In the strife of theories, both science and faith should be saved from confusion. Carefully, at least, if not repeatedly, should we take our bearings, that we may the better detect the drift of modern thought, and distinguish the course of false thinking from that of the true.

At the outset, it is obvious to remark, but it is important to remember, that thought has its laws as fixed as those of material nature — perhaps comprehending the laws of nature and confirming the laws of faith.

The primary law of thought is the recognition of existence; the existence of the thinker, and then of the act of thinking as involving content. This is illustrated by the proposition cogito, expressing the simplest judgment. Whatever may be thought of Descartes' familiar enthymeme, cogito ergo sum, to which we do not refer, the proposition cogito (I think), illustrates this primary law which thought implicitly follows in the simplest judgment, I am thinking. In the simplest and earliest thought, then, there is by inevitable law the consciousness of existence and action — of the thinker thinking.

But more than this, there cannot be thought without content, and the primary law involves this, that in every
thought there shall be the thinker, the thinking, and the theme; the agent and the content, the subject and the object, to both of which the thinking relates. This primary law is so comprehensive that if the mere phenomenon seem to furnish the content, the law is not satisfied. It claims more than this, viz. some substance underlying the phenomenon, as well as some person originating the act of thinking. So scrupulous is this fundamental law of thought, in each direction requiring reality, implying that there cannot be an appearing or manifesting without some thing which furnishes the appearance or manifestation. Even Herbert Spencer admits, asserts, this to the confusion of Comte and Mill and Lewes and all mere phenomenalists. There must be a seeing self or mind as well as an object seen. For example, a sensation or impression cannot be, unless there be something to produce the sensation or impression; and more, something to cognize the impression or sensation. Without a mind to receive, there could be no appearing in the universe, no manifestation. So that at the outset, we find a certain modern system, in both directions violating this primary law, and therefore doomed to self-renunciation or to self-destruction.

Let valiant knight-errants of science who would fiercely slay theologians and metaphysicians, on the right hand and on the left, sheathe their swords. Their own safety and the higher interest of science will be promoted by peace rather than by Quixotic warfare. Mr. Spencer's advice to scientists is timely and significant: "He who contemplates the universe from the scientific point of view, must learn to see ... that religion must be treated, as a subject of science, with no more prejudice than any other reality." ¹

Even Mr. Mill admits that "there are laws of thought and of feeling which rest on experimental evidence which are a clue to the interpretation of ourselves and others. Such laws, so far forth, make psychology a positive science, as certain as chemistry." ² According to the involuntary confession of

¹ First Principles, p. 21.
² See his Inaugural Address at the University of St. Andrew.
the "straitest of the sect" of inductionists, then, we shall, as we advance, meet with other laws of thought.

Knowledge begins in consciousness. Without consciousness knowledge were impossible. Whether or not suggested by Socrates, at least since the time of Descartes this principle has been admitted. In regard to knowledge, then, the subjective factor is primary and chief, and is to be studied first and chiefly, if we would ascertain what can be known and how it can be known. What then is the scope of our knowledge? Evidently, the scope of our consciousness. Whatever may be presented to consciousness may become matter of knowledge.

We have already seen that the primary law of thought is that there must be both content of thought, and agent—something which thinks and something about which it thinks. Now what and whence and how is the content furnished? Whether these essential questions can be answered a priori we do not stop to inquire. We, at least, will make the approach to the answer a posteriori, and by the process of observation, which the most fastidious Comtean must approve, detect the law which regulates thinking in relation both to the agent and to the content.

Starting with simple apprehension, we pass, by a process of the judgment, from premise to premise, and thus to conclusion. This, which is completed reasoning, may be in the line of analysis or synthesis, from the general to the particular, or from the particular to the general, and so be legitimate reasoning, either deductive or inductive. These laws developed into a science constitute logic. To ascertain these logical laws, and properly to apply them, is the appropriate work of thinkers in any and in every age. To invent a new, another logic, and call it a science, is quite incompetent for any thought in any age. The simple apprehension of terms—the first elements of knowledge—belongs to the mind alone; but it is dependent upon the presentation. The senses are to do at least a part of this important service; and the apprehension, without which the presentation can be of no avail,
the mental apprehension, must be intuitive. The senses, in
this presentation, must be supervised by some higher faculty
which must evermore verify for the sense, so as to correct
for the mind the faulty presentation of a sense, and confirm
the true—as in the opposite cases of healthy condition and of
nervous derangement, or when the medium for the action of
sense is at fault, as in beholding a distant star whose light
has been millions of years coming through space, coming to
report to us the position of the star in the heavens,—not its
present position, but the position it held ten thousand cen-
turies ago.

Sense is not only unable to verify for itself, its report may be
actually false; e.g. sight reports as the present place of Sirius
that which it occupied five millions (?) of years ago, and from
which place during this immense period it has been steadily
hastening away. Ratiocination, having from the higher laws
of astronomy deduced the distance, orbit, and motion of this
planet, and the velocity of light, corrects and adjusts the
report of sense and tells us the real position which the planet
now occupies. Our eyes hail the morning and report the
sunrise. But eight minutes have actually elapsed since the
sun rose above our horizon; and, again, ratiocination must
correct and adjust the report of sense and verify for the mind
the knowledge thus imperfectly presented. Sense says the
sun rises, the sun sets, daily performing its revolution round
the earth. But this report of sense must be corrected by
some higher mental faculty before it is accepted by precise
science and properly announced as the diurnal revolution of
the earth upon its axis. The sailing ship is not where the
sense reports it, nor is the floating cloud, nor the flying bird.
Our friend receding or advancing is not where we see him,
nor is our foe. The lightning flash deceives the eye; the
thunder's roar deceives the ear. Did the soldier or the sailor
trust to sight or sound, disaster would prevail on land and
sea; defeat would take the place of victory.

Instead, then, of sense being competent to verify to the
mind all our knowledge, it cannot always verify even for
itself. Its very reports cannot be relied upon. In the instances just cited — and these are but samples of unnumbered instances — we must needs call in our reasoning faculty, the understanding, to rectify and adjust and verify for sense. Reason supervises both, and as between the two decides that the conclusion attested by the higher faculty is to be accepted as valid. And, whatever the pretension of some "advanced thinker" or scientific coterie, the world confirms the decision as rational. And now if this be clear and trustworthy, that while sense (sight, hearing, etc.) reports mere phenomena, mere qualities and attributes, but not any subject to which the attributes belong, not any substance in which qualities inhere, nor any cause which produces the phenomena, the reasoning faculty — the understanding — has the competency and the right to supply this deficiency — to correct again and adjust this report of sense, and affirm to the mind with an authority which gives higher knowledge than mere sense can give — knowledge of attributes and subject, of qualities and substance, effect and cause; i.e. that thinking is done by a thinker; that extension belongs to a body; that effect is related to its cause. Here, again, reason supervises the work of both, and as between the two decides that the conclusion attested by the higher faculty is to be accepted as valid. And, whatever the pretension of some "advanced thinker" or scientific coterie, the world confirms the decision as rational.

While, then, we admit and affirm what every experiential or sense-philosopher will assert, that the senses present to the mind elements of knowledge; we deny what some of these philosophers assert, that the senses alone can give, and can verify our knowledge.

In tracing the laws of thought we are now prepared to take another step forward.

The reasoning faculty, the understanding, may also present to the mind elements of knowledge deduced from observation and experience. For example, by the argument from progressive approach, the law of motion, or the law of attraction,
may be thus presented: that a body cannot stop or put itself in motion, and that all bodies gravitate toward each other. No sense has discovered these conclusions or can verify them. Nevertheless they are laid down as established principles in science. These are among a thousand illustrations which might be given. This second mode of presentation as supervised by the reason is pronounced rational. The elements of knowledge as thus presented and thus supervised are accepted by the mind as verified knowledge. This, we see at once, is a larger field of knowledge than the former while it is certainly none the less trustworthy, perhaps less liable to suspicion and vacillation.

But, does not reason, also, present elements of knowledge for the intuitive apprehension of the mind— as intuitive as in the case of sense presentation? An effect, which the sight presents for intuitive beholding by the mind, is no less directly presented by the reason as necessarily produced by a cause, and this whether it be the first or the last effect ever presented by the sense.

The wind blows, as the sense affirms to the mind; but sense cannot go beyond the effect. Reason, however, as quickly affirms that this effect must have a cause; and the mind as intuitively sees the latter truth through reason as the former truth through sense, and holds the latter truth, to say the least, as certainly and as firmly as the former. Again, the sense cannot see or feel or taste or smell space, yet it affirms extension — material extension, as of some body great or small — which the mind intuitively perceives through the sense. But reason as quickly affirms space in which such body may be extended — a space in which all bodies may be extended — even universal limitless space, which no sense can verify, but which the mind sees as intuitively through the reason as it saw through the sense a body extended. Indeed, the latter may have been a fancy, the fancy of a disordered sense; the former is a fact beyond all possible doubt or uncertainty. Events illustrate the same truth. The event is reported to the mind, reported by the sense, for intuitive
perceiving; but no sense can affirm the time in which the event occurred. Time transcends the cognizance of any sense. Neither sight nor touch nor taste can detect it. But reason as quickly, as certainly, affirms a time for the occurrence of this event,—time for the occurrence of every event,—time universal, limitless; and the mind as intuitively beholds this through the reason as the other through the sense. Indeed the sense may be at fault in respect to the specific event; but the reason is at no fault in regard to time. The mind holds the latter knowledge at least as certain as the former. If it be said that the sense verifies for itself in regard to the things of sense and the mind accepts this intuitively (a statement which we might question, but which we do not now stop to challenge); may we not say with higher certainty that the reason verifies for itself in regard to the things of reason, a verification which the mind accepts as the clearest intuition and as of supreme authority? We may apply the same principle to quality and substance, phenomena and subject, effect and cause, axiom and corollary.

The inevitable conclusion, then, is that sense is not the only agency which presents to the mind elements of knowledge. Reason is a surer, if not a more fertile, source of knowledge. Again, sense is not the only means of verification. Reason is as prompt to verify, and no less competent. Sense, perchance, may verify for the things of sense. It may compare sensation with sensation, as touch with sight, or sight with sound; but, at best, how do these gross sensations differ, while, often, they cannot avail to help each other, as in the instance of sight and smell, or taste and touch—in the universe of color, or in the vast realm of astronomy. So the verification of sense is ever exposed to error and attended with more or less of mental misgiving, until a higher faculty has been called in to decide the case. Indeed, the very ground for any confidence in induction and generalization, viz. the uniformity of the course of nature, is a ground which no sense can furnish and no sense can verify. Withdraw this ground and all the superstructure of induction becomes insubstantial and "like the baseless fabric of a vision."
On the other hand, reason verifies for the things of reason with an authority which does not require the attestation of a lower faculty to confirm; nor does it allow the intermeddling of subordinates. Reason may, does, accept the sympathetic attestation of conscience, and the responsive assurance of faith, and the concurrent testimonials of analogy and order and design from ten thousand thousand voices which fill the universe. Now thinkers, ancient or modern, who, in obedience to mental laws, have employed these modes of presenting knowledge to the mind, and these modes of verification, and these processes of thought, inductive or deductive, analytic or synthetic, are justified in their work. No arbitrary method in the interests of a particular theory or school can be foisted into scientific service to displace or exclude the method which the common consciousness approves, and which the ages of serious and sincere thinking have employed and established. Such a change, if violently precipitated, would be not a revolution, but a rebellion, against the laws of mind—a rebellion to be suppressed by the united force of loyal thought. We would be, we are, no less alert to note the testimony of sense and to encourage scientific observation and experiment than are the positivists. We use the results differently, perhaps, while we claim a criterion at once higher and surer. Within the scope of our theory we embrace all the positive knowledge, all the positive science, which they can get; and by our theory we are authorized to get more.

The advances of modern science in every direction are to be hailed with sincere gratification by every true thinker. Its real successes cannot be appropriated and monopolized by any clique or class or country; they belong alike to the world. Everywhere they help the better to interpret the laws which pervade material nature, and to satisfy the philosophic longing of the human soul to know things in their causes, contributing to extend and unify that knowledge in the realm of thought and the realm of force, everywhere revealing more fully the reign of law and the prevalence of order. As true science is evermore consistent with itself
(since it is the knowledge of a higher and all-surrounding harmony), its present successes do not annul those of the past, nor demand that we relinquish what has been gained in order to receive what is being secured. Its real office is not to destroy, but to conserve; reverently to guard, reverently to gain. Entertaining evermore this twofold purpose, and cherishing this genuine spirit of science, he is the best modern thinker who is grateful for the past and hopeful for the future, with mind alert, actively awaiting every presentation of knowledge by the lower intuitions of sense, by the higher intuitions of reason, and by the logical deductions from both. It is evident from this threefold presentation of knowledge that science is by no means restricted to the narrow circle of sense. To change the figure, the great superstructure of knowledge which the individual and the universal mind are uniting to rear is based not upon sense alone, but upon the triple foundation of sense, understanding, and reason; reason being the corner-stone.

In the process of knowledge, especially in the scientific process, ratiocination, or understanding, supports sense, gives it significance, and makes it serviceable to science by arranging in order the incoherent reports of each sense and of all the senses, reducing them to results, connecting them to conclusions. With sense alone there could be no science. However strong were the sight, though it could penetrate like the glance of the eagle, undazzled by the noontide blaze of the sun; however acute were the hearing, though it could detect the harmony of the spheres, as in concentric circles they glide through outlying realms of space; though touch and taste and smell were intensified a thousand and a thousandfold; yet, with mere sense and without understanding there would be, there could be, no classification, no judgments, no generalizations, no advance toward science. Reason, in the meantime, supervises the whole process that it be rational, not fanciful; that science itself be not the slave of tyranny nor the dupe of superstition; and that sense become not false through fear, nor imbecile through inaction, nor
blunted by age, nor drowned in dissipation and maddened with delirium. If reason be enthroned in the soul, its light and guidance penetrate the understanding and pervade the sense; both become rational; and man is exalted to his proper place, a different and a higher sphere than that of the animal, and in the right of his own excellence holds dominion. But, if reason be dethroned, human knowledge can be no longer verified; sense and understanding both wander, lost, without the light and without a guide; and man is inferior to the meanest brute. In the exercise of these threefold powers, man is conscious of their possession. He needs no argument to make that possession more apparent, while no argument can lessen his assurance. But more than this, he clearly sees the propriety of this threefold possession. He needs the senses to commune with the outer world, to know its varied phenomena, and to satisfy his physical wants. He needs the understanding to prepare him for scientific knowledge and intellectual advancement. He needs reason to satisfy the demands of conscience and the longings of faith; and, as he holds himself and others morally responsible, to fit him for moral responsibility. This is the more apparent, since, by universal consent, when reason fails man ceases to be held responsible. He may be confined, commiserated, or cast out; but he is not held responsible.

There need, then, be no conflict between true science and true religion. The conflict has been between scientists and religionists. The best thinkers have often been the most devout. Trite as the saying has become, it is no less true, and Baconians at least should not object to its repetition, "Depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds back to religion." Science and religion heartily bid each other good-speed. Religion has served science, and certainly science, especially modern science, with and without intent, is doing much-needed and lasting service to religion in the increasing demonstration it affords of order, "Heaven's first law," and in the steady advance toward higher and still higher unification of knowledge, unmistakably indicating what reli-
gion has uniformly maintained: that there is a uni-verse, giving new and still newer significance to that term held in common both by science and religion—the universe.

It is, then, the more remarkable with what refinement of self-conceit a certain set of thinkers now-a-days monopolize the merit of modern thought, and gratuitously assume that all other thinking in these times is archaic and obsolete; who talk boastingly of philosophical radicalism that shall reverse the world's estimate of more than twenty centuries, proclaim a new definition of truth, ostracize the old leaders, repudiate and banish the established method of thought, and reconstruct the whole empire of knowledge;¹ who ostentatiously parade a "New Philosophy"; and consistently with such pretension sneer at conservative thought as superstitious veneration for the past, arrogating to themselves the purpose and the spirit of progress; who would confine science to the field of experience—the field of sense—and then patronize this bantling as the sum of all knowledge and as their own private possession. Lest their bantling be not sufficiently dwarfed, they talk evermore of material science, as if science were only material.² Sometimes, in more liberal mood, they mention both mind and matter, but both attenuated to the slightest phenomenal consistency (Mill); while, in severer moods, they declare feeling and even thought to be material secretions of the brain, as the liver secretes bile (Vogt, etc.).

From such premises, self-styled modern thought would proceed to divorce science and Christianity as incompatible, framing its bill of indictment, and trumping up its testimony in irrelevant and inconsequential conflicts between science and religion. With inflamed zeal it would banish theology as a hoary intruder upon the domain of scientific thought, slay theologians as enemies of scientific progress, and brand metaphysics as an outlaw doomed to fetters and perpetual imprisonment. Having thus cleared the field, it would consummate the new regime by enthroning "The New Philosophy."

¹ See Comte, and Lewes, and positivists everywhere.
² See Büchner, Moleschott, Maudsley, and Virchow, etc.
The effrontery of such pretension becomes more manifest when we remember that the greatest philosophers of modern times, like Newton and Bacon and Locke and Leibnitz and Descartes and Kepler and Galileo, have been sincere Christians, and that the greatest thinkers of all times have been most earnest believers in the supernatural; and still more manifest, when we remember that the greatest theologians, like Augustine and Calvin and Edwards and Bishop Butler and Chalmers, have been valiant champions of progress; while Christianity has been the very parent of modern civilization, more industrious in its promotion than any other agent, and more successful than all other agencies, and most industrious and most successful when most thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Christ, the Master; seeking to-day with sublime zeal and courage and self-denial to extend Christian civilization and Christian progress over all the earth; desiring at once to plant the school and the church everywhere, at home and abroad; and still more remarkable, when we remember that Christianity, not satisfied with even the present degree of progress, points to the better time coming, when the knowledge of the Lord shall fill the whole earth; bids us, as sons of God, "Be strong and of good courage," "laying aside the first principles of the doctrine of Christ, go on unto perfection," when, as full inheritors of the truth of God, men shall "grow up into the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ," speaking to us evermore of the supreme value of the soul, and stimulating us and the world evermore with the significant words of Jesus: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?"

On the other hand, self-styled modern thought, with shameful contradiction of its pretensions to progress, goes back to heathen scepticism for its philosophy, revives the defunct notions of Democritus and Leucippus, exalts nature above God, and matter above mind, asserts the descent of man from the monkey; and, as if not satisfied with such debasement, declares that the monkey was once a slimy ascidian, and that the ascidian — the low, but living ascidian — had a
spontaneous generation, taking its life from that which was positively and utterly lifeless; so that the human soul and body equally are material and alike subject to death and decay; while "modern thought" completes the vicious circle of contradictions by declaring that the future shall be not a progress, but a regress along the receding curve in the cycle of evolution and revolution. Such is the pretension and such is the mockery of self-styled modern thought. If this be "advanced thinking," what, we ask, is the direction? What a system, we submit, is this to be proud of! How well it is authorized to despise Christ and Christians, theology and theologians, civilization such as Christianity has produced and perfected, progress such as Christianity promises — inimitable in the opening field of the future, in a purer moral life and a better moral atmosphere and "a better country, even an heavenly," saying to each and to all evermore: "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect!"

These general criticisms are more than verified by a reference to specific results reached by modern thought in regard to science, philosophy, morals, and religion. This reference must, of course, be restricted by the limits of a review Article; and it need be the less extended by reason of the notoriety industriously given to their conclusions by these new schoolmen.

In science, which is their especial boast, they tell us that we can know nothing but phenomena, their antecedents and sequents. Indeed, this is all we can know of the laws of nature. In fact, this is the law of nature, according to their formal definition — the invariable succession and resemblance of phenomena (Comte and Lewes and Mill). After all the vaunted talk of laws, their sum is this, and nothing more.

According to "modern thought," so extremely tenuous and insubstantial a thing is law. And yet we are told by these "advanced thinkers" not only to study the laws of nature, but to study only the laws of nature, since this is all we can know. At the same time, we are oracularly informed that we ourselves are only a series of feelings and sensations,
and that material nature—the universe of worlds—is but the possibility of sensations (See Mr. Mill).

But if "modern thought" makes the realm of knowledge thus phenomenal and fleeting, still more unstable does it make science itself. Even so simple a fact as that \(2 + 2 = 4\) they tell us is not fixed, but that at some other time or place \(2 + 2\) may make 5, that two lines which are parallel may meet somewhere and at some time, and that effects may happen without any cause. Like the old sceptics, they cannot affirm; they cannot deny. In this uncertainty of knowledge, which is more tantalizing than ignorance, "modern thought" is driven like a shuttle, between phantasms without and phantasms within, weaving its own winding-sheet of nescience; so that even Mr. Mill, coolest and steadiest of modern thinkers, as he looks in one direction resolves all knowledge into outward experience, and as he looks in another direction resolves it all into self-knowledge, and then, as he pauses to look at his theory, denies the knowledge of self and the knowledge of things. Driven by his theory of nescience, he concludes, with the notorious sophists of twenty centuries ago, that nothing is truly known; and now, driven by the necessity of thought, or, as he styles it, "irresistible association," he refers every sensation to mind and matter—the subject and object; affirming, "I cannot be conscious of the sensation, without being conscious of it as related to these two things." ¹

In his posthumous essay on "Nature," he says: "The nature of a thing means its entire capacity of exhibiting phenomena. Nature means the sum of all phenomena, together with the causes which produce them." Thus, in common with all phenomenalists, he fully recognizes both the principle and the terminology of causation. Yet, driven by his theory, in common with all phenomenalists, he repudiates the principle, and emasculates the term "cause" of its meaning: "I do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon." ² His logic should have saved him from contra-

¹ Mill's Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 214, 215. ² Logic, i. p. 358.
dictions. It should at least have prevented his false play between the general and the special use of such a term as "cause," and from the convenient fallacy of shifting premises. The teacher of logic should not allow his own practice to illustrate the *ignoratio elenchi*. More than this, if he disregards the claim of consistency, he should respect the claim of honesty; and, in a question so manifestly essential, be careful neither to deceive himself nor to mislead others.

Herbert Spencer, driven by the necessity of thought, asserts that "there cannot be appearing without an underlying reality or ground of the appearance, that is unthinkable"; — striving thus to give validity to science; and now, driven by his theory of nescience, asserts that the ultimate ground is unknowable, and thus concludes, with the sophists, that nothing is truly known. His whole scientific superstructure, which seemed so fair and firm, only deceives us by concealing from our view the fathomless abyss of nescience; and as we enter it, seeking scientific repose and security, the false foundation suddenly sinks, precipitating us and all into the frightful vortex of the unknown.

Lewes, who, with his modern definition of truth as the order of ideas corresponding to the order of phenomena, asserts that we know only phenomena, and should therefore study their laws, and would make science at least legitimate, informs us that law is only invariable succession, having no vital connection nor real power. When asked whether there is an external world or an internal conscious being, he replies that we know only phenomena — that whether there is really anything within or anything without, we know not. Driven by his theory of verification, Lewes would make science legitimate. Driven by his theory of nescience, he would make the internal and the external world merely phenomenal, and science itself — however legitimate by hypothesis — invalid in fact; concluding, with the sophists, that nothing is truly known, and even pausing to applaud the sophists in their remarkable conclusion.

1 *First Principles.*

2 *History of Philosophy,* i. p. 81.
A single quotation from Mr. Bain must conclude our illustration of science as presented by these "advanced thinkers." As if to outdo the old sophists in this direction, and thus establish some apparent claim to originality for "modern thought," Mr. Bain asserts: "Both as to the reality of matter and as to the reality of spirit, I am incapable of direct knowledge, therefore make no distinction between the knowable and the unknowable."¹ Such is the scope, and such the security of science, according to self-styled "modern thought." What can science such as this avail, even if perfected? Is this the boasted progress of our century? Stripped of its disguises, such thought is not even modern. It is not only ancient, but antiquated.

We are forcibly reminded of Tyndall's truthful confession: "The logical feebleness of science is not sufficiently understood"; and the more forcibly, when we compare the assertions and admissions of the automatic system so pompously presented by modern materialists, like Maudsley: "The formation of an idea is an organic process. Exquisitely delicate is the mental development which takes place in the minute cells of the cortical layers; yet the mysteries of their secret operations cannot be unravelled. Physiology hitherto has been unable to construct a mental science"²; and Carl Vogt: "Thought stands in the same relation to the brain as bile to the liver"; and Moleschott: "Thought is a motion of matter"; and the irrepressible Büchner: "Mental activity is a function of the cerebral substance"; in contrast with Tyndall's acknowledgment that "the molecular groupings and molecular motion of the materialists explain nothing. The problem of the connection of soul and body is as insoluble in its modern form as it was in the pre-scientific ages."

Mr. Huxley, who significantly points to materialism as threatening the extinction of spirit, and sneeringly refers to the public solicitude in regard to the question as no more dignified or reasonable than the vulgar lamentation at the death of Pan, feels compelled to vindicate his own reputation,

¹ The Senses and the Intellect. ² Physiology and Pathology of Mind.
by saying: "I am no materialist. On the contrary, I believe materialism to involve grave philosophical error."

"Modern thought," in its phase of materialism, makes mind, like heat, a mode of motion, and thought the result of molecular changes; and in the phase of nescience, finally reduces science to the knowledge not of things, but of relations, and these not even the relations of things, but the relations of fleeting appearances,—of mere phenomena,—scientifically and seriously this, and nothing more.

But if "modern thought" is so faulty and false toward true science, it is, as we should expect, fatal to true philosophy — philosophy as knowledge of things in their causes. Indeed, Comte magisterially ruled out philosophy from his system, as irrelevant to knowledge and impossible. Lewes, in his elegiac history of its repeated, but fruitless struggles, reports philosophy a failure — the study of causes vain and illusory.

Mill, who "positively" condescends to examine the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, repudiates all consciousness of being, or knowledge of causes, and, with endless iteration, repeats: "All our knowledge is only of phenomena; of things and causes we can know nothing."

Mr. Spencer, not content with mere phenomena, seeks forever for something real; but, having extinguished from his system the light of reason, in his blindness postulates despairingly in the unknown what he longs to find, but forever fails, and leaves philosophy confounded in the limitless chaos of the unknowable. If positive science is merely of the phenomenal, not of the real, positive philosophy, at the most, can be no more than this — the science ultimately of the unknown and unknowable. Thus does the nescience of "modern thought" summon the scientific crusade against theology and metaphysics and philosophy, against the being of God and of mind and of matter. In this war of extermination it would at last slay knowledge itself. The great defect in the experiential philosophy is the chasm between mind and matter. Whatever the persistency of the analysis, mind remains conscious, matter remains unconscious.
It is especially noticeable to what contradictions these philosophical repudiators are driven. Now, in their theory, they repudiate *a priori* principles and processes. And now, driven by the necessity of thought, Spencer rests on a "fundamental verity," and postulates a force unknowable, as persistent, and as a ground of all phenomena. Mill, driven by "irresistible association," refers all phenomena to matter and mind — to the "me" and the "not-me" — the subject and the object. And Lewes is driven to admit that "the fundamental ideas of modern science are as transcendental as any of the axioms in ancient philosophy."¹ These principles, this science — their science of the phenomenal — will not, cannot give. No generalization of phenomena can give the knowledge of being, especially to those who scientifically deny the possibility of all knowledge of things as existing; no generalization of effects can give the knowledge of cause, especially to those who scientifically deny all possible knowledge of things and causes, and who thus ignore and rule out philosophy as illicit and illusory.

How do these "advanced thinkers" treat morality?

Mr. Buckle says: "Every new fact is the necessary product of antecedent facts, and both providence and free-will are a delusion. Physical laws take the place of personal agency. Historic actors, therefore, are automatons." In this personal statement Mr. Buckle indicates the general drift of "modern thought" in regard to morals.

Mr. Mill, in reviewing Comte's theory approvingly, says: "The transition is steadily proceeding from the theological mode of thought to the positive, which is destined finally to prevail by the universal recognition that all phenomena, without exception, are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions, either natural or supernatural, interfere." Mill would subject even the Creator and Governor to necessity, and restrict him to arbitrary arrangements, permitting no belief even to recognize his existence, unless he obey fixed laws, which are never to be modified or counteracted by the

¹ *Philosophy of Aristotle*, p. 66.
personal preference of the Creator.\(^1\) Thus does "modern thought" repudiate responsibility, and reject moral freedom, and inculcate the pernicious theory of automatic action on earth and in heaven.

Mr. Mill introduces his view of punishment by this startling preamble: "Though a man cannot help acting as he does, his character being what it is," and much more to the same effect. "His own good, either physical or moral, is no warrant for compelling him" to do otherwise. "The most we should think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself."\(^2\)

And yet, whether influenced by force of thought or by force of feeling we need not conjecture, Mr. Mill, with strange forgetfulness, falls into this gross inconsistency: He has made up his mind, if the First Cause be an immoral God, he will defy him to do his worst, and will not worship him.\(^3\)

But we reply, how can the First Cause, according to Mr. Mill's theory, possibly be immoral or moral? As a necessary and necessitated cause he can have no moral character; or, if you please, he must be un-moral (i.e. not moral). But suppose Mr. Mill will not worship such a God? The carping philosopher must obey, as the effect (according to his system of necessity) must obey its cause. What if the defiant philosopher must, even if he will not, worship the tyrant? Such talk, from a philosophic necessitarian is mere bravado. In spite of his theory excluding all possible morality, Mr. Mill freely employed the terms "morality" and "morals," "moral results" and "moral causes"; admitted the prevalent conviction of choice or moral freedom both before and after voluntary action; and asserted that this conviction could only be acquired by experience. The admission proves too much for the necessitarian — proves the undoing of his theory. The conviction is acquired. The freedom has been exercised. Moral freedom is vindicated

\(^1\) Mill's Philosophy of Comte, p. 16.

\(^2\) See Mill's Essay on Liberty; although this is rather a vindication of necessity or denial of any possible morality or accountability.

\(^3\) See Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 103.
by experience, as well as by universal conviction. Therefore Mr. Mill is held to the logical consequence of moral responsibility and moral government. Hence we argue to the moral character and moral government of God.

Comte, at first, excluded religion from his system, or referred to it not as moral or spiritual, but merely as intellectual—the product of the understanding striving to explain the phenomena of nature, rather than of reason and conscience recognizing moral obligation and seeking communion with a living, personal God. The two conceptions differ utterly in regard to the source, the character, and the sphere of religion. Both cannot be true. One must be right to the exclusion of the other. According to Comte's conception, natural history, as intellectual—the product of the understanding and seeking to explain the phenomena of nature—would be the height of religion; though it involved not the least moral choice, nor the slightest moral feeling, nor any recognition of God.

But at length intense reaction completely reversed the religious attitude of Comte, and from his earlier exclusion of religion he proceeded to elaborate the "religion of humanity," which the Catéchisme Positiviste, since 1852, has made more familiar to the public, perhaps more repugnant.

In his review of Comte's system, Mr. Mill expressly declares: "Comte's religion is without a God";¹ and, lest the reviewer be suspected of condemning it as such, he remarks approvingly: "We venture to think that a religion may exist without belief in a God," and be at once "instructive and profitable." Mr. Mill will, indeed, allow one to believe or disbelieve in a God, and yet have religion. Nothing could more clearly indicate his complete indifference to religion, and the utter emptiness of his religious conception. And yet for this careless permission to believe in a God he is severely criticised and condemned by Littré, a disciple and successor of Comte. The religious theory of Mr. Spencer is at least as liberal as that of Mr. Mill. From his system

¹ p. 120.
he rules out the possible recognition of a personal God, and allows nothing but an utterly inscrutable power, while he makes this startling statement: "The atheistic, the pantheistic, and the theistic hypotheses contain the same element—an absolute mystery." Thus modern positivism presents a religion without a God, but proposes "a new Supreme Being," the "Grand Etre," that is, Collective Humanity—"a God not yet formed," but "to be forming of new component parts"; "the dead to occupy the first place, then those who are yet to be born." Madame Clotilde de Vaux—like Comte himself released by divorce from the marriage bond—becomes his "angelic interlocutrix" in elaborating the new religion. With the establishment of this religion the Christian calendar is to be superseded by a scientific calendar. The temples are to be turned toward Paris—the Mecca of "modern thought." Jehovah is to give place to a new goddess, the goddess of Collective Humanity. Thrice daily shall men pray everywhere to deified woman. Worship, dogmas, discipline, architecture, altars, priesthood, symbolism, gestures, sacraments,—all the details are minutely given in the ritual of positive religion, even to directions for closing and opening the eyes, in this worship of woman. Madame Clotilde—or whatever woman—is to be exalted over him whose name is above every name; and "soon the knee of man will never bend, except to woman." The deification of mortals according to Comte, or the worship of the unknowable according to Spencer, or blank materialism excluding all worship and all religion, is offered to us by modern thought to supersede the Christian religion and the worship of the ever-living and true God.

Mr. Spencer feels the need of conciliation, not of conflict, between science and religion, and points to a common ground, which both may harmoniously occupy. Comte, the Corypheus of positivism, whom Lewes devoutly hails as a scientific apostle, and proclaims as a leader not only for himself, but for such impatient followers as Mill and Huxley and Spencer—

1 First Principles, p. 36.
Comte, suffering the horrors of divorce between science and religion, penitently besought a reconciliation, and strove to effect a union between his emasculated system and a religion if not wholly earth-born, at least not divine. Even Strauss, after forty years of Titanic struggle to scale the heavens and dethrone the old faith, repented of his folly, and turned beseechingly toward a new faith, to which he sought to win his vacillating disciples. Mill, left alone with his philosophy, became a devotee at the grave of departed love. The school of nescients worship an unknown God; while the more advanced of the advanced thinkers, who have pushed their analysis to its scientific limit, and have found the primal being—the source of all phenomena—return with synthetic fervor, crying "Aha! we have found a God!" and reverently place a fetich upon the altar of science; and, with worship "for the most part of the silent sort," bow the knee to force,—blind, unconscious, unintelligent, unknowable force. Mr. Spencer, we repeat, feels the need of conciliation, not conflict, between science and religion, as did Bacon and Locke, and Newton and Descartes, and Galileo and Copernicus, and Tully and Plato and Socrates, and, as we believe, most men who have been capable of profound thought, earnestly feel. How can this be made not only possible, but permanent?

We have already described the threefold presentation of knowledge to the mind by the sense, by the understanding, by the reason. Now science, however restricted, need not, cannot, legitimately conflict with religion. If science be theoretically confined within the narrow limit of sense, as it is by many, it cannot oppose, it can at most only stand self-silenced in the presence of religion. Its strongest assertion can only be, it does not know. Its comprehensive objection must be its own ignorance. In the pathway of religion experiential science has come thus far; because of self-imposed limits it can go no farther. By no means, however, can it legitimately forbid religion to advance.

If science be enlarged to the field of the understanding, as
is its right and its duty, logical deductions from ten thousand thousand indications confirm the claim of religion, and follow far in the pathway of her advance; and if pausing at any time, it is not with disbelief, but with prompt admission that the course, however long, is right, and with an earnest good-speed to religion along the brightening way it would fain accompany her.

But if science advance to the province of the reason, which is its chief right and duty, it beholds not only things seen and temporal through the intuitions of sense, but the things unseen and eternal through the intuitions of reason. Reason looks out upon space, and reports it limitless; upon time, and reports it endless; surveys the realm of phenomena, and reports of every effect,—as does the sense, so far as it can feel or hear or see,—reports that every effect has a cause, and more, that every effect must have a cause; and applies this rule with unqualified assurance to every positive effect in space, and to every positive effect in time; and as certainly that every effect must have an adequate cause, e.g. that while the weight of fifty pounds requires a power sufficient to raise it, a weight of one hundred pounds requires twice that power to raise it; and that variation of cause is required for variation of effect, not only in degree, but also in kind. Moral effects require moral causes; for there can be no morality without mental choice, and no responsibility without rational freedom. By the same intuition of reason, it is a positive knowledge that an intelligent effect must have an intelligent cause. Every design put forth into effect must have a designer. The author of all things must be adequate to what is. Who shall dare deny that these intuitions of reason, reported to the human mind and carefully arrayed in classified knowledge—who shall deny that this is science? Shall he, especially, who in the same breath asserts that intuitions of sense reported to the mind and then classified constitute science?

Intuitively to the individual mind, and with supreme authority, reason presents this as most rational. Not only has
the common consciousness of the world confirmed this affirmation of reason, but natural religion rests in confidence upon this rational support. In this higher and surer realm of science, religion may best expatiate and feel most at home. With no fanatical frenzy and no superstitious devotion, but in the calm and cheerful light of rational beholding, religion and reason have thus accompanied each other sympathetically and harmoniously. On the way have the physical senses failed? Has the eye grown dim? the ear dull and heavy? Religion has pressed forward; for she walks not by physical sight. Have tongues ceased? Has the understanding completed its deductions from what has been seen and heard and felt of sensible things, and paused in its prophecies? Religion has pressed forward; for something there is in the human soul that has never failed it — the presence and the support of reason.

But is there no end? no beginning? Are reason and religion doomed forever to tread the unsatisfying pathway of development, never to find what is, only to meet what is becoming — the phenomenal, the transitory? Is there no comprehension to the field of rational science? While the field of sense is comprehended, and the field of the understanding is comprehended, is there no comprehension to the field of rational science? Reason itself comprehends this field by a right as complete, at least, as does the sense and the understanding each comprehend its field. And reason evermore affirms not only that phenomena come and go in endless succession and variety, but that something is — eternal. Though phenomena pass by and vanish, this remaineth; although all else should wax old and be changed, yet this shall remain the same, and never fail. This ultimate ground not only has Spencer reached in the pathway of rational science, which he would harmonize with religion; but the same ultimate ground Paul has reached in the pathway of religion, which he promptly harmonizes with reason. So far forth, there has been no conflict between science and religion.
Religion would find in this eternal source of all things adequate cause for every effect, in one word, eternal power and Godhead, in which it may confide, on which it may rely, with which it may commune. Does reason reject as irrational the declaration of an old and familiar, but by no means dishonored writer, whom we have just mentioned, who, in a remarkable letter to the Romans, says: “The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made”; and in another letter, no less remarkable, addressed to the Hebrews, says: “Thou remainest, and thou art forever the same.”

If an issue is raised, it is at this point: Shall mind be secondary and subordinate to matter? This is the real issue. One or the other is original and dominant. We shall be pardoned for adverting to it, for it is the real issue presented and pressed by “modern thought.” Mr. Spencer postulates an ultimate force, persistent, unconscious, unintelligent, physical force. This, then, he assumes is original and dominant—the source of all that is. Mind, therefore, according to Spencer, is secondary and subordinate to matter.

Tyndall looks “across the boundary of experimental evidence,” beyond which, according to the experimental system of “modern thought,” he has no right to look, “and discerns in matter the promise and the potency of every form and quality of life.” Mind, then, according to Tyndall, is secondary and subordinate to matter. And yet Tyndall is compelled to say that all true men of science “will frankly admit their inability to point to any satisfactory, experimental proof that life can be developed save from demonstrable antecedent life.”

Avowed materialists, with whom Spencer and Tyndall are unwilling to be classed,—avowed materialists assume that matter is primary and all-prevalent. Hence mind, if there is any, is secondary and subordinate to matter; in its final analysis, is indeed material.

Now, we do not for a moment stop to speak of blank materialism, which precludes the existence of mind by reducing it and all things to matter, and thus contradicts our
fundamental belief, the universal distinctions of language, and the common consciousness of mankind. To avowed materialists, who assume that mind itself is material, this issue must be utterly irrelevant and impossible. The issue with them is upon entirely another ground. Science itself is impossible, where mind is ruled out as material; for matter can know nothing, a fortiori it cannot construct science.

But to advance to the narrowest field of science,—that of sense, the experiential,—we affirm that those who confine themselves within this narrow field are by self-limitation excluded from this discussion. The problem does not, at least, lie within that field. The issue is not a phenomenon, for the eye or ear or touch to decide. If there is no science but this possible, as some scientists pretend, then the problem is ruled out forever, and the issue must be pronounced nugatory. But the issue does not await the permission of positivism. It spurns such scientific impertinence. Ruled out forever as nugatory and impossible, it returns with ten thousand thousand voices to assert its real presence, and confront and contradict the partial ruling. If this restricted tribunal is incompetent to do it justice and secure its rights, it is but a confession of the incompetency of positivism. There is an appeal to a court of larger jurisdiction and higher competency. We make no special plea against the modern school of science. We point to the confession as conclusive proof of weakness. Within its own field it is doing industrious and legitimate service to religion and progress. But it is not comprehensive, therefore it must not be exclusive. It may be positive in regard to its knowledge; it should be positive, also, in regard to its ignorance. On other and essential grounds we have already shown its fatal defect. Its confession here confirms our criticism. The issue is not only between religion and partial science, but also between partial science and true philosophy.

We repeat, the real issue remains. It will not down at the bidding of positive science. It has the life of humanity, and the vigor of faith reappearing in every form of religion
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since the world began. Shall mind be secondary and subordinate to matter? Or is mind itself superior and primary—the source of all that is, and the sovereign? We say to positivism, as we say to every sense-theory, it is incompetent to assert; it is incompetent to deny. All it can say is, that there are antecedents and sequents, phenomena succeeding phenomena; but it cannot affirm, it certainly cannot deny, that there is anything abiding. Hence we dismiss objections from any such quarter as unauthorized and groundless. But there is a larger field of science—the field of the understanding, where true logic has its legitimate sphere, and conclusions may be valid, e.g. that there cannot be phenomena without something to appear, nor effects without something to produce them. And so Mr. Tyndall admits that all phenomena have a causative source in the potency of matter; although he does not tell us what matter is, nor whence or what is its potency. Till these questions be answered, he has thrown but a dim and unsatisfactory light upon the problem. Yet Tyndall disclaims atheism—a disclaimer certainly significant in regard to the real question at issue.

Mr. Spencer, with greater boldness, tells us that force is the ground of all phenomena, and that force is unknowable. This is the farthest analysis of "modern thought."

And this is proposed as the common ground of reconciliation between science and religion. Is science, whose very office is to know,—is science satisfied with this proposed reconciliation, in the unknowable? Can it consent to a postulate which is suicidal—an ultimate which would swallow up every scientific labor and success in fathomless nescience?

Can religion accept this theory as sufficient to satisfy the longing of the human soul—a longing not only to rely upon, but to trust in and commune with, the Eternal Being,—not only to fear, but to worship and love, the Eternal? In this final question, important above all others, does ratiocination repudiate or confirm faith? Does reason still accompany and support religion? Can science give us any knowledge of force which will help decide the case? In our own consciousness does
force appear as the offspring of mind, the result of will-power, and not *vice versa*? Is not Mr. Spencer's notion of force derived from mind? "Force, as known to us, is an affection of consciousness."¹ "The force by which we ourselves produce changes serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general, and is the final disclosure of analysis."² Is then, his final analysis final, when he postulates force as ultimate? Or does it look directly beyond, to the will-power or personality which exerts that force? Is not his final analysis, then, really an indication and admission of a personal First Cause as Author of force, and thus Creator of the universe? Religion does not discard the reconciliation proposed by Mr. Spencer, because it is too scientific, but because it is too little scientific. Religion admits the right of science to go thus far, whether Mr. Spencer's system would authorize it to do so or not. But religion denies the right to go thus far, and then stop at this point.

Faith raises the same question in behalf of religion which reason asks in behalf of science: Why stop with force as the ground of all phenomena, when force itself is phenomenal as meeting and resisting the senses, e.g. in hearing, touch, etc.? Why stop with force, when force itself, according to our consciousness, testifies of will as its source? Why call it unknown, when in the same breath it is declared known, as having persistence and power and causality, etc.—attributes which belong to personality? Why call it unintelligent, when confessedly its doings are the most intelligent (according to "modern thought") in the universe; comprehending, indeed, by the theory, all the intelligence in the universe? Why call it unconscious, when it manifests not only the highest intelligence, but the highest wisdom in the adaptation of means to ends, in relating causes to effects, in harmonizing forces and phenomena throughout the universe? so that science itself asserts the universal order; and science and religion agree in tracing all phenomena and all effects to one ultimate cause. Why call this ultimate and eternal cause force,

¹ First Principles, p. 58. ² Ibid. p. 235.
—blind, unconscious, unintelligent force,—and thus exclude
God from the universe, and deny his existence, when "modern
thought" itself involuntarily admits that such effects as have
been produced demand the highest type of causation? Why
call it unknown, when in the same breath it is declared persist-
tent, and so known as enduring? when it is declared "the
ultimate of ultimates," and so known as the ground of all
appearances, "the cause of all phenomena," the ultimate or
first cause? If science can know so much about this "un-
knowable" as to clothe it with attributes of personality, why
not frankly admit, as some of the most candid and able
scientific thinkers affirm, and as faith will admit and our
consciousness asserts, that force is the product of will-power,
and so the primal or ultimate force is the product of an
eternal, almighty, intelligent, and wise will—the infinite
and holy will of a personal God?

This may be common ground for science and religion.
Thus is the First Cause not only ultimate, but adequate to
the production of mental, as well as material, phenomena—
adequate, which according to Mr. Spencer's theory it con-
fessedly is not. Thus all things centre harmoniously in
God. Mind as a free, personal activity is his offspring; and
force, though unseen, is his material creation—the product
of his will—the ground of all material phenomena. So that,
in the higher light of rational science, as well as in the clear
vision of faith, God appears as the Author of all things, and
reason confirms the affirmation of faith, that "The worlds
were framed by the word of God; so that things which are
seen were not made of things which do appear."

Thus both by the authority of reason and of faith is the
universe wrested from the false and fearful dominion of fate,
and the capricious and still more fearful dominion of chance.
Moral government is restored to the world. Not only power,
but wisdom and goodness belong unto God. Henceforth,
forever, science, as well as religion, may rest by faith in God.
He is our dwelling-place in all generations; the universe is

1 See Tyndall's Address.
secure under his almighty and everlasting and holy government. Neither necessity nor chance shall wreck or crush it. The field of science securely opens into the alluring and widening future. Newton was, indeed, as a child gathering pebbles on the shore of the boundless ocean of knowledge. Bacon was but the trumpeter to sound the inspiring call in the triumphant march of thought; while faith surveys the expanding fields of science and the bright and interminable field of religion, and with rapture recalls the promise of God: “All are yours.”

Here we find the clue to a true theory of evolution, which runs throughout all material nature, and inductively and securely leads us back to force, and up to God as the Creator of force and the Author of nature— an evolution originated by a divine mind, controlled by divine power, guided by divine wisdom, and consummated by divine benevolence.

On the other hand, this clue saves us from wandering in the endless mazes of the false theory of evolution presented by “modern thought,” based upon the false theory of force as ultimate. Besides this fundamental defect, this theory of evolution declares force to be absolute, yet becoming conditioned; to be homogeneous, yet becoming heterogeneous— the one evolving into the many, not only, and the multifarious, but into the contradictory and superior, in endless succession. How, we ask, can evolution start with the homogeneous,— force, and force only,— without spontaneity or will? How, then, can the homogeneous become unstable and heterogeneous, and force become forces? It is impossible, according to the system; and evolution cannot begin. It is only by an illicit process that Spencer’s system can change the homogeneous into the heterogeneous— by surreptitiously introducing motion. If force is first, and at first is all, how is it that it evolves so as to produce consciousness and self-consciousness; so as to produce knowledge,— knowledge of itself, and knowledge of all things, amounting even to omniscience?

By Spencer’s “positive” legerdemain not only does his
unknown and unknowable make itself familiar to mortals in these new and curious forms, as blind force playing fantastic tricks that rival the capricious antics of the Grecian Pan; but more than this, the unknown and the unknowable, grown familiar in the skilful hands of Mr. Spencer, outrivals Pan, who indeed became all things, but by hypothesis was himself all things. Mr. Spencer's blind force evolves into more than it was, and what it was not. This ultimate force, in itself unconscious, makes itself conscious by whirling; in itself unintelligent, makes itself intelligent by whirling and whirling; without wisdom or purpose in itself, it makes itself the centre of all wisdom and the perfection of all purpose by fortuitous whirling and whirling; in itself merely physical, at a single bound it leaps into the metaphysical. Material, blind, and unseeing, at a bound it evolves into the mental; at another bound, it evolves into the rational; by continued evolution the blind, unconscious, physical force evolves into mind,—rational, moral, spiritual,—until, in a maze of wonder, the multitude cry out: "It is a God"; and the high-priests of positivism, with reverential recognition, standing aloof from the wondering crowd, bow down, "for the most part in worship of the silent sort." Such is the wonder-working of "modern thought." In phenomenal theorizing, verily, nothing serves so well as a skilful prestidigitator.

If force be declared ultimate,—force persistent, unconscious, unintelligent,—then matter must be primary and superior, and evolution must be unoriginated and uncontrolled by a divine mind, subject to blind fate or capricious chance. Either horn of the dilemma would prove fatal. With chance supreme, science were impossible; with fate supreme, moral freedom and moral government were impossible.

If mind is declared ultimate,—mind infinite, eternal,—then mind is primary and superior; then evolution is originated and controlled by divine wisdom and power, and nature's laws are at the same time efficient and uniform; efficient, because sustained by divine authority; and, although variable according to the divine behest, yet uniform because of the divine faithfulness, which "is unto all generations."