ARTICLE VI.

A DEFENCE OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH CONCERNING THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST AGAINST FAUSTUS SOCINU8 OF SIENNA WRITTEN BY HUGO GROTIUS.

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[Prefatory Note. — The translation of Grotius's "Defence" herewith offered to the Christian public is an attempt to present in pure and readable English this masterpiece among works upon the statement. It has been the first endeavor to make the translation readable as well as exact, and the next to make it literal. Grotius's style was eminently sequacious. He delighted in linking his sentences together by innumerable connective particles, and availed himself freely of the resources of the Latin language to accomplish this. As far as was thought consistent with English idiom these connective particles have been retained. But it was thought necessary to break up some of the longer sentences into shorter ones, and to take the same liberty with the paragraphs. An occasional Greek phrase, which in our day would seem pedantic, has been silently translated, and the Greek put at the bottom of the page, along with the numerous notes which were incorporated by Grotius with the text. To these foot-notes some small additions had been made by the translator, for self-evident reasons, and enclosed in brackets. The preface of Vossius has been omitted. Otherwise no change has been made; and it is hoped that the translation may enable the English reader to gain as true an idea of Grotius's work as the Latin itself would afford him.

The translation is made from the Amsterdam edition of Grotius's Theological Works and Letters, in four volumes, folio, 1679. Two other editions have also been employed in the work; one probably the first edition, Leyden, 1617, another the second edition of the same year and place. These texts differ somewhat, for the folio was printed from the author's private copy, upon the margin of which certain additions had been made, chiefly citations of authorities. The folio edition is a most careful and excellent one, and reflects great credit upon its editor. For ready reference the pages and columns of the folio are printed in the margin of the translation. After the translation was completed, nearly two years since, it was revised throughout, from the Latin. Within a few months it has been again revised with the aid of the only other English translation of the work ever made. This was first published in London, 1692, and bears the trans-
ulator's initials only — W. H. This translation is, of course, now unreadable, and often obscure. But it never was a perfect translation; for beside the fact that the English is Latin-English, such as never was spoken, and never could be, W. H. has not infrequently failed to gain precisely the author's meaning. He is hardly ever felicitous, abounds with small errors of various kinds, and in some places positively blunders; while throughout he has permitted his work to be seriously marred by careless proof-reading. But he is so literal that an Erasmus could rewrite the original from him, and improve upon Grotius, and he is in general very faithful to his task. His text evidently differed somewhat from any of the texts to which I have had access.

For a life of Grotius the reader is referred to the Christian Examiner, Vol. xlii. No. 1, or to McClintock and Strong's Cyclopaedia. In the latter work a statement of the editions of Grotius's works, and other bibliographical matter, will be found. A large number of English translations from Grotius have been made. His "Rights of War and Peace" and "Truth of the Christian Religion" have been most frequently translated. A statement of the editions will be found in Lownde's "Bibliographer's Manual."

Certain notes have been added by the translator, explanatory, critical, and historical. At this time, when the theory of which Socinus was the principal early defender finds so many advocates, even among those who profess the Evangelical doctrines which Socinus denied, it is hoped that the logical, simple, rational, and Scriptural view presented by Grotius in confutation of Socinus may not be without influence in restoring harmony of doctrinal belief.

CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY IS EXHIBITED, AND THE TRUE DOCTRINE EXPLAINED IN THE WORDS OF SCRIPTURE.

237 a] Before we engage in this discussion, we will first state that doctrine which the church of Christ has hitherto defended with unshaken faith, as derived from the sacred Scriptures, that thence the difference between it and the view of Socinus* may clearly appear. We will next explain the same doctrine by producing certain testimonies of Scripture, whose true interpretation, since Socinus has wrested them to another sense, will be vindicated in passing.

The Catholic Doctrine, therefore, is as follows: * God was moved by his own goodness to bestow distinguished

Note. — References by small superior letters in the text are to the notes at the end of the Article.
blessings upon us. But since our sins, which deserved punishment, were an obstacle to this, he determined that Christ, being willing of his own love toward men, should, by bearing the most severe tortures, and a bloody and ignominious death, pay the penalty for our sins, in order that without prejudice to the exhibition of the divine justice, we might be liberated, upon the intervention of a true faith, from the punishment of eternal death.

The First Efficient Cause of that of which we treat is God. "God gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish." 1 "God spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all." 2 "The Lord hath laid on Christ the iniquity of us all." 3 "God made Christ sin." 4

The first cause which moved God is mercy or love to men. 5 "God so loved the world that he gave his Son." 1 God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us." 6

The other cause which moved God is our sins, fully deserving punishment. "Christ was delivered for our offences." 7 We have here διὰ with the accusative, which in sacred and profane authors in the Greek language is the most common mark of the impulsive cause. For example: "διὰ ταῦτα, because of these things, cometh the wrath of God upon the children of disobedience." 8 But however often this phrase, on account of sins, is connected with suffering, it never receives a signification other than the impulsive cause. "I will chastise you seven times for your sins." 9 "Because of these abominations the Lord thy God doth drive them out from before thee." 10 And frequently elsewhere in the sacred writings, and nowhere otherwise.

Another phrase, for sins, whenever it also is connected with sufferings, has plainly the same force. Here [977 8] belong the well-known passages: "Christ died for our sins." 11

1 John iii. 16. 2 Rom. viii. 32. 8 Isa. liii. 6. 4 2 Cor. v. 21. 5 φιλανθρωπία. 6 Rom. v. 8. 7 Rom. iv. 25. 8 Eph. v. 6. 9 Lev. xxvi. 28. 10 Deut. xviii. 12. 11 διαφε, 1 Cor. xv. 3.
“Christ also hath once suffered for sins.”

Christ gave himself for our sins.

Nevertheless, Socinus supposes that in these passages the final, and not the impulsive, cause is denoted. He even goes so far as to add that by the word pro, and the Greek ἐμπέ, the impulsive cause is never designated, but always the final. Many passages show that this latter, upon which Socinus relies, is not true. For ἐμπέ and ἀπε are used to designate the impulsive as well as the final cause. The Gentiles are said to “glorify God for his mercy.” “Let thanks be given on our behalf,” says Paul; “for you,” and “for all.”

“We pray you in Christ’s stead.”

“Great is my glorying of you.”

“Distresses for Christ’s sake.”

“I thank my God always on your behalf.”

“God will convince the ungodly of all their ungodly deeds.” So also the Latins say: pro beneficis gratias agere, or reddere, as Cicero frequently does. The same writer employs the expression ulcisci pro injuriis, pro magnitudine sceleris poenas persolvere, supplicia pro maleficiis metuere. Plantus: castigare pro commerita noxia. Terence: pro dictis et factis ulcisci. In all these passages pro signifies not the final, but the impulsive cause. So also when Christ is said to have suffered or died for sins, the nature of the case forbids us to understand, as Socinus would, the final cause. For, although an end may be two-fold, that for which, or that for sake of which, (as the end for which the medicine is prepared is the sick man, the end for sake of which, his health), neither is appropriate to sin. For even if you say with Socinus that the end of the death of Christ is that we may be recovered from sin, or even that we may obtain the remission of our sins (I will not dwell upon the fact that this end, according to his opinion, could not be attributed to death, except very remotely), neither of them

1 ἀπε, 1 Pet. iii. 18. 2 ἀπε, Gal. i. 4. 3 ἀπε, Hab. x. 12.
4 Book ii. chap. vii.; iii. 7; ii. 25, and more clearly, iv. 13.
5 ἐμπέ, Rom. xv. 9. 6 ἐμπέ, 2 Cor. i. 11. 7 ἐμπέ, Eph. i. 16
8 ἐμπέ, Eph. v. 20. 9 ἐμπέ, 2 Cor. v. 20. 10 ἐμπέ, 2 Cor. vii. 4; ix. 2; xii. 5.
11 ἐμπέ, 2 Cor. xii. 10. 12 ἀπε, 1 Cor. i. 4. 13 Jude 15.
14 ῥῆθος ἀντὶ καλ ῥῆθος ὁ. 
can be expressed by the words, *on account of sins*, or *for sins*. The end for which will be the man; but the end for sake of which is not the sins, but the very opposite of sins, the [des) destruction or remission of sins. Who ever said that a drug was taken on account of death when meaning to say, to avert death? But it is said to be taken on account of disease in this sense, that disease drives us to it. It follows, therefore, that in these passages the impulsive cause should be understood. Therefore, as the Hebrew particle נ denotes the antecedent or impulsive cause, the passage from Isaiah cannot be translated better or more in accordance with Scripture than thus: “He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities.” What else can be the meaning of Rom. vi. 10; “Christ died ἁμαρτία,” than that he died on account of sin?

But though the impulsive cause may be of many kinds, in this place it must be taken as meritorious. For we are considering the subject of punishment, as we shall presently show. Sins are a cause of punishment only by way of desert. No one can show that the words, *on account of sins*, especially when they are connected with sufferings, are employed in the sacred writings in any other sense than this of desert. The contrary is not proved by the passage, “God shall give Israel up because of the sins of Jeroboam”; for “the sins of Jeroboam” signify, in that place, the very genus of sin, viz. idolatry, which Jeroboam had originated among the people; and this is shown by the explanation which follows: “With which he sinned, and with which he made Israel to sin.”

This interpretation is more correct than that advanced by Socinus: “Who did sin, and made Israel to sin.” These sins, therefore, in which Jeroboam was author, the

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1 Ps. xxxvi. 9, et passim.
2 Isa. iii. 5 [Grot. — Dolores afflictur ob defectiones nostras, atteritur ob iniquitates nostras.] Rom. vi. 10 [διὰ δικαιοσῦνης τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐπάθων ἠμᾶς.]
3 1 Kings xiv. 16.
4 [Auctor fuerat.]
5 [Heb. ἁμαρτίαν ἔχων ἔχετο δικαιοσύνην τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἔχετο δικαιοσύνην.] Our version as Soc.].
people imitators, deserved this punishment of giving up. I will not now dwell upon the testimony of the sacred writings that the imitators of another's sin suffer punishment deservedly, not only on account of their own, but also others' sins. This is so plain that Socinus¹ is himself compelled to confess that one man may be punished on account of another man's sins provided he is a participator in the other's fault. But the passage² which Socinus quotes clearly makes against him. "When thou with rebukes dost correct man for iniquity, thou makest his beauty to consume away like a moth." That is, if thou shouldest determine to punish any one as much as his sin deserves, truly that man's life would be a living death.³ For he wishes by this reason to excite God's pity. So elsewhere:⁴ "If thou shouldest mark iniquities (that is, rigidly exact their punishment) who shall stand (or sustain it)?"

It remains, therefore, unshaken that the phrase on account of sins, denotes the impulsive, and that too, the meritorious cause. For, as to Socinus's endeavor to escape by saying that it is sufficient for the integrity of the phrase that an occasion of any kind should be indicated; this, in the first place, is opposed to his own position. For he has said that the word for is never referred to the impulsive, but always to the final cause. An occasion cannot be a final cause. If it deserves to be called a cause at all, it should be referred to the impulsive cause. And again, such an exposition of the words for sins and on account of sins is directly contrary to the usage of Scripture, and common speech as well.

We see from this how incorrect it is for Socinus to say that beyond the will of God and of Christ, no antecedent cause of the death of Christ can be found. This is evidently opposed to the words of Paul: "If righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain."⁵ Here the word ὀμηδή, as Socinus concedes,⁶ signifies without cause, but it should be added, without antecedent cause, which is the origi-

¹ H. 7; iii. 10. ² Ps. xxxix. 11. ³ [Ipsa vita vitalis non est.] ⁴ Ps. cxxx. 3. ⁵ ὀμηδή, Gal. ii. 21. ⁶ H. 34.
nal and most frequent sense of this word. It is derived from the word δώρον, which signifies gift, that is, such a giving as has an antecedent cause of right. Hence, it has been gradually transferred to other matters also in which there is no antecedent cause. So David speaking of his enemies, says: 1 "They hate me without a cause;" 2 that is, though I have given them no cause of hate. Applying this passage to himself our Saviour says: 3 "They hated me without a cause;" 4 evidently in the same sense. 5

The very passage of Paul which we are considering, does not permit us to understand any other than an antecedent cause. For the cause which Socinus invents, viz. that those who amend their lives may be assured of the remission of their sins, — this as a final cause, relates to the preaching, and to the resurrection, but not to death. Socinus saw this, and maintained that by the word death here Christ is referred to, and that preaching and the resurrection are also included. But this is a distortion of the meaning of Paul. For in maintaining that Christ did not die without cause, Paul means to say that there was some peculiar cause for the death of Christ. Otherwise he could have preached for a certain cause, and for a certain cause have been rewarded (for according to Socinus this is the only object of the resurrection), and yet not have died. We may also see that Paul has exclusive reference to the death of Christ from the preceding context: "Who gave himself for me." For this giving everywhere in Scripture designates death. Calling this the grace of God, Paul declares that he neither spurns it nor rejects it, and immediately assigns as the cause: "For if righteousness came by the law, then Christ is dead in vain;" pointing out, on the contrary, that the peculiar reason why Christ gave himself up and died was this, that we were not just by the law, but sentenced to punishment. Therefore, our transgression of the law, 7 is the antecedent cause of the death of Christ.

1 Ps. xxxv. 19.  
2 δώρον.  
3 John xv. 25.  
4 εὐδοκέων.  
5 δώρον is always explained in Scripture like προ, Kimchi. Paginus: a particle excluding price, cause, or merit.  
6 Hi. 24.  
7 δοῦλος.
A SECOND EFFICIENT CAUSE, and that too a willing cause, is Christ himself. "I lay down my life," says Christ, "no man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself." 1 "Christ gave himself for me," "for the church." 2

The cause which moved Christ was his own love for man." 8 "This is my commandment," he says, "that ye love one another, as I have loved you. Greater love hath no man than this that a man lay down his life for his friends. Ye are my friends." 4 "By the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me." 5 "That loved us and washed us from our sins in his own blood." 6 "Christ hath loved us, and hath given himself for us an offering." 7 "Christ loved the church, and gave himself for it." 8

THE MATTER is the tortures antecedent to death, and especially the death itself.

Isaiah 9 employed the powerful word ἁμαρτία 10 to designate [tortures] the tortures, and Peter 11 the word μόλυνσις. 10 So, also, we find mention of the cross where this argument is discussed: "That he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross." 12 "Having made peace through the blood of his cross." 13 But we must not understand by the word "tortures" pains of body only, but rather principally the sufferings of the mind, 14 with especial reference to which Christ exclaims that he is forsaken of God.

As another part of the matter, death is presented in many passages. "I lay down my life." 15 "Reconciled through death." 16 "By means of death for the redemption of the transgressions." 17

This death is considered in the sacred writings with especial reference to two qualities, as bloody and as ignominious. The quality of bloody death is denoted by the word

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1 John x. 17, 18.  2 Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 2, 25.  3 ἁμαρτία.  4 John xv. 12-14.  5 Gal. ii. 20.  6 Rev. i. 5.  7 Eph. v. 2.  8 Eph. v. 25.  9 Isa. lxi. 5.  10 discolored stripe.  11 1 Pet. ii. 24.  12 Eph. ii. 16.  13 Col. i. 20.  14 The Evangelists designate these by the words ἀνεπιστήμη [Matt. xxvi. 37], ἡθοματική [Mark xiv. 33], ἀδικίαν [Matt. xxvi. 37 and Mark xiv. 33].  15 John x. 18.  16 Col. i. 21, 22.  17 Heb. ix. 15.
blood. "This my blood of the New Testament which is shed for many for the remission of sins." 1 "God purchased the church with his own blood." 2 God set forth Christ "to be a propitiation through faith in his blood." 3 "Justified by his blood." 4 "We have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins." 5 "Ye who sometimes were far off are made nigh by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace." 6 "We have redemption through his blood." 7 "Having made peace through the blood of his cross." 8 "Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us." 9 "Without shedding of blood is no remission." 10 "Ye are come to the blood of sprinkling, that speaketh better things than that of Abel." 11 "Unto sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ." 12 "The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin." 13 "Christ washed us from our sins in his own blood." 14

But the second quality of ignominy is denoted by the very word cross (for in that punishment there is the greatest ignominy; whence it is said: "He endured the cross, despising the shame" 15), and by the word despised, which Isaiah 16 employs.

At this point we may observe, in passing, not only that death and the cross and blood are mentioned in the passages now produced, and others of similar character, treating solely or chiefly of the remission of sins, but that in many others the apostles declare that they know nothing, teach nothing, except Jesus Christ and him crucified. 17 Therefore the gospel itself is called by them the preaching of the cross. 18

Note also that Christ instituted the most holy rite of his supper not specially as a memorial of his life or resurrection,
but of his death and shed blood. These things, so often repeated, show that some peculiar and extraordinary effect must be ascribed to this death and blood. But Socinus cannot do this. For an example of holiness was exhibited by the whole life of Christ, rather than his death, which was completed in a brief moment. The confirmation of the promise of a heavenly life consisted peculiarly in the resurrection of Christ, to which death bears only the relation of a means. So that with reference to this the Scripture ought to speak of the resurrection, and not of death, or, at least, not so often, and with the addition of marks of emphasis.

Socinus himself, laboring to show that the way of salvation was confirmed by the shedding of blood, when he had rejected the true cause, which we defend, could substitute no other probable cause of that confirmation; nor bring any true distinction upon which it should be ascribed to the death of Christ alone, and not also to that of other martyrs. But he will never be able to explain how Christ by shedding his blood put God under obligation to us (which he concedes to be true in some sense), if God has promised nothing on account of the shedding of blood.

The Form is a perfect suffering of the penalty of our sins. This Socinus stiffly denies. We will, therefore, give a brief proof of it.

The Hebrews have no phrase in more frequent use to express that which is expressed in Latin by poenas pendere, than to bear sin. This is like the Latin expression huere delicta, that is, suffer the punishment of crimes. If any one neglects to point out a blasphemer, “then he shall bear his iniquity.” “He hath uncovered his sister’s nakedness; he shall bear his iniquity.” So expiatory victims are said to bear the iniquities of those who offer them, because their blood is for a human life. These words are found separately, as well as in connection, in the same sense. Thus we have “to bear the judgment”; “to bear ini-

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1 1 Cor. xi. 26. 2 i. 3. 3 i. 8. 4 iii. 9; ii. 4.
6 Gen. xliii. 9; xlv. 39. 6 Lev. v. 1. 7 Lev. xx. 17.
4 Lev. x. 17. 9 Lev. xvii. 11. 10 Παρασκευή το κρύμα, Gal. v. 10.
quity”;¹ “some mischief will come upon us,” that is, punishment for mischief.² In the same sense, evidently, Peter said that Christ bore up our sins in his own body upon the tree.³ He might have employed the word ἰδίωτα; but because he wished to indicate at the same time that he ascended upon the cross, he said ἀντίφερεν, that is, bore by going up. The phrase employed is not weakened, but rather intensified, by this addition. The Syriac has it: “bore and made to ascend.” Socinus, in order to weaken the force of this passage says, first, that ἀντίφερεν signifies bore away. This, however, is contrary to the nature and use of the word. For the particle ἀνά does not allow this interpretation, nor has any Greek writer so employed the word. In the New Testament, also, it nowhere occurs in that sense, but signifies either to bear up⁴ or to lead up.⁵ And because they used to bear up the victims upon a high place, that is, upon an altar, so the victims are said to be borne up.⁶ From this fact Christ is said to have borne himself up,⁷ and we are said to bear up praises or spiritual sacrifices.⁸

One passage only does Socinus quote:⁹ “So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many; and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation.”¹⁰ In this passage he supposes that to bear (up) sins¹¹ is the same as to bear away, but improperly, and without example, and when the sense of the passage does not demand it. For the two comings of Christ are contrasted with one another; the first when he bore our sins, the other when he is to come without sin,¹² that is, not weighed down, not burdened by any sins, but free and secure from them.

The contrasted members are not to be without sin, and to bear away sins; but to be without sin, and to be burdened with sins. Hence it appears that in the passage from Hebrews ἀνερεσκεῖν is either to bear up, that is to say, upon the cross, as in the passage from Peter,¹ or simply to endure.² ἀναφέρειν, therefore, means to bear, not to bear away. This is shown by the context. Peter is speaking not of any benefit of Christ, but of his perfect patience. This is exhibited not in bearing away, but in bearing. Socinus's remark that the following words, "that we being dead to sins should live to righteousness," are not sufficiently consistent with this sense in which Christ is said to have borne our sins, is not well founded. For, manifestly, Peter shows that Christ has borne our sins in such a way as to liberate us thereby from punishment. Accordingly, he adds immediately: "by whose stripes ye were healed." But these things are perfectly consistent. If Christ suffered such severities that ye might obtain the pardon of your sins, having indeed obtained it by faith, ye ought to beware of sinning in the future. "That he would grant unto us that we, being delivered out of the hands of our enemies, might serve him without fear in holiness and righteousness."³ "Behold, thou art made whole; sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto thee."⁴ "For ye are bought with a price; therefore glorify God in your body."⁵ Nor has Paul any other object in the seventh of Romans and following than to show that we ought to be aroused by the great benefits of God and Christ to live holy.⁶

¹ This is an appropriate sense, because here also allusion is made to the sacrifices. But the cross was, so to speak, an altar. ἔκτος in Moses's writings is the same as ἀναφέρειν, in which is involved the force of ἐκαίνιον. Kimchi explains ἐκαίνιον, to suspend (whence Syr. ἐκαίνιον, ἀναφέρειν) by ἐκαίνιον, to lift up. See his notes on John iii. 14, and xii. 32.
² Thus, καθότου ἀναφέρειν.
³ John v. 14. ⁴ 1 Cor. vi. 90. ⁵ Luke i. 74, 75. ⁶ Isa. liii. 11.
shall bear their iniquities.”¹ The Hebrew word יַע signifies iniquity, and sometimes the punishment of iniquity.² The word בָּשָׂס is to sustain, to bear; but whenever it is connected with the word sin or iniquity, in every language, and especially in Hebraism, it signifies to bear punishment. For בָּשָׂס, to be sure, sometimes signifies to bear away, but בָּשָׂס, never. The meaning of this passage is, therefore, evidently this,—that Christ will bear the punishment of those who are justified. The phrase admits of no other interpretation.

It is no objection that this bearing of iniquity seems to be put by the prophet after the resurrection. For to the glory of Christ the prophet in a kind of parallelism opposes his antecedent sufferings, now in natural, now in inverted order, as when we proceed from effect to cause. Thus, after speaking of eternal duration, he goes on to speak of cutting off and being stricken.³ Then,⁴ after bruising and grief and offering, seed, days prolonged, and prosperity are mentioned. With these are connected liberation from suffering and the justifying of many. Again the prophet returns to punishment borne for sins, and adds: “He shall divide the spoil,” that is, because he surrendered himself to death, and was numbered with the transgressors. He who bore the sins of many ought to have the right of interceding for them.⁵

Socinus remarks that even this word בָּשָׂס, though connected with sin, does not always include imputation, but that it is sufficient if it designates the affliction of one person for any reason connected with another’s act, no matter what. But he proves this by no other example, neither does Scripture ever speak in this way. Moreover, even the Greek and Latin authors, when they use this phrase, always include imputation.

To strengthen this exception, Socinus cites a passage of Jeremiah,⁷ which runs thus: “Our fathers have sinned and are not, and we have borne their iniquities.” He will not

¹ On this whole passage of Isaiah see Origen, I against Celsus.
² Heb. בָּשָׂס, מָשָׂס יַע.
³ vs. 8.
⁴ vs. 10.
⁵ vs. 11.
⁶ vs. 12.
⁷ Lam. v. 7.
admit that any imputation is here taught. But with what argument does he prove that the phrase means something else here than in all the other passages in which it is found? Socinus himself is compelled to confess that when the sons follow in the footsteps of their fathers, not only their own, but their father's, sins are imputed to them. For this is the plain word of God. Moreover, that those of whom Jeremiah is speaking were like their parents, is shown by the following context: "Woe unto us that we have sinned." Nor is this foreign to the design of Jeremiah. For to magnify the misery of those who were then living, he says that the punishment of their own sins and the sins of their ancestors re­ounded to them; and that on this account their lot was much harder than that of their parents, who, equally guilty, had yet departed from life before those exceedingly bitter punishments, heaped together, as it were, in the treasury of divine wrath, were at length simultaneously poured forth.

But even if the signification of the words to bear sins in the sacred writings were doubtful, yet in this passage of Isaiah, and that of Peter also, the joint mention of the sufferings of Christ and of our liberation, would make the interpretation certain. For to bear sins by suffering, and in such a way as to liberate others thereby, can only mean to receive another's punishment. In the same passage we have: "God cast upon him, or smote him with, the punishment of us all. It is exacted, and he is himself afflicted." Here Socinus leaves no stone unturned to wrest away from the words their genuine sense, and invents a new interpretation: "God met through him (or with him) the iniquity of us all." But the Hebrew word רָצִּוֵּי, of that conjugation which denotes not single but double action, openly contradicts it. Therefore, since רָצִּוֵּי properly signifies to meet, it follows that רָצִּוֵּי.
is to make to meet, and metaphorically to intercede, for an intercessor, as it were, interposes his prayers. To intercede is not the meaning here; for then God would be said to have interceded for Christ, for that is the signification of the word when followed by the particle \( \pi \).\textsuperscript{1} Caused to intercede is not appropriate here, because of \( \varepsilon \nu \gamma \sigma \iota \wbar \pi \tau \nu \zeta \sigma , \) upon him, since otherwise we ought to have made him to intercede, and because the immediate context, preceding and following, relates to affliction, and not intercession. Therefore the only admissible sense of these words is the following: “God made him to meet, i.e. cast upon, caused to smite, upon him the sin of us all. Sin is exacted (i.e. according to Scripture phrase, the punishment of sin), and he himself is afflicted.”\textsuperscript{7}

At this point Socinus brings up against us the passage\textsuperscript{2} where sins are said to be laid upon the expiatory goat, and the goat himself is said to bear the sins of the people into the desert solitude. He thinks that nothing can be plainer than that this goat cannot be said in any way to have borne punishment for the sins of the people; but with what warrant he assumes this I do not see. For punishment, taken generally, certainly falls even upon brutes. “Your blood of your lives will I require: at the hand of every beast will I require it.”\textsuperscript{3} “If an ox gore a man or a woman that they die, then the ox shall be surely stoned.”\textsuperscript{4} “If a man lie with a beast, he shall surely be put to death, and ye shall slay the beast.”\textsuperscript{5} “I will not again curse the ground any more for man’s sake.”\textsuperscript{6}

Nor is the objection of Socinus true, that the scapegoat\textsuperscript{7} was not customarily killed; but for the remission of sins the shedding of blood, or death, was required. For, although the Scriptures do not clearly teach, the Hebrew interpreters agree, that this very goat was thrown down from a high place in the desert, and so done to death. But if it were not so, what other end was threatened by that driving away to desert solitudes than a death by no means natural, but either by hunger, or the rending of wild beasts?

\textsuperscript{1} Jer. xv. 11. \textsuperscript{2} Lev. xvi. 21, 22. \textsuperscript{3} Gen. ix. 5. \\
\textsuperscript{4} Ex. xxii. 28. \textsuperscript{5} Lev. xx. 15. \textsuperscript{6} Gen. viii. 21. \textsuperscript{7} Lev. xix. 27.
We ought also to notice Isaiah's word וְזֵקַנְתָּה. It is perfectly certain that וְזֵקַנְתָּהproperly signifies to exact. But metaphorically it is employed for to oppress. The passive is, accordingly, either to be oppressed or to be exacted. To be oppressed is not appropriate here, because וְזֵקַנְתָּה follows in the same comma; “and he himself is afflicted.” From this it appears that the verb is referred to another noun than that with which afflicted agrees. It would make no sense if one should say of the same person, He is oppressed and he is afflicted. Consequently this word is properly taken in the sense it is exacted, and refers to the noun next antecedent, which is sin. But to exact sin is the same, and must be the same, as to exact the punishment of sin. Therefore the exaction of punishment is connected with the affliction of Christ.

In the same prophet had preceded: "The chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed." In Hebrew the word for chastisement is נְסָטְרָה. This word signifies not an affliction of any sort whatsoever, but that which has the character of a penalty, whether of the nature of an example or of a warning. Hence it came to pass that by a bold figure every kind of warning was denoted by נְסָטְרָה. But since the meaning warning is out of place in connection with Christ, — especially since Isaiah is treating of afflictions, including death, — we must understand such an affliction as bears with it an example. For it is not possible to find a case where the Hebrew word has no reference to fault. True, among the Hebrews any kind of good may be meant by the word peace. But in this case, if we understand from the subject-matter the good of impunity, the punishment of Christ and our impunity will appear to form the best antithesis. Nothing, however, prevents us from understanding reconciliation by the word peace, even when no mention has been made of enmity, since both the nature of the case

1 Sin, not Shin. 2 Cf. 2 Kings xxiii. 35 and Zech. ix. 8. 3 Isa. liii. 5. 4 таραθευματικ or νοθευματικ. By these words Taurus the philosopher once aptly distinguished the classes of punishment. 5 κατάχρωσις. 6 таραθευμα.
and the following words of the prophet indicate that this had preceded. The angels did not mention enmity when they proclaimed that peace was to come upon earth, nor the apostle when he said that we had peace with God. But as the Hebrews employ sin for punishment, so they also [201] call him who suffered the punishment, sin; as also the Latins take piaculum now for the crime, now for him who pays the penalty of the crime. Hence the Scripture calls the expiatory victim for sin, sin. Therefore, following this form of speech, Isaiah said of Christ: "He made his soul sin," i.e. He exposed his soul to the punishment of sins. In the same way, Paul: "For he hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." In both members in Paul the adjunct appears to be taken for the subject.

Socinus, to escape the authority of the Pauline passage, supposes that by the word sin should be understood a man regarded by men as a sinner; in the first place without warrant, for there is no example of such a use of either the Greek or the Hebrew word; again, Paul attributes to God the act of making Christ sin. But certainly though the Jews and others regarded Christ as a criminal and a malefactor, God was not in any way the author thereof. On the contrary, by the voice from heaven, and by producing miracles, he testified to all men of the innocence of Christ. Again, this new interpretation of Socinus cannot be adapted to the words of Isaiah which contain a similar phrase. For what Paul says God did, Isaiah ascribes to Christ, that doubtless he made his soul sin, or that he made himself sin. Besides, Paul contrasts sin and righteousness. "We have been made the righteousness of God, i.e. we have been justified or liberated from divine punishment. But that this might be done, Christ was made sin, i.e. suffered the divine punishment. Another antithesis is to be observed in the

3 In addition to the passage already adduced, see Zech. xiv. 19; Gen. iv. 13.
4 Lev. iv. 3, 29; v. 6; Ps. xl. 6.  5 Isa. liii. 10, Hab. ἱσόν ζοῦν ἀνήθη
6 2 Cor. v. 21.  7 I. 8.

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words of Paul: "Him who knew no sin," i.e. who did not deserve punishment; "God made sin," i.e. would have him bear punishment. Christ was innocent not only before human, but also divine law. Therefore the force of the antithesis requires that he should also bear the punishment of the divine law. Furthermore, that the innocent are evilly esteemed by evil men is an every-day matter. But the apostle is here noting something exceptional. Can it be anything else than that God has inflicted punishment upon the undeserving?

Not much different from the preceding is the well-known passage of Paul: "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, cursed is every one that hangeth upon a tree; that the blessing of Abraham might come upon the Gentiles through Jesus Christ." There is the less need here of being in perplexity as to Paul’s meaning when he says that Christ is made a curse or execution, since he interprets himself, and by alleging Moses as the author of his remark, shows that by κατάρα he understands ἐπικατάρατος. For the ἐπικατάρατος, according to the interpretation of Paul himself, is one who is under a curse. "Curse," says Socinus, "signifies in this place the punishment of a curse," which is true. In many places curse signifies a punishment proceeding from the sanction of the law. And in this place the mention of the law which is added forbids us to understand curse otherwise. Moreover, even Socinus confesses that this curse in the case of Christ was the cross. Therefore the cross of Christ had the character of a punishment. This is what we said. Perhaps Socinus will admit that the cross was punishment because it was imposed upon Christ by Pilate, the judge, by way of punishment. But this does not give the complete meaning of Paul. For to prove that Christ was made liable to punishment he quotes Moses, who plainly says that those who are lifted up (of course in accordance with the divine law) are cursed by God. Therefore, also, when

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1 ἐπικατάρατος κατάρα.
2 2 Pet. ii. 14; Matt. xxv. 41.
3 ii. 1.
4 ἐπικατάρατος τῆς θεότητος. See upon this passage of Moses, Maimus on Josh. ch. 2.
Paul quotes Moses, and applies these expressions to Christ, the same word must be supplied, as if he had said that Christ was made cursed by God; i.e. liable to a punishment imposed by God, and ignominious in the extreme. For when the apostles say that the passion of Christ was to benefit us, they do not by this refer to the acts of men, but to the act of God himself, as is evident from many of the passages already adduced.

To all these things we may add also this; that death, i.e. the destruction of that person which the body and soul constitute, since it is inflicted by God, always has some reference to punishment. As the Hebrews say, without sin there is no death. Not that it is not right for God to inflict it upon a man otherwise (for he is Lord of the creature), but that it has seemed best to his goodness to do differently.

That the state of this particular controversy may be rightly understood: we do not deny that man when he was formed was earthy, since he possessed a certain vital force, but not a quickening force; and especially not that the condition of his body was such that, if God did not sustain it, it would perish. But we maintain that by divine decree he would not have died if he had remained in innocence. This is proved by the very nobility and eminence of this creature, so that it alone is said to be formed in the image of God, i.e. possessed of a mind and free-will, which is the foundation of its empire over other creatures. That cannot be lord of other things which is not lord of its own actions. This superiority to other things is an argument that something more than temporary advantage was contemplated in the creation of man. Athenagoras says: "God did not create us like sheep and oxen, incidentally, and that we might perish and be destroyed."

1 τῷ θεῷ ἐνυπατρητοῖς. 2 Against Soc. iii. 7, 8, and 9.
3 χοίχος. 4 So Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 45, 46.
5 ὑπ. Theophilus ad Autol., Book 2.—Arnob. adv. gentes.—Justin. Resp. ad Orthodox. Quest. 32.
6 ὃς γὰρ ἦμι ὡς πρεσβεία ἡ ὑποξύγων, τὰραγμ, καὶ ἡ ἀπολογισμοὶ καὶ ἐφανερωτικὰν ἐκπλασεν ἐς Θεός.
God created us "that when created we might individually live and be preserved." ¹ A little further: ² "That when created we might ourselves live; yet not with such a life as should be kindled for a short time, and then soon be extinguished forever." But what is clearer than the word of God, ³ "If thou eatest thou shalt die"? This refers to the act of death whether violent or without violence. Therefore the death of man would not have come to pass unless the condition of sin had been fulfilled. Equally clear and general is the following passage of Paul's: ⁴ "The wages," i.e. the punishment, "of sin is death." He had said before, "Death by sin, and so death passed upon all men." "All men," he says. He is therefore speaking of the common end of the whole human race. "By man" therefore, i.e. by the act of man, "came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die (as many as do die), even so in Christ shall all be made alive" (as many as shall be made alive). ⁵ Who that looks at the mere words does not see that this sentence in Corinthians corresponds exactly to that in Romans? He is therefore speaking of death which is common to the posterity of Adam, and from which they rise who do rise. Wherefore also we say, when this passage is compared with that in Romans, that Paul is here treating of Adam as a sinner. For as he says here "by man," he says there "by sin." The animal condition of Adam is touched upon by the apostle in twenty or more verses below, plainly for another purpose; for in this passage death is opposed to resurrection, but in that the qualities of the originally created and then of the resuscitated body are compared with one another. Of these the former had, by the gift of God, in conjunction with the natural possibility of dying, the possibility also of living; but the latter will have life in itself in such a way that there will be for it no natural possibility of dying.

¹ Gen. ii. 17. ² Rom. vi. 23. ³ Rom. v. 12. ⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 11, 22.
I cannot forbear to add here a remarkable passage of the distinguished writer of the Book of Wisdom, which, though not in the Hebrew canon, has notwithstanding a venerable antiquity, and has always been highly prized by Christians. It is as follows: 1 "God made not death; neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living. For he created all things, that they might have their being; and the generations of the world were healthful; and there is no poison of destruction in them, nor the kingdom of death upon the earth. (For righteousness is immortal.) But ungodly men, with their works and words, called it to them; for when they thought to have it their friend, they consumed to nought, and made a covenant with it, because they are worthy to take part with it." A little way on: 2 "God created man to be immortal, and made him to be an image of his peculiar nature. Nevertheless, through envy of the devil, came death into the world; and they that do hold of his side do find it." Here death, which is said not to have been created nor chosen by God, that is, with a choice preceding the sin, means every kind of death. This is shown by the contrast with "immortality," in the hope of which man is said to have been formed, and this hope is not obscurely shown to have been a part of that divine image, or, at least, a consequence of it. But immortality excludes all death, whether violent or not violent. As the apostle said that death entered by man and by sin, this writer had said no less truly that death entered by the envy of the devil. All these expressions point to this fact, that the first sin of man was committed at the suggestion of the devil. It is not a valid objection that this author is here speaking of a certain special

1 i. 13-16. Ὁ θεὸς ἄνευν εἰκὼν ἔσο̂λη, οὗτος ὁρητει ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ σάντων. ἐκ τούτων εἰς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὰ πάντα, καὶ σωθήσονται γενόσεις τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῶν φάραμαν ἔλεος, οὓς ἠθέναν βασιλεῖς ἐν τῇ γῇ. ἐκακουμένοι δὲ ἀδελφοὶ ἀυτῶν. ἐξελείης ἐν τῶν χερσὶ καὶ τῶν λόγων παρεκκλήσαντο αὐτῶν, φίλου ἐγγίζομεν ἀυτῶν ἐτάσκωσιν, καὶ συνθέσθαι ἑαυτὸν πρὸς αὐτόν, ὃς ἤδεικε εἰς τῆς ἑκάστου μερίδος ἑνα. 2 ii. 23, 24. Ὁ θεὸς ἐκτὸς θρόνον ἐν θαραχαὶ, καὶ εἰς χειρὶς ἑαυτοῦ ἑκάστου ἐκακωσε αὐτῶν. Φθορὰ δὲ διαβάλως ἀτρασκεῖ εἰσὶν ἕν τῶν κόσμων. Παρεκκλησι ἐν αὐτῶν ἐν τῆς ἑκάστου μερίδος ἑνα.
effect of death upon the wicked. For death having entered by the first sin, and obtained rule over all men, acquires a certain peculiar power by the grave and continued sins of individual men. In this sense sin is said to be the sting of death.\(^1\) In this way those to whom after death all approach to a better life is precluded, are deservedly styled the allies of death, or the captives and property of death.

It would be very easy to show, if it were pertinent, that this has been the constant opinion of ancient Jews and Christians, that the death of man, of any kind whatever, is the punishment of sin. Not improperly, therefore, did the Christian emperors disapprove most of all of that dogma of Pelagius and Celestius in which they said that death did not arise from the ensnarements of sin, but that an inward law of our immutable constitution demanded it.

To sum up what has been already said: since the Scripture says that Christ was chastised by God, i.e. punished; that Christ bore our sins, i.e. the punishment of sins; was made sin, i.e. was subjected to the penalty of sins; was made a curse with God, or was exposed to the curse, that is, the penalty of the law; since, moreover, the very suffering of Christ, full of tortures, bloody, ignominious, is most appropriate matter of punishment; since, again, the Scripture says that these were inflicted on him by God on account of our sins, i.e. our sins so deserving; since death itself is said to be the wages, i.e. the punishment of sin; certainly it can by no means be doubted that with reference to God the suffering and death of Christ had the character of a punishment. Nor can we listen to the interpretations of Socinus, which depart from the perpetual use of the words without authority, especially when no reason prevents us from retaining the received meaning of the words, as will be made plain below. There is, therefore, a punishment, in God actively, in Christ passively. Yet in the passion of Christ there is also a certain action, viz. the voluntary endurance of penal suffering.

\(^1\) 1 Cor. xv. 56.
tention of God and Christ, which, proposed in the act, may also be said to have been effected, is two-fold; namely, the exhibition of the divine justice, and the remission of sins with respect to us, i.e. our exemption from punishment. For if you take the exaction of punishment impersonally, its end is the exhibition of the divine justice; but if personally, i.e. why was Christ punished, the end is that we might be freed from punishment.

_The former end_ is indicated by Paul when he says of Christ,¹ "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation in his blood to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God." Then he adds, repeating almost the same words: "To declare, I say, at this time his righteousness, that he might be just and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." Here, in close connection with the blood, i.e. the bloody death, stands the end, "to declare his righteousness."²

By the expression "righteousness of God" is not to be understood that righteousness which God works in us, or which he imputes to us, but that which is in God.¹ For he proceeds: "That he might be just," i.e. appear to be just. This justice of God, i.e. rectitude, for different objects has different effects.³ With reference to the good or evil deeds of a creature its effect, among other things, is retribution,⁴ with reference to which Paul said;⁵ "It is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you." In another place: "Every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward."⁶ And [see] the following: "Whose damnation is just."⁷ The Syriac has it: "Whose condemnation is reserved for justice." So also, "day of wrath,"⁸ and "day of just judgment"⁹ are the same.¹⁰ It is said that the final judgment will be "in equity."¹¹

¹ Rom. iii. 25, 26. ² ἀναθέτετο τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ. ³ ἐν ἐνδειξίᾳ τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ. ⁴ ἀπαντάσεως. ⁵ 2 Thess. i. 6, δίκαιον ἔχει αὐτὸν ἀπαντάσεως τοῖς θείοις θείοις. ⁶ Heb. ii. 2. ⁷ Rom. iii. 8. ⁸ ἡμέρα ἀπειθής. ⁹ ἡμέρα δικαιοσύνης. ¹⁰ Rom. iii. 8. ¹¹ Acts xvii. 31. ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ.
Elsewhere, "to judge in equity" is to take severe vengeance which is shown by the additional words, "make war," and much more by those that follow a little after: "And out of his mouth goeth a sharp sword, that with it he should smite the nations; and he shall rule them with a rod of iron; and he treadeth the wine-press of the fierceness and wrath of Almighty God." So both God is said to be just, and his punishments to be just, because he severely punishes sin. Vengeance is accordingly the name given now to the punitive justice of God, and now to the punishment inflicted by it. The judgment of God is explained by Paul to be this: that they who commit, or approve evil things, are worthy of death. Conjugate to these are "revenger" and "vengeance," the force of which is explained by the word "repay." It is true that by the word justice is frequently meant veracity, frequently also equity. But since by this word, as has already been shown by many examples, that attribute of God is indicated which moves him to punish sin, and which is exhibited in this punishment of sin, we say that this is the proper signification of our passage. Different ages are set in opposition; e.g. the ages before Christ and that of Christ. To the former is attributed the passing over of sins, which is also explained by the word "forbearance." πάρεσε does not mean remission, but passing over, to which ἀνωτέρω, forbearance, is rightly added. By this word the Greeks designate a truce, because by it war was for a time kept in check. To this passing over and checking is opposed such a demonstration of justice that by it God may be, i.e. may appear, just. Once, when God passed over very many sins unpunished, his retributive justice did not sufficiently appear. At length, therefore, he showed how he was a just...
retributor when he determined that his own Son for this cause should shed his blood to become a propitiation for the human race, and to redeem all those who had ever believed, or should ever believe, in God. So the apostle has put the open demonstration in close connection with the grace, i.e. the divine goodness which is bestowed upon creatures, and with the justice of him who is the guardian of right order and also of retribution. Certainly the very word blood, the word propitiation, and even redemption, show that he is not engaged here with the simple testimony to goodness. He has also connected impietration with application. The impietration is through the blood; the application through faith. Rightly is that justice, of which we are treating, said to be made manifest through faith; that faith, namely, by which the blood of Christ is believed to have been shed to propitiate God; which faith entirely excludes all glory in works, all trust in the law.

This end, viz. the exhibition of the divine justice, is also rightly inferred from the form of the transaction of which we treat. For the end of punishment is the exhibition of retributive justice concerning sins, also upon antecedent cause, which we have above shown to be meritorious. But the impelling cause of an action cannot be meritorious except also the end be to make retribution.

The second end, as we have said, is our exemption from punishment. Of this Paul has significantly said: "Being justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath." "The wrath of God" sometimes signifies, as Socinus also recognizes, a desire (if one should so speak) of punishing; but frequently the punishment itself. For this reason it is explained by the word destruction. Hence the law is said "to work wrath," i.e. to prepare punishment. "To bring wrath upon" is to punish. The magistrate is said to be a revenger appointed against evil doers "unto wrath," i.e. to inflict pun-
ishment; and it is said that he must be obeyed, not only "on account of wrath," i.e. through fear of punishment, but also for conscience's sake. But impunity is the opposite of punishment. Punishment is eternal death, or detention under death, whose minister is the devil. Who, moreover, having the power of death, is said to have been destroyed by death; that of Christ. For the mention of liberation from fear of death, which follows, shows that the passage relates to the impetration of pardon, rather than to the mortification of sin. Christ is called he "which delivered us from the wrath to come."

This impunity, in the most common phrase of Scripture, is called remission of sins, which properly follows the death of Christ, as many passages show. For example: "This is my blood of the New Testament which is shed for many for the remission of sins." "In whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins." "Without shedding of blood is no remission." These passages explain that above quoted from Paul: "Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness, that he might be just and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." Here, with many words of the same signification, he has set forth the same things. For as he has expressed the exhibition of his justice twice, and the third time added "that God might be just," that is, appear just, which pertain to the former end; so he has indicated the second end also, both by repeating the word justification, and by the word redemption. Justification, as has been remarked, frequently in the sacred writings, but especially in the Pauline epistles, signifies acquittal, which, presuming sin, consists in the remission of sins according to

1 Rom. xiii. 4.  
3 1 Thess. i. 10. ἐπεφέρετο δὲ κράτος ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπὸ τοῖς ἐρχόμενοις. 
4 Matt. xxvi. 28. 
5 Col. i. 14. 
6 Heb. ix. 22. 
7 Rom. iii. 24-26.

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the clear explanation of Paul himself. Wherefore with these passages ascribing the remission of sins to the blood of Jesus we must connect that which we just cited: "justified by his blood." Also those which ascribe the washing away of sins to blood or death. "The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin." "Unto sprinkling of the blood: [see of Jesus Christ.] "Christ washed us from our sins in his own blood." For although to wash away, to cleanse, and similar words, may signify to prevent sins either from being committed in the future, or from appearing, though committed, yet the latter interpretation is more harmonious with the expressions of Scripture. So to blot out iniquities is explained not to remember sins, and to cleanse from iniquity is shown to be the same as to forgive. To remit sins is used in the same sense as to cleanse from all iniquity. In another passage to be cleansed and to obtain remission are given as synonymous. Wherefore even Socinus is compelled to confess, when commenting upon the Revelation where cleansing is attributed to the blood, that it is more correct to understand liberation from punishment than the cleansing of the soul. With these connect that passage of Isaiah just quoted: "The chastisement of our peace was upon him," that is, his punishment procures for us peace with God. Of which peace the angels spake. Note also the following passage from Isaiah: "By his stripes we are healed," that is, through his punishment is our exemption from punishment.

From these testimonies it is evident that exemption from the punishment of our sins is the end of the death of Christ, and the effect of that death.

Socinus, who is not willing to admit this connection of death with the remission of sins granted to us, brings forward other modes of connecting them. How wonderfully different are they from the words and scope of the Scriptures!

1 Especially in Rom. iv. 2, 6. 2 Rom. v. 9. 3 1 John i. 7. 4 i. 2. 5 Rev. i. 5. 6 Isa. xiii. 25. 7 Jer. xxxiii. 8 ἔλεος ἑαυτῆς τὸ δίκαιον, Acts iii. 19, in the same sense. 8 1 John i. 9. ὑπὸ καθαρίσεως καὶ γίνομαι ἀμετρον, Heb. ix. 22. 9 II. 17. 10 Eccl. 2. 11 τὸ καθαρὸν. 12 Isa. liii. 5. 13 Luke ii. 14. 14 Isa. liii 5.
But I think all of them, scattered as they are over his whole book, may be reduced to these four heads.

I. That Christ, when he had preached that the remission of sins was attainable by the penitent, that he might furnish an attestation of that preaching, did not refuse death.¹

But this sense makes the death of Christ the effect of remission, rather than remission the effect of death. The existence of a thing is the cause of the attestation, not *vice versa*. But the Scripture says that we obtain remission through blood,² and that blood cleanses our sins.³ Also that the shedding of blood is something antecedent, without which there is no remission.⁴

Again, if this interpretation were correct, the martyrs also might be said to have shed their blood for the remission of sins, and we to obtain remission through their blood. The Scriptures, on the contrary, attribute this privilege to Christ alone.⁵

Again, the cause of Christ’s execution, so far as men were concerned, was not peculiarly the preaching of repentance and the remission of sins, but that he had said that God was his Father, making himself equal with God,⁶ and consequently professed that he was God.⁷ Wherefore his death furnished attestation particularly to this profession, not to the preaching of pardon.

Finally, attestation to doctrine was secured not less, but rather, even more, by the miracles of Christ than by his death. But this effect, that we have through them remission of sins, is never ascribed to miracles.¹

II. The second thing which Socinus brings forward is that Christ obtained by his death the right of bestowing remission.⁶

But Socinus himself overthrows this position, when he shows⁸ that Christ when on earth had and exercised this right. But what is mine cannot be made more mine. We must note, lest any one should think that this power of Christ had respect to penalties temporal only, and of the

¹ Socinus, i. 2. 3. ² Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14. ³ 1 John i. 7. ⁴ Heb. ix. 22. ⁵ John v. 18. ⁶ John x. 33. ⁷ 1. 6. ⁸ il. 4.
present life (a thing which Socinus hints, rather than affirms), that when Christ is said to have had the right of remitting sins upon the earth, the effect is not restricted by that addition, upon the earth, but the place of the action is emphasized. For it is also said to the apostles: 1 "Whatsoever ye shall loose on earth." To loose, here, is to declare loosed. Yet the phrase on earth designates only the place of action; for the following words are: "shall be loosed in heaven." This, therefore, was the meaning of Christ—that though acting upon the earth, yet this so exalted and heavenly right belonged to him. What excited the wonder of the apostles was that the right was given to men, that is (by enallage), to one of the number of men. So Christ himself remits the sins of the paralytic before he removes the paralysis,—the temporal punishment,—and, openly distinguishing the two rights, proves the one by the other, the invisible by the visible. Therefore, finally, Christ did not obtain by his death the right of remitting sins; and, accordingly, those passages which ascribe this effect to death are not to be applied to such a purpose. Moreover the Scripture explains the connection between death and remission by the word "propitiation," and by other similar words, which cannot be applied to the right of giving pardon.

III. The third is that in the death of Christ is proposed to us an example of patience and obedience. 8

In reply: This example pertains to sanctification and to the eternal glory which follows it, in some way, but evidently not to the remission of sins. Christ by his obedience and patience obtained no pardon for himself, for he had no sin. When Christ, therefore, is set before us to be imitated, that all persevering in the way in which he trod may come to the same goal, nothing would be more foreign to the meaning than to refer to the remission of sins. The phrases of Scripture "blood cleanses us," "through his blood we have remission" set aside this explanation.

With the remaining explanation Socinus was best pleased,
and often insists upon it as the mainstay of his cause. It is this:

IV. That the death of Christ persuades us to exercise that which is requisite to obtaining remission of sins; viz. faith, or, as Socinus himself explains it, the hope of obtaining eternal life.

But, indeed, what can be more widely removed from the truth, we ask, than that the death of a perfectly innocent man, so bloody, should of itself have power to persuade us that the greatest joys are prepared by God for those who live holily? Wherefore Socinus, seeing the absurdity of this invention, says that, to be sure, the death of Christ did not effect this, but the resurrection of Christ and those events which immediately followed his resurrection, but that death must necessarily precede.

But if the Scriptures had meant this, they would, when referring to the remission of sins, have constantly spoken of his rising, or rather his ascending, and his sitting at the right hand of God, not of death and of blood,—at least, not so often and with such significant words. So frequent and so customary connection of blood with remission indicates an effect not ordinary, but peculiar; not far remote, but near. For what are these circumlocutions of his? Remission of sins is granted only to those who live holily. Faith and the sure hope of a reward makes for holiness of life. This faith is produced by the example of Christ, who was raised from the dead on account of the holiness of his life, and glorified. This raising was preceded by death. Therefore rightly and fitly is remission said to be obtained through the death of Christ!

Is not this really that which he finds fault with in others: "Utinam ne in nemore Pelio"—? For he brings in as a cause not something in close connection, or at least removed by only a moderate interval, but something very far removed from the effect. If this were done in one passage of Scripture, it would be much less remarkable.

1 I. 5, and frequently.  
2 So says Socinus, iii. 11.  
3 Socinus, ii. 2.  
4 iii. 8.
But that in so many places the Scriptures speak as obscurely, nay, as frigidly, as this, what sane man will believe? Very different is the saying of Paul: "Christ was raised from the dead for our justification." To explain this there is no need of the long circuit of Socinus. The resurrection of Christ produces within us faith and confidence in God and Christ, to which faith is promised the forgiveness of sins. This is a series plainly shown in the Scriptures. But death is so far from producing faith, that, on the contrary, for the most part it deters men from that faith. So in preaching the gospel the apostles always set over against the ignominy of the cross and the misery of death, the resurrection. But if in speaking of death and the shedding of blood (which is commonly employed in this argument in the Scriptures, and which is not properly the cause of the resurrection, but only its antecedent) they meant the resurrection, it would be like speaking of night that men might understand day.

Besides, if death pertained to the remission of sins only on account of the resurrection which followed, how could it happen that this remission should be referred only occasionally to the resurrection, but in innumerable places to death? Add that Paul ascribes the effect of obtaining redemption to death, and that, too, separately, that is, abstracted from the resurrection and glory of Christ. For he says: "If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more being reconciled we shall be saved by his life." He contrasts death with a glorious life, and as to the former reconciliation, so to the latter preservation, is distinctly ascribed. Reconciliation is obtained for enemies through death as a sacerdotal act; the reconciled are guarded by the kingly power to which the resurrection was the path. So also the apostle has elsewhere placed reconciliation before that preaching which produces faith. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them, and hath committed unto us the word of

1 Rom. iv. 25.  2 Acts xiii. 38, 38; Rom. i. 4; x. 9.  3 Rom. v. 10.  4 [Lat. Regla virtute].  5 2 Cor. v. 19, 20.
reconciliation. Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ’s stead, be ye reconciled to God.” Here a twofold reconciliation is spoken of; the former announced by preaching, the latter caused by the preaching; the former is of impetration, the latter of application; the former previous to the preaching, the latter subsequent to the preaching. We are speaking of the former, and rightly do we deny that it can be referred to the production of faith, which is brought about by preaching.

Again, that which is believed unto salvation cannot in itself be an argument by which we are led to saving faith. For it is necessary that an argument should be different from the thing to which you wish to persuade. But this very thing, that Christ died for our sins, is put by Paul as the substance of the gospel which is believed, and by which we obtain salvation. See also the passage of John where Christ is said “to have been given,” that is, to death, “that whosoever believeth should not perish.” Its power is exerted in producing something else than belief.

If one will carefully observe, the same is not obscurely taught in the very passage of Paul which Socinus cites for the sake of strengthening his own opinion; viz. that of which we have already spoken: “Who was delivered [viz. to death] for our offences, and raised again for our justification” (or on account of justification already obtained). Since sins are an evil, but justification a good, it appears that the word for is not to be taken alike in both members. In the latter, the final cause is appropriately introduced; and that in the former the impulsive cause is meant we have, unless I am deceived, clearly shown; just as if I should say that a medicine was taken for disease and for health.

Justification, therefore, is designed as the result of the resurrection, that is, through the production of faith, as Socinus confesses. Although, for my own part, I do not know whether the resurrection is considered as an argument

1 [Lat. nudum argumentum].
2 1 Cor. xv. 1-3.
3 John iii. 16.
4 Rom. iv. 25.
5 Rom. vii. 7.
to persuade to faith, or whether it rather designates the whole glorious state of Christ, which has this end in view, among others, that the preachers of the gospel should be sent forth and their work promoted by the very plentiful influence of the Spirit, and, faith being produced in this manner, men should obtain the pardon of their sins. For Christ himself says: ¹ "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations. And lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." Previously to this, as John says, ² "the Holy Ghost was not given," that is, with such power and fulness. The cause is subjoined: "Because that Jesus was not yet glorified." Paul also says of Christ: ³ "When he ascended up on high he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men. And he gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers for the perfecting of the saints." But in whichever way you take it, it appears that some peculiar end is ascribed to the resurrection when it is distinguished from death. On the contrary, what he obtained for sins is ascribed separately to death, or to delivery to death. But it is nowhere ascribed to resurrection, and in this passage is plainly separated from the same.

Therefore, in this matter, the death of Christ must be separated both from the resurrection and from the production of faith. In those passages which derive the remission of sins from the death of Christ a certain distinct effect must be understood, which is indicated by the simplicity of the words, agreeing, as they do, with other words of Scripture which declare that Christ died a bloody death for our sins, and that the punishment of our crimes was exacted ⁴ of him. Of these things we have already treated, and, in connection with them, of those which declare not obscurely that God is appeased and reconciled to us by the blood of Christ, that his blood was given for us as a price, that Christ died in our stead, and was our expiation; of which we shall take the opportunity of treating below.

CHAPTER II.

How God should be considered in this matter: and it is shown that he should be considered as a Ruler.

The state of the controversy being known, and that doctrine upon which the faith of the church rests being established from the Scriptures, we need, in the first place, in order to dispel the objections which his reason, or, to speak more properly, his abuse of reason, has dictated to Socinus, to understand what part, or what office, God occupies in the matter of which we treat.

Socinus confesses that we are treating of liberation from punishment. We add that we also are speaking of the infliction of punishment. From this it follows that in all this subject God must be treated as a Ruler. For to inflict punishment, or to liberate any one from punishment whom you can punish (which the Scripture calls justifying), is only the prerogative of the ruler as such, primarily and per se; as, for example, of a father in a family, of a king in a state, of God in the universe. Although this is manifest to all, yet it can easily be proved from the consideration that punishment is the last thing in compulsion. But compulsion is competent only to the superior. Accordingly Seneca has defined clemency as the lenity of a superior towards an inferior in appointing punishment. It is no objection that the vindication of one's right seems sometimes to be committed to private persons, and those possessed of no superior power. For this vindication is either a matter of fact, not of right, and is opposed to natural equity itself, or it signifies a right not pertaining to its possessor primarily and per se, but by the concession of another. Thus a father slays the ravisher of his daughter, or any one an outlaw. Or, finally, it does not signify the act itself of punishing, but only the demand for the infliction of punishment by God, or by some other ruler. To these methods of punishment correspond as many methods of remission or forgiveness, which both Scripture and common speech often attribute to private persons.

1 τῷ ἰδρυκτῷ ἰδρωτὶ.
But our assertion needs the less proof, because Socinus himself somewhere\(^1\) confesses that God in punishing and acquitting men must be regarded as a prince, than which no remark could be more true. James had the same thing in mind when he said:\(^2\) "There is one Lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy."

We have, therefore, the true relation of God in this matter, and having found it, it is easy to set aside all others. First, therefore, we concede to the demand of Socinus that God is not here to be looked at as a judge placed under the law. Such a judge as that could not liberate the guilty from punishment, even by transferring the punishment to another. Not that this is unjust in itself, but it is not congruous with the law of which he is chosen a minister. This is expressed by Lactantius in the following words:\(^3\) "A judge cannot pardon sins, because he is the servant of another’s will; but God can, because he is himself the arbitrator and judge of his own law, and when he established it, undoubtedly he did not take away all power from himself, but has the power of forgiving.” Rightly says Seneca: “Clemency has free-will. It judges not by rule, but in accordance with the just and good.” For equity is the action of a judge who is bound to a form of law; but clemency cannot be properly so called, unless it is the action of the highest ruler in any community. The same Seneca bids a prince to think of this: “Everyone can kill against the law: none can save but myself.” Augustine recognized this distinction: “It is unlawful for judges to revoke a sentence pronounced upon the guilty. Shall the emperor himself be under this law? No; for he alone has the power to revoke the sentence, free the man under sentence of death, and himself pardon him.” And Symmachus: “The condition of magistrates, whose sentences seem to be corrupt, if they are milder than the law, is one thing; another thing the power of the divine princes, in whom it is becoming to turn aside the harshness of a severe law.” It was with reference to this, also, that

\(^1\) \textit{iii. I.} \hfill \(^2\) \textit{James iv. 13.} \hfill \(^3\) \textit{De ira Dei, chap. 19.}
Cicero said, in behalf of Ligarius, to Caesar: "'I did not do it, I never thought of it.' So one is accustomed to speak to a judge. But I speak to a parent; I have erred, I have done rashly, I repent; I fly to your clemency, I seek pardon for my fault, I beg you to forgive me." Quintilian; "Plea for pardon is rare, and before those judges only who are bound by no certain rule of sentencing."

But Socinus, although in the place above quoted he looked upon God as the highest Ruler, yet frequently in all this act he ascribes to him a far different relation, viz. that of an offended party. But he supposes every offended party to be a creditor of the punishment, and in this to have the same right as other creditors in things due to them, which right Socinus even calls by the name ownership. And therefore he repeats very frequently that God must be regarded as an offended party, as a creditor, as a lord, putting these three as if they amounted to the same thing. Since this error is diffused very widely through his whole treatise, and may almost be said in this matter to be his fundamental error, it ought to be carefully refuted.¹

I. To do this, the first assertion may be that to punish is not an act properly belonging to the offended party as such. This is proved, because otherwise to every offended party would belong per se the right of punishing. This is seen not to be so, from our proof that punishing is the act of the superior power;² also from the confession of Socinus when he says that God must be looked at, in this matter, as a prince. From the latter a strong argument is derived. If God punishes and remits punishment as a prince, he does not do it as the offended party. For the same cannot be referred to two diverse things, as such.

Meanwhile, we do not deny that God, who punishes sins or lets them go unpunished, may rightly be called the offended party. But we do deny that to punish or let go unpunished is attributed to him as the offended party. For it is well known that a thing may be said of a man which is

¹ τὸ πρῶτον ήθος.
² τὰς ἐπορευόμενα.
not appropriate to him as such. Thus the lawyer sings, not as a lawyer, but as a musician. Lactantius has noted this correctly: "We rise to punishment not because we are injured, but that order may be preserved, manners corrected, license repressed. This is just wrath, which, as it is necessary in men, certainly is so in God, from whom example has come to men." It is a received maxim that no one is a fit judge in his own cause. But this is a maxim not of natural, but of positive law, and so is not universal. For plainly it is not true of chief rulers, under which name I comprehend also parents, as far as the care of their families is concerned. The lawyers remark\(^1\) that emperors \(^2\) judge in their own cause. The same may occur in cases of crime, as in judgment for high treason, and in wars which because of an injury done to the king are declared by the king. Princes, therefore, when injured, yet not as injured, punish crimes or let them go unpunished. For if they did it as injured, others also when injured would have the same right, who yet are neither able to punish him who injures them nor free him from punishment.

Again, if to punish or dismiss without punishment belonged to princes as injured, they would have no right to punish crimes in which they were not injured. But this is contrary to reason and experience. It may be supposed that criminals are punished by the prince because they injure the state, of which he is the head. But we see that even subjects who have committed grave crimes beyond their domains, and against a foreigner, are rightly and laudably punished. From this it appears that the right of inflicting punishment does not belong to the injured party as injured, since it is neither immediately conferred when the injury is done nor removed when the injury is removed. On the contrary, this right belongs to the ruler as ruler. As soon as you establish supreme power,\(^3\) you establish the right of punishing. Take away the one, and you take away the other.

Whatever is said of the right of punishing must neces-

\(^1\) On L. Et hoc Tiberius. D. de haered. insti.

\(^2\) A notable example, 2 Sam. x.

\(^3\) οὐκ ἰσχύε.

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sarily be understood of the right of forgiving. These things are connected with each other by a natural bond. Socinus has apparently made the mistake of supposing that sometimes in the sacred writings, and among other places in the Lord’s prayer, the example of God in forgiving sins is set before us, that we also, when injured by others, may forgive their sins. But he should reflect that examples are drawn not only from things which are the same in the proximate genus, but also from those which have some likeness, especially when the same name is put, on account of this likeness, upon things similar, although different in proximate genus. Thus Christ forbids us to judge, that is, without mercy, lest we be ourselves judged. He adds: "With what measure ye mete it shall be measured to you again." In this passage the first judging is not entirely different from the second. The first is the judgment of liberty; the second, of power. In the same way, it is one thing in God and other rulers to remit sins, but a far different thing in private persons when injured by others. The opposite of the one is punishing, but of the other, demanding punishment, or desiring it, or making complaint. Intrinsically they are different, but extrinsically they are somewhat alike. The cause impelling to either is benevolence. The effect, too, is that he who has sinned is relieved of some disadvantage, either his very burden, or, at least, so far as is in the power of the remitting party. This agreement is enough, by its own force, to constitute an example.

II. The second assertion may be this: In the nature of things, the offended party, as such, has no right in punishment. This is an advance upon the first proposition. There we denied that the act of punishing belonged to the offended party. Here we deny that he has any right not merely to perform the act, but even to oblige another to perform it. That is, the offended party is not really a creditor in the punishment. Yet Socinus holds this opinion, and often repeats it as a thing perfectly well established.

1 Matt. vii. 1, 2. 
2 Col. iii. 13. 
3 ἐνάγωραῖ.
I do not mean here by creditor, in the strict signification of the word according to its derivation, him who has reposed faith in another; but more generally, according to the definition of law, creditors are those to whom, from any cause whatever, something is due.

Let us now prove our proposition. It is well known that right is twofold, natural or positive. Every debt must therefore arise from one or the other of these sources. Natural right consists in the making of things equal to each other. Such, therefore, is also natural debt. Positive right is that which springs from the free act of the will. This is twofold, contract and law. Contract is the product of that power which any one has over himself and his own things. Law is the product of that power which he has over another and another's things. Of positive debt we are not now treating. Thus we add the word "naturally," the reason for which we shall explain below. By nature nothing else is due me from your act, and nothing else can be due, than equality according to fact, that is, that as much as is lacking to me on your account, so much should be returned. In one word, natural debt may be called indemnity or restitution. Hence Aristotle rightly defines creditor: 1 "He who has the less." This takes place both in voluntary acceptances and in involuntary, as Aristotle also notes. As you are bound to return a loan or deposit, so also a thing taken by theft. So far, in the natural sense, we may be made creditors by crime. This is not merely true in those crimes where the receiving of a material thing occurs, but also in other injuries done to one. He who has wounded another owes him for both the consequent pay of the physician, and the expenses incurred in the cure, and the loss of labor.

Some have wondered that Aristotle placed homicide also among contracts, among which is numbered the right of correcting and amending. But Eustathius has well observed that this is done for the same reason that some compensation

1 τὸν κέφαλον ἐχοντα. 2 ἔκραξεν, ἔκραξεν. 3 L. ult. D. de his qui effuder. 4 συναλλάγματα. 5 τὸ διαφθούγμαν δικαιον [Lat. editor as above].
is ordinarily given to the wife, children, or relatives of a murdered man.¹ So he who injures the fair fame of another by a lie, ought by a profession of the truth to restore that which has been taken from his credit.

From all these considerations it appears that that which is due for crimes in a natural sense differs from punishment. The cause of that natural debt is, first and per se, not the viciousness of the act, but that I lack something. Even when it is lacking without fault, as in case of a deposit, none the less is restitution due me. But the cause of punishment is the viciousness of the act, not that anything is lacking to me. Even if nothing is lacking to any one, an act may rightly be punished, as in grave crimes which are only begun and not consummated.

There is also another distinction, not less important, that the very nature of the thing determines the method and amount of restitution. Although punishment has a natural cause in its own class, yet in a certain way, as we shall show below, it cannot be determined except by a free act of the will. And further, before condemnation, punishment, so far as it consists in receiving or inflicting, is not due in the ordinary sense; but restitution is due in every sense. The debt of restitution descends to the heir; but punishment does not descend.

I have thought fit to refer to these things only for this purpose, that no one may rashly confound with punishment that which is properly owing to the injured party. Meanwhile it is true that by positive law, and by contract as well, some claim to punishment might be given to the creditor. But in that case the laws clearly distinguish it from the pursuit of a thing or of a loss.² This is frequently the case in pecuniary punishments, which, of course, bring not only loss to him who has done the injury, but also profit to the injured. But in corporal punishments, in which there is no true profit

¹ L. fid., ﬁd. fidei.: D. de fide. De iure Aquilla. ² his custom servit.
to the injured party, it is not commonly done. So we see kings and other supreme rulers remitting punishment to the guilty, even when the injured party is unwilling, restitution alone being enjoined upon them. No one thinks this unjust. But it would be unjust if punishment were due to the injured, especially when no necessity of the state demanded remission. Wherefore the fact that inferior magistrates are unable to remit corporal punishments does not arise from any right of the injured party in the punishment (for when the injured one consents they are no more able than before), but from the fact that the laws of the supreme ruler has not conceded to them that power, but, on the contrary, has expressly refused it. We must have a similar understanding with respect to kings when compared with God, in case of those crimes which the divine law commands them always to punish.

This argument goes to show that God, also, when injured by us, is not properly a creditor in punishment. He who affirms it relies on that right which arises from the circumstances of the case, or upon constituted right. We have sufficiently shown, as I think, that the injured party is not a creditor in punishment by that right which arises from the circumstances of the case. But it is not alleged that there is a constituted right by which, not punishment, but such a debt of punishment, has been introduced, and, if it were alleged, it could not be proved. No reason can be given why it should be constituted.

Perhaps some one may make the objection that God in remitting the punishment of sins is sometimes compared with a creditor yielding his own right. But, as we have shown above, comparison does not demand that the things agree in proximate genus, but is contented with any similitude whatever. Christ washing the disciples' feet gave them an example that they should do as he had done, that is, serve one another. But the resemblance between God remitting sins and a creditor yielding his own right is closer than that between God remitting sins and an injured person forgiving.

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1 L. 2. C. de in jus vocando.
2 Matt. xviii. 35.
offences, of which resemblance we have just now treated. The act of God and of the creditor agree not only in the moving cause, which is benevolence, and the effect, which is liberation from misery or harm, but still more in this: that in both some right precedes; in God the right of punishment, in the creditor of demanding payment. In both cases the result is the dissolution of a certain obligation before existing, although in the obligation, as also in the dissolution, there is something dissimilar, which, since this example does not properly pertain to that to which it is applied, cannot vitiate the comparison.

III. Let the third assertion be this: That the right of punishing in the ruler is neither the right of absolute ownership, nor the right over a thing loaned.

This is proved, in the first place, from the final cause, which ordinarily best distinguishes the powers. The right of absolute ownership, as well as the right over the thing loaned, is secured for the sake of him who has that right; but the right of punishing does not exist for the sake of him who punishes, but for the sake of the community. For all punishment has as its object the common good, viz. the preservation of order, and giving an example; so that desirable punishment has no justification except this cause, while the right of property and debt are desirable in themselves. In this sense God himself says that he is not delighted with the punishment of those who are punished.

Again, it is never repugnant to justice to waive the right of ownership, or the right over the thing loaned. It is the nature of proprietorship that one may use it or not use it. But to let certain sins go unpunished (as, for example, of those who do not repent), would be unjust in a ruler, even in God, as Socinus confesses. The right of punishing is therefore not the same with the right over one's property or a loan.

Moreover, no one is said to be just, and no one is praised for his justice, because he employs his right of property, or exacts a debt. But any and every ruler, and God himself, is
called just, and is praised for his justice, because he does not remit punishment, but severely exacts it. "Thou art righteous, O Lord, because thou hast judged thus." This has been proved often above.

Again, diversity of virtues arises from diversity of objects. The virtue by which we waive our right of property, or right of creditor, is called liberality, not clemency. But that by which impunity is secured is called, not liberality, but clemency.

Perhaps some one may ask, since punishment is said to be due, who is the creditor? It seems scarcely possible to use the term debtor where there is no creditor.

It should be observed that the words "to owe" do not always denote a relation between two persons. Frequently, that I ought to do this is no more than that it is proper that I should do it, without respect to another person. So "I owe punishment" is the same as "I am deserving of punishment," and "to suffer it I am held absolutely, but not relatively, to this one or that one." The same is true in any state and under any ruler, when any man suffers the penalty of his crime, for he will be discharged equally among all. This would not proceed thus if of punishment, as of other things, there were a certain creditor; for then payment made to him alone, but not to others, except at his direction, would liberate the debtor.

The same contrast appears in case of rewards. It is right to say that a reward is due to a man, but the particular person who owes it (apart from positive law) does not appear. If one says that a certain state owes a reward because it has received a benefit, he makes no distinction between reward and a favor. Experience shows that rulers honor with rewards those who have not profited their own state particularly, but the human race, as discoverers of facts to the common advantage. Yea, even when success has not crowned plans well devised, and when, consequently, advantage has resulted to no one, we see rewards conferred. Here,

1 Rev. xvi. 5.
therefore, there is no relation between definite persons, as in that kind of debt which arises from contracts.

Yet if any one must have in punishment something which shall be an analogue to the creditor, not inaptly, perhaps, may it be said that the order of things and the public good perform the office of creditor, the dispensation of which order and good has been committed to the ruler. For this is apparently the signification of that trite maxim: It is for the public advantage that crimes be punished.1 And hence it comes to pass that while in other causes a judge gives a hearing to two parties, in criminal causes the defendant appears, but frequently no plaintiff; for order, or the public good, is, as it were, in the place of the plaintiff. Scripture seems also to intimate this when it says that sin cries out against the sinner. In actions for punishment the prosecutor is either any one who chooses to take that position (as in those places where accusations are open to all promiscuously), or some one appointed by the law to this office. This is the case in those places which have accusers publicly appointed. Either example is a complete proof that in the nature of things there is here no definite adversary, and, as it were, demander of punishment.

There is another question as to the force of the word when the ruler is said to let pass,2 or remit3 sins, or, the same thing, punishment. Deceived by this word, many think that some property or debt precedes here; in which they are greatly mistaken.

The Greek word ἀφιέναι properly signifies to remove from one's self;4 whence metaphorically it means to desert, to dismiss, to pay no attention to, as the Latins say, by a similar figure of speech, misses aliquid facere; and accordingly the Greek scholiasts frequently explain ἀφιέναι by ἀμελεῖν, to neglect.5 Ἀμαρτήματα

1 [Lat. Delecta puniri publica interesse]. 2 ἀφίνειν. 3 ἀμέλεια. 4 So used in Matt. iv. 20, et passim. 5 The word is used in this sense in Matt. xv. 14; xviii. 12; xxii. 23; Mark vii. 8.
\( \text{\textbf{Def.} GBOTIUS'S DEFENCE.} \)

\( \text{\textit{apsu\v{s} is to remit sins.}} \) Elsewhere, carrying this figure out further, the Scripture speaks of casting sins into the sea.\(^1\) The Latin poets, also, when they mean that things are put out of our care, say that they are delivered to the winds to be thrown into the sea. Wherefore, as \textit{to remit} and \textit{to retain} anything are opposites, so \( \text{\textit{apsu\v{s} τὰς ἀμαρτίας}} \) and \( \text{\textit{παρεῖν}} \) are opposed to one another.\(^2\) \textit{To remit} sins, \textit{to blot out} sins, and \textit{to cover} them is the same as is expressed more plainly elsewhere, \textit{not to remember} them.\(^3\) \textit{Not to remember}, like the Latin \textit{ignoscere}, signifies to be unwilling to punish. Wherefore, as in the expressions, \textit{not to remember, to cover, to blot out, to be unwilling to retain}, neither the right of property or of debt is meant, so also are they not in the word \( \text{\textit{apsu\v{s}}} \). But because the word which signifies \textit{to remit} is general, it may be with equal propriety applied to those things which we have by ownership, and to names, and to other things.

So also the word \( \text{\textit{χαρισθῆναι}} \) pertains to every kind of favor. Christ \textit{bestowed} sight upon the blind.\(^4\) "To you it is given\(^6\) to suffer for Christ's sake."\(^6\) The judge, also, who, out of favor to any one, releases or condemns a man, is said to \textit{grant}\(^7\) him to the other.\(^8\) These things unite in declaring that by this word neither property nor debt is necessarily signified.

About the Latin words\(^9\) which are ordinarily employed in this argument it is less necessary that we should be solicitous, since they are not found in the sacred writings. Yet for these, also, it is easy to give a reason. The same befalls these as many other words; yea, almost all other words, that they are extended from one signification to another similar one. \textit{Dona}, \textit{to give}, properly, is to make freely another man's that which is one's own by ownership. Punishment is therefore not properly \textit{given}; for that which is given exists before, and remains afterwards; but punishment does

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\(^1\) Mic. vii. 19. \(^2\) John xx. 23. \(^3\) Jer. xxxi. 34. \(^4\) τὰ ἀμαρτίας \textit{χαρισθῆναι}, Luke vii. 31. \(^5\) \textit{χαρισθῆναι.} \(^6\) Phil. i. 29. \(^7\) \textit{χαρισθῆναι}. \(^8\) Acts iii. 16; xxi. 11, 16. \(^9\) Dono, condono, remitto.
not exist before it is given, and by giving it is made to pass out of existence. The similitude is in this: that as the giver has a right in the thing, so the ruler in the punishment; yet not the same right, or equally free. The right of property, as we have said before, is for the sake of the owner. The right of punishment is for the common good: the dispensation of which, as of other common things, belongs to the ruler. A second point of agreement is, that in a gift the right of the giver, and in granting forgiveness the right of punishing, which had belonged to the ruler, are both taken away. A third, that the act of giving and the act of granting forgiveness both arise from the same fountain of benevolence, and are of advantage to another.

Nor here only, but also in other places, the word denoting to give is frequently transferred to those things in which the right of property has no place. Thus a man is said to be presented by the magistrate with citizenship, immunity, honor, reward. Thus Seneca says, to give delay, for to take away delay for another's sake. So we are said to give our time to others. But to remit is, in its primary signification, like the Greek ἀφελαῖ, to remove from one's self. So a tree puts off its bark; a horseman lets go the bridle. So attention is relaxed, and, metaphorically, watch, discipline, spirit. Often to be relaxed and to be taut are opposites. Hence a debt is said to be remitted when there is no account made of it. So also punishment. This word is not applied to punishment on account of debt, nor to debt on account of punishment, but to each on account of something in which they agree.

We may add that in a certain way punishment may be said to be owing to a man; not properly, because no one is here truly a creditor, but because of a certain similarity. For as a creditor has the right of exacting that which is due to him, so the ruler has the right of punishing and the accuser of demanding punishment. Again, by a bold figure,
we are sometimes said to owe punishment either to a ruler, as God, or to an accuser, as the devil. Yet if punishment is not inflicted on the man no injury is done to the devil. On the other hand, it is not consistent with the justice of God that he should remit all punishment forever. Of these considerations neither can have place in true creditors.

CHAPTER III.

Of what Sort the Action of God in the Matter was, and it is shown to be a Relaxation or Dispensation of the Law.

Having examined the part which God performs in this matter, we shall easily find a name for the act itself. And, first, since God, as we have proved, is to be considered here as a ruler, it follows that his act is an act of the administration of justice, generally so called. From this it follows that we are not treating here of acceptilation,* as Socinus thinks, for that is not an act of the administration of justice. To designate the class of this act more particularly it may be considered either in relation to the divine sanction (or, as more recent jurists say, the penal law), or without regard to that relation. We add this specification because, even if the law had made no reference to punishment, yet, in the nature of things, man's act, either as having an intrinsic depravity from the immutable nature of the case, or also an extrinsic depravity on account of the contrary precept of God, deserved, on that very account, some punishment, and that, too, a grave one. That is, it was equitable to punish man as a sinner. If we take our stand here, the act of God of which we treat will be the punishment of one to obtain the impunity of another. Of the justice of this we shall soon treat. But if further we have regard to the sanction, or penal law, the act will be a method of relaxing or moderating the same law, which relaxation we call, in these days, dispensation. It may be defined: The act of a superior by which the obligation of an unabrogated law upon certain persons or things is removed. This is the sanction: the man that eateth of the forbidden
tree shall surely die.\(^1\) In this passage by one species of sin every class of sin is indicated, as is expressed by the same law more clearly brought out, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all the precepts of the law."\(^2\) By the words *death* and *curse*, in these passages, we understand especially eternal death. For this reason it is as if the law had been expressed in this manner: Every man that sinneth shall bear the punishment of eternal death.

There is, therefore, here no *execution* of that law; for if God always executed the law no sinner could be saved from the penalty of eternal death. But now we know that for believers there is no condemnation,\(^3\) because they are liberated from death\(^4\) and redeemed from the curse.\(^6\)

Again, this act is not an *abrogation* of the law; for abrogated law has no binding force. But unbelievers are still exposed to the penalty of the same law. Thus we find written that the wrath of God abideth upon them that believe not,\(^6\) and that the wrath of God is come upon them to the uttermost.\(^7\)

Again, it is not an *interpretation* of the law according to *equity*; for that interpretation shows that some person or act never was comprehended under the obligation of the law. Works of religion and mercy, for example, were never comprehended under the interdiction of working upon the Sabbath.\(^8\) But indeed all men (assuredly concluded under sin),\(^9\) even those who are liberated, are, by nature or by act, children of wrath,\(^10\) that is, bound by the sanction of the law.

It is therefore not declared that there is no obligation; but this is done that what was may be removed; that is, that a relaxation or dispensation of the law may be made.

It may be asked here whether the penal law is relaxable? There are certain irrelaxable laws, either absolutely or by hypothesis.\(^11\) Those are absolutely irrelaxable whose opposite involves, from the nature of the case, immutable wickedness;
as, for example, the law which forbids perjury, or bearing false witness against one's neighbor. For, as we say that God cannot lie, or deny himself, so, no less rightly, do we say that God cannot perform actions in themselves wicked, or approve them, or grant the right to do them.

Those laws are irrelaxable of hypothesis which arise from a definite decree; such as the law of condemning those who will not believe in Jesus Christ.

But all positive laws are absolutely relaxable; and we are not compelled to resort to hypothetical necessity, of a definite decree, where no mark of such decree exists.

It is a great error to be afraid, as some are, lest in making such a concession we do injury to God, as if we made him mutable. The law is not something internal within God, or the will of God itself, but only an effect of that will. It is perfectly certain that the effects of the divine will are mutable. By promulgating a positive law which at some time he may wish to relax God does not signify that he wills anything but what he really does will. God shows that he seriously wills that the law should be valid and obligatory, yet with the reserved right of relaxing it. This inheres in positive law, of its own nature, nor by any sign can it be understood to have been abdicated by God. More than that, God does not deprive himself of the right even of abrogating the law, as appears from the example of the ceremonial law. To be sure it is a different thing, if with the positive law be connected an oath, or a promise; for an oath is a sign of the immutability of that with which it is joined. Moreover, a promise gives a right to the party which cannot be taken away from it without injury. Wherefore, although it is optional to promise, yet to break promises is not optional. This is one of the cases, therefore, in which is involved im-

1 Heb. vi. 18. 2 Tim. ii. 13.
2 τὰς δοκὶς ἀμετάβλητας οὐ ἀμεταβλήτως, in the Scriptures. [Cf. Rom. xi. 29, ἀμεταμέλεια].
3 Heb. iii. 18.
4 Each of these is mentioned in Heb. vi. 18.
5 Ps. cxv. 11; cx. 4; Heb. iii. 11, 18; vi. 17; vii. 21.

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mutable wickedness. God cannot break his promises, who is called faithful especially because he keeps them.\textsuperscript{1}

Let us therefore inquire whether there is anything in the said penal law when promulgated which plainly repudiates relaxation.

First, it may be objected that it is just, in the nature of things, that the wicked should themselves be punished with such a punishment as shall correspond to their crime, and that this is, consequently, not subject to free-will, and so not relaxable.

To answer this objection we must know that injustice does not result from every negation of justice, even under the same circumstances. For as it does not follow that if a king ought to be called liberal because he has given a thousand talents to a certain man, he would therefore be illiberal if he should not do so, so it is not a general rule that what may be done justly cannot be omitted without injustice. Anything may be called natural in morals as well as in physics, properly or less properly. That is properly natural in physics which necessarily coheres in the essence of anything, as feeling in a living object; but less properly that which is convenient to the nature of anything, and, as it were, accommodated to it, as for a man to use his right arm. So in morals there are certain things properly natural which necessarily follow from the relation of things to rational natures, as that perjury is unlawful; and certain things improperly natural, as that a son should succeed a father. According to this, that he who has committed a crime, deserves punishment, and is on that account liable to punishment, necessarily follows, from the very relation of sin and the sinner to the superior, and is properly natural. But that all sinners should be punished with a punishment corresponding to the crime is not simply and universally necessary, nor properly natural, but only harmonious with nature. Hence it follows that nothing prevents the law which demands this from being relaxable.

\textsuperscript{1} 1 Thess. v. 34
The mark of definite decree, or of irrevocability, does not appear in the law of which we are treating. Neither is the law a promise. Therefore nothing prevents the relaxation of these things. For we should not admit that a threat is equivalent to a promise. For from a promise a certain right is gained by him to whom the promise is made; But by a threat there is merely a more open declaration made of the desert of punishment in the sinner and the right of punishing in the threatener. Nor should we fear lest the veracity of God is impaired in any respect if he does not fulfil all his threats. For all threats which have not the sign of [311 irrevocability must be understood, from their own nature, to diminish in no degree the right of the threatener to relax, as has been explained above. The example of the divine clemency towards the Ninevites proves this.

We must not omit here to show that the ancient philosophers judged by the light of nature that there was nothing more relaxable than a penal law. Aristotle says that the just man is inclined to forgive. Sopater, in his Epistle to Demetrius, says: “The right which is called equity, modifying the stern voice of the law, seems to me to be an irreprehensible class of genuine and liberal favors. That part of justice which reduces contracts to equity, entirely rejects every kind of favors. But that part which is engaged upon crimes does not disdain the mild and humane countenance of grace.”

From what has already been said it appears that the positive and penal law of God was dispensable. But this does not prove that there were no reasons which (to stammer, as man must) might oppose their relaxation. These may be sought either in the nature of universal laws, or in the peculiar matter of the law. It is common to all laws that in relaxing,
the authority of the law seems to be diminished in some respects. It is peculiar to this law that, although, as we have said, it is not of inflexible rectitude, yet it is entirely in harmony with the nature and order of things. Hence it follows, not that the law could not be relaxed at all, but that it could not be relaxed easily, or upon slight cause. And this has been followed by that sole all-wise Lawgiver. For he had a most weighty reason, when the whole human race had fallen into sin, for relaxing the law. If all sinners had been delivered over to eternal death, from the nature of the case, two most beautiful things would have entirely perished: on the part of men religion toward God, and on the part of God the declaration of especial favor toward men. God has not only followed reasons, and those most weighty, in relaxing the law, but he has also made use of a singular method of relaxation. For speaking of this a more suitable place will be found below.

(To be continued).

1 τὸ μὲν ἡγέσις ἐκεῖνης.