestination. By the side of this conception also must be placed the contradictory one of the freedom of the human will. It is contradictory, "for we cannot conceive how that which is caused can itself be a first cause, or a spring of motion to itself." These two conceptions of divine power and free-will are "two great tendencies of thought inherent in our minds, which contradict each other, and can never be united or brought to a common goal; and which, therefore, inasmuch as the essential condition of absolute truth is consistency with other truth, can never, in the present state of our faculties, become absolute truths, but must remain forever contradictory tendencies of thought, going on side by side till they are lost sight of and disappear in the haze of our conceptions, like two parallel straight lines which go on to infinity without meeting." The doctrine of predestination thus interpreted rests upon an imperfect foundation, and must be held as an imperfect truth. It is *a* truth, but not *the* truth. If it is based upon the doctrine of original sin, it is also to be remembered that the statements of the Bible are explicit that man deserves punishment only for his own sin. It is not "an absolute, but an indefinite truth." "Scripture has, as a whole, no consistent scheme, and makes no positive assertions; it only declares, and bids its readers acknowledge, a mystery on this subject. It sets forth alike the divine power

and man's free-will, and teaches in that way in which alone it can be taught, the whole, and not a part alone, of truth." Upon this important doctrine Canon Mozley held a theory quite akin to the law of the contradictories of the philosophy of Pascal and of Sir William Hamilton. That God is a First Cause and that man is in himself an original cause are contradictories; but of contradictories only one can be true. And yet reason and Scripture assure us that both are true. What then is man's position? It is, answers Mozley, as answers Pascal, one of faith. "Listen to God," commands the Frenchman.¹

§ III. MIRACLES.

The relation of God to man is still further made known by the miracles recorded in the New Testament. Yet the question directly discussed in the volume, *On Miracles*, which comprises the Bampton Lectures for 1865, is not miracles as a revelation of the divine character, but the intrinsic credibility of miracles. This narrow scope, it is to be acknowledged, is best adapted to the needs of the present time. For, many minds, especially those learned in science, have become impressed with the impossibility of suspensions of physical law. Other minds, too, devout as well as learned, have been inclined to discredit belief in miracles though holding fast to the belief in a Christian revelation. With this exact aim, the arrow of Professor Mozley's argument flies straight and swift. It were indeed well had a more precise definition of miracles been adopted. The definition which is given, that miracles are "visible suspensions of the order of nature for a providential purpose" is offered only in a sort of parenthesis. What is the difference between a miraculous and a supernatural event? Need this suspension be visible? May the suspension not appeal to some other sense beside that of vision? These and other questions are considerations which might with fitness have been examined.

At the outset it is declared that miracles are necessary

¹ Pascal's *Thoughts*, chap. x.

for a revelation. They are not necessary as a part of the contents of a revelation, but they are necessary as a proof of the truth of a revelation. This evidential function is founded upon the principle of design as manifested in coincidence. An interruption of the laws of nature taken by itself proves nothing, but taken in connection with the word or the deed of a person it is seen to be a miracle. The coincidence proves design. A thunder-storm is no infrequent occurrence in certain localities. Its appearance is no sign of an interruption of the laws of nature. But a thunder-storm occurring in a clear sky immediately after a certain command may be a coincidence so remarkable as to furnish evidence of design, and so of a miracle. The necessity of miracles is not removed by the strength of the internal evidence of Christianity. However strong this evidence may be, and very strong it certainly is, it can never reach beyond what is undiscoverable by the human reason. This kind of evidence is a constant appeal to the reason, and can never go beyond rational limits. The adaptiveness of a doctrine of the Christian system to men's needs is no absolute proof of the truth of the doctrine. The doctrine of the Atonement requires evidence other than its adaptiveness to the sense of ill-desert and the desire for forgiveness. Nor can the historical results of Christianity be regarded as evidence sufficient to prove its divine character. Great as these results are, they do not as evidence supersede the need of miracles. Even if the faith of the individual does not rest upon miracles, their falsehood could not but weaken his faith; for the miracles form a part of the biblical record and are bound up with its doctrines, and they cannot be separated without a certain sacrifice both of the Bible and of Christian doctrines. "Christianity as a dispensation undiscoverable by human reason, and Christianity as a dispensation authenticated by miracles — these two are in necessary combination." Hence it follows that a miracle although an anomaly in relation to a part of the universe is not an anomaly in relation to the entire universe. It has a complete adaptation to the whole.

It is an instrument, a means to an end, not an end in itself. Spinoza's definition is in this respect defective. "A miracle," he says, "as an interruption to the order of nature, cannot give us any knowledge of God, nor can we understand anything from it." Considered as a means to an end a miracle can and does give us some knowledge of God, and we can and do gain from it an understanding of various things. "The same works that I do bear witness of me that the Father hath sent me" (John v. 36).

The credibility of miracles bears intimate relations to the order of nature. For the difficulty of believing in miracles arises from the circumstance that they are an interruption of the order of nature. And what is the meaning of this expression "order of nature"? It means such a connection of those natural phenomena which we know with those which we do not know that we expect the latter to be like the former. It is an expectation of likeness. What is the ground of this expectation? The ground is not self-evident; for self-evident truth is that the opposite of which is self-contradictory; and it is not self-contradictory to affirm that the sun will not set to-night. The ground is not that of the working of a permanent cause; for repetitions of effects prove that the efficient cause is permanent only so far forth as those effects are concerned. From the particular cannot be inferred the universal. No demonstrative reason can be given for this belief in the order of nature. No probable reason can be given; for probable reasoning rests upon this presumed similarity which is itself to be explained. That the belief in the uniformity of nature has no necessary connection with the reason is seen in the fact that brutes possess it quite as strongly as human beings. This belief is one of those many processes which are "entirely spontaneous, irresistible, and, so to call it, of the automaton kind." It is like the impression which time makes upon us, or like the force of association in place. It is "an unintelligent impulse, of which we can give no rational account."

Such being the nature of the belief in the order of nature,

this belief cannot properly be made to oppose the credibility of miracles. "A miracle in being opposed to our experience is not only not opposed to necessary reasoning, but to any reasoning." The remark frequently made that miracles are impossible because they are opposed to law is inconsequential; for we know nothing of law in such a sense as to compel it to prevent miracles. Science proclaims that antecedence and consequence reign in nature, but we see no necessary connection in the parts of the succession. The objection against miracles founded upon experience, that we expect future facts to be like those we have known, and miracles are unlike these facts, is also thus set aside. For philosophy shows that we have no reason for such expectation. Even when this unintelligent impulse is known by the name of induction and is applied to the subject of miracles, the application shows that no argument is thus derived against the credibility of miracles. The scientific part of induction is simply the pursuit of a particular fact. The existence of a particular fact does not interfere with the existence of a fact entirely dissimilar. Therefore the scientific part of induction is not an armory whence to draw weapons to attack miracles. Neither can the inductive principle itself, which establishes the order of nature, be thus employed. For this principle is simply the unreasoning impulse by which one expects that the future will be like the past, unless there be evidence to the contrary. The proper function of the inductive principle, or of the belief in the order of nature, is in the practical concerns of life. Without it human society would either be impossible, or, if possible, chaotic. Its proper function is not in laying down speculative propositions. It has no right to affirm either what can or what cannot occur. Such affirmations are beyond its sphere. It cannot therefore furnish conclusive objections against the belief in miracles.

In respect to the credibility of miracles the force of testimony bears important relations. For it is chiefly by means of testimony that we believe in miracles. But when applied to prove miracles, testimony is subject to certain conditions

or limits. And, first, that which it is attempted to prove must be within the bounds of reason. "Pure, boundless enormity is itself incredible, and therefore out of the reach of testimony." It is further to be observed that "all evidence of miracles assumes the belief in the existence of a God." To an atheist human testimony for miracles has no weight. In the absence of the belief in the being of a God the witness to a miracle can have no credence. It is this consideration which constitutes the essence of Hume's famous argument. His argument is based upon experience. "The source of our belief," he says, "in the uniformity of nature is experience, and this experience is constant; the source of our belief in testimony is also experience, but this experience is variable, because testimony has sometimes deceived us. We follow the constant experience, which is against the miracle, in preference to the variable, which is in favor of it." But this consideration is overthrown by the fact that belief in testimony is not, as Hume claims, a "mere derivative from experience"; it is "an original principle in our nature, and has an antecedent ground of reason." We believe testimony even before we have learned by observation that the witness is usually truthful. This assumption of the existence of a Divine Power helps to make clear a distinction between miracles and ordinary facts as matters of belief. A miracle is an extraordinary fact, and therefore requires extraordinary evidence. A miracle as a subject of credit, further, assumes a basis of faith which is not assumed in believing in a common fact. "A miracle is both an outward fact and also an invisible and spiritual fact, and to enclose the twofold whole both testimony and faith are wanted." The remark is frequently made that "no testimony can reach to the supernatural." If this remark is designed to distinguish merely between the fact and the cause of a miracle, it is a true, but it is also an inconsequential distinction. Testimony may prove the fact of certain miraculous occurrences; but whether these occurrences are the result of divine interposition depends upon the existence of a Deity, and also upon the argument

of design. Testimony does not, indeed, reach to the supernatural; it is not intended so to reach. But the human reason, acting upon the data which testimony furnishes, may be said to reach to the supernatural. It is still further objected that the assumption of an Infinite and Supernatural Power places miracles upon the ground rather of faith than of testimony. In reply, it is sufficient to say that miracles rest upon the ground of faith so far as they assume a truth which it requires faith to adopt, namely, the being of a God; but no further do they rest upon this ground of faith; and even if thus resting, the fact of the occurrence of these events may be proved by testimony. It must also be borne in mind that faith is not arbitrary supposition, but is belief founded upon reasonable grounds.

Although miracles are summarily described as violations of the laws of nature, it is frequently affirmed that they are instances of the operations of laws which are unknown to us. The expression "unknown law" in relation to miracles has two meanings: first, unknown connection with known law; and second, law which is absolutely unknown. The former is of slight relative importance; the latter suggests what is known as the "higher law," i.e. a law which embraces other laws less extensive. Under this second meaning a miracle is an instance of the operation of the higher law. But before this question of the higher law can be entertained in reference to miraculous facts, the question of the lower law of these facts must be considered. A miracle is a violation of natural laws as these laws are known by us. Therefore a miracle is not affected by any imaginary supposition concerning laws of nature not known by us of which it would not be a violation. "For no new order of things could make the present order different. . . . A miracle, could we suppose it becoming the ordinary fact of another different order of nature, would not be the less a violation of the present one. But it is frequently asked if in the original creation of nature its law or principle may not have been so combined that miracles are the regular consequences of its operation?" The calculating machine is

so adjusted as to run on for a long time ; but at certain and distant intervals a number appears which is very different from the ordinary series. In answer it is to be said that this invariable antecedence produces a law of nature, and if this law of nature is unknown the question of miracles has no relation to it ; for miracles are concerned only with known law. It is further to be said that miracles do not occur at certain physical junctures ; they occur under diverse circumstances, and do not come under an intermitting law of nature. The question of the method of divine action in producing miracles can be waived ; in reference to the argument, it matters not whether this action be immediate or mediate through secondary causes. The suspension of the physical and material laws of a Supreme Being are no more inconceivable than their suspension by man. For the laws of matter are constantly thus suspended. I myself move matter, my body, and suspend its laws. The laws of vegetation constantly suspend the law of gravitation.

The credibility of miracles is by no means dependent upon the excellence of their practical results ; and yet the evidence for miracles ought to have the benefit of these results in any consideration of their claims. It is generally acknowledged that Christianity has wrought the greatest change ever known in the moral standard and practice of men. This change is attributed by common consent to the doctrines of the Christian system. But these doctrines were communicated and proved to be true by means of miracles. Therefore miracles have been the most powerful means in the moral and spiritual regeneration of men. A religion founded on miracles as compared to a religion founded upon the evidence of God as seen in nature, has a superior motive-power in the very fact of its supernatural origin. The voice of God speaking from the heavens has more influence with men than a sign of his existence discovered in the growth of the forest or in the peculiar adaptations of the air-cells of a bird to its flight. The Epistle to the Romans suggests the great effect of the doctrines of Christianity in the moral elevation of men.

This Epistle shows the method of translating knowledge into action. It proves the influence of the incarnation and of the death of the Son of God upon moral conduct. It indicates at once the righteousness of God, for he demands an atonement for sin; and the mercy of God, for he accepts an atonement for sin. This revelation of God in Jesus Christ has been the great motive-power in moral and spiritual action. This doctrine, which is founded upon a miracle, has had the greatest influence on human conduct.

This influence of miracles may be one occasion of the origin of those miraculous pretensions which have characterized the history of the Christian church since the apostolic age. And yet these pretensions are not confined to the Christian church. They seem to form a "running accompaniment of human nature," assuming different shapes according to the religious conceptions and the prevailing notions of a people or of an age. These false miracles must be distinguished from the miracles which serve as evidence of a Christian revelation. In making this distinction the first point to be noted is the character of the facts themselves. The believers in these miraculous pretensions appear to see almost as great a difference between a genuine miracle and their own pretended supernaturalism as between that miracle and the order of nature. The Jews who believed in and practised thaumaturgy made a vast difference between their magic art and the miracles of Christ. A difference likewise as great was spontaneously made between the miracles of the apostolic and of the sub-apostolic age. This difference is explained by the character of the facts in the two sets of miracles. This current supernaturalism is confined to a certain class of occurrences which, at the best, are "very ambiguous miracles." Visions, vaticinations, exorcisms, wonderful cures comprise these miracles of human history. They fail to include such a fact as the resurrection of the dead. They frequently embrace events which are rather special providences than genuine miraculous occurrences. This characteristic suggests the uncertainty which rests upon

this assumed supernaturalism, and is in striking contrast with the range and the freedom of the Gospel miracles. Although a large share of the Gospel miracles are cures and exorcisms, yet they are not all of this sort; and this lower class of miracles are to be judged by the higher class. The question is, What is the power working in these events? It is certainly more than sufficient for the production of this lower class of events. The lesser miracles do not therefore cancel the higher; but the higher explain and make reasonable the lower. It is further to be observed that in the instances of the operation of this current supernaturalism "is a wildness, a puerile extravagance, a grotesqueness and absurdity" which disqualify them as being a subject of evidence. "The sense of what is absurd, ridiculous, and therefore impossible as an act of God, is part of our moral nature; and if a miracle even seen with our own eyes cannot force us to accept anything contrary to morality or a fundamental truth of religion, still less can professed evidence force us to believe in divine acts which are upon the face of them unworthy of the divine authorship." The comparison of the results, moreover, of these two sets of miracles reveals this difference: The miracles of the Gospels have worked, as before suggested, marvellous changes in the moral constitution of human society; the miracles of the later ages have claimed only to effect an intercourse between the living and the dead and to cure certain diseases.

The difference also in the kind of evidence for these two classes of events deserves notice. The miracles of the Gospel are supported by contemporary testimony, the miracles of a subsequent time are not always thus supported. The character of the witnesses, also, is to be considered. The witnesses of the New Testament had a strong perception of and regard for the claims of truth; the witnesses of subsequent periods, though self-denying, courageous, of enterprise, and of high faith, were ambitious, and inclined toward certain exaggerations in the growth of moral character and toward certain excesses in moral practices. They could not, therefore, be so

truthful witnesses as those whose testimony is recorded in the New Testament. It is still further to be observed that the testimony of the early witnesses was tested by the ordeal of sacrifice and suffering; and that the testimony of later witnesses is subjected to no such ordeal. The miracles of the Mediaeval Period labor under still another peculiar difficulty. By common confession at least a part of them are acknowledged to be spurious. The Scripture miracles are free from any such stain. Two causes contributed to the spread of miraculous pretensions in the Middle Ages. One cause was the desire of the church to concentrate its power into an absolute monarchy, and its willingness to extend the beliefs in certain dogmas by means of deliberate and audacious fraud. Hence arose the bold forgeries, the false compilations of authorities, and the counterfeit miracles of the Middle Ages. The other cause of the spread of miraculous pretensions was the "adoption of miracles as the criterion and test of high goodness." The popular idea was that before a saint was admitted to the Calendar, proof should be given of a miracle performed either by him or by virtue of his bones. The desire for canonization would thus tend to increase the number of spurious miracles.

But it is to be said that even were these miracles of the Middle Ages proved to be authentic, this fact would not at all invalidate the miracles of Christ and of his apostles. These early miracles still stand firm upon evidence which cannot be overthrown. The Roman Catholic who accepts the miraculous pretensions of the later period, also accepts the miracles recorded in the New Testament. Nor does the assertion, frequently made, that in the multitude of spurious miracles it is impossible to distinguish the true, have more than a show of truth. All cases of recorded miracles cannot be thus summarily disposed of. Each case is, like each case in civil justice, to be decided upon its own evidence. It requires only the application of this rule to prove the credibility of the miracles of the Gospel and the spuriousness of the miracles of the Mediaeval Period.

§ IV. THE ATONEMENT.

Canon Mozley's doctrine of the Atonement is suggested in a sermon included in the volume of University Sermons and in a criticism of Frederick Denison Maurice's Theological Essays. I say *suggested*, for the doctrine is not explained with fulness of definition or defended with that comprehensiveness and detail which belong to a treatise. Yet the suggestions thus made are sufficient to yield an outline of the form of his belief in the central truth of Christianity. In general the doctrine of the Atonement is defined as "the doctrine that Christ's death and sufferings have been accepted as a sacrifice in our behalf; and, whereas our sins would, in the natural course, have brought eternal punishment upon us, this sacrifice has redeemed us from it." Although this definition omits certain essential elements in the Atonement it yet includes certain other elements which are essential. It includes the element of substitution, and also that of the influence of the work of Christ on the mind of God. In respect to substitution Canon Mozley repudiates that interpretation which represents the sufferings of Christ as literally and fully taking the place of the punishment of the sinner. Christ is not punished for the sinner. The substitution is genuine, but it is a moral substitution. The substitution is not simply in behalf of another, it is also and more, instead of another. Christ takes the place of another and acts in his stead. "He suffers that another may escape suffering, he condemns himself to a burden that another may be relieved." This is very different from the substitution which has frequently been represented as an element of the Atonement. It does not mean that one person is *punished* for another person. This interpretation is nothing less than pagan. The teachings of Scripture, on the contrary, are rather a protest against this interpretation. Objectors to the Atonement on this ground are not attacking the biblical doctrine, but rather a heathenish conception of it. Their missiles are therefore ineffective.

The mediatorship of Christ is also represented as having influence on God. It increases the love of the divine Father for his children on the earth. But this change on the part of God does not dispense with the need of moral change in the sinner. "We cannot, of course, because a good man suffered for a criminal, alter our regards to him if he obstinately remains a criminal." If there is a change in the regard *for* the sinner there must also be a change *in* the sinner.

The Atonement is not a literal fulfilment of justice. It contains no *quid pro quo* element. Yet it contains a certain fulfilment of justice. "It is a fulfilment in the sense of appeasing and satisfying justice; appeasing that appetite for punishment which is the characteristic of justice in relation to evil." "There is," Canon Mozley remarks in the sermon to which allusion is made, "obviously an appetite in justice which is implied in that very anger which is occasioned by crime, by a wrong being committed; we desire the punishment of the criminal as a kind of redress, and his punishment undoubtedly satisfies a natural craving of our mind. But let any one have exposed himself thus to the appetite for punishment in our nature, and it is undoubtedly the case, however we may account for it, that the real suffering of another for him, of a good person for a guilty one, will modify the appetite for punishment, which was possibly up to that time in full possession of our mind; and this kind of satisfaction to justice and appeasing of it is included in the scriptural doctrine of the Atonement." Thus in a sense the mediatorship of Christ is a fulfilment of justice, although *not* in that sense which certain of the older theologians have represented.

It is to be observed that the benefit of the Atonement consists not simply in the deliverance of man from punishment, but in his deliverance from sin as well. Here two advantages are closely allied, but the former should not be allowed to absorb the latter. Deliverance from sin, even if by grace sin is

cast off, cannot amount to more than repentance and reformation. But reformation cannot effect the sins already committed, it can affect only the future life. We can therefore escape the natural consequences of past sins which are represented in punishment only through the Atonement. As Bishop Butler well says, in language which Canon Mozley employs to fine effect against the weak theories of Professor Maurice, Christ "interposed in such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of justice upon sinners which God had appointed should otherwise have been executed upon them, or in such a manner as to prevent that punishment from actually following, which, according to the general laws of divine government must have followed the sins of the world, had it not been for such intervention." The Atonement thus has regard to man's future and to man's past, and to God as well as to man.

§ V. REGENERATION AND BAPTISM.

The Atonement does not result in the salvation of the sinner except he be regenerated. The views of Canon Mozley in reference to regeneration are set forth in an early work having the title, *A Review of the Baptismal Controversy*. The purpose of this work is to affirm two positions: first, "that the doctrine of the regeneration of all infants in baptism is not an article of the faith"; and second, "that the formularies of our church do not impose it." The purpose is indeed narrow, and perhaps at the present time apparently inconsequential. But in the course of the closely reasoned argument the views of the author concerning important doctrines, and especially concerning regeneration, are stated. The term "regenerated" he interprets Scripture as meaning "born of God," or "child of God." The first birth is of man, and the second of God. The term also means likeness to God in character. The "child of Abraham" is one who resembles Abraham in character; "the child of the devil" one who resembles the devil in wickedness; "the child of hell" one who resembles the occupants of that world in malice

and sin. The "child of God" is, therefore, one who is like God in character. The scriptural sense of regeneration is to be distinguished from several incorrect, inadequate, and false meanings which have been given to it. Regeneration is not merely grace. Grace is a generic term, and may embrace grace which is ineffective or merely assisting and not wholly sufficient. Regeneration implies an actual state of goodness in the individual. Regeneration is not simply a change of federal relations to God. Regeneration implies not simply a capacity for goodness, but goodness itself. Regeneration is by some pronounced as totally different from renovation. But in the New Testament it is represented as "the renewal of the inward frame and disposition," which is equivalent to renovation. It is, however, renovation and more, It is renovation plus the remission of sin. "The act of regeneration is a birth, but it is a birth into a state of actual possession, not means of acquisition only; and from the moment that it takes place goodness exists, and has not to grow *into existence*, though it admits of growth. The regenerate man may rise indefinitely in the scale of perfection; but he is still, from the moment that he *is* regenerate, a formed spiritual man, having actual goodness, of which his birth is the beginning and first enjoyment indeed, but not the mere rudimental capacity." Regeneration implies remission of sins, but it is more than this. Remission of sins is the removal of the guilt for past sin which is an impediment to the individual's present goodness. It is true that in the case of moral agents the removal of guilt signifies a certain degree of actual goodness as the condition of its removal. But this goodness is not the effect of this remission, although it may be thereby increased. Regeneration is thus more than this negative quality of the remission of sins. It signifies also the formation of the quality of positive goodness. Remission implies faith and repentance in the individual.

With this definition, the relation of the regeneration of adults to their baptism is easily formulated. The general theory is that an adult is regenerate in baptism with faith and

repentance. Those who maintain that wicked adults become regenerate in baptism can do so only on the supposition that "regeneration is only the imparting of a *power* or *faculty*." In this meaning it is possible for the wicked while wicked to be regenerated; for there is no inconsistency in the idea that God confers great powers or faculties alike upon the good and the evil. The relation, however, of the regeneration of infants to their baptism is not so easily stated. Canon Mozley affirms that "an infant is not regenerate in the sense of being actually good, if he has only a new capacity for goodness implanted in him at baptism. A faculty or capacity for attaining goodness is a totally different thing from goodness, the power altogether a distinct thing from the fact. The inhabitation of the Holy Spirit as a prompting and assisting divine influence within the soul does not make that soul actually good." Nor is an infant "made actually good in baptism, if he is only freed from the guilt of original sin; because the cessation of the imputation of sin does not constitute goodness, which is a positive quality, and consists in a good moral quality or habit." Yet again: "An infant is not made good in baptism by being admitted into a new federal state or covenant with God"; for this federal state is only a combination of the two states of forgiveness and the *opportunity*, by means of divine grace, of attaining salvation. Nor can it be affirmed with apparent truth that an infant becomes actually good in baptism by means of an "implanted character," that is, character in a rudimentary or seminal stage. But it is not reasonable to affirm that *all* infants thus have this character implanted in them by baptism. For a character of so holy a nature as would thus be given does not show itself in after life in the case of all baptized children. In the lack, therefore, of evidence to the contrary we are obliged to believe this character was not implanted. The precise theory of Canon Mozley concerning the relation of the regeneration of baptized children to their baptism it is not easy to discover. The purpose of his work is negative, and many of his positions are negations. "Scripture is silent with respect to

infants as recipients of the grace of baptism." He, therefore, also declines to lay down affirmations.

§ VI. ESCHATOLOGY.

The theory of eternal punishment appears, like the theory of the Atonement, in the criticism of Professor Maurice's views. The reverend Professor who was removed from his chair of Divinity in King's College, abstracted from the words eternity and eternal all idea of time. He explained them as meaning pure and simple existence. This interpretation is by no means as new or as universal to-day as it was thirty years since, when the teaching of such conceptions was the principal cause of the removal of a professor of great ability and energy. But this interpretation has been deftly overthrown by Canon Mozley, not on the ground of exegesis as is customary, but on the ground of metaphysics. Whenever we think of existence we do not think of existence pure and simple; we think of the existence of some object; and the existence of this object we think of as continuing or as not continuing. "If the idea of eternity, then, is reduced to the idea of pure existence, independent of duration, it is reduced to an idea which I have not got within my mind." The idea of pure existence is an idea which the very laws of thought prevent one from forming. But, further, the affirmation that eternal does not mean everlasting or endless would by the popular mind be received as indicating that eternal punishment does mean punishment of which the duration is limited. The popular mind will not rest in the refined conceptions of pure existence. It explains eternal as referring to time, and if the scholar affirms that the word does not mean everlasting, it, still holding to the notion of time, infers that the word must mean time finite.

Seldom have the disastrous effects of entertaining such a theory been expressed with greater force and comprehensiveness than in the strong sentences of Dr. Mozley. "The release from the notion of eternal punishment," he remarks, "would be felt by the great mass as a relief from the sense

of moral obligation ; and, relying on this certainty that all would be sure to be right at last, men would run the risk of the intermediate punishment, whatever it might be, and plunge into self-indulgence without hesitation. It may be said that men do this now under the belief in eternal punishment. They do ; and there is no limit to the powers of imagination by which men can suppress the reasonable certainty of the future and make the present everything. But the belief in eternal punishment is the true and rational concomitant of the sense of moral obligation. Destroy the punishment and you destroy the sin ; limit it, and you make sin a light thing. Moreover, the belief in eternal punishment, however suppressed, leaves a blank and dark ultimate prospect before the sinner's mind ; but this prospect is removed by the limitation of punishment, and in the place of a cloudy termination of the view, which the sinner at any rate had rather have removed, and which therefore must so far operate as a stimulus to that change of life which alone can remove it, he has a bright ultimate termination anyhow, whether he changes his way of life or whether he does not, and therefore he loses a stimulus to change which even the most careless must in some way feel. For even those to whom eternal punishment is thus a mere negative and suppressed idea had rather have a bright termination than this suppressed bad one before them. . . . A general relaxation of moral ties, a proclamation of liberty and security, the audacity of sins which had before been abashed, carelessness where there had been hesitation, obstinacy where there had been faltering, and defiance where there had been fear, would show a world in which the sanctions of morality and religion had been loosened, and in which vice had been a controlling power, and got rid of an antagonist and a memento." Although these words were written nearly a third of a century ago, and in England, they deserve to be pondered by the American theologians of this generation.