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ARTICLE II.

GREECE AS A EUROPEAN KINGDOM.

BY REV. A. N. ARNOLD, D.D., FORMERLY A MISSIONARY IN GREECE.

THE generation that sympathized with the Greeks in their heroic struggle to break the yoke of Ottoman oppression has nearly passed away. A few still survive who remember the generous enthusiasm which was so widely felt in our country while that struggle was going on. That enthusiasm was neither strange nor unreasonable. Indeed, in several respects, the contest by which Greece won her independence was not unlike that by which we achieved our own. It was the struggle of a weak power against a strong. It was the effort to throw off a yoke of oppression far heavier and more cruel, and of far longer continuance, than that which our fathers were no longer able to bear. It was marked, like our own, by alternations of glorious success and deep disaster. It was perseveringly prosecuted amid great discouragements and with great sacrifices. And it lasted for very nearly the same period as our own.¹ No wonder, then, that American sympathy with the Greeks in their contest for freedom was widespread and earnest. This sympathy was shown by multitudes of our people in contributions of money and food and clothing for the relief of the suffering Greeks; by the personal efforts and services of individuals, like Dr. Samuel G. Howe of Massachusetts and Colonel Jonathan P. Miller of Vermont; and by the official utterances and acts of such public men as Daniel Webster and Henry Clay.² It will

¹ This parallel has been noticed by Gladstone, "Gleanings of Past Years," Vol. iv. p. 285, and by Felton, "Lowell Lectures," Vol. ii. p. 253.

² Dr. Howe acted as a Surgeon in the Greek war (1824-1827), organized the Greek signal service, and presided over it. He bore this testimony to the Greeks: "The more I became acquainted with the Greek people, their language and manners, the more I became pleased with them, the more convinced that there

hardly be denied that our interest in the little kingdom of Greece, since it became an independent power, has but poorly corresponded with the earlier enthusiasm with which we watched and encouraged the contest by which her independence was achieved. This is to be regretted. Greece is not ungrateful for our past sympathies and services. She needs and deserves our sympathies still. Always remembering the sage caution of Washington's Farewell Address, against embroiling ourselves in the quarrels of European nations, we need not, and should not be, indifferent to the progress of a brave and freedom-loving people.

It may tend to revive and perpetuate our friendly interest in the welfare and prosperity of this little Greek kingdom, if we briefly recall the principal events of that revolutionary struggle which at the time aroused and justified our sympathy; and then consider what progress Greece has already made, in the face of many difficulties; and finally glance at the obstacles which she has had to encounter in her natural and praiseworthy endeavors to complete the work of the emancipation of the entire Greek race, which was unfortunately left incomplete when the kingdom was organized, and which, after the lapse of more than half a century, and after several partial extensions of territory, can hardly yet be called complete. Greece would be unworthy of herself and of her

is in the modern Greeks that which, with liberty and education, will make them again a people remarkable for talent and taste" (Address in New York in 1828). As to Col. Jonathan P. Miller (born Feb. 24, 1798, died 1847), see his "Condition of Greece in 1827, 1828," consisting of the Journal which he "kept by order of the Executive Greek Committee of the city of New York." In the House of Representatives Dec. 8, 1823, Mr. Webster offered the following: "Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law for defraying the expense incident to the appointment of an agent or commissioner to Greece, whenever the President shall deem it expedient to make such an appointment." When this resolution came up for discussion Jan. 19, 1824, Mr. Webster delivered his eloquent oration on "The Revolution in Greece" (Vol. iii. pp. 61-93, Everett's edition of Webster's Works). Mr. Clay had seconded Mr. Webster's resolution in an earnest speech (Colton's edition of "Life and Times of Henry Clay," Vol. i. pp. 246-249), and though the resolution was lost at the time, the United States was the first to acknowledge the Independence of Greece, when John Quincy Adams was President, and Mr. Clay Secretary of State.

past history, if she did not aspire ardently and struggle manfully to see that work completed in the liberation of the entire Greek race.

The outbreak of the revolutionary uprising, in 1821, was not due, as has sometimes been asserted, to foreign intrigue; but it was the legitimate and inevitable consequence of the awakened life of the nation. While this revival of the national spirit was no doubt connected in some measure with the general movement in Europe which had its most signal illustration in the French revolution, it was more particularly due to the influence of certain scholars and patriots who had arisen among the Greeks themselves, and whose burning words were directed to the very purpose of awakening among their countrymen that love of liberty with which the literature of ancient Greece is so eminently pervaded. Indeed, it was largely by recalling the attention of the people to their ancient classic writers that these scholars and patriots aroused the national spirit.

Prominent among these was Adamantios Koraēs (or Coray, as his name is often spelled), a Greek of Sciote parentage, but born in Smyrna, in 1748, and educated in his earlier years in Scio by his grandfather, who was the teacher of a Hellenic school in that island. He spent six years in a commercial house in Amsterdam, giving all his leisure to literary pursuits. After a short sojourn in his native place, he spent six years more in Montpellier (1782-1788), where he studied medicine; supporting himself in part by his writings. Thence he removed to Paris. While there he was employed by Napoleon, then First Consul of France, to translate the works of Strabo, the Greek geographer, into French (1802). From this time he remained in Paris till his death, in 1833. During this last half century his literary career forms part of the intellectual history of the age. In 1803 he read before a literary society in Paris (called Observers of Man) a memoir on "The Present State of Civilization in Greece," which contains one of the earliest direct assertions of the necessity for national emancipation. His editions of several of the

Greek classics and his animated exhortations to his countrymen gave him unbounded influence; and for the space of forty years he may be said to have guided the education of his people. His patriotic writings, together with the influence of the Hetairias, or secret societies of the Greeks, formed the chief causes by which the Greeks were aroused to shake off the Turkish yoke.

Another prominent actor in the preparation of the Greek nation for their emancipation was the patriot scholar and poet, Constantinos Rihgas, not inaptly styled "the Tyrtaeus of Modern Greece." He was born in Thessaly, in 1753, and resided in Bucharest from his early youth till 1790 — at first engaged in commerce, and afterwards holding the office of professor. Thence he removed to Vienna, where as a journalist and a poet he was active in arousing his countrymen to insurrection, until he was basely delivered up by the Austrian authorities to the Turks, and put to death with cruel tortures.¹

The outbreak of the Greek revolution is commonly assigned to the 25th of March, 1821; and that date, corresponding to the 6th of April, N. S., is celebrated by the Greeks as the birth-day of their nation. It was on that day that Germanos, the Archbishop of Patras, raised the standard of the cross at the monastery of Laura. The first military enterprises of the insurgents were crowned with success; and before the end of the summer they had liberated almost the whole country; and the few Turkish troops that remained on their soil were closely besieged in about a dozen fortresses. Had energetic European intervention come to their aid then, instead of five or six years later, much bloodshed would have been saved, and many hinderances and difficulties forestalled. But Europe was very slow to espouse the cause of Greek emancipation; and the first rapid triumphs of the insurgents, due not only to their bravery and enthusiasm, but also in part to the unprepared state of their oppressors, were soon

¹ Sergeant's *New Greece*, p. 240; Felton's *Lowell Lectures*, Vol. ii. pp. 416-419.

followed by terrible reverses. The project was seriously entertained at one time in Constantinople of devoting all the Greeks throughout Turkey to indiscriminate massacre; and, in fact, many of the leading Greeks in the capital and elsewhere fell victims to the bloodthirsty revenge of the Turks. Gregory, the Patriarch of Constantinople, was hung at the gate of his palace; and after his body had been left to swing there for three days, it was taken down, dragged through the streets by the Jews, and then thrown into the sea. Seven bishops and a large number of priests, besides a multitude of prominent men among the private citizens, were put to death. In fact, the war was conducted, on the part of the Turks, during the whole period of its continuance, with the most barbarous cruelty. Perhaps the extremest instance of this was the massacre of the Sciotes, in the year 1822. We have a thrilling account of this terrible scene in a letter written by Mr. Richard Cobden. The island of Scio had long been a favored spot. It was famed for the beauty of its scenery, the fertility of its soil, and the intelligence and comfort of its inhabitants. Though technically a part of the Turkish empire, it had enjoyed peculiar privileges, and had become a favorite resort for wealthy Greeks who had retired from a life of successful business in other parts. Its schools and libraries were famous; and it was, in fact, a sort of Greek paradise. The inhabitants had taken no part in the first outbreak; but as the war advanced, and became more and more a war of races and religions, the Sciotes could not fail to show that their sympathies were heartily on the side of their suffering countrymen. At last the Turkish garrison was shut up in the citadel. This was the signal for a mandate from Constantinople, virtually giving up the entire population to the greed and outrage of Moslem fanaticism. There was an immediate rush from the capital and from the large towns on the coast of Asia Minor to the doomed island. The people of this hitherto happy region were given up to fire and sword, and not only to the most atrocious cruelties and butcheries of a savage soldiery, but to the more diabolical

outrages of an infuriated mob of the baser sort. For three terrible months the whole island was abandoned to their ravages. Not less than forty thousand, of both sexes, were sold into slavery; and of a population of about one hundred thousand not more than five thousand were left alive upon the island.¹ The massacre of Scio is a tragedy without a parallel in the history of modern wars. Is it to be wondered at that the Greeks sometimes retaliated by similar cruelties to those which their tyrants had taught them? It is written that "oppression maketh a wise man mad" (Eccl. vii. 7). But no scriptural maxim or historical precedent teaches the converse—that oppression makes maddened men wise or moderate or forgiving.

It is a relief and a pleasure to turn from this horrible example of Turkish savagery to some of the many illustrations of Grecian patriotism and bravery with which the annals of the revolution abound.

On the sea, especially, Admirals Miaulis and Kanaris, with their fireships, struck terror into the hearts of Turkish naval forces. They destroyed more than three thousand Turks during the first year of the war. They burned the Admiral's ship at Scio, and very soon drove the enemy in panic from the Grecian waters. While a Turkish fleet was lying at anchor in the bay of Tenedos, two barques, with Turkish colors, appeared in sight, followed by two Greek brigs. The Turkish spectators from the fleet watched the chase with lively interest, and as the barques drew near, not suspecting any stratagem, the ships opened their lines with loud cheers to admit their countrymen into safety. This was what the Greeks desired; for those two barques were fire-ships, manned by Greek sailors dressed as Turks, and commanded, one by Kanaris himself, the other by a Hydraote captain. The

¹ *New Greece*, p. 302, note 1. See also the story of Loukis Laras, "Reminiscences of a Chiote Merchant during the Greek War of Independence," by D. Bikelas, pp. 273; translated from the Greek by J. Gennadius. London: Macmillan, 1881. A historical romance, written with touching simplicity, and with no little dramatic power; one of the finest specimens of modern Greek literature in this comparatively uncultivated department.

barques immediately grappled the two principal ships, the one the Turkish flag-ship and the other a ship of the line filled with treasure. The Turkish Admiral, by cutting his cable, narrowly escaped destruction; but the other ship was set on fire, and soon blew up with a terrific explosion, destroying with the treasure the lives of sixteen hundred Turks. The remainder of the fleet cut their cables and made for the Dardanelles. In their flight two of their ships ran ashore and were wrecked. Among more than a dozen prizes which these Greek fire-ships took was one in the harbor of Damietta with a million piasters aboard. Many instances are related of the personal prowess and cool daring of Kanaris. On one occasion, after he had left the fire-ship, seeing that it was not properly inflamed, he went on board again alone and set it on fire. This gallant naval officer survived until the year 1877.

Other exploits on land, no less daring and successful than these naval achievements, might be mentioned. That of Marco Botsaris, the heroic defender of Missolonghi, may serve as a specimen. Being hard pressed, and having barely three thousand men with which to hold his ground against more than eight times that number of his besiegers, he had recourse to a desperate stratagem. Selecting one hundred and fifty Suliotes, the bravest of the brave, he fell by night upon the advanced guard of the enemy, composed of five thousand men, while the remainder of his little force attacked the main body at different points. The Turkish force, thus taken by surprise, was thoroughly routed, and dispersed in all directions, leaving eight hundred dead upon the field, and one thousand prisoners, eighteen standards, seven guns, and immense military stores in the hands of the victorious little band. The Greeks lost but one hundred and fifty men; but they lost that heroic leader, whose name the muse of Fitzgreen Halleck has immortalized. Though wounded near the beginning of the fight, he would not leave the field until near the close, when about daybreak he was shot through the head, and only lived long enough to hear the shouts of his victorious comrades. This was in the autumn of 1823.

Severe reverses now followed. The prospects of the Greeks for the next three or four years were gloomy in the extreme. The Sultan called upon Mohammed Ali to assist him in subjugating Greece; and this powerful prince, in the summer of 1824, sent an army of eight or nine thousand Egyptians, under Ibrahim Pasha, into the Morea. The Greeks were not able to oppose any adequate force to these new invaders; and they ravaged the country, destroying olive trees and currant plantations, and desolating the land. In their extremity, the Greeks, not now for the first time, but now more earnestly and persistently than ever before, appealed for assistance to Europe, and especially to England. But from the beginning political and diplomatic difficulties retarded the united intervention of the great powers of Europe in behalf of Greek independence. As early as June 1821, Russia had taken the initiative by addressing a note of inquiry to her allies on these two questions; namely, what attitude they would assume in case of a war between Russia and Turkey; and what system they would suggest in place of the Turkish rule, in case the result of such a war should be the termination of that rule. This note was accompanied by a distinct disclaimer of any design to extend the limits of Russia, or to act without the co-operation of her allies, and a declaration of the readiness of the Czar to employ the military force of his empire in order to maintain peace and to strengthen the equilibrium of Europe. The court of Berlin was the only one that made any response. Prince Hardenberg, the Prussian chancellor, answered, that he learned with satisfaction the disposition of Russia to treat the Greek question as a European concern, and suggested a conference; adding, that the open and unreserved participation of France and England would be indispensable to the attainment of the desired end. He accordingly addressed a memorandum to London and Paris inviting co-operation. But neither of these powers was enthusiastic for the proposed intervention in behalf of Greece. England, in particular, was influenced by that extreme jealousy of Russian

policy which has played so important a part in her diplomacy for more than half a century. Wellington and Castlereagh were at the head of the English ministry at that time; and neither of these statesmen was ever suspected of philhellenism. It was in this very year 1821 that the representatives of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France met in the congress of Laybach, and formed that misnamed "Holy Alliance" in defense of absolutism and in opposition to popular liberty, which led to the scandalous interference of Austria against Naples, and in the following year of France against Spain.¹ England, it is true, had kept aloof from this nefarious conspiracy; had, in fact, protested against it. In reply to this appeal of Greece, Castlereagh, who was the minister of foreign affairs, instructed Lord Strangford, the British ambassador at Constantinople, to give his support to the Russian demands against Turkey; but at the same time enjoined him not to allow himself to be drawn into any collective action. Next came a proposition from Austria to have a conference at Vienna for the express purpose of preventing a war between Russia and Turkey. The English government was disposed to listen to this Austrian suggestion, rather than to the memorandum from Berlin. Prince Metternich, the Austrian minister, wrote to Nesselrode that England would take part in the proposed conference at Vienna. But now it was Russia's turn to demur; and so the suggestion of Metternich amounted to nothing.²

Castlereagh, seeing the failure of written communications, invited Prince Metternich to meet him in Hanover. Here the two statesmen arrived at an understanding by which an Anglo-Austrian alliance was agreed upon, with the qualified

¹ It was against the monstrous principles of this Congress that Daniel Webster pronounced his eloquent invective in his speech in behalf of Greece, referred to in the note to p. 418.

² There was a curious trick of diplomacy connected with this correspondence. While the court of Vienna was expecting a reply, a bag of documents from St. Petersburg arrived at Vienna. A separate communication to Prince Metternich stated that the bag had already been sealed when the invitation was received, and was sent off before there was time to read the new despatch. So the sealed bag was sent back to St. Petersburg unopened. — *New Greece*, p. 360.

concurrence of France as a substitute for the European concert proposed by Russia and Prussia. The object of these statesmen was to prevent any action; and it was accomplished. They addressed a joint note to St. Petersburg, requesting Russia to explain her plans in the East,—as if she had not already sufficiently explained them by her action of the preceding June! The only answer to this communication was to the effect that Russia did not desire, and had not desired, to act without the sanction of Europe.

Things remained in this state of inaction, so far as European intervention in behalf of Greece was concerned, until the butcheries of the Greeks by the Turks in the island of Scio sent a thrill of horror throughout Europe, and especially throughout England. The ambassadors of the powers at Constantinople now demanded that measures should be taken to put an end to this cruel war, and to decide upon the future fate of the Greeks. The sudden death of Castlereagh about this time (in August 1822), caused a change of affairs in England, and Canning, always a friend to Greece, succeeded to the foreign office. In August 1822 the congress of Verona met. In the mean time the Greeks had proclaimed their independence (at Epidauris, January 27, 1822). This, without doubt, had a favorable effect upon the public opinion of Europe. In November the Eastern question was opened in the congress by Nesselrode. He declared that the Czar was ready to renew diplomatic relations with the Porte (he had withdrawn his ambassador several months before), provided the Sultan would prove, by a series of facts, that he was disposed to respect the Christian religion placed under the protection of Russia, and to establish peace in the Greek peninsula. The representatives of Austria, Prussia, and France concurred in this suggestion, but Wellington hesitated; it was necessary for him to consult his colleagues at home; after the lapse of a fortnight he gave this reply: he acknowledged the magnanimous moderation of the Czar, but it was the opinion of his government that the Porte had already given, by its practical concessions, a series of facts

which would warrant Russia in reopening diplomatic relations. At the same time he suggested that the pressure of England should still be brought to bear upon the Porte, in order to confirm it in its good dispositions. The next day after this reply of England the Russian representative, Tatischeff, declared to the congress that the friendship of his allies inspired the Czar with such a sense of security that he entirely confided to their wisdom the direction of all future negotiations.¹

It was just at this time that the delegates of the Greek provisional government, Metaxas and Jourdain, arrived at Verona, with a formal application for recognition. In the document which they presented to the congress, drawn up with emphatic expressions of piety, which the Greeks probably supposed would have no little influence with the Czar Alexander (whose heart was believed to be very deeply affected by religious emotion), they demanded the readmission of Greece into Christendom and her protection by Europe against the vengeance of the Porte. The reply of the congress to this appeal of the Greeks was such as might have been expected after the action of the previous year at Laybach. In their circular, issued at Verona on the 14th of December, they declared that the coincidence of the Greek rising with the revolution at Naples and in Piedmont left no doubt as to the identical origin of these various movements; that the leaders of the Greek revolt had erred in thinking it possible to sow discord in the councils of the powers; and that the sovereigns had determined to repel the principle of revolution in whatever shape or in whatever country it made its appearance. This was the heartless reply of Europe, or rather of "the European concert of tyranny," as it has well been called, to the moderate and humble appeal of the Greeks. This was the mode in which the great powers, a little more than half a century ago, abandoned the Greeks to the brutality of Turkey. Well might the Greek patriot, Kolokotronis, when he heard the result of this appeal to the

¹ *New Greece*, pp. 304, 305.

powers, warn his soldiers that they must trust entirely to their guns and their swords.

And to this, in spite of all disappointments and discouragements, they girded themselves anew. They made heroic sacrifices; witness, for example, the efforts of Miaulis and Konturiotes, two merchants of Hydra, who spent more than one hundred thousand pounds sterling to equip a flotilla; and the magnitude of the forces which they arrayed against the Turks, compared with the small population of the country, proves that the people at large were not recreant at the call of patriotism. Finlay, the historian, who spent a large part of his life among the Greeks, and who certainly was not chargeable with any undue disposition to flatter them, while affirming their lack of able leaders, is compelled to add that the true glory of the Greek revolution lies in the indomitable energy and unwearied perseverance of the mass of the people.¹

Volunteers, also, from other countries began to flock into Greece, to aid them in their heroic struggle by funds, supplies, and military service: Stanhope and Napier and Gordon and Hastings from England, and Raybaut and Blaquiere from France, besides many others from both these countries, and even from our own country. Among these the name of Lord Byron ought not to be omitted; for although he was unable to do much for Greece as a soldier, dying of disease at Missolonghi only a little more than three months after his arrival in Greece,² his devotion to the Greek cause not only gave powerful encouragement to the Greeks themselves, but contributed not a little to awaken a spirit of philhellenism both in England and on the continent. Nor indeed was his direct service, though so short, by any means insignificant. He not only raised and equipped and disciplined, at his own expense, a considerable force of Suliotes, but he aided the Greeks in raising a loan in Europe, and even spent much of his own fortune in anticipating that loan and in providing the combatants with the sinews of war. No wonder that his

¹ History, vi. 231.

² He landed at Missolonghi Jan. 5, 1824, and died April 19th.

memory is dear to the Greeks still. His friend, Mr. Trikoupes, afterwards for many years ambassador to England, and the author of the best history of the Greek revolution (4 vols. 8vo., 1853-1857), delivered an eloquent funeral oration and eulogy. The remains of Byron were carried to England, but his heart was, in accordance with his own desire, preserved in a funereal urn at Missolonghi.¹

All Europe now began to take an interest in Greek affairs, and various plans were proposed in England, in France, and in Russia for constituting in Greece a kingdom, independent, or merely tributary to the Porte. Mr. Canning, now England's minister of foreign affairs, though favorable to the Greek cause, was no less determined than Wellington and Castlereagh had been not to allow Russia to take the lead in the philhellenic movement. The Greek leaders, understanding that England was now disposed to favor their cause, prepared a declaration expressing their desire to place themselves under her protection. They sent an agent to London to lay their views before Canning, to assure him that

¹ Felton's *Lowell Lectures*, Vol. ii. pp. 439-441. Prof. Jebb of Glasgow University, in his paper on "Byron in Greece," supplementary to his "Two Lectures on Modern Greece," delivered at the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh in the winter of 1879-1880, successfully vindicates Byron from the charge of being actuated by romantic and self-seeking motives in espousing the Greek cause. The most plausible ground of this charge, is the unfavorable account of the Greeks contained in some of his earlier poems. Prof. Jebb shows very conclusively that he had come to entertain more favorable views of Greek character, and better hopes of the future of Greece after their rising in 1821, than he had when he visited Greece a quarter of a century before. In 1824 Byron writes: "I cannot calculate to what a height Greece may rise. . . . The English government deceived itself at first, in thinking it possible to maintain the Turkish empire in its integrity, but it cannot be done; that unwieldy mass is already putrified, and must dissolve. If anything like an equilibrium is to be upheld, Greece must be supported. Mr. Canning, I think, understands this, and intends to behave towards Greece as he does with respect to the South American colonies. This is all that is wanted, for in that case Greece may look towards England with the confidence of friendship, especially as the latter now seems to be no longer infected with the mania of adding to her colonies, and sees that her true interests are inseparably connected with the independence of those nations who have shown themselves worthy of emancipation; and such is the case with Greece." — Jebb's "Modern Greece," pp. 178, 179. This, spoken half a century ago, now "sounds like a prophet's word."

they desired a monarchical form of government for their country, and to declare their readiness to accept as their sovereign any prince whom Great Britain would nominate. At the same time they protested against a Russian plan, which probably originated with Capo d'Istria, that the Greek mainland, including Thessaly and Epirus, as well as the Morea and the islands including Crete, should constitute three principalities, with Turkish garrisons in certain fortified towns. This protest, which was received by Canning near the close of the year 1824, is said to have pleased him so much that he declared it was the best thing the Greeks had done since the time of Epaminondas. He felt that he was now master of the situation, and that he had checkmated Nesselrode and Metternich; and there is reason to believe that they felt it, too, and with no little chagrin. Very soon after this he wrote to the Greek government at Nauplia that if hereafter they wished to have recourse to the good offices of England, and would formally express such a desire, they would find her ready to accept the duty.

The next year, 1825, in view of the successes of Ibrahim Pasha, the Russian government renewed its proposal for a conference. Canning made no objection; but he knew that the wishes of the powers principally concerned were diametrically opposite, and that therefore their deliberations could produce no good result. Russia wished to take the lead in the European intervention for the coercion of Turkey; but she had no desire to see Greece independent. Austria was more inclined to see the Greek insurrection suppressed, and did not wish to have Turkey weakened or attacked. The conference met in St. Petersburg, February 24, 1825. Russia proposed that the powers should at once demand of the Porte a cessation of hostilities, enforced by the threat of recalling their ambassadors from Constantinople. The Austrian plenipotentiary suggested that a threat to acknowledge the independence of Greece (to which he knew that the Russian government would never consent) would answer the end just as well. Finally, the conference did nothing but draw up

a remonstrance to the Ottoman government; to which the Porte, seeing that the powers were hopelessly divided, replied in a tone, not only cool, but contemptuous.

In the mean time the encouragement which Canning had given to the Greeks was producing its effect. A declaration asking for English protection was signed by nearly all the leading men of the country, to the number of about two thousand. This declaration was brought before the National Assembly at Nauplia, and formally ratified. It was brief, simple, and conclusive. It consisted of these two concise articles :

“ In virtue of the present act, the Greek nation places the sacred deposit of its liberty, independence, and political existence under the absolute protection of Great Britain.

“ The President of the Council shall immediately execute the present law.”

This document was dated Napoli (Nauplia), August 1, 1825. Demetrius Miaulis, son of the famous Greek captain, brought these articles to London, and presented them to the foreign secretary. But Canning was hardly prepared to act promptly in redeeming his pledge. The influence of Austrian intrigues with the English tories, and especially the attitude of the King and the Duke of Wellington, made it necessary for him to be cautious. He told the Greek delegates that their offer could not be immediately accepted without involving England in a war with Turkey, which would give cause of complaint to the powers. He advised them not to look for a single protectorate, but for the common mediation of the powers. He intimated to them that there might come a point in the contest at which Great Britain might exert her influence to bring about a compromise with the Porte, not for the entire independence of Greece,— for that would be asking everything,— but for anything short of independence.¹ This reply does not seem very satisfactory; but it was diplomatic, and it effected its object. It did not deceive the Greeks; nor did it deceive Europe. It especially annoyed Prince Metternich,

¹ *New Greece*, p. 323.

who after this held himself aloof from taking any part in the establishment of Greek independence. Canning gained his object in this somewhat indirect way. He did all he well could, while he distrusted the sincerity of Russia, and had to act with a constant regard to the known temper of his own sovereign and of Wellington. The Russian government, in October, instructed its ambassador in England to request the English government to take the Greek affair in hand, as the only power able to bring it to a satisfactory issue.¹

But the death of the Czar Alexander, on the first of December, and the accession of Nicholas his second son (Constantine, the elder, being passed over), changed the aspect of the whole Greek question. It broke up the previous relations between the cabinets of St. Petersburg and London. The new Czar, more energetic than his predecessor, undertook to settle the Eastern question; and his zeal precipitated the action of Canning. The Duke of Wellington was sent to St. Petersburg, about the beginning of 1826, to bring about the co-operation of Russia and England. On the 4th of April a protocol was signed by Wellington and Nesselrode, on behalf of the two governments, to make the following joint propositions to the Porte: "That Greece should be a dependency of Turkey, paying her an annual tribute; but that the Greeks should be exclusively governed by authorities chosen and named by themselves, and should enjoy complete liberty of conscience and freedom of commerce." It was stipulated, moreover, "that this protocol should be communicated confidentially to the courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin, together with the proposal that they, in concert with the Emperor of Russia, should guarantee the treaty made between Turkey and Greece on this basis. This protocol amounted to nothing. The offer of mediation was decidedly rejected by the Porte (June 10, 1827). In the mean time France, by her quarrel with the Dey of Algiers, which was a dependency of the Porte, had put herself in a position to assist in the emancipation of Greece.

¹ New Greece, p. 331.

Accordingly, on the 6th of July 1827, a formal treaty was signed at London between England, France, and Russia, prefaced by the declaration that it originated in a desire to put a stop to the effusion of blood, and to the disorders which interfered with the commerce of the states of Europe, and disturbed the tranquility of the continent. It was further premised that the governments of England and France had received from the Greeks an earnest invitation to interpose their mediation between the Porte and Greece. The first article of the treaty pledged the contracting powers not only to renew their offer of mediation to the Porte, but also to demand an immediate armistice between the contending parties. There was also in this treaty of London a secret article, providing for the actual recognition of Greece as an independent state, and for the attainment of peace, by at least a menace of coercion.¹

It was this treaty of London, in 1827, confirming and extending the protocol of 1826, which at last secured the effectual interposition of the three powers, and ultimately the independence of Greece. The contracting powers immediately demanded a cessation of hostilities. The Greeks acceded to this demand; but the Porte refused. It was also stipulated in this treaty that the contracting powers should immediately transmit to the admirals commanding their respective squadrons in the Levant instructions conformed to the arrangements mentioned above. This last measure speedily led to important results—more speedily, in fact, and more important, than the allies contemplated. The Turkish and Egyptian fleet, consisting of eighty-two vessels, carrying two thousand guns, was anchored in the bay of Navarino. The allied fleets of England, France, and Russia, consisting of twenty-six vessels, carrying twelve hundred guns, entered the harbor October 20, with no intention of attacking the Turkish squadron, but merely to prevent its escape, and because they found no suitable shelter outside of the bay. The Turks thought, or pretended to think, that they were on the point of being

¹ *New Greece*, pp. 336, 337.

attacked; and so they took the initiative, by opening fire upon the allies, from their ships and from the batteries on shore, even before the Russian ships, which were in the rear, had actually entered the bay. Of course, there was then but one course to pursue. The fire was returned by the whole allied squadron, and with such terrible effect that by the following morning, of the eighty-two vessels of the Turco-Egyptian fleet, only twenty-nine remained afloat. The Turks lost about six thousand in this engagement, and their naval strength was seriously crippled.

The battle of Navarino has been described as "a happy blunder." It was hardly regarded so favorably as that by the conservative class of the English people. In the royal speech it was deprecated as a disaster to "an ancient ally." Sir Edward Codrington, who had the chief command, was blamed for exceeding his orders. And this event undoubtedly contributed to the downfall of the Canning-Goderich administration, and the return of the Duke of Wellington to office.¹

But this blunder, if we may call it such, was indeed a happy one for Greece; for it materially advanced her cause. It was soon followed by a final offer to the Porte of mediation, which was again refused; and in the month of December the ambassadors of the three powers withdrew from Constantinople. But there was yet no declaration of war on the part of the allies; and the Greeks and Turks still carried on their unequal contest. Even after the battle of Navarino an Egyptian fleet sailed from the Morea to Alexandria with Greek slaves on board. Sir Edward Codrington was again blamed,—this time for neglecting his orders, as he had been in the former case for exceeding them; and he was soon recalled.

Again the councils of England underwent a change, unfortunate for the Greeks. Canning had died (August 8, 1827), even before the battle of Navarino. The term of office of his colleague, Lord Goderich, expired in January 1828; and from that time till 1830 the ministry of Wellington and

¹ *New Greece*, p. 250.

Aberdeen was in power. We have already seen that Wellington was no friend to the Greek cause. In September 1829 he "entreated the Russian representative in England to warn the emperor of the danger of establishing in Greece a focus of revolution." His ministry acted throughout on the principle of taking from Turkey and giving to Greece as little as possible.¹ Within twelve months after Canning died the understanding between England, France, and Russia was virtually at an end. Russia had declared war against Turkey on her own account. "In the protocol of June 15, 1828," says Mr. Finlay, "Lord Aberdeen, with the diplomatic inaptitude which characterizes the proceedings of Great Britain at this period, allowed the clauses to be inverted, — Russia being put foremost, — and by this inversion the claim of Russia to an exceptional position was in some measure ratified. England, as protector of a Greek population in the Ionian Islands, ought to have insisted on equal rights. Russia was not driven from the claim which she set up to an exceptional position until Sevastopol fell, in 1855."²

The condition of the Greeks was never more wretched than at the end of the year 1827, after the three powers had agreed that they should be added to the family of European states. Reschid Pasha was boasting to the Sultan that he had re-subjected the continent of Greece, from Missolonghi to Athens.³ The devastated country was unable to support its non-militant inhabitants. Thousands died of starvation. The national treasury was empty; the army was supported almost entirely by voluntary contributions. In the mean time, six months before the battle of Navarino, Capo d'Istria had been elected President of Greece, by the National Assembly, for a period of seven years. This gave Russia another advantage; for Capo d'Istria, though a native of the island of Corfu, was a Russian subject, and had been from his youth in the Russian diplomatic service, having been especially employed in arranging the details of the treaty of Paris.⁴

¹ *New Greece*, pp. 353, 354.

² *New Greece*, p. 344.

³ *Finlay's History*, Vol. vii. p. 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 241, and note 1.

But while England was thus withdrawing from the support of Greece, and doing much, or suffering much to be done, to turn the minds of the Greeks towards Russia as their chief protector, France was rendering important service to the cause of Greek emancipation. On the 30th of August, 1828, a French army of fourteen thousand men, under General Maison, landed in Greece. They expelled Ibrahim Pasha, drove all the Turks and Egyptians out of the Morea, and held the country until 1834.

But before this last date Russia had so successfully prosecuted the war against Turkey, and so humbled her haughty adversary, that by the treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829), the Porte gave its unqualified adhesion to the protocol of the London conference of March 22d of the same year. In February of the following year (1830), the plenipotentiaries of the three powers came to the following decisions, which form the basis upon which the kingdom of Greece was established: That Greece should form a perfectly independent state; that the government should be monarchical; and that the prince who should be selected to administer it should not be taken from either of the reigning families of the three protecting powers. Greece was to pay to the Porte forty millions of piastres, equal to above four hundred and sixty thousand pounds. The boundaries of the new kingdom were described; but as this description would not be very intelligible without a map, and as the boundaries were shortly afterwards slightly enlarged (July 1, 1832), it is scarcely worth while to give the details of the description.

At the close of the negotiations, the three courts congratulated themselves on having come to a perfect agreement, and flattered themselves that this union was a sure pledge of the permanence of their work, and of its lasting contribution to the peace of all the world.¹ Those who know the subsequent history of the Eastern question, even down to our own times, will agree that these congratulations were strangely premature. "They had created a cripple," says Mr. Sergeant, "and made him pay more than he possessed for the privilege

¹ *New Greece*, p. 359.

of his mutilated existence, and crowned their cruel work by congratulating themselves that now 'the Greek question is irrevocably settled.'¹

Before the last act of this irrevocable settlement, Capo d'Istria had been assassinated (October 9, 1831), and a new prince was to be selected. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, the former husband of the amiable and lamented Princess Charlotte of England, had been offered the crown of Greece, and had accepted it (February 11, 1830); but changed his mind, and abdicated about three months after (May 21). His chief reason for declining the honor and responsibility was, as stated by Mr. Waddington at the Congress of Berlin (1877-1878), the conviction that "Greece could not prosper under the territorial conditions imposed upon her, — above all, without the gulfs of Arta and Volo, with the territories adjacent to them."²

The prince selected after the abdication of Leopold was Otho, the second son of King Louis of Bavaria, a youth of only sixteen years. He arrived at Naupli on the 1st of February 1833; and with him was sent the money which the protecting powers had stipulated that Greece was to pay Turkey for the purchase of a part of her own territory. The Greek National Assembly ratified this choice of the powers (August 8, 1832). Until the young king should attain his majority the country was to be governed by Bavarian regents. No guarantee was given to the Greeks that the country should be governed constitutionally. This was soon a ground of complaint, with sufficient reason, on the part of the Greeks. Discontents and disorders increased, until, in September 1843, a bloodless revolution extorted from King Otho a constitution, and compelled him to dismiss his Bavarian troops and counsellors.

¹ *New Greece*, pp. 360, 362.

² *New Greece*, p. 22. See a fuller statement of his reasons for abdicating, in his letter to Charles X. of France, dated May 23, 1830, two days after his final decision, quoted in the "Spectator" of March 27, 1830, and in Jebb's "Modern Greece," pp. 139, 140. Thus the ungenerous restriction of her frontier cost Greece at the outset the loss of a prince-whom Gladstone (*Gleanings of Past Years*, Vol. iv. p. 286), has styled "the first among the statesman-kings of his day, or perhaps of his century."

Otho's reign continued for nearly twenty years longer; yet not without much dissatisfaction on the part of the people, and with little improvement in the general condition of the country. Brigandage flourished, and was carried on with great boldness, sometimes almost in sight of the capital. Internal improvements were not encouraged; the highways were neglected, and there was little increase in the products of the soil. In fact, except in the matter of education, the progress of the people was very limited. In that the Greeks all the while made rapid strides.

In 1862 another revolution took place, and Otho was driven from his throne. Again, as in 1848, the people took their affairs into their own hands, and dismissed an incompetent ruler in a resolute, but bloodless, manner. Their conduct on this occasion was justified by the verdict of Europe. Earl Russell, then foreign secretary, wrote to Mr. Scarlett, the English representative in Athens (November 6, 1862), that "during a long course of years the British government had endeavored to impress upon King Otho the mistaken nature of the system of government which he had pursued, and the necessity of adopting a system better calculated to conciliate the affection and confidence of his subjects and to promote the prosperity of Greece. The kingdom having, by the transactions of 1832, been acknowledged as an independent state, the people of Greece are entitled to exercise the rights which belong to an independent nation; and one of these is the right of changing its governing dynasty upon good and sufficient cause. Her majesty's government cannot deny that the Greeks have had sufficient cause for the steps they have taken."¹ Words like these from a member of the English cabinet were of course very acceptable to the Greeks, and they did much to revive their confidence in the friendship of England,—a confidence which had often been displayed before,

¹ *New Greece*, pp. 390, 391. Mr. Gladstone says: "Otho was neither a depraved nor a neglectful sovereign; but he had no conception of free government; the stage on which he had to act admitted only of its exhibition in Lilliputian proportions, and there were no indigenous statesmen to supply his deficiencies."—*Gleanings of Past Years*, Vol. iv. p. 226

but had not always been responded to with such action on the part of England as the Greeks had reason to expect. In fact, not one of the European powers made any protest against the action of the Greeks in this matter. Influenced by the strong desire of retaining the goodwill of England, and probably also by the hope of obtaining from her the cession of the Ionian Islands, which had been placed, after the settlement of 1815, under "the *perpetual* protection of the British crown," the Greek people now, with a remarkable approach to unanimity, gave their suffrages for Prince Alfred, the second son of Queen Victoria, as the successor of King Otho. Out of 238,655 votes 230,016, more than ninety-five out of every one hundred, were given for this young English prince.¹ He was accordingly proclaimed King of Greece. But the treaty which had been agreed to by the three powers when the kingdom was constituted forbade that any prince of either of the three royal families should be eligible to the throne of Greece. Indeed, a distinct declaration that this agreement would be adhered to had been communicated to Greece before the voting was completed.

The cabinet of Lord Palmerston then undertook to find a new king. Two selections were made: King Ferdinand of Portugal and the Duke of Saxe Coburg; but both declined the offered throne.² The choice then fell upon Prince William George (born December 24, 1845), second son of Prince Christian of Holstein-Glücksburg, afterwards King of Denmark, whose sister, the Princess Alexandra, had shortly before been espoused to the Prince of Wales. To prevent any possible jealousy on the part of Russia, on account of his connection with the royal family of England, as well as to gratify the

¹ The record of the full vote by universal suffrage in Greece, and at the foreign consulates, was as follows: For Prince Alfred, 230,016; for Duke of Leuchtenberg (a Romanoffsky), 2,400; for an Orthodox King, 1,917; for the Czar, 1,841; for "a King" simply, 1,763; for Prince Napoleon, 345; for the Prince Imperial of France, 246; for a Republic, 93; for Prince Amadeo of Italy, 15; for the Count of Flanders, 7; for Prince William of Denmark (now King of Greece), 6; for Prince Hypsilantes (a Greek, 6); making a total of 239,846.

— New Greece, p. 394, note 1

² New Greece, p. 395.

desire of the Greeks to secure an orthodox succession, it was understood that a niece of the Czar should share the throne with this Protestant king. The Greek National Assembly and the Greek nation acquiesced in this arrangement; and the more readily on account of the understanding that the Ionian Islands would be ceded to Greece.¹ These Islands had been for more than thirty years persistently demanding to be united with their "mother country," as they styled the kingdom of Greece. Mr. Gladstone had been sent by Lord Lytton to Corfu, in 1858, and had found this desire of the Ionians so general and so strong that he suggested to them to petition the queen on the subject. In accordance with this suggestion a vote of the Ionian parliament was framed and conveyed by him to her majesty, declaring it to be the single and unanimous will of the Ionian people to be united with the kingdom of Greece. This petition of the Ionians met at first with some opposition in the British cabinet; but after the revolution which put an end to Otho's reign it was regarded with more favor, and was formally granted in the last month of the year 1862.²

With the reign of King George began a new era of growth and prosperity for Greece. While it must be admitted that Greece has made *creditable* progress during the last fifty years, it ought to be said that during the last fifteen years her progress has been truly *remarkable*. This is the explicit testimony of Professor Jebb in his book on Modern Greece, published in 1880.³

A new constitution was adopted in 1864, far more liberal than that of 1844. Universal suffrage was decreed by the National Assembly, which was convened December 22, 1862,

¹ The crown was offered to Prince George on the 5th of June, 1863. His acceptance of it was signified on the following day. He arrived at the Piræus October 30th, and commenced his reign October 31st, with the title of George I. He was married October 15, 1867, to Princess Olga (born Aug. 22, [= Sept. 3], 1851), daughter of the Grand Duke Constantine, brother of Nicholas, Emperor of Russia.

² Lord Palmerston was then Premier, Earl Russell Foreign Secretary, and Mr. Gladstone Chancellor of the Exchequer. — New Greece, p. 397.

³ p. 103.

and continued in session until November 28, 1864. A national guard was enrolled. The senate and the council of state were abolished; and the government of Greece was left in the hands of the representative chamber and the king. The representative chamber consists of one hundred and ninety deputies, elected by ballot. Every male who has completed his twenty-fifth year is entitled to vote. Every voter who has completed his thirtieth year, who resides in the province where he is a candidate, and owns property, or exercises a profession or calling in the same, is eligible to the chamber. There are in Greece more than three hundred (311) electors to every one thousand inhabitants; while in France there are two hundred and sixty-seven to every one thousand, in England not much above fifty, and in Italy only twenty. The election of the municipal authorities is made by direct, universal, and secret suffrage and by ballot. This provision of the new constitution swept away at once that centralization, which had been the principle of the constitution of 1844, and restored to the municipalities that freedom of self-government which had been enjoyed through all the long periods of Roman domination and Turkish tyranny. This new constitution, while declaring the eastern orthodox church to be the established religion of the kingdom, grants toleration to every other recognized religion, proclaims the equality of Greeks in the eye of the law, apportions the public burdens impartially, makes all Greek citizens admissible to public employments, forbids titles of nobility, makes personal liberty inviolable, secures to all the right of petition, of assembling, and of forming societies, the secrecy of letters, and exemption from domiciliary visits.

The civil and criminal codes of Greece are based mostly on the French system. The supreme court of justice is the Areopagus, composed of a president, vice-president, and five councillors. The judiciary is independent. As an illustration of this independence we may cite the trial and condemnation, in December 1876, of certain bishops and cabinet ministers for simony.¹

¹ Gladstone, *Gleanings of Past Years*, Vol. iv. p. 292.

In speaking of the progress of the kingdom of Greece there is good reason to speak first of education; for it is unquestionably in this department that the progress of the Greeks was the earliest, and has been the most conspicuous. From the first, popular education has been one of the chief cares of every government in Greece. Already, in 1840, there were more than 250 elementary schools, attended by above 20,000 scholars. In 1860 the schools of all kinds numbered more than 750, with about 53,000 pupils. In 1872 there were more than 81,000 pupils in all the public and private educational establishments. The character of public education has shown a corresponding advance. In 1855 there were 80 grammar schools, with more than 4,000 pupils, and 7 gymnasias, with not quite 1,000 pupils; in 1875 the grammar schools had grown to 126, with 8,000 pupils; and the gymnasias to 18, with nearly 2,500 pupils. The university of Athens opened in 1837; in 1841 it had 300 students; in 1850, 550; in 1862, 1,182; in 1872, 1,244 (about 1,000 native and nearly 250 foreign-born Greeks).¹ It has now an annual aggregate of about 1,400 students, and a library of above 150,000 volumes. Education is gratuitous in all grades of public schools, the university included. The faculty of the university comprises upwards of 60 professors.

The department of higher female education has not been overlooked. An education society was formed in Athens nearly half a century ago especially to meet this want. A Greek merchant of Odessa erected a fine building for their use, at a cost of more than \$50,000. Many accomplished teachers have gone forth from this seminary, called the *Arsakeion* from the name of its benefactor. At the annual meeting of this society, in February 1881, 150 members being present, it was reported that in all the schools under its direction, in Athens, in Corfu, and in the provinces, 1,900

¹ The twelve hundred and forty-four students on the catalogue of 1872 were divided among the different faculties as follows: Law, 622; Medicine, 423; Philosophy, 120; Pharmacy, 53; Theology, 26. There are several well endowed private Theological Seminaries in the country, some of which have a larger attendance than the theological department of the university.

young ladies were receiving an education. The expenses for the year were nearly 800,000 drachmas (\$50,000), and the property of the society was valued at 1,400,000 drachmas.¹

The Greek press has borne an honorable part in the regeneration and development of the country. It has been free from censorship, and has, in the main, been distinguished for patriotism and love of liberty. In 1867 it was represented at the Paris exhibition by nearly 100 periodicals. There are at present published in the country about 130; of which number more than 50 are published in Athens, 9 or 10 at Patras and Syra, and about half a dozen each at Zante and Corfu. Besides the ordinary newspapers, published daily or from two to five or six times a week, there are monthly magazines, devoted to law, medicine, theology, and general literature. The annual expenditure for public education in Greece is believed to be greater, in proportion to the revenue, than in any other country in the world.² Indeed, it is often made a matter of blame by foreigners that the Greeks are over-educated. But what other nation in the world was ever accused of sacrificing, to an undue extent, gain to knowledge, the material to the intellectual?

The condition of trade and industry in Greece in 1833 was summed up by Thiersch, who had been the tutor of the Bavarian prince, and who visited Greece before the arrival of Otho, in order to investigate the actual condition of the country. "The country," he says, "derives everything from abroad; its linen, its leather, its iron, its arms, its furniture, its glass."³

¹ Report of the Philekpaideutiké Hetairia in the Athens newspaper, 'H 'Αλληθρία for February 2d., O. S.

² Mr. Tuckerman claims for Greece, that "she stands first in the rank of nations as a self-educated people. Nowhere else does the state spend so large a part of its disposable revenue on public education; nowhere else is there such a spontaneous desire to profit by the educational advantages which the state affords." — Jebb's *Modern Greece*, pp. 124, 125. It is our just boast as Americans, that our first settlers, in their poverty of resources, made generous provision for popular education. But they were picked men from the most free and enlightened country in the world. The Greeks were but just emancipated from a servitude of nearly four hundred years to the worst and most brutal despotism.

³ *New Greece*, p. 137.

The total value of both its imports and its exports, previous to 1840, was at no time equal to 30,000,000 drachmas (\$5,000,000); and there were only one or two years during which the imports were not more than double the exports. Since that date, while the imports have increased from 20,000,000 drachmas to more than 100,000,000, the exports have grown in still greater proportion; from 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 to 60,000,000 or 70,000,000, and have at no time been less than half the value of the imports, and have approximated, during the last few years, to three fourths the value of the imports.

Next to education, commerce has had the most rapid development in Greece. At the end of the war of independence there were scarcely more than 1,000 vessels, including even the smallest. In ten years the number exceeded 3,000; and in 1871 there were more than 6,000, with aggregate burden of over 400,000 tons.¹ The number of Greek seamen in the same year was 35,000, about three times as many, in proportion to the population, as in Great Britain, the most maritime nation in the world. The trade of Greece with Great Britain alone amounted in 1861 to more than \$4,500,000, and in 1871 had risen to \$11,500,000; equal, in fact, to not less than forty per cent of the whole; that with Austria and Turkey being next in order.

In the last few years Greece has made considerable progress in agriculture, a branch of national development heretofore much neglected. "Agricultural pursuits," says Mr. Rangabe, "occupy about one fourth of the population." Of the 13,000,000 or 14,000,000 of acres, which the area of Greece comprises, about one half is occupied by mountains, forests, marshes, and rocky tracts, not at present susceptible of cultivation, leaving only about 6,000,000 acres of arable land. Of this portion about 1,000,000 acres are occupied by cereal products. Within the last fifteen years, 500,000 acres have been brought under cultivation. The cultivation of the olive has increased threefold since 1830; of figs, sixfold;

¹ *New Greece*, p. 146.

of currants, fifteen-fold; of vines, twenty-eight fold. The area occupied by currant plantations is nearly 40,000 acres. Before the war, the annual product was about 10,000,000 pounds weight; now it is more than 150,000,000.¹

The products of Greek art and industry at the first great exhibition in London, in 1851, were represented by thirty-six exhibitors; at the great exhibition in Paris, in 1878, they were represented by more than five hundred exhibitors.² In 1858 a series of Olympic Games was organized, under which title are included the exhibition of industrial products, scientific and literary competitions, and athletic sports. In 1865 the programme of the Olympiad for that year reckoned one thousand two hundred and seventy-two exhibitors.

In the important work of internal improvements Greece has not been backward. Up to 1869 eleven new cities had been rebuilt, mostly on their ancient sites; namely, Syra, the Piraeus, Sparta, Patras, Megalepolis, Petalidi, Othonopolis (in Euboea), Eretria, Amaliopolis, Adumas (in Milo), and New Corinth. More than forty towns, specially injured in the war, had been restored and enlarged. More than six hundred villages had been constructed. These statistics are taken from a report of Mr. Maniotaki, one of the officers of public works.³

Seven ruined harbors, of primary importance, had been established,—those of the Piraeus, of Nauplia and Coron, of Syra, of Stauros (in Tenos), of Naxia and Thera. Besides these, six new ones had been constructed; namely, Kyparissia, Catacolo, Cyllene, Patras, New Corinth, and Andros. In 1847 there was only one light-house (on a small island near Syra); now there are forty-six, of which eight have revolving lights; namely, that of Andros (visible for thirty nautical miles), of Zea, of Pistalia, of Catacolo (seventeen miles), of Patras, of Antirhion, of Aegina, and of the Piraeus. These are of signal importance, as the seas of Greece and the archipelago are proverbially dangerous.⁴

¹ Jebb's *Modern Greece*, p. 112.

² *Ibid.*, p. 118.

³ *New Greece*, p. 165.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 168, 169.

As an additional proof of the general prosperity, the rapid increase of the population may be mentioned. From 650,000 in 1834, it rose to 1,238,000 in 1870 — an increase in greater proportion than that of Great Britain. It now exceeds 1,500,000.¹ The population of Athens has grown to above 50,000, and of the Piræus to 30,000.²

Within the last ten or fifteen years manufactures have been largely developed. The Piræus has already no less than thirty steam-factories, and the kingdom of Greece more than one hundred, besides not less than seven hundred which do not use steam.³

Such evidences of progress, industry, and enterprise as these show that Greece deserves from Europe better treatment than she has hitherto received; and they furnish a sufficient answer to the charges of her calumniators. We will now notice some of these charges.

One of the complaints of Europe — especially of the protecting powers, and principally of England — is, that the Greeks have been remiss in the payment of their national loans, and even of the interest on them. It is a partial answer to this complaint to narrate the circumstances under which these loans were made, and the manner in which the money has been spent. The external debt of Greece began with the loans of 1824 and 1825. The first amounted to £800,000, and the second to £2,000,000. Of the latter, £250,000 were used in buying up £500,000 worth of the former, leaving the total debt £2,300,000. This drew interest at six per cent. This, with the interest unpaid up to 1874, had accumulated to nearly \$27,000,000. To this accumulated sum was added, when Otho came to the throne, a new loan of \$10,000,000, guaranteed by the three powers. Of these large sums the Greeks received, in the first instance, less than \$1,000,000. The rest of the advance was consumed by commissions to agents, expenses of the Bavarian dynasty, and indemnification to Turkey. Some debts have been con-

¹ Gladstone, *Gleanings of Past Years*, Vol. iv. p. 293.

² Jebb, p. 65.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

tracted since, mainly to strengthen the army and navy, and to meet the difficulties brought on by the war between Russia and Turkey. The annual charge upon the Greek treasury now for the foreign and internal debt is not far from \$1,500,000. It would not be strange, in view of certain facts known to those who are familiar with the history of financial affairs nearer home, if the quick-witted Greeks had sought to lessen this national burden by some ingenious scheme of repudiation or "readjustment."¹ But, while it is true that some Greeks have questioned the moral obligation of the nation to liquidate those earlier debts, in view of the manner in which they were contracted, the manner in which they were manipulated by foreign agents, the high rate of interest, and the manner in which the avails of them were spent, — the fact is, that in 1864, shortly after the cession of the Ionian Islands, the new ministry, under Mr. Karnares, acknowledged the debt of 1824 among its first acts. A distinguished Greek economist, Mr. John Soutsos, has recently propounded a plan by which an annual appropriation of not more than \$5,000,000 may be made to sweep away the entire national debt. This sum, in view of the rapidly increasing revenue of the kingdom, would not impose an intolerable burden upon the Greek people.²

But we ought, in justice to the Greeks, to say something of what they have already suffered from their creditors, which would seem to entitle them, in strict equity, — to say nothing of magnanimity, which is hardly to be expected of nations, — to some abatement of the foreign claims upon their treasury. In 1850 Lord Palmerston sent a British fleet to the Piræus, under Admiral Parker, on pretence of supporting the claims of one Don Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew, whose house in Athens had been attacked, and his windows broken, by a Greek mob. The harshness of this blockade, which continued for several weeks, was aggravated by the circumstances that Don Pacifico was not a British subject, as he claimed to

¹ "The country started with a heavy debt, for a loan of which less than one-fifth was applied to the purpose for which it was raised." — *Jebb's Modern Greece*, p. 104.

² *New Greece*, pp. 108–113.

be, and that his demand for indemnification was enormously out of proportion to the damage which he had suffered. It was strongly suspected, moreover, that the real purpose of the British government, in this high-handed proceeding, was to offset the influence of Russia in Greece,—an influence in regard to which England has shown a chronic and morbid jealousy. Admiral Parker even went so far as to threaten, if the indemnity claimed was not immediately paid, to take possession of the custom-house at the Piraeus, and collect the import duties. The effect of this proceeding was very damaging to the maritime trade of Greece.

Another act of severity toward Greece on the part of England, for which she justly owes some atonement, occurred in connection with the Cretan insurrection, which lasted from 1866 to 1869. A British vessel, the "Assurance," had brought a number of refugees from Crete to Athens. Fearing lest this act should be regarded by the Porte "not in the light of simple humanity, but as an indication that Her Majesty's government sympathized with the cause of the insurgents," Lord Stanley sent a despatch to the Mediterranean squadron, forbidding the captains of English vessels to remove any more refugees from the island; that is, forbidding them to remove any more Cretan women and children and aged men to a place of safety from the fury of the Turks.¹

Another of the principal grounds of complaint against the Greeks has been the prevalence of brigandage. The facts must not be denied. It is true that this form of lawless violence prevailed to an alarming extent, up to the time of the accession of the present king, and even for some little time after. The authorities were openly defied; life and property were unsafe; and gangs of armed robbers struck terror into the people, and even committed acts of violence almost within sight of the capital. The evil reached its height during the decade between 1860 and 1870. In this latter year a tragedy occurred which brought the matter to a crisis. In the month of April a party of travellers—six of

¹ *New Greece*, pp. 400, 401.

them English and one a Frenchman — were seized by a band of brigands, in the neighborhood of the village of Marathon. For nearly ten days nothing was heard from the captives; and the highest degree of excitement prevailed throughout the country and in England. At last two of the party, Lord and Lady Muncaster, were released and sent to Athens, with the message that the rest of the captives would be liberated on the payment of a ransom of £25,000, coupled with a free pardon. At the same time, the brigands threatened that any attempt to send an armed force against them would imperil the lives of their prisoners. Notwithstanding this menace, it was determined, after anxious deliberation, that the ransom should not be paid; and the Greek government, under the strong pressure of the foreign ambassadors, sent out a large force of troops, with orders to enclose the gang in a wide circuit, and secure the brigands at all hazards. The brigands, finding themselves surrounded, dragged their prisoners from place to place, in the vain hope of escaping with them; and at last, on the 21st of April, put them all to death. But they failed to secure their own escape. Some were killed in fight, and seven were captured and executed. Loud complaints followed on the part of the foreign residents and of the English people; and accusations of past complicity with the brigands on the part of the authorities were freely made, but never proved. But the additional powers given to the authorities by a measure adopted about six months later resulted in the thorough suppression of the evil; and for the last ten years Greece has been free from that curse, and her solitary mountain roads are now scarcely less safe for the traveller than many districts in the most highly civilized countries of Europe.¹

These disorders, and others of less note, which have been frequent grounds of accusation against the Greeks, are easily accounted for by the nature of the country, — especially of the border-land between Greece and Turkey, — and by the

¹ "In respect to brigandage, Greece compares favorably with districts in Italy and Sicily, and European Turkey." — *Jebb's Modern Greece*, pp. 80, 81, note *

state of chronic unrest and excitement in which Southeastern Europe has been kept during the last half century.

Let us turn now to the claims which Greece has upon Europe for the enlargement of her territory. This claim dates back in equity to the establishment of the Greek kingdom in 1833. For the provinces of Thessaly and Epirus had done and suffered their part in the war for independence. We have already seen that the harsh limitation of the territory of the Greek kingdom by the three powers at the outset was largely the means of depriving the Greeks of that wise ruler who approved himself afterwards, on the throne of Belgium, a model constitutional king.¹ "Every one now admits," says Professor Jebb, "that it was a mistake to make the Greek kingdom so small."² When Palmerston and Russell proposed, in 1862, to make arrangements for the surrender of the protectorate of the Ionian Islands, and their incorporation with the neighboring continental state, Mr. Gladstone affirms of his own knowledge that they were favorable to the assignment of Thessaly and Epirus also to Greece.³ In 1877, after the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey, the Greeks were eager to engage in the fray, and to improve what seemed their opportunity to deliver the provinces inhabited mainly by their countrymen and co-religionists from the barbarous despotism of Moslem rule. A military force of Greeks actually invaded the Turkish territory. Then it was that Europe, and especially England, interfered to restrain Greece from improving this opportunity. The military force was withdrawn, on the Greek government receiving a distinct pledge from England to this effect: "That her majesty's government, so far as may lie in their power, will, when the time comes for the consideration of the settlement of the questions arising out of the war, be ready to use their best influence to secure for the Greek population in the Turkish provinces any administrative reforms which may be conferred upon the Christian population of

¹ See p. 438, note 2.

² *Modern Greece*, p. 103.

³ *Gleanings of Past Years*, Vol. iv. p. 289.

any other race." This is the precise language of Lord Derby's despatch to Mr. Stuart, the British representative at Athens, dated July 2, 1877. This pledge was renewed by the English government on the 6th of February of the following year, by giving to the Greek foreign minister "the assurance that it will do all it can to secure for the oppressed Greeks the reforms and advantages which may be conceded to other races."¹ Mr. Trikoupes, the Greek minister of foreign affairs, declared the readiness of Greece to go beyond what international duty required of her, and to endeavor to prevent insurrection in the Turkish provinces, "upon condition of obtaining a promise from Great Britain, that in the final peace negotiations it will be considered that there is an Hellenic question before Europe, no less than if such question had been raised by the actual insurrection of all the Hellenic provinces."² Mr. Trikoupes, at the same time, made no secret of the fact that England's intervention in the matter, at the request of the Porte, was regarded by the Greek government and people as "an unfriendly act."

Under these circumstances, the right of Greece to have a voice to represent her interests at the Berlin Congress was incontestable. In the exercise of that right, she sent to Berlin for that purpose Mr. Delyannis, Mr. Rangabes, and Mr. Koumoundouros. These men advocated the cause of Greece before the congress with signal ability and moderation. They only asked that Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete might be joined to the Hellenic kingdom. Mr. Delyannis reminded the congress that these provinces had for half a century been demanding their union with Greece; that only this addition to the boundaries of Greece would give peace and practicable existence to the kingdom. Mr. Rangabes followed, dwelling upon the difficulties experienced by the kingdom from its contracted area and its ill-defined boundaries, and from the increasing agitation of its frontier provinces.³ These representations were made to the congress at its ninth session, June 29, 1879. On the 5th of July Mr. Waddington, the French

¹ *New Greece*, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 6.

³ *New Greece*, pp. 17-19.

minister, brought forward his plan for the rectification of the Greek frontier. After remarking that it was not the object of the congress "to satisfy the extravagant aspirations of certain organs of Hellenic opinion," but that "it might be just and politic to annex to Greece provinces which would be a source of strength to her, whilst they are now a cause of weakness to Turkey," he proceeded to state that "the authority of the high European assembly would impart to the two governments, Ottoman and Greek, the moral strength necessary for the former to consent to opportune concessions, and for the latter to refrain from extravagant pretensions." He then went on to trace, as a basis for negotiations, a general line, indicating, at one and the same time, to Turkey *the measure of the intentions of Europe*, and to Greece the limits beyond which *she cannot be allowed to go*. The line thus indicated is "to follow the valley of the Salamyria (the ancient Peneus) on the side of the Aegean Sea, and that of the Calamas on the side of the of the Ionian Sea. The congress is confident that the interested parties will succeed in coming to an agreement. At the same time, the powers are prepared to offer their direct mediation."¹ He seems to have intended to convey the idea that the rectification thus suggested was to be insisted on, perhaps enforced, by the powers. But this last idea was distinctly opposed by Lord Beaconsfield. "England," he said, "has always used her influence with Greece and Turkey with a view to the maintenance of a good understanding, indispensable in her eyes to counterbalance the influence of a third race—that which by disturbing peace has led to the assembling of the congress." He acknowledges that the Greek government, in conformity with the advice of Great Britain, applied itself to the repression of insurrection in Epirus and Thessaly. He adds that "Europe caused to be conveyed to Athens the advice not to count upon territorial aggrandizement"; adding a protest against the notion that Turkey was a superannuated state (*Etat vieilli*), and concluding with the statement that the Greek government was

¹ *New Greece*, pp. 21-22.

entirely mistaken as to the views of Europe.¹ As if anything short of territorial enlargement had been aimed at and asked for by Greece from the beginning! After his return to England from the Congress of Berlin, Lord Beaconsfield stated, at the conservative banquet to the plenipotentiaries, July 26, 1878, that "Greece has the opportunity of obtaining a greater increase of territory than will be obtained by any of the rebellious principalities that have shed their blood and wasted their treasures in this fierce contest."² Had not other counsels than his since prevailed in England, the opportunity which he makes a merit of securing to Greece would apparently have been little more than an opportunity to "shed her blood and waste her treasures in a fierce contest" for her own rights; and to do this under far less favorable circumstances than those in which she was restrained from doing it by the assurances of the English government.

There can be little doubt that Mr. Waddington, who was a cordial friend to Greece, intended to make larger claims for her than those which he actually did make in the thirteenth protocol.³ When that protocol was read the Turkish delegate asked that action upon it might be postponed until he could receive instructions from his government. In response to this, Prince Bismarck observed that "the paragraph in question expressed a *desire* of the congress, and not a *resolution* in which the Porte was asked to concur. The powers confine themselves to declaring that they are animated by the desire of seeing the negotiations succeed."⁴ To advertise the Porte beforehand that no coercion was intended to be used was very nearly equivalent to an invitation to the Sultan to pay no regard to the demands of Greece. When was the Porte known to make important territorial concessions out of delicate regard to the philanthropic sentiments of foreign diplomatists; or even to fulfil its solemn engagements, without coercion, or at least without stringent pressure from without, differing little from coercion? The difficulties since ex-

¹ *New Greece*, pp. 23, 24.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 75, 76.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴ *New Greece*, p. 30.

perienced in persuading the Porte to carry into effect the will of the congress in regard to the rectification of the Greek frontier are a sufficient answer to this question.

One fact yet remains to be mentioned, in regard to the Congress of Berlin, which justifies the ill repute in which the memory of Beaconsfield is held by the Greeks. In the course of the debate on Greek affairs in the house of commons, between July 29 and August 2, 1878, Sir Charles Dilke stated that Mr. Waddington's first intention was to recommend the annexation of the whole of Thessaly and Epirus to Greece. This proposal was supported privately by Italy, and even by Austria, and was not opposed by Germany and Russia. He intimates plainly that it had to be abandoned on account of opposition from England. Mr. Waddington, in an anxious interview with Lord Beaconsfield, on the very morning that was to decide the fate of Greece, represented to him in how hard a position he was placed by those who had asked him to formulate a resolution on the subject of the Greek demands, and who then opposed his minimized proposal of the resolution in such a form that it found no place as a resolution in the treaty. The outcome of the transactions was the loss by England of the sympathy of the only rising power in the East that was not Slavonian.¹

But there is reason to hope that this sympathy has been recovered. The relations of Greece to the European powers have changed. The Slavs have come to be regarded as rivals. Among the Bulgarians there has been for many years a growing discontent with the management of their ecclesiastical affairs by Phanariot bishops.² They accordingly demanded of the patriarch the right to choose their bishops from among themselves, and to have an exarch of their own as their primate. The patriarch offered to make them an independent national church, like the churches of Russia and Greece, which each has its own national synod. But a

¹ *New Greece*, pp. 20, 21, note 1.

² So called from the Phanar, the name of that quarter of Constantinople around the Patriarchate, where the Greek officials in Ottoman service have their residence. — *New Greece*, p. 228, note 1.

difference arose in regard to the territorial extent of this national church. The Bulgarians claimed that it should include all the territory where the Bulgarians were a majority of the inhabitants. This claim, it seems, was in conflict with certain traditional rules of the patriarchate in regard to the matter. The Russian church took the part of the Bulgarians against the patriarch; and the Russian government, probably for the purpose of securing an easier command of the Balkan pass for military operations, fomented the schism. The Greeks naturally sided with the patriarch, whom they regarded as the ancient and central head of the orthodox Eastern church, of which both the Russian and Greek national churches are but younger branches. This ecclesiastical quarrel, combined with the rivalry of race and the growing dislike of Russian absolutism among the more intelligent Greeks, has done much to alienate them from their Russian co-religionists. As between the Greek and the Turk, they had long been accustomed to look to the Czar as their champion; but as between the Greeks and the southern Slavs, they now look upon the Czar as their adversary. Added to this, the commercial interests which connect Greece with Great Britain, and other causes, have combined to incline the Greeks to look more to western Europe as their truest friend. And the same may be said of the Christians of European Turkey in general, except those of the Slavic race.¹

In the meantime England is manifesting a growing interest in the welfare of Greece. Mr. Gladstone has ably and eloquently advocated the cause of Greece through the press, as well as by his speeches and official acts.² Professor E. A. Freeman, the historian, has also pleaded the cause of Greece in a learned and eloquent article published in the "Hellenic Annual" for 1880. Professor Jebb, of the University of Glasgow, perhaps the foremost Greek scholar in Great Britain, has recently written a book on Modern Greece,³ in which he

¹ Gladstone, *Gleanings of Past Years*, Vol. iv. pp. 298-330.

² See *Contemporary Review* for December 1876; "The Hellenic Factor in the Greek Problem;" also, *Gleanings of Past Years*, Vol. iv. Art. vi.

³ London: Macmillan and Co., p. 183. 1880.

says, "the Greek race offers, on the whole, the best hope of settled order, of constitutional government, and of high civilization in those countries which were once Hellenic. The efficacy of Greek civilization as compared with Slavonic has once already been tested on a large scale, and with a definite result. In the middle of the ninth century the Slavs had a numerical majority in Greece. What happened? In two hundred years the Greek minority had absorbed and Hellenized the Slavs among whom they lived by the superiority — intellectual, political, social — of Greek civilization."¹

France, too, long friendly to Greece, has been brought by recent events into closer sympathy with her, by their mutual hatred of a common enemy. The late proceedings at Tunis have of course led to unpleasant relations between France and Turkey. But France has evidently the approval of Germany, or at least of Bismarck; in her movements in North Africa; and with this support she will not be likely to be hindered in her aggressive movements by captious inquiries in the English house of commons; and so the breach between France and Turkey is likely to be permanent, and to result in a growing friendliness on the part of France towards Greece.

Italy has, since she became by her unification once more a European power, shown herself in consistent and enthusiastic sympathy with Greece, and been an earnest advocate of her territorial claims.

In fact the times seem to be at last propitious to Greece. The general disruption of the Ottoman Empire in Europe seems to be imminent, indeed to have already begun. Bulgaria is already independent. Austria has gained Bosnia and Herzegovina. England has Cyprus. France is taking possession of Tunis. Italy will probably reconcile herself with France by taking possession of Tripoli. Why should not Greece, the oldest and best claimant, have a share of the dissolving territory? Indeed, while we write, the journals bring us tidings of the actual evacuation by the Turkish troops of the territory assigned to Greece by the Congress

¹ Modern Greece, pp. 105, 106.

of Berlin, and its occupation by the soldiers of Greece. This gives to the new kingdom, not, indeed, all the territory she has claimed, but it gives her a more practicable boundary, and it adds to her area on the north a goodly share of Thessaly and Epirus.

ARTICLE III.

THE LEGEND OF THE BUDDHA, AND THE LIFE OF THE CHRIST.

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THE legend of the Buddha runs substantially as follows.¹ It is said that, at a time variously fixed at dates varying between the fifth and twenty-fifth century B.C.,² the Buddha, who had already existed in a great diversity of forms, in not less than five hundred and fifty previous births, and was at that time living under the name of Santusita in the Tusita heaven, — at the request of the gods of that celestial world, and out of love to man, — determined the next time to be born on earth; and there attain to that supernatural knowledge whereby he should become a Buddha, i.e. an enlightened one, and so be able to show to all men the way of deliverance from their sorrows.

Accordingly, having carefully considered all the various conditions under which the would-be Buddha must be born, he decided to be conceived in the womb of Maya, the queen of Suddhodana the king of the Sakyas, in the village of Kapilavastu, about a hundred miles northwest of Benares.

¹ I have drawn the account of the Legend for the most part from a translation of the Pujawaliya, in the Rev. Spence Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*; some particulars are added from other authorities which will be indicated in their place. Mr. Hardy was for more than a quarter of a century Wesleyan Missionary to the Buddhists of Ceylon, and is justly regarded as a very high authority on all that pertains to Buddhism.

² See Chips from a German Workshop, Vol. i. p. 214; also Hardy's *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, pp. 78, 79.