A DEFENCE OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH CONCERNING THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST AGAINST FAUSTUS SOCINUS OF SIENNA WRITTEN BY HUGO GROTIAN.

CHAPTER IV.

Whether it was unjust that Christ should be punished for our sins; and it is shown that it was not.

The arguments with which Socinus attempts to overthrow this doctrine are very poorly arranged by him. It seems best, therefore, for us to arrange them in the following classes: first, that what we defend, if done, was unjust; secondly, that there was no reason for doing it; thirdly, that what we assert was not done by God.

If the transaction was unjust, it is useless to look for its cause, since there can be no rational cause for that which is unjust; useless, also, to dispute whether it was done, as no injustice can be done by God. Again, the examination of the cause, since it naturally precedes the question of fact, must be treated before it.

To begin, therefore, with the question of justice or injustice, we must first make a distinction between the two following inquiries: whether it were just that Christ should be punished on account of our sins; and whether this could effect anything in obtaining pardon for us. The latter must be referred to the second class, which discusses the cause of the deed, but does not properly belong to the first. For even if there had been no such cause for punishment, it would not follow that injustice was involved in the punishment itself. But it would seem that there might be injustice either in the matter, that is, in the very severe sufferings and death, when compared with the innocency of him who suffered
these things, or in the form, that is, in the punishment when compared with the sins of others, as a meritorious cause. We shall therefore show that there is no injustice in either of these.

First, therefore, Socinus confesses¹ that it was not unjust that Christ, though perfectly innocent, should suffer from God the severest tortures, and death itself; so that no aid to his cause can come from this quarter. The simple occurrence manifestly proves the same thing. For sacred history shows that Christ suffered the severest things, and also died. Scripture says, no less clearly, that this was done by God. But we cannot say, without insult to the divine majesty, that God can act unjustly.

Passing, therefore, to the second part, I affirm² that it is not unjust simply, or contrary to the nature of punishment, that one should be punished for another’s sins. When I say unjust it is manifest that I speak of that injustice which springs from the nature of things, not that which is founded upon positive law; so that the divine liberty cannot be abridged by it. In proof of this remark:³ “God visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children’s children.” “Our fathers have sinned, and we have borne their iniquities.”⁴ For the act of Ham, Canaan is subjected to a curse.⁵ For the act of Saul, his sons and grandsons are hung with the approval of God.⁶ For the act of David, seventy thousand perish, and David exclaims, “Lo, I have sinned, and I have done wickedly; but these sheep, what have they done?”⁷ So for the act of Achan his sons were punished,⁸ and for the act of Jeroboam his posterity.⁹ These passages manifestly show that some are punished by God for others’ sins.¹⁰

Socinus brings up in opposition that passage of Ezekiel,¹¹ where we read, “The soul that sinneth it shall die, and the

¹ iii. 9, 10. ² Contra Soc., iii. 8. ³ Ex. xx. 5; xxxiv. 7. ⁴ Lam. v. 7. ⁵ Gen. ix. 25. ⁶ 2 Sam. xxi. 8, 14. ⁷ 2 Sam. xxiv. 15, 17. ⁸ Josh. vii. 24. ⁹ 1 Kings xiv. 10. ¹⁰ See at your leisure Chrysostom, Hom. 9, upon Gen. iv., and Tertullian against Marcion. ¹¹ xviii. 20.
son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall
the father bear the iniquity of the son." By these words,
we reply, God teaches not what he must do of necessity, but
what he has freely decreed to do. It no more follows from
this that it is unjust for a son to bear any punishment of
his father's crime than that it is unjust that the sinner should
not die. The passage itself proves that God is not speaking
here of perpetual and immutable right, but of the ordinary
course of his providence, which he declares he will hereafter
so conduct toward the Jews as to take away all occasion of
false accusation.

It is of no more assistance to him that it is written [319 b]
in Deuteronomy,¹ "The fathers shall not be put to death
for the children, neither shall the children be put to death
for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own
sin."² This law is, in part, positive, being imposed upon
men by God; but God is not bound by it, since he has never
imposed it upon himself, nor indeed can he be bound by any
law. The difference of reason is seen in the fact that the
power of man is more restricted than that of God. This will
be more fully explained below; so that I will say nothing at
present of the fact that in men there is reason to fear abuse
of power, but not in God.

Socinus makes the exception that in the Scriptures the
innocent can nowhere be found punished for the sins of the
guilty. But this exception does not help him. For when
we say that certain ones are punished not merely on account
of their own sins, by reason of which they were guilty, but,
in addition, on account of the sins of others, it follows that
they are punished when they were not guilty. If one can
be punished in part when he is not guilty, in the nature of
things he may be punished so on the whole. The right of
parts and the whole is the same. Note, further, that the
posterity of Saul were entirely innocent as to that sin for
which they were punished. If one may be punished for that

¹ Deut. xxiv. 16.
² See also 2 Kings xiv. 6.
in respect to which he is innocent, he may be punished also though innocent.

The truth is that innocence does not prevent punishment any more than it does affliction. Indeed, it offers no objection to the former except on account of the latter. Wherefore the distinction of innocent and guilty pertains to the following question: Whether a man may be justly afflicted? but not to this: Whether his affliction could perform the part of punishment? For, granted that relation to a particular sin is not of the essence of punishment, granted also that the innocent may be afflicted, as Socinus confesses may be done by God for a time, evidently nothing can be brought to prove from the nature of things (and we are not treating here of positive law) that it is unjust that an innocent man should be punished with such affliction for the guilt of another.* Especially is this true if he has submitted to such punishment of his own will, and had the power of taking it upon himself. Of this we shall speak later.

Socinus urges that there ought to be at least some connection between the guilty man and him who is punished. Such a connection he recognizes between a father and his son, but does not recognize between Christ and us. We might reply that no man is unconnected with another; that there is a certain natural union among men by birth and blood; that our flesh was assumed by Christ. But another and a greater connection between us and Christ was designed by God. For Christ was designated by God himself as the head of the body of which we are members.

We must observe here that the connection which is sufficient to call for the punishment of one for the sins of another is incorrectly restricted by Socinus to the flesh alone, although the mystic connection ought in this case to have a place of no less importance, as very clearly appears in the case of a king and his people. The story of the people of Israel, punished on account of David's crime, has been cited above. The ancient author of _Quaestiones ad Orthodoxos_ (which is circulated under the name of Justin), wisely
discoursing upon this topic, says: 1 "As man is composed of soul and body, so a kingdom is composed of the king and his subjects. And as, if a man committing sin with his hands receives punishment on his back who punishes him does not act unjustly, so God acts not unjustly when he avengest the sins of the rulers upon the people."

At length Socinus gets so far as to say that at least one cannot find in the Scriptures that an innocent man should be punished for those faults for which the guilty one receives impunity. But this also is of no service to him. For since it is not unjust per se and universally to grant impunity to a guilty person, as Socinus confesses, nor unjust to punish one for the sins of another, there can be no injustice in the union of the two. Indeed, the Scripture makes plain by the example of Ahab that this is not unjust; for he himself receives impunity for his sins, which are punished in the persons of his son and posterity. 2 But this will be more carefully examined when we come to the question whether there was any cause to move God to punish Christ for our sins.

In no respect, then, do the sacred writings support Socinus, since they show that God has done that which he undeservedly accuses of injustice. He has no greater support in right reason, which he boasts of a wonderful number of times, but which he never displays. But that every error may be removed from this discussion, we must note that though it is essential to punishment that it should be inflicted on account of sin, it is not essential that it should be inflicted upon the sinner himself. 3 This is evident from a comparison of reward, thanks, and vengeance. For a reward is often conferred upon the children or the relatives of him who has deserved much, thanks upon the friends of him who has conferred a benefit, and vengeance is visited upon the friends

1 οὐς συγκεῖται ὁ ἀθροιτος ἐκ φυσῆς καὶ σώματος, οὕτως καὶ ἡ βασιλεία συγκεῖται ἐκ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν βασιλικῶν καὶ διότερ ἀμαρτήσας ὁ ἀθροιτος ἀμαρτημα ὡς χερός, ἐξ ὁμοιοῦ εἰς τὸν πύρτον οὐκ ἄλλῳ ὁμοὶο ὁμοιότατος ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁμοῖο τοῦ ως οὕτως οὐκ ἄλλῳ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ τῶν βασιλέων παλαιότατον τὸν λαόν τιμοροδόμεσιν.

2 1 Kings xxii. 29; 2 Kings viii., ix., and x.
of the offender. But on this account they do not cease to be what they are—reward, thanks, vengeance.

Furthermore, if it were contrary to the nature of punishment that it should be inflicted upon him who has not sinned, we ought to call this not unjust, but impossible. But God forbids men to punish a son for the crime of his father, and impossibilities are not forbidden.

Again, injustice does not properly attach to a relation, such as punishing, but to an act, such as the matter of punishment. At this point we ought to investigate the distinction according to which it is not just as free to all to punish one man for another man’s fault as it is to reward or thank the one for the other’s service or benefit. The act of conferring a reward or benefit is a beneficial act, which by its own nature is possible for all. The act of punishing is an injurious act, which is not granted to all nor for all. That the punishment may be just, it is therefore required that the infliction of penalty be within the power of the punisher. This may occur in three ways,—either by the previous right of the punisher, or by the just and valid consent of the one to be punished, or by the crime of the same. When an act is made lawful in these ways, nothing prevents that it should be ordained as punishment for another’s sin, provided there is a certain connection between the one who has sinned and the one who is to be punished. Such a connection must be either natural, as between father and son; or mystic, as between king and people; or voluntary, as between the guilty person and the surety.

Socinus appeals to the opinions of all nations. But first, in relation to God, philosophers have never doubted that the sins of parents were punished by him in their children. Says Plutarch: 1 “The same opinion is to be conceived of a race of men, depending upon one and the same

1 "Concerning those whom God is slow to punish": Ἡτί θητον καὶ γένος ἐξαρτημένων αρχῆς μιας καὶ δυναμὸν των καὶ κοινωνίαν διακοφορίων ἀναφοράς· καὶ τὸ γεγονός ὅτι δὲ τι δημιουργική πατριμονίων ἀναφέρεται τοῦ γεγονότος· δὲ αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὖν ὅταν αὐτοῦ γέγονεν, ὅσι ἔχει τι καὶ φέρεται τῶν υἱῶν μάρτας δὲ διαυού καὶ ταλαιπώρων προσημότης καὶ τιμωρούμενων.
beginning and carrying along with it a certain power and communion of qualities. What is begotten, also, cannot be thought to be severed from that which begets it, like a piece of workmanship from the artificer; the one being begotten of the person, the other framed by him. So that what is engendered is a part of the original from whence it sprung, either in meriting honor or deserving punishment.” And further: 1 “It is neither strange nor wonderful, if, being of them, they share theirs.” Then he adds something not dissimilar from that which we have just now cited from a Christian writer: 2 “It would be ridiculous to say that it is unjust that the thumbs should burn while the thighs are in danger.” Again, Valerius Maximus, writing of Dionysius of Sicily, says: 8 “Although he did not suffer the tortures due for so many acts of sacrilege, yet in the disgrace of his son he dead pays the penalty which living he escaped.” There are countless similar passages in the historians and poets. So it has been the received opinion that a people are punished by God for the sin of their king, even from the time of Hesiod, who said that Justice 4 was the daughter of Jove who besought him:

\[ δόρρη \, ἀποτίσις \]

\[ Ἀμύος ἀποσθαλίας βασιλέων. \]

That some are punished for the crimes of others Socinus does not dare to deny. For in pecuniary punishments this is evidently the case. Ulpian says 5 that in pecuniary punishments the surety is punished for the guilty person. Caius says 6 that the surety is rightly made partner in the punishment of theft, because the reason why punishment should be inflicted for crimes is a great one. And this suffices to show that it is not of the nature of punishment that he who

1 Oδίδην δεινόν οἱδε ἀποτελον περὶ ἄκεινων ἔχει πείρα τὰ ἄκεινων.
2 Γελοίοις ὁ φάσκων ἀδικον είναι ἕξισιν πυοῦτον κατὰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα.
3 Ταντεσί δείτις τὸν σαρκαλίας ἀνάθεσιν ἀναθεματισμὸν οὐκ ἐξσυνέται, διεδοξεῖτο μίλλων μορφῶν ποιήσας ἀνεπείδης ὑπὲρ δυστύχησιν.
4 Διαν.
5 L. Si quae resum. D. de cast. et exhib. resorum.
6 L. Si a reo. D. de fidejuro.
has done wrong should both pay and of necessity be punished. Socinus adduces the following reason why the same right is not allowed in corporal punishments,—because money can be made over by one to another, and so, being paid for another, by a short fiction of the hand, seems to be given to the delinquent, and afterwards paid by him; but corporal distress cannot be made over to another. But this is a subtile, rather than a true, reason. For such a reason effects something towards procuring liberation for the culprit, but nothing towards securing the infliction of a punishment which one has deserved upon another. If that were the true reason, it would frequently occur that even a reward to a meritorious man could not be paid to a relative; for the thing in which the reward consisted could not be made over to him who had deserved well, either because he was dead or because it was incorporeal. The Athenians educated at the public expense the children of those who had deserved well. The Romans gave to the sons of veterans the privileges of decurions. They would not subject the grandsons or great-grandsons of the so-called most perfect to examination by torture. We read in the Greek and Roman histories that the remembrance of parents was the cause of children's escape from punishment. But the education, privilege, impunity of children cannot be made the education, privilege, impunity of the dead parents! Indeed, if Socinus's observation were true, punishment could not be exacted even from a surety if he were unwilling that the guilty person, happening to be absent, should be liberated from the obligation of pecuniary punishment. This, therefore, so far as it relates to our question, is not the true difference between pecuniary and corporal punishment. We shall soon point out one nearer the truth.

But I am most surprised at this remark of Socinus, viz. that it is proved by the laws and customs of all nations and

1 iii. 3.

[The text of W. H., is here followed: "atque ideo pro alio soluta brevi manus fictione videatur donata delinquenti," etc. The editions to which I have had access all have brevis. — Tr.]
ages that corporal punishment, owed by one, cannot be paid by another. For frequently, among the Persians, in ancient times, a man's relatives perished for his crimes, on the testimony of Marcellinus. Curtius relates that among the Macedonians those who were connected by blood with public enemies were capitaly punished. In the states of Greece it was the custom that with the tyrants the tyrants' children should be slain, as the Halicarnassaeans and Cicero remark. These things certainly are not commendable, but they show, nevertheless, that Socinus's remark about the consent of all nations is not in all respects true.

In these examples the mere connection of persons 'seemed sufficient for punishment without consent,' which, the Halicarnassaeans remarks, was deservedly repudiated by the Romans. But where consent did precede, I would almost dare to say that there was not one of those whom we call pagans, who would regard it unjust that one should be punished for the crime of another. This is shown by the right of slaying hostages exercised even by the most humane nations. The Thessalians once slew two hundred and fifty hostages, as Plutarch relates. The Romans beheaded three hundred Volscii; they threw down the Tarentines from the Tarpeian rock, as Livy says. Similar examples are known of the Goths, Dacians, and Angli. And, as very learned men have remarked, it was believed that this was right. So, also, in capital punishments the sureties were punished if the criminal did not appear, whence they were called by the Greeks \\

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must be granted. And, indeed, if any one will examine this whole matter with the diligence he ought, he will find that the true reason why a man is not as closely held by his consent to corporal punishment as to pecuniary is this, that he who consents has not equal power over his money and his life.

Yet I cannot agree with the more recent jurists who prove this from a reply of Ulpian's, who said that no one seems to be master of his own members.¹ For he takes the word master strictly in accordance with its usage in civil law, where it is opposed to slave. For, because the lex Aquilia is speaking strictly of a slave, it affirms that the direct action actio utilis ought to be granted. Yet the case is such that according to the law, by parity of reasoning an actio utilis ought to be granted. And to express my real opinion, although I greatly admire the equity of the Romans in moderating this extension of punishment, yet I cannot be induced to believe that the matter was thought by them plainly and per se unjust that one should be corporally punished for the crime of another. Nor am I influenced by this, that they forbade the giving of surety under capital punishment. They are accustomed to forbid many things, not because they think them entirely unjust, but because they think them perilous, as all sureties of women, and of others also, for dowry.

This, therefore, is the decision of the civil law. But since it is void among other nations, so the Romans in the case of hostages followed another course. But why so long afterwards did the Christian emperors decree that when a criminal had escaped through the fault of his keeper's household, the keeper should bear his punishment?² And how is it that to-day, or not so very long ago, noble masters of law have taught that the rule that no one shall be able to bind himself to capital punishment, is invalid, if law or custom have established that precept?

¹ L. liber homo. D. ad legem Aquil.
² L. ad commentariensem. C. de custod. reor.
But so far as those punishments are concerned which require no consent, but a simple connection of persons, although the Roman law forbade making a son successor of his father's punishment, or marking him with any disgrace for his father's crime; yet the Halicarnassaeans declare that this custom obtained, not from the beginning, but from that time when Spurius Cassius was condemned for tyranny. Not even the Romans, then, thought this right to descend from some perpetual and immutable rule of justice. So Arcadius and Honorius, the emperors, would seem to bestow life upon the sons of those who had committed treason, not of legal necessity, but by royal clemency; for otherwise, as they say themselves, such persons should have perished in the punishment of their fathers.\(^1\) It might be proved from the historians that death was inflicted upon the children of public enemies not only by Tiberius and Severus, but also by Theodosius. It ought farther to be noted in the same law of Arcadius and Honorius, that all right of heirship without a will, or with a will, is taken away from the sons of public enemies; that they are branded with infamy, that they are forbidden to hold public offices, or to come to the Sacraments. Finally, it is added: "Let them be so miserable by reason of perpetual want that death shall be a solace, and life a punishment to them." Exclusion from public offices had been practised against the children of those who had committed offences against the republic, even so long before as the time of Sulla. Cicero says that it was a custom both ancient and common to all nations that sons should atone for the crimes of their parents by their own poverty. He particularly adds that the children of Themistocles were poor. These things make it appear that there was not that consent of nations which Socinus adduces, and that indeed the Romans, whose equity was most conspicuous among all people, did not respect this distinction in punishment, that money can be transferred to another, but not corporal punishment. For neither the poverty of the sons nor their infamy, nor ex-

\(^1\) L. quisquis. C. ad L. Jul. Majest.
clusion from public offices could be made the poverty, infamy, or exclusion from public offices of their parents, except, per-
sibly, by a certain fiction which regards the father and his children as one and the same man.

One may well wonder at the statement which Socinus makes in reference to the act of Zaleucus, whose history is found in Diodorus Siculus and Aelianus. He says that Zaleucus gained a very bad name, and that his name is numbered among impotent and rash princes, and judges of the people. Certainly all antiquity praised Zaleucus, not only on account of his very wise laws, but most of all for this deed, as appears from those writers whom I have named, from Plutarch, and from others. Nor do I think that any ancient writer judged differently of that deed.

All have seen the following passage of Valerius Maximus: "Nothing is more influential with men than examples of justice. Zaleucus, when he had fortified the city of the Locrians with most wholesome and useful laws, and when his son, condemned for the crime of adultery, according to the established law should have lost both eyes, and the whole city, in honor of the father, remitted in favor of the youth the necessity of punishment, for a while resisted. At last conquered by the prayers of the people, he plucked out first his own eye, and then that of his son, but left to each the power of sight. Thus he conceded to the law the due measure of punishment, having by an admirable tempering of equity, acted the part both of a pitiful father and a just lawgiver." And, indeed, if it were as completely in a man's power to destroy his own eye as to go into exile, nothing could be found more worthy of renown than that act of Zaleucus, especially since the precise obligation of the law was void either because of his kingship, or because of the consent of the people. The error of Zaleucus, therefore, as of almost all the pagans, was in assuming over his own body a power greater than was proper. But that deed, so greatly celebrated, testifies against the conception of which Socinus thinks impressed upon the minds of men, that no one can receive upon himself the punishment of another's crime.
To conclude this inquiry, the question is not whether it is lawful for any judge to inflict upon any man any punishment of another's crime. The law of superior judges takes this power away from the inferior. Nor is it this: whether this is lawful for the highest power among men in every case, and towards every man. For sometimes the divine law, or natural reason opposes it. But this question may properly be asked, whether an act which is in the power of a superior, even without considering another's crime, may not be appointed by that superior for the punishment of another's crime. That this is unjust the Scripture denies, in that it shows that it has been done very often by God; nature denies, because she is not proved to forbid; the consent of the nations openly denies.

To place the thing more clearly before our eyes, who thinks that the decimation employed in Roman legions was unjust where he who had sinned, and might have been forgiven as well as another, is punished not only for his own crime, but for the crime of all? Who thinks it unjust if, when the Supreme power relaxes the laws, some man useful to the state, but deserving of exile for a fault, is retained in the state, while another freely condemns himself to exile, to furnish the required example? Who thinks it unjust if the Supreme ruler of the state refuses public offices, for which others equally competent are to be found, to the children of public enemies though they are not otherwise unworthy? Certainly there is nothing unequal is this! For in the first case the personal offence of the punished, in the second, the valid consent of him who is most concerned, in the third, the privilege of the ruler, permitted that to be done which the ruler employed as punishment. In the case we are considering, God had by his divine right the power of afflicting Christ, though innocent, even to temporary death, as Socinus confesses. Christ had also by the divine permission, nay, as himself God, the power, which we have not, over his own life and body.
“I have power,”¹ says Christ, “to lay down my life.” There is, therefore, no unfairness in this, that God, whose is the supreme power in respect to all things not unjust per se, and who is bound by no law, determined to employ the tortures and death of Christ to set forth a weighty example against the great crimes of all of us with whom Christ was very closely connected by his nature and kingdom and suretyship. That this was done not only justly, but also wisely, by a God most wise and most just, will appear more clearly in the following chapter, when we shall trace out the cause of this divine plan.

CHAPTER V.

Whether there was a sufficient cause to induce God to punish Christ in our stead, and it is shown that there was.

Socinus,² to prove that God did not intend that Christ should pay the penalty for us, frequently employs this argument, that there is no apparent cause for so intending. We will not employ here the artifice of the jurists who say that it is impossible to give a reason for everything which has been established by our forefathers, although such a refuge is much more properly open to us than to them, since it is not so difficult for men to trace out the causes of human action, on account of community of nature. But the causes of the divine will, by their very sublimity, often escape us. “Who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counselor?”³ And so his ways are often “past finding out.”⁴ It might be added that frequently the mere will of God is its own sufficient cause. For, excepting those things which are of an intrinsic rectitude, fixed and determined to one thing, and which God wills because they are just, that is, because they agree with his nature; in all other things which he wills he makes them just by willing. So, “He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.”⁵

But it is not necessary for us to fly to those refuges, since God has himself made the cause of his plan very plain to us.

¹ John x. 18. ἐξουσία, i.e. power, authority. ² iii. 1. ³ Rom. xi. 34. ⁴ Rom. xi. 33. ἀκολουθεῖν ἐν εἰδολοβασί. ⁵ Rom. ix. 18.
It becomes us only to make this preliminary remark that Socinus is not right in postulating that we must assign a cause which shall prove that God could not have acted otherwise. For such a cause is not required in those things which God does freely. But he who will maintain that this was a free action, may refer to Augustine, who declares not that God had no other possible way of liberating us, but that there was no other more appropriate way for healing our misery, neither could be. But also, before Augustine, Athanasius had said: "God was able, by a mere utterance to annul the curse without coming himself at all. But it is necessary to consider what is useful to men, and not always what is possible to God." Nazarius says: "It was possible for God even without the incarnation (of Christ) to save us by his mere volition." Bernard: "Who does not know that the Almighty had at hand various methods for our redemption, justification, liberation? but this does not detract from the efficacy of that method which he has selected out of many."

The postulation of Socinus is even the more unfair that he does not himself give any reason for the tortures and death of Christ, which implies necessity. For, to exhibit to us the way of holiness, discourses and miracles were enough. So, also, was Christ without death, and death without Christ. The affliction and death of prophets also, and apostles, and the life of Christ as well, could have served this purpose abundantly. Christ after a life passed here in innocence, could have been, like Enoch or Elijah, translated to heaven without pain, and have shown thence his majesty to the earth. These are the causes to which Socinus ascribes the death of Christ, although connected with that effect, as every

1 xiii. de Trinitate, cap. x.
2 Serm. iii. Against the Arians. ἰδὼν τοῦτο καὶ μὴ διὰ ἐπιθυμησάμενος αὐτοῦ βουλή εἰσείς ὁ Θεός καὶ λύσαι τὴν κατάραν. ἄλλα σκοτεινόν ἔδω τοῖς ἀνθρώποις λατερεῖσιν, καὶ μὴ ἐν τὰς τοῦ Θεοῦ λογίζεσθαι. [The Folio translates this passage into Latin thus: Poterat Deus, illo nequaquam presents, loquim, etc.].
3 Epistola ad Trident. [Nazarius is put by conjecture for Grotius's simple "Naz."]
4 Epist. exc. contra Pel. et Basil.
one can see, by no necessity. But if he is content with alleging causes which do not compel, so to speak, but invite and persuade, fairness does not permit him to apply a more severe law to those who dispute with him.

But it will not be difficult to assign from the Scriptures a sufficient cause, and, indeed, a most weighty cause, whether we inquire why God chose to remit to us eternal punishment, or why he did not choose to remit the same otherwise than by the punishment of Christ. The former has its cause in benevolence, which is, of all the attributes of God, most truly peculiar to him. For everywhere God describes himself chiefly by this attribute, that he is benignant and clement. Therefore, God is inclined to aid and bless men, but he cannot do this while that dreadful and eternal punishment remains. Besides, if eternal death should fall upon all, religion had totally perished through despair of felicity. There were, therefore, great reasons for sparing man.

On the other hand, those passages of Scripture already adduced by us, which declare that Christ was delivered, suffered, died for our sins, show the reason why God imposed punishment upon Christ. This manner of speaking, as we have shown, points to the impulsive cause. It may be seen from what we have said of the end not only that there was a cause, but what it was, viz. that God was unwilling to pass over so many sins, and so great sins, without a distinguished example. This is so because every sin is seriously displeasing to God, and the more displeasing the more grave it is. Since God is active, and has created rational creatures in order to give more abundant testimony to his attributes, it is proper for him also to testify by some act how greatly he is displeased with sin. The act most suitable for this is punishment. Hence, arises that in God which the Sacred Writings, because there is no other more significant word, call wrath.

1 Ex. xxxiv. 7; 2 Chron. xxx. 9; Ps. lxxxvi. 5, 15; ciii. 8; cxi. 4, 5; cxlv. 8. Isa. iv. 7; Jer. xxxi. 20; Joel ii. 13; John iv. 2; Luke vi. 36; Rom. ii. 4.
2 Prov. xi. 20; Ps. v. 5; xlv. 8; Isa. lxvi. 4; Zech. viii. 17; Rom. i. 18; Heb. xi. 2.
3 Ex. xxxii. 10, 11; Num. xi. 1; xvi. 22; xxi. 3 sq.; Ps. ii. 5; vi. 2; John iii. 36; Rom. i. 18; ii. 8; Eph. v. 6; Col. iii. 6; Rev. vi. 16.
God declares he is prevented by this wrath from blessing men.\(^1\)

Again, all neglect to punish sin leads *per se* to a lower estimation of sin, as, on the other hand, the most ready means of preventing sin is the fear of punishment. Hence, the well-known saying: "By bearing an old injury you invite a new." Therefore prudence also, on this account, invites the ruler to inflict punishment.

Moreover, the reasons for punishing are increased when a law has been published threatening punishment, for then the omission of punishment almost always detracts from the authority of the law among the subjects. Hence, the precept of politics: "Guard the established laws with the greatest care."\(^2\)

God has, therefore, most weighty reasons for punishing, especially if we are permitted to estimate the magnitude and multitude of sins. But because among all his attributes love of the human race is pre-eminent, God was willing, though he could have justly punished the sins of all men with deserved and legitimate punishment, that is, with eternal death, and had reasons for so doing, to spare those who believe in Christ. But since we must be spared either by setting forth, or not setting forth, some example against so many great sins, in his most perfect wisdom he chose that way by which he could manifest more of his attributes at once, viz. both clemency and severity, or his hate of sin and care for the preservation of his law.\(^3\)

So Aelianus, in commending the deed of Zaleucus, mentions two reasons for it, that the youth might not be made entirely blind,\(^4\) and that what had been once established should not become invalid.\(^5\) Of these reasons, the former operated to bring about some change in the law through clemency, the latter prevented too great a change. Those who have written on the relaxation of laws, observe that

\(^1\) Gen. vi. 7; Dent. xxxii. 29, 30; Jer. v. 24; Isa. lxix. 2.
\(^2\) τόσον θεμέλιον ρήμαν ισχυρός διαφύλαττειν.
\(^3\) οὐκ ὅπερ διαφθείρῃ τὰ ἐκτεχνημένα.
\(^4\) οὐ διαφθείρῃ τὸ ἓταξ κεκουμένου.
those are the best relaxations, which are accompanied by a commutation, or compensation. In this way the least injury is done to the law, and the particular precept is executed in some accordance with the reason upon which the law was founded. It is as if a man held to deliver a certain article should be excused upon paying the price. For the same thing and the same value are very nearly related.

Such commutation is admissible not only among things, but sometimes also among persons, provided that it can be done without injury to another. Thus sons are permitted to go into prison in place of their fathers, as Cimon for Miltiades. And not to go beyond penal judgments, and that too the divine, there exist in the Sacred Scriptures traces of a similar fact. To David, the homicide and adulterer, is pronounced at the command of God by Nathan: 1 "The Lord hath put away thy sin (that is, the punishment of thy sin); thou shalt not die (which otherwise the law demanded); Howbeit because by this deed thou hast given great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, the child also that is born to thee (evidently since it is very closely connected with thee, and the substitute in thy punishment) shall surely die." Ahab had defiled himself with both murder and rapine. God announces to him through Elijah that the dogs will lick his blood. Yet immediately when his fear, and a certain reverence for the divine majesty was manifest, the same God said: 2 "I will not bring the evil (viz. what both he had merited, and I threatened) in his days; but in his son’s days (who shall bear not only his own, but also his father’s punishment) will I bring the evil upon his house."

317 a] In both cases God relaxes the law, or the threat of punishment, but not without some compensation, by transferring the punishment upon another. Thus at the same time he exhibits both his clemency and severity or hatred of sin. So, therefore, God, wishing to spare those who should believe in Christ, had sufficient, just, and great reasons for exacting of the willing Christ the punishment of our sins,

1 2 Sam. xii. 13–14.

3 1 Kings xxi. 29.
viz. to use the words of Aelianus, "that what had been once established should not become invalid;" and that sin should not be thought of less importance, if so many great sins should be remitted without an example.

Further, God not only testified his own hatred of sin by this act, and so deterred us from sin (for it is an easy inference that if God would not remit the sins even of those who repented except Christ took their punishment, much less will he permit the contumacious to go unvisited); but more than that, he also declared in a marked way his great love for us in that we were spared by one to whom it was not a matter of indifference to punish sins, but who regarded it of so much importance that rather than dismiss them altogether unpunished, he delivered his only-begotten son to punishment for them! The ancients said of forgiveness that it was neither according to law, nor against law, but above law, and for law. So may we say with emphasis of this divine grace. It is above law, because we are not punished; for law, because punishment is not omitted; and remission is granted that we may live hereafter to the divine law.

If these things are rightly understood, all those objections which Socinus makes about the lack of reason fall together, so that it is unnecessary to consider them one by one. Yet not a few errors might be noted, as in the first chapter of the first book, and also the first chapter of the third book, he says that punitive justice does not reside in God, but that it is an effect of his will. Certainly the act of punishing is an effect of the will; but the justice or rectitude from which other things as well as the execution of punishment spring, is an attribute residing in God. For the Scripture concludes that God is just because he punishes sins, inferring the cause from the effect. Socinus seems to be led into this error, because he believes that all effects of the attributes of God are in all respects necessary, though many are free, since the act of free-will intervenes between the attribute and its effect. Thus it is an effect of the goodness of God to confer favors; but he did not do this before creation. It is char-
acteristic of the same goodness to spare the guilty; but one would scarcely say that God spares those whom he punishes with eternal punishment. There are, therefore, certain attributes of God, the exercise of which, both as regards the act and as regards the time and mode of the act, nay, even as regards the determination of the object, depends upon the free-will of him over whose action wisdom yet always presides. Nor because God has the free use of those attributes, can it therefore be said, when he exercises them, that he does what he does without reason. It is not true that because it was possible for God not to create the world, he has created it in vain. Nor is it true, because it was possible for God not to punish (which Socinus confesses to be true in the case especially of them whose repentance God does not expect), that when he does punish them he has no reason for punishing. Many things are done freely, and yet for sufficient reason.

Another error has also been indicated above, that Socinus thinks that God in remitting sin plainly intends to do exactly the same as men who depart from their laws. We have shown that punishment is not in the sphere of ownership, or debt, and that it cannot be compared with them in all respects. To give one's own, to remit a debt, is always honorable per se. When we say per se we exclude accidental, accessory circumstances, such as the poverty of the donor. This can, moreover, have no place in God. But to remit punishment would not be honorable at all times, not even in God, as Socinus admits. Therefore a distinction has been made at this point. The origin of the distinction is in this, that the ultimate foundation of the law of ownership and debt is a certain relation of a thing to a person, but of punishment, relation of a thing to a thing, especially equality between a crime and some affliction promotive of order and the public good. From this arises the falsity of that which Socinus lays down¹ as established, that a state will commit no injustice in absolving a guilty man except it transgresses at the

¹ III. 1.
same time the peculiar right of some individual, or infringes the law of God. By the word "state" he means either the body which rules, or that which is ruled. The body which is ruled has no more power of modifying the law than of making it; and the body which rules, as the senate in an aristocracy, or the majority of the assembly in a popular state, has no more power than other supreme rulers, as for example, free kings in a kingdom, or fathers in their families. But it is a part of rectoral justice to preserve the laws even when positive and of the ruler's own making, which is proved to be true by the jurists in case of a free community as well as a supreme king. Consequently, a ruler has no right to relax such a law except for some antecedent reason, if not necessary, at least sufficient. This opinion also is the received opinion among jurists. The reason of both is that the act of making or relaxing a law is not an act of absolute ownership, but an act of government, which ought to tend toward the preservation of good order.

We must disapprove also of the remark of Socinus, that except the free-will of God and of Christ, no legitimate cause can be given for the death of Christ, unless we say that he deserved to die. There is in an antecedent cause an inherent desert, as we have shown above, but impersonally. For our sins deserved the exaction of punishment. But that the punishment was laid upon Christ we refer to the volition of God and Christ in this sense, that that volition has its cause not in the desert of Christ (who though he knew no sin, was made sin by God), but in the consummate fitness of Christ for displaying a distinguished example. This consisted in his intimate union with us, and in the incomparable dignity of his person. This inference of Socinus is, moreover, refuted by the plain testimony of Scripture. The antecedent cause of the death of David's child is plain. It was because David by a most grave sin had given occasion to the impious for heaping insult and contumely upon the divine name. There is, therefore, demerit here, but not the demerit  

1 iii. 10. 2 Chap. ii.
of the infant. In punishing the posterity of Ahab beyond their own desert God had respect to the demerit of the sins of Ahab. Whence it appears that the antecedent cause of punishment is indeed demerit, but not always the demerit of the persons who are punished.

CHAPTER VI.

Whether God intended to Punish Christ; and it is shown that he did; and at the same time the Nature of Satisfaction is explained.

Having answered the two questions: Whether God could justly punish the willing Christ for our sins; and: Whether there was a sufficient reason for God's doing this; we come now to the third: Whether in very truth he did so, or, what amounts to the same thing, intended to do so. Socinus denies this both in many other places, and especially in Book iii. chap. 2. We maintain with the Scriptures that God intended to do this, and did it. For Christ is said to have been delivered, to have suffered, to have died for our sins.¹ The chastisement of our peace was laid upon Christ. God cast upon Christ our sins, that is, the punishment of our sins, which were so exacted that he was punished for that cause. Christ bore our sins, that is again, the punishment of our sins.² Christ made himself sin, and God made Christ sin and a curse, that is, exposed to the punishment of sins.³ The blood of Christ was shed for the remission of sins, so that that remission was not obtained without shedding of blood, but by it.⁴

Socinus makes many objections at this point: certain examples and promises before Christ; certain passages concerning those things which God said he gave through Christ; the word remit, and forgive, and the very nature of liberality, from which he thinks it follows that God is willing to bestow impunity upon us when we reform, without exacting punishment of any one for that cause.

¹ Rom. iv. 25; 1 Cor. xv. 3; 1 Pet. iii. 18; Isa. liii. 5.
² Isa. liii. 5, 6, 7, 11; 1 Pet. ii. 24. ³ Isa. liii. 10; 2 Cor. v. 21; Gal. iii. 13.
⁴ Matt. xxvi. 28; Heb. ix. 22, and elsewhere in many places.
I. So far as examples of forgiveness are concerned (especially because nothing of universal application can be inferred from them), we must note that they pertain either to temporary punishment, or to eternal. If to temporary only, as in the case of Ahab, there is a plain distinction, for, as we commonly say, what is put off is not put away. And further, in the case of Ahab, as in the case of David, the contrary appears of that which Socinus wishes to infer, when he brings up these very cases in his own behalf. For the temporary punishment is removed from David and Ahab, in order to be transferred to others. Under the law sins are not remitted except by the shed blood of victims, as will be explained below. But when we turn to the remission of eternal punishment, Socinus offers no argument to prove that this has ever been granted except God looked upon Christ.

Concerning promises the same must be affirmed as concerning examples. Let us observe in passing that when God promises release from temporal punishments to those that reform, this is not always to be understood of all punishments, but only of so many. For God frequently punishes even those who reform, but paternally and gently. So God restored his penitent people from the Babylonian captivity into their native country, but he did not restore the pristine liberty and glory of their kingdom. But in respect to eternal punishment there is no promise of remission which excludes reference to Christ. Here belong those statements of Scripture which, without any distinction of time, show that Christ tasted death for all, that he gave himself a ransom for all, and especially those which repudiate by the addition of a comparison all restriction of time, as when all are said to have sinned, and to be justified through the redemption in Christ, and when it is said that by one, Christ, justification came to all men (viz. as many as are justified), just as by one, Adam, condemnation came upon all. Hence it is

1 ἐκτάσεις. 2 Heb. ii. 9; 1 Tim. ii. 6. 3 Rom. iii. 23. 4 Rom. iii. 18; v. 17, 18; vid. on this passage in Rom. Cyril adv. Anthrop. cap. 9.
that Christ is called the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.\(^1\) This passage is vindicated from the interpretation of Socinus\(^2\) both by the connection of the words, and the corresponding passage of Peter,\(^3\) where redemption is said to have been made by the blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish, and without spot, foreknown before the foundation of the world, but made manifest in these last days. Elsewhere the death of Christ is said to have intervened for the redemption of those transgressions which were under the first covenant,\(^4\) and through blood the justice of God is said to have been declared for the concealing of sins that are past, which God is shown to have tolerated meantime, and to have borne deferring the exhibition of his justice till the time of Christ.\(^6\)

There is, besides, the famous passage: \("Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the high-priest entereth into the holy place every year with the blood of others; for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world,—but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself. And as it is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the judgment, so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many.\)\(^7\) If the entire connection of this passage is rightly attended to, and especially if the passage of Peter\(^8\) where the same subject is treated, and almost in the same words, is compared with it, the sacrifice of Christ will appear to differ from the Levitical in that the power of the latter was limited by the space of a year; but the power of the former extended itself through all ages, since his passion was regarded by God as completed before all ages, though in fact completed at a fixed time, and so the decree of God has thus been openly revealed to us. Unless this were so, Christ ought frequently to suffer, not after he began to preach, but from the very beginning of the world. These words have evidently no force except the power of the death of Christ extends itself to all sins which

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\(^1\) Rev. xiii. 8.\(^2\) ii. 26.\(^3\) 1 Pet. i. 19, 20.\(^4\) Heb. ix. 15.\(^5\) [Lat. dissimulatio.]\(^6\) Rom. iii. 25.\(^7\) Heb. ix. 25–28.\(^8\) 1 Pet. i. 19.
have ever been remitted to men from the beginning of the world, just as judgment after death extends to all those sins which the man has committed during life. The contrary interpretation of Socinus not only makes the words meaningless, but also weakens the argument of the writer. For when you affirm that Christ must have been offered more frequently, it does not follow that he ought to have suffered not only more frequently, but also more frequently from the foundation of the world, unless you affirm along with the rest that he ought to have been offered more frequently from the foundation of the world. These two things are mutually connected, because the effect of the oblation does not extend further than the dignity of the immolation. But, granting that which the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews is combating, viz. the equality of the Levitical sacrifice, and the sacrifice of Christ, it would follow that Christ ought to have been offered more frequently from the foundation of the world, only because the effect of the oblation of Christ was extended to all the sins which have been committed and remitted from the foundation of the world. For if it were on the same level with the Levitical sacrifice (which has a virtue limited to a certain time), certainly the efficacy of Christ's sacrifice could not reach from the time in which he died to most distant times, but there would evidently have been need that between both points of time many actions of that sort should intervene.

II. To come now to those testimonies which Socinus thinks properly pertain to the time of Christ and the new covenant, — Jeremiah indeed says¹ that God will be propitious to sins. But he does not deny what Paul says,² that this propitiation is made in the blood of Christ; or that God has regard to Christ. Indeed, all the prophets (among whom is Jeremiah also), give testimony that remission of sins is received through the name, that is, through the power and virtue of Christ.³ It is said that we have obtained liberation through Christ according to that covenant which God had made with

¹ Jer. xxxi. 34. ² Rom. iii. 25. ³ Acts x. 43.
the fathers, and according to those things which he had announced previously through the prophets. The Baptist also by divine command promises remission to penitents, and that through the tender mercy of God. But the same man said that Christ was the Lamb which takes away the sins of the world, that is, by sacrifice, as the Apocalypse expresses it, or by blood, as Peter says. The mention made in these passages of the Lamb shows clearly what the Baptist had in mind.

III. The word to remit, which Socinus presses, is in Greek ἀφέων, which an ancient interpreter has nominally translated διμίττερε. But we have shown above that neither the Greek nor the Latin word has that force, which necessarily includes every kind of yielding of proper right, as the origin, and primitive signification of the word is opposed to ἀφέων, which is to retain, or bring into. Whence, further, by a certain figure of speech it began to be transferred to punishment, and then to death, nor to these things only but also to others. The Greeks call even the discharge of a guiltless defendant ἀφέων.

We have also shown above how much difference there is between a remission of a debt, and a remission of punishment. And we have shown that in the remission of punishment which is granted by a ruler, there is no relinquishment of such a peculiar and private right as Socinus indicates, viz. of absolute ownership or debt. For these things the reader may therefore turn back. We have only to add now, that it is not true, as Socinus thinks, that a remission is inconsistent with every antecedent payment.

That this may be understood let us give some description of the remission of debt, which contains under it the two species, viz. remission of the thing loaned, and of punishment. This is according to the usage of the word both in civil law and in common speech. To remit a debt is an act either of a creditor, or a ruler, setting the guilty person free from the obligation of punishment or debt.

1 Luke i. 66, 70-74. 2 Luke i. 77. 3 καθ' ἀλλήλου.
For the sake of those who are less familiar with legal terms we will undertake a more extended explanation. In law destruction of obligation is called liberation. Payment may precede this, it cannot follow it, for no act can be occupied with that which no longer exists. Liberation, therefore, takes place sometimes with preceding payment and sometimes without any payment. Of payments one kind liberates ipso facto, another not ipso facto. Payment of exactly the same thing that was in the obligation liberates ipso facto. Whoever makes the payment, whether it be the guilty person himself, or some one else for him with the intention of liberating him, he pays as if he were the guilty person. This is to be noted, because if another person makes the same payment with a different intention, it does not liberate him. When, therefore, the same thing is paid either by a debtor, or by another in the name of a debtor, there is no remission, for the creditor, or ruler, does nothing about the debt. Wherefore, if any one has completely paid the penalty due, what takes place is liberation, not remission. The declaration of such liberation in the law of debt the jurists properly and strictly call quittance. No other payment liberates ipso facto, as, for example, if anything is paid otherwise than is required by the obligation. But it is necessary to add the act of creditor or ruler, which act is properly and usually called remission. Such a payment as can be either admitted or refused, has, when admitted in law, the special name of satisfaction, which is sometimes opposed to payment strictly so called.

Here we must look for the reason why a substitute in corporeal punishment cannot liberate a guilty person ipso facto by enduring the punishment. This is true primarily and per se, not because another pays (for this does not prevent liberation, so long as it is the will of the one who pays), but because he pays something else than what is in the obligation.

3 L. 1, § 2. D. de reb. cred.
4 L. satisfactio. D. de solut.
In the obligation is prescribed the affliction of the guilty party himself. Hence, the common remark: Punishment attaches to the person.\textsuperscript{1} We may see this in other merely personal obligations to an act, as in a contract of marriage, and in an obligation to official duties.\textsuperscript{2} In all these things, if another pays, liberation \textit{ipso facto} will not follow, because it is not only payment by another, but payment of another thing. Some act of the ruler must intervene that liberation may come to one from the punishment of another; for the law demands that the delinquent shall himself be punished. This act with respect to the law is a relaxation or dispensation, with respect to the debtor a remission.

Liberation without payment is effected either by a substitution of a new obligation, or by an entire destruction of the old. The liberation which is effected by a substitution of a new obligation is called a novation, and if the person of the debtor is changed, a delegation. That liberation which without any payment entirely destroys the debt, if it is performed concerning the thing loaned with certain solemn words, is called in civil law acceptilation. But in regard to the punishment it has no proper name (inasmuch as it necessarily excludes payment of any kind and amount), but is called \textit{am} by the common name grace, pardon, indulgence, abolition.

Socinus, therefore, makes a twofold mistake when he applies to that remission which God concedes to us, a word taken from the civil law, viz. acceptilation. For, in the first place, this word may be applied, even when no payment precedes, to the right over a thing loaned, but is not, and cannot be, applied to punishment. We nowhere read that indulgence of crimes was called by the ancients acceptilation. For that is said to be accepted which can be accepted. The ruler properly exacts corporal punishment, but does not accept it, because from punishment nothing properly comes to him.

But, in the next place, acceptilation is opposed to some

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Lat. noexam caput sequi.} \textsuperscript{2} \textit{L. operae. D. de operis libert.}
sort of payment. Hence it is figuratively defined an imaginary payment. But Christ gave his life a ransom for us. We were bought with a price, that is, we were liberated by some payment. This is, therefore, no case of acceptation. Neither is there a payment of the exact debt so as to liberate *ipso facto*, for our death, even our eternal death, was in the obligation. Nor is there a novation, nor a delegation, for after we are liberated there follows neither a similar debt nor another debtor. But this is a remission with an antecedent satisfaction. Socinus is mistaken in thinking that these conflict with one another, since on the contrary, all satisfaction (that is, refusible payment), is admitted in such a way that there is place for remission.

When we say that there is an antecedent satisfaction, it must be understood either in reference to the act itself, as in the case of the sins of Christians, or to a certain and irrevocable decree, as in the case of sins committed and remitted under the law. For what God decrees to do is regarded as already done, and when a debt is truly paid it makes no difference at what time this is done, especially with him who has most clear knowledge of what will certainly take place, and sees it by intuition as always present.

The arguments therefore, which Socinus adduces to prove that satisfaction cannot follow remission, or that it must take place exactly at the same time, and that there is indeed no novation or delegation, nor can there be any liberation when there is no remission are adduced in vain, and are not pertinent to the question. But when he says that the debt is entirely and immediately removed by satisfaction, this is certainly pertinent to the subject, but is not true, unless satisfaction be taken contrary to the usage of law, for the payment of the very thing which was due by the debtor. Of the latter we are not treating; but when another man pays for a debtor, and pays another thing than what was due, a double act of the will is required to liberate. For he who pays must

1 Adam.
2 Matt. xx. 28.
3 1 Cor. vi. 90; vii. 23; vid. infra.
4 Socinus admits this intuitional view of God's, ii. 27.
intend that the debtor be liberated or there is no liberation, as we have shown above, and the creditor or ruler must be willing to accept the payment of one thing for another. Now as any one may impose upon an act depending upon his own free will, a law; so what is due without condition may be brought by novation under a condition. So, also, he who pays for another, and he who admits the payment of one thing for another, may jointly permit that remission follow either immediately or upon a fixed day, and also either without condition or with a condition. But this was the mind, and this the will both of Christ in making the satisfaction, and of God in admitting the satisfaction; this finally the treaty and covenant, not that God should immediately remit the punishment at the very time of Christ’s suffering, but when man, converted to God by true faith in Christ, should suppliantly pray for forgiveness, then, and not till then, should he be forgiven upon the advocacy and intercession of Christ with the Father. At this point, then, the satisfaction does not prevent remission from following. For satisfaction had not already removed the debt, but it had effected this, that at some time the debt should be removed on its account.

The word remission, powerless in itself, Socinus supplies with a support from the parable of Matt. xviii. 22 sq., and that by a twofold argument. First, that God is compared with a king remitting a debt to his servant, though no mention is added of satisfaction. Secondly, that we are tacitly commanded to do the same as God. But we ought by no means to forgive those who sin against us in such a way as to demand punishment from their friends.

The answer is easy. The comparison is stretched farther than that to which it has reference. Such extension in every argument derived from a similitude is a fault. Christ compares himself to a thief, and us to a steward giving away another’s property, not that he steals, or that we ought to steal. But he compares himself to a thief because he comes unexpectedly, and us to the steward because we ought to do
with our own what he did with that which was not his own. So in this parable of Matthew kindness toward our neighbor is commended to us, because God is kind to us. The king in the parable and God correspond in this particular, that they are kind to those who are placed far below them. God exhibits this kindness by remitting punishment, the king by remitting a debt. Should there be another kind of debt, then there would be another kind of remission. But in this the king and God do not correspond, that the king remits without satisfaction, but God does not remit without satisfaction. But this is not intended to be the point of comparison.

There is also another reason. For with regard to the debt, the law of which has been prepared for the advantage of the creditor, a man has the freest power of decision. The less he demands, the more liberal he is. But in making a demand he exercises no act of virtue. But in regard to punishment, which pertains to the common good and to order, a ruler has, to be sure, power, but not boundless power. And when he exacts punishment he exercises a certain virtue, which is called retributive justice, as we have shown above.

So far as the second comparison which is instituted between God and us in the application of the parable is concerned, nothing can be inferred from it except that it is not equitable in us to be more severe towards an equal than God, so much our superior, is towards us, miserable pygmies. Hence it follows that we ought not to demand vengeance more than God does punishment. But God has liberated us from punishment, therefore we ought to have no desire for vengeance. How God has effected that liberation the passage does not tell us, neither did it intend to tell us. At this point there is no similitude, but a dissimilitude. God is a judge, and we are private persons. It belongs to a judge to be solicitous of example; that care does not belong to private persons. The power of punishment is involved in the office of a judge; that power is taken away from private persons. But if the comparison were pressed too far, as is done by Socinus, it would follow that even judges ought not to demand punishment from criminals.
Dimly perceiving that the word *remission* is not strong enough to exclude every kind of payment, or satisfaction, Socinus hopes for more help in some way from another word, ἔλαφος, which Paul uses thrice in this argument. We have shown above that this word must point out some benefit, especially something not due. Socinus affirms, as if an established fact, that to complete the meaning of this word it is required that some one should take something from himself, deprive himself of some possession. This is plainly untrue. I will not dwell upon those references made everywhere in the Scriptures to the gifts of God, as for example, among other things, when it is said to be given to us to believe in Christ, and to suffer for Christ. When Jesus bestowed sight upon the blind man did he deprive himself of any advantage? He who condemns an innocent man for the sake of another is said to deliver that man to another though he was not the possession of the one condemning. Paul had exercised the severity of the apostolic condemnation upon the man guilty of incest, though he was not himself injured, and for no advantage to himself; remitting this, he says that he forgives. Also when admonishing the Corinthians to admit the same man to the enjoyment of his former fellowship, he calls this also forgiving. From these and many other passages of the New Testament, and of other writers as well, it clearly appears that to complete the signification of the word ἔλαφος: it is enough that the recipient obtain something not due to him, even if he who gives parts with nothing.

Moreover, as we have seen above, the ruler in punishment gives up nothing peculiar or personal. This is the more plain in this argument from the fact that forgiving is not only attributed to God but also to Christ. The injury of sin is properly done to God, so that if on that account in remitting sins God must be said to take something from himself, yet the same cannot be said of Christ as mediator. There is

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1 Col. ii. 13; iii. 13; Eph. iv. 32. 2 ἔλαφος. 3 ἔλαφος. 4 ἔλαφος. 5 ἔλαφος. 6 ἔλαφος. 7 ἔλαφος. 8 ἔλαφος.
no more truth in what Socinus adduces from his previous proposition, viz. that forgiving¹ is entirely inconsistent with any satisfaction, for it is not inconsistent with that which is admitted when it might be rejected, and to which he who is benefited has contributed nothing. But both of these things are true of Christ’s satisfaction for us. The Latin word condonare, since the Holy Spirit has not seen fit to employ it in this discussion, would occupy our attention to no purpose. But if this word were also in the Sacred Writings, since in punishment giving, properly so called, has no place, and the tropical use of the word is not uncommon, nothing could be inferred from this quarter against satisfaction, since anything may rightly be said to be forgiven as well as remitted, even when a payment has been made, if it be such a payment as would not have the power of liberation without an act of free-will. When princes pardon those accused of capital crimes, they are accustomed to impose upon them some fine, and some public deprecation of their fault. Yet this does not prevent us from saying that they forgive crimes. How much more justly, therefore, may this word be used when the required satisfaction does not proceed from us, but liberation comes entirely gratuitously, so far as we are concerned, although not absolutely gratuitously. This is the meaning of Scripture when it says that we are justified freely, and immediately adds, “through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus.”² Certainly when the Scripture says, and not in one place merely, that we are redeemed, and even with a price, and that Christ gave himself, or his flesh, to liberate us, we cannot in any fairness overturn all the force of these expressions by insisting upon the word forgiveness, above what usage demands.

To another argument of Socinus’s which is derived from the imitation of God and Christ in freely giving commanded us, there is no need of making further response than has been already made to the parable of Matthew. The thing is proposed for our imitation, not every mode of the thing.

¹ ἐν παρακολούθωσιν.
² Rom. iii. 24.
The thing is kindness, even after sin; and out of this a consequent remission, or (if you prefer to say) forgiveness. The mode is different,—in God, upon antecedent satisfaction; in our case without it. This is nothing wonderful when God is a judge, we private persons.

But if one contemplates the matter more subtilely he will find perhaps, that not even from that forgiveness which is prescribed to us is all satisfaction removed, but only that which in consideration of the person, viz. that of an equal, and not a superior, surpasses the proper limit. For that confession of fault, and prayer for forgiveness (which Christ does not forbid us to demand), is not so entirely diverse from satisfaction but that the Latins, with a high degree of elegance called it by an appropriate term, *satisfacere*. So, also, Paul employs the word *forgive* of the Corinthians, when notwithstanding “the punishment inflicted of many” had preceded. And in the ages next after the apostles we know that the peace of the church (as they called it), was not granted to those who had fallen publicly, except after certain public acts of humiliation, which they also called satisfaction.

The argument derived from liberality rests upon a fragile foundation. As we have shown before, that virtue which God exercises in remitting sins is not liberality, but clemency, which Seneca rightly defines as the lenity of a superior towards an inferior in fixing punishment. Cicero, employing the name of the genus for the species, called this very clemency lenity, and defined it,—justice residing in the moderation of the punisher,—the word justice being taken in so broad a sense as to include pity, faith, and friendship. This clemency pertains to that virtue which Aristotle in his Ethics calls *πραότης*. Clemency is τοῦ ἀρχοντος πραότης. But there is a great distinction between *πραότης* and *δευθεριότης*. The Scriptures call this clemency of God by a somewhat more general term *χρηστότης*, but never *δευθεριότης*. And what is more to the point, the word *δευθεριότης* is applied to God not even in other things which are commonly given and re-

1 Luke xvii. 4. 2 Cor. ii. 6. 3 Rom. ii. 4; xi. 22; Tit. iii. 4.
ceived. But this virtue is rather called the love¹ of God, for
liberality is properly to give something in such a way that
the giver has less. But as Socinus with great intemperance
of speech condemns the perpetual doctrine of the [see a
church as impious and sacrilegious, so he, in recognizing as
he does a twofold liberality of God (but we a single only),
does great injury to the truth. For our doctrine recognizes
not a twofold liberality (for that word is foreign to the
argument, and is not employed in Scripture), but a twofold
beneficence of God, and, indeed, a much greater beneficence
than the newly arisen doctrine of Socinus. It is beneficence,
in the first place, because when God was moved with great
hatred of sin, and could no more choose to spare us than he
could the angels that sinned, yet that he might spare us he
not only admitted such a payment as he was not bound to
admit, but further, he himself devised it. This benefit, cer­
tainly, is much greater and more illustrious than if God,
plainly judging that it made no difference whether he set up
an example or not, had left our sins unpunished, as Socinus
says. Therefore the clemency of God is not overturned by
the payment of the penalty, since the admission of such
payment, and much more the devising of it, proceeded from
clemency alone. It is beneficence, again, because God sur­
rendered his dearly beloved Son, the image of himself, and
(if it is proper so to speak) another self, to death, not only
that he might testify to the truth of his doctrine, and so
come to the resurrection (which are the two opinions between
which Socinus hesitates), but even chiefly that he might
perfect the payment of which I have spoken, or satisfaction,
by bearing the punishment of our sins. In that case, So­
cinus ought certainly to confess that he would owe less to
Christ than we owe. Nay, even the love of God is declared
greater by us, as appears because justice requires us to esti­
mate benefits not by their expense alone, but especially by
the advantage which is derived from the expense for the
benefited party. But beside the advantage which Socinus

¹ [Lat. charitas.]
confesses as well as we, we gratefully acknowledge one preeminent benefit which he denies.

We do not, however, say that God devoted his Son that he might receive his own, and so make God sordid, as Socinus reproaches us with doing; but we say that God did this that he might openly testify of the desert of sin and his own hatred of sin, and at the same time, so far as it could be done in sparing us, consult for the order of things and for the authority of his own law. Socinus's view is as unjust and (to use his own word, for he says that we make God monstrous) as monstrous as ours. For the superadded end of making satisfaction renders the sufferings of Christ no more severe. Socinus himself is compelled to confess that they were inflicted by God without cruelty. Nay, because they have more objects to accomplish they are the more removed from the appearance of cruelty. For the cruel one is he who tortures another without cause, or for slight cause. And further, this object of making satisfaction or bearing punishment is connected with the death of Christ much more openly and much more closely than those objects which Socinus recognizes. Testimony of doctrine might be sufficiently and abundantly supplied by the miracles; even celestial glory might easily be conferred upon Christ without the intervention of death; but death, and especially such a death, is a proper means of averting punishment, and the punishment itself of procuring liberation.  

But although up to this point we have shown that satisfaction was made to God by the punishment of Christ, we have not intended to deny that the efficacy of the satisfaction lay also in the action of Christ. For frequently a pleasing act is accepted, as it were, in compensation for punishment. "By adding a benefit," says Seneca, "the injury is prevented from appearing." But although God, who needs nothing, cannot receive a benefit, yet the supreme goodness accepts

1 [Lat. immans.]  
2 De benef. lib. vi. ch. v, where he shows that to return is to give one thing for another, and that by a payment not the same thing is paid, but its equivalent.  
3 Andereich.
any kind of service as if it were a benefit. So Ahab averted
temporal punishment by suppliantly venerating God. Not
only a man’s own action may procure impunity for him, but
also that of some other one with whom he is connected. So
David’s posterity were saved from punishment on account of
David himself, and not only on account of the promises
made to him, but also because his acts had pleased God,
who estimated them according to his own goodness. Ael­i­
anus tells us that Aeschylus was liberated from punishment
because his father Amyntas had bravely saved his native
country. Among the Romans, when Titus Quinctins was
accused he profited by the memory of his father Cincinnatus.
Livy says of Appius: “He related the good deeds of his
fathers towards the republic, that he might deprecate punish­
ment.” “Plautius Lateranus,” says Tacitus, “was saved
from execution for the distinguished merit of his uncle.”
And generally Sallust: “If they have done wrong, ancient
nobility, the brave deeds of their forefathers, protect them.”
Cicero: “The services of his ancestors, if any shall still be
known, ought to help him who prays that he may be par­
doned.” Quintilian: “The merits of ancestors commend a
man in peril.” Josephus: “The services of ancestors ought
to be a defence against the punishment due to posterity.”
But as deeds temporally good secure temporal impunity, the
work of Christ, perfectly and spiritually good, has availed to
secure our liberation from eternal punishment. This is the
thought of the passage: “By the obedience of one shall
many be made righteous,” that is, shall be justified, shall be
regarded as innocent. And again: “For his name’s sake”
(viz. Christ’s, for Christ alone, and not God, had just been
mentioned, as Socinus confesses) are our sins forgiven.
Certainly by this phrase, “for any one’s name’s sake,” is
denoted the impulsive cause. Socinus has not proved the
contrary by any other passage of Scripture.

1 2 Kings viii. 19.  2 Kings xi. 18; 2 Kings viii. 19; xx. 6.
2 1 Kings xi. 18; 2 Kings viii. 19; xx. 6.
3 [Lat. Et in universum Sall.]  4 Rom. v. 19.
4 This is besides proved by a similar passage, Acts x. 43.  5 1 John ii. 12.
But what we have now said of satisfaction, that it should be referred first to the punishment, and then to the act of submission, should be understood also of the propitiation of God, of our redemption, and of expiation. We will now gird ourselves for the explanation of these things.

CHAPTER VII

ON THE PROPITIATION AND RECONCILIATION MADE BY THE DEATH OF CHRIST.

Lest some one should suppose a dispute to have been instituted over a single word, Socinus has himself taken sufficient care to prevent it. Since he says in many places that he does not object to the mere word satisfaction, but to the thing expressed by that word. And so he repudiates all such expressions as these: Christ reconciled God to us by his death; Christ liberated us from the hands of divine justice by giving it his blood as the price of our redemption; Christ made compensation for our sins by his own obedience; Christ richly merited that God should bestow upon us the remission of our sins; Christ by laying down his life appeased the wrath of God toward us; — and repudiates them no less than the word satisfaction. And yet if the dispute had been instituted over the word, it would not be just to deprive the church of the right of interpreting the Scriptures. In this is involved the right of transferring those things which either the prophets have said in Hebrew or the apostles in Greek, and which are frequently redolent of Hebraisms and Syriasms, to other words, as may be most convenient, or of reducing to a summary, in a clear, abridged expression, what the Scripture has given in different places upon the same topic. So, as the Scripture has said that Christ was delivered to death on account of our sins, that he bore our sins,—that is, the punishment of our sins,—and that his blood was poured out for the remission of sins, we may express the thought by the significant Latin word satisfaction. For in law and common usage that word signifies the exhibition of some deed or thing, from which not indeed ipso
facto, but by a succeeding act of the will, liberation follows; and it is commonly employed in this sense not only of pecuniary debts, but also of crimes. This is called in languages corrupted from the Roman "contenting any one."

But that it may appear that words having the same force, and even the very phrases which Socinus rejects, are found in the sacred writings, in addition to those which in the first explanation of this view above were adduced from the sacred volume, we will add also certain other testimonies, and refer them to four classes. The first class will contain words which designate the averting of wrath; the second, those which indicate a liberation made by redemption, or the giving of a price; the third, those which carry an intimation of surrogation; the fourth, those which ascribe to the death of Christ the efficacy of an expiatory sacrifice.¹

I. To turn to the first class: It is very well known that to turn away the wrath of any one is signified in Greek by the words ἰδάσκεσθαι, εἰρηνοποιεῖν, καταλλάσσειν, ἀποκαταλλάσσειν; in Latin, placare, pacare, conciliare or reconciliare, also propitiare. The act itself, and that by which the act is properly effected, is called by the Greeks ἰδασμός, and by the Latins placamen. Wrath in God is so called, as we have seen above, anthropopathically, as if it were a love of punishing. The apostle says it is disclosed or revealed from heaven upon all impiety and unrighteousness of men, since they hold back² the truth in unrighteousness, that is, rebel against the known commands of God. No one is excepted, since we are all by nature sons of wrath, that is, exposed to the divine wrath. This wrath abides over³ certain ones. It is averted from those over whom it does not remain. This averting Christ obtains by his death, which is rightly called propitiation. The apostle John twice calls it this, when he

¹ [The remaining four chapters of the work are each occupied with one of these classes.]
² [E. V. "hold the truth"; Grotius: "delineo." Gr. "ἐκτίθεσιν." Rom. i. 18.]
³ John iii. 36 [E. V. "abideth on." Grot. "super manet." Gr. "μένει ἐπ' αὐτῷ,"]
810 GROTIUS'S DEFENCE. [April,
says: 1 "If any man sin, we have an advocate with the
Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation
for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of
the whole world." Also: 2 "Herein is love, not that we
loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the
propitiation for our sins." With this passage we
must compare that of Paul's: 3 "God commendeth his love
towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died
for us." Both Paul and John prove by the same argument
that we did not first love, but were loved by God. And
when Paul says that Christ died, John says that he was
made a propitiation. We should add also the following
passage of Paul's: 4 "We are justified freely by his grace
through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God
hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his
blood."

Christ was therefore made ἡλασμός or ἡλαστήριον in his
blood. Is this anything else than that which Socinus denies,
that God was propitiated by Christ? For when ἡλασμός, in
John, is interpreted expiation, 7 and when, further, Socinus
understands by this word "expiation" the destruction of
sin, he does this without cause, and without authority.
ὁλάσκευ among all Greek writers, poets, historians, and
others, is to propitiate, and is ordinarily construed with the
accusative designating the person whose wrath is turned
away. The same is true in the Septuagint, and in Luke. 8
In one place only 9 is Christ said to be constituted high-priest
to expiate the sins of the people. In this passage the phrase
"to expiate sins" is an enallage, by Hebraism, where ac-
cording to usage we should say, to propitiate God concerning
sins. 10 So the Hebrews employ נְפָר. The phrase "to ex-
piate sins" 11 is found in Ecclesiasticus. In the Psalms: 12
"Who forgiveth all thine iniquities." The meaning there is

1 1 John ii. 1, 2. 2 ἡλασμός. 3 1 John iv. 10. 4 Rom. v. 8.
6 Rom. iii. 24, 25. 6 ἡλαστήριον. 7 ii. 20. 8 xviii. 13 [passive.]
9 Heb. ii. 17. εἰς τὸ ἡλασκεύα τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ.
10 ἡλασκεύα Θεόν περί τῶν ἁμαρτιών. 11 εἰλασκεύουσα ἁμαρτίας.
12 τὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὰς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἁμαρτίας [Grot. ἁμαρτίας.]
consequently expiation, but such an expiation as is made by propitiation. Otherwise this use of the word would have nothing in common with the nature of the word, or with its perpetual signification. Wherefore such expiation as Socinus speaks of, that is, the destruction of sin, which may take place without propitiation, the word ἰδιωκεσθαι, and ἰδισμός, derived from it, cannot denote.

But ἰλαστήριον in Paul is interpreted by Socinus as that in which God shows himself propitiated. We do not deny that this signification can be made to agree with the word, and that for some such reason the writer to the Hebrews calls the cover of the ark ἰλαστήριον. But since words of this termination properly indicate a certain effective power, but a declarative improperly, there is no sufficient reason for departing from the proper use. For Christ appears to be called by Paul ἰλαστήριον in the same sense as he is called ἰδισμός by John. But ἰδισμός everywhere means propitiation, and not the testimony of propitiation. Wherefore, Scripture interpreting Scripture, the word ἰλαστήριον must be expounded in reference to Christ actively, not declaratively. The additional word blood, to which the power of propitiation is ascribed, shows this. For "without shedding of blood there is no remission." Trite is the passage:

"Sanguine placatis ventos et virgine caesa."

There are also similar passages from the poets, of which there will be an opportunity of speaking below.

II. The words καταλλάσσεως and ἀποκαταλλάσσεως, to reconcile, which Paul uses in this argument, correspond to the word propitiate. Socinus says in reply that it is not written that God is reconciled to us, but we to God. This is because God is not angry with us, and so in need of propitiation, but we have ourselves turned away from him. But it is not true, as he assumes, that he who is of a hostile mind is reconciled, but not the other to him. For the word for reconciling, as well as the word for propitiating, employs

1 ii. 16. 2 Contra Soc., ii. 2. 3 Heb. ix. 22. 4 Rom. v. 10, 11; 2 Cor. v. 18; Eph. ii. 16; Col. i. 20.
promiscuously now the dative, and now the accusative of either party, both the hostile, and that which is not at all, or less, hostile. To reconcile us to God, therefore, and God to us, amount to the same thing. Sophocles, in the Ajax, says:

'Αλλ' οίχεται τοι πρός το κάρδιστον πραξεις
Τωνάμης, θεοῦτων ὡς καταλλαχθῆς χόλου.

The chorus thus expressed what Ajax had before said:

'Αλλ' ἄμω πρός τε λουτρὰ καὶ παρακτίαν
Λαμώνας, ὡς ἐν λύμαθ' ἀγνίσας ἔμα,
Μήν βαρεῖ'αν ἐξαλείψωμεν θεσ.

We see plainly here that to be reconciled to the gods is the same as to escape their wrath. And surely no one who has examined with some degree of care the passages above quoted will deny that the apostle is speaking of this reconciliation, that is, the turning away of God’s wrath, or at least of the latter.

III. For in Romans, chapter fifth, Paul, twice expressing, after his custom, the same thing as he had said before, that Christ died for the ungodly and for sinners, immediately declares 3 that “when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son.” But that this benefit is prior to conversion appears from the opposite member. “If these things are so,” he says, “‘much more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath,’” 4 “‘much more being reconciled we shall be saved by his life.’” 5 The argument of the apostle proceeds from the greater to the less. If God was so good to us not yet converted, what will he be towards us converted? In this case, the word reconciliation in the former member cannot denote conversion. The apostle is pointing out something singular.

1 [Plumtre gives the following translation of these two passages:]

“But he is gone, to best of tempers turned,
That he may soothe the anger of the Gods.”

“But now I go to bathe
Where the fair meadows slope along the shore,
That having washed away my stains of guilt,
I may avert the wrath the Goddess feels.”

2 vv. 6 and 8. 3 v. 10. 4 v. 9. 5 v. 10.
in Christ. But to convert sinners is not of this kind, for they are never converted except as sinners. But to die for sinners, and to reconcile sinners by death, is rare, and evidently singular, for they have always been very few who would submit to death for the sake of good men though they were their friends.¹

Again, it is more proper to say that we receive conversion to the glorious life of Christ than conversion to his death. But reconciliation is attributed to the death distinguished and discriminated from the glorious life of Christ, as the antithesis of the passage shows.

Besides this, we may understand from the later benefit what the earlier is. The later, which pertains to the unconverted, is to have peace with God,² to be saved from wrath.³ This is what the apostle calls receiving reconciliation.⁴ What is this receiving reconciliation but receiving remission of sins, as the Scripture says?⁵ But to speak of receiving conversion is an unknown use of language. If, therefore, in the latter member to receive reconciliation is to receive reconciliation of sins, and by the effect to be liberated from wrath or from punishment, in the former member also to be reconciled ought to have an analogous meaning. The former benefit is the right to a thing; the latter is the exhibition of the same thing.

In addition to all this, one cannot say, except improperly or awkwardly, that the love of God is to be inferred from our being relieved of the hate of God. If the apostle had wished to treat of the benefit of our conversion this should certainly have been expressed by some other word signifying not our action, but that of God. But nothing is plainer than our interpretation, nothing more pertinent to the apostle's object. The objection which Socinus raises that mention of satisfaction is not apposite here, or still more, that the glory of love is diminished by it, is invalid. For satisfaction is mentioned not with reference to punishment, but with reference to the mode of liberating us. Nor is it pos-

¹ v. 7. ² v. 1. ³ vv. 9 and 10. ⁴ v. 11. ⁵ Acts x. 43; xxvi. 18. ⁶ Acts x. 4. ⁷ Acts xxvi. 18.
sible, as we have proved above, that the love of God for men should be displayed in any other way more clearly than in this, that though he was angry, that is, demanded punishment, yet he provided a way for our impunity by devoting Christ to this object.

IV. In 2 Cor. v., near the close, as in the passage from Romans, is found mention of a two-fold reconciliation. The former reconciliation is that by which God has reconciled all things, or the world, to himself, through Christ, or in Christ. The latter is that to which the apostles, as ministers of reconciliation, to whom is committed the word of reconciliation, exhort men in the name of Christ, and God. The former, therefore, cannot be conversion, for it is the antecedent, and especial material of that discourse through which conversion is brought about.

Paul himself shows that it consists in a non-imputation of sins, that is, in a decree of non-imputation. Not to impute, and to remit sins, amount to the same thing. How is this decree of non-imputation founded upon Christ? Let Paul answer: “God hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin.”

The objection of Socinus that non-imputation of sin conflicts with the mode of reconciliation through satisfaction lacks a reason. For, as has been explained above, satisfaction precedes, then the remission or non-imputation follows, not to dwell on the fact that it is not said absolutely that God does not impute sins, but that he does not impute them to the men who have sinned. But it is possible that sin should be both remitted or non-imputed to one, and imputed to another, for example’s sake, or that another should be afflicted and punished for that cause, as is plain from many things alleged above, and especially from the history of David. It is not true, because the expressions “not imputing sins,” and “he made him to be sin who knew no sin,” do not exhibit entire verbal consistency, that they pertain to different things. They are connected by the copulative

1 vv. 18, 19. 2 vv. 18, 19, 20. Rom. iv. 6, 7, 8. 4 2 Cor. v. 21.
particles καὶ and γὰρ. No subject new or foreign to our argument intervenes. But it is said that God made the apostles ambassadors and ministers of a benefit provided by himself, that they are sent into the world for this purpose, to implant in men by their preaching faith in this benefit. For producing this belief there is a very powerful argument in the deliverance of Christ to death. For it is by no means credible that God was willing to allow his most dear and most innocent Son to be so grievously afflicted, except with some momentous end in view. But this end, ever peculiar and in perfect consistency with the act, on the testimony of Scripture throughout, with the aid of reason by induction, can scarcely be anything else than obtaining a right to pardon by an antecedent satisfaction. The expression, "We beseech you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God," although from the nature of the word it may signify either throw off your hatred towards God or receive remission of sins (viz. by penitence), yet from the nature of the subject more readily admits the latter sense. For it is not common for the weaker to receive the stronger into favor. Those words of Paul express the ministry of reconciliation, which reconciliation he had just described as the non-imputation of sins. So Christ himself says that he was sent to preach remission to captives, and he commands his apostles to preach in his name remission of sins. So Paul says that he proclaims the remission of sins.

V. In Ephesians it is written of Christ: "That he might reconcile both [Jews and Gentiles] unto God in one body." In this passage the dative θεῷ can be governed only by the word ἀποκαταλλάξας. But the interpretation of Socinus that θεῷ stands here by itself, or that to reconcile to God means to reconcile them to one another that they might serve God, is forced, harsh, and without authority. Neither can one

1 v. 20.
2 Cf. Mark i. 4; Luke iii. 8; v. 31.
4 καταγγέλλων ἑφούσαν ἀμαρτίαν, Luke xxiv. 47.
5 καταγγέλλων ἑφούσαν ἀμαρτίαν, Acts xiii. 38.
6 Λ. 16. ὅτα ἀποκαταλλάξας τοὺς ἀμαρτήτους ἐν ἑνὶ σάμάτι τῇ θεῷ.
draw a valid argument from the fact that in this place Paul is properly speaking of the peace made between Jews and Gentiles; for it does not follow that the peace made for both with God is alien from the discussion. The two different things which are united are so united that they are first and chiefly united with the connecting bond; and they are not united except by and because of the bond. Jews and Gentiles were made friends with each other through their friendship with God. It is remarkable that Socinus does not perceive this, since he says himself ¹ that the apostle having begun to speak of the harmony obtained among creatures subjoins immediately, without transitional particles, the mention of that reconciliation by which men are made friends with God, —yes, even interjecting the word καὶ, which is commonly employed to connect only similar things. Hence it is manifest that these things are so connected that Paul in this passage referred the reconciliation of men with men to the reconciliation of men with God as he would an effect to its cause. It should be added that the blood of Christ is mentioned in this passage as if the reconciliation were effected by it. But it is common in Scripture to connect the the blood of Christ with the remission of sins as an especially appropriate effect.²

VI. To the passage in Ephesians that passage to which allusion has already been made, viz. Col. i. 20, seems to correspond to such a degree that I have thought it should be brought in, rather than Eph. i. 9, 10, to explain the other. For there are many points of agreement. What is expressed in one passage separately by blood and the cross,³ in the other is brought into one expression, "by the blood of the cross."⁴ In the former you have ποιῶν εἰσήλθην, in the latter εἰσήλθεν τοις; there "to reconcile both unto God,"

¹ On Col. i. 20–22.
² Matt. xxvi. 28; Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14; Heb. ix. 22; Rom. iii. 24, 25; Rom. v. 9; 1 John i. 7; 1 Pet. i. 2; Rev. i. 5, vis. by propitiating power; 1 John i. 2 and iv. 10.
³ Eph. ii. 13 and 16.
⁴ Col. i. 20.
here "to reconcile all things unto himself." The importance of this lies in the fact that in the former mention is made merely of men reconciled with one another because they had been reconciled to God; but in the latter, of men reconciled both among themselves and with the angels, because reconciled to God. *eis aíròv* is everywhere *unto himself;*¹ that is, God, as it also is interpreted in Syriac 'n, that is, *for himself.*² If those words meant what Socinus thinks they mean, namely, *unto one,* it should have been written *eis to aírò,* or at least *eis aírò,* and not *eis aíròv,* or *eis aíròv,* which necessarily refers to a certain person. It is no new thing that the preposition *in* with the accusative should be put instead of the dative, since among the Hebrews the interchange of *א* and *ב* is very common. As Socinus confesses, the phrase *καταλλαξασθαλ τω προς έτερον* is in use among the Greeks. But no one will deny that in the apostles' style *eis* is put in the place of *προς,* if he will diligently examine their writings.³ Interchange of the same words occurs not infrequently in profane writers.

For these reasons it is not probable, as Socinus thinks, that in this paragraph the topic is simply the reconciliation of creatures with one another, but in the following paragraph the reconciliation of men with God. On the contrary, what is said universally in verse 20 is specially applied to the Colossians in verse 21, as is shown by the words *καὶ ὑμᾶς,* that is, *Nay, even you,* or *you also yourselves.* In the latter paragraph it is not said, as Socinus thinks, that reconciliation is made by rendering us blameless, but that we are reconciled in order to render us blameless. Of an end Socinus makes a mode, certainly a great liberty to take! The Scripture everywhere hints that sins are remitted to us that for the future, bound by so great an obligation, we may live holly.⁴ And it is to be noted that in this paragraph also mention is made of the body of Christ, which indeed was broken for us for the remission of sins,⁵ and of his death, to

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¹ [Lat. *in esse*] ² [Lat. *obi*] ³ Vid. Matt. xv. 34; Acts xvi. 40; Eph. iii. 19.
⁴ Luke i. 74.
⁵ 1 Cor. xi. 24; Matt. xxvi. 28.
which, as we have already seen, remission is in like manner frequently attributed as an effect. The apostle adds that we have been reconciled though we were alienated and hostile in mind, as he has elsewhere said that Christ died for us though we were sinners and impious. We believe with the more correctness that he is here treating of the the same benefit for the reason that the beginning from which the apostle had come down into this discourse was that we have redemption in Christ, viz. the remission of our sins. And certainly we cannot more correctly understand how much God and Christ have loved us, and how much we owe to God and Christ than by considering that when we were as yet exposed to the wrath of God, and guilty of sins, a remission of sins was first obtained for us, and then applied to us. These two things the Scripture frequently connects.

In another place Socinus says that God ought to be completely placated, and by no means angry with us, before Christ should be sent to make a covenant. But he seems elsewhere to recognize how foreign to the truth this is, since he has made God, at the very moment when he offered conditions of restoration to friendship, not placated, but placable. And certainly reason dictates this. For in setting all persons under conditions free, there are prior conditions. But a condition ought not to be merely offered, but also fulfilled, before the completed act. Wherefore the Scriptures say that we have peace with God after we have been justified by faith. Before we were children of wrath, for our sins are the cause of separation, that is, turn God away from us. This wrath excludes peace or friendship, but not every kind of love, taken in a broad sense. Not even Socinus holds that sins are properly remitted to men before repentance. But he who still imputes sins cannot be said to be placated at the time of the act, or, to use Socinus's term, fully placated.

To render this more clear we must make a distinction

1 Rom. v. 6, 8. 2 i. 7. 3 i. 8. 4 Rom. v. 1. 5 Eph. ii. 3. 6 Isa. lix. 2. 7 Vid. John iii. 16; 1 John iv. 10.
between three moments, if I may use the term, of the divine will.

The first is before the death of Christ was established, either in fact or in the divine decree and prescience. In this moment God was angry with the sinner, but not in such a way as to reject all plans for laying aside his wrath.

The second moment is when the death of Christ has been determined upon, in which God has not only decreed, but also promised, to lay aside his wrath.

The third is when a man with genuine faith believes in Christ, and Christ in accordance with the provisions of the covenant commends the believer to God. Here, now, God lays aside his wrath, and receives the man into favor.

But since active and passive verbs corresponding to the same things have a twofold signification, so as either to point only to the force and efficacy, or to include also the effect, viz. the ultimate effect, it follows that in the first moment neither of these is possible. In respect to that, God can only be said to be placable. In the second and third he may rightly be said to be placated with a distinction of the two senses which I have already indicated. In the former sense it is said: "God reconciled the world to himself in Christ,"¹ and "We were reconciled to God when we were enemies."² In the latter: "Be ye reconciled to God,"³ "We have received reconciliation."⁴ The same is the meaning of the words "redemption" and "expiation," and of that phrase by which Christ is sometimes said to die for all, sometimes for particular ones.

Finally, we must note that the word "reconciliation" does not exclude satisfaction, or even payment or compensation. We find in Livy: "That he might by that gift reconcile to himself the minds of the citizens." Similar expressions are frequent in others. For this reason we ought not to avoid calling Christ our reconciler, as the Scripture also shows by adding to reconciliation the mention of blood.

¹ 2 Cor. v. 19.  ² Rom. v. 10.  ³ 2 Cor. v. 20.  ⁴ Rom. v. 11.
(To be continued).